DavidRoden,OpenUniversity Mankind'sadeadissuenow,cousin.Therearenomoresouls.Onlystatesof mind.

d.1 Sinceemerginginninetiescriticaltheory,transhumanismandcyberpunkliterature, the term 'posthuman' has been used to mark a historical juncture at which the status of the human is radically in doubt. Two main usages or, if you will, two distinctposthumanismscanbediscernedoverthisperiod. Transhumanists, futurists and science fiction authors regularly concatenate or hyphenate 'post' and 'human' when speculating about the longrun influence of advancedtechnologiesonthefutureshapeoflifeandmind. Bycontrast,forculturaltheoristsandphilosophersinthe'continental'traditionthe posthuman is a condition in which the foundational status of humanism has been undermined. The causes or symptoms of this supposed crisis of humanism are various as the bioengineered 'clades' ramifying through the postanthropoform solar system of Bruce Sterling's 1996 novelSchismatrix. Posthumanism, in this diagnostic orcritical sense, is expressed in the postmodern incredulity towards enlightenmentnarrativesofemancipationandmaterialprogress;thedeconstruction of transcendental or liberal subjectivities; the end of patriarchy; the emergence of contrary humanisms in postColonial cultures; the reduction of living entities to resourcesforaburgeoningtechnoscience,or,ifsometheoristsaretobebelieved,all oftheabove.2 In this paper, I will argue that these two usages do not only reflect divergent understandingsoftheposthumanthespeculativeandthecriticalbutalsoreflect aforeclosureofradicaltechnogeneticchangeonthepartofcriticalposthumanists. Thisgesturecanbediscernedinfourargumentsthatoccurinvariousformswithin theextantliteratureofcriticalposthumanism: Theantihumanistargument Thetechnogenesisargument Thematerialityargument Theantiessentialistargument Allfour,asIhopetoshow,areunsound.
1

ADEFENSEOFPRECRITICALPOSTHUMANISM

Sterling(1996),p.59.

ThisappearstobethepositionofRosiBraidottiinherrecentplenaryaddresstothe2009Societyfor EuropeanPhilosophyandForumforEuropeanPhilosophyConferenceinCardiff.

Analyzingwhytheseargumentsfailhasthedualbenefitofpreventingusfrombeing distracted by the antihumanist hyperbole accruing to theoretical frameworks employed within critical posthumanism such as deconstruction and cognitive science but, more importantly, contributes to the development of a rigorous, philosophicallyselfawarespeculativeposthumanism. *** Contemporarytranshumanistsarguethathumannatureisanunsatisfactory'workin progress' that should be modified through technological means where the instrumental benefits for individuals outweigh the technological risks. This ethic of improvement is premised on prospective developments in four areas: Nanotechnology,Biotechnology,InformationTechnologyandCognitiveSciencethe 'NBIC' suite of technologies. For example, improved bionic neural interfaces may allow the incorporation of a wide range of technical devices within an enhanced 'cyborg' body or 'exoself' while genetic treatments may increase the efficiency or learningormemory(BostromandSandberg2006)orbeusedtoincreasethesizeof thecerebralcortex.Thewiredandgenemodifieddenizensofthetranshumanfuture could be sensitive to a wider range of stimuli, faster, more durable, more intellectuallycapableandmorphologicallyvariedthantheirunmodifiedforebears. Justhow unrestricted and capable transhuman minds and bodies can become is contested since the scope for enhancement depends both on hypothetical technologiesanduponhotlycontestedmetaphysicalclaims.Amongtheprospective technologies which excite radical transhumanists like Ray Kurzweil are the use of microelectricneuroprostheseswhichmightnoninvasivelystimulateorprobethe brains native neural networks, allowing it to jack directly into immersive cognitive technologies or map its state vector prior to uploading an entire personality (Kurzweil 2005, 317); 3 the elusive goal of artificial general intelligence the creationofrobotsorsoftwaresystemswhichapproximateorexceedtheflexibilityof human belieffixation and comportment; or, perhaps less speculatively, improvements in processor technology sufficient to emulate the computational capacityofhumanandothermammalianbrains(Ibid.124125). Amongthemetaphysicalissuesthattroubleallbutthemostfacileoftranshumanist itineraries is the scope of functionalist accounts of mental states and processes. Functionalistphilosophersofmindclaimthatthementalstatestypessuchasbeliefs or pains are constituted by the causal role of token states within a containing systemratherthanbythestuffthatthesystemisconstitutedfrom.Thecausalrole ofatokenstateisdefinedbythesetofstatesthatcanbringitabout(itsinputs)and setofthestatesthatitcausesinturn(itsoutputs).Thesubstrateonwhichthatstate is realized is irrelevant to its functional role.4Some philosophers of mind David
For a rather less sanguine commentary on the state of the art in noninvasive scanning see Jones 2009. 4 Byanalogy,anysystemcouldcountasbeinginthestateWhiteWashCycleifinputtingdirtywhites atsomeearliertimeresultedinitoutputtingcleanwhitesatsomelatertime.

