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The Strengthening Northern Insurgency in Afghanistan

August 2011 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises

Mark Checchia Security & Force Protection Knowledge Manager

mark.checchia@cimicweb.org

This document outlines the reported expansion of the insurgency into northern Afghanistan and presents a number of implications for Central Asia. Related information is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

he Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) indicates that, until recently, the Taliban, which was traditionally identified with the Pashtun ethnic group, would have trouble finding a solid foothold in northern Afghanistan. The Taliban was seen as having little appeal outside the Pashtun ethnic group, and the AAN notes there is only a limited Pashtun presence in Afghanistans northern provinces as opposed to larger groups of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens, among others. The lack of a strong Pashtun presence was seen by the AAN to deny the Taliban the relatively greater degree of support or tolerance they enjoyed in the southern and eastern parts of the country. The Taliban, however, appears to be increasingly motivated by religious ideology rather than by ethnicity, says the International Crisis Group (ICG). Therefore, by developing a religious rather than ethnic ideology, the Taliban has gradually been able to extend its strength in northern Afghanistan. According to ICG, the Taliban has found support for its religious ideology among clerics in Uzbek and Turkmen communities. Tajiks, who comprise the largest ethnic bloc in northern Afghanistan and have previously fought against the Taliban, have reportedly shown less involvement in the insurgency thus far. The US Military Academys Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) pointed out in 2007 that the Taliban had begun a concerted effort to establish a stronger presence in the North of Afghanistan. Taliban leaders had reportedly talked about expanding into northern Afghanistan, where international and Afghan security forces were less prepared to repel the insurgency, according to the CTC. By 2008, insurgent leaders were calling for more attacks in the North. Such calls were followed by a surge of anti-government (i.e., insurgent) activity that seriously destabilised parts of the North and West of the country. The Taliban growth in the North initially was under-recognised because of the belief that the lack of Pashtuns would render this area inaccessible for the insurgency. However, insurgent activity in the North became evident in 2008, according to the aforementioned AAN report. Furthermore, the Taliban developed plans to introduce sympathetic mullahs in local madrassas and mosques. Such a strategy reflected the belief that clerics would be among the strongest Taliban supporters, according to the ICG report noted above. Some religious figures were already preaching against the Afghan government and international community and, hence, needed little urging to support the Taliban. Furthermore, ICG analysts estimate that up to 70% of mullahs in the North have been trained in Pakistan, where the Taliban first emerged in the mid-1990s.

AFGHANISTAN THEMATIC REPORT

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Thematic Report: The Northern Insurgency in Afghanistan

Selected Insurgent Groups in Northern Afghanistan Haqqani Network: The Haqqani Network is an insurgent group in Afghanistan that is based out of North Wazirstan in Pakistan. Sometimes it is in conflict with the Taliban The two groups also periodically collaborate. Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG): Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, HIG is an insurgent group active in Afghanistan. HIG is believed to have local alliances with the Taliban and al Qaida.

Relations with Other Insurgent Groups

The Taliban did have to operate in an environment in northern Afghanistan which included other militant and insurgent groups, according to the CTC. The largest insurgent faction in the North is Hezb-e Islami, a group controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Additionally, the control of key transit routes, such as the one running through Kunduz and Baghlan, led to significant competition between the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami, asserts the CTC. Domination of these routes allows whichever insurgent group controls them to reap benefits, such as added revenue (from informal taxation and extortion) and a strengthened ability to recruit.

