Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
PREDESTINATION.
BY J. B. M Z L E Y, B. D.
FELLOW OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE, OXFORD.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1855.
LONDON :
A. and O. A. SPOTTISWOOOR,
New-Jtreet-Square.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Page
Statement of the Argument for Predestination - 1
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER IV.
CHAPTER V.
- - - 134
Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination
CHAPTER VI.
-
Augustinian Doctrine of (draco ) - - 157
CHAPTER VII.
CHAPTER VIII.
Page
- 209
Augustinian Doctrine of Freewill
CHAPTER IX.
- - 250
Scholastic Theory of Necessity
CHAPTER X.
CHAPTER XI.
Conclusion - - - - 314
NOTES - - 343
THE
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE
OF
PREDESTINATION,
CHAPTER I.
1
If man be a self-determining agent, men in the world ? Toplady, vol. vi.
will it not necessarily follow, that there p. 31. If I am an independent animal,
are as many First Causes (. e. in other I am also necessarily self-existent. p.
words, as many Gods) as there are 45.
CHAP. I.] FOR PREDESTINATION.
The
necessitarian thus believes freewill not only to be
1
Augustine endows Adam With free- Instit. 1. 1. c. 15. Though the latter
will : Potuit non peccare primus afterwards calls the notion of Adam's
homo, potuit non mori, potuit bonum freewill "frigidum commentum," and
non deserere. Nunquid dicturi sumus asks why he should not have been the
non potuit peccare qui tale habebat li- subject of a decree, as his posterity
berum arbitrium." De. Corr. et Grat. were "
:
Atqui predestinatio velint,
c. 12. "Homo male utens libero ar- nolint, in posteris se profert. Neque
bitrio et se perdidit et ipsum." Ench. enim factum est naturaliter ut a salute
c. 30. Lombard (L. 2. Distinct 24. 1.), exciderent omnes unius parentis culpa.
Gotteschalus (Usher, p. 29.), and Quid eos prohibet fateri de uno homine
" In his
Calvin, follow Augustine : quod inviti de toto humano genere
praeclaris dotibus excelluit prima ho- concedunt.r Instit. 1. 3. c. 23.
2
minis conditio. ... In hac integri- Edwards, On the Freedom of the
tate libero arbitrio pollebat homo." Will.
B 2
THE ARGUMENT [CHAP. I.
"
plained that though they had a voluntary cause," or a cause
in the human will, this was only secondary and intermediate
1
NOTE L predestinarian doctrine of efficacious
At qui omnium connexionem rerum- grace, which rests upon original sin.
omne quod fit, " Predeterminatio
que causarum qua fit
physica necessaria
nomine appellant
fati ; non multum cum statuituromnibus agentibus ex vi causae
iis controversia certandum
de verbi secundse quae essentialiter tarn in operari
atque laborandum est, quandoquidem quam in esse suo subordinatur primae, a
ipsam causarum ordinem et quandam qua ad agendum praemoveri debet ;
connexionem, summi Dei tribuunt vo- Christi adjutorium nequaquam sed laesae
luntati. De Civit. Dei, 1. 5. c. 8. voluntati propter solum vulnus necessa-
2
Jansen draws the distinction be- rium est. De Grat. Christi Salvatoris,
tween the theory of the " predeternii- 1. 8. c. 1, 2.
" 3
natio physica of the will ' ex philoso- Ratio reprobationis est originale
" defenditur
phia profecta," an d which peccatum. Aquinas, vol. viii. p. 330.
a sectatoribus sancti Thomae," and the
CHAP. I.] FOtt PREDESTINATION. 5
1
We have no power to do good works towards our own recovery. Hence it
pleasant and acceptable to God, without was God's own arm which brought salva-
the grace of God by Christ preventing tion Conversion is a new birth,
us. Art. x. Works done before the and resurrection a new creation. What
grace of Christ are not pleasant to God, infant ever begat itself? What in-
. . . rather we doubt not but they animate carcase ever quickened and
have the nature of sin. Art. xiii. raised itself? What creature ever
2
So totally are we fallen by nature, created itself? Toplady, vol. iiL p.
that we cannot contribute anything j
363.
B 3
6 THE ARGUMENT [CHAP. I.
the old one in the nature, character, and effect of the aid
which it supplies to man for attaining salvation. A dis-
grace of it
depends on the human will for its use and im-
grace, given when that will has been tried and failed, and
must have its want of internal strength supplied by con-
trol from without. The Divine saving act is the bestowal of
this irresistible grace. The subject of the Divine predesti-
nation rescued by an act of absolute power from the
is
freewill, or the
power to obey the Divine law, and in return
claimed the due use of this power from him, the proper exer-
1
Vita scterna . . . gratia nuncu- . . . Justitia) quidem stipendium est,
patur non ob aliud nisi quod gratis sed tibi gratia est, cui gratia est et ipsa
datur, nee ideo quia non meritis datur justitia. Aug. Ep. 194. n. 19. 21.
10 THE ARGUMENT [CHAP. I.
not that the law was really a continuation of it, but it was so
1
Bull On the State of Man before ralem'qua ad principaliter diligendum se
the Fall," gives this as the doctrine of alligatur. Bradwardine, p. 371.
all the early Fathers, Homini in creatione, sicut de angelis
Nam et tune (cum natura erat Integra diximus, datum est per gratiam auxi-
et sana) esset adjutorium Dei et tan- lium .... Non talis natura facta est
quam lumen sanis oculis quo adjuti ut sine Divino auxilio posset manere si
videant, se prceberet volentibus. Aug. vellet." Lombard, L. 2. Dis. 24.
De Natura et Gratia, c. 48. Jackson objects to a supernatural
Quod fuerit conditus in gratia vide- original righteousness, on the ground
tur requirere ipsa rectitude primi status that nature would not be corrupt by
" If the
in qua Deus homines fecit Aquinas the loss of it. righteousness of
Summ. Theol. Prima Q. 95. Art. 1. See the first man did consist in a grace
NOTE III. supernatural, or in any quality addi-
Hoc autem (the need of grace), tional to his constitution, as he was the
nedum est verum propter depressionem work of God, this grace or quality
liberi arbitrii per peccatum, verum etiam might have been, or rather was, lost,
propter gravedinem liberi arbitrii natu- without any real wound unto our na-
ture." Works, vol. ix. p. 6.
CHAP. I.] FOR PREDESTINATION. 11
spirit within you ; and I will take away the stony heart out of
their flesh, and will give them a heart of flesh."
n The
ground of Scripture for the doctrine of predestination thus
becomes a large and general one, consisting of a certain
pervading language, instead of being confined to a few texts
in which the word itself is mentioned, and which are po-
1 7 10
Eph. ii. 10. 4
1 Cor. iv. 7. Eph. ii. 8, 9. 2 Cor. v. 1 7.
2
Phil. ii. 13. 5
John vi. 44. 8
1 Cor. xv. 10. "Ezek. xi. 19-
3 6 9
Rom. xii. 3. 2 Tim. i. 9. 1 Cor. i. 30.
12 THE ARGUMENT [CHAP. I.
whole human race lies before us, prior to the action of this
decree upon them, one mass of perdition. This decree only
allows a portion to remain such. Viewed through that me-
dium, all are under one sentence of condemnation : this decree
1
Hie si dixerimus quanto melius tione adhuc possumus dicere, quo-
ambo liberarentur ; nihil nobis conve- niam bona sunt cuncta ista quae fecit,
nientius dicetur quam, O homo, tu quis quanto melius ilia duplicasset, et mul-
es qui respondeas Deo ? Novit quippe tiplicasset, ut multo essent plura quam
ille quid agat, et quantus numerus esse sunt ; si enim ea non caperet mundus
debeat primitus omnium hominum, nunquid uon posset etiam ipsum facere
deinde sanctorum, sicut siderum, sicut quantum vellet ampliorem ? Et tamen
angelorura, atque, ut de terrenis lo- quantumcunque faceret vel ilia plura,
quamur, sicut pecorum, piscium, vola- vel istum capaciorem et majorem, nihil-
tilium, sicut arborum et herbarum, ominus eadem de multiplicandis illis
choice, and feel that we are not forced to act in one way
or another. But it is replied that this objection proceeds
from a misapprehension as to the nature of this irresist-
ible influence.The terms irresistible, necessary, and other
.
with no more than the mere statement of it, are apt to feel
surprise and perplexity how it could have been maintained by
the pious and thoughtful minds that have maintained it. But it
must be admitted that its paradoxical character is diminished,
when we come to examine its grounds and construction. It
CHAP. II.
grounds to
support conclusions which are repugnant to
natural reason, there are two things for us to do. First, we
have to examine if the reasoning upon these truths is correct,
and they really contain the conclusions which have been
if
grounds, or what is
ordinarily called necessitarianism or
fatalism; and
us examine the nature of these grounds.
let
1
It may be pretended that the re- command over ideas and limbs. . . .
sistance which we meet with in bodies, Secondly, this sentiment of an endea-
obliging us frequently to exert all our vour to overcome resistance has no
force, and call up all our power, thus known connection with any event ;
gives us the idea of force and power. what follows it, we know by experience,
It is this nisus or strong endeavour of but would not know it a priori. It
which we are conscious, that is the must, however, be confessed that the
original impression from which this animal nisus which we experience,
idea is copied. But, tirst, we attribute though it can afford no accurate or
power to a vast number of objects, precise idea of power, enters very much
where we can never suppose this resist- into that vulgar inaccurate idea which
ance or force to take place ; to the is formed of it. Hume, " Enquiry con-
Supreme Being, who never meets cerning the Human Understanding,"
with any resistance ; to the mind in its sect 7.
CHAP. II.] ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION. 21
further, which
not negative, but positive; but it is no
is
1
It is an oblique proof of the mys- qu'il est. II est faux qu'il soit pair, il
teriousness of infinite number, that it est faux qu'il soit impair ; car en ajou-
can be neither odd nor even. " Nous tant 1'unite, il ne
change point de
connaissons qu'il y a un infini, et ig- nature : cependant un nombre,
c'est
norons sa nature, comme nous savons et tout nombre est pair ou impair il ;
ju'il est faux que les nombres soient est vrai que celas'entendde tous nombres
nuis ; done il est vrai qu'il y a un infini nnis. Pascal (ed. Faugere), vol. ii.
mainly two first, the maxim that every event must have a
cause, and, secondly, the idea of the Divine Power ; the first
1 " Nous sommes surun milieu ilse derobe, et fuit d'une fuite eterneUe:
vaste,
toujours incertains, et flottants entre rien ne peut 1'arreter." Locke
Pascal.
1'ignorance et la connaissance ; et, si and Hume both substantially admit the
nous pensons plus avant, notre
aller class of indistinct ideas. NOT* IV.
object branle, et eehappe a nos prises ;
c 4
24 EXAMINATION OF THE [CHAP. II.
inevitably follows.
But though the maxim that every event must have a
cause is is it ? Is it a
what kind of a truth
undoubtedly true,
truth absolute and complete, like a fact of sensation or re-
flection ; or is it a truth indistinct, incipient, and in tendency
only, like one of those ideas which have just been discussed ?
It is a truth of the latter kind, for this simple reason, that
there is a
contrary truth to it. When we look into our
minds, and examine the nature and characteristics of action,
we find that we have a certain natural and irresistible im-
a reductio adabsurdum of
persons have endeavoured to extract
the truth itself. For it has been said, "If will determines
CHAP. II.] APwGUMENT FOB PREDESTINATION. 25
guage ; and in the next place that it does not do justice even
to the language for however inconceivable self-motion strictly
;
tural test; for, put this distinction before any plain man,
1
The former is Edwarda's, the latter Mr. Mill's position. NOTE V.
28 EXAMINATION OF THE [CHAP. II.
1
If the will of man be free with a dence from its throne. Toplady, vol.
liberty utrumlibet, and if his actions
ad vi. p. 90.
be the offspring of his will, such of his If be said that volitions are events
it
actions which are not yet wrought, must that come to pass without any deter-
be both radically and eventually uncer- mining cause, that most palpably
is
they are performed or no. ... So that precepts; for nothing is more plain
any assertor of self-determination is in than that laws can be of no use to
fact,whether he mean it or no, a wor- direct and regulate perfect accident.
shipper of the heathen lady named Edwards "On Freedom of the Will,"
Fortune, and an ideal deposer of Provi- part 3. sect. 4.
CHAP. II.] ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION. 31
1
That no future event can be certainly see evidence where there is none . . .
foreknown whose existence is con- But if there be "a future event whose
tingent, and without all necessity, may existence is contingent without all ne-
he proved thus :it is impossible for a cessity, the future existence of the
thing to be certainly known to any in- event Is absolutely without evidence.
"
tellect without evidence . . But no
.
Edwards, On Freedom of Will," part 2.
understanding, created or uncreated, can sect 12.
32 EXAMINATION OF THE [CHAP. II.
ing to the argument stated in the last chapter, that the pre-
CHAP. II.] ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION. 33
good life, has in the doctrine of the fall not a complete, but
an imperfect premiss, and must follow the conditions of that
premiss. The doctrine of the fall is held under a reserve
on the side of the contrary truth the doctrine of irresisti-
;
D
34 EXAMINATION OF THE [CHAP. II.
not fallen, he does not want it. One inference, then, from one
their own. All men are said to have sinned in Adam, and
Adam, or the old man, is spoken of as the root or principle of
evil in every human being. Sometimes it is so expressed as
1
Quanto magis prohiberi [a bap- I natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum
tismo] non debet [infans] qui recens |
Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis
CHAP. II.] ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION. 35
antiquse prima nativitate contraxit, qui Oxon.) The more common and re-
ad reraissam peccatorum accipiendam cognised mode however of expressing the
hoc ipso facilius accedit, quod illi re- doctrine is that which represents man-
mittuntur -non propria sed aliena pec- kind as having sinned in Adam, and
cata (Cyprian, Ep. ad Fidum, 64. ed. having been parties in the act. NOTE VI.
D 2
36 EXAMINATION OF THE [CHAP. II.
hell, and other like questions; but with the aid of this
distinction it is
easy to see that such objections suppose an
entirely different mode
of holding such statements, from that
which every reasonable believer adopts. are not to We
measure these mysterious consequences of the sin of Adam
by human analogies, as if the act of God in visiting the sin of
Adam upon all mankind, were like the act of a human
monarch who punished a whole family or nation for the
crime of one man. They are of the order of mysterious
truths, and represent modes of Divine dealing which are
beyond the sphere of our reason. 1
except for his own personal sin. And the one is declared
in revelation itself as plainly as the other; for it is said,
" The soul that it shall die the son shall not bear
sinneth, :
the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the
1
Le peche" originel est folie devant eloigne quand on le lui presente. Pas-
les homines ; mais on le donne pour cal (ed. Faugeres), v. ii. p. 106.
tel. Vous ne me devez done pas re- Nous ne concevons ni 1'etat glorieux
proclier le defaut de raison en cette d'Adam, ni nature de son peche, ni
la
doctrine, puisque je le donne pour etre la transmission qui s'en est faite en
sans raison. Mais cette folie est plus nous. Ce sont choses qui se sont passees
sage que toute la sagesse des hommes ; dans 1'etat d'une nature toute differente
sapientius est hominibus Car, sans cela,
. de la n6tre, et qui passent notre capa-
que dira-t-on qu'est I'homme ? Tout cite presente. p. 369. '
1
this is true at universally true , applying as
all, it is
trine, his opponent can, from the other, conclude the con-
trary. If the mystery of our responsibility for the sin of
Adam justifies his scheme, the truth of our exclusive respon-
1
Jeremy Taylor's argument is sound father's sins to us, unto eternal dam-
so far as he
that the case of
insists nation ; and is it otherwise in this
"
original sin should not be treated as an only ? Vol. ix. p. 383.
exception to God's ordinary justice. It is evidently wrong to treat the
" When yourlordship had said that case of original sin as an exception, in
*
my arguments for the vindication of one particular instance, to God's ordinary
God's goodness and justice are sound justice; for there can be no justifiable
and holy,' your hand run over it again, exception to the rule of justice. All
and added ' as abstracted from the case God's acts must be just. It must be
of original sin.' But why should this treated as a mystery, something un-
be abstracted from all the whole eco- and against which, on that
known,
nomy of God, from all His other dis- account, we can bring no charge of
pensations ? Is it in all cases of the injustice. For before we can call an act
world unjust for God to impart our unjust, we must know what the act is.
D 3
38 EXAMINATION OF THE [CHAP. II.
nor would any plain man receive any other impression from
this language, than that the moral being had freewill, and
NOTK VIII.
CHAP. II.] ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION. 39
The
truth of absolute predestination cannot be stated
without contradiction to the Divine justice and man's free
agency. It belongs, then, to that class of truths which does
not admit of statement. It is an imperfect truth that is, a
4
40 EXAMINATION OF THE [CHAP. II.
feeling or
impression upon the mind of the individual.
All conscious power, strength, energy, when combined with
a particular aim, tend to create the sense of a destiny
an effect with which we are familiar in the case of many
remarkable persons. A man who feels in himself the
great man of the world in his, feels himself marked out for a par-
ticular work and the final reward which is to follow it. Accor-
ding to his calculation of his resources is his conviction that he
shall attain his object ; and from the calculation that he will,
the sense that he is destinedsucceed almost immediately
to,
arises. Not that this result need take place in all Christian
pursue the same actual course with less of reflection upon them-
selves as agents. So far, however, as a man thinks definitely
of himself and of his own spiritual strength, and so far as
which the Gospel teaches us, that the ends which earthly
greatness proposes to itself, are but shadows of those to which
Christians are called ; that the conquest of sin is the true
glory of man, and the heavenly his true crown. The Chris-
tian, therefore, is addressed as one predestined to eternal
glory. He
encouraged to regard himself as a favourite of
is
Heaven, singled out from the world, and stamped from the
very commencement of his course with the token of future
triumph. The resolution to obtain the spiritual crown is
This" the
isgodly consideration of predestination," re-
commended in the seventeenth article of our church. The
sense of predestination which the New Testament en-
courages is connected with strength of moral principle in the
individual ; the Christian being supposed always to be
devoted to his calling, so much so that he is even by antici-
as such, but to the person as good and holy, that eternal life
is ordained. Does a man do hisduty to God and his neigh-
bour ? Is he honest, just, charitable, pure ? If he is, and
if he is conscious of the power to continue so, so far as he
can depend on this consciousness, so far he may reasonably
believe himself to be predestined to future happiness. But
to suppose that a man may think himself predestined, not as
a Christian. 1
1
As to what follows in your letter, Divine testimony, but on my own con-
concerning a person's believing himself sciousness. The testimony that is the
to be in a good state, and its being pro- proper ground of faith is in the word
perly of the nature of faith ; in this of God, Rom. x. 17., "Faith cometh of
there seems to be some real difference hearing, and hearing of the word of God."
between us. But perhaps there would There is such a testimony given in the
be none, if distinctness were well ob- word of God, as that " he that believeth
served in the use of words. If by a man's shall be saved." But there is no such
believing that, he is in a good estate, testimony in the word of God, as that
be meant no more that his believing such an individual person, in such a
that he does believe in Christ, love God, town in Scotland or in New England,
&c. ; I think there is nothing of the believes. There is such a proposition
nature of faith in it ; because knowing in Scripture, as that Christ loves those
or believing it depends on our imme- that love Him, and therefore this
diate sensation or consciousness, and not every one is bound to believe or affirm.
on Divine testimony. True believers Believing thus on Divine testimony is
in the hope they entertain of salvation, properly of the nature of faith, and for
make use of the following syllogism, any one to doubt of it, is properly of
whosoever believes shall be saved. I be- the heinous sin of unbelief. But there
lieve, therefore, 8fc. Assenting to the is no such proposition in the Scripture,
The
sense or feeling, then, of predestination is, as has been
2 8
2 Tim.
Phil. ii. 12. 2 Peter, i, 10. j
iv. 8. 1 Cor. ix. 27.
CHAP. It.] ARGUMENT FOR PREDESTINATION. 49
CHAP. III.
other denied, the fall of man. But the doctrine of the fall
NOTE IX.
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 51
thing without the aid of the other, nihil bonum sine gratia.
This formula satisfied the simplicity of the primitive church
as it has satisfied the uncontroversial faith of all ages ; and no
desire was felt for further expression and a more exact
truth. But it is evident that this state of theology on this
assigned the part of chief agent to the one that uses and
turns to account the action of the other. If one man
furnishes another with means and resources for any
the
the work of a holy life. While the giver and the user of
that assistance are both agents in that work, the user is the
principal one.
1
In cases where the use of means, if supplied,
takes place easily and as a matter of course, the result may
be properly referred to the supplier rather than the user of
them. But the act of the will in using grace is no easy
or matter-of-course one, but involves much effort and self-
denial.