Chalmers,sayarefunctionalistswithregardtorepresentationalstateslikebeliefs or desires, but not with regard to phenomenal states like having a toothache or seeingpink.IfChalmersisright,thenwecanneverproduceartificialconsciousness purely in virtue of emulating the kinematics of brain states. However, if we accept the accounts of philosophers with (however divergent) functional analyses of the propertyofstateconsciousnesslikeDanielDennettandMichaelTyetheprospects for artificial consciousness seem somewhat brighter (Dennett 1991). Given a sufficiently global functionalism, a simulation of an embodied nervous system in which these constitutive relationships were actually instantiated would also be areplication lacking none of the preconditions for intentionality or conscious experienceregardlessofwhethertheywereimplementedwithbiologicalmaterialas this is currently understood. For radical transhumanists influenced by functionalist andcomputationalistapproachesinthephilosophyofcognitivescience,then,neural replication opens up the possibility of copying the patterns that constitute a given mind onto nonbiological platforms that will be inconceivably faster, more flexible andmorerobustthanevolvedbiologicalbodies(Kurzweil2005). Theseradicalaugmentationscenariosindicatetosomethatafutureconvergenceof NBICtechnologiescouldleadtoanew'posthuman'formofexistence.Followingan influentialpaperbythecomputerscientistVirnorVinge,thisontologicalstepchange issometimesreferredtoas'thetechnologicalsingularity'(Vinge1993):anepochal 'discontinuity' resulting from positive feedback exerted by technical change upon itself (Bostrom 2005, 8). Characteristically the scenario is painted in terms of the creation of artificial superintelligence intelligence being the variable considered most liable to affect the rate of technical growth. Vinge claims that were a single superintelligent machine created, it could create still more intelligent machines, resultinginagrowthinmentationtoplateauxfarexceedingourcurrentcapacities. Lacking this intellectual prowess, we cannot envisage some of the ways post singularityintelligencesmightreordertheworld.Apostsingularityworldwouldbe constituted in ways that cannot be humanly conceived. If it could be humanly conceiveditwouldnotbethegenuinearticle. Theideaofthesingularity,then,isthatofaprincipledlimitonhumancognition,and predictive power, in particular. It is homologous, in many respects, to Immanuel Kant's idea of the thinginitself, which lacking any mode of presentation in the phenomenal world of space and time must necessarily elude systematic empirical knowledge.5 Commitment to the possibility of a singularity nicely exemplifies the philosophical position of speculative posthumanists. Posthumans in this sense are hypothetical descendantsofcurrenthumansthatarenolongerhumaninconsequenceofsome augmentationhistory. For speculative (or precritical) posthumanism, a technically mediated transcendenceofthehumanconstitutesasignificantontologicalpossibility.
InRoden2010,however,Iconsiderandrejecttheapplicabilityofthisconceptionoftranscendence tothesingularityortheposthumanmoregenerally.
5

