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1 Introduction On February 6, 2007 military organization, U.S. departmental interaction, and U.S.

policy towards Africa took a controversial turn. Former President George W. Bush announced the creation of a new Unified Command, AFRICOM. He stated that the commands purpose was to strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africaenhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa1. What appeared to be reorganization within the Department of Defense ushered in a new era of debate, focus, and analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards the African continent. On March 11, 2008 Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs Chairman, Senator Russ Feingold, stated in a hearing that, This part of the world [Africa] is far too important for us to rely on narrow feeble policies, or half-hearted ad-hoc measures.2 The policies and measures Feingold spoke of were components of past U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. The policy was and still is in serious need of reevaluation. The old archaic framework of African engagement that the U.S. has operated in is no longer a viable option for the strategic areas of importance the African continent plays in U.S. security interests. Africa has become strategically important to not just the United States, but to other countries around the world. This level of importance will continue to increase in the future.

McFate, Sean. 2008. U.S. Africa Command: A New Security Paradigm? Military Review. JanuaryFebruary: 10. 2 Feingold, Russell. 2008. Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold at a Hearing on Evaluating U.S. Policy Options on the Horn of Africa. March 11. <http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=305904
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2 AFRICOM has encountered a two-front battle hindering its potential success. The first is the reception of AFRICOM within the United States. From Congress to non-profit organizations, AFRICOM has been vehemently opposed, reluctantly accepted, or heralded as an innovative approach to Africa. The second is the African response to AFRICOM. In Africa, mixed reactions from governments, institutions, and communities have created a public image and logistical nightmare for AFRICOM. The purpose of this paper is to better understand, as well as find solutions for AFRICOMs strained reception on the continent of Africa. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs and Chairman, Senator Feingold, have been instrumental in holding hearings and drafting proposals related to U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. The Subcommittee is also accepting of innovative ideas to strengthen U.S.-African relations. Since the creation of AFRICOM, Senator Feingold has held and been a part of hearings structured to understand AFRICOMs present and future role and effectiveness in U.S.-African relations. Feingold has visited the continent of Africa and met with leaders and officials a number of times. His understanding of Africa, the inner workings of the U.S. government, and his influential role as Subcommittee Chairman enable him to be an effective force in implementing solutions for AFRICOMs shortcomings. Past and Present U.S. Policy Towards Africa For half a century, the United States has maintained official ties with many African countries3. Through the framework of past U.S. policies towards Africa, the complexities of
U.S.-Africa Relations Chronology. 2008. Retrieved March 1, 2009 from Department of State website: http://www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2008/February/20080206163314dmslahrellek0.9545404.html.
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3 AFRICOM can be better understood. The U.S. has a deep history of engagement on the African continent. For the purposes of this paper, U.S. policy from the Cold War to the present will be given a brusque overview. Broader changing policies, which indicate the level of inconsistency that has existed in U.S. policy towards the African continent, are defined by the perception each presidential administration held of the role of the U.S. towards Africa and the state of the international system at the time. Such policy towards Africa has typically been reactive as opposed to proactive and driven by events rather than to shape events.4 Cold War Policy In 1952, North Africa was integrated in to the AOR of EUCOM5. This was due to the colonial history and connection between European and the African countries included in the Command6. The U.S. further enlarged its focus on Africa through the establishment of the State Departments Bureau of African Affairs in 19587. Other countries in Africa were integrated into perceived relevant U.S. Command structures, with some countries in SSA included in LANTCOM in 19608. The inclusion of more countries in Africa was due to the growing concerns the U.S. had over increasing Soviet Influence on the African continent9. In 1961, President Kennedy established USAID in order to promote development in developing countries and increase U.S. influence in areas around the world, such as Africa10. The first Peace Corps

Henk, Dan. 1998. Unchartered Paths, Uncertain Vision: U.S. Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Wake of the Cold War. Regional Series. USAF Institute for National Security Studies. <www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp18.pdf>. ix. 5 Esterhuyse, Abel. 2008. The Iraqization of Africa: Looking at AFRICOM From a South African Perspective. Strategic Studies Quarterly. Spring: 113. 6 Ibid.,113 7 U.S.-Africa Relations Chronology. 8 Esterhuyse 113 9 Ibid.114 10 U.S.-Africa Relations Chronology.
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4 volunteers to work on the African continent were received in Ghana on June 4, 196111. SSA was fully placed under the AOR of STRICOM in 196212. The U.S. containment strategy for the Soviet Union and Communist ideology during the Cold War led U.S. administrations to support and ally themselves with African leaders they knew opposed communist ideology and reform, and could be swayed to lean towards U.S. interests13. Much to the chagrin of many inside and outside of the African continent, most leaders backed by the United States led corrupt regimes, which were typically autocratic and violated the rights of many14. One of the most notorious leaders to have U.S. support was Zairian15 dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu was crucial in ensuring that the Soviet as well as Cuban sponsored government in Angola was strategically countered by a Western ally in the same region16. In the 1970s, Somalia became an ally to the U.S. to counter Soviet ally, Ethiopia.17 The U.S. policy of backing pro-American and anti-Soviet leaders continued well into the eighties. Kenyan authoritarian leader, Daniel Moi, and consistent human rights violator, Somali leader Mohamed Siad Barre, were two other African leaders who fit into the U.S. containment strategy on the continent18. Former president of Liberia, Samuel K. Doe, was entrusted with ensuring the safety of the U.S.-African Communications network stationed in Monrovia during the 80s19. Due to his strategic importance to the U.S., not much was said of his rigging of

11 12

Ibid. Esterhuyse 115 13 Chege, Michael. 1992. Remembering Africa. Foreign Affairs. 71(1), 159.
14 15

Ibid. Now the Democratic Republic of Congo 16 Chege 159 17 Volman, Daniel. 1993. Africa and the New World Order. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 31:5. 18 Chege 160 19 Ibid.