The combinationof grace with freewill thus issued in the
assertion of an independent freewill on the one hand, while
this logical result was avoided on the other, only by a
recourse to the opposite extreme. It was seen that an
assisting grace could only
be protected by making it sorne-
1 '
Nam quando ad eundem actum non potest fieri, sed illi quae nutu suo
liberum concurrunt plura sine quibus totam machinam ad motum impellit,
libertas agendi in actum suum exire- aut otiosam esse sinit." Jansen, De
non potest, non illi causae tribui debet Grat. Christi, p. 935.
exercitiumactusautvoluntatis, sine qua
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 53
thing more than assisting, and that the will must have the
credit of the unassisted acceptance and use of it, unless it were
controlled by it. The original formula, therefore, issued on
this side in the doctrine of a controlling and irresistible
nature grace ; freewill itself, and all the faculties and affec-
is
ance at all
it, he did in the shape of the created affec-
to as
1
To
the objection of the Catholic, quicquid illud est per quod esse homo
" Potest quidem esse, sed per gratiam sine peccato potest, confitetur, quisquis
Dei," Pelagius replies, "Ego ne ab- rem ipsam confitetur." De Natura et
nuo qui rem confitendo, confitear ne- Gratia, n. 11.
8 "
cesse est et per res effici potest ;
quod Sanctificando, coercendo, provo-
"
an tu qui rem negando, et quicquid illud cando, illuminando. Op. Imp. 1. 3.
est, per quodres efficitur procul dubio c. 106. "Dum nos multiformi et
negas . . . Sive per gratiam, sive per ineffabili dono gratia; ccelestis illu-
tiae suse adjuvat semper auxilio." Pe- proficisci decernerent, eorum causam
lagius de Lib. Arb. apud Aug. de Deum adjuvantem esse sentiebant."
Grat. Christi, n. 5. Jansen, De Grat. Christi. p. 127. NOTE
Thus Julian : " Adsunt tamen ad- X.
2 " Ostendit resistere debea-
jutoria gratis Dei quae in parte virtutis quomodo
nunquam destituunt voluntatera cu- : mus Diabolo,siutiquesubditisimus Deo,
jus licet innumerae species, tali tamen ejusque faciendo voluntatem divinam
semper moderatione adhibentur, ut mereamur gratiam." Pelagiusap. Aug.
nunquam liberum arbitrium locopellant, De Gratia Christi, c. 22. Augustine
sed prjEbeant adminicula, quamdiu eis argues incorrectly from this passage that
voluerit inniti ; cum tamen non oppri- Pelagius holds that merit must precede
mant reluctantem animum." Op. Imp. grace ; whereas he only says it may,
1. iii. c. 114. that, grace may be obtained by merit, or
1
Bradwardine and Jansen thus under- good works. On the other hand Pela-
" dam-
stand the Pelagian doctrine of grace: gius at the Synod of Diospolis
" Non enim existimandum est solam navit eos qui decent gratiam Dei
legem atque doctrinam esse possibili- secundum merita noslra dari." De
tis adjutorium. . . Pelagiani motus
. Grat. Christi, c. 3., and Ben. Ed. pre-
indeliberatos bonos sub gratia complexi face, c. 10. Nor is there anything in
sunt Nam sive motus illos a Deo con-
: the Pelagian statements to show that
ditos inseri, sive mente per istam gra- assisting grace was considered to wait
am pulsata, ulterius naturaliter a corde till human merit earned it.
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 57
1
The general language of the Pelagians divinae gratiae sibi pariat opem." Ep.
allows an "
initiative grace (provocans, Prosperi. inter Aug. Ep. 225. Quod
excitans), and maintains a crowning enim dicitur. Crede et salvus eris ;
will:| "Quod possumus bonum facere unum horum exigi asserunt, aliud
ill i us est qui hoc posse donavit; quod offerri ; ut propter id quod exigitur si
The
doctrine of the perfectibility of man in this life was
1
NOTE XI. ergo nee debet ; et si nee debet homo
2 " Ante omnia esse sine peccato, debet ergo cum pec-
interrogandus est
qui negat hominem sine peccato esse cato esse; et jam peccatum non erit, si
posse, quid sit quodcunque peccatum, illud debere constiterit. Aut si hoc
quod an quod vitari non
vitari potest, etiam dici absurdum est, confiteri
potest. Si quod vitari non potest, pec- necesse est debere hominem sine peccato
catum non est; si quod vitari potest, esse, et constat eum non aliud debere
potest homo sine peccato esse quod quam potest. . . . Iterum quaerendum
vitari potest. Iterum quaerendum
. . . est quomodo non potest homo sine
est peccatum voluntatis an necessitatis peccato esse, voluntate an natura. Si
est. Si necessitatis est, peccatum non natura, peccatum non est si voluntate, ;
est ; si voluntatis est, vitari potest. . . . perfacile potest voluntas voluntate mu-
Iterum quaerendum est, utruinne debeat tari." Pelagius ap. Aug.De Perfectione
homo sine peccato esse. Procul dubio Justitia, c. 2, 3. 6.
debet. Si debct, potest; si non potest,
40 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
1
Benedictine Editor's preface to Augustine's Antipelagian Treatises, c. x.
CHAP. IIT.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 61
1
"In medium procedit homo ille qui non habeat." L. 5. c. 50. "Non ei
clamat,
'
Non quod volo facio bonum, possibilitatis inanitas, sed necessitatis
"
sed quod nolo* malum hoc ago.' inerat plenitudo." L. 5. c. 59.
Op. Imp. 1. 6. c! 18. "Qui per legem The Pelagians interpreted this
quam vidit in membris suis repug- text as referring to the force of custom,
" Ille enim in membris
nantem legi mentis suae et captivantem legem consue-
se sub lege peccati, clamat, ' Non quod tudinem malam vocabat, quae ab eruditis
volo,' &c. Si habet liberum arbitrium, etiam seculi dici solet secunda natura."
" An
quare non facit bonum quod vult ? Op. Imp.l. 1. c.69. interpretation
L. 3. c. 1 1 2. Augustine, assuming this which Augustine turned against them,
captivity as an evident fact, proves ori- as committing them to the admission
sin from it " Nam si that sin might be necessary, and yet
ginal peccatum
:
and the truth is not in us." But what is this but a sense
of necessity on the side of evil ; for if it is simply absurd
4. c. 91.
" The body of this death was meorum quse commisi, cum vitari
1
"Liberum arbitrium et post pec- rendum puto quid sit peccatum, sub-
cata" tarn plenum est quam fuit ante stantia aliqua, an omnino substantia
peccata." Julian ap. Op. Imp. 1. I.e. carens nomen, quo non res, non exis-
"
91. Nos dicimus peccato hominis non tentia, non corpus aliquid, sed perperam
naturae statum mutari sed merit! qua- facti actus exprimitur. Credo ita est.
litatem, id est et in peccato bane esse Et si ita est quomodo potuit humanam
liberi arbitrii naturam, per quam potest debilitare vel mutare naturam quod
a peccato desinere, quae fuit in eo ut substantia caret." Pelagius ap. Aug.
posset a justitia deviare." c. 96. De Nat. et Grat. n. 21. " Materiam
" Primo de eo disputandum est quod peccati esse vindictam, si ad hoc pec-
per peccatum debilitata dicitur et im- cator infirmatus est ut plura peccaret."
mutata natura. Unde ante omnia quae- n. 24.
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 65
The reason was that, as I have just stated, the sense of bare
ability continues in spite of any length of habit ; on which
sense the Pelagian absolutely relied. But this was not a
1
reasonable, but a fanatical doctrine of freewill ; a gross
delusion, belonging to that class and rank of absurd ideas
1
It was perhaps an ironical charge et tenentis inventa, perseverans quo-
against the Pelagians that they held dammodo lucta convincitur. Quomodo
" etiam
parvulos propria per liberum ergo in infantibus haec agentibus, nul-
arbitrium habere peccata Ecce lum est vel ad bonum vel ad malum
inquiunt, Esau et Jacob intra viscera propriae voluntatis arbitrium, unde
materna luctantur, et, dum nascun- proemia sive supplicia meritis praeceden-
tur, alter supplantatur ab altero, atque tibus subsequantur." Ep. 186. n. 13.
in pede praecedentis manu consequents
66 THE PELAGIAN CONTBOVERSY. [CHAP. III.
ing another. Those who will not allow the will to be the less
free for any amount of sin must accept the alternative, that
sin has very little effect,' with
natural corollary, that that
its
plicable.
But the question of transmitted or hereditary sin gave
would be good.
Thus easily and summarily refuted, however, his argu-
ment involved a mixture of truth and error. So much must
be conceded to the Pelagian, that the trial of the will is the
necessary condition of the highest kind of virtue that comes
F 2
68 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
offering to God.
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 69
by early trial and past moral acts, still the general sense of
mankind acknowledges what are called good natural dispo-
sitionsthat some persons have by nature a good bias in one
;
1 " Cur non annuimus esse nonnulla congenita, quse in atate qua
quosdam
natura misericordes, si natura quosdam usus incipit esse rationis, sicut ipsa ratio,
non negamus excordes? Sunt cnim incipiunt apparere." Op.Imp. 1.4. c. 1 29.
F 3
70 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
being for ever on his trial. A time must come, then, when
this will cease, when more deciding between
there will be no
design ; is
practised with too much apparent system and
method ; it wants ease and naturalness ; and is more or
less hard, formal, and artificial, and to a spectator unat-
tractive, which it is not its proper nature to be. Thus,
take a person of an ambitious and assuming habit of mind
gift? Were
present effects alone to be considered, it were
better to be simply shone upon by the creative grace of
appear to attach this value to it, for this reason, viz., because
a power in the will of determining itself either way is power,
do evil is the
power to injure oneself. Such power has no
more an advantage as power than it has as liability. It is
limit in morals.
There are, however, two distinct questions properly in-
volved in this subject; one, whether the trial of the will
is, as opposed to implanted dispositions, essential to the
answer, but the form in which it was put was not wholly
faultless.
as we conceived of
it at all, as the ordinary natural quality
so called, only we
cease at a certain point to form any con-
'
mini, aliter judicavit ipse." Op. Imp. telaudet os tuum (Prov. xxvii. 2.), nee
1. 3. c. 33. Julian " Si qua? sunt justa
: tamen dicendus est arrogans aut super-
a nobis fieri velit, et ipse faciat quod bus, cum se innumerabiliter laudare non
injustum est: justiores nos, quam ipse desinit." c. 22. "Hoc judicium Deus
est, cupit videri ; imo non justiores, hominum voluit esse non suum, qui
sed nos aequos, et se iniquum." Julian, dixit, Reddam peccata patrum in filios.
ap. Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 24. (Deut. v. 9.) Quod etiam per homi-
4 " Hoc quidem pracceptum dedit ho- nem fecit, quando per Jesum Nave non
minibus judicantibus, ne pater pro filio, solum Achan, sed etiam filios ejus occi-
vel fill us pro patre more ret ur. Caete- dit vel per eundem, filios Canaanorum
;
rum judicia sua Deus non alligavit hac etiam parvulos damnavit." c. 30,
" Non est "
lege." Op. Imp. 1. 3. c.12. Quis enim homo Justus si nit perpe-
Deus quando aliud
leg is sua? praevaricator trari scelus quod habet in potestate non
facitDeus ut Deus, aliud imperat homini sinere ? Et tamen sinit haec Deus."
ut homini ?" c. 23.
" Facit enim Deus c. 24.
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 79
was not only pain but sin, and not only sin but captivity
to sin and inability to do any good thing. This worst and
strongest penalty, then, attaching to the sin of Adam, was de-
fended by an appeal to a remarkable law of God's judicial
administration, discernible in his natural providence, and
specially attested by Scripture ; the rule, viz. of punishing
sin by further sin, peccatum pcena peccati, a rule which,
in the present instance, only received a
mysterious applica-
tion, as being extended to the case of a mysterious and incom-
prehensible sin.
procul dubio priusquam peccaret, non- retur humana natura universa, quan-
dum necessitate consuetudinis pre- tum valet nunc in homine uno secunda
mebatur. Ac per hoc, etiam secundum natura?" Op. Imp. 1. i. c. 105.
vos, peccandi necessitas unde abstinere
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 81
1 " In occulto autcm mail esse cavit quanto ibi major non peccandi
coeperunt, ut in apertam inobedientiam facilitas ubi vitiata natura non-
erat,
laberentur." De Civit. Dei, 1. xiv. c. dum erat."
Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 189.
" " Tanta
13. et seq. Quantum malum sola impietate peccavit quantam
inobedientia." De Gen. ad literara, nos metiri atque aestimare non pos-
8. c. 13. " Noluit homo inter de- sumus." Ibid. 1. 3. c "Illius
1. 65.
licias paradisi servare justitiam." De natura quanto magis sublimiter stabat,
Pecc. Merit, et Remiss. 1. 2. n. 55. tanto magis graviter occidit. . . . Pec-
'
Quid avarius illo cui Deus sufficere catum quanto incredibilius, tanto dam-
non potuit." In Ep. Joannis ad Ear- nabilius." Ibid. 1. 6. c. 22. See Bull
"
thos, Tr. 8. n. 6. Rapere voluerunt on the State of Man before the Fall,
divinitatem, perdiderunt felicitatem." vol. ii.
(Oxford ed.) p. 64.
In Tr. 68. n. 9. " Tanto gravius pec-
82 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
more incorrect. 1
The
objection to the punishment of mankind for the
2.
two great heads the fact of sin, and the fact of pain.
First, how were we to account for the fact of sin, as
it met us
in the world the universal depravation and cor-
and for the same reason that this cause is wanted itself,
1 "
Sic creat malos quomodo pascit et timonium non Vide
malignitatis. . . .
nutrit malos." De Nupt. et Cone. 1. 2. ergo quam nescias quid loqueris, qui de
n. 32, 33. Julian " Deus misericordise voluisti crudeli-
:
Quod pascit exemplo
etiam peccatores, benignusque est super tatem probare," Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 64.
ingratos et malos pietatis est ejus tes-
O 2
84 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVEKSY. [CHAP. Til.
upon the truth of the axiom, that every event must have
a cause, an axiom which I discussed in the last chapter,
when I defined the degree and measure of truth which
belonged to it. It will be enough to say here of this rationale
of original sin, that it is a wholly philosophical, as dis-
1
Mr. Coleridge, in his "Aids to his usual mixture of obscurity and
adopts this rationale of power. See NOTE XII.
Reflection,"
sin, and discusses it with
original
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 85
hand, it
may be said that, with so vast a number of trials, we
could not calculate any one's universal success under them.
The chances in favour of cases of perfection which the
number of individuals in the world presents, are met by the
chances against it, contained in the number of trials in the
lifeof each individual.
But if by sin we understand
not only a loss of perfection,
but positive depravity, certainly the general fact of sin in
this sense cannot be accounted for on the mere principle of
him, and occupy and fill his mind with sufficient strength
and frequency to constitute a depraved condition of mind.
A certain tendency to evil is indeed no more than what is
1
S. Augustine, in Op. Imp. 1. 1. non utrosque idem dicere quod ea
:
c. 92., 1. 2. c. 89. 104. 116. 124. 139. Manichaei tribuunt alienae naturae
144., 1. 3. c. 7. 48. 89. 95. 154. 198., malse, Catholici vero et bonae et nostrae ;
1. 5. c.1. 6. c. 7. 9., and passim,
1., sed peccato vitiatae, meritoque punitae."
refers the general fact of human
to L. 6. c. 14. " Si
parvuli sine ullius
misery as a proof of original sin: peccati merito premuntur gravi jugo,
" Teste " Si
ipsa generis humani miseria iniquus est Deus." L. 2. c. 124.
peccatum originale monstratur." L. 3. ergo nullum esset in parvulis ex origine
c. 89. " Constat mala
hujus vitse, qui- meritum malum, quicquid mali pati-
bus plenus est mundus Manichaeos cum untur esset injustum." L. 3. c. 204.
Catholicis confiteri sed unde sint hsec
:
G 4
83 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
1 " Sedilli parvuli nee flerent in para- ceretur, quod illi vitae esset utile seire,
diso, nee muti essent, nee aliquando sine ullo labore aut. dolore id asse-
uti ratione non possent, nee morbis queretur beata natura, vel Deo docente
nee a bestiis Isederentur
affligerentur, vet seipsa. Unde quis non intelligat
.... nee
surgentes in pueritiam in hac vita etiam tormenta discentium
domarentur verberibus, aut erudirentur ad miserias hujus saeculi, quod ex uno
laboribus."Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 198. in condemnationem propagatum est,
" Omnibus cogenita est quaedam tarditas pertinere." L. 6. c. 9.
2 "
mentis, qua et hi qui appellantur 'Eo-Acoi/ yap virb xa-pparcw
ingeniosi, non sine aliqua laboris Ilfjjua dvdffKet iraXiyKOTov 8a/j.a(rdtv
serumna, vel quascunque artes, vel eas po'ipa ire/jurr)
the power of the will, the nature of virtue and vice, and the
Divine justice, the Catholic doctrine of original sin adopted,
as an account of the existence of evil, a middle ground
between two extreme theories on either side, which pre-
vailed in the world. According to the Manichean theory,
evil was an original substance in nature, coeval with the
Divine. It was therefore an ineradicable, unconquerable
1
Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 170177. 186.; interpreted the texts of Scripture
1. 4. c. 2. ; 1. 5. c. 30. 56. ; 1. 6. c. 7. 9. bearing on the doctrine of original
*
For the mode in which the Pelagian sin, see NOTE XIII.
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 91
called goodness l
: at any rate, the possession of it alone affords
1
An rectus erat non habens volun- facere voluntatis bonae, in qua cum
tatem bonam sed ejus possibilitatem ? tamen permanere non cogeret sed in ejus
Op. Imp. 5. 57. See NOTE XIV. esset arbitrio sive in ea semper esse
2
"Hsec discordia carnis et spiritus vellet, sive non semper, sed ex ilia se
in paradiso, si nemo peccasset, absit ut in malam nullo cogente mutaret, sicut
csse potuerit." Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 37. et factum est." Op. Imp. 1. 5. c.61.
8 "
Quasi non potuerit Deus hominem
92 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
1 '
Ilia itaque perfectio naturae quam aliquam, eamque non raalam." Op.
non dabant anni sed sola manus Dei, Imp. 1. 5. c. 61.
1 " Pcenae illius devitandae quae fuerat homo, paratus ad obediendum Deo, et
secuturapeccatum,tranquillaeratcautio, prseceptum obedienter accipicns, quod
non turbulenta formido." Op. Imp. 1. sine ulla quamdiu vellet difficultate
6.c. 14. servaret." Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 61.
2 "
Boiife igitur voluntatis factus est
94 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
1
"Prsecessit mala voluntas, et se- vitiatam venenosa persuasione serpentis,
cuta est mala concupiscentia .... ut oriretur cupiditas quae sequeretur
Voluntas cupiditatem, non cupiditas potius voluntatem quam resisteret
voluntatem duxit." Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. voluntati." Ibid. 1. 6. c. 14.
71. "Voluntatem ejus prius fuisse
96 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
spect and the pledge. The paradisal age was to him nothing
more than the first age of the world, when science, art,
and the refinements of life had not yet arisen, and man was
simpler than he was afterwards, only because he was more
rude. He took the same view of it that a human philo-
sopher would take who pictures to himself the primitive
2
state of man simply as a state anterior to civilisation , and
1 " Naturam humanam a Deo bono rem. Veruntamen eorura qui nos no-
conditam bonatn magno inobedientiae verunt,nemo miraretur, si adderetur
peccato fuisse vitiatam, Catholica fides nomen vestrum ad titulum, et scribere-
dicit, Sed vos qui hoc negatis, quaeso, tur Paradisus Pelagianorum." Op.
paulisper Pavadisum cogitate. Placetne Imp. 1. 3. c. 1 54. Fide 1. 3. c. 95. 147. ;
nomen conscriptum nee : diceret errasse fuit." Contra. Jul. Pel.l. 4. n. 81.
pictorem, sed plane agnosceret irriso-
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 97
1
"Quod miserrimum bellum introdu- esse, si nemo
peccasset, talemque in
cere conaris in illius beatissimae pacis et priusquam peccaret ; addis
illo fuisse et
libertatis locum." Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 8. ejus condition! et istam miseriam per
" Nos autem dicimus
tarn beatum fuisse carnis spiritusque discordiam." C.
ilium hominem ante peccatum, tamque 16.
liberae voluntatis, ut Dei praeceptum 2 " Christus con-
ergo nulla illicita
magnis viribus mentis observans, resis- cupivit, quia discordiam carnis etspiritus,
tentem sibi carnem nullo certamine pa- quse in hominis naturam ex prsevarica-
teretur, nee aliquid omnino ex aliqua tione primi hominis vertit, prorsus ille
cupiditate sentiret, quod nollet." L. 6. non habuit, qui de Spiritu et Virgine
c. 14. " Addo ad bonitatem conditionis non per concupiscentiam carnis est
Ada; quod in eo caro ad versus spiritum natus." Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 57.
Malum quamvis mente non
3
nonconcupiscebatante peccatum: tu au- esse
tem quitalem dicis carnis concupiscen- consentiente, vel carne tamen talia con-
tiam qualis nunc est, in paradise futuram cupiscere. Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 59.