 Speculative posthumanism is logically independent of the normative thesis of transhumanism: one can be consistently transhumanist while denying the ontological possibility of posthuman transcendence. Similarly, speculative posthumanism is consistent with the rejection of transhumanism. One could hold that a posthuman divergence is a significant ontological possibility but not a desirableone. Critical posthumanists such as Katherine Hayles, Andy Clark, Don Ihde and Neil BadmingtondonotcontestthepotentialofNBICtechnologiesoradvanceprincipled argumentsagainstenhancement(Clarkisawarmblooded,moderatetranshumanist accordingtomytaxonomy)butarguethatspeculativeorprecriticalposthumanism reflects a philosophically nave conception of the human such that the posthuman wouldconstitutearadicalbreakwithit.Thispositionisclearlyimpliedinthetitleof KatherineHayles'seminalworkofculturalhistoryHowWeBecamePosthuman.For Hayles, the posthuman is not a hypothetical state which could follow some prospectivesingularityevent,say,butaworkinprogress:acomplexandcontested reconception of the human subject in terms drawn from the modern 'sciences of theartificial':informationtheory,cybernetics,ArtificialIntelligenceandArtificialLife (Hayles199,286). Oneexampleoftheintellectualtendenciesthatinformthisnewculturalmomentis socalled 'Nouvelle AI' (NAI). Where the manipulation of syntactically structured representationsistheparadigmofintelligencetraditionalAI,NAIdrawsinspiration from computational prowess exhibited in biological phenomena involving no symbolization, such as swarm intelligence, insect locomotion or cortical feature maps. The guiding insight of NAI is that the preconditions of intelligence such as errorreduction strategies, pattern recognition or categorization can emerge in biological systems from local interactions between dumb specialized agents (like antsortermites)withoutacentralplannertochoreographtheiractivities. If human mentation 'emerges' likewise from millions of asynchronous, parallel interactionsbetweendumbcomponents,Haylesargues,thereisnoclassicallyself present 'human' subjectivity for the posthuman to transcend. Mental powers of deliberation, inference, consciousness, etc. arealready distributed between biologicalneuralnetworks,activelysensingbodiesandartefacts(Hayles1999,239). I have christened this 'the antihumanist objection to posthumanism' given its striking similarities to the deconstruction of subjectivist philosophy and phenomenology undertaken in postwar French antihumanisms Derridas in particular (Ibid. 146). Hayles proximate target, here, is the putatively autonomous subject of modern liberal theory. The autonomous liberal subject, she argues, is unproblematicallypresenttoitselfanddistinctfromtheconceptuallyorderedworld in which it works out its plans for the good (Ibid. 286). The posthuman subject, by contrast, is problematically individuated, because its agency is constituted by an increasingly 'smart' extrabodily environment on which its cognitive functioning depends and because of the open, ungrounded materiality or iterability of

languagewhichisbotharrestedbythecontextofembodiedactionandinfectedby its opacity (Derrida 1988 152; Hayles 1999, 2645). The decentered or distributed posthuman subject is no longer sufficiently distinct from the world to order it autonomouslyasthesubjectofliberaltheoryisrequiredtodo. Butisthisright? Letssuppose,alongwithHaylesandotherproponentsofembodiedanddistributed cognition, that the skinbag is an ontologically permeable boundary between self and nonself (or exoself). Proponents of the extended mind thesis like Andy Clark andDavidChalmersarguefromaprincipleof'parity'betweenprocessesthatgoon intheheadandanyfunctionallyequivalentprocessintheworldbeyond.6Theparity principle implies that mental processes need not occur only in biological nervous systemsbutintheenvironmentsandtoolsofembodiedthinkers.IfIhavetomake marks on paper to keep in mind the steps of a lengthy logical proof, the PP states thatmymentalactivityisconstitutedbytheseinscriptionaleventsaswellasbythe knowledgeandhabitsreposinginmyacculturatedneuralnetworks. However, given the parity between bodily and extrabodily processes, this cannot make the activity less evaluable in terms of the rationality standards we apply to deliberativeacts.Evenifthehumanistsubjectemergesfromthesummedactivities of biological and nonbiological agents, this metaphysical dependence (or supervenience)neednotimpairitscapacitytosubtendthepowersofdeliberationor reasoningliberaltheoryrequiresofit.7 Derridas more systematic deconstruction of the semantically constitutive subject nuancesthispicturebyentailinglimitsonthescopeofpracticalreasoninthefaceof the outside or exception which infects any rulegoverned system (Derrida 1988, p.152).Theruleordesireisalwaysprecipitate,inthisway.Butthereisadifference between being ahead of oneself and being beheaded. The posthuman, in Hayles criticalsenseoftheterm,isnotlesshumanforconfrontingthefragile,constitutively precipitatecharacterofcognitionanddesire. Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,thatthereisnomeritinthemodelofthehybridselfthat Hayles presents as 'posthuman' or that it has no implications for precritical or
ParityPrinciple.If,asweconfrontsometask,apartoftheworldfunctionsasaprocesswhich,were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, thenthatpartoftheworldis(forthattime)partofthecognitiveprocess.(fromClarkandChalmers (1998)p.XX) 7 The notion of supervenience is frequently used by nonreductive materialists to express the dependence of mental properties on physical properties without entailing their reducibility to the latter.Informally:MpropertiessuperveneonPpropertiesifathingsPpropertiesdetermineitsM properties.Ifaestheticpropertiessuperveneonphysicalproperties,ifxisphysicallyidenticaltoyand x is beautiful, y must be beautiful. Supervenience accounts vary with the modal force of the entailments involved. Natural or nomological supervenience holds in worlds whose physical laws are like our own. Metaphysical supervenience, on the other hand, is often claimed to hold with logicalorconceptualnecessity.
6