5 elections in 1985, and many of his human rights violations20. Furthermore, he was consistently given aid, which totaled to approximately $550 million, which was subsequently embezzled21. Due to the Cold War, and the interests of the U.S., in 1983 President Reagan divided AOR for Africa between three Commands: EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM.22 However, the ending of the Cold War decreased the geostrategic importance Africa held as an ideological and strategic battleground.23 Essentially, there remained few reasons as to why Africa would gain absolute importance at the top of the global economic agenda or strategic interests of influential powers in the international system.24 President George H.W. Bush: New World Order Former President George H.W. Bush ushered in a change of U.S. policy towards Africa alongside a changing perception of the nature of the relationship the U.S. should have with African countries.25 Bush claimed that the ending of the Cold War had given way to an international system where the U.S. was threatened by turmoil and dangers in the developing world.26 Therefore, it was essential that the U.S. be prepared to deal with a world that, for all our hope, remains a dangerous place- a world of ethnic antagonism, national rivalries, religious tensions, spreading weaponry, personal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism.27 Bushs New World Order philosophy consisted of a need to positively engage with African countries, in a manner that was contrary to past Cold War involvement and
20 21

Ibid. Ibid. 22 Esterhuyse 115 23 Chege 156 24 Ibid. 25 Lawson, Letitia. 2007. U.S. African Policy Since the Cold War. Strategic Insights. 6(1): 1 26 Volman 1 27 Ibid.

6 interference.28 One of the first steps was an international partnership conducted by the U.S., Russia, Portugal, Cuba and South Africa to mediate in the Angolan civil war, and help reach a settlement.29 This was surprising, since most of the countries involved in working to end the civil war had previously engaged in the country and perpetuated the civil war for their own gains. Furthermore, in 1990, the U.S., Great Britain, and France tied potential aid to African countries with conditions of democratization. Democratic movements in Africa strengthened in 1991, which led to a shift in U.S. Policy.30 For the first time since the Kennedy administration's support for anti-colonial African nationalism, crowds yearning for freedom, this time from domestic tyranny, cheered statements from the U.S. State Department as it distanced itself from the autocratic and unpopular leaders it once supported.31 From 1990 to 1992, the U.S. adhered to its policy change by cutting off aid to Liberia, Sudan and Zaire, all of who were Cold War allies. 32 In 1991, the U.S. ended their support of one tine much-courted ally, Mobutu. The American embassy in Kinshasa, Zaire released a statement from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, stating, Mobutu has lost legitimacy and should hand over the government to an opposition-led transition.33 Resources towards countries, which were strengthening their democracies continued to increase. In addition to U.S. interests in the democratization of African countries, the Bush administration realized how extensive U.S. energy interests in unstable African countries had

28 29

Lawson 1 Ibid. 30 Chege 156 31 Ibid.,146 32 Lawson 1 33 Chege 160

7 become.34 Therefore, energy security was a second motivating factor for increased engagement on the continent. Former U.S. Marine Corps Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray, summarized the various levels of interest Africa held to the U.S. by stating, if the U.S. is to have stability in these regions, maintain our access to their resources, protect our citizens abroad, defend our vital installations, and deter conflictwe must maintain within our active force structure a credible military power projection.35 As the situation in Somalia began to deteriorate in the late 80s and early 90s, there was pressure on the U.S. to intervene.36 However, as the country continued to fall apart, the U.S. and other western states adopted a hands-off attitude towards the chaos that began to engulf the country.37 Soon, the number of civilian casualties and the starving Somali population could not be ignored. On August 15, 1992 the U.N. launched Operation Provide Relief (UNOSOM-I), which was intended to ensure that food aid was delivered to civilians in need.38 By December, the U.N. requested aid from the U.S. due to the difficulty of delivering aid in Somalia and establishing secure roads. On December 5, 1992, as one of his final acts as President of the United States, Bush committed 25,000 U.S. troops to Operation Provide Relief. 39 With the landing of the first U.S. Marines in Somalia in December, the U.S. named the mission Operation Restore Hope.40 Operation Restore Hope was the immediate African legacy Bush left for his predecessor, President William J. Clinton.

34 35

Volman 1 Volman 2 36 Ibid., 6 37 Ibid. 38 Snyder, R. 2001. Operation Restore Hope/Battle of Mogadishu. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/Somalia93.html#timeline.
39 40

Ibid. Ibid.

8 President William Clinton: Assertive Multilateralism, PDD-25, and Virtual Engagement Though President Clinton continued Bushs engagement in the African continent early on, he sought a reduction in the number of U.S. troops positioned in Somalia.41 In October of 1993, eighteen U.S. soldiers were wounded and killed in Mogadishu.42 News networks were saturated with images of Somali rebel forces dragging the corpse of an American soldier through the streets and holding a U.S. helicopter pilot hostage.43 Finally in the spring of 1994, the U.S. withdrew from Somalia completely, which led to disengagement from the African continent.44 In light of the Somali debacle, President Clinton issued PDD-25.45 PDD-25 served as a an attempt to not only limit future U.N. missions, but to also limit U.S. involvement in U.N. missions.46 The PDD-25 Executive Summary stated the following: Peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. However, as the policy states, properly conceived and well-executed peace operations can be a useful element in serving America's interests. The directive prescribes a number of specific steps; to improve U.S. and UN management of UN peace operations in order to ensure that use of such operations is selective and more effective.47 PDD-25 sought to ensure that peacekeeping would no longer remain a vital component of U.S. foreign policy, therefore restricting U.S. involvement in peace operations. However, the Directive did allow for the U.S. to participate in peace operations that served to advance the

Schraeder, Peter J. 1998. Guest Editors Introduction: Trends and Transformation in the Clinton Administrations Foreign Policy Towards Africa (1993-1999). Issue: A Journal of Opinion. 26:2.
41 42 43

Ibid. Ibid. 44 Snyder 45 Lawson 2 46 Ibid. 47 PDD 25: Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. 1994. Presidential Decision Directives. Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm.