98 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
guarded the person of our Lord from the too near approaches
of Desire discloses, on a nearer examination, different
sin.
been less, and the force of His example was less with it. 2
But, it was replied, that a state of mind which kept off the
approach of sin was a higher one than that which resisted
it near; that the merit of our Lord's obedience was the
3
perfect one of a triumphantly sustained distance from evil ;
quo earn sentiret, sed voluntas adfuit ostenderet imitandum, si ilium externa?
qua non haberet." Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. carnis natura discrevisset. . Quanto .
48. And he observes that if, according ei rectius diceret aegritudo peccantium
to Julian's argument, the merit of virtue et securitas coactorum ; cum valemus
lay in conquest, it would follow that omnes recta consilia preebemus aegrotis ;
where the virtue was greatest, the pas- tu si sic esses, aliter longe longeque
sions must be strongest ; which would sentires.'" Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 86, 87.
8 " Dicimus eum
lead to a blasphemous conclusion in the perfectione carnis,
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 99
and that the force of example did not depend on the identity
of trial, but on the goodness of the example itself, as was
etnon per carnis concupiscentiam pro- et Virgine Maria nati sumus ? Postremo
creata carne, cupiditatem non habuisse nun quid tanta nobis esse virtus potest
vitiorum. . . Illius virtus%aec erat earn quanta qui ita homo es, ut etiam
tibi est,
non habere ; nostra virtus est ei non Deus Ideone non debuit sic nasci
sis ?
consentire." Op. Imp. 1.4. c. 48. " Sic ut hominibus eum nolentibus imitari talis
ijriturChristus abstinuit a peccato, ut excusatio daretur ? Sicut nobis ipse
abstineret etiam ab omni cupiditate pec- Patrem proposuit imitandum, qui certe
cati non ut ei existent! resisteret, sed ut
:
homo fuit Nee dicunt ei, Tu
ilia mmquam prorsus existeret." C. 58. propterea hoc potes quia Deus es. . . .
1 "
Ncque negare debemus ejus excel- Non itaque ideo debuit natus de Spiritu
k'ntiam, neque propter hanc excellentiam Sancto et Virgine Maria habere concu-
nos excusare, ut non eum pro modo piscentiam, qua cuperet mala, etsi ei
nostrostudeamusimitari." Op. Imp. 1. resistendo non faceret, ne dicerent ei
4. c. 89. homines, Habetoprius cupiditates malas,
"Quid enim, homo multum loquens et eas vince, si potes, ut te imitari nos-
et parum sapiens, si dicerent homines tras vincendo possimus." Op. Imp. 1.
Christo, Quare nobis jubetur ut imite- 4. c. 87.
mur te ? Nunquid nos de Spiritu Sancto
100 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
2
corruption.
1
De Natura et Gratia, n. 42. tarn rationis quam
evangelii attestatione
"Incarnatio Christ! justitiae fuit forma convelli . excogitavit aliud unde ejus
,
lion prima sed maxima, quia et ante- haere.sis, quee perdurat hactenus, nasce-
quam Verbum caro in Prophetis
fieret, et retur ; et dixit animam quidem huma-
et in multis aliis sanctis fulsere virtu- nam in Christo fuisse sed sensus in eo
tes." Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 188. corporis non fuisse, atque impassibilem
2
Julian " Hie igitur ut adsit toto
: eum pronuntiavit universis extitisse
anhno lector admoneo : videbit enim peccatis." Op. Imp. 1. 4. c. 47.
" Certe hanc vim in disputando
Apollinaristarum haeresim, sed earn
Manicbaei per te adjectione reparari. Apostolus non haberet si secundum
Apollinaris primo talem incarnationem, Manichaeos et eorum discipulos Traduci-
Christi induxisse fertur,ut diceret solum anos, carnem Christi a naturae nostrae
corpus dehumana substantia assumptum communione distingueret." Op. Imp.
videri, pro anima vero ipsam
fuisse 1. 6. c. 33.
been no fall. And this was the chief obstacle between the
Pelagian and a sound doctrine of the Incarnation. The
design of the Incarnation was to remedy the effects of the
fall; apart from which object, it could only be held as an
isolated fact, and, without place or significancy, had no root
in the system.
between the Apollinarist statement, unt, sed qui nullam carnem Christum
Christum non habuisse corporis sensus, habuisse contendunt. . . . Dimitteillos
and his own, that those senses non con- . .
quia nobiscum carnem Christi etsi
.
tra Spiritum
concupisse (1. 4. c. 47.); and dissimiliter confiteris. Nee nos enim
as against the Manicheans, he earn a naturae atque substantiae carnis
says,
"Manicheei non sunt, qui camera Christ! nostrae, sed a vitii communione distin-
a naturae nostrae communione 6. c. 33.
distingu- guimus." Op. Imp. 1.
H 3
102 THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. [CHAP. III.
'experience), he describes
a state of divided consciousness, and
CHAP. III.] THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 103
Nor was this a mere abstract idea. But he did not take into
consideration with it the facts of the existing constitution
of things. We
find a severe law of suffering in operation
in this world previous to the existence of the individual ;
which law, therefore, can hardly be said to be, in a compre-
hensible sense, a just one. Our moral nature, then, and the
only over their acts, but over their nature: for, however
incomprehensible, they have felt something to be sinful
within them which was yet coeval with them. But the
Pelagian, not admitting any sin but that of direct choice,
would not see in concupiscence anything but a legitimate
CHAP. IV.
stop with they speak of the race and not of the indi-
itself ;
1
Justin Martyr Tb y4vos ruv : Of the same generic sort are the ex-
avQpanrcw 6 airb TOV 'ASct/i inrb QO.VO.TOV pressions, 7) (Justin. Apol.
irpdanr) yevecris
r\avi]v Triv TOV o<pios 1. 61.), TJ TraAoto yweffis (Tatian, contra
Dial cum Try ph. c. 88. Grac. c. 11.).
Irenseus Ilominem (the race) absor- *
: Dominabatur nobis apostasia. Ire-
ber! magno ceto. Adv. Hoer.3. 22. nacus, Adv. Hcer. 5, 1.
Tatian Trrepoxris yap rrjs tyv^s rb
:
Quos in eadem captivitate (Adam)
irvtvfj.0. T~b rcAetoj/, (Jirep
awopptyaffa, 5ta generavit. 3. 34.
TTjV a/JLapTiav Sxnrep vtovabs, KOI
C'TTTTJ Per priorem generationem mortem
Xa/xaiTrcT^s tyevero. Ad. Graec. c. 20. hsereditavimus. 5. 1.
Athanasius 'H tyvxh aitoaraoa rijs
: Vitium originis. Naturae corruptio.
irpbs TO /coAa Qwpias. Contra Gentes,4. Tertullian, DeAnima, c. 41.
Basil 'EKOKudi) r) ^vxh itapaTpaireiaa
:
Nativitatis sordes Origen, Horn. 14.
TOV Kara <pv<nv. Horn. Deus non Auc- in. Luc.
tor Mali. s. 6.
108 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CHAP. IV.
one, and have set down the writers as not full believers in
it. But the truth is, such mixed and double statements
more faithfully express the truth than single-sided ones
drawn out in either direction would, because they express
the whole truth, and not a part of it. What appears to be
ambiguity is comprehensiveness, and is a merit and perfec-
1
NOTE XV.
CHAP. IV.] OP ORIGINAL SIN. 109
But, in the second place, granting that these gifts were ne-
cessary for the first man, it may still be asked, why call them
supernatural? They were not supernatural as being Divine
gifts ; for
in that case our natural affections would be super-
to his created state; though, had they been, they would not
have been supernatural, because they were thus additional.
Is not this, then, it may be asked, an arbitrary distinction?
1
Man may be considered in a double celestial life
; and of this life the Spirit
order or relation. 1. In relation to the of God is the principle ; for man's
natural, animal, or earthly life. And natural powers and faculties, even as
so he is a perfect man that hath only a they were before the fall, entire, were
reasonable soul and a body adapted not sufficient of themselves to reach
thereunto ; for the powers and faculties such a supernatural end, but needed the
of these are sufficient to the exercise of power of the Divine Spirit to strengthen,
the functions and operations belonging elevate, and raise them thereunto.
to such a life. But, 2. Man may be
" On the State of Man before the
Bull,
considered in order to a supernatural Fall," vol. ii. p. 87.
end, and as designed to a spiritual and
CHAP. IV.] OF ORIGINAL SIN. 113
ginal sin.
But, whatever were the reasons, an earlier school repre-
sented man's nature as continuing fundamentally sound after
the fall, and laid down, as the consequence of that event, a
state of defect and loss of perfection as distinguished from
a state of positive corruption. Man was deprived of impulses
114 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CHAP. IV.
which elevated his moral nature ; but still that moral nature
remained entire and able to produce fruits pleasing in their
measure to God. And though it was admitted that all
mankind were, as a matter of fact, positive sinners, such
positive sin was not regarded as the necessary consequence of
1
Strom. 1. 1. c. 19. ffe/j.v6rr)Tos els ebv reti/^'fiKcun. Strom.
2
Strom. 1. 6. c. 7. 1. 1. c. 15.
9 5
Strom. 1. 1. c. 14, 15. 'Opeyerai rrjs &tas eTnffT'hfj.ris> ov8e-
4
'IvSuv re oi rv^vofrocpiffral, &\\oi re Trca8e ruyxdvet. Strom. 1. 6. c. 7.
<f>i\oa6(f>oi j8ap)3apoi. AITTOJ/ Se rovroav The true Gnostic or Christian alone
rb yevos, ol /j.ev 'Sap/j.dvou avriav, ol 8e attained this knowledge 'O yvwariKos
:
BpaX^dvai Ka\ovfj.evor Kal ru>v 2ap/xa- 8e eK?i/os, rb. SoKovvra ctKaT(Ar)7rra elvai
vSav ol *A\\6iot Trpo<ra.yopev6/Ji.ei>oi, oftre rois &\\ois, atirbs Ka.ra\a/j.Sdi>ei' TTUT-
irfafis oiKovmv, otire trreyas K~ypv(Tiv, Ti;cros ort ovSev aKard\r)irTOV r vlai
I 2
116 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CHAP. IV.
sophy was the great gift of God to the gentile world and ;
the less perfect law and the more perfect law came both
from the same Fountain Head. 1 And though some called its
truths stolen ones, or attributed them to the devil, or to nature
as their teacher ; still
philosophy, if it had stolen its truths,
had them he taught them, had taught the truth
;
the devil, if ;
to belong to it, did not rest simply such, but rose above
ferent measure, still alike partakers of that one " Light that
"
lighteth every man that cometh into the world and all ;
1
Udvres avrov ol avOpoyiroi oAA' \i6ov
ol fj.fv /car' tiriyvwffiv, ol 8e ol 8tA iro\\uv *rS>v fft^i\pS>v e'/cret-
jrvev/j.ari,
oi p\v us <t>i\oi, ol Se
us KTvhtui', ovrca Kal T$ a.yt<p
ol 5us air\us oute'rat b 8i8a<r/caAos f\K6/j.evoi, ol fjLfV frdperoi,
ovros 6 ira&evuv /j.v<TTiipiois ptv TOP oiKetovvrai 8'
rrj irpurr) (Ji6vri, e^e^s
yvuffTiKbv, 4\-jri(ri 8e ayadais TOJ/TTIO-TOC, T^S TA.etratas. L. 7. c. 2.
&*.\oi Aie'xpt
Kal TratSeia Si' aladr)- Athanasius (De Incarn. c. 12.) ap-
-ry firavopBuriKy
TIKTJS evepysias rbv o~K\i]poKdp8iov. . . .
pears to speak of the heathen as in a
ovr6s 4(TTiv 6 8i8ois Kal ro7s "E\\r)<rt T V certain sense under the same dispen-
<piXoao<piav, 8ta ruv vTrepSfeo-repuv ayye- sation as the Jews ; as having the power
\uv. "Hroi yap ov <ppovTiet iravrvtv Trarpbs \6yov yv&vai from the works
. . .
avdptoiruv o Kvpios
Suj/ao-001 iraQoi av
'
'
Kal TOVTO, rj T$ ^ '
of nature ; the prophets sent by God
o-rrep ov Qfp.n6v to the Jews having been sent for
affQfvetas
\eadai
yap ff^f"iov % T$ fiov- ^ their sake as well.
2
Svvd/Jievos, O&K ayaQbv 5% TO Tatian, Ad Graec. c. 20.
^upurOf-
irdQos. . .
^ Kr)8fTai TWV (Tvfj.irdvruv
. ffav ol TrpuToir\ao~Tai airb rrjs yijs peis,
Kal KadrjKei T^J
'6irep Kupiu irdvruv ytvo- a\\' oijK K ravrrfs, Kpftrrovos ot rfjs
l*.sv(p' (rarr^p yap iffTiv ovx^ T&v (ifis, fvravQa 5iaKofffjL-f]<rfus. See Bull, On
TUV 8' of} Strom. 1. 7. c. 2. the State o f Man before the Fall, p.
'ils olv (rvyKiyfirai Ka\ 67.
I 3
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CHAP. IV.
1
P. in.
CHAP. IV.] OF ORIGINAL SIN. 119
1 *
B\TIOJ><X o7roAo/igci>ii> Iv rif iravrl
j
'fls "Af\, us Nwe, us (' TIS Urtpos
Ta|t. Strom. 1. 7. c. 2. ! SIXMOS. Strom. 1. 2. c. 9.
I 4
120 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CHAP. IV.
good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile," at the same
time excludes the heathen, as being still under original tdn,
from the kingdom of heaven. 2 The Pelagians, with a doctrine
which did not support, or rather opposed such a conclusion, de-
ferred -to an established distinction, and excluded the unbap-
tized, whom
the Church at large regarded as under the guilt
of original sin, though they themselves acknowledged no such
sin in the first instance from which such guilt could arise,
"
from this state of happiness. The text, Except a man be
born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the
. . .
\6yov OVT&, ov credentibus. Potest enim fieri . .
'
irav yevos avdpuircw jueretrxc Kal ot ut Gracus, i. Gentilis justitiam teneat.
e.
e \6yov puaffavTss \piaT iavoi eiffi, . . . Iste licet alienus a vita videatur
aBeot fvofjLi<r6ri<Tav olos eV "EAATjcrt seterna, quia non credit in Christo, et
Sco/cpcfo-Tj?
Kal 'Hpa/cAetTOS, KOI oi intrare non
possit in regnum coelorum,
quia renatus non est ex aqua et Spiritu,
'
afaois fv jSapgapots 8e 'AGpaa/J.
Kal 'Avavlas, Kal 'Afapias, Kal Mt<ra$jA, videtur tamen quod per hsec qua;
Kal 'HAtay, Kal #AAoi TroA^of. Justin, dicuntur ab Apostolo, bonorum operura
Apol. 1. 46., Ben. ed. gloriam, et honorem, et pacem perdere
2
"Quod (Rom. ii.
10.) de Judacis penitus non possit." In Rom. ii. 10.,
t Gcntibus dicit, utrisque nondum vol. iv. p. 484.
CHAP. IV.] OF ORIGINAL SIN. 121
1
Augustine appeals to this estab- ix. ) This is opposed to the most fund-
lished opinion in the case of infants in ament al Catholic faith contra Catho-
his controversy with Vincentius Victor: licam fundatissimam fidem." De
'
Never believe, or say, or teach that Anima, 1. 2. c. xii. See Wall on In-
infants dying before they are baptized fant Baptism, part 1. c. 15.; part 2.
can attain to the remission of original c. 6.
sin, if you wish to be a Catholic vis 2
NOTE. XVI.
esse Catholicus. (De Anima, 1. 3. c.
122 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CHAP. IV.
great schools ; has largely hinged her great conflicts and di-
visions ; the portions which the Reformation separated from
the main body have retained it ; the Koman and Protest-
ant churches meet in it ; and the West has been the pro-
vidential exponent of the doctrine of S. Paul. Tertullian
first set the example of strength and copiousness in laying
down the nature and effects of original siu ; he was fol-
1 "
Sola nunc bonitas deputetur, cum formam
initio sortitus est
initium,
quae tantum homini largita sit, id est qua esset, atque ita non natura in
arbitrii libertatem. . . Nam bonus . bonum dispositus est, sed institutione;
natura Deus solus. Homo autem
. . . non suum habens bonus esse sed in-
qui totus ex institutione est, habens stitutione. . . . Ut ergo bonum jam
CHAP. IV.] OF ORIGINAL SIN. 125
suum haberet homo, emancipatum sibi emancipati a Deo boni, libertas et po-
a Deo, et fieret proprietas
jam boni in testas avbitrii, quae efficeret bonum ut
homine et quodammodo natura, de in- proprium." Adv. Marc. 1. 2 c. 0.
of choice was gone, and man was unable not only to rise
above a defective goodness, but to avoid positive sin. He
was thenceforth, prior to the operation of grace, in a state of
necessity on the side of evil, a slave to the devil and to his
own inordinate lusts.
Such a difference in the explanation of original sin neces-
corrupt character are hollow, and are not real virtues. Such
a character may display, for example, affection to individuals,
1
NOTE XVII.
CHAP. IV.] OF ORIGINAL SIN. 129
liberty to choose good, but only lesser evil, and therefore is not
2
stripes. With respect to unbaptized infants, his language
varies in strength. The severest consigns them to the flames
of hell ; the most lenient to such a punishment as left
quam conantur quidam parvulis non iram tuam in gentes quae te non nove-
"
baptizatis tribuere. De Pecc. Merit, et runt;' et illud quod ait Apostolus,
Rern. 1, 28. "An tandem aliquando '
Cum venerit in flamma ignis dare vin-
extra regnum Dei infelices futures fate- dictam in eos qui ignorant Deum.'"
mini parvulos non renatos? Dicite De Grat. et Lib. Arb., c. iii.
" Sicut enim non impediunt a vita
ergo hujus infelicitatis meritum, ver-
bosi et contentiosi, qui negatis originale eterna justum quaedam peccata venialia
"
peccatum." Op. Imp. 2. 113. Qui sine quibus haec vita non ducitur: sic
velut defensione justitiae Dei niteris, ut ad salutem aeternam nihil prosunt impio
evertas quod de parvulorum non re- aliqua bona opera, sine quibus diffi-
generatorum damnatione tota sentit cillime vita cujuslibet pessimi hominis
ecclesia, nunquam dicturus es
grave invenitur. Veruntamen sicut in regno
jugum super parvulos unde sit justum, Dei velut Stella ab stella in gloria
si non trahant originale peccatum." different sancti; sic et in damnatione
2. 117. See NOTE XVIII. poenae sempiternae tolerabilius erit
2 "
Sed et ilia ignorant ia quae non Sodomae quam alteri civitati et erunt :
est eorum qui scire nolunt, sed eorum quidam duplo amplius quibusdam
qui tanquam simpliciter nesciunt, ne- gehennse filii: ita nee illud in judicio
minem sic excusat ut sempiterno igne Dei vacabit, quod in ipsa impietate
non ardeat, si propterea non credidit, damnabili magis alius alio minusve
quia non audivit omninoquod crederet; peccaverit." De Spirit, et Lit. 1. 1.
sed fortasse ut mitius ardeat. Non c.28.
CHAP. IV.] OF ORIGINAL SIN. 131
1
NOTE XVIIL
K 2
132 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CHAP. IV.
such sinful ; and from that, that they do not as such deserve
eternal punishment. It was wrong, then, to draw out a
string of consequences from the doctrine of original sin, and
state them as absolute truths, when they were contradicted
at every step by a set of parallel consequences from another
truth, which was equally certain, and to which Scripture
itself bore equal testimony. It was quite true that the
CHAP. V.
"
Whoever, therefore, are separated by Divine grace from
394, contains substantially the same some in a way which He knows will
doctrine, though being written just as be effectual, and gives this call to some
he was crossing the boundary line, and and not to others? So that of the
passing from one system to another, it latter it might be said, pofsent olio modo
winds about so and alternates and os- vocati accommodate fidei voluntatem ?
cillates so long between one conclusion He decides in favour of this interpre-
and another, that it is with some diffi- tation, on the ground that it agrees
culty that we ascertain what his real with the text, "Not of him that
conclusion is. He ends, however, in willeth," &c. ; while the contrary cannot
adopting the strong interpretation of be said of it, because the effectual call
S. Paul : and his argument, which is to thus defined depends not on man's
" are called will but on God's, who would have
reconcile the text, Many
but few chosen," an effectual
with given it to others besides those to
call effectrix
runs thus
vocatio : whom He has given it, if He had pleased.
Is it that they are called and that the Q'da si vellet etiam ipsorum misereri,
call is not effectual, because they do posset ita vocare, quomodo eis aptum
not will to obey it? This does not esset.
CIIAP. V.] DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION. 135
Tyrians are, and the Sidoiiians are, who would have been
able to believe they had seen the miracles of Christ but
if ;
1
Ex quo apparet habere quosdam in discreti, nee ipsa eis adhibentur vel
ipso ingenio divinum naturaliter munus dicta divina vel facta, per quse possent
intelligentia?, quo moveantur ad fidem, credere, si audirent utique talia vel vide-
si congrua suis mentibus vel audiant rent. In eadem perditiouis massa
verba, vel signa conspiciant : et tamen relicti sunt etiam Judsei qui non potu-
si Dei altiore judicio, a perditionis erunt credere factis in conspectu suo
massa non sunt gratiae praedestination* tam magnis clarisque virtutibus.