speculative posthumanism. On the contrary, a 'deconstruction' of the classically constitutivesubjectofpostCartesianthoughtis,Ihaveargued,ausefulprophylactic against immaterialist fancies or transcendentally inspired objections to the naturalizing project of cognitive science (Roden 2006). However, the naturalization ofsubjectivityandmindisatbestaconceptualpreconditionforenvisagingcertain transcendent posthumanist itineraries involving the emergence of artificial minds from new technological configurations of matter. It does not represent their culmination. There are two other objections that may potentially survive this analysis. Firstly, it couldbeobjectedthatthecriticalposthumanismliketheextendedmindthesis showsthatthehumanisalwaysalreadytechnicallyconstituted.Inhercontribution to a recent Templeton Research Seminar on transhumanism Hayles argues that transhumanistsareweddedtoatechnogeneticanthropologyforwhichhumansand technologieshaveexistedandcoevolvedinsymbioticpartnership.Notonlywould future transhuman enhancement be a technogenetic process; but so, according to this story, are comparable transformations in the deep past. Human technical activity has, for example, equipped some with lactose tolerance or differential calculus without monstering the beneficiaries into posthumans. One of the proponentsoftheextendedmindthesis,AndyClark,hasframedthetechnogenesis argument against posthumanism particularly clearly in his bookNatural Born Cyborgs: Thepromise,orperhapsthreatened,transitiontoaworldofwiredhumans andsemiintelligentgadgetsisjustonemoremoveinanancientgame...We are already masters at incorporating nonbiological stuff and structure deep into our physical and cognitive routines. To appreciate this is to cease to believe in any posthuman future and to resist the temptation to define ourselvesinbrutaloppositiontotheveryworldsinwhichsomanyofusnow live,loveandwork(Clark2003,p.142). Natural born cyborgs, as suggested, are already dealers in hybrid mental representations which exploit both a linguistically mapped environment and the pattern detecting talents of our multifariously talented brains. This is significant becauseourcapacitytoascribestructuredpropositionalattitudestoothersarguably presupposesthecapacitytouselanguagetorepresenttheircontents.Representing the contents of beliefs is necessary for evaluating them and it is independently plausibletosupposethat,asDonaldDavidsonarguesinhisessayThoughtandTalk, having the capacity to evaluate beliefsis part of what is required in a believer (Davidson1984). Clearly, if we restrict the evidence base for the technogenesis argument to cases whereaugmentationhasnotresultedinaspeciesdivergenceorsomethingverylike it,thenwewillinducethatthisisnotliabletohappeninthefuture.However,some prehuman divergence had to have happened in our evolutionary past and it is at least plausible given thenaturalborn cyborgsthesis thattechnologiessuch as publicsymbolsystemswereafactorinthehominizationprocess.Givenaprehuman