9 interests of the United States around the world. Six guidelines for U.S. involvement in peace operations as well as the reforming of U.N. peace operations were established. As the PDD-25 was released in May of 1994, the CIA released plans to shut down fifteen CIA stations located in Africa.48 A CIA official stated, We have never been in Africa to report on Africa. . . . We went into Africa as part of the covert activity of the Cold War, to recruit (as spies) Soviet, Chinese, Eastern European, and sometimes North Korean officials under circumstances that were easier to operate under than in their home countries.49 The release of PDD-25 also met with a worsening situation in Rwanda. Due to the new Directive, the U.S. advocated for alternative forms of intervention in Rwanda, as opposed to sending in a peacekeeping force.50 Commander of the U.N. forces in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire, had requested numerous times for the monitoring of the Abuja Accords, which were established to bring an end to the civil war between the government and the Rwanda Patriot Front. He also requested the presence of reinforcements on the ground to circumvent a situation that appeared to be turning into genocide.51 The requests, however, were denied, and soon U.N. troops were pulled off the ground. From the perspective of the U.S. and the newly implemented Directive, sufficient evidence and cause did not exist for U.S. intervention in Rwanda.52 Other powers, including the U.S., were apprehensive about designating the situation in Rwanda as genocide.53 After reports came from Rwanda placing the death toll of Tutsis and moderate Hutus at a total of close to
Chau, Donovan C. U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Culture and Conflicts. Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>. 10. 49 Ibid. 50 Lawson 2 51 Ibid., 3 52 Ibid., 4 53 Ibid.
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10 800,000, it became imperative that the world intervene. The U.N. gave its approval for an intervention, which was led by France, to step in to Rwanda and suppress what was now an evident genocide.54 In 1995, the Pentagon released the report, US Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, stating, Ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.55 Hence, there was no immediate need to place much traditional security emphasis on Africa through the creation of a unified command, or increased military engagement in all areas of the African continent. However, as an effort to focus on capacity building on the continent Clinton launched the ACRI in 1996.56 The purpose of the ACRI was to create partnerships with African countries in order to strengthen the capability of African peacekeeping as well as humanitarian relief capabilities.57 As with most U.S. policy towards Africa, ACRI focused more on reactive operations, as opposed to proactive initiatives. President George W. Bush: Aid Increase and AFRICOM As Former President George W. Bush was running for president, he acknowledged that Africa was a continent with many problems.58 However, he stated that Africas strategic role in Americas overall foreign policy objectives was limited.59 September 11, 2001 led to a change in the evaluation of U.S. strategic objectives and interests. Bushs increase of aid to Africa contradicted his campaign stances, and lead to the highest level of foreign aid the U.S. had ever
54 55

Ibid. Lin, Christina Y. 2007. The Rise of Africa in the International Geopolitical Landscape- a U.S. Energy Perspective. Institut Fur Strategie - Politik - Sicherheits - und Wirtschaftsberatung. Retrieved on February 2, 2009 from http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=211C11FE1366-4429-1CD2-8D88BA4C4565&lng=en. 56 Chau 10 57 Ibid. 58 Smith, Gayle. 2004. Review of African Political Economy. 31(102): 698 59 Ibid.

11 given to the African continent.60 In March of 2002 at a Conference on Financing Development, Bush presented the creation of the MCA, which was a five billion dollar fund designated for developing the world's poorest, yet best economic and political 'performers'.61 In his State of the Union Address the very same year, Bush surprised many by stating that he would triple the amount of aid the U.S. spent on combating the global AIDS pandemic.62 The aid for combating the pandemic was delivered through Bushs PEPFAR. Bushs promised aid defied the stigma of impossibility that had plagued many who had attempted to significantly increase aid to Africa post Cold War63. Bush significantly increased non-food economic aid to Africa from what the previous Clinton administration had given.64 Former President George W. Bush announced plans for the creation of a UCC65 entirely focused on Africa on February 6, 2007.66 Defense Secretary Gates described the preexisting command structure67 for Africa as being an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.68 Africa would fall into the AOR of the new command, AFRICOM, with the exception of Egypt, which would remain under the AOR of CENTCOM. AFRICOMs mission statement describes itself as a Command in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment

60 61

Ibid. Ibid. 62 Ibid., 699 63 Ibid. 64 Figure 1: Non-Food Economic Aid 65 For an explanation of the Unified Combatant Command System please see Appendix A 66 Esterhuyse 117 67 Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup and New Command Setup 68 Ibid..,113

12 in support of U.S. foreign policy. 69 AFRICOM serves two purposes. First, it creates an easier organization of UCC AOR in Africa. Second, it addresses the security interests of the U.S. towards Africa through an interagency and proactive approach. AFRICOMs creation allows for more seamless operations, and reorganization within the UCP, which simplifies the DODs approach towards Africa. Prior to the creation of AFRICOM, the three UCCs that had various African countries within their AOR began to feel overextended. EUCOMs African AOR consisted of 42 countries (located in Western, Central and Southern Africa), CENTCOMs AOR included the seven countries in the Horn of Africa, and PACOMs AOR covered the islands off the Eastern coast of Africa. EUCOMs total AOR consisted of 93 countries and territories in Europe and Africa.70 This was a significant amount of area to cover for one command and former EUCOM Commander General James Jones stated that in 2006 EUCOMs staff were spending more than half their time on Africa issues, up from almost none three years prior.71 There was also difficulty in conducting smooth and clear operations between the three UCCs.72 U.S. security interests expanded on the African continent post 9/11. This was largely due to the change within the global security framework, and Americas perception of its role and threats within the new framework. According to the 2002 NSS: The events of September 11,2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does
69 70

Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from http://www.africom.mil/. Ploch, Lauren. 2008. Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf. 2. 71 Ploch 2 72 Berschinski, Robert G. 2007. AFRICOMs Dilemma: The Global War on Terrorism, Capacity Building, Humanitarianism and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa. Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=827.> 7

13 not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.73

The 2002 NSS went on to state that America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.74 In 2005, DoD Directive 3000.05 affirmed that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and would be given priority comparable to combat operations and the be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.75 The 2006 QDR added on to the change in thinking and stressed the importance of shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves76. The 2002 NSS, DoD Directive 3000.05 and the 2006 QDR, all laid the framework for the type of thinking that went in to the creation of AFRICOM. The documents represented a change in the Bush administrations view of simply maintaining a heavily aid based and military to military policy towards Africa. September 11 had brought about a shift in how the U.S. viewed security and the maintenance of U.S. security and stability around the world. There was a realization that it was necessary the United States begin to look at places such as Africa as more of a strategic interest in maintaining U.S. and global security. Preventative and proactive

73

National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2002. Retrieved March 2, 2009 from The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves website: http://www.cngr.gov/pdf/library/national%20security%20strategy%20sept%202002.pdf. ii. 74 Ibid., 1 75 Department of Defense Directive: 3000.05. 2005. Department of Defense. Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from www.dtic.mil/whs/directive/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf. 76 Quadrennial Defense Review. 2006. Department of Defense. Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf.

