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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002467 SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL DAMAGE CONTROL AFTER RAID ON LEADING SUNNI PARTY LEADER Classified By: Classified by David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Mission, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of the mistaken arrest of Iraqi Islamic Party leader Dr. Muhsin Abdal Hamid, Post and MNF-I took steps to repair relations with the most prominent Sunni political party. Hamid was detained in an early morning operation on May 30 and released that same day after it became apparent he was incorrectly targeted. Charge Satterfield met IIP Secretary General Tariq al-Hashimi on June 1, to clarify the incident and convey our apologies. Acting Political Counselor visited IIP headquarters on June 5 to present a written apology directly to abd al-Hamid. Later that day abd al-Hamid had a lunch meeting with both the Charge and MNF-I Commanding General Casey. On June 6, MNF-I/Pol/Mil/Econ Deputy Commander and PolOffs again visited IIP headquarters to present compensation for damages and missing items from the home. End Summary. 2. (C) U.S. military forces detained Dr. Muhsin Abdal Hamid in the early hours of May 30. Hamid is the leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), Iraq's

most prominent Sunni political party. MNF-I continues to investigate the causes leading to the targeting of the former Governing Council President's home, but it appears it was simply a case of misdirection. Hamid's detention created a stir among Baghdad's political class and the first 45 minutes of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) session on May 31 was devoted to denunciations of the detention and offers of support for the IIP leader. Though abd al-Hamid was released within 12 hours of the raid, Post and MNF-I took special measures to clarify the mistake and make amends with this sensitive, perhaps pivotal organization. 3. (C) Charge Satterfield met with IIP Secretary General Tariq al-Hashimi on June 1 to express regret over the detention and persuade party leaders that the incident was not deliberate. Hashimi insisted the U.S. issue a written apology. He queried whether the U.S. considers the IIP to be directly connected with insurgency. If so, he demanded the U.S. bring any accusations to his party's intention so they might be allowed to refute any charges. He added the party is in a very difficult position, and that the insurgents are "killing us before they kill you". He noted the "Zarqawis" had burnt down the IIP headquarters in the western town of Hit. Charge Satterfield assured Hashimi that the U.S. does not have any bias against his party and urged them to continue their positive role in the Iraqi political process. Hashimi closed by urging the Charge to visit IIP headquarters and to keep the lines of communication open. 4. (C) Acting PolCouns visited IIP headquarters on

June 5 to explain the incident directly to abd alHamid and convey a written letter of apology, as is commonly expected in Iraqi society. Secretary General Hashimi expressed appreciation for the letter and committed himself to improving relations with the U.S. He, nonetheless, argued that such raids and mass arrests are incomprehensible to the party and its constituents. He added that largescale detentions are "undermining our credibility". He also presented A/PolCouns a list of damaged and missing items from the Hamidi home. 5. (C) A/PolCouns urged the IIP leadership to use their influence with their constituents to cooperate and share intelligence about the terrorists with security forces. This would be the best method of improving the precision of raids and targets for detention. IIP leader Dr. Ayad Samarra'i emphasized there is no higher priority for the party than establishing a representative Constitutional Drafting Committee in a timely manner. 6. (C) Dr. abd al-Hamid recounted the raid to A/Polcouns. He claimed the soldiers disregarded his attempt to present his current second tier International Zone badge and former President of the Governing Council identification and threw him to the floor, pressing a boot on his neck. (NOTE: A knee to the upper back was the method used; apparently perceived to be a boot. END NOTE.) He commented that this incident was neither in the IIP's interests nor in the USG's. Hamid railed that his detention was an insult to him and his family. He reiterated Hashimi's point that if the Coalition has suspicions of any IIP party members, we should approach the party with the charges and

the IIP would strip the guilty member of his party membership. 7. (C) In a lunch given by Charge Satterfield and General Casey, the Charge again emphasized to abd al-Hamid that his detention was not a deliberate attack on his person, party or the role his party is playing in building a democratic Iraq. Abd alHamid summarized his reasons for believing he was indeed the target of the operation. He insisted that if the Coalition ever wants to interrogate him on specific ties to the insurgency, all they had to do is send a car for him and he would appear for questioning. He accepted the Charge's apology and expressed hope that such incidents would not be repeated. General Casey reported he had assigned a general officer to investigate the erroneous detention and explained the unit involved had been seeking an individual with a similar name. The unit had been to two prior locations and was finally misdirected to the Abd al-Hamid,s household by a bystander. He appeared to accept this explanation. 8. (C) Abd al-Hamid related the IIP's role in the current effort to form a representative Constitutional Drafting Committee. He said his party had put forward 30 names for the enlargement of the committee and all are specialists of the law. His noted that Iraqis simply have to write a constitution by August 15 to ensure the December elections are not delayed. Regarding election security, Secretary General Hashimi postulated that security cannot be improved through the use of excessive force. He drew a distinction between terrorists (who pursue an international agenda) and "nationalists" who have a sincere desire to join

the political process. He urged the USG support confidence building measures to include: controlling the borders; opening a dialogue with the "nationalists"; releasing detainees who have no charges brought against them; and declaring a "reasonable" timeline for withdrawal of Coalition forces. Charge Satterfield responded that the USG is doing all it can both militarily and diplomatically to address the issue of border security. He told the IIP leadership that any use of violence as a political tool should be condemned as terrorism. 9. (C) Politically the situation appears to be resolved. IIP leaders took PolOffs, phone calls on June 8 and the media furor seems to have died down. On June 8 a CF officer in Baghdad (in the vicinity of the IIP headquarters) witnessed two Iraqis putting up anti-American posters with the IIP logo. He spoke to them and took the placards. One read, "The arrest of Dr. Mushin Abdal Hamid will not divert us from our path of liberating the country and throwing out the occupier", the second, "The arrest of Dr. Mushin is terrorism American-style". On June 9, poloff returned a copy of the second placard to the IIP SecGen, who commented that all such placards have been removed. Dealing with Sunni political groups will continue to be a challenge. 10. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, minimize considered. Jeffrey (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of