divergencehasoccurredinthepast,perhapsduetoevolutionarypressuresbrought about the development of simpler symbolization techniques, why preclude the possibilitythatconvergentNBICtechnologiesmightpromptasimilarstepchangein thefuture? I have arguedelsewhere that a cognitive augmentation that replaced public language with a nonsymbolic vehicle of cognition and communication might assuming Clark's account of hybrid representations lead to the instrumental eliminationofpropositionalattitudepsychologythroughtheeliminationofitspublic vehicles of content.Postfolk folk might, arguably, be opaque to the practices of intentionalinterpretationwebringtobearinouri.e.humansocialintercourse and thus might well form initially discrete social and reproductive enclaves that mightlaterseedentirelyposthumanrepublics. AnotherofHaylesobjectionstostandardposthumanistsvisionsoftranscendenceis their supposed elision of the materiality of human embodiment and cognition:the materiality argument. The fact that computer simulations can help us understand theselforganizingcapacitiesofbiologicalsystemsdoesnotentailthatthesecanbe fullyreplicatedbysomesystembyvirtueofimplementingasufficientlyfinegrained softwarerepresentationoftheirfunctionalstructure. Itistruethatsomeposthumanistscenariospresupposethatmindsororganismscan befullyreplicatedonspeculativenonbiologicalsubstrateslikethecomputroniumor 'smart matter' imagined in Ken MacLeod'sFall Revolution novels. However, this objectionappliestoafairlyrestrictedclassofposthuman itineraries:namelythose involving the replication of existing minds and organisms in computational form. Although Hayles provides no arguments against pancomputationalism or global functionalism, it might well be the case that syntheticlife forms or robots, beingdifferentlyembodied,willbedifferentlymindedaswell(whoknows?). Thus the materiality of embodiment argument works in favour of the precritical posthumanistaccount,notagainstit.8Ontheotherhand,shemaybewrongandthe pancomputationalists right. Mental properties of things may, for all we know, supervene on their computational properties because every other property supervenesonthemaswell. I turn, finally, to an objection that is perhaps implicit rather than explicit in the argumentsofCriticalPosthumaniststodatebutisworth consideringonitsown,if onlyforitsspeculativepayoff.Irefertothisastheantiessentialistargument. The antiessentialist objection to posthumanism starts from a particular interpretationofthedisjointnessofthehumanandtheposthuman.Thisisthatthe only thing that could distinguish the set of posthumans and the set of humans is thatall posthumans would lack some essential property of humanness by virtue of their augmentation history. It follows that if there is no human essence no
Itmaymilitateagainsttranshumanistdreamsofvirtualimmortality,but,asmanyhavepointedout, thisisahumanistorhyperhumanistscenario,notaposthumanistone.
8

propertiesthathumanspossessinallpossibleworldstherecanbenoposthuman divergenceortranscendence. This is a potentially serious objection to speculative posthumanism because there seemtobeplausiblegroundsforrejectingessentialisminthesciencesofcomplexity or selforganization that underwrite many posthumanist prognostications. Some philosophers of biology hold that the interpretation of biological taxa most consonant with Darwinian evolution is that they are not kinds (i.e. properties) but individuals. Evolution by natural selection is a form of selforganization involving feedbackrelationshipsbetweenthedistributionofgenetictraitsacrosspopulations and their phenotypic consequences in particular environments. An individual or protoindividual can undergo a selforganizing process, but an abstract kind or universal cannot. Thus, the argument goes, evolution happens to species qua individuals (or protoindividuals) not species qua kinds. To be biologically 'human' onthisviewisnottoexemplifysomesetofnecessaryandsufficientproperties,but to be genealogically related to earlier members of the population of humans (Hull 1988). Clearly,ifbiologicalcategoriesarenotkindsandposthumantranscendencerequires the technically mediated loss of properties essential to membership of some biological kind, then posthuman transcendence envisaged by precritical posthumanismismetaphysicallyimpossible.9 Underlyingtheantiessentialistobjectionistheassumptionthattheonlysignificant differencesaredifferencesintheessentialpropertiesdemarcatingnaturalkinds.But whyadheretothisphilosophyofdifference?10Theviewthatnatureisarticulatedby differencesintheinstantiationofabstractuniversalssitspoorlywiththeideaofan actively selforganizing nature underlying the leading edge cognitive and life sciences. A view of difference consistent with selforganization would locate the engines of differentiation in those micro components and structural properties whosecumulativeactivitygeneratestheemergentregularitiesofcomplexsystems. For example, we might adopt animmanent ontology of difference for which individuatingboundariesaregeneratedbylocalstatesofmatter:suchasdifferences inpressure,temperature,miscibilityorchemicalconcentration(Delanda2004).For immanent ontologies of difference that of Gilles Deleuze, say the conceptual differences articulated in the natural language kind lexicons are asymmetrically
This objection is overdetermined because the possibility of successfully implementing radical transhumanistpoliciesseemsincompatiblewithastablehumannature.Iftherearefewcognitiveor bodyinvariantsthatcouldnotinprinciplebemodifiedwiththehelpofsomehypotheticalNBIC technologythentranshumanismarguablypresupposesthattherearenosuchessentialproperties forhumanness. 10 David Hull points out that the genealogical boundaries between species can be considerably sharperthanboundariesin'characterspace'(Hull1988,4).Thefactthatnectarfeedinghummingbird hawk moths and nectarfeeding hummingbirds look and behave in similar ways does not invalidate theclaimthattheyhaveutterlydistinctlinesofevolutionarydescent(Laporte2004,44).
9