14 action would be the best policy course to maintain the security of Americans at home and abroad. Following Bushs 2007 announcement, the command commenced as a sub-unified command at the Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany under EUCOM.77 In October of 2008, AFRICOM was finally launched as a fully operation UCC. Due to the amount of criticism and controversy caused by the potential placement of AFRICOM in Africa, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced in November of 2008 that no decision regarding headquarters would be made until at least 2012.78 AFRICOM altered much of the vocabulary towards Africa, placing an emphasis on working with Africa as opposed to working on Africa.79 The organization of AFRICOM focused more on an interagency approach imbedded within the functions of each office. While the Commander is a General (General Ward) one of his two deputies is from the DOS (Ambassador Mary C. Yates), and serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities.80 Through an interagency approach with the Department of State and USAID, AFRICOMs purpose is to prevent war and conflict, as opposed to engaging in war and conflict. Thus, programs conducted with or through AFRICOM include all aspects of the three Ds: Defense, Development and Diplomacy. Much of the work would be done through Phase Zero

77 78

Ploch 8 Ibid. 79 U.S. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century. 2009. Retrieved March 1, 2009 from Department of State website: http://www.state.giv/p/af/rls/rm/2009/117326.htm. 80 Chau 17

15 operations, which focus on combat prevention and developmental initiatives, with the intent of maintaining an environment that will not be a breeding ground for combat or security threats.81 The Obama administration has inherited AFRICOM. However, much policy towards Africa has existed mainly on a military and developmental level, and not much has been explicitly stated by the Obama administration to indicate concrete policy towards Africa. Through AFRICOM, the Obama administration plans to continue to work with the AU, subregional organizations, and member states as they work to stand up the Africa Standby Force.82 Through its interagency and preventative approach, AFRICOM is considered a testing ground for a more integrated military-civilian approach to address some of the long-term, underlying causes of insecurity on the continent.83 Africas Security Challenges and U.S. Security Interests Security Challenges in Africa. Africa is a massive and complex continent. The continent spans an impressive 11.7 million miles (75% of which are uninhabited).84 Filled with resources such as oil, gold, diamonds and coltan, the African continent is very resource rich. Quite diverse, more than 1000 languages are spoken by over 3000 ethnic groups.85 Despite a burgeoning population, and a vast amount of land and resources, Africa is the site of many humanitarian crises and security challenges.

81 82

Ibid. U.S. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century. 83 Cooke, Jennifer G. and Kathleen Hicks. 2008. A New U.S. Command for Africa. Regional Priorities. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4208.>. 39. Harlow, Hap. 2008. AFRICOM: Scenesetter - Prospects and Challenges. AFRICOM presentation by Lieutenant Colonel Harlow, representing the Strategy, Plans and Programming division of AFRICOM. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1793. 85 Ibid.
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16 As stated by journalist James Crawley, Africa is on the front burner with its humanitarian crises, caused by nature and man.86 In light of Africas diversity, many of the countries on the continent share similar broad challenges. Understanding the source of security challenges and underdevelopment on the continent of Africa is a Chicken-Egg question, which has driven much security and developmental related debate about the continent for decades. Does underdevelopment increase the likelihood of insecurity and instability? Or, does insecurity and instability allow for underdevelopment? It is not the purpose of this paper to form an argument for one side of the debate; however, the connection between security and development is evident. More so, achieving peace and security on the continent would produce increased development and stability.87 In 1994, the UNDP released the annual Human Development Report, wherein the term human security was which encompassed economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.88 All are forms of security, which present security challenges on the African continent, and affect the stability of all regions. Africas many security challenges range from transnational challenges to internal and regional challenges. These security issues affect the continent as a whole, and cross boundaries, thus making them difficult to control and diminish. The majority of these threats can be described as nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nations inhabitants.89 Conflicts
86 87

Chau 10 Security and Development in Southern Africa. 2008. Centre for Conflict Resolution: Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, June 8-10. 8. 88 Ibid., 9 89 Berlin, Don and Paul J. Smith. 2000. Transnational Security Threats in Asia: Conference Report. Asia-Pacific Center. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Transnational%20Report%20version%2020%20Dec%202000.html.

17 An estimated eighteen billion dollars a year goes towards armed conflict in African states.90 Such a large sum shrinks the economy of African states experiencing conflict by fifteen percent. This is detrimental to African states that are incapable of providing their citizens with the least amount of public and civil services. Since 1990, an estimated $300 billion has been spent on armed conflicts alone in Africa by African states.91 Armed conflicts have a significant impact on the economical expansion of African states. Armed conflict causes societies to disintegrate, and diminishes the ability of social mechanisms to provide for the population. Young people are affected by the shutting down of schools, or their being forced to work to makeup for lost family income due to the conflicts effects. In worst-case scenarios, the young are forced to become child soldiers. Massive flows of civilian populations attempting to flee conflicts increase the number of IDPs and refugees. Conflicts also have a devastating effect on natural resources, placing a strain on them either due to illicit trading or damage caused by the fighting. Environmental Degradation92 Executive Director of the UNEP, Achim Steiner, noted that there existed a strong inescapable linkage between environmental degradation and worsening economic and social conditions.93 Steiner went on to state "conflicts ultimately become inevitable if systems become so pressurized and social, economic, and institutional systems are not able

Hillier, Debbie. 2007. Africas Missing Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict. Oxfam. <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/download/?download=http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_dis asters/downloads/bp107_africa_missing_billions.pdf>. 5. 91 Ibid. 92 See Figure 3 for Map of current and potential effects of environmental degradation/climate change 93 Schlein, Lisa. 2007. UN Program Finds Environment Degradation Triggers Conflict in Sudan. Voice of America. June 22. <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-06/2007-06-22-voa50.cfm.>.
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18 to adapt.94 When the demand of scarce resources exceeds the available supply, conflict typically ensues. Environmental degradation has led to conflict in many African countries and regions, such as Sudan. Rainfall decline over the past 30 years in Darfur led to land degradation, which pushed many pastoralists and farming communities southward where conflict erupted between the new migrants and settled communities.95 Food Security/Crisis 2006 was one of the worst years for food security around the world. Particularly in Africa96, close to 300 million experienced a food crisis of disastrous proportions, which constituted of 1/3 of the total number of people going hungry worldwide.97 A total of 27 countries were in need of external food aid.98 The United Nations considers the following to be three sources of food security issues in Africa: poor harvest due to erratic rainfall, growing impact of the AIDS epidemic, weakening ability of governments to respond.99 Like so many security challenges on the continent, there is more than one source of the problem. Challenges combined with other challenges create more challenges, which require further assistance. Good Governance/Accountability100 Many of the security challenges confronting the African continent can be traced to poor governance and a lack of accountability in governments across the continent. Poor governance
94 95

