Challenging social structures through the prism of bilingual interactions in Southern Transylvania, Romania

Emese Emke Batizn

2011 Budapest
I would like to begin my paper quoting Taylor, who gives a very good abstract for the structure. He states that our identity is never simply defined in our individual properties. It also

places us in some social space (1994:53). I believe that this social space refers to the social structure, which defines our identity and situates us in the society or a respective community. For Taylor, the existence of structure is taken for granted. There can be many social structures, many logics and variables which can structure a society. He refers to Wittgenstein when stating that we all know how to follow a rule, which fact was imposed by the society and is already automatic in us (1994:45-47). Structures can function and can take their affect unless individuals being aware of the existence of these structures. They often will be articulated only, when their existence or their efficacy will be challenged. For example gender is a structuring element in every society -as far as I know- and it is functioning as something taken for granted. However, it will become problematic, when appear categories which challenge the authority and exclusiveness of the dominating structure, a category which neither belongs to male nor to female category, but it is something between. Sewell highlights that structure in its nominative sense, always implies structure in its transitive sense (1992:2). It is part of the social reality but it explains the whole reality (1992:2). Neither Sewell nor Taylor do not see the sense to separate clearly agency and structure because action is already structured and structure is acted to exist (Kowalski 2009). This is how the question of freedom and constraint will become more important than the question of agency and structure. However there are approaches which analyze the sructure not in the poststructuralist paradigm but with the help of RCT or network analysis. Granovetter for example takes as basic unit the individuals and their interactions (1973). He analyzes the formation of the common knowledge (what Coleman takes for granted) and concudes that weak ties are decisive in forming the social cohesion while they bridge different segments of society. He also concludes that networks structure communities and those who bring radical change in the structure are always marginal agents (1973:1378). Coleman at the same time works with methodoligical individualism and categorizes individuals as utility maximizing beings who in different social positions have access and control over different resources (1996). But even in his approach RC is realized on the basis of collectively shared norms imposed by structure itself- which are the basis of the individuals calculations and shape the expactations regarding the possible outcomes (Kowalski 2009).

In Lewiss approach lower-class behavior (if we believe that exists lower-class behaviour as a homogenious category) and lower-class values are the result of structural circumstances (in Swidler 1986:275). However, I agree with Swidler who calls into question this model. She argues that children who belong to the lower-class have the same values and aspirations as children born in elite families, the difference between them lies in their structural possibilities and life chances (ex. education, restricted vs. elaborated linguistic codes). Bourdieu underlines that social agents always act in social world (1984:467). The structure is which helps us in interpreting the social world, and this structure exists in our mind and body too (embodied knowledge). But this is true vice versa, our action will gain meaning only within a certain social structure. Certainly, the existing structure is defined by those who are in dominating positions and those who define the doxa (Bourdieu 1984). Until now I have treated social structure almost as something which is taken for granted. However, if we remain at this point, this analysis/paper will be a little bit superficial. Because there are other understandings of social structure, which even call into question the reality of the structure. Haraway underlines that structures do not exist as such, they are - just as thruths always negotiated. In this logic structures are arbitrary and they exist only as long as we accept them. Coleman underlines that people interiorize to such a large extent social structures, that they are even capable to act against their own interest (1996). As Swidler illustrates, individuals who belong to lower classes tend to refuse lifestyle, goods and influential positions, which are already structurally prohibited and refused for them, argumentating that that was not for them (1986). Haraway presents three models which define and mirror in the same time the social structures which were/are created and are the basis for social scientists in certain periods to analyze and to understand societies (in Kowalski 2009). She criticizes the god-trick which represents the colonial relationship, divides society into knowing subject and object (KS O) object being defined by the subject and having no space to transform this influence bi-directional (in Kowalski 2009). A second model is when we have more KS-s influencing and defining more Os; this model leaves space for an epistemological, political problem, for the multiple objectivity (in Kowalski 2009). The currently working model which creates the social structure for social scientists has as its basic many actors, many KS-s which not only act, but are in permanent interaction and permanent dialog with each other.

I will analyze in the following, a linguistic interaction where the question is: how can the occurence of code switching be explained in a certain utterance. I will try to give answer on this question in the paradigm of social structure, mainly presenting Bourdieus and Gramscis argumentation. The social interaction happens in Transylvania, in Romania in a Hungarian diaspora community among bilingual individuals whose bilingualism is unbalanced, integrative and subtractive. Interview part: Child 1: - Mami pot s beau suc?(Romanian) Mummy may I drink juice? Child 2: - Nici n grajd nu-i!(Romanian) It is not in the equerry either! [new born lamb] [...] Child 1: - Mami pot s beau suc?(Romanian) Mummy can I drink juice? [...] Child 1: - Mami vreau suc. (Romanian) Ihatok szukkot(Hungarian)?? Mummy I want juice (Romanian). Can I drink juice (Hungarian)?? Mother: - Igen, desanym.(Hungarian) Yes, sweetheart. Bourdieu criticizes the rational choice theory (as he calls it rational action theory), which uses pragmatic approach in explaining language choice and code switching. His main critique to the address of RCT is that it locates the dynamic of social life in individual (In Jenkins, 2002: 73) and does not give enough importance and attention to social life and social structure. Moreover, Bourdieu alludes that rational action theory is the sociologized version of the fond illusions which actors themselves maintain about their own rationality and power of decision making (In Jenkins, 2002:73). To illustrate Bourdieus view there is an adage which perfectly fits: in a free country free individuals do what is free to do. We can always say that individuals make choices as long as we do not forget that they do not choose the principles of their choices (Jenkins 2002:77). In Bourdieus estimation every interaction, thus linguistic behaviour too, must be analyzed within the paradigm of subjective expectations but objective probabilities too (Bourdieu in Jenkins 2002:30). Thus, the linguistic behaviour of the little girl in South Transylvania can not be understood simply through the logic that she practices code switching, 4