The CTC estimates the Taliban to have 300 to 600 hard core fighters, most of whom are locals, along with scores of foreign Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): An Uzbek terrorist organization which has fighters in northern Afghanistan. On the other hand, CTC says targeted ISAF and ANSF forces from safe Hezb-e Islami has a fighting force of 400-600 by conservative havens in the Pakistani border region. estimates; other analysts say Hezb-e Islami has close to 1,500 full-time fighters. A 2010 report by AAN puts insurgent Taliban: Islamic fundamentalist militia in numbers at 1,150, organised in 95 groups, in north-eastern Afghanistan, originally consisting mainly of Afghanistan and 872 insurgents organised in 75 groups in the Sunni Pashtun religious students. In 1996 North. The CTC says that by late 2009, turf battles over key they controlled much of Afghanistan either pieces of terrain, including fertile farming areas and key by force or through forming alliances with logistical hubs, exploded between [Hezb-e Islami] and the other groups. It was unseated in 2001 by Taliban. In March 2010, Hezb-e-Islami and the Taliban international forces collaborating with clashed in Baghlan province, which resulted in hundreds of Afghan fighters. casualties, according to the CTC. Both insurgent groups United Tajik Opposition (UTO): A fought again in Wardak province in July 2010. The CTC notes militant group which opposes the that the Talibans growth in northern Afghanistan and that government of Tajikistan. Their more subsequent competition for terrain between insurgent groups aggressive followers have been known to had generated a significant fissure in the countrys militant cooperate in actions with other Islamic movement. Hekmatyars and Hezb-e Islamis willingness to Fundamentalist groups. pursue a political settlement with the Afghan government has reportedly irritated the Taliban. Some observers noted in the aforementioned CTC report suggest Hekmatyars moves to negotiate are impelled by the fact that a portion of his base is being lost to the Taliban. In addition, the insurgencys penetration of the greater Kabul area has intensified competition between Taliban fighters, the North Waziristan-based Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e Islami, says ICG. Violent rivalries between these insurgent groups in places such as Kapisa, Logar and Wardak have resulted in hundreds of lives lost. The Afghan government is concerned about the Talibans growth in the North and is taking actions to address the situation. According to the CTC, President Hamid Karzai appointed Hajji Abdul Munshi Majeed, the longstanding governor of Badakhshan province, who has strong ties to Hezb-e Islami, to be governor of Baghlan province. This step, which is intended to prevent further Taliban infiltration, demonstrates the seriousness in which the government views the increase in Taliban activities and consolidation in the northern districts of Kunduz and Baghlan, states the CTC.

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Control
Insurgency in provinces north of Kabul, particularly Parwan, Kapisa and Laghman, is heavily influenced by Hezbe Islami, which has historically been active in those areas, according to the ICG. The Taliban also has developed substantial influence in the region, further exacerbating the tensions between the two groups discussed above. The Taliban resurgence in Kapisa province in particular gained traction in 2006 and gathered momentum in 2007, exploiting deep-seated distrust between the Tajik and Pashtun groups in the province, according to the ICG study. The aggressiveness of Taliban leaders in Kapisa, when campaigning against NATOs International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), has been widely reported. They worked at consolidating a hold over Pashtun population groups through intimidation and assassination of local government officials. In addition, the ICG says that the Taliban took advantage of distrust between Tajikdominated areas and Pashtun-dominated areas of the province in order to expand its influence among Pashtuns. The Taliban influence in Kapisa is important because of its strategic place as a staging ground for attacks on Kabul. For that reason, as the ICG indicates, Kapisa has time and again proven pivotal for insurgent operations targeting the capital.

Figure 1. The Provinces and Regional Borders of Afghanistan

Note: For a larger map and security, governance and development indicators for each province, see the Afghanistan Provincial Indicators (APIs). Source: Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin

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From 2009 onwards, AAN says there was evidence that the Taliban was actively recruiting Uzbeks and Turkmens as well as smaller numbers of Tajiks. In the spring of 2010, ethnically-mixed insurgent groups were already reported. The AAN says that by 2010, the Taliban was increasingly influential in northern Baghlan, southern and northern districts in Kunduz, northern Takhar and parts of Faryab and Jowzjan provinces.

