MYANMAR’S FOREIGN TRADE

UNDER MILITARY RULE

Patterns and Recent Trends
Tin Maung Maung Than

After gaining independence from the British in 1948, Myanmar’s economy was
heavily dependent upon foreign trade with exports constituting on average some
45 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) during the early 1950s. This
proportion fell to around 33 per cent in 1961, the year before the March 1962
military coup that led to 26 years of socialist command economy. During this
period, foreign trade became marginalized, despite the fact that it was the major
source of acquiring foreign goods and services in the absence of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and limited official development assistance (ODA). For example,
during fiscal year 1985–86, external trade reached a total volume of US$900
million, accounting for only around 11.3 per cent of the GDP. During the socialist
era, Myanmar posted persistent deficits in its trade balance.1
When the military took over control in September 1988 in the aftermath of
a widespread popular uprising against the one-party socialist government, market-
oriented reforms were quickly introduced after abolishing the socialist economic
system. In 1989, foreign trade, which was formerly the sole prerogative of the
state, was liberalized to allow private participation and an “open door” policy
towards FDI and foreign trading firms. This led to a revival of foreign trade as a
significant driver of economic growth, a major source of fungible hard currency,
and of revenue for the state. The private sector quickly realized its potential for
quick returns and rapid expansion. Trading enterprises blossomed in the early 1990s
with the number of registered export-import companies increasing from none in
1988 to 2,813 in April 2001 and to 19,494 in June 2005.2 Since the Myanmar

TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore.

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 Myanmar’s Foreign Trade under Military Rule: Patterns and Recent Trends 243

currency is not convertible, exports became the private sector’s sole vehicle in
obtaining the scarce foreign exchange needed not only to import consumer goods
but also to obtain materials and equipment for the services and manufacturing
sectors. By the fiscal year 2005–2006 the value of foreign trade reached US$5.5
billion — six times the volume achieved 20 years ago.3

Institutions and Regulatory Measures

When the socialist economy, premised upon centralized state control, was
formally abandoned in March 1989 in favour of a market-oriented system, state
agencies controlling foreign trade were reorganized in the process of revamping
the Ministry of Trade. State monopoly on both domestic and foreign trade was
abolished (except for selected commodities deemed important for national security
and economic development), making way for private trading. New laws were
also enacted to allow the establishment of private companies (including export
and import agencies) and facilitate foreign and domestic private investment and
trading. Meanwhile, the dormant chambers of commerce and industry were revived
under government sponsorship.
Presently, foreign trade comes under the purview of the Ministry of Commerce
(formerly the Ministry of Trade up until 1996), the motto of which is “Advance
Forward through Commerce”, while the highest policy-making body for trade
issues is the Trade Council chaired by the Vice-Chairman of the ruling State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Vice–Senior General Maung Aye. The
number of state trading agencies under the Ministry was reduced from 11 to six
by the mid-1990s, and then to three by the turn of the century.4
The “Main Objectives” of the Ministry of Commerce were stated as follows:5
1. To support internal and external trade activities for the economic
development of the country.
2. To upgrade the commercial efficiency of the private and public
trading houses.
3. To increase the foreign exchange earnings of the country by export
promotion.
4. To encourage the trading activities of co-operatives and private
entrepreneurs.

Three “Basic Principles” are also espoused as guidelines for trade policies:6
1. Trade activities should be aimed at the interest of the State and the
people.
2. Trade activities should not be a burden to the people.

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 244 Tin Maung Maung Than

3. Trade activities should be aimed at structuring a long-term viable

trading system, rather than to gain short term profit.