because she is aware that her mother prefers the Hungarian language. Thus, does she decide to use the Hungarian language to reach her goal more effectively? I believe that we also feel, that something is missing from this model. Is she that conscious that her desire will be fulfilled in a shorter time if she speaks in Hungarian? During conversation do actors always have that much time to contemplate about this issue? Is it always so black-and-white which language has more weight in a certain situation? And is it the totally free choice of the girl when she switches to Romanian? Bourdieu would answer no to all these questions. Consequently he moves beyond subjectivism (interpretation of lived experiences) but beyond objectivism too (which highlights rules and structures) and tries to bridge these two levels (Bourdieu, 1992:12). This is how he introduces his theory of practice. Practices are results of different set of predispositions or products of the relation between habitus and special social context (Bourdieu, 1992). In his field he defines everyday linguistic exchanges
as situated encounters between agents endowed with socially structured resources and competencies, in such a way that every linguistic interaction, however personal and insignificant it may seem, bears the traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to reproduce

(1992:2).

Practice is not wholly conscious and not wholly unconscious either. Practice is happening and it is part of the social game, where the rules of the game are inculcated in early childhood (the girl in our interview is a child) by the structure because they determine what one can and what one can not do (Jenkins 2002:70-72). This is how actual speakers have a practical competence (Bourdieu 1992:8). This is how the girl in Rctie does not necessarily know that she should switch but only does it; it happens something between knowing and having a sense of it or feeling. This feel for the game is created through habitus, which are set of dispositions that orientate individuals to act in certain ways. Habitus mediates between outside and inside worlds, between individual and supra individual structures. It is a system of generative schemes that are durable (both in social construction and in self), transposable, both subjective and objective (Craig, Puma and Postone, 1993). Habitus defines ones possibilities and access to symbolic (social and cultural) capital. It is not an abstract concept, it exists inside the heads because of participating at interactions (Jenkins 2002:74). In this logic the habitus of the girl is facilitated (Bourdieu would emphasise that not predetermined) by her ethnic belonging, family background, by the temporal and spatial factors. Consequently, this speech act happened in (and is typical to)

Hungarian diaspora-area in Transylvania, Romania. The girl in the interview does not belong to a Hungarian elite family, who could afford to enroll their children into a prestigious Hungarian private school but 20 km away. The mother can not afford either to spend much time with the education of their children, because she is helping her husband from morning until night repairing cars and because she is not that educated either. The child spends most of her time with her brothers and sisters and with girls and boys who are living in the neighbourhood and who all are Romanian. This is how her language competency in Romanian is higher than in Hungarian, although Hungarian is her first language. Language, as any other social, socially embedded phenomenon can not be understood and analyzed in isolation from its cultural context and the social conditions of its production and reproduction (in Jenkins 2002: 153). Linguistic relations are thus relations of power, set by the authorized and legitimized cultural authorities of the dominant group and excercised even on lower level through civil hegemony. It is important to note that in Gramscis view, the state turns to direct domination only in that case when it can not win the consent of the masses through civil hegemony (Anderson 1976). Bourdieu uses the term symbolic domination to express the same thing as Gramsci did. As Bourdieu puts it, all symbolic domination presupposes from those who submit to it a form of complicity which is neither passive submission to external constraint nor a free adherence values (1992:51). Thus it is challenged the absolute dichotomy of constraint and freedom and is happening something that Bourdieu describes as invisible, silent violence (1992:52). Consequently, I join to those authors (Bourdieu, Taylor, Sewell, Coleman and others) who consider that social structures are, or at least function as real. But there is an important refinement: social structures function/are real only as long as they are accepted by the mainstream society. And the fact that this acceptance would be the result of hegemony and doxa which is imposed by groups who are occupying dominating positions in certain field does not matter at this level.

References

Anderson, Perry. 1976. The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci. The New Left Review 1-100 Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Classes and Classifications in Distinction. Paris: Minuit Bourdieu, Pierre. 1992. Language and Symbolic Power. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Polity Press Calhoun, Craig, Puma, L Edward and Postone, Moise ed. 1993. Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives. Cambrdidge: Polity Press Coleman, James. 1996. Foundations of a theory of collective decisions. AJS 71(6): 615-627 Granovetter, Mark. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. AJS 78(6): 1360-1380 Haraway, Donna. 1989. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question under Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. In Primate visions: gender, nature, race in the world of modern science. New York: Routledge Jenkins, Richard. (1991) 2002. Pierre Bourdieu. Routledge London and New York Kowalski, Alexandra. 12 01 2009, Contemporary Sociological Theory course, Budapest, Central European University Sewell, William. 1992. A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation. American Journal of Sociology 98:1-29 Swidler, Ann. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. American Sociological Review 51: 273-286 Taylor, Charles. 1994. To follow a rule in Li Puma et al. Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, Chicago: University of Chicago Press