Ibid. Ibid. 96 See Figure 4 for map of countries requiring food assistanc 97 Plaut, Martin. 2006. Africas Hunger-A Systemic Crisis. BBC News Online. January 31. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4662232.stm>. 98 Ibid. 99 Millions Face Food Crisis in Africa. 2005. CARE. Retrieved on April 3, 2009 from http://www.care.org/newsroom/articles/2005/10/20051006_africahunger.asp?source=170740270000&W T.srch=1. 100 See Figure 5 for diagram of effects of weak governance

19 and a lack of accountability or transparency in government leads to corruption, nepotism and patronage systems that are fragile and often the target of insurgencies.101 Maritime Security Maritime Security consists of issues ranging from illegal fishing to piracy. 102 Fisheries are a major exporting commodity for many African countries, and account for $2.7 billion a year in revenue.103 Due to illegal fishing, however, approximately $1 Billion in revenue is lost each year; which diminishes food supply for over 200 million and recedes the income of more than ten million.104 Also of concern are the effects of illegal dumping off the coastlines of Africa, and the impact on ecosystems and the health of surrounding communities.105 In describing the extent of the problem, British Trade and Development Minister, Gareth Thomas stated that fisherman were once able to get moneysend their children to school, however, they are not able to give to their family."106 The prevalence of piracy (discussed further on in this paper) affects global trade, and impacts the ability of countries to do business. Proliferation of SA/LW The proliferation of SA/LW is a major security challenge in Africa that is difficult to control and prevent.107 Generating an exact number of the amount of SA/LW in circulation

101

Perry, Jennifer, Jennifer Borchard and Jessica Piombo. 2009. African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency: January 2009 Workshop Report. 12. 102 Harlow 103 Bittrick, Mike. 2008. Maritime Security in Africa. February 19, 2008 presentation. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/NCW_course/Bittrick_20080219_MarSec_NDU.pdf. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Redfern, Paul. 2008. Africa: Illegal Fishing Costs Continent Sh62 Billion. The Nation (Nairobi). May 2. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200805010790.html>. 107 Aning, Kwesi. 2007. Africa: Confronting Complex Threats. International Peace Academy. <http://www.ipaacademy.org/publications/policy-papers>. 1.

20 around the world is near impossible. However, it is estimated that out of roughly 500 million SA/LW in circulation, 100 million are located in Africa.108 SA/LW constitute for the majority of weapons utilized in ongoing conflicts in countries such as Sudan, the DRC, and Somalia.109 The larger part of victims killed by violent acts in Africa are killed by SA/LW. The availability of [SA/LW] is now so widespread throughout Africa that the price for an AK-47 is less than $20 in Somalia.110 Public Health Crises Major public health challenges such as HIV/AIDS and Malaria affect various social systems and the infrastructural capabilities of social, political and economic mechanisms.111 HIV prevalence in Africa112 poses various threats to the security and development of seriously afflicted regions and countries. Of the 33 million living with HIV around the world, 67% are located in SSA.113 75% of all AIDS related deaths occurred in SSA, while only 28% of the affected population has access to the medicines needed.114 The sheer number of those infected with HIV/AIDS place a heavy strain on public healthcare and resources as well as lowering the potential number of healthcare workers and peacekeepers that could be working.115 GDP is strained as well. In nations with an HIV
Small Arms and Light Weapons. 2001. African Union: Peace and Security Council. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Small_Arms.htm>. 109 Zihindula , Mulegwa. 2000. Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferating in Africa. Global Ministries: The United Methodist Church. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://gbgmumc.org/global_news/full_article.cfm?articleid=4542. 110 Ibid. 111 Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century. 2007. Centre for Conflict Resolution: Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, May 29-30. 10. 112 See Figure 6 for map of HIV prevalence map 113 Status of the Global HIV Epidemic: 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. 2008. World Health Organization. 30-62. Retrieved on March 1, 2009 from <http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global>. 30. 114 Ibid. 115 Harlow
108

21 prevalence rate of 20% or more, a 2.6% loss in GDP is experienced, and it is estimated that in the next two years GDP loss might rise to 17%.116 The highest prevalence of Malaria infections and deaths occur in Africa 117. Approximately 90% of all Malaria deaths occur in Africa; specifically Malaria is the leading cause of mortality for children under the age of five.118 Accounting for 40% of total public health expenditure in Africa, close to $12 billion in productivity is lost due to the impact of Malaria on the workforce and social structure.119 Political Islam/Radical Islam Political and radical Islam has been an increasing national and regional security challenge in Africa. While serving as a medium for political activism and/or mobilization, the activities conducted by various groups to voice grievances are of concern.120 Political Islam is not always negative and can produce positive results. For example, the Senegalese organization, Sufi Brotherhood, provided support for the democratic and secular government.121 Contrarily, Wahhabism has become more popular, specifically in the Horn of Africa.122 Political Islam is also altering the landscape of various localities. In Nigeria, for example, sharia law has been adopted in one-third of the states.123 Further complicating the ability to generate a clear distinction between moderate and extreme organizations is

116 117

Ibid. See Figure 7 for Malaria prevalence map. 118 Malaria Statistics. 2009. Nets For Life. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from <http://www.netsforlifeafrica.org/malaria/malaria-statistics>. 119 Ibid. 120 Aning 5 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid.

22 the complex mixture of political Islam, radical Islam and anti-Americanism that has developed in Africa.124 Increasingly, organizations adverse to the interests of many in Africa are gaining a foothold in local areas. In 2007, Algeria and Morocco experienced terrorist attacks.125 Eastern and Southern Africa have also joined the counterterrorism periphery. Along the coast of East and Southern Africa (Tanzania, Zambia and Comoros) there appears to be a network of terrorist cells.126 Though not much action has been seen from the cells, there exists a fear that the unchecked cells could potentially harbor international terrorists. 127 Security Capacity The capacity of countries and regions to encounter security threats and challenges is lacking in many cases. Security capacity is essential for the development of programs to enhance peace and security in Africa, as well as confronting rising and ongoing violent threats. Weak procedures and resources have stalled the ability of mediators and other actors to prevent manage and resolve conflicts.128 Transnational Crime (TNC) Transnational Crime (TNC) in Africa is a growing threat to security and stability. The activities engaged in by various illicit organizations and groups not only destabilize affected regions, but also aid in the financing of ongoing and future operations.129 These groups mainly engage in the trafficking of drugs, other human beings, and SA/LW.130 According to estimates from the International Labor Organization (ILO) around 1.2 million
124 125

Ibid. Lyman, Princeton N. 2008. The War on Terrorism in Africa. In Africa in World Politics. <http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/Lyman_chapter_Terrorism.pdf >.14 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128 Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century. 1. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid.

