Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T.

Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011

The two movements in ancient Chinese thought, although often presented as contentious rivals, can also be arguably construed as complementing each other. This is to say that differences do exist between Taoist and Confucian thinking, butand perhaps in concession to the formerthese may be viewed as belonging to a comprehensive unity of the different binaries which both thoughts contain. In discussing thus the differences and similarities between Confucianism (taken to mean the thought that is contained in the four books of the Analects, The Great Learning, Mencius, and Doctrine of the Mean) and Taoism (as they are found in the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tze), it is not accidental that the complementarity of their moral humanism and liberal naturalism as they responded to the collapse of the social and political order of their times can be discerned.

Knowing For instance, in Taoism, both in the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tze, knowing is characterized to be more analogical than non-logical, that is, it is less the product or result of ratiocination than by an intuition occasioned by meditation/contemplation. Knowledge in the usual sense of being learned is adjudged in Taoism to be cleverness which only results in the harm of the self and of the community. For such cleverness abets attachment to honor, riches, that in turn leads to discord: Exalt learning, and there will be strife/envy as the Tao Te Ching puts it. Authentic knowledge, in contrast, is trans-rational and detached from notions of profit, gain, utility, and even happiness or self-fulfillment. And while it is directed to knowing Tao, the Tao as object of knowing is elusive and illusive; hence, Taoist knowing is not assimilative or comprehensive. Rather, it is meta-cognitive and non-calculative.

Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T. Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011

Meanwhile in Confucianism (and in particular in the Lun yu and the Great Learning), knowing is depicted as being steeped in the tradition and culture of the erstwhile Chou epoch. Thus in Confucianism, knowing requires an objective apprehension of a given subject matter (the culture, mores, and rites of the Chou) and a concomitant integration of these in the person. For the chun tzu or Superior Man of Confucianism must be a ru, a scholar of the idealized age of the Chou. In addition, Confucian knowing is directed towards virtuousness or the development of ren (humaneness/benevolence) and its subsidiary virtues of yi (loosely, justice), li (moral and ritual propriety), and chi (wisdom). In other words, the epistemological project is necessary subordinated to an ethical aim. While it may be argued that in Taoist knowing it is also virtue in the individual that is being aimed at in the knowing of the Tao, this can only be cogent when one qualifies that being virtuous or becoming a sage is a necessary but unwilled consequence of knowing and being immersed in the Tao. Hence contrastingly, while Taoist knowing does contain an ethical dimension similar to Confucianism, this is only secondary or subsidiary.

Human Nature The Confucian view of human nature is one which is endowed with virtues that are in need of cultivation. In a word, Confucianisms account of human nature is centered on its characterization of all persons as having certain capacities or virtues that must be nourished to their fullness. The novelty of this premise or insight lies in its contradistinction from the previous notion (not emanating from Taoism) that to be chun tzu, i.e., to be a cultivated person, is only for noblemen or an elite segment of society.

Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T. Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011

Confucianism responded to this view of a differentiated human nature with a universalism which posited a commonly shared humanity that is tasked to ethically develop itself through an education/formation based on an idealized past. There is a universal human nature that is essentially good, but is in need of protection from external corrupting influences; and simultaneously, requiring a disciplined cultivation. Significantly, the four virtues of Confucianism which are ren, yi, li, and chi are social virtues hereby signaling that Confucian human nature is other-oriented. The supreme virtue of ren bespeaks of relating to others with compassion (as it was in Mencius) and benevolence: the other is not an enemy, a rival or a competitor, but is a friend, a family member, or ones fellow. The virtue of yi presumes a fundamental situation of equality and non-aggression between myself and the other. Lis context is a shared social world in which external gestures found in rites and ritual behavior are derived from shared meanings and values. Finally, chi presupposes that notions of what are right and wrong are commonly held and understood. One may also add the fact that Confucius sees the human person as an intersection of personal and social relations (ruler-vassal, father-son, etc.) further evinces the social character of human nature. Taoist human nature, in the meantime, is less humanistic and is more imbued by Taoisms overarching naturalism. What is meant by this is that in Taoism human nature is taken to be a constitutive part of Nature and must therefore be aligned to or guided by or the Tao. Human nature, instead of being the master or having dominion over natural reality, is subordinated to it.

Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T. Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011

Due this, Taoist human nature achieves its perfection as it were, not from the active exercise of its faculties but from its non-action. This is crystallized in the paradoxical doctrine of wei wu wei or doing by non-doing. Especially in the realm of Nature, human intervention is sought to be eschewed since human freedom is construed to be employed in letting go of ones personal projects; and instead, be attuned to the Taos movements and stirrings. In the Chuang Tze, the account on how Bull Mountain came to lose its forests and verdant vegetation conveys the notion that primitive human nature is fundamentally good but is eventually made depraved by civilization. The lesson pointed out in the said parable was that a return to this pristine natural state of the human person is recommended. Similarly, the parable about the willow tree and the cups condemns the violence undertaken against nature (in this case, the willow tree) in order to produce cups, which in turn communicates that the formation of human nature by education and human custom is not only superfluous but is actually deleterious. In retrospect, while both Taoism and Confucianism attribute fundamental goodness in human nature, they differ from each other in stating that it must be cultivated (as in the case of Confucianism) or it must be left alone in its natural state (as averred by Taoism).

Ethics At the outset, it must be noted that as ethical systems, both Taoism and Confucianism are similarly classified as examples of virtue ethics in which the character or the virtue of the person is that which is regarded; and not so much on (although they still provide some account of this) the morality of specific actions.

Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T. Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011

Now, if by ethics what is meant is a theory of what is morally right and morally wrong, Confucian ethics adjudges what is moral to be what is in accordance with the social virtues mentioned above. In other words, the virtues of ren, yi, li, and chi may be construed to serve as the grounds and norms of Confucian morality. On the part of Taoism, Tao and Nature have these functions. More concretely, this entails in Confucian morality a subscription to the Doctrine of the Mean in which what is considered virtuous action/behavior is that which is neither excessive nor deficient in the appropriate relating to others. Conversely, what is morally wrong is action/behavior which is in excess or exhibits deficiency in achieving these appropriate relations. In Confucian terminology, the person who embodies the ethical idealas mentioned aboveis the Superior Man or the chun tzu; while the one who falls short of this ideal or is even the corrupted counterpart of this ideal is the Inferior Man. The Superior Man is the man of virtue who by being who he is serves the interest of the community; the Inferior Man, in contrast, is the man of vice who very often serves his narrow self-interests centered on pleasure, wealth, and personal aggrandizement. In this regard, Confucian ethics is not individualistic but is personalistic: it seeks to develop the person in order to be of use to the community, and not actualize an individuals potentials as an end in itself. Taoist ethics is distinguished, on the other hand, by its reliance on the Tao as that which ultimately guides morality. Opposing the previous ages adherence to the notion of a personalized tian (heaven), the Tao is impersonal and is not swayed by favors, sacrifices, or

Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T. Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011 compromises. The ethics that thus emerges is one that may be described as deontological 1: the man of Tao, Taoisms ethical ideal, is a person unaffected by and disinterested in the consequences of his actions that are in keeping with Tao. Perhaps this may be illustrated by the account in Chuang Tze in which the woodcarver explains to the Prince how it is that he carves so effortlessly: he says that after relieving himself of the anxious thoughts of success or failure, he sets himself to the task of discerning the sculpture contained in the block of wood. Guided by this, he proceeds to carve according to how the block of wood manifests the sculpture, and not according to his personal design nor to his personal interest of achieving renown or avoiding disgrace. Ultimately, the work of art that results is not his active doing but that of the Tao working in him. In the Tao Te Ching, the man of Tao is characterized as humble and unassuming, not given to the folly of riches or fame. His preoccupation is attaining as it were the intuition or experience of the supreme reality that is both transcendent and immanent. And this is largely possible by retreating to solitude and from customary social relations. While this hermetic character is apparent in the Tao Te Ching, however, in the Chuang Tzeas it will be discussed later belowthis is not altogether the case. In anticipation of the section on Government, it may be said that while Lao Tzu apparently admits grudgingly of political engagement, Chuang Tze is less hesitant in offering Taoist counsel on statecraft and rulership.

Despite a previous qualification of the Taoist ethical system as being a type of virtue ethics, the description above regarding its being deontological is not contradictory inasmuch as what is being accounted for is the moral subjects disposition.

Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T. Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011

Government It is with regard government or rulership that Confucian thought seems to be more developed than Taoism. This is understandable given the difference that obtains in the tow philosophical projects: while Taoism is generally Utopian in its approach, rejecting the existing social and political conditions of its time and seeking refuge in an ultimate reality that transcends them, Confucianism is largely reconstructive or reformist in dealing with civilizations decline that confronts it. Hence, Confucianism readily engages in critiquing a deteriorating political order, but at the same time seeks to reform it and not abandon it. Confucian government is ethical: political rationality must have an ethical dimension. While elsewhere I rehearsed the thesis that politics and ethics have distinctive spheres of their own, 2 it is nonetheless undeniable that these spheres are not independent of each other. In other words, in Confucianism ethical virtues function crucially within the political: virtuous example by the ruler is the best form of governance. In the Lun yu, for instance, Confucius remarked that while a ruler can discipline his people to follow laws through a system of punishments, their obedience is but external and precariously enforced. Whereas, if the people are educated in virtue, as led by the ruler, not will they obey the letter of the law, but its spirit as well. Similarly in the Mencius, we find the eponymous character urging princes and dukes to set examples to their people. Mencius opines that if a ruler delights in bodily pleasure, he ought to let his people delight in it as well. Unspoken in this particular account is Mencius argument that if the ruler objects to his people delighting in what he delights in, then perhaps he ought to engage in the very behavior he seeks in his subordinates.
2

My second paper submitted for this course.

Name or Code No.:Federico Jose T. Lagdameo ID # 987031 Subject: Ancient Chinese Philosophy Part: I Date: 5 February 2011

What is also quite revealing in the Lun yu is the valorization of values or principles above arms and food in government policy. When asked which ought to be last to be given up in a very dire situation, Confucius states that it is the faith of the people or the principles with which they live by: weapons are that which is most expendable, followed by food. Accordingly, a people without principles will not survive even if they have material sustenance. In sum, Confucian government is one in which the ruler practices and embodies the social virtues of ren, yi, li, and chi, and through his example he is able to govern his people. This ethical rulership by example is arguably the core of Confucianism: the formation of the inner sage who consequently is externally a king. Taoism, as was remarked earlier, does not lend itself as much to statecraft and government owing to its onto-cosmological trajectory. Its contemplation of the supreme reality tends to blur the importance of the political. Notwithstanding this, the Tao Te Ching does contain passages which may be interpreted as providing a Taoist account of government. In fact, the martial rendition or construal of Te as power indicates the presence of such content. Still, it is in the Chuang Tze that Taoist thought becomes more engaged in the matter of ruling and governance. Like Confucianism, the Chuang Tze posits the virtue of the ruler (in this case, his adherence to the Tao) as decisive in governance. Describing the ruler as disinterested in power for its own sake and concerned largely for the welfare of his subjects, the Chuang Tze appears to be walking the same path as Confucians. Yet, Taoist political thought distinguishes itself from the Confucian in its submission of all hope for politics not in human virtue, but in the cosmic union with what is beyond words and silence.