CHAP. V.] OF PREDESTINATION. 137
work together for good for those alone who are called accord-
the called simply, not the many called, but the few chosen.
For whom He did foreknow He also did predestinate to
be conformed to the image of His Son, that he might be
the firstborn whom He did
among many brethren; and
predestinate them also He called; and whom He called
them also He justified and whom He justified them ;
credere, quiu praedestinati non sunt ab destinati essent, ut eos CECCOS Deus
eo cujus inscrutab'.lia sunt judicia, et illuminaret, et induratis cor lapideum
invcstigabilcs viae; ncc istis obfuisset vellet auferre.
138 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
number, but who, out of the same lump of which they are,
are made vessels of wrath, are brought into the world for the
the day of wrath ; but out of that mass God leads some
in mercy to repentance, and others in judgment does not
lead." Contra Julianum Pelag. 1. v. n. 14.
1
Caeteri autem mortales qui ex isto |
operetur ignorat ; cum et hoc ipso
numero non sunt, et ex eadem quidera bonum operetur, quod in eis humanam
ex qua et isti, sed vasa irae facta sunt, creat naturam, et ex eis ordinem prse-
ad utilitatem nascuntur istorum. Non sentis saeculi exornat Istorum ne-
enim quenquam eorum Deus temere ac minem adducit ad paenitentiam salu-
fortuito creat, aut quid de.
illis boni I brem et spiritualem.
CHAP. V.J OF PREDESTINATION. 139
1
Ut in his ostenderet liberum arbi- crctione discreta, quid sibi collatum
trium sine sua gratia quid valerct ; ut esset addiscerent.
in eorum justis et debitis pcenis vasa
2
See Hooker's Statements of S. Au-
misericordiae, quae non suorum meritis, gustine's Doctrine. NOTE XIX.
sed gratuita Dei gratia sunt ab ilia con-
140 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
1
Niinium gratia ista secreta est, cordibus divina largitate tribuitur, a
gratiam vero esse quis ambigat ? Haec nullo duro cordc respuitur.
2
itaque gratia, qua; occulte humanis De Pra?d. Sanct. c. viii.
3
Epist. 194. c. iii.
142 AUGUST JNI AN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
Again :
te
Why He wills to convert some, and to punish
others for being unconverted (quare illos velit convertere,
illos vero pro aversions punire), let none presume to ask as
if to blame God for the law of His secret justice
rests with Him alone (consilium occultioris justifies penes
2
ipsum esf)"
Augustine, then, regarded predestination as a perplex-
S.
*
1
De Div. Qusest. ad Simplic. 1. i. I De. Pecc. Merit, et Rem. 1. 2. c.
Q. 2. n. 16. |
xviii.
CHAP. V.] OF PREDESTINATION. 143
1
The Church of Marseilles, which, Correptione et Gratia, and were an-
through Prosper and Hilary, protested swered by the book De Prcedestinatione
1
Pracd. Sanct. c. viii.
L,
146 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
1
De Corr. et Grat. c. xiii. I
2
pe j) ono pers c
CHAP. V.] OF PREDESTINATION. 147
they were not yet born, was yet caused by the difference
which was to be and which God foresaw, is rejected, as
depending on a distinction wholly irrelevant; it making
no difference to works as a cause of election, whether they
operate thus as present or as foreseen works. "Jacob was
not loved because he was of such a character, or because he
1
De Trad. Sanct. c. xvii. Quod sua futura facta praescivit : electi sunt
profecto si propterea dictum est quia autem de mundo ea vocatione, qua
prcEscivitDeus creditnros esse .... Deus id, quod prasdestinavit, implevit.
Electi suntautem ante mundi consti- 2
De Pra?d. Sanct. c. xviii.
tutionem ea praedestinationein qua Deus
L 2
148 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
3
1
Op. Imp., Contra Jul. 1. 1. c. 133. I Rom. xi. 5, 6.
2 Ibid. c. 4
141. Contra Duas, Ep. Tel. 1. 2. n. 15.
CHAP. V.] OF PREDESTINATION. 149
1 "
Effectum prsedestinationis con- communi ; et sic impossibile est quod
siderare possumus duplicitcr: unomodo totus praidestinationis effectus in com-
in particular!, et sic nihil prohibet muni habeut aliquam causam ex parte
aliquem effectum praedestinationis esse nostra." Sum. Theol. P, 1. Quaest.
causum altcrius. . . . Alio modo in 23. Art. 5.
L 3
150 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
are not freed by grace, whether they have not had the oppor-
tunity of hearing, or whether they have heard and refused to
obey, or whether they have not lived to be old enough to hear,
but died before receiving the washing of regeneration to
save them, are all justly condemned inasmuch as they are ;
tion, justice repays the due shame, grace bestows the un-
merited honour." l " Forasmuch as that one man in whom
2
all have sinned is also in each individual punished."
" Grace alone
separates the redeemed from the lost, alone
divides those whom a common original sin formed into
one mass of perdition . . . The whole human mass was
so justly condemned in the apostate root, that, were none
rescued from that damnation, none could blame God's justice.
Those who are rescued are rescued gratuitously ; those who
are not, only show what the whole lump deserved, even the
rescued themselves, had not undeserved mercy succoured
them." 3
"Divine Scripture calleth those in excusable whom
itconvicts of sinning knowingly. But neither does the just
obey ; and that sin has not passed to his posterity but by
his misuse of freewill. Men are not condemned without
having sinned, inasmuch as sin hath passed to all from
one, in whom, previous to their separate individual sins,
all have sinned in common. And on account every
this
sinner is inexcusable, either by the guilt of his origin or
the addition of his own will, whether he knows or whether
he is
ignorant for ignorance itself is sin beyond question
;
2 8
Ep. 194. c. 2. | Ep. 186. c. 4. |
Enchiridion, c. 99.
L 4
152 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
dignity ? Was
not this Man, by virtue of his assumption
by the Word, from the first moment that he was Man, the
Son of God? Was not as the only Son of God that
it
1
Ep. 194. c. 6. 8. of the will of the human soul of Jesus
2
Edwards, in his book " On the Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly vir-
Freedom of the Will," uses the same tuous, praiseworthy, rewardable," &c.
" the acts
argument in the chapter on
CHAP. V.] OF PREDESTINATION. 153
. . .
Why, when nature is common, is grace so different ?
Why is there respecting of persons with God?' What
I will not say, Christian, but sane man would say this."
From the case of Him, then, who is our Head, we may
understand the operation of grace how from the Head it ;
1
De Pra:d. Sanct. c. xv. See De Dono Perseverantiae, c. xxiv, Op. Imp. 1. 1.
c. 138.
154 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. V.
did this take place but in the Virgin's womb, where the
Man Christ began to be? That gratuitous
nativity joined in unity of person man with God, the flesh
"
or that " all means not men, but some out of ail classes
all
1
Chapter II. personarum, in duobus debitoribus
'Enchiridion, c. Contra Jul.
ciii. ; sequaliter reis, si alteri dimittitur
Pelag. 1. 4. c. viii.; Ep. 217. c. vi. alteri exigitur, quod pariterab utroque
*
Luke ii. 42. debetur." Contra Duas, Ep. 1. 2. c. 7.
4 " enim omnia " Cur
Neque Pharisaci ergo in regnum coelorum, non
olera decimabant. . . . Ita et illic accepto regenerationis lavacro, parvulus
omnes homines, omne hominum genus nullus intrabit? Nunquidnam ipse
intelligere possumus." Enchiridion, sibi parentes infideles vel negligentes,
c. ciii. de quibus nasceretur elegit? Quid
The text that God is no respecter dicam de inopinatis et repentinis innu-
of persons is, in its general spirit, a merabilibus mortibus, quibus sa?pe etiam
counter text to the predestinarian religiosorum Christianorum praesumun-
ones. But its opposition is not exact, tur, et baptismo prseripiuntur infantes ;
because it supposes a difference of rank, cum e contrario sacrilegorum et inimi-
or other advantages, in the individuals, corum Christi aliquo modo in Chris-
which is not respected ; whereas pre- tianorum manus venientes, ex hac vita
destination applies to those between non sine sacramento regenerationis
whom there is no difference, all de- emigrent. . . Ista cogitent, ista con-
.
away the opposite ones ; and converts the obscurity and in-
expresses.
157
CHAP. VI.
power to act and what can that grace be but one which
;
intimates also that love is the root ofgood. all If, therefore,
the two trees good and evil are two men good and evil, what
is the good man but the man of a good will ; that is, the tree
of a good root ? And what is the evil man, but the man of
an evil will ; that is, the tree of an evil root ? And the
fruits of these two trees are acts, words, thoughts ; which
if good proceed from a good will, and if evil from an evil
for there is one root of good men, viz. love and another ;
1
De Grat. Christi, c. xviii.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 161
vice can come out of the same moral condition of the agent,
as this neutral state of power would be and maintains that ;
will, which is, that the same moral condition, or the same root,
is capable of either fruit. The former only the admission
is
just as a material is
capable, in the first instance, of any one
out of many different forms ; but when it has once received
a particular form, is necessarily of that form which it has
received.
The whole of the book, however, De Gratia Christi,
is one comment on the adjutorium voluntatis et actionis, as
doing it.
By that Divine mode of teaching will itself and action
itself, not only the natural power of willing and acting, are
assisted. For, were our power alone assisted by this grace,
our Lord would have said, ( Every man that hath heard or
hath learned of the Father is able to come to Me.' But He
him to will" 1
" In
truth, a greater freedom, and one fortified and con-
firmed by the gift of perseverance, is necessary against so
1
De Corr. et. Grat. n. 31. |
2
De Corn et Grat n. 34.
M 3
166 AUGUSTINIAN [CHAP. VI.
"
Perseverance, then, was not given to Adam as a Divine
gift,but the choice of persevering or not was left to himself,
because his will, created as it was without sin and without
1
De Corr. et Grat. n. 35. et insuperabiliter ageretur." The ac-
2
Ibid. n. 36. knowledged MS. reading, though some
8 " Ut divina gratia indeclinabiliter editions have " inseparabiliter."
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 167
grace has now to deal with a being who has not freewill.
But what kind of grace, he then naturally argues, is to
restore and reclaim such a being, to raise him to
spiritual
life, and make him persevere in it, but an over-mastering
and controlling grace? Less power in the grace would
suffice if there were some in the being; for if there is
any
power in nature, the complement of it only is needed from
1
De Corr. et Grat. n. 38. I
2
Potentia libcri arbitrii. - De Corr.
et Grat. c. xi.
M 4
168 AUGUSTINIAN [CHAP. VI.
recognise it, leave it to act, and suspend its own effect upon
its action. But when man has freewill no longer, to leave
the effect of grace dependent upon his freewill is a mockery.
If he is to be reclaimed at all, he must then be reclaimed
hath heard and learned of the Father cometh, whoever hath not
come hath not heard or learned of the Father. For if he had
heard or learned, he would have come. For there is no one
that hath heard or learned, and cometh not but every one, ;
as saith the truth, that hath heard and learned of the Father
cometh." 2 Here the test of grace, whether it is given or not,
is the effect. If a man is admitted to hearing and learning,
i.e. to illuminating grace, the effect of a new life or coming
2
De Grat. Christi, c. xiv. |
De Prod. c. viii.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 169
grace, but a man's own use of it, would be the thing tested
This is to adopt the test of the effect. The saying " Agis si
"
acjaris thou actest if thou art acted on 3 does the same,
its force and inseparableness at the
lying in the contrast
same time of an influence on the man and an act of him.
The saying " Grace gives merits, when it is given itself
gratia dat merita cum donatur ," the term merit meaning
4
in
1 3
Iste docendi modus quo per gratiam Serm. 128. c. 7.
docet Dens. *
Ep. ad Vitalem, 217. n. 5.
2
De Div. Quaest.ad Simp. 1. 1 . n. 1 2, 1 3.
170 AUGUSTINIAN [CHAP. VI.
has been given to them is God's free gift, and not of their
own deserving."
1
The test of the effect is clearly adopted
here; the conquest of sin and continuance in it being re-
spectively attached to the bestowal of grace and the with-
2
holding of it.
1
Op. Imp., Contra Jul. 1. iv. c. 129. sam, et operationem voluntatis bonam
2 " Nulla omnino medicinalis Cbristi velut effectum, esse, ut philosopbl lo-
gratia effectu suo caret; sed omnis quuntur, convertibles, et a se mutuo
efficit ut voluntas velit, et aliquid ope- inseparabiles." Jansen, De Gratia
retur.t . Primo igitur hoc probat,
. Christi Salvatoris, 1. 2. c. 25.
quod apud Augustinum gratia et opus De Grat. et Lib. Arb, c. v.
bonum ita reciprocentur, ut quemad- De Dono Pers. c. ii,
having been, that God was the Former of the world, and
put it into shape, but was not the Maker of its substance.
The human mind appears to have had great difficulty in
reaching the idea of positive causation of existence, making
substance out of nothing such a power appearing even to
;
those who
entertained a system of religion, and admitted
the existence of a Deity and our duties to Him, incredible,
fictitious, and monstrous. A
was accordingly
material
1
Isaiah, xxix. 16.; xlv. 9.; Ixiv. 8.; Jeremiah xviii. 6.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 173
faciant."
5
God ct
makes faith fidem gentium facit."
6 (<
He
makes men believers facit credentes"
7
God " makes men
to persevere in good." 8 " God calls whom He vouchsafes
to call, and makes whom He will religious Deus quos
"
dignatur vocat, et quern vult religiosum facit : a saying of
S. Cyprian's, often quoted, on which he affixes a literal
" Man
never does good things which God does
meaning.
not make him do. qua non facit Deus ut faciat homo."
9
" The
Holy Spirit not only assists good minds, but makes
them good non solum mentes bonas adjuvat, verum etiam
bonas eas facit" 10 " There is a creation, not that by which
we were made men, but that of which a man
already
<
created spoke, create a clean heart in me ;
'
and'that of which
'
speaks the Apostle, If any man be in Christ, he is a new
creature.' We are therefore fashioned and created in
good
works, which we have not ourselves prepared, but God,
that we should walk in them." n
Nor is this language used by S. Augustine in a qualified
1 2
See Note, p. 9. Ep. 134. n. 19.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 175
gians say, that that grace which, is given at the end i.e.
1
De Dono Pers. c. xix. quidem ut non discedamus a Deo non
2 " dandum cum
Frequentationibus autem oratio- ostendit esse nisi a Deo,
num simpliciter apparebat Dei gratia poscendum ostendit a Deo. Qui enim
quid valeret non enim poscerentur de
: non infertur in tentationem non disce-
Deo quas praecipit fieri, nisi ab illo dit aDeo."
De Prasd. " Ecclesia orat ut increduli credant.
donarentur, ut fierent."
Sanct. c. xiv. Deus ergo convertit ad fidem. Orat ut
" documenta non Deus ergo dat
Si alia essent, do- credentes perseverent :
1
Ep. 217. ad Vitalem. n. 5. |
2
De Dono Pers. c. xxiii. ; Ep. 194. c. iv.
N
178 AUGUSTINIAN [CHAP. VI.
gift of God ; and that this gift is given to some and not
to others cannot be doubted without opposing the plainest
declarations of Scripture. Nor should this disturb any
believer who knows that from one man all went into justest
condemnation ; so that, were none rescued, God could not
be blamed, the real deserts even of those who are rescued
being the same with those of the damned. It belongs to
God's unsearchable judgments, and His ways past finding out,
why He rescues one man and not another. O man, who art
thou that repliest against God? Bow to the rebuke, rather
than speak as if thou knowest that which God who wills
2 " God
nothing unjust has yet willed to be secret." Again :
2
Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 230. |
De Praed. c. viii.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 179
who frees human wills for works of piety. But why, when
there is with Him no respect of persons, He makes some men
sheep, and not others, is, according to the Apostle, a question
more curious than becoming. O man! who art thou that
repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed say to Him
that formed it, why hast Thou made me thus ?
This ques-
tion belongs to that abyss from which the
Apostle shrank
with dread, exclaiming, O the depth of the riches both
of the wisdom and knowledge of God !
'
. . .
Why this
man and that man does not receive, when neither
receives,
deserves to receive, measuring thy strength, examine not;
1
De Dono Pers. c. vii. viii.
N 2
180 AUGUSTINIAN [CHAP. VI.
1
Contra Duas, Ep. Pel. 1. 4. c. 6.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 181
apparel, and covered with gold and precious stones, and was
very dreadful, and looked at her with a countenance inflamed
with indignation, so that the queen fainted with fear,
whether that king had already f run to the Lord, and desired
to be led by Him, and suspended his will upon His will, and
mortified all his will, and put his heart in God's hand.' It
would be madness to think so and yet God converted him, ;
and changed his fury to mildness. But who does not see
that it is a much greater thing to convert an opposite indig-
nation into mildness, than to convert a heart
pre-occupied
with neither the one nor the other affection, but
midway
between the two? Read then, and understand, behold and
confess, that not by law and teaching from without, but by a
marvellous and ineffable power within, God produces in the
hearts of men, not only true revelations> but also good
1
wills."
1
DC Gratia Christi, n. 25.
N 3
182 AUGUSTINIAN [CHAP. VI.
you say, men are not recalled by any necessity from their
own evil intentions, how was the Apostle Paul, yet Saul,
the terrible voice from heaven, and from the prostrate per-
secutor, raised to be a preacher and the most laborious one
of all? Acknowledge the work of grace. But God calls
one man in this way, and another in that, whomever He
prefers to call, and the wind bloweth where it listeth."
*
1
Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 93.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTEINE OF GRACE. 183
else but what Christ had prayed that he should will True, !
1
Luke, xxii. 32. Rom. xiii. 10.
2
De Corr. et Grat, c. viii. 1 John, iv. 12.
N 4
184 AUGUSTINIAN [CHAP. VI-
"
works, being His gifts.
l
is said,
'
Thou
preventest him with the blessings of sweet-
ness.' For what can be meant here but that appetite for
good of which we speak. For good begins to be desired
1
De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. 1. 2. c. xix.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 187
as soon as it
begins to be sweet. But when good is done
through fear of punishment, and not through love, good is
not done well. It is done in the act, but not in the heart,
when a man would not do it if he could refuse with im-
punity. The blessing of sweetness is therefore given as
a grace whereby that which is commanded delights us, and
(e
is desired and loved."
l
Again If grace co-operates with :
1
Contra Duas, Ep. 1. 2. c. viii.
4
Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 114.
2 8
Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 95. Ibid. 1. 3. c. 106.
De Spirit et Lit. c. xxxii.
188 AUGUSTOIAN [CHAP. VI.
out which no one has a good will, and with which a man
cannot but have a good will, you would then define a true
freewill, and not inflate a false one." l
vivit" which
a repetition of the language above
is
" ad~
jutorium cum quo aliquid fit ; donum per quod non nisi per-
2
severantes sunt."
and virtue,
2
V Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 122. |
Pp. 163. 165.
CHAP. VI.] DOCTRINE OF GRACE. 189
on this subject. For upon what ground does any one hold
that there is this irresistible grace, except on the ground
that human nature needs it, and cannot do without it ? but
if human nature cannot do without it, nothing short of it
1
Bishop Overall appears to have fallen the salvation of men might be more
into the error of endeavouring to com- certain, that He thought good to add a
bine irresistible grace to some with suf- special grace, more efficacious and
" These two
ficient grace to all :
things abundant, to be communicated to whom
agree very well together, that God, in He pleased, by which they might not
the first place, proposed salvation in only be able to believe and obey, if so
Christ to all, if they believed, and com- inclined, but also actually be inclined,
mon and sufficient grace in the means and persevere." Overall
believe, obey,
divinely ordained, if men were not on the Quinquarticular Controversy,
" Effects of
wanting to the Word of God and to the quoted by Mr. Goode,
Holy Spirit then, secondly, that He
: Infant Baptism," p. 129.
might help human infirmity, and that
191
CHAP. VII.
tion, the
if sensation has been, there has been happiness.
The fact has already taken place, then, before the end
comes ; and whatever that end may be, it cannot cause what
has taken place not to have. A man therefore who has
had uninterrupted happiness up to the end of his life, but
has then fallen into misfortune, has undoubtedly had more
appeared from that time, and was no more seen, we carry his
image in our minds connected with this fall and adversity.
If the melancholy association is the last in order, it cannot
be corrected, but is fixed and unchanging and the same is ;
affects not only the individual's present life, but his relation
to his former, disconnecting him with it. The change from
bad to good conduct disconnects him with the bad ; the change
from good to bad disconnects him with the good. Good after
bad and bad after good, exert each a rejective power over
the past, to his loss and to his relief respectively. For a
man cannot turn from bad to good conduct sincerely and
bad, affect him, except they belong to him ? This law, then,
determines the question of property in acts, and it determines
it by the fact of what come latest. The man's previous
virtue or vice for the time are not his absolutely, unless they
are his then ; they wait in suspense for that final appro-
priation. The question of property in the case of happiness
or pleasure is perfectly simple ; for happiness being only
a present sensation, can only belong to the present possessor,
but goodness is more than present action, and therefore
wants another proprietor besides the present agent.