Recruiting and Wider Appeal

An Outlook Afghanistan article from July 2011 says that the Taliban is attempting to widen its base by recruiting militants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which reportedly has ties to al Qaeda, is both assisting and benefitting from Taliban recruiting and training. The Taliban, according to Outlook Afghanistan , trains IMU volunteers and eventually recruits the most eager fighters to join them in launching attacks. The article asserts that northern regions of Afghanistan are increasingly becoming infested with militancy spearheaded by the Taliban in alliance with groups such as the IMU. Mohammad Asim, a former lawmaker from the Baghlan, says the IMU has carved out their niche in northern Afghanistan, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Although the IMU campaigns and has demonstrated a willingness to fight against ISAF and Afghan forces in the region, their ultimate aim, Asim says, is to build a base in Afghanistan for operations across Central Asia.

Figure 2. Ethnic Group and Taliban Presence in Afghanistan, Dec 2009

Source: Carnegie Endowment; available via the Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin

A deadly attack on the governors offices in Takhar on 28 May 2011, in which the Afghan National Police (ANP) commander and the provinces police chief were killed, gave insight into the cross-group cooperation among insurgent groups in northern Afghanistan, says RFE/RL. Afghan and ISAF forces arrested an IMU recruit working for the Taliban in connection with the Takhar attack. RFE/RL says that rising violence, recruitment of locals and

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more sophisticated attacks are all signs that the IMU has made inroads into the Uzbek community in northern Afghanistan by playing on their grievances. The IMUs base, says RFE/RL, has grown and, by extension, so too has the Talibans. . Waheed Mozdah a respected Afghan historian and Taliban expert, say that the Taliban and IMU may even have jointly infiltrated the ANSF in northern Afghanistan. The RFE/RL piece further notes that [i]f left uncheckedalliances between the Al-Qaeda linked IMU and the Taliban could not only destabilize northern Afghanistan but establish it as a launching pad for attacks across Central Asia and beyond. The July article in the Outlook Afghanistan reports that [t]he recent increase in militant activity in Northern Afghanistan, involving a resurgent Taliban regrouping in alliance with IMU, can very well change the dynamics of militancy in the region towards increasing destabilization of not only Afghanistan but also the Central Asian countries.

Implications for Afghanistan and Central Asia

ICG cites the following statement from the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper: as the US increases reliance on Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan, the regions political and social stability is becoming more important. Additionally, the DNI stated that in 2010, Tajikistans President Rakhmon was forced to negotiate with regional warlords after failing to defeat them militarily, an indicator that Dushanbe is potentially more vulnerable to an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with renewed interests in Central Asia. The Outlook Afghanistan article says the IMU is dangerous because it is developing cross-border terror networks. For example, the organisation has taken refuge in Pakistani tribal areas and has taken advantage of familial, tribal and ethnic ties to Central Asian states. Hence, it is important for both Afghanistan and its neighbours to the north to understand the northern insurgencys implications for former-Soviet, Central Asian republics, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan The ideal role for Tajikistan in US Afghanistan strategy, the ICG assesses, is to remain stable and to allow for unfettered over-flight and transit of forces. However, challenges facing Tajikistan became increasingly clear after September 2010, when Tajik security forces were unable to fully quell an uprising by warlords and a group of young extremists led by Mullo Abdullo, head of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and a leader of the Islamist forces as well. AAN asserts that Tajikistan is increasingly vulnerable to militant activity from a mix of dissatisfied Islamists at home, and armed groups over the border in Afghanistan. The ICG says that difficulty controlling the lengthy border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan poses a significant challenge to security. In addition, ICG analysts find that up to a quarter of Afghanistans drug output moves through Central Asia annually, the majority through Tajikistan. The ICG cites other research which suggests that it is unlikely that opiate trafficking adds less than 30% to the recorded GDP [of Tajikistan]. The Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) reiterates the speculation by retired police Col. Aliakbar Abdulloev that the formerly dormant UTO might be evolving as the kind of franchise operation used by al Qaeda for recruiting and funding. Additionally, he notes the IMU may be looking to identify willing recruits for domestic insurgency operations within Tajikistan. Uzbekistan Several groups operate in border areas between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan and are linked to the Taliban. The previously discussed IMU is the most noteworthy. Ballpark estimates from the ICG put the IMUs fighting force in the low thousands. On the other hand, according to the ICG, many observers agree the IMU and its allies are