On the international front, Myanmar was a founding member of GATT

(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and is a member of the WTO (World
Trade Organization) and is subject to the rules of the prevailing multilateral trading
system. Being a member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) since
July 1997, it also subscribes to AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and its CEPT
(Common Effective Preferential Trade) scheme.7 However, since the Myanmar
currency (kyat or K) is not convertible and foreign trade is subject to licensing,
the overall impact of AFTA had, thus far, been minimal in the private sector.8
It can be said that the main regulatory instrument employed by the government
since the early days of liberalization has been the export-import licensing
system under the control of the Trade Council and implemented by the Ministry
of Commerce.9 The private sector engaged in foreign trading has become the
handmaiden of the government in this context. Under this system, export earnings
(in hard currency) are needed for financing private-sector goods imported through
the normal trading system. The government controlled the volume and variety of
goods in private commodity trading by stipulating the share of export earnings
that could be retained by the private exporter for imports of their own choice
(that is, by specifying the mix of goods that could be imported by licensees),
prohibiting exports and imports of selected items, and also restricting licences for
some commodity items to a selected number of importers.
For example, in 1989, private exporters were allowed to retain only 60 per
cent of their earnings in the initial stage of trade liberalization that allowed direct
private exports for the first time in 25 years. This retention rate was increased to
100 per cent in 1990 but by 1992 it was scaled back to 75 per cent.10 In March
1998, the Ministry of Commerce issued an order stipulating that private imports
must constitute a minimum of 80 per cent (in value) from a high-priority list
(A) and a maximum of 20 per cent from a selected low-priority list of consumer
goods (list B). This unpopular rule known among traders as the “80-20 rule” of
“bone” (A) and “flesh” (B), reflecting their profitability, was only rescinded in
mid-2005 when the rule allowing 100 per cent retention of export earnings was
reinstated.11 At the same time, wide-ranging separate lists of items prohibited
from being exported and imported by the private sector were also announced.12
These and similar regulations together with the licensing system are essentially
non-tariff barriers that have been deployed by the state in an attempt to restrict
and control private exports and imports.13

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 Myanmar’s Foreign Trade under Military Rule: Patterns and Recent Trends 245

Border Trade
It can be said that officially sanctioned border trade, which was launched by the
deposed socialist regime towards the end of its rule was a belated attempt to
legalize the huge cross-border illegal trade that had been functioning since the
1970s.14
Supervised by the Department of Border Trade since its establishment in
1996 under the Ministry of Commerce, border trading has been permitted to fulfil
the following stated objectives:
1. To further strengthen the existing friendship between the two
countries
2. To promote Border Trade between the two countries, putting it in
line with normal trade
3. To get reasonable revenue for the state
4. To facilitate private business activities thereby allowing them to
acquire reasonable profit
5. To enhance the smooth flow of commodities.15

There were altogether 13 border trading posts by the end of 2006: five on
the China border, four on the Thai border, two on the India border, and two on
the Bangladesh border.16 According to official statistics, the annual total volume
of border trade ranged between 10 and 14 per cent of the total value of foreign
trade between 1995–95 and 2004–2005. However, anecdotal evidence and data
from the neighbouring countries suggest that the actual value could be much
larger.17
At the beginning of 2005, the authorities announced that a transition to normal
trade procedures would be implemented for border trade within a few months
whereby the previously allowed cash transactions in local currencies would be
discontinued to be replaced by formal rules requiring sales contracts, letters of
credit, and bank transactions in a single currency prescribed by the government.18
In early 2005 the Muse border trade post (known as the 105th mile post) on the
China-Myanmar border was chosen as a pilot project for such a transition. In
April 2006 it was declared a Border Trade Zone operating on a normal trade
basis. Following the success of Muse (opposite Ruili in Yunnan) the government
instituted similar arrangements in Myawaddy (across Mae Sot in Thailand) within
a few months and envisaged having another one at Tamu on the India border as
the next step.19 It seems that the government expected to eventually restrict the
volume of transactions through border-trade procedures to a minimum, catering
only for localized consumption on a small scale.20