Indeed, one view which is held of change of character in
change.
And this explanation of change of character is undoubtedly
a natural and true one, properly understood, and with a
certain limitation. A
man who changes his character
cannot indeed be said to have had his later character before
in the same sense in which he has it after, nor can such a
"They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if
they had been of us they would no doubt have continued
with us ; but they went out that they might be made mani-
"2
fest that they were not all of us.
The doctrine of final perseverance, then, so far as it is
the adoption of a test of saving goodness, is only the doctrine
of trial and probation explained. The doctrine of trial and
probationis, that we are placed in this world in order to prove
2 19.
Ezekicl, xviii. 21, 22, 24. |
1 John, ii.
o 3
198 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VII.
religion.
The test of final perseverance does indeed, in some of its
O 4
200 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIL
gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down
from the Father of lights.'
" " Perseverance is the 1
gift of
God, by virtue of which a man perseveres in Christ unto the
end." 2 " We
pray that the unbelieving may believe faith, :
3 "
God." Why is perseverance asked of God, if it is not
1
De Corr. et Grat. c. vi. 4
De Dono Pers. <. ii.
*
De Dono Pers. c. i. 5
De Corr. et Grat. c. xii.
3
Ibid. c. iii.
202 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VII.
the text from the Book of Wisdom, " Speedily was he taken
5
difficult can easily give both."
1
De Pra?d. c. xiv. 4
De Prad. c. xiv. (980.)
3
De Dono Pers. c. xvii,
6
De Dono Pers. c. 2.
8
Ep. 217. c. vi.
204 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIL
for it does not follow that because God spares some persons
on particular occasions the exercise of a certain power of
choice and original agency inherent in their nature, that
therefore such a power does not exist, and would not have
been called into action by another arrangement of Pro-
vidence. But the argument itself, which is all that we are
concerned with here, certainly shows the sense in which
" "
S. Augustine uses the term gift of final perseverance.
For there can be no doubt that removal from temptation is
1
De Dono Ters. c. ix.
CHAP. VII.] OF FINAL PERSEVERANCE. 205
1
De Dono Pers. cc. ix. x. ; De Corr. et Grat. c. viii.
206 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VII.
1
De Dono Pers. c. viii. et seq.
3
DC Corr. et Grat. c. viii.
3 De Corr. et Grat. c. xii.
CHAP. VII.] OF FINAL PERSEVERANCE. 207
" Wonderful
Again : indeed, very wonderful, that to some of
His own sons, whom He has regenerated and to whom He
has given faith, hope, and charity, God does not give perse-
verance that He who oftentimes pardons and adopts the
!
searchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out !
3
1
De Dono Pers. c. ix. De Corr. et Grat. c, viii.
2 4
Ibid. c. xiii. Ibid. c. viii.
208 DOCTRINE OF FINAL PERSEVERANCE. [CHAP. VII.
CHAP. VIII.
2
Chap, V. j
Chaps> vi. and VII.
210 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
that the cause of this decision is the will itself, and that the
will has a power of self-determination inherent in it. This
appears to the maintainers of this doctrine the natural
inference from that whole fact of willing, of which they are
not appear to have started with any bias one way or another
on the examination of the question, but to have decided
according to what he thought the plain facts of the case. I
cannot but think, however, that his love of exact truth
and the test of actual perception and apprehension which
his philosophy applies, have been carried too far in this in-
stance, and led him into a mistake. For this test cannot
be applied with absolute strictness in all cases, as I have
often said ; there being truths of reason, which do not admit
of it, truths in their very nature indeterminate and indistinct ;
all
necessarily involve the particular expression, freedom
p 2
212 AUGU8TINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAF. VIII.
for this the only act the will can do, the power of the will
is
which is, as has been just said, the real question at issue
between the two sides. On this question, then, he first de-
cides and no one will oppose him,- that the man is not free
in the case of any generally and altogether
proposed action,
in respect of willing but that he must will one thing or
;
" Will-
another, either doing the act or abstaining from it.
ing or volition being an action, and fteedom consisting in a
power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing
P 3
214 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
1
Essay, book 2. c. 21. s. 14.
CHAP. VIII.] OF FREEWILL. 215
tion in the human mind and he ; does not allow such an idea
a place as an indistinct one. He thus rests ultimately in
the simple fact of will, as the whole of the truth of the free-
dom of the will. " For how can we think any one freer, than
to have the power to do what he will ?...... We can
scarce tell how to imagine any being freer than to be able to
3
do what he wills."
1
See Chap. II. I
Essay, book 2. c. 21. s. 21.
2
NOT* IV.
P 4
216 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
nobody in his senses can deny the fact of the will. But the
further question of its determination cannot be said to be
unimportant, both in itself, and as involving these theo-
logical results. It makes a difference in what way we
decide it.
only, but internal ones. Let them have the same amount of
inward bias or inclination, and let this inclination be acted
trine of freewill is, that these two agents may, under this
:
Appendix to Archbp. King, On Predestination, p. 99.
218 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTPaNE [CHAP. VIII.
tion that thesame event must take place under the same cir-
cumstances " amounts to little more than an expansion of the
axiom that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not
to be." But surely the two assertions must be either abso-
lutely and completely identical, or not at
all. For if it is not
1
A position maintained in another motive is at the first much the stronger
passage in Archbp. Whately's Essay, of the two; he feels the former as
is in tendency and language, necessi-
.
almost overwhelming, while the latter
tarian, though it admits of an expla- is but feebly felt: but his will now
nation. " But some have I comes and deliberately increases and
may say, in
the power of choosing among several strengthens the conscientious motive,
motives at once present to my mind ? calling up every consideration of pre-
or must I obey the strongest? for if so, sent or future interest to outweigh the
how can I enjoy freewill ? Here, again, other, and putting the advantages of
Is an entanglement in ambiguous words: the right side as vividly before the
' ' '
*
must and '
obey and '
strongest mind as possible. Thus in time what
suggest the
(which idea belongs to was the more feebly felt becomes the
them in their primary sense) of com- more strongly felt motive ; and the man
pulsion, and of one person submitting acts on the right side. In this sense,
to another ; whereas here they are only then, there is no doctrine of necessity
'
used figuratively, the terms weak '
involved in the position that a man
and 'strong,' when applied to motives, must act upon the strongest motive.
denoting nothing but their greater or For in every act of choice between
less tendency to prevail (that is, to good and evil, the will either docs or
operate and take effect} in practice ; so does not create this good stronger
say the stronger motive pre-
<
th'.it to motive ; in either case it is the man's
vails' only another form of saying
is will acting well or ill, and not the
' " '
that that which p.-evails prevails !
power of externally caused motives,
P. 95. Now, when persons talk of which produces the result. But under-
the stronger motive prevailing, they standing by the term motive something
sometimes make the assertion in a simply acting from without upon the
sense involving an original act of the mind, to say that the stronger motive
.
will Itself. A man is drawn by some must prevail, is to say that the in-
strong temptation towards a had act, dividual's act is decided by causes out-
while conscience dissuades: the bad side of himself.
220 AUGUSTINIAK DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
put under two heads; under the first of which it does not
come up to the received doctrine of freewill, and under the
second is opposed to it.
the cause of sin, you ask the cause of the will should I :
discover it, will you not ask then the cause of that cause and ;
1
L. 3. c. xvii. homo factus est L. 3.
loquimur.
2
Cum autem
de libera voluntate c. 18.
faciendi loquimur, de ilia scilicet in qua 8
De Corr. et Grat. c. xi.
222 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
ingredient its in
composition. Freedom is thus first
Lit. c. xxxi.
CHAP. VIII. j OF FREEWILL. 223
Locke's " How can we think any one freer than to have
"
the power to do what he will ? Both writers, applying this
freedom to the will, immediately discover the freedom
of the will to consist in willing as it wills: Augustine
" Nildl tarn in nostra
saying, potestate quam ipsa voluntas est ;
ea enim prorsus nullo intervallo mox ut volumus prcesto est : "
Locke " the man's
stating freewill as liberty to will which
of the two things lie
pleases" and challenging any one to ask
" whether freedom itself were free."
facimus We
say both that God knows all things
before they take place, and that we act with our will,
inasmuch as we feel and know we do not act except with
2
our will."'
1
A dictum of S. Anselm's, expresses original supposition, on which the defi-
the principle of it scientifically In nition of power is raised.
libero arbitrio posse non prcecedit sed *
De Civ. Dei, 1. 5. c. 9.
sequitur voluntatem. The will is the
224 AUGUST1NIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIIL
1
Ep. 214, 215. prsemiare propter merita final iter or-
*
Non eodem modo se habent Deus et dinanda, i.e. vult quod tails sit finis
homo ad reddendum prsemium. Homo talium meritorum secundum ordinem
namque sicut Rex publico edicto pro- ab ipso talibus preestitutum, ita quod
mulgat, monetque ipse indiflferens et merita nullo modo antecedenter, cau-
indeterminatus in voluntate sua circa saliter, a priori, monent, determinant,
sibi subjectos. . . . Non sic autem vel actuant voluntatem divinam ad
Deus. Semper aeque determinate vult. pramia reddenda. . .
. Deus primo
Per meritum innotescit hominibus, vult homini premium et gloriam tan-
daemonibus, et forsitan Angelis, quale quam finem, et ideo vult sibi et facit
premium quis habebit. . . . Cum merita congrua." Bradwardine, p.
dicitur,Deus vult istum propter merita 150. et seq.
pnemiarc, hoc est, Deus vult istum
CHAP. VIII. ] OF FREEWILL. 225
1
De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. ii. et seq.
Q
226 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
not given either will not or do not what they will those to :
but this is
saying nothing as to how that will is determined.
good or bad act which really ensues, the same cause, can
1
De Gratia Christi, c.~ 18.
Q 2
228 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
ference. But if the act arises directly itself one way, then the soul is already
out of a state of indifference, without come to a choice, and chooses that way,
any intervening choice to determine it, And so the soul is in a state of choice,
then the act not being determined by and in a state of equilibrium, both at
choice is not determined by the will." the same time." On the Freedom of
. An antecedent choice, then, he says,
.
the Will, part ii. sect. 7.
But if it " if the
must be granted. is,
CHAP. VIII.] OF FREEWILL. 229
good will ;
that is, the tree of good fruit ? And what is
the evil man but the man of an evil will; that is, the
tree of an evil root? And the fruits of these two trees
passage the lives and actions of the good and evil man are
referred in the first place to two immediate or proximate
roots, and then to two ultimate or original ones. The
proximate roots of the two respectively are a good and evil
1
Habemus autem, inquit, possi- duae arbores bona et mala sunt, duo
bilitatem utriusque partis a Deo insitam, homines, bonus et malus, quid est
velut quandam, ut ita dicam, radicem bonus homo, nisi voluntatis bonae, hoc
fructiferam atque fecundam qua ex est arbor radicis bonas? et quid est
voluntate hominis diversa gignat et homo malus, nisi voluntatis malae,
pariat, et quse possit ad proprli cultoris haac est arbor radicis malae? Fructutf
arbitrium, vel nitere flore virtutum, autem harum radicum atque arbo-
vel sentibus horrere vitiorum. Ubi non rum facta sunt, dicta sunt, cogitata
intuens quod loquatur, unam eandemque sunt, quaa bona de bona voluntate
radicem constituit bonorum et malorum, procedunt, et mala de mala. Facit
contra evangelicam veritatem doctri- autem homo arborem bonam, quando
namque apostolicam. Nam et Dominus Dei accipit gratiam. Non autem se
nee arborem bonam dicit posse facere ex malo bonum per seipsum facit, sed
fructus malos, nee malam bonos ; et in illo et per ilium, et in illo qui
Apostolus Paul us cum dicit radicem semper est bonus. Malam vero
. . .
Q 3
230 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
is thus laid down, in the place of one and the same moral
quodam ita consistere, ut nee bona nee mala sit. For either
we love righteousness, and it is good, or we do not love
God, the good one coming from God, and being the gift
whereby we are justified ... a gift which to whomsoever
God gives it, He gives in His mercy, and from whomsoever
He withholds it, He withholds it in His judgment . . .
for the law of His secret justice rests with Him alone." *
conduct, lays down two separate wills, good and bad, which
have each possession of the agent prior to all action.
These two distinct wills, or roots or causes of human
action, then, are, as has already appeared, and as the whole
doctrine of Augustine shows, original sin and grace.
out of and beyond the personal will or the will of the indi-
; i. e. by the transgression of the
vidual first man, or original
He does what he does with his will, and not against it. No
force has compelled him to act contrary to his inclination, but
he has acted according to his inclination. He has therefore
acted as a free agent, and he is responsible for his acts.
What more is wanted for responsibility than that a man has
acted willingly, and without constraint "
? Why perplex a very
plain subject. He is free for evil (i. e. a free agent in doing
evil) who acts with an evil will. He is free for good (i. e. a
1
Quid aperta implicas loquacitate sua voluntate retinentur, et a peccato
perplexa? Ad malum liber est, qui in peccatum sua voluntate pra?cipitantur.
voluntate agit mala ad bonum autem
:
Neque enim agit in eis qui suadet et
liber est qui voluntate agit bona. decipit, nisi ut peccatum voluntate
Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 120. committant." Contra Duas, Ep. 1. I.
2 "
Non itaque, sicut dicunt nos c. 3.
not of course meant that it remains apart from all will what-
ever, for some kind of will must go along with a sinful act to
1
Retract. 1. 1. c. 9. essent quae in alia loca transire sine
2 sic dixi
Ego peccatum sine volun- radicibus possent. . . . Sine voluntate
tate esse non posse, quomodo dicimus non potest esse, nam sine voluntate non
poma vel frumenta sine radicibus esse potest existere ut sit; sine autem vo-
non posse. . . . Sine voluntate esse luntate potest esse, quia sine voluntate
non posset, ut eset quod in alios sine potest manere quod existit. Op. Imp,
voluntate transiret ; sicut frumenta 1. 4. cc. 97. 99.
upon the will, and the effect of habit or custom. The will
P. 221.
234 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
ginal sin to evil, was free : because it is true will ; because the
man acts willingly and without constraint. " The human
do we do but He makes us
;
to do, by giving the most effective
strength to the will cerium est nos facer e cumfacimus, sed
3
ille facit utfaciamus, prcebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati."
" Some will to believe, others do not ; because the will of some
is prepared by God, the will of others is not aliis prapara-
tur aliis non prceparatur voluntas a Domino. . . .
Mercy and
justice have been respectively exerted in the very wills of men
4
misericordia et judicium in ipsis voluntatibus facia sunt."
That is to say, the will is moved and determined by Divine
grace, but it is still will, and freewill.
i
De Gratia et Lib. Arb. n. 41. I
8
De Gratia et Lib. Arb. n. 32.
9
De Pecc. Merit, et Rem. 1. 2. c. 6. |
*
De Praed. Sanct. c. 6.
CHAP. VIII. ] OF FREEWILL, 235
priated to the good side ; and the good state of the will
is called the freedom, in contrast with the other, which is
1
De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. xvii.
238 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CIIAP. VIII.
1
De Lit. et Spirit, c. 5.
CHAP. VIII. ] OF FREEWILL. 239
co-operation.
The same mode of co-operation is described in the follow-
" When God wills the salvation of a man, no
ing extract :
etpotestatem"
1
Here it is said that in a particular sense
own power, and were the sense in
a man's will is in his
which were allowed a free and natural one, nothing
this
power in the human will, there are many plain and simple
modes in which he might have done it, as a common language
in theology, both ancient and modern, on this subject shows.
But he only admits a power which is
negatived by an entire
subordination to another power ; and a will with such a
'
thou Least not received
of the believing will, and asserting,
?
'
arbitrium, -si in eo quod dicitur, Quid vocationi Dei, vel ab ea dissentire, sicut
habes quod non accepisti?' propterea dixi, proprice voluntatis est. Quse res
etiam voluntas qua credimus dono Dei non solum non infirmat quod dictum
'
tribuitur, quia de libero existit arbitrio, Quid habes quod non accepisti ?
'
est,
quod cum crearemur accepimus; at- verum etiam confirmat. Accipcre
tendat et videat, non ideo, quia ex quidem et habere anima non potest
libero arbitrio est, quod nobis naruraliter dona, de quibus hoc audit, nisi con-
concreatum est; verum etiam quod sentiendo: ac per hoc quid habeat et
visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut quid accipiat, Dei est ; accipere autem
velimus et ut credamus, sive extrin- et habere, accipientis et habentis est.
secus, per evangelicas exhortationes . . Jam si ad illam profunditatem scru-
sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in tandam quisquam nos coarctet, cur illi
potestate quid ei veniat in mentem, ita suadeatur ut persuadeatur, illi autem
sed consentire vel dissentire proprice non ita: duo sola occurrunt interim
His ergo modis quando quas respondere mihi placeat O altitude
'
voluntatis est.
Deus agit cum anima rational!, u". ei
'
divitiarum' et Numquid iniquitas apud
credat (neque enim credere potest Deum?"' De Spiritu et Litera, 1. 1.
vel dissentire propricB voluntatis est ;" and this expression seems
at first sight to involve a self-determining will. But it will
nothing more than to say that the will must receive when
it receives habere utique accipientis et habentis
accipere et
est. The believing will thus comes out, after due ex-
planation, a simple gift, to which the only consent is one
which is involved in the mere fact of it being given; viz.
reception and possession. And, lastly, why one man has
R
242 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
1
Jansen (De Gratia Christi, pp. 220. his view of Augustinian election as
225. 908. 936. 955. 980. 989.) pro- ex prcevisis operibus (p. 989.): and
perly explains various passages of his and Molina's explanation of gratia
Augustine from which the Jesuits ejficax, as efficacious si voluntas cum ea
Bellarmine, Suarez, Molina, Lessius and co-operari velit (p. 936.), omitting the
others had extracted a freewill meaning, whole consideration that this consent
as applying to the will of man as of the will is itself, according to Au-
created, or simply to will as such. But gustine the effect of grace. Having
while such explanation is sometimes excluded Augustinianism from the pale
required on his own side, nothing can of toleratedopinion, the Church of
be more far-fetched and artificial than Rome obliged to prove that S. Au-
is
the Jesuit interpretations of the great gustine was not Augustinian. But
pervading dicta" and fundamental posi- the plain language of S. Augustine
tions of Augustine ; if interpretations refutes such interpreters, and forces
deserve that name which are obvious one of two alternatives upon them,
and barefaced contradictions to, rather either that they tolerate his doctrines,
than explanations of, S. Augustine's and so keep him in communion with
meaning ; as Lessius' interpretation of their Church, or anathematise his
the Augustinian predestination as con- doctrines, and confess that S. Augustine
ditional and incomplete (pp. 955. 981.) does not belong to their communion.
CHAP, VIII.] OF FREEWILL. 243
1
Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 134.
R 2
244 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII,
1
Op. Imp. 1. 1. c. 101. ejus origo quaerenda non est, non ideo
Quid autem vanius definitionibus quaerenda non est quod voluntas ali-
tuis,qui propterea putas non esse quae- cunde non sit, sed quia manifestum est
rendum unde sit voluntas, quia motus unde sit. Ab illo est enim voluntas
est animi cogente nullo? Si enim cujus est voluntas ; ab angelo scilicet
dicatur, ut putas, unde sit; non erit voluntas angeli, ab homine hominis, a
verum quod dictum est, cogente nullo : Deo Dei, et si operatur Deus in homine
quia illud unde est earn cogit esse; et voluntatem bonam, id utique agit, ut
ideo non est alicunde, ne cogatur esse. oriatur ab illo bona voluntas, cujus est
O stultitiam singularem Non est
! voluntas ; sicut agit ut homo oriatur
ergo alicunde ipse homo, qui non est ab homine ; non enim quia Deus creat
coactus esse, quia non erat qui cogeretur hominem, ideo non homo ex homine
antequam esset. Prorsus et alicunde nascitur. Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 42.
est voluntas, et esse non cogitur ; et si
CHAP. VIII.] OF FREEWILL. 245
1
Op. Imp. 1. 5. c. 61. cantem peccatum habendi dura ne-
2 93. " Necessitatis donee tota sanetur infirmitas,
Op. Imp. 1. 1. c, cessitas,
inerat plenitude." L. 5. c. 59.
" At- . . . ita ut sit etiam bene vivendi, et
tende eum qui dicit, Quod nolo malum nunquam peccandi voluntaria felixque
hoc ago, et responde utrum necessitatem necessitas." De Perfectione Justitiae,
non habeat." L. 5. c. 50. "
Quia c. 4.
vero peccavit voluntas secuta est pec-
246 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
necessity.
But the combination of necessity, and that a necessity
communicated to the will from without, with freewill,
being
admitted on both sides, the peculiarity of Augustine's doc-
trine lies in the application of this principle ; in the reason,
the time, and the manner he assigns to its operation. That
state of the will to which an original power of choice attaches
is upon the doctrine of freewill identical with a state of
R 4
248 AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE [CHAP. VIII.
producing good or evil acts and motions with the ease and
uniformity of physical law. But in S. Augustine's applica-
tion of the principle, the reason, and time of its introduction,
and mode of operation, are all different. Necessity is not the
reward or punishment of a previous exercise of liberty of
choice, but the effect of original sin on the one hand, and an
eternal Divine decree of mercy on the other. And with the
difference of reason for, the time of its introduction is also
different. It does not succeed and come after a state of
this life, instead of being reserved for the next. And the
manner of its operation is for the same reason different,
CHAP. IX.