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increasingly active in northern Afghanistan. ICG analysts speculate it may be because they view the battle for Afghanistan as the central international obligation of all jihadists. Since 2009, the ICG mentions there have been increasing reports of Central Asian guerrillas operating in northern provinces of Afghanistan, and most are described as members of IMU. The IMU first shifted their main base to Afghanistan after breaking alliance with UTO over the 1997 peace deal that ended the Tajik civil war and their unsuccessful incursion into Kyrgyzstan in 1999. After the Taliban defeat in 2001 in Afghanistan, the IMU relocated to Waziristan, Pakistan, where they were seemingly inactive; the ICG says most analysts thought they were finished. However, they go on to say it is likely they were rebuilding instead of dying. The first influx of IMU recruits was Chechen fighters in 2000, relocating after the quashing of their rebellion by Russian Federation forces. This movement made sense as the Taliban, allied with the IMU, was the only quasi-governmental entity that recognised Chechnya as an independent nation. The ICG says the next infusion of fighters into Uzbekistan and the IMU came when the Islamist guerrilla movement in Dagestan was dying down in 2001-2002; they fled from Russian Federation forces to Afghanistan, where many became affiliated with the IMU. Subsequent reports confirmed young Dagestanis leaving home for Afghanistan in the following years. The ICG notes that claims of Central Asian fighters training in Afghanistan are as recent as April 2011.

Conclusion
RFE/RL notes that the expansion of the Taliban and other insurgent groups in northern Afghanistan may have implications for the handover of security responsibilities from ISAF to the ANSF. The Joint Afghan-ISAF Inteqal Board, responsible for the transition process, is expected to announce the second tranche in late September or early October 2011. As Asim, the former politician from Baghlan referenced earlier in this report, says in his RFE/RL interview, instability in the north means it will be unsuitable as a testing ground for Afghan forces. RFE/RL says the insurgency in northern Afghanistan will be a difficult test for the ANSF in those locations where ISAF will play a smaller role. As the ANSF takes more responsibility for security, the Taliban will quickly test them in places like Kapisa. The ICG assertion that insurgent influence in Kapisa is particularly important because of its utility as a staging ground for attacks on Kabul make it pivotal for operations against the capital. ICG indicates that Afghanistan faces significant challenges as ISAF continues its withdrawal. The situation is exacerbated by challenges facing the Afghan government, not just military, but also those related to effective and accountable public administration, providing security and services impartially. The ICG further states that the concentration of ISAF troops and donor resources in the south has left the rest of the country vulnerable to insurgent encroachment, with the Taliban opening new fronts in the North and penetrating even deeper into the central-eastern provinces. If the Afghan government is slow to address the public good, it provides an opening for the Taliban and its allies to step into that vacuum. The Taliban movement into the North, the RFE/RL article notes, demonstrates its intent to become a genuinely nation-wide movement. The ICG states that while ISAF and Afghan forces have combated insurgents in the North, such efforts have not been followed up with a strategy to hold the areas and ensure maintained stability. Accordingly, it remains an open subject of debate not only how to counter the insurgency in northern Afghanistan but also how to ensure that it is unable to return.

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Annex A.

Further Readings

Giustozzi, Antonio and Christoph Reuter. 2011. The Insurgents of the Afghan North. Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network. Gopal, Anand and Matthew DuPee. 2010. Tensions Rise Between Hezb-e-Islami and the Taliban in Afghanistan. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy. International Crisis Group. 2011. Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats. Brussels: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group. 2011. The Insurgency in Afghanistans Heartland. Brussels: International Crisis Group. Mohammad, Wahidullah. 2009. Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation. Olimova, Lola. 2011. Assessing Tajikistans Mujahedin, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 30 May. Rezale, Mehdi. 2011. The Rise of the Taliban-IMU Nexus in Northern Afghanistan, Outlook Afghanistan, 11 July. Siddique, Abubakar. 2011. In Afghanistan, IMU-Taliban Alliance Chips Away at the Stone, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 09 June. United States Department of Defense. 2011. Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: US DOD

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