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 246 Tin Maung Maung Than

Patterns of Exports and Imports

As depicted in Table 1, exports grew consistently for 13 consecutive years, peaking
at US$3 billion in fiscal year 2002–2003, before falling in the following year,
hampered by trade sanctions imposed by the United States in mid-2003 in the
name of human rights and democracy. Myanmar’s exports recovered in three years’
time to US$3.55 billion in the fiscal year 2005–2006 though its trade volume
failed to achieve the US$5 billion target for fiscal year 2004–2005.21
Meanwhile, imports driven by pent-up consumer demand (suppressed for
over two decades under the socialist command economy), a mini construction
boom and massive infrastructure developments undertaken by the government,
outpaced exports throughout the 1990s creating ever larger trade deficits whose
value surpasses that of export earnings from 1995–96 to 1997–98, as seen in
Table 1. They were partly offset by substantial inflows of FDI whose cumulative
pledges reached some US$6.8 billion by fiscal year 1997–98 when the Asian
financial crisis and the US embargo on new investments reduced the inflow to a

TABLE 1
Value of merchandise foreign trade
(US$ millions)

Fiscal Year Exports Imports Balance

1989–90 215 204 14
1990–91 325 269 56
1991–92 419 606 –227
1992–93 591 1,010 –419
1993–94 696 1,302 –606
1994–95 917 1,488 –571
1995–96 897 1,831 –934
1996–97 929 2,107 –1,178
1997–98 1,011 2,451 –1,440
1998–99 1,125 2,116 –991
1999–2000 1,309 2,355 –1,046
2000–2001 1,662 2,165 –503
2001–2002 2,544 2,736 –192
2002–2003 3,063 2,300 763
2003–2004 2,357 2,240 117
2004–2005 2,928 1,973 955
2005–2006 3,554 2,000* 1,600
* Rounded to the nearest hundred million.
Sources: Myat Thein, Economic Development of Myanmar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2004), table 5, p. 156; International Financial Statistics (Washington, DC: IMF,
June 2005); Ye Lwin, “Foreign Trade at Record Levels”, Myanmar Times (hereafter cited as
MT ), 5–11 June 2006, p. 3; Ministry of Commerce web site, http://www.commerce.gov.mm.

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 Myanmar’s Foreign Trade under Military Rule: Patterns and Recent Trends 247

trickle.22 The widening deficit in the balance of merchandise trade prompted the
government to curb imports since 1998, while pushing for increased exports.23
An import surge in 2001–2002 led to a further cut-back that resulted in imports
for 2005–2006 just reaching the same level as that of 1996–97. Hence, beginning
with 2002–2003, the perennial trade deficit turned into a surplus, as evident in
Tables 1 and 2.
Table 2 depicts the volume of trade with values denominated in kyat (K),
the local currency. The trends in values shown in Tables 1 and 2 do not match
exactly because of the fluctuation of the US dollar with respect to the local
currency as well as other currencies such as the Chinese yuan and the euro that
have become more common in transactions involving both normal and border
trading (see the section on “Border Trade” above). It is also likely that international
trade statistics may not cover border trading denominated in kyats. Moreover, the
official exchange rate fixed at K8.51 to 1 SDR (Special Drawing Rights of the
International Monetary Fund pegged since 1977) used officially for conversion
between the kyat and the US dollar has been diverging from the so-called free
market rate used as a basis for practically all commercial transactions (even during
the socialist era where it represented the currency black market undergirding the
commodities black market in a shortage economy) for some three decades. As
such the free market exchange rate for one US dollar that stood around K40 in
the late 1980s, ballooned to some K120 in 1995, to around K350 in 2000, and to
K1,300 in early 2006, while the official exchange rate fluctuated on a declining
trend from around K7 in the late 1980s to about K5.9 in early 2006.24

TABLE 2
Value of merchandise foreign trade, selected fiscal years
(Kyat millions)

Fiscal Year Exports Imports Balance Total

1990–91 2,961.9 5,522.8 –2,560.9 8,484.7
2000–2001 12,736.0 15,073.1 –2,337.1 27,809.1
2001–2002 17,130.7 18,377.7 –1,247.0 35,508.4
2002–2003 19,955.1 14,910.0 5,045.1 34,865.1
2003–2004 14,119.2 13,397.5 721.7 27,516.7
2004–2005 16,697.3 11,338.5 5,358.8 28,035.8
2005–2006* 20,646.6 11,514.2 9,132.4 32,160.8
* Revised estimates.
Sources: Selected Monthly Economic Indicators (hereafter cited as SMEI), March 2006;
Statistical Yearbook (hereafter cited as SYB ) 2004 (Yangon: Central Statistical Organization,
2006).