1
I cannot wholly understand, except and are more like the shadows and
as unfavourably characteristic of that ghosts of reasonings than the realities.
2
age, the great mediaeval reputation of The predestinarian controversy in
Bradwardine, called the "profound the Gallican Church, which arose out
doctor." A dull monotony character- of the statements of Gotteschalcus, in
ises his speculations, which are all spun the ninth century, does not offer much
out of the idea of the Divine Power, or valuable material to the theological
of God as the Universal Cause ; but spun student. I give the principal points of
into airy subtleties, which want the sub- it in NOTE XX.
stance of solid thought and argument,
252 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX.
upon the First Great Cause, from which they derived all
1 " Voluntas Dei causa est omnium " Causalitas autem Dei
qui est primum
quae naturaliter fiunt, vel facta sive agens, se extendit usque ad omnia entia,
futura sunt, .... prima et summa non solum quantum ad principia spe-
causa omnium specierum et motionum." ciei, sed etiam quantum ad individua
Lombard. 1. 45. " Cassari
1. 'Distinct. principia." Summa Theologica, P. 1.
non potest, quia voluntate fecit
ilia Queest. 22. Art. 2.
" In
quaecunque voluit, in ccelo et in terra, hujusmodi autem causis non
cui, teste Apostolo, nihil resistit." est infiriitus processus, est ergo aliqua
Distinct. 46. "Nulla causa impeditur omnium una prima qua? est Deus."
nisi ab aliquo fortiori agente, sed nihil p. 190.
" Omne movens
Bradwardine,
est fortiusDivina voluntate. . . Prse- .
posterius est instrumentum primi mo-
terea, diminutio gaudii si voluntas non ventis, alias enim non est posterius na-
impleatur, sed Deus felicissimus." turaliter eo, sed prius vel etiam coae-
Aquinas, in Lombard. Distinct. 47. quum," p. 173.
CHAP. IX.] OF NECESSITY. 255
1 "
Quodsi aliqua causa particularis sit prima causa universalis non unius
deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter generis tantum, sed universaliter totius
aliquam aliam causam particularem ends, impossibile est quod aliquid con-
immediantem, quse continetur sub or- tingat prapter ordinem divinse guberna-
dine causse universalis. Unde effectus tionis; sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid ex
ordinem causae universalis nullo modo una parte videtur exire ab ordine Di-
potest exire." Sum. Theol. P. 1. Q. vinse providentiae, quo consideratur se-
19. Art. 6. " Sicut cundum aliquam
lignum impeditur particularem causam,
a combustione per actionem aquaa." necesse est quod in eundem ordinem
" Sicut secundum aliam causam."
Q, 22. Art. 2. indigestio con- relabatur
tingit praeter ordinem virtutis nutritivae Sum. Theol. P. 1. Q. 103. Art. 7.
ex aliquo impedimento, puta ex gros- 2
Cum Deus omnia posse dicitur,
sitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in nihil rectius quam quod
intelligitur
aliam causam, et sic usque ad causam possit omniapossibilia. Sum. Theol.
primam universalem. Cum igitur Deus P. 1. Q. 25. Art. 3.
256 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX.
1
"Potest Deus meliorem rem " Utrum Deus
facere, potuerit facere hu-
sive etiamrerum universitatem, quam manitatem Christi meliorem quam fit."
"
fecit." Lombard, L. 1. Dist. 44. " Se- Quamvis humana natura sit Divi-
cundum philosophum albius est quod nitati unita in persona, tamen naturee
est nigro impermistius ergo etiam: remanent distantes infinitum, et ex
melius est quod est impermistius malo : hoc potest esse aliquid melius humana
sed Deus potuit facere universum in quo natura in Christo." Aquinas, in Lomb.
nib.il mali esset. . . . Quantum ad Dist. 44. Art. 3.
"
Talem potuit Deus hominem fecisse
partes ipsas potest intelligi universum
fieri melius. Sive per additionem plu- qui nee peccare posset nee vellet ; et
rium partium, ut scilicet crearentur si talem fecisset quis dubitet eum melio-
multse alias species, et implerentur rem fecisse." Aug. sup. Gen. ad Lit.
multi gradus bonitatis qui possunt esse, xi. 7. Quoted by Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 44.
cum etiam inter summam creaturam et 2
Causae mediae
proximae secun-
Deum infinita distantia sit et sic Deus dae.
" Omnium sunt causa est
qua?
;
in either case these causes were but mediate, and fell back
upon the First Great Cause, from which they derived all
1 8 "
In his autem qui consequuntur finem Quibusdam effectibus praaparavit
per principium quod est natura in- causas necessarias ut necessario eveni-
venitur quidam gradus, eo quod quarun- rent; quibusdam vero causas contin-
dam rerun natura impediri non potest gentes, ut evenirent contingenter, se-
a consecutione effectus sui, et iste est cundum conditionem proximarum cau-
gradus altior sicut est in corporibus cae- sarum." Sum. Theol. P. 1. Q. 23.
lestibus. Unde in his nihil contingit Art. 4.
non intentum a Deo ex defectu ipsorum; " Ita omnia movet secundum eorum
et propter hoc Avicenna dicit quod supra conditionem ; ita quod ex causis neces-
orbem lunae non est malum. Alius sariis per motionem divinam sequuntur
autem gradus naturae est quae impediri effectus ex necessitate ; ex causis autem
potest et defi cere, sicut natura generabi- contingentibus sequuntur effectus con-
lium et corruptibilium ; et quamvis ista ma 2 a a
tingentes." l Q. 49. Art. 4.
natura sit inferior in bonitate, tamen " Effectus
consequitur conditionem
bona est Aquinas, in Lomb. 1. 1. causae suae proximo." Aquinas, in
Dist. 39. Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 39.
258 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX,
not deny the plainest facts must admit.; .-They brought all
these characteristics to a point, and expressed them in
one term self-motion. The will moved itself, was the
cause of its own motion, the mistress of its own acts; it was
in its power to will or not to will. Man moved himself
to action by his freewill. But was only
this self-motion
1
Dicendum est quod hoc contingit voluit eos contingenter evenire, contin-
propter efficaciamDivinaevoluntatis. . . gentes causas ad eos praeparavit. Sum.
Vult enim quaedam Deus necessario, Theol. l ma Q. 19. Art. 8.
2 "
quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo in Voluntatis causa nihil aliud esse
rebus ad complementum universi. Et potest quam Deus." Sum. Theol. l ro "
ideo quibusdam effectibus aptavit causas 2 dae Q. 10. Art. 6. "Deus est causa
necessarias, ex quibus effectus ex ne- prima movens et naturales causas et
cessitate proveniant; quibusdam autem voluntarias." m
l Q. 83. Art. 1.
3
causas defectibiles, ex quibus effectus Providentia hominis continetur
contingenter proveniant. Non igitur sub provident ia Dei sicut particularis
propterea effectus voliti a Deo eveniunt causa sub causa universali." Sum.
rontingenter, quia causa? proximas sunt Theol. m
l Q. 23. Art. 2.
contingentes ; sed propterea quia Deus
CHAP. IX.] OF NECESSITY. 259
not follow that this principle of motion was not itself set in
motion by something else. The will was the internal prin-
ciple of its own motion but ; this self-determining power moved
the will as causa proximo, not as causa prima ; the internal
1 " Voluntas domina est sui actus, et actiones earum sint voluntarise, sed
non velle ; quod non
in ipsa est velle et potius hoc in eis facit ; operatur enim
esset sinon haberet in potestate movere in unoquoque secundum ejus proprie-
seipsam ad volendum." l
m 2 dM tatem." Sum. Theol. l ma 83.
Q. Q.
9. Art. 3. Art. 1.
"Liberum arbitrium est causa sui " De ratione voluntarii est quod
motus: quia homo per liberum arbi- principium ejus sit intra ; sed non oport-
trium seipsum movet ad agendum. et quod hoc principium intrinsecum
Non tamen hoc est necessitate libertatis sit primum principium non motum ab
s 2
260 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX.
1
"Haec igitur coactionis necessitas tarium, quia est secundum inclinationem
omnino repugnat voluntati. Nam hoc voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile est
dicimus esse violentum quod est contra quod aliquid simul sit violentum et
inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus naturale ; ita impossibile est quod aliquid
voluntatis est inclinatio qusedam in simpliciter sit coactum, sive violentum,
aliquid: et ideo, sicut dicitur aliquid et voluntarium. Necessitas autem na-
naturale, quia est secundum inclinatio- turalis non repugnat voluntati." 1
nem naturae ; ita dicitur aliquid volun- Q. 82. A. 4.
CHAP. IX.] OP NECESSITY. 261
1
Cuilibet finite possibilis est ad- cundurn determinationem divinae vo-
ditio; sed cujuslibet creaturae bonitas luntatis, et ideo nulla invidia in Deo
finita est. Ergo potest sibi fieri additio, resultat, si rem meliorem facere potuit
sed creatura nunquam potest attingere quam fecerit. Aquinas, in Lomb,
ad aequalitatem Dei. Nee alia mensura Dist. 43. Q. 1. A. 1.
fieri; and, allowing that God did not will evil, it was
1
quod Dens vult mala
Alii dicunt aliquo malum fieri, cum scriptum est,
non tamen vult mala. Alii
ease vel fieri, Rom. voluntati ejus quis resistit?
9.,
vero quod nee vult mala esse nee fieri. Supra etiam dixit Augustinus quia ne-
In hoc tamen conveniunt et hi et illi cesse est fieri si voluerit. Sed vult
quod utrique fatentur Deum mala non mala fieri aut non fieri Si vult non
velle.Utrique vero rationibus et auctori- fieri non fiunt ;
fiunt autem, vult ergo
tatibus utuntur ad muniendam suam as- fieri.
sertionem. Qui enim dicunt Deum mala Illi vero qui dicunt Dei voluntate
velle esse vel fieri suam his modis mu- mala non fieri vel non esse, inductio-
resistit, et non est omnipotens, quia nollet mala fieri, vel vellet non fieri,
non quod vult, sed impotens
potest et tamen fierent, omnipotens non esset.
nos sumus, qui quod vo-
est sicut et .... Ideoque non concedunt Deum
lumus quandoque non possumus. Sed velle mala fieri ne malorum auctor in-
quia omnipotens est et in nullo im- telligatur, nee concedunt eum velle mala
potens, certum est non posse fieri non fieri, ne impotens esse videatur, sed
mala vel esse nisi eo volente. Quo- tantum dicunt eum non velle mala fieri.
modo enim invito eo et nolente posset ab Lombard, 1. 1 Dist. 46. .
8 4
264 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX.
signi.
1
And the object of this distinction is the same with
"
Aliquando vero secundum quandam hos tropos diverse voluntates Dei di-
1
figuram dicendi voluntas Dei vocatur, cuntur, quia diversa sunt ilia quae per
quod secundum proprietatem non est tropum voluntas Dei dicuntur."
"
voluntas ejus: ut praeceptio, prohibitio, Magna est adhibenda discretio in
consilium, ideoque pluraliter aliquando cognitione Divinse voluntatis, quia et
Scriptura voluntates Dei pronuntiat. beneplacitum Dei est voluntas ejus, et
Unde Propheta psalm 1 1 0. Magna opera signum beneplaciti ejus dicitur voluntas
Domini, exqnisita in omnes voluntates ejus. Sed beneplacitum ejus aeternum
ejus, cum ron s t nisi una voluntas Dei
;
dicitur, sed verum quod dicitur sub potest did aliquid velle dupliciter ; vel
and trodden under foot by the passion and the pride of man.
But that secret and ulterior will which lay behind this
external and expressed one, was not opposed to any, but
harmonised with all facts ;
and evil was no rebel against it,
voluntas vere in eo est, et h<ec est volun- Unde ea, in quibus attenditur similitudo
tas be.neplaciti. Dicitur etiam aliquid istius rei ad voluntatem Dei, voluntates
velle metaphorice, eo quod ad modum ejus metaphorice dicuntur, et quia talia
volentis se habet, in quantum
prcecipit, sunt effectus, dicuntur signa. " Aquinas,
vel consulit, vel in Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 45. A. 4.
aliquid hujusmodi facit.
266 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX.
all morals and religion. But if this position does not mean
this, as in the minds of those who maintained it it did not,
it is not available for the object for which it
designed. is
ubique, intelligens Deum non ideo sequent! totum non autem quicquid
fit,
prohibuisse, quin vellet opus suum vult voluntate antecedent! ; quia hoc
praedicari, sed ut daret formarn homini, non simpliciter vult, sed secundum quid
laudem humanam declinandi." Lomb. tantum ; nee ista imperfectio est ex
1. 1. Dist. 45. parte voluntatis, sed ex conditione
2 Voluntas Dei duplex, antecedens voliti." In Lomb. Dist. 47. Q. 1.
et consequens . . .
propter diversas A. 1.
CHAP. IX.] OF NECESSITY. 267
supposition that men were good; and this will, which was
not opposed to the evil of punishment if men were bad, could
not be frustrated, being as much fulfilled in the damnation
of men as in their salvation. This distinction, then, had the
same aim as the former; viz. to establish a Divine Will which
was not opposed to evil, and which therefore the existence
of evil did not frustrate, and so interfere with the Divine
Power. But while the difficulty which this distinction
the good and set it off to better advantage ? Would the good
be appreciated as it should be, and its real nature come to
light , but for this evil ? And in this way is not evil of the
1 " Illud sine quo universum raelius of the existence of evil with approval :
esset non confert ad perfectionem uni- " Dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate Di-
versi sed si malura non esset universum
: vina ratio sumi potest prsedestinationis
melius esset, quia malum plus tollit uni aliquorum et reprobationis aliquorum.
quam addit alteri, quia eicujusest tollit ... Ad completionem enim universi
bonitatem absolutam, alteri autera addit requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, qua-
bonitatera comparationis." In Lomb. rum quaedam altum et quaedam in-
1. 1. Dist. 46. Q. 1. A. 3. nmum locum teneant in universe."
Yet Aquinas reverts to this rationale Sum. Theol. l m * Q. 23. A. 5.
CHAP. IX.] OF NECESSITY. 269
world, all the more for the evil which we see in it.
assistance i. e.
by the contrast between this goodness and a
and awe the signal and noble use which the wickedness of
the world answers ; inasmuch as for anything we see to the
important as his.
And the same may be said of the use of which the moral
evil in the world is, for the trial, purification, and confirm-
ation of the good. The wickedness of the bad portion of
mankind indeed one of the principal means by which the
is
ing will. But this conceded, moral evil, it was said, followed.
For such natures as the latter must, as the very condition of
this higher good, have the power of going wrong and reced-
ing from the end designed for them ; and, with the power to
do so, the fact would in some instances take place. 1 Now, this
is a substantially different argument from the former, and is
First Cause ; the human will in that case being no such bar-
The evil proper to the nature of fire was cold; the evil proper
to the nature of water was drought. Thus while, in the col-
lision of different natures in the universe, the defect of one
was the growth of another, the evil to each nature was the
1 "
Causam formalem nullam habet, et suam profectionem,
necesse est dicere
sed est magis privatio forma : et simi- quod et perfectio cujuscunque naturae
liter nee causam finalem, sed magis est rationem habeat bonitatis. Unde non
privatio ordinis ad jinem." Sum. potest esse quod malum
signiflcet quod-
Theol. m Q. 49. A. 1.
l dam aut quandam formam, seu
esse,
" Malum quod in defectu actionis naturam. Relinquitur ergo quod no-
consistit, semper causatur ex defectu mine mali significetur quaedam absentia
A. m
agentis." 2. boni. l Q.48. A. 1.
Cum omnis natura appetat suum esse
272 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX.
1 "
Corruptio aeris et aquae est ex est pars universi quia neque habet na-
perfectione ignis. ...
Si sit de- turam substantialneque accidentis, sed
fectus in effectu proprio ignis, puta privationis tantuin. In Lorn. 1. 1.
quod deficiat a calefaciendo, hoc est Dist. 46. Q. 1. A. 3.
8 "
propter defectum actionis, sed hoc ipsum Peccatum est actus inordinatus.
quod est esse deficiens, accidit bono cui Ex parte igitur actus potest habere cau-
ma ex autem inordinationis ha-
per se competit agere." l Q. 49. sam, parte
A. 1. bet causam eo modo quo negatio vel
2
Nihil potest esse per suam essentiam privatio potest habere causam." l
ma
malurn. l ma Q. 49. A, 3. Malum non 2 dac Q. 75. A. 1.
CHAP. IX.] OF NECESSITY. 273
1
Malum causam formalem nullam reducitur in causam primam
habet. m Defectus a libero arbitrio non reducitur
l Q. 49. A. 1.
2 " Effectus causa? m'
mediae secundum in Deum sicut in causam. '
l
too; for the effect must follow the nature of the cause.
Nor can we avoid this conclusion but by a scheme of
dualism, which allows an evil first cause of being and, ;
1 "
Tribus modis contingit aliquid nomen duobus hominibus conveuit.
aliquibus commune esse, vel univoce, Cum igitur per scientiam nostram
vel aequivoce, vel analogice. Univoce deveniatur in cognitionem Divinse sci-
non potest aliquid de Deo et de creatura entiae, non potest esse quod sit omnino
dici . . . et ideo quidam dicunt quod aequivocum. Et ideo dicendum quod
quicquid de Deo et creatura dicitur, per scientia analogice dicitur de Deo et
puram aequivocationem dicitur. Sed creatura : et similiter omnia hujus-
hoc etiam non potest esse quia in his modi." Aquinas, in Lomb. 1. 1. Dist.
quae sunt pure aequivoca ex uno non 35. Q. 1. A. 4.
agnoscitur alterum, ut quando idem
T 2
276 SCHOLASTIC THEORY [CHAP. IX.
prevent it, how could evil exist ? Hence these vain efforts of
T 3
278
CHAP. X,
1
Praescientia meritor um non est causa est autem distinctum quod est ex libero
vel ratio praedestinationis. . . . Mani- arbitrio ex praedestinatione, sicut
et
festum est quod id quod est gratise est nee est distinctum quod est ex causa
praedestinationis eflfectus ; et hoc non secunda et causa prima. l ma Q. 23.
divina bonitas: ratio autem reproba- tuum est et vade ; an non licet mini
m Q. 23. A. 5.
tionis est originate peccatum. Aquinas, quod volo facere?" l
2
rol. 8. p. 330. Deus movet voluntatem hominis si-
1
Voluit Deus in hominibus, quantum cut TJniversalis motor ad universale ob-
ad aliquos quos prsedcstinat, suam re- jectum voluntatis, quod est bonum ; et
praesentare bonitatem per modum mi- sine hac universal! motione homo non
sericordiae parcendo, et quantum ad potest aliquid velle. . . Sed tamen
.
potest aliquis pro libitu suo dare cui est beatitudo naturam hominis exce-
vult plus vel minus, dummodo nulli dens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute
subtrahat debitum, absque praejudicio pervenire potest secundum quandam
Et hoc est ma 2 d " e
justitisc. quod dicit pater- Divinitatis participationem." l
T 4
280 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
Thus
clearly and strongly laid down, however, the doctrine
of Aquinas and the Augustinian schoolmen on the subject of
1
Homo in statu naturae integras Secundum utrumque statum natura
potest operari virtute suae naturae bonum humana indiget Divino auxilio, ad faci-
quod est sibi connaturale, absque super- endum etvolendum quodcunque bonum,
additione gratuiti doni, licet non absque sicut primo movente. Virtute gratuita
auxilio Dei moventis. lm"2 dae Q, 109. superaddita indiget ad bonum super-
A. 3. naturale. Ibid. A. 2.
CHAP. X.] OF PREDESTINATION. 281
The writer, however, treats them all as one school, and con-
by the Augustinian Aquinas
siders the predestination taught
1
Laurence's Bainpton Lectures, pp, 148. 152.
282 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
day blaze."
l
The language he refers to is that of Aquinas,
whom again he quotes as saying that there are two reasons
why grace, where it is withheld, is withheld ; one because
the man not willing to receive it, the other because God
is
in order to the former tails est ordo ut secundum non sit nisi
1
2
Bampton Lectures, p. 151. Aquinas in Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 40.
Q. 4. A. 2.
284 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
1
T. 1
S. Q. 22. A. 2. his system, and the same contented
8 " on the apparent meaning of
Quis tarn impie desipiat, ut dicat resting
Deum malas hominum voluntates quas particular language, without any con-
voluerit, et quando voluerit et ubi sciousness of a different interpretation,
voluerit in bonum non posse conver- which in a vast and intricate theolo-
tere." Augustine, quoted by Lombard, gical fabric might be reflected from
other quarters upon it. " Dicendum
1. 1. 47. Neque ideo prsecepit
Dist.
omnibus bona, quia vellet ab omnibus quod electio divina non praeexigit diver-
" sitatem gratiac, quia haec electionem
bona fieri, si enim vellet utiqtie fierent.