23 humans are victims of human trafficking, 32% of who are African.131 Other activities perpetrated by these groups consist of illegal smuggling of refugees and aliens, illegal trade in human organs, credit card fraudcyber crime, motor vehicle theft, and money laundering.132 Tanzanian President, Jakaya Kikwete, commented in an Op-Ed that the structures and institutions in African governments are grossly inadequate, therefore presenting continental wide challenges in confronting TNC.133 Many countries in Africa also serve as transit points for drug trafficking, as well as points of origin for drug production. Heroin, for example, is smuggled from South Asia across Africa to Europe and North America.134 Youth Bulge135 As of early 2009, Africa has an estimated population of 1 billion (14.8% of the world population) and an annual population growth rate of 2.2%.136 Africa is predicted to have the highest long term population growth.137 Societies experiencing youth bulge share high birth rates and a high proportion of the population between 15 and 29 years of age. According to demographers, many countries with high birthrates tend to be more prone to conflict.138 From 1970 to 1990, an estimated 80% of all the worlds civil conflicts took place

131 132

Ibid., 2 Kikwete, Jakaya. 2007. Comment: Transnational Organised Crime a Major Threat To Our Security. Business Daily. July 16. <http://www.bdafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1930&Itemid=5821.> 133 Ibid. 134 Shinn, David H. 2009. Chinas Engagement in Africa. In Africa Policy in the George W. Bush Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <http://www.csis.org/component/option.com_csis_pub/task,view/is,5217/type,1/.> 11. 135 See Figure 8 for map of youth bulge density 136 World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database. 2009. <http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp> 137 Ibid. 138 Beehner, Lionel. 2007. The Battle of the Youth Bulge.CFR: Daily Analysis. April 27. Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from

24 in states where the total population of those less than 30 years of age was 60%.139 In SSA, 15-29 year olds make up an average of 40% of the population.140 Some countries have more extreme cases of youth bulge. In Zimbabwe, for example, 70% of the population is under the age of 30.141 In the U.S. the same demographic makes up for 21.1% of the population and less so in Germany where youth make up 14.8% of the population.142 Considering that Africa has the highest predicted long term growth trend, the youth bulge suggests an increased labor workforce in the future. Therefore, Africa needs to be capable of generating a sufficient number of jobs for the expanding labor force.143 Most SSA countries are predicted to experience a growth in their labor force of 100% to 157% between 2005 and 2030.144 Large populations of young people can act as engines for economic growth, but only in contexts in which they have access to education and labor markets are able to absorb them.145 Hence, if current trends continue in the development of educational infrastructure and capacity and job creation, there is a fear that the mechanisms needed to support the expanding labor force will not be present. U.S. Security Interests. As previously stated, Africa has never been the center of U.S. foreign policy or defense policy.146 Yet, Africa is now a continent of more importance to U.S.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/13094/battle_of_the_youth_bulge.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2Fpublic ation_list3%Fid%3D129. 139 Ibid. 140 Gavin, Michelle D. 2007. Africas Restless Youth. Current History. May: 220-226. 141 Ibid. 142 Harlow 143 Gavin, Michelle D. 2009. Africas Looming Mega-Challenges. In Africa Policy in the George W. Bush Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090127_africa_review_megachallenges_draft.pdf.> 2. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Chau 2

25 foreign and defense policy goals. Why? China, global trade and oil, and terrorism are three main areas of concern to the United States where Africa concerned. Chinas engagement with Africa, while not new, has increased over the past three to four years and affects the role of the U.S. in Africa and around the world. Global trade between the U.S. and Africa is increasing. The U.S. has an interest in ensuring that trade routes are secure, and partners are sufficiently stable in order to maintain or increase trading potential. As the U.S. begins to import more oil from African countries, it is in the interest of the U.S. that access to the markets remain stable as well as open and not too affected by competition. China Chinese engagement on the continent of Africa is not a new occurrence. In 1956, China launched bilateral assistance programs to African countries.147 From 1957 to 2008, over 800 projects on the African continent were financed by the PRC.148 However, the PRC has aggressively expanded its level of engagement and influence on the continent in the past three to four years, which has impacted African countries and the United States of America. It is estimated that Chinese development assistance to Africa in this current decade has been $1-2 Billion a year.149 Chinese businesses have diversified their economic and commercial engagements in Africa significantly, in the past three to four years.150 In 2000, bilateral trade totaled $10 Billion, however, 2007 estimates indicated an increase to around $70 Billion.151 Such

Christensen, Thomas J. 2008. China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1786. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid.
147

26 growth has propelled China into becoming Africas second largest trading partner, with the U.S. being the largest.152 Chinas increased presence on the African continent has impacted both the United States and Africa. For both, there have been positive and negative consequences. Due to the level of strategic importance that the continent holds for the United States, it is to be expected that a more engaged China would have some impact on U.S. -African policy and relations. This should come as no surprise considering the areas where the political and economic philosophies of the U.S. and the PRC conflict. In Africa, while there are economic benefits to strengthened engagement on the behalf of the PRC, there are economic, governmental and social consequences as well. Direct negative consequences of Chinese engagement on the African continent; have led to indirect consequences for U.S. strategic interests. Direct consequences consist of the dumping of low priced goods in Africa, little technology transfer of job creation in Africa, lax attention to environmental and workers rights standards, and Chinas willingness to look the other way in dealing with non-democratic regimes with poor human rights records.153 As part of its conditions for economic aid and investment, China requires African countries to agree to the One-China policy, thus strategically dismantling official recognition of Taiwan.154 Global Trade and Oil

152 153

Ibid. Morrison, J. Stephen and Phillip Nieburg. 2009. The United States Big Leap on HIV/AIDS in Africa: Whats the Next Act? In Africa Policy in the George W. Bush Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <http://www.csis.org/component/option.com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5217/type,1/>. 154 Lin 6