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 248 Tin Maung Maung Than

TABLE 3
Share of exports by ownership
(Percentages)

Export
Fiscal Year Public Sector Private Sector
1990–91 53.8 46.2
2000–2001 29.6 70.4
2001–2002 47.7 52.3
2002–2003 46.2 53.8
2003–2004 44.5 55.5
2004–2005 56.4 43.6
2005–2006 54.4 45.6
Sources: SMEI, various issues.

TABLE 4
Ranking of top five principal commodities
among Myanmar exports, selected fiscal years

Principal Commodity 2005–2006* 2000–2001 1990–91

Natural gas 1 (30.2) 3 (8.7) None
Timber products 2 (13.9) 5 (6.3) 1 (33.7)
Beans and pulses 3 (9.1) 2 (13.0) 2 (17.4)
Garments 4 (7.7) 1 (29.7) None
Marine products 5 (5.5) 4 (7.3) 4 (5.6)
Rice and rice products [7] [8] 3 (5.8)
Precious and semi-precious stones n.a. [6] 5 (2.9)
Notes: Figures within parentheses are corresponding shares as a percentage of total
exports; and figures within square brackets are corresponding ranks for commodities
falling outside the top five.
* Revised estimates.
n.a. = Not available.
Sources: SMEI, March 2006; SYB 2004.

The public sector share of exports rebounded in 2004–2005 due to the

increase in natural gas and timber exports by state economic enterprises (SEE)
coupled with a drastic fall in garment exports by the private sector.
It can be seen from Table 4 that natural gas exports to Thailand had
recently become the top export earner replacing garments that topped the
league in 2000–2001, whereas in 1990–91 there was no export at all. Similarly,
garments export that was non-existent in 1990–91 figured prominently in recent

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 Myanmar’s Foreign Trade under Military Rule: Patterns and Recent Trends 249

years despite the US-imposed ban on them. As these two new export products
came to the fore, rice and rice products that had been the traditional export
earner declined both in absolute and relative terms. On the other hand, timber
products, another traditional item, remained amongst the top five earners of
hard currency.
The data depicted in Table 4 also show that the same set of commodities
constituted the top five export items in 2005–2006 and 2000–2001, with three
of them dating back to 1990–91. Altogether, only seven items were among the
top five positions in all three occasions. Moreover, the cumulative share of
the top five products in the total value of exports in 2005–2006 was 66.4 per
cent compared with 65 per cent for 2000–2001 and 65.4 per cent for 1990–91.
Therefore, it seems that heavy reliance on a few major commodities had remained
unchanged in the commodity structure of exports over the past 15 years since
trade liberalization took effect.
Table 5 shows that the top five export destinations (predominantly regional
states) had hardly changed since 1990–91. The United States featured in the top
five in 2000–2001 due to the garment exports, which rapidly declined thereafter
due to sanctions. On the other hand, Thailand retained its top position since
2000–2001 by virtue of substantial natural gas exports to that country.
Table 6 shows that private sector share of imports declined after 2000–2001
due mainly to government licensing restrictions in its attempt to redress the
unfavourable trade balance as seen in Tables 1 and 2. Thereafter, the downward
trend levelled off and the shares stabilized.

TABLE 5
Ranking of top five countries among major destinations
for Myanmar exports, selected fiscal years

Country 2005–2006* 2000–2001 1990–91

Thailand 1 (38.1) 1 (14.4) 4 (13.1)
India 2 (13.8) 2 (13.4) 2 (17.7)
China (PRC) 3 (10.3) 4 (9.0) 3 (13.4)
Singapore 4 (7.4) 5 (5.8) 1 (28.6)
Hong Kong 5 (7.2) [7] 5 (8.4)
USA Negligible 3 (12.5) Negligible
Notes: Figures within parentheses are corresponding shares as a percentage of total
exports; and the figure within square brackets is the corresponding rank for a country
falling outside the top five.
* Revised estimates.
Sources: SMEI, March 2006; SYB 2004.