dependent upon active individuating differences (Ibid. 10). Deleuzean ontology is obviouslynottheonlyoptionhere:anyontologywhichreconcilestheexistenceof realorradicaldifferenceswiththelackoftranscendentortranscendentalorganizing principleswoulddo. Inshort:wecanbeantiessentialistsandantiPlatonistswhileholdingthattheworld is profoundly differentiated in a way that owes nothing to the transcendental causalityofabstractuniversals,subjectivityorlanguage. Conclusion: I have argued that critical posthumanists provide few convincing reasons for abandoningprecriticalorspeculativeposthumanism.Theantiessentialistargument presupposes a model of difference that is ill adapted to the sciences that critical posthumanists cite in favour of their naturalized deconstruction of the human subject. The deconstruction of the humanist subject implied in the antihumanist objection may itself be a useful prolegomenon to a posthumanengendering cognitive science; but it complicates rather than corrodes the philosophical humanism that critical posthumanism problematizes while leaving open the possibility of a radical differentiation of the human and the posthuman. The technogenesis objection is weak, if conceptually productive. The elision of materialityargumentisbasedonproblematicassumptionsand,evenifsound,would precludeonlysomescenariosforposthumandivergence. Ofthese,theantiessentialistobjectionseemsthestrongestandmostwideranging initsimplication.Ourresponsetoitsuggestedthatitmightbecircumventedwithan immanent ontology of emergent differences such as Deleuze's ontology of the virtual. However, a consequence of embracing locally emergent differences in this way is that there can be no adequate concept of posthuman difference without posthumans.Foritissurelyaconsequenceofanysuchaccountthatascienceofthe differentcannotprecedeitshistoricalemergenceormorphogenesis,evenifonlyin simulatedform.Thisimpliesthattheposthumanisatbestaplaceholdersignifyinga possibility that we cannot adequately conceptualize ahead of its actualization. However, this does not preclude a theoretical development of the implications of theposthumaninsofaraswecanconceptualizeit. Moreover, the emptiness of the signifier 'posthuman' has an ethical or, perhaps, 'antiethical'consequencethatarguablyshouldbeconsideredmorefullyinthelight ofDerrida'sremarksabouttheprecipitatecharacterofthought.11Ifthespeculative ideaoftheposthumanisaplaceholderfordifferencesthataredeterminableonlyvia some synthetic process such as the creation of actual posthumans, modified
InheraddresstotheCardiff,SEPFEPconference,'TheEthicsofExtinction'ClaireColebrookargued thatwhileethosimplieshabit,placeandenvironment,situationsofcatastrophicchange(e.g.climate change)implytheneedtoovercometheserootedmodesofactionandaffect.Hencetheprospectof humanitybeingsupersededbynonhumansrequiresanantiethicswhichimaginesorsimulatesthe radicallynonhuman.