27 Through AGOA, trade between the U.S. and Africa has increased.155 The global output of oil is approximately 85 million barrels a day.156 In 2007, the IEA released a study forecasting a daily global demand of 116 million barrels by 2030.157 Every year, U.S. demand for gasoline grows by at least one percent.158 Though the U.S. imports many natural resources from Africa, the majority of the natural resources imported are energy resources.159 Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States.160 According to the CIA, by 2015 the source of 25% of all oil imports to the U.S. will be Africa.161 Africa already supplies the U.S. with 18% of its oil imports.162 There exists, as well, the increase in oil, which would come from potential deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea.163 In 2006, before Congress, Former President George W. Bush pledged a reduction of oil imports from the Middle East by 75%.164 Ultimately, in the absence of alternative energy, dependency on Middle Eastern oil will shift to other areas around the world (notably Africa). If Africa will continue to become a major exporter of oil to the U.S., stability in oil exporting countries is in the interest of the U.S. Chronic insecurity and instability in the Delta region poses a threat to uninterrupted flow of oil in Nigeria. It is estimated that output of oil from Nigeria has been reduced by as much as 25% due to instability.165 In April of 2007, the contested national elections in Nigeria caused the price of oil around the world to rise above $60 a

155 156

Ibid., 2 Roberts, Paul. 2008. World Oil. National Geographic Magazine. June. <http://ngm.nationalgeorgraphic.com/print/2008/06/world-oil/roberts-text>. 157 Ibid. 158 Gismatullin, Eduard. 2007. Oil Trades Near $64 in New York on Rising Demand for Gasoline. Bloomberg. <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601072&sid=a2UbRX_oHs4Q&refer=energy>. 159 Ploch 63 160 Lin 3 161 McFate 12 162 Lin 3 163 Ploch 63 164 Roberts 165 Ploch 63

28 barrel.166 One month later, attacks on Nigerian oil pipelines, push the price to over $70 a barrel.167 It is in the interest of the U.S. to ensure that sea and trade routes are off the coasts of Africa are stable and secure. . The National Strategy for Maritime Security, released by the Bush administration in 2005, highlighted freedom of the seas and the facilitation and defense of commerce as top national priorities.168 Piracy mainly occurs in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea and the Indian Ocean. According to the IMB, in 2008 an estimated 90 pirate attacks occurred in East Africa alone.169 Kenya's foreign minister, Moses Wetangula, estimates the pirates have been paid more than $150 million in the past.170 Effectively controlling and battling crimes that occur in the waters of the coast of Africa is an arduous task for all governments involved. The first American ship to be hijacked by Somali pirates occurred in April of 2009.171 Indicative of developmental issues in the region, the ages of the four pirates ranged from 1719.172 Terrorism Ungoverned lands and weak states in Africa are of concern to the U.S., since such areas are potential breeding grounds for terrorist organizations. The Horn of Africa is considered to be the Bridge to the Middle East and is an area where the U.S. has placed much of its military and counterterrorism resources. Since 2002, the United States has stationed between 1,200 to
166 167

Lin 3 Ibid. 168 Ploch 13 169 McKenzie, David. 2008. No Way to Stop Us, Pirate Leader Says. CNN. Retrieved on March 17, 2009 from http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/01/pirate.interview/index.html 170 Ibid. 171 Barrett, Devlin. 2009. Gates: Pirates Untrained Teens With Heavy Weapons. Associated Press. April 14. <http://www.gopusa.com/news/2009/april/0414_pirates_teens.shtml>. 172 Ibid.

29 18,000 troops in Djibouti under the Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa (CJTFHOA).173 The Horn of Africa has been the area of the most U.S. counterterrorism activity on the continent of Africa. In 2006, through intelligence and equipment aid, the U.S. backed Ethiopias invasion of Somalia in order to topple a radical Islamic government that had taken control over Mogadishu.174 In 2008, the U.S. bombed areas in the southern part of Somalia, based on intelligence that one of the bombers of the U.S. embassy in 1998 had surfaced.175 Also in the Horn of Africa is Sudan. Sudan is noted as being the first African country to have become entrenched in terrorism on an international level.176 In the 1980s, terrorist activity perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists occurred. An American ambassador was killed and the Saudi Arabian embassy was bombed.177 At the request of Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front, Osama bin Laden was invited to visit Sudan in 1991 where he remained until approximately 2006.178 It is from Sudan that he was able to create financial and supportive terrorist networks and operations.179 Currently, it is the ongoing civil war in Darfur that is also of concern. More rhetorical than material, the situation in Darfur still poses as a threat for the potential uprising of terrorist organizations.180 Concern is not just limited to the Horn of Africa, but to North Africa as well. According to U.S. Defense Intelligence, Morocco and Algeria is the source of a significant number of foreign fighters in Iraq.181 Especially in light of the 2007 terrorist attacks, which occurred in both countries.

173 174

Lyman 3 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid., 12 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid., 13 181 Lin 3

30 Nature of the Problem Considering the convergence of Africas security challenges and the effects of those challenges on Americas security interests, the failure of AFRICOM to effectively address issues marring its potential success is obstacle severely limiting the Command. Consequences The byzantine structure of past U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has created distrust in Africa towards the influence and involvement of America and other western countries on the African continent. The reaction of Africans to the creation of AFRICOM was based on five areas of concern. First, there was an issue of sovereignty, which many Africans feared AFRICOM would violate. Second, the history of military leadership on the continent, as well as current military leadership created a unified fear of what AFRICOM would mean for civilian and military led governments. Third, the ambiguous introduction of AFRICOM led to questions and criticism about the transparency in the new Command, the truth behind mixed messages, and the initial lack of a presentation of how Africa would benefit from AFRICOM. Fourth, Africans voiced concern that AFRICOM showed a lack of confidence and western acceptance of African solutions for African problems. Finally, there was a fear of a neo-colonialist or Cold War era styled showdown between the East (China) and the West (U.S.). The response of Africa to AFRICOM has been mixed. However, one major theme has been the disapproval of many leaders, governments and civil organizations to the potential positioning of AFRICOMs headquarters on the African continent. Kenyan retired Lt. Gen. Daniel I Opande explained that African reactions to AFRICOM were based on a minute amount of information received. Very little was really known by the majority of the people or countries

31 in Africa who were supposed to know before such a move was made.182 He added, If you know the politics of Africa, you know there are certain very powerful countries who said, no, we are not interested in having a headquarters here.183 Two of the countries he alluded to were South Africa and Nigeria. In October of 2007 the Pan-African Parliament body of the AU voted in favor of a motion to prevail upon all African Governments through the African Union (AU) not to accede to the United States of Americas Governments request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.184 AU leadership advised that AFRICOM should better articulate and consider the role AFRICOM would play in complementing the regional structure and organs, such as the PSC and ASF.185 The ASF has followed the economic regional structure in Africa, and is expected to be functional by 2010. The ASF is the embodiment of the idea of African solutions for African problems. Therefore, the announcement of AFRICOM and the initial understanding of its function violated the idea that many African leaders and civil organizations had about future absolute self-sufficiency. It is the idea of many in Africa that for too long Africas future has been dictated by outsiders.186 Colonialism, the Cold War, and botched humanitarian interventions have translated into hardship for the African people. And with increasing engagement in the continent by rising powers around the world, such as China and India, African leadership felt weary initially accepting what appeared to an increased U.S. military presence on the continent.