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 250 Tin Maung Maung Than

TABLE 6
Share of imports by ownership
(Percentages)

Import
Fiscal Year Public Sector Private Sector
1990–91 58.2 41.8
2000–2001 20.0 80.0
2001–2002 35.0 65.0
2002–2003 22.3 77.7
2003–2004 31.5 68.5
2004–2005 31.6 68.4
2005–2006 31.0 69.0
Sources: SMEI, various issues.

TABLE 7
Share of imports by type of goods
(Percentages)

Type of Goods
Fiscal Year Capital Intermediate Consumer
1990–91 34.5 30.1 35.4
2000–2001 26.9 30.4 42.7
2001–2002 30.2 40.3 29.4
2002–2003 24.9 35.5 39.6
2003–2004 29.3 33.2 37.4
2004–2005 29.9 29.3 40.8
2005–2006 27.6 32.1 40.3
Note: Figures may not add up to 100 because of rounding errors.
Sources: SMEI, March 2006; SYB 2004.

On the other hand, despite the government’s emphasis on infrastructure

development and import-substituting industrialization (underwritten by the 80-20
rule, see above), the annual share of capital goods imported since the turn of
the century was less than that in 1990–91 (though much larger in value terms),
indicating that market forces responding to consumer demand had been relatively
significant, especially in border trading (Table 7). Nevertheless, Table 8 seems to
suggest that capital equipment and intermediate goods still played an important part
in value terms. On the other hand, it is again (as in exports) apparent from Table
8 that the mix of significant (in value terms) product groups among Myanmar’s
imports had barely changed over the years since 1990–91.

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 Myanmar’s Foreign Trade under Military Rule: Patterns and Recent Trends 251

TABLE 8
Ranking of top five principal commodities among Myanmar imports,
selected fiscal years

Principal Commodity 2005–2006* 2000–2001 1990–91

Machinery (non-electrical) and
transport equipment 1 (15.6) 1 (17.5) 1 (28.0)
Refined mineral oil 2 (13.6) 5 (6.3) 5 (3.6)
Base metals and manufactures 3 (10.1) 3 (9.5) 3 (8.4)
Artificial and synthetic fabrics 4 (8.0) 2 (10.3) Negligible
Electrical machinery and
apparatus 5 (5.6) 4 (7.4) 2 (9.0)
Edible vegetable oils and
other hydrogenated oils n.a. [6] 4 (7.4)
Notes: Figures within parentheses are corresponding shares as a percentage of total
imports; and the figure within square brackets is the corresponding rank for a commodity
falling outside the top five.
* Revised estimates.
n.a. = Not available.
Sources: SMEI, March 2006; SYB 2004.

TABLE 9
Ranking of top five countries among major suppliers for
Myanmar imports, selected fiscal years

Country 2005–2006* 2000–2001 1990–91

Singapore 1 (28.1) 1 (24.2) 5 (9.6)
China (PRC) 2 (23.6) 4 (12.3) 1 (21.8)
Thailand 3 (12.0) 2 (13.1) 4 (10.0)
Malaysia 4 (7.0) [7] [6]
Japan 5 (5.3) 5 (8.7) 2 (16.3)
Republic of Korea [6] 3 (12.4) [7]
USA [7] [10] 3 (12.3)
Notes: Figures within parentheses are corresponding shares as a percentage of total
imports; and figures within square brackets are corresponding ranks for countries falling
outside the top five.
* Revised estimates.
Sources: SMEI, March 2006; SYB 2004.

Similarly, the pattern of little or no change was repeated in the composition

of top source countries for imports into Myanmar as indicated in Table 9 with
neighbouring countries dominating the list. As it had been for exports, the top five
source countries garnered a larger share of total imports in 2004–2005 compared
with 2000–2001.