Ibid. consequitur ; sed praeexigit diversitatem
3
Arcbbp. Laurence's use of the fol- naturae in divina cognitione, et facit
diversitatem gratiac, sicut dispositio
lowing statement in Aquinas (B. L. p.
diversitatem naturae facit." In Lomb.
151.) shows the same want
of insight into
CHAP. X.] OF PREDESTINATION. 285
grace.
And first it must be observed that, without appending the
it, has the effect of making the man good and acceptable
to God. The leaning to the side of freewill which has
marked church authority for the' last three centuries, has
impressed for the most part upon the term grace the sense
of assisting grace i. e. a Divine influence which excites,
;
of the soul. They divide grace into two great kinds, one
which is designed for the good of the individual, and makes
him acceptable to God, gratia gratum faciens ; the other,
which not the grace of acceptableness, but only some gift
is
1
Duplex est gratia, una quidam per Gratia autem gratum faciens ordinat
quam ipse homo Deo
conjungitur, quae hominem immediate ad conjunction em
vocatur gratia gratum faciens ; alia vero ultimi tinis ; gratiae autem gratis data?
per quam unus homo cooperatur alter! ordinant hominem ad qua&dam prsepa-
ad hoc quod ad Deum reducatur ; hujus- ratoria finis ultimi, sicut per prophetiam
modi autem donum vocatur gratia et miracula. Et ideo gratia gratum
gratis data; quia supra facultatem na- faciens est multoexcellentior quam gratia
turae, etsupra meritum personae homini gratis data. l
m 2 dae Q. iii. A. 1. 5.
conceditur. Sed quia non datur ad hoc Gratia habitus gratus a Deo causa
ut homo ipse per earn justificetur, sed efficiens meriti. . . Virtutes theolo-
.
in this way, i. e.
by the freewill of the individual sustaining
and guarding it ? In either of these cases such a grace as
this involves no doctrine of efficacious and irresistible grace ;
1
Gratia est nitor animse sanctum sic vos in matin mea. Sed lutum non
concilians amorem. ms 2 a " e ex necessitate accipit formam a figulo,
l Q. 110.
A. 2. quantumcunque sit praeparatum.
8
Ergo
Homo comparatur ad Deum sicut neque homo recipit ex necessitate prra-
lutum ad flgulum, secundum illud tiam a Deo, quantumcunque se prze-
Jer. 18. 6. Sicut lutum in manu figuli paret. l ma 2 dae Q. 1 12. A. 3.
288 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
moved.
The distinction indeed of operating and co-operating grace,
gratia operans et cooperans, appears at first sight to imply
an original act of the will, with which Divine grace co-ope-
rates, and which is co-ordinate with that grace. But as
act, the other its manifestation ; the one the real moral act
mota ; Deus autem ut movens et prae- ; jusmodi actus dicitur gratia cooperans."
sertim cum voluntas bonum l
m 2d iii. A. 2.
incipit Q.
CHAP. X.] OF PREDESTINATION. 289
the question is, upon what law does this state of things last ?
Does permanence depend on the individual's own original
its
indiget ut ei perseverantia a Deo detur. mentum peccati, quia hoc ipsura quod
. . . Postquam aliquis est justificatus est peccare, opponitur perseverantiae ;
per gratiam, necesse habet a Deopetere ita quod si aliquis perseverantiam me-
perse verantiae donum ; ut scilicet cus- reretur, Deus non permitteret ilium
todiatur a malo usque ad finem vitae. cadere in peccatum. Non igitur per-
Multis enim datur gratia quibus non severantia cadit sub merito. .
. Per-
.
U
290 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
was from having this source of acts in his mind, that a man
was good, rather than from the acts considered in themselves.
As was concerned, then, with the production of
grace
goodness, the schoolmen, incorporating the Aristotelian doc-
trine of habits with the doctrine of grace, maintained that
God imparted goodness in the shape of habit ; and the result
was, the distinction between habitual and actual grace
1
gratia habitualis et actualis ; a distinction which, in their
mode it out, produced such a labyrinth of com-
of carrying
1 " Homo ad recte vivendum duplici- secundo ratione speciali propter condi-
tur auxilio Dei indiget uno quidern
: tionem status humanae naturae ; quae
modo quantum ad aliquod habituale do- quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quan-
num, per quod natura humana corrupta tum ad mentem, remanet tamen in eo
sanetur, et etiam sanata elevetur ad corruptio et infectio quantum ad car-
operanda opera meritoria vitsc aeternas, nem . . . et ideo necesse est nobis ut
2 "
Habitus homini a Deo infundun- sionem sua? virtutis producit sanitatem
tur. . . Ratio cst quia aliqui habitus
. absque causa natnrali quse tamen per
;
sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad naturam posset causari ; ita etiam quan-
finem excedentem facultatem humanae doque infundit homini illos habitus qui
et quia habitus oportet naturali virtute possunt causari." l
m
naturae, . . .
U 2
292 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
discipline.
Now, so far as the schoolman in this scheme simply asserts
that God can, and often does, implant holy dispositions and
habits in human souls, without previous discipline and
up of the human soul, one set, at the point where its power
failed, being taken up, and its action carried on
by another.
The theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, were
infused habits. But though, their infusion into a particular
soul being supposed, these were true habits or dispositions
of that soul; they were passive and inert, not producing
acts until they were moved from another quarter to do so.
They were habits indeed, but elementary ones, imperfectly
possessed, and rather of the nature of principles or faculties
1
He admits natural moral virtue in portionem humanae naturae excedit,
limited way, p. 291. principia naturalia hominis non suffi-
2
Et quia hujusmodi beatitude pro- ciunt ad ordinandum hominem in bea-
CHAP. X.] OF PREDESTINATION. 295
principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad autem (theologica) habetur quasi im-
beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per perfecta. Sed id quod imperfecte habet
principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem naturam aliquam non habet per se ope-
connaturalem et hujusmodi principia
:
ab altero moveatur. ... Ad
rari, nisi
dicuntur virtutes theologicce ; turn quia finem ultimum naturalem ad quam ratio
habent Deum pro objecto, turn quia a movet, secundum quod est imperfecte
solo Deo nobis infunduntur. l ma 2 dae formata per theologicas virtutes, non
Q. 62. A. 1. sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper
1
Manifestum est quod virtutes hu- adsit instinctus Spiritus Sancti A. 2.
manae proficiunt hominem, secundum 2
Loco naturalium principiorum con-
quod homo natus est moveri per ra- feruntur nobis a Deo virtutes theolo-
tionem. Oportet igitur inesse homini gicae. . . Unde oportet quod his etiam
.
u 4
296 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
God : and no habit, as has been just said, can put itself in
1
See p. 290. actualis quod tune datur, quando actu
2
Non habitus qui faelt facere,
est volumus et operamur. . . inspirans
.
qualified them for it, and abandon the rest, from whom
He withheld such grace, to eternal punishment. But this
formal scheme laid down, the attentive reader of Aquinas
will next observe a certain general leaning and bias towards
a modifying interpretation of it.
Having constructed a
pinquior, per actualem gratiam," really neque actiones angelorum essent spe-
had. p. 338. This position is main- cialia Dei dona, hoc est, non eis Deus
tained as the only one which cuts off special! donatione seu gratia largiretur.
the ground of merit from man. Did Tantummodo enim donabat ea in
he use habitual grace by his own power radice, quatenuseisadjutoriumquoddam
of choice, he would have the merit of gratia; tribuebat, sine quo .non. .
his own use of this grace (p. 186.); poterant sed ipsum velle, agere, et
:
but if this grace is put in action by perseverare, non eis dabat adjutorium
another grace, no ground of merit in gratise, sed propria voluntas . . . Tune
the man himself remains. And a dis- igitur velle et agere bonum non erat
tinction is drawn in this respect be- speciale Dei donum, sed tantum gene-
tween fallen man and the angels. rale. pp. 935, 936.
llinc nascebatur ut neque volitioncs
298 SCHOLASTIC DOCTIilNE [CHAP. X.
1
Bradwardine has less scruple cum omnibus suis domesticis reprobatis
Ecce triplex bonum ex reprobis utilitas
: tollereturde medio, essetque coelumtan-
electorum, bonum naturae, seculique tummodo cum civibus suis sanctis tune :
1
Est autem duplex hominis beati- dum quandam Divinitatis participa-
tude una
; quidem proportionata tionem ;
secundum quod dicitur
humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo (2 Pet. i.) quod per Christum facti
sum us m*
pervenire potest per principia suae na- consortes divines natures. l
1
La distance infinie des corps aux mouvement de charite ; car elle est
esprits figure la distance
infiniment plus d'un ordre infiniment plus eleve'.
infinie des esprits a la charite ; car elle De tous les corps ensemble on ne
est surnaturelle. saurait tirer la moindre pensee: cela
Tous les corps, le firmament, les est impossible, et d'un autre ordre.
etoiles, la terre et les royaumes ne Tous les corps et les esprits ensemble
valent pas le moindre des esprits ; car ne sauraient produire un mouvement
il connait tout cela, et soi-meme ; et de vraie charite : cela est impossible,
le corps, rien. Et tous les corps, et et d'un autre ordre tout surnaturel.
tons les esprits ensemble, et toutes leurs Pascal.
productions, ne valent pas le moindre
302 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
" Charitas
diligit Deum super om- cum
1
spiritualem Deo. Addit etiam
nia eminentius quam natura. Natura charitas super naturalem* dilectionsm
enim diligit Deum super omnia, prout Dei, promptitudinem quandam et delec-
l ma 2
daa
est principium et finis naturalis boni ; tationem." Q. 109. A. 3.
charitas autem, secundum quod est 2 <3ac
lmft 2 Q. 6 8. A. 1.
objectum beatitudinis, et secundum 3
lm a 2 de Q. 1Q. A. 6.
1 " Ad Unde
illud autem, ad quod noil po- ratio prsedicta transmissionis crea-
test aliquid virtute suae naturae perve- turae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae
nire, oportet quod ab alio transmittatur, pradestinatio nominatur ; nam desti-
sicut sagitta a sagittante mittitur ad nare est mittere." ma
l Q. 23. A. 1.
Unde 2 "
signum. proprie loquendo, ra- Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad
tionalis creatura,quae est capax vitae bonum secundum quod modificatur per
aeternae perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo legem divinam, et non per rationem
transtnissa. Cu,]us quidem transmissionis humanam, non potest causari per actus
ratio in Deo praeexistir, sicut et in eo humanos quorum principium est ratio;
est ratio ordinis omnium in finem. sed causatur solum in nobis per ope-
Ratio autem alicujus fiendi existens est rationem divinam." m
I * 2 dae Q. 63.
queedam praeexistentia rei fiendae in eo. A. 2.
304 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
in the human race, which meets with its due punishment in one
of these, with a gratuitous pardon in the other. Aquinas,
then, formally adopts the Augustinian scheme, with the esta-
blished defences. But a careful observation of his language
will detect a contest between two different rationales in his
mind ;
the Clementine view of human nature struggling with
1 "
Creaturis autem naturalibus sic dum bonum supernaturale aeternum in-
providet ut non solum moveat eas ad fundit aliquas formas, seu qualitates sn~
actus naturales, sed etiam largitur eis pernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et
formas et virtutes quasdam quae sunt prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum
principia actuum. . . Multo igitur aeternum consequendum." l ma 2 dae Q.
great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but
also of wood and earth, and some to honour and some to dis-
honour.' But why He has elected these, and reprobated
those, there is no reason but the Divine Will, as Augustine
saith,
'
Why He draws this man, and not that, do not to in-
quire, if thou wouldest not err.' Just as in natural things, a
reason can be assigned, why out of uniform elemental matter
one part is put under the form of fire, and another under the
form of earth, and so on ; but why this or that
part of matter is
chosen for this or that form none can be,
except the arbitrary
x
306 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
1 "
Sicut in rebus naturalibus potest est sub ista forma, et ilia sub alia, de-
assignari ratio, cum prima materia tota pendet ex simplici divina voluntate ;
sit in se uniformis, quare una pars ejus sicut ex simplici voluntate artificis de-
est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma pendet quod ille lapis est in ista parte
terrae a Deo in principio condita, ut sic parietis, et ille in alia, quamvis ratio
sit divcrsitas specierum in rebus natu- artis habeat quod aliqui sint in
liac, et
ralibus sed quare hsec pars materite aliqui sint in ilia."
m
; l Q. 23. A. 5.
CHAP. X.J OF PREDESTINATION. 307
sonal. Nor could any argument be drawn from the fact, that
children suffered pain in this world because this world
; was not
under the strict law of justice, as the next was. Nor did this
x 2
308 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X,
1
"In autem perfectionibus et
aliis detrimentum sustinebunt pro peccato
bonitatibus naturam humanam
quac original! damnati." In Lonib. 1. 2,
jection to say, that this exclusion does not arise from their
own personal fault ; for immunity from blame does not
diminish, but increase the pain of punishment :
or, again,
correct to say, that they are happy because they do not know
what they have lost ; for the soul freed from the burden of
the body must know whatever reason can discover et
etiam multo plura.
The general solution, then, of this difficulty, is, that it is
1
Sicut nullus sapiens homo affligitur fuit. Pueri autem nunquam fuerunt
de hoc quod non potest volare sicut proportionati ad hoc, quod vitam aeter-
avis, vel quia non est rex vel imperator; nam haberent, quae nee eis debebatur ex
cum sibi non sit debitum. . . Si ab .
principiis naturae, nee actus proprios
hoc deficiant (qui liberum arbitrium habere potuerunt et ideo nihil omnino
:
habent), maximus crit dolor eis quia dolebunt de carentia divine visionis:
amittunt illud quod suum esse possibile immo magis gaudebunt de hoc quod
x 3
310 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE [CHAP. X.
participabunt multum de divina boni- and darkness under the earth, but
tate, et perfectionibus naturalibus. without fire; the Franciscans say they
In Lomb. A. 2. are to remain upon the earth, and in
The question came up in the disputes light. Some affirmed also, .that they
at the Council of Trent, in which the should be philosophers, busying them-
majority appear to have favoured the selves in natural things, not without
position of Aquinas ;but not without that greatest pleasure which happeneth
" For the Dominicans
distinctions ; when curiosity is satisfied by invention."
said that the children dead without Paul's History of the Council of
baptism before the use of reason Trent.
remain after the resurrection in a limbo
CHAP. X.] OF PREDESTINATION. 311
life and the spiritual life, in the sense in which they have
been spoken of, exist as facts in the world and we see these ;
proverb.
In this state of the case it is needless to add, that the
CHAP. XL
CONCLUSION.
they avoid doing so ? But over and above this general and
vague confession of ignorance, it might have been expected,
perhaps, that more would have attained, than appear to have
done, to something like an accurate or philosophical per-
for the sake of rest, and enjoys it. But difficulty with pas-
siveness, is uncongenial. We want always, when we are at
up, is, for the time that it is such a waiting, and previous to
its reward, a painful void and hollowness of the mind. But
such is the attitude which is required for true analytical
thought, or the mind's examination of itself. For the
ideas which are the contents of that inward world, wandering
in and out of darkness, emerging for an instant and then lost
again, and carried about to and fro in the vast obscure, are
too subtle and elusive to be subject matter of regular and
active pursuit ; but must be waited and watched for, with
to catch and
strength suspended and sustained in readiness
fasten on them when they come within reach but the exer- ;
lectual eye, have caught sharp glimpses of the great ideas and
processes of the human reason, quick and momentary sights,
which, impressed by their vividness upon the memory, and
thence transferred to paper, have enabled them in a certain
sense to bring the human mind to light, to mark its main
outlines, and distinguish perceptions or ideas ; by
its different
ways ; but either does not see at all, and has a blank before
it, or has only an incipient and indistinct sight, not amount-
obscurity. Each
successive step of demonstrative reasoning,
ignorance.
And these considerations, while they serve to explain
Hume and Hobbes on the one side we may oppose Butler and
Pascal on the other. But could we expect that the gene-
rality of men would exert that intellectual self-discipline
1
This appears to have been Hume's state of mind with respect to religious
truths.
322 CONCLUSION. [CHAP. XT.
their whole lives, thinking they know a great deal more than
dogmatism.
And now, to bring these remarks to bear on the subject
of this treatise, the question of Divine grace is a question
of Divine Power. Grace is power. That power whereby
God works in nature is called power. That power whereby
He works in the wills of His reasonable creatures is called
question ; for no one can be blamed for not doing that which
is impossible. But if this limit is not allowed, and if God
could have created a universe with all the advantages of the
present one and none of its evils, and if, when moral evil
had begun, He could have removed it ; it is
certainly very
difficult to answer the question why He did not ; for we
necessarily attribute consummate benevolence to the Deity.
The explanation of such a difficulty on the principle of variety,
that evil and good together, with their respective reward and
punishment, redound to the glory of God more than good
alone of itself would do, is futile and puerile. Variety is
cceterisparibus an advantage ;
and we praise God's natural
creation, not only because it is good, but because that good
is various. Nor would it be reasonable to object to different
degrees of good in the created universe ; to complain because
the earth was not as beautiful all over as it is at its most
beautiful part, or because all the birds of the air have not the
colours of the tropical birds; or even, in moral life, because
allhave not the same moral capabilities or power of attaining
the same goodness. But when it comes to a comparison,
not of like good with varied, or of higher good with lower,
but of good with evil, the case is very different.
Upon this abstract idea, then, of the Divine Power, as an
unlimited power, rose up the Augustinian doctrine of Pre-
destination and grace ; while upon the abstract idea of free-
because his own idea was simple and intelligible, and the
religion of human nature was mysterious and complex as ;
religion of man.
In this state of the case the Church has made a wise
CHAP. XL] CONCLUSION. 333
1
About time a circumstance
this on Predestination and Election more
occurred, which
then excited con- clearand perspicuous, and less liable
siderable interest, and in which the to be wrested by our adversaries to
part that Dr. Porteous took has been a Calvinisticsense, which has been
much misinterpreted and misunder- so unjustly affixed to it On
stood. The following statement in these grounds we applied in a private
his own words will place the fact in its and respectful manner to Archbishop
" At the close of
true point of view : Cornwallis, requesting him to signify our
the year 1772, and the beginning of wishes (which we conceived to be the
the next, an attempt was made by wishes of a very large proportion, both
myself, and a few other clergymen, of the clergy and laity) to the rest of
among whom were Mr. Francis Wol- the bishops, that everything might be
laston, Dr. Percy, now Bishop of Dro- done which could be prudently and
more, and Dr. Torke, now Bishop of safely done, to promote these important
Ely, to induce the bishops to promote and salutary purposes."
" The answer
a review of the Liturgy and Articles ; given by the Arch-
in order to amend in both, but parti- bishop, February 11. 1773, was in these
cularly in the latter, those parts which words :I have consulted severally my
'
allreasonable persons agreed stood in need brethren the bishops, and it is the
of amendment. This plan was meant opinion of the Bench in general, that
to strengthen and confirm the eccle- nothing can in prudence be done in
siasticalestablishment ; to repel the the matter which has been submitted
"
attacks which were at that time con- to our consideration.' Works of Bishop
tinually made upon it by its avowed Porteous, vol. i. p. 38.
enemies ; to render the 1 7th Article
CHAP. XL] CONCLUSION. 335
general will see that on this and some other questions truth
is twofold, and is not confined to either side that our
singly,
perceptions are indistinct and contradictory, and therefore,
do not justify any one definite position, remains to be seen.
Philosophers have from time to time prophesied a day, when
a better understanding would commence of man with himself,
and of man with man. They have risen up from the survey
of the past with the idea that it is impossible that mankind
can go on for ever repeating the same mistakes ; that they
must one day see the limits of human reason, distinguish
what they know from what they do not know, and draw the
necessary conclusion, that on some questions they cannot
insist on any one absolute truth, and condemn each other
hymns, being the fruit and expression less in those points which are called
of my own experience, will coincide Calvinistic, appear desirous that the
with the views of real Christians of Calvinists should for their sakes, studi-
all denominations. But I cannot ex- ously avoid every expression which they
pect that every sentiment I have ad- cannot approve. Yet few of them, I
vanced will be universally approved. believe, impose a like restraint upon
However, I am not conscious of having themselves, but think the importance of
written a single line with an inten- what they deem to be truth justifies them
tion either to flatter or offend any in speaking their sentiments plainly and
party or person upon earth. I have strongly. May I not plead for an equal
simply declared my own views and liberty ? The views I have received of
feelings. . . I am a friend of peace ;
. the doctrines of grace are essential to
and being deeply convinced that no my peace I could not live comfortably
:
one can profitably understand the great a day or an hour without them. I
truths and doctrines of the Gospel any likewise believe, yea, as far as my poor
further than he is taught by God, I attainments warrant me to speak, I
have not a wish to obtrude my own know them to be friendly to holiness,
tenets upon others in a way of con- and to have a direct influence in pro-
troversy ; yet I do not think myself ducing and maintaining a Gospel con-
bound to conceal them. Many gracious versation
; and therefore I must not
persons (for many such I am persuaded be ashamed of them." Newton's Pre-
there are) who differ from me more or face to the Olney Hymns.