DeYoung, Karen. 2008. U.S. Africa Command to Trim Its Aspirations. Washington Post. June 1. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/regionafrica/2008/0601africom.htm>. 183 Ibid. 184 Ploch 23 185 Ibid., 22 186 Esterhuyse 123
182

32 The South African government has vehemently opposed the presence of AFRICOMs headquarters in Africa, especially within the SADC. South African Defence Minister Mosioua Lekota stated that the United States Africa Command should stay out of the African continent.187 He further went on to say AFRICOM was not really a new development, as the US had always had some kind of focus on the African continentat some point, there is a certain sense that Africa has to avoid the presence of foreign forces on its soil.188 Lekota expressed concern over the impact AFRICOM would have on the dynamics of the SADC and that a presence of a base in one of the member countries would affect the relations between the sister countries, and not encourage an atmosphere, or in a sense, of security.189 Botswana had initially expressed openness to hosting AFRICOMs headquarters; however, the SADC placed a tremendous amount of pressure on the countrys leadership not to host the headquarters. Lekota stressed that any member state of the SADC that offered to host AFRICOM headquarters would suffer negative consequences from SADC fellows.190 He later clarified that the consensus across the African continent was not disapproval of the programs AFRICOM could offer, however, the issue of its location in the continent was cause for concern.191 After a 2007 visit to Washington, D.C., Nigerian President Umaru YarAdua stated, We shall partner with AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria, but also the African continent to actualize its peace and security initiative [ASF].192 In reaction to the speculation of

AFRICOM Should Stay Off Africa. 2007. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://www.news24.com/News24/AnanziArticle/0,,2-11-1447_2173503,00.html. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Reed, Valerie. 2007. A Big Image Problem Down There: Prospects for an African Headquarters for AFRICOM. Center for Defense Information. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from <www.cdi.org/pdfs/reedAFRICOM.pdf>. 6. 191 AFRICOM Should Stay Off Africa. 192 Ploch 22
187

33 AFRICOMs headquarters being based in Nigeria and President YarAduas acceptance of the Command, Nigerian Senator Anthony Agbo stated, We are not comfortable with that. It spells doom for the security of this countryit means the country will not only become attractive to terrorists groups, but would indirectly give unlimited access to the US to spy on the country.193 He argued that the United States has a hidden agenda to become the most powerful nation in the world and would stop at nothing in achieving that.194 In reply, Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Mauekwe stated, If the Command is about stationing troops on African soil, we feel there is no need for that.195 He later explained, President YarAduas statement on the proposed AFRICOM is consistent with Nigerias well-known position on the necessity for Africa to avail itself of opportunities for enhanced capacity for the promotion of peace and security in Africa.196 Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci expressed disinterest in having the presence of U.S. military on Algerian soil within the framework of the war on terrorism.197 Both Algeria and Libya are against other countries within the region hosting AFRICOMs headquarters. The UMA has expressed its opposition to the presence of any foreign military in Africa conducting operations.198 According to Moroccan newspaper, Attajdid, Morocco offered to host AFRICOM, and expressed that the United States was seeking a site with good health and education services, a low level of bribery, and a good human rights record.199 However, Libya and Algeria expressed strong opposition to AFRICOMs headquarters being hosted in any country in the
Agbodo, Jeff Amechi. 2007. Senator Cautions YarAdua on AFRICOM. The Nation. December 12. <http://www.thenationonlineng.com/dynamicpage.asp?id=40605>. 194 Ibid. 195 Reed 7 196 Ploch 22 197 Reed 6 198 Ibid. 199 Ploch 21
193

34 region.200 Due to the pressures of its regional neighbors, Morocco changed its position and in June of 2007 the Foreign Minister of Morocco stated that Morocco was averse to hosting AFRICOMs headquarters.201 Zambian newspaper, The Post, reported U.S. Ambassador Carmen Martinez had issued a confirmation that the U.S. had approached Zambia about establishing an Africa Command Office. In response to the request, the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa responded that he was against the establishment of a U.S. military base in his country.202 Zambian Chief Government Spokesman Michael Mulongoti further clarified his countrys stance saying, It is like allowing a giant to settle in your home. And what would you do if you find him with your wife?203 It is a matter of trust, little of which many African governments have for the presence of stationed troops in their countries. Governments were not the only African institutions to regard AFRICOM with distrust. Many civic groups in Africa perceived AFRICOM to be an increase in U.S. military presence on the continent, which would be a permanent fixture.204 Taking note of permanent U.S. military bases around the world, there was an initial fear that once the U.S. was allowed in the U.S. would never leave. There is also the perception of the U.S. as a bully of the small, the weak, the defenseless, which was solidified by the invasion of Iraq by the U.S.205 For the past eight years, Africans have witnessed a more aggressive U.S. military, and fear it making its way on

200

Holm, Ulla. 2008. North Africa: A Security Problem for Themselves for the EU and for the U.S. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. 32. 201 Ibid. 202 Reed 6 203 DeYoung 204 Smith 19 205 Esterhuyse 123

35 to the African continent.206 The Minister of Defense from Liberia, Brownie J. Samukai, suggested that AFRICOM do more to explain the purpose of AFRICOM to not just African leaders, but African people as well.207 Beth Tuckey, a staff member for the Africa Faith and Justice Network, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee In June of 2008 on AFRICOM and its potential impact on Liberia. The train and equip idea is not new, she stated, In fact, it has a very bad history in Africa a history that harkens back to the proxy wars of the Cold War and U.S. support for illegitimate or corrupt regimes. 208 She refers to the U.S.-Liberia relationship of the 1980s, which did not bode well for the majority of Liberians seeking a democratized, transparent, and accountable government. Tuckey mentioned