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 252 Tin Maung Maung Than

Conclusion
The military government has been promoting foreign trade as part of its
marketization drive and encouragement of private sector participation in the
economy. It had succeeded in reversing the perennial trade deficit in recent years
through natural gas exports and cutting back of imports. Imports have been a
significant source of government revenues through custom duties and further
cutbacks would seriously affect the government budget. The existence of illegal
trading despite trade liberalization seems to indicate that more could be done to
encourage private traders to play by the rules. To be successful, the government’s
rule and regulations on licensing, taxation, and banking should be streamlined
to enhance the role of foreign trade as an engine of growth. In recent months,
the government seems to be making serious attempts to minimize red tape and
offer incentives to the private sector for the further development of foreign trade,
such as establishing free trade zones in the border regions. It remains to be seen
whether this momentum could be sustained.25

Notes
1
All values were derived from data provided in Teruko Saito and Lee Kin Kiong,
compilers, Statistics on the Burmese Economy: The 19th and 20th Centuries (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 185–86, 216, 222.
2
Tin Maung Maung Than, State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Economy of
Industrialization (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), table 9.5,
p. 388.
3
Iftekhar Ahmed, “Burma’s Natural Gas Contributes to $1.3 Billion Trade Surplus”,
Narinjara News, 24 September 2006, reproduced online in BurmaNet News, 23–25
September 2006.
4
They are Directorate of Trade, Department of Border Trade, and Myanmar Agricultural
Product Trading.
5
See http://www.commerce.gov.mm/moc/index.html.
6
See http://www.commerce.gov.mm/moc/index.html.
7
According to the CEPT scheme, Myanmar is required to reduce tariffs on the agreed
inclusion list of product lines to less than 5 per cent by 2008 and to further reduce
them to zero by 2010. See Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN
Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 225–27.
8
Nyi Nyi Aung and Sandar Linn, “Official Urges Action to Reap More Benefits from
AFTA”, Myanmar Times, 7–13 June 2004, p. 3.
9
Until the issuing of foreign trade licences was taken over by the Trade Council (TC)
in August 2005, private companies had to submit applications to the Ministry of
Commerce, which sought approval from the Export and Import Supervisory Committee

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 Myanmar’s Foreign Trade under Military Rule: Patterns and Recent Trends 253

(EISC, a cabinet sub-committee), while certain “sensitive cases had to be submitted to

the TC for finalization. The new procedure promised to shorten the turnaround time
for applications from two weeks to one week. See Ye Lwin, “Foreign Trade Licenses
to Be Issued by Trade Council”, Myanmar Times, 15–21 August 2005, p. 7. However,
in February 2006, the licensing authority was reverted back to the EISC, apparently
due to delays partially caused by the shift (in November 2005) of the administrative
capital to “Naypyitaw”, some 400 kilometres from Yangon, again promising quicker
processing targeted at not more than two weeks. See Ye Lwin, “EISC Resumes Import,
Export Licensing Duties”, Myanmar Times, 20–26 February 2006, p. 9.
10
Mya Than, Myanmar’s External Trade (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1992), p. 56.
11
See, for instance, “Priority Import Product Announced”, Myanview, July 1998, p. 3.
This scheme was abolished in July 2005 (7Day News [in Myanmar], 28 July 2005,
p. 1). List A included, among others, agriculture inputs, construction materials, fishing
gear and associated equipment, medical equipment, veterinary supplies and livestock,
paper and stationary, petroleum products other than crude oil, diesel, and gasoline,
transport vehicles, electrical goods, selected machinery, and spares. The aim seemed
to be to promote industrialization and infrastructure development as well to enhance
production in agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors.
12
See Myanview, July 1998. The banned exports included, among others, agricultural
products such as rice and rice products, cooking oils, groundnut, sugar, gram; precious
and semi-precious minerals and gems; animal and animal products; rubber, cotton, and
antiques. Part of the objective of the prohibition appeared to be to assure an adequate
supply of “staple” food for domestic consumption at stable prices. Some of those
items were released from the list in recent years while others were added over time
when the occasion arose (for example, onions in 2006) to prevent local shortages.
Prohibited imports included, among others, alcohol, beer, cigarettes, monosodium
glutamate, tinned provisions, fresh fruit and juices, dried noodles, and biscuits. The
banned imports list was also subject to occasional revision depending on domestic
demand. The major aim of the imports ban seemed to be the protection of local
production enterprises (both private and public) from foreign competition.
13
Private traders tried to get around such restrictions by resorting to various illegal means
such as under-invoicing, transferring foreign exchange earnings abroad, blackmarket
trading of foreign currency earnings, and bribing customs and other relevant officials
to overlook irregularities. Border trading provided ample opportunities for such
malpractices (including illegal trading, which avoided official procedures altogether),
though normal overseas trade through containerization had its share of irregularities The
government responded by launching occasional crackdowns on corrupt officials and
errant traders. In fact, beginning in mid-2006 with the arrest of the Director-General
and top officers, the entire Customs Department was purged for graft and corruption.
For recent developments, see Ye Lwin, “Govt Again Targets Illegal Trade”, Myanmar