Z 2
340 CONCLUSION. [CHAP. XI.
may differ, not in holding truth and error, but only in holding
different sides of the same truth. And with this reflection
I will conclude the present treatise. After long considera-
tion of the subject, I must profess myself unable to see on
what strictly argumentative ground the two great parties in
the English Church can, on the question which has occupied
this treatise viz. the operation of Divine grace, and on other
regeneration. A
slight consideration will be enough to show
how intimately this doctrine is connected with the general
doctrine of grace ; and that one who holds an extreme, and
one who holds a modified doctrine of grace in general,
cannot hold the doctrine of baptismal regeneration in the
same If a latitude of opinion, then, may be allowed
sense.
on the general question, it seems to follow that an equal lati-
tude may be allowed on this further and more particular one ;
and that if an extreme predestinarian, and a maintainer of
z 3
342 CONCLUSION. [CHAP. XI.
NOTE I.
p. 4.
NOTE II. p. 8.
p. 370.
This is perhaps a misinterpretation of the predestinarian
statement quoted. The Divine decree, it is true, is, ac-
w
cording to that statement, terminated to the entities of men,"
(s
and has no respect to their qualifications," as the cause or
reason of such decree ; but it may still have respect to such
qualifications as the effects of such decree. But, whatever
may be said of this particular statement, such an interpreta-
tion of it, if meant for a representation of the doctrine of
Q. 95. Art. 1.
This necessity of grace, however, before the fall is
explained by Aquinas with various distinctions, the substance
of which is, that grace is wanted for supernatural virtue only
by man in his upright state, but for natural as well in his
corrupt ; while the assistance of God as Prime Mover, which
he distinguishes from grace, is necessary for all acts in Iboth
states. "Homo in statu naturae integrae potest operari virtute
suae naturae bonum quod est sibi connaturale absque super-
additione gratuiti doni, licet non absque auxilio Dei moventis."
l
ma 2 dae 109. Art. 3.
Q.
" Secundum
utrumque statum (corruptum et integrum)
natura humana indiget Divino auxilio ad faciendum vel
volendum quodcunque bonum, sicut primo movente. Sed in
statu naturae integrae poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et
NOTE V. p. 27.
such a one, and that it never occurs without having the phe-
nomenon in question as its effect or consequence. On the
p. 358.
first place, to ask, what is meant by the
I will stop, in the
word " character," in the assertion that
" a
person's actions
( ;
upon self, which the latter, carried away by the fallacy that
the certainty of the end supersedes the necessity of the means
or subordinate agencies,denies it. " fatalist or A believes,
half believes (for nobody a consistent fatalist), not only that
is
compose that sum. Have the individuals who have been bad
and good, selfish and disinterested, been so in conjunction
with different respective sets of antecedents i. e. different cir- ;
misit, nostra vero quia fecit Adam, etin illo fuimus omnes.
Op. Imp. 1. 3. c. 25.
peccatum, sicut pictus homo non vere homo est, sed vere est
infans qui nullum habet
pictus homo, profecto sequitur quia
peccatum nisi originale mundus est a peccato. . . .
Qtiare
omne peccatum est injustitia, et originale peccatum est abso-
lute peccatum." C. 3.
Aquinas against the imputation of another's act for the
is
tion in the world to make men not to love God, of whom men
so easily speak such horrid things." p. 373. "Is hell so easy
a pain, or are the souls of children of so cheap, so contempti-
ble a price, that God should so easily throw them into hell ?
God's goodness, which pardons many sins that we could avoid,
will not so easily throw them into hell for what they could
not avoid." p. 14. "To condemn infants to hell for the
fault of another, is to deal worse with them than God did to
the very devils, who did not perish but by an act of their own
most perfect choice. This, besides the formality of injustice
or cruelty, does add and suppose a circumstance of a strange,
be lessened by any act of the same faculty, for the act is not
contrary to the faculty, and therefore can do nothing towards
its destruction. As a consequent of this I infer that there
is no natural necessity of sinning, that there is no sinful
action to which naturally we are determined; but it is our
own choice that we sin." p. 88.
This is the Pelagian argument for freewill which we meet
with in S. Augustine and it has the one-sidedness of that
;
ourselves possessed ?
with the mysterious one, not that the mysterious one is not
maintained. So of the text ft Death passed upon all men ; for
that all have sinned," he says, " all men, that is, the gene-
rality of mankind, all that lived till they could sin the others ;
'
(
The ungodly as soon as they be born, they go astray and
speak lies,' which, because it cannot be true in the letter,
NOTE VII. 367
Pharisees,
(
Thou wertaltogether born in sin, and dost thou
teach us?'; which phrase and manner of speaking being
plainly a reproach of the poor blind man and a disparage-
ment of him, did mean only to call him a very wicked
person, not that he had derived his sin originally and from
his birth." p. 27. But even were the text <( In sin hath
my mother conceived me," only a phrase to express the depth
and strength of sin in the character of the person using it,
why should that depth and strength of sin be expressed in
that form ? Why does David, on the first deep perception
of his own guilt, and the hold w hich sin has had over him,
r
ginal sin, but to the actual ; and of this sense of the word
nature,' in the matter of sinning, we have Justin Martyr,
(
the action and the guilt are relatives, one cannot be done
without the other, something must be done inwardly or
outwardly, or there can be no guilt. But then for the evil
of punishment, that
may pass further than the action. If it
passes upon the innocent it is not a punishment to them, but
than it would have been but for Adam's sin we are not ;
B B 2
372 NOTE VIII.
"
Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by
Jesus Christ to Himself," adoption always implying in the
So 2 Tim. i. 9. " Who hath saved us
epistles sanctity. :
being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, it
is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated."
"
predestinated us to be conformed to the image of His Son."
But the ninth chapter of Romans, just quoted, supplies
the most decisive answer to this qualification of the doctrine
of predestination; it being expressly said there that the
purpose of God according to election is antecedent to any dif-
ferences of life and conduct between one man and another ;
that formed while the children are yet unborn, and have
it is
is
clay of the same lump of which some vessels are made to
" But to
deny ourselves and renounce all works is a work :
making was the fault of the clay." Vol. ix. p. 462. But is
clay was of the same lump, and therefore the difference of the
Divine design did not arise from any difference in the clay.
Origen makes in the same way a difference in the clay, though
the very phrase eadem massa, which he accepts, as he is
" Videns Deus
obliged to do, from the Apostle, refutes it. pu-
potestatem habens ex eadem massa facere
ritatein ejus, et
aliud vas ad honorem aliud ad contumeliam, Jacob quidem
cujus animam non ita pur am nee ita simplicem videbat, ex ea-
dem massa fecit ad contumeliam." In Eom. ix. vol. iv. p. 616.
With the explanation of foreseen goodness, however, as the
ground of election, Jackson couples the other mode of recon-
with freewill viz. that of election to means
ciling the passage ;
" The
and opportunities. Apostle imagineth such a potter
as the wise man did, that knows a reason why he makes one
vessel of this fashion, another of that, why he appoints this
to a base use, that to a better." P. 462.
Hooker's explanation of the passage (given in a recently dis-
covered and edited writing, made an appendix to Ecclesiastical
Polity, bk. v.) makes, like Origen's and Jackson's, a difference
in the clay, though he will not at the same time allow that the
Divine Justice requires this reason for its own defence. " Sup-
pose (which is yet false) that there were nothing in it, but only so
God will have it, suppose God did harden and soften, choose
and cast off, make honourable and detestable, whom Himself
will, and that without any cause moving Him one way or
other, are we not all in His hands as clay? If thus God did
deal, what injury were it ? How much less now, when they on
whom His severity worketh are not found like the clay with-
out form, as apt to receive the best shape as any other, but
are in themselves and by their own disposition fashioned for
destruction and for wrath." Keble's Ed. vol. ii.
p. 748.
Now, of this explanation the first part undoubtedly adheres
to the natural meaning of the passage in S. Paul more
ing his later ones on the subject of freewill, and shows that,
though not consistently brought out, the germ of his ultimate
system was to be found in parts of that treatise. He refers
particularly to the scheme of the two kinds of Divine gifts
laid down in 1. 2. cc. 18, 19. according to which both those
;
which did and those which did not admit of a bad use (vir-
tutes and potentice) were alike gifts of God. The explana-
tion which he gives in the Retractations of some of the state-
NOTE X. 381
NOTE X. p. 56.
SUNT alii
[Pelagiani] tarn validis testimoniis non audentes
resistere ; ideoque dant Deo primitias extrinsecas gratiae et
fidei, ac bonorum similium, sed hominibus gratiam ipsam et
fidem cum caeterisbonis hujusmodi. Dicunt enim Deum
semper praevenire pulsando, et excitando ad gratiam, fidem, et
ad bona similia, et hominem subsequi aperiendo et consen-
tiendo, et hoc ex propriis viribus per seipsum, juxta illud
" Ecce sto ad
Apoc. 3. : ostium, et pulso : si quis audierit
vocem meam, et aperuerit mihi januam, introibo ad ilium, et
crenabo cum illo, et ipse mecum." Hi autem faciunt Deum
332 NOTE X.
NOTE XL p. 59.
possibility is
through the Divine grace or power, and by a
miraculous exertion of that power. " Et ideo
ejus perfec-
tionem etiam in hac vita esse possibilem, negare non possu-
mus, quia omnia possibilia sunt Deo, sive quae facit sola sua
voluntate, sive qua? cooperantibus creaturas suaa voluntatibus
a se fieri posse constituit. Ac per hoc quicquid eorum non
facit, sine exemplo est quidem in ejus operibus factis ; sed
credendum, neminem vel fuisse, vel esse, vel fore in hac vita
qui hoc opus impleverit, ab homine impleri potest.
si Sed
cogitare debes quamvis ad homines id agere pertineat, hoc quo-
que munus esse divinum, atque ideo non dubitare opus esse
divinum." De Spir. et Lit. n. 2. " Si omnes illos sanctos
et sanctas, cum hie vixerunt, congregare possemus, et interro-
'
laudem humilitatis in parte non ponere falsitatis.' Itaque hoc
si verum dicerent, haberent peccatum, quod, humiliter quia
faterentur veritas in eis esset si autem hoc mentirentur,:
thin) are to our affections and moral feelings. Let the reader
c c 2
388 NOTE xi r.
suppose this,, and he will have before him the precise import
of the scriptural doctrine of original sin."
It is evident that, according to this rationale, Adam as first
created had original sin, and had a corrupt nature as truly
as any of his posterity. For the first sinful act of man is as
open as any other to this reasoning from effect to cause, from
an evil act to an evil will, and from an evil will to a source
of evil in the will or original sin so that Adam's sin in
:
finite debt (in the proper and law-court sense of the word
c c 3
390 NOTE XII.
purpose
'
: Now, I trust, you are appeased, and will be
henceforward reconciled to James. I have satisfied all your
claims on him. I have paid his debt in full and you are :
1
Op. Imp. 1. 2. c. 47. 64. ; 1. 3. c. 85.
NOTE XIII. 393
that if one sin had been the source of the general sinfulness of
"
mankind, it would have been written from one offence," not
"from many offences unto justification." 2 The unity of the
source is not inconsistent with plurality in the proceeds from
it. To interpret "many "again to mean many offences of
one and the same person was gratuitous 3 , though convenient
for a coveted inference, that the state out of which a man was
raised at justification was contemplated here only as a state of
posterity.
3
The Pelagian observed that sorrows were " mul-
4
tiplied" on the woman, as if they had existed before and ;
non liberal quenquam nisi ipse." Ibid. eas esse faciam. Poterat multiplicare
3 " Sicut
omnes, i. e. -multi Adae quae non erant." Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 26.
5 "
imitatione moriuntur, ita omnes, i. e. Quid ei novum accidisse credi-
multi Christi imitatione salvantur." mus, si sentiret sudorem." Op Imp.
Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 31. 1. 6. c. 27.
NOTE XIV. 395
\ 3
Op. Imp. 1. 6. c. 27. L. 2. c. 28.
2 u damnatus 4
L. 6. c. 27.
Imo, inquis et est, et
nihil ei accidit novi. Hie risum tenere
difficile est." -L. 6. c.27.
396 NOTE XIV.
que perfectio naturae quam non dabant anni, sed sola manus
Dei, non potuit nisi habere voluntatem aliquam, eamque non
malam. Bona3 igitur voluntatis factus est homo neque . . .
"
Spiritum quern tune de afflatu ejus acceperat." De Bap-
tismo, c. 5. Clemens Alexandrinus speaks of" the characteris-
tical propriety of the Holy Spirit superadded" to the nature
of Adam :
7rpoa<yiv6fjisvov
f
dylov Trvsvfjbaros )(apaicTripicniKov
t'Stcoyita. Strom. 1 6. c. 16. Athanasius speaks of God impart-
avrols KOI TTJS rov I&LOV A6<yov ^vvdfjisws. De Incar. Verb. torn,
i. c. 3. Basil speaks of the " assession of God, and conjunction
with him (Adam) by love 17 Trpoo-sBpsta rov 6sov} /cal rj Sia rrjs
familiar abode of the Spirit in the first man, and the cha-
racter and seal stamped by the Spirit upon him, evidently
'
THUS Justin Martyr Fays of the human race o dirb TOV :
"
Quid festinat innocens aetas ad remissionem peccatorum."
" *E\66vTs sisTovSs TOV
Tertullian, De Bapt. c. 18. Koa^ov
Cat. iv. 13. " To aTrsi-
avafidpTijToi." Cyril of Jerusalem,
pofcaicov vrjTriov . .
prj SSOJJLSVOV TTJS s/c TOV /ca6ap0f)vai vytSLas,
OTL fj,r)Ss Trjv dpfflv Trjv voaov Trj ^v^(fj TrapsSs^aTO. . . TO /JLIJTS
ev dydOq), fj,r)TS h KCLKW vpi(TKo^svov^ Gregory Nyss. (De iis
subject.
vdr](Tiv, rj T(j>
VOCTOVVTL TO Ejji7ra\ti> /caraSiKrjv nva TO fjur] /ASTE-
^dsvri TTfs (f)vasa)9, TO yu-^ Evspyslv Tr)V opacriv rbv avrov TOTTOV
Kal f) fjua/capia for) av/ji^urjs sari, /cat OiKsla rols KSKaOapfMsvo^
ra 777? 'tyvxfjs aladrjrrjpia. Upon this principle he proceeds
to argue that the happiness of infants in a future state will
be in proportion to their capacity for it, which will be lower
than that of those who have lived virtuously as mature men ;
D D
402 KOTE XVII.
sunt omnium, sed alias animas minus, alias plus gravant, pro
diversitate judiciorum Dei, occultorum quidem, sed sine ulla
" ET
propterea conantur parvulis non baptizatis innocentiae
merito salutem ac vitam aeternam tribuere ; sed, quia bap-
tizati non sunt, eos a regno coelorum facere alienos nova :
Ibid. c. xxvii.
"
Quemadmodum enim omnes omnino pertinentes ad
generationem voluntatis carnis non moriuntur nisi in Adam
in quo omnes peccaverunt: sic ex his omnes omnino per-
tinentes ad regenerationem voluntatis spiritus non vivi-
ficantur nisi in quo omnes justificantur. Quia
Christo, in
sicut per unum omnes ad condemnationem, sic per unuin
omnes ad justificationem. Nee est ullus medius locus ut
possit esse nisi cum diabolo, qui non est cum Christo. Hie et
D D 2
404 NOTE XVIII.
"
De Dono Perseverantice, c. xii.
respondeas Deo ?
;
c. vii.
" Ac male vivendo addiderunt ad
per hoc, quia nihil ipsi
Qui ibi non est in sinistra est. Quid erit in sinistra ? Ite in
whereby to be saved is
deservedly not given unto all men:
7. That no man cometh unto Christ, whom God by the in-
ward grace of the Spirit draweth not 8. And that it is not :
in every one, no, not in any man's mere ability, freedom, and
NOTE XX. 409
possint, si
Hookerjnserts after "is not given,"
voluerint."
" which softens the effect, though the desert may
deservedly?
be admitted by the most rigid predestinarian in the shape
of original sin. There is a real difference between the two
statements of doctrine, in the omission in Hooker's of the
doctrine of assurance, which is asserted in the Lambeth
document.
pro omnibus, nisi solummodo pro his qui passionis ejus sal-
vantur mysterio.
5. Postquam primus homo libero arbitrio cecidit, nemo
<s
'*
Deus omnipotens omnes homines sine exceptione vult salvos
fieri, licet non omnes salventur," to which proposition Remi-
that man responsible for his own sins, and not God, is ap-
is
pended
Augustine. Indeed, no one who professed to be a Christian
could teach the doctrine without such a check. No Christian
NOTE XXT. 415
of any school could make God the author of evil, or say that
sin was not blameworthy.
ego sane ad
arcanam Dei electionem homines ablego, ut inde
salutem hiantes expectent : sed recte ad Christum pergere
jubeo, in quo
nobis proposita est salus quas alioqui in Deo
;
scribit,
'
Solus homo inter animalia liber : et tamen, inter-
veniente peccato, patitur quandam vim et ipse, sed a voluntate
non a natura, ut ne sic quidem ingenita libertate privetur.
Quod enim voluntarium Et paulo post
etiam liberum.'
(
Ita nescio
quo pravo miro modo et
ipsa sibi voluntas, pec-
cato quidem in deterius mutata, necessitatem facit; ut nee
necessitas (cum voluntaria sit) excusare valeat voluntatem,
nee voluntas (quum sit illecta) excludere necessitatem.' Est
enim necessitas haec quodammodo voluntaria." L. 2. c. 3. s. 5.
E E
418 NOTE XXI.
pere, s'il
manque quelque chose a ce pouvoir, 1'appelez vous
prochain ? et direz vous, par exemple, qu'un homme ait, la
nuit, et sous aucune lumiere, le pouvoir de voir ? Oui-da, il
enfin, mon pere, cette grace donnee a tous les hommes est
porte jamais le
plus, et que rien ne lui
qiia ce qui lui plait
plait tant alors que ce bien unique, qui comprend en soi tous
les autres biens ? Quod enim amplius nos delectat, secundum
id operemur necesse est, comme dit saint Augustin. Exp.
Ep. ad Gal. n. 49.
" C'est
ainsi que Dieu dispose de la volonte libre de 1'homme
sans lui imposer de necessite, et que le libre arbitre, qui pent
nie qu'on ait le pouvoir d'y resister ; car alors il serait here-
cannot act but in the way in which grace moves " Non quod :
THE END.
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upon the whole in a tone alike removed from fanaticism or coldness. Spectator.
" ROBERTSON'S
CHURCH HISTORY brings within a reasonable compass the most
important events, and the most conspicuous features of the progressive development
of the external form of her doctrines and her institutions. The spirit in which the
narrative is composed is that of a sound English Churchman. Clergymen and
Divinity students will find the work exceedingly valuable as a guide in the prose-
cution of their studies." John Bull.
" ROBERTSON'S
CHURCH HISTORY. Theological students will find the learned
annotations to this volume of the greatest use. It has a table of the various wor
cited, and is supplied with an excellent index. Its genuine scholarship and wi
research will obtain for its author considerable reputation." The Press.
"
ROBERTSON'S CHURCH HISTORY enjoys the rare merit of being free from par-
tisanship, or at least of effectually excluding it from historical investigation and ;
the diligence with which the author has searched for the truth, as well as the clear-
ness with which he has exhibited the results, will render his book a popular source
of information on the subject." Morning Post.
" ROBERTSON'S
CHURCH HISTORY only professes to supply us with a ' readable
'
introduction to the early history of the Church ; but with the volume in our
hands we are disposed to rank it somewhat higher. It is written by a man who
understands the bearings of his subject, and exhibits more than ordinary skill in
the construction of his materials ; but the features we select for special commen-
dation are his candour, honesty, and independence in handling controverted ques-
tions." Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology.
"
ROBERTSON'S CHURCH HISTORY during the first six centuries is a manly, solid,
straightforward, and clear-headed performance, evincing large scholarship, prompt
and vigorous discernment. The author is a man of moderate views, but nowise
wanting in decision and firmness in expressing them. Modest of pretension, and
without much that is absolutely new, it presents a faithful and compact digest of
all that modern research has rendered available for such an undertaking." New
York Churchman.
" ROBERTSON'S
CHURCH HISTORY is of great service to the educated classes of
the British community, by furnishing them with a really good compendium of
ancient Church history. Although the present publication is not called a first
volume of General Church history, but appears in an entire form, there are not
wanting indications of the author's purpose to continue his work, and we sincerely
wish him health and strength to do so." Scottish Ecclesiastical Journal.
ME, MURKAY'S
GENERAL LIST OF WORKS.
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16. GROOMBRIDGE'S CATALOGUE OF CIRCUMPOLAR STARS.
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17. HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF HIS TIME-KEEPER. PLATES
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JOHNSON'S LIVES OF THE ENGLISH POETS. Edited with Notes.
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In Preparation.
WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE. Edited by the RIGHT HON. JOHN
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WORKS OF DRYDEN. Edited with Notes.
HUME'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND. A
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