11

transhumans, or a range of simulations or aesthetic models (as in cybernetic art) these differences can be determined only by progressive actualization. Thus posthumanist philosophy is locked into a dialectically unstable preterition falling between speculative and synthetic activity. To understand what it as yet undetermined,itmustattempthoweverincrementallytobringitintobeingand togiveitshape. BIBLIOGRAPHY: Bostrom,Nick(2005),AHistoryofTranshumanistThought,JournalofEvolutionand Technology,14(1). ____(2008),WhyIWanttoBePosthumanWhenIGrowUp,B.Gordijn,R BostromN,SandbergA(2006),'ConvergingCognitiveEnhancements',Ann.N.Y. Acad.Sci.1093:201227. Chadwick(eds.),MedicalEnhancementandPosthumanity,Springer. ____(2005b),InDefenceofPosthumanDignity,Bioethics19(3),pp.203214. Clark,Andy(2003),NaturalBornCyborgs,(OxfordOUP). ___Language,EmbodimentandtheCognitiveNiche,TrendsinCognitiveScience 10(8),pp.370374) ___(1993)AssociativeEngines,(MITBradford). ___(2006)MaterialSymbols,PhilosophicalPsychologyVol.19,No.3,June2006,pp. 291307. ClarkAndy,ChalmersDavid(1998),TheExtendedMind,Analysis199858(1),pp.7 19. Churchland,Paul(1998),ConceptualSimilarityAcrossSensoryandNeuralDiversity: TheFodor/LePoreChallengeAnswered,JournalofPhilosophy,XCV,No.1, pp.532. _____(1995).TheEngineofReason,TheSeatoftheSoul(CambridgeMass.: MITPress. _____(1989)FolkPsychologyandtheExplanationofHuman Behaviour,PhilosophicalPerspectives3,pp.225241. ____(1981),EliminativeMaterialismandthePropositionalAttitudes,Journalof Philosophy78(2),6790. Cilliers,Paul(1998).ComplexityandPostmodernism.London:Routlege. Davidson,Donald(1984)ThoughtandTalk,inInquiriesintoTruthand Interpretation(Oxford,ClarendonPress),pp.155170. Deacon,Terrence(1997),TheSymbolicSpecies:TheCoevolutionofLanguageand theHumanBrain(London:Penguin). DeLanda,Manuel(1997),ImmanenceandTranscendenceintheGenesisof Form,SouthAtlanticQuarterly96:3,Summer1997,pp.499514. _____(2004),IntensiveScience&VirtualPhilosophy,London:Continuum. Deleuze,GillesandGuattari,Felix(1992),AThousandPlateaus,BrianMassumi (trans.).London:Athlone. Derrida,Jacques(1986),MarginsofPhilosophy,AlanBass(trans.).Brighton: HarvesterPress),pp.209271. ___(1988),LimitedInc.SamuelWeber(trans.).NorthwesternUniversityPress. ___(2002),ActsofReligion,GilAnidjar(ed.).NewYork:Routledge.

10

Daniel,Dennett(1991).ConsciousnessExplained.London:Penguin. Fukuyama,Francis(2002),OurPosthumanFuture:Consequencesofthe BiotechnologyRevolution(London:ProfileBooks). Hayles,NKatharine(1999),HowWeBecamePosthuman:Virtualbodiesin Cybernetics,LiteratureandInformatics(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress). Hull,David(1988),OnHumanNature,inPSA1986,vol.2,A.FineandP.Machamer (eds.),EastLansing,MI:PhilosophyofScienceAssociation,pp.313;reprintedinHull (1989)andHullandRuse(eds.),PhilosophyofBiology(1998). Jones,Richard(2009),BrainInterfacingwithKurzweil, http://www.softmachines.org/wordpress/?p=450,Accessed08.09.2009. Kurzweil,Ray(2005),TheSingularityisNear(NewYorkViking). LaPorte,Joseph(2004),NaturalKindsandConceptualChange(CambridgeCUP). Lisewski,AndreasMartin(2006),Theconceptofstrongandweakvirtual reality,MindsandMachines16,201219. Lycan,WilliamG.(1999),TheContinuityofLevelsofNature,inWilliamLycan (ed.)MindandCognition(OxfordBlackwell),pp.4963. MacLennan,B.J.(2002),TranscendingTuringComputability,MindsandMachines13: 322. Marx,KarlandEngels,Frederick(1994),TheGermanIdeology,C.J.Arthur(Ed.). London:LawrenceandWishart. Mackenzie,Adrian(2002),Transductions:bodiesandmachinesatspeed(London: Continuum). Patton,Paul(2007),UtopianPoliticalPhilosophy:DeleuzeandRawls,Deleuze Studies1,pp.4159. Rawls,John(1999),ATheoryofJustice(HarvardUniversityPress). Roden,David.2010.Deconstructionandexcisioninphilosophical posthumanism.JournalofEvolutionandTechnology21(1)(June):2736. Simondon,Gilbert(1989),Dumodedexistencedesobjetstechniques(Editions Aubier). Shragrir,Oron(2006),WhyweViewtheBrainasaComputer,Synthese(153),pp 393416. Soper,Kate(1986),HumanismandAntihumanism.London:HarperCollins. Sterling,Bruce(1996),SchismatrixPlus,(Berkley,NewYork). Vinge,Vernor(1993)[online]TheComingTechnologicalSingularity:HowtoSurvive inthePostHuman Era,http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.htmlAccessed 2008.24.04.

11