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 254 Tin Maung Maung Than

Times, 24–30 April 2006, p. 7; Nyein Chan Aye, “Behind the Customs Corruption
Crackdown”, Irrawaddy, 7 August 2006, http://www.irrawaddy.org; “Customs Officials,
Traders Sentenced”, Irrawaddy, 10 August 2006, http://www.irrawaddy.org; and Ye
Lwin, “Govt Inspecting All Containers”, Myanmar Times, 2–8 October 2006, p. 9.
In another example, a government-owned newspaper reported that the sales of goods
confiscated by customs at the Yangon Port fetched K549.4 million (New Light of
Myanmar, 16 August 2006, http://www.myanmardigest.com/eng_md/Aug16.html.
14
An agreement with China was reached in August 1988. See, for instance, Mya Than,
op. cit., pp. 56–63 for a summary of the illegal blackmarket trade.
15
Ministry of Commerce, http://www.commerce.gov.mm-moc-dobt.html (accessed 26
December 2006).
16
Ibid. Agreement with Thailand, India, and Bangladesh were formalized in 1996, 1994,
and 1994, respectively. Two more on the China border and one each on the Thai,
India, and Bangladesh borders are scheduled to open soon.
17
For the trade figures, see ibid. See also Ye Lwin, “Govt Again Targets Illegal Trade”,
Myanmar Times, 24–30 April 2006, p. 7; “China Acts on Illegal Timber imports from
Myanmar”, Myanmar Times, 5–11 June 2006; and Mungpi, “Indians Faced Burmese
Court for Illegal Logging”, Mizzima News, 23 June 2006.
18
See Ye Lwin, “Transition to Begin on Normalizing Border Trade”, Myanmar Times,
24–30 January 2005, p. 7. The move was apparently aimed at preventing illegal
trading and tax evasion.
19
See, for example, “Roundup: Myanmar Takes Measures to Boost Border Trade with
Neighbouring Countries”, Xinhua, 2 August 2006, online newsgroup BurmaNet News,
2 August 2006.
20
See, for example, Saw Kyaw Myat Nyein, “Naizat Konthwe Ponhman Konthwe”
[Border Trading Normal Trading], Myanma Dana, October 2006, pp. 36–43.
21
See, for example, Ye Lwin, “Foreign Trade at Record Levels”, Myanmar Times, 5–11
June 2006, p. 3.
22
For data on the annual amount of FDI approved by the Foreign Investment Commission,
see Tin, op. cit., figure 9.11, p. 373.
23
. See Selected Monthly Economic Indicators (hereafter cited as SMEI) (Yangon: Central
Statistical Organization), various issues. It is believed that the smuggling of commodities
with neighbouring countries still accounted for a substantial volume of imports and
exports until the crackdown that followed the purge of corrupt intelligence and border
security personnel in the last quarter of 2004.
24
Data from Saito, op. cit., p. 186; Tin, op. cit., p. 408, n. 108; and SMEI, March 2006.
25
For recent government initiatives to facilitate foreign trade, see, for example, Ye
Lwin, “One Stop Service for Import, Export Licenses”, Myanmar Times, 22–28 May
2006, p. 9; and “Myanmar to Designate Six Free Trade Zones under New Economic
Zone Law”, Xinhua, 5 January 2006, in online news group BumaNet News, 5 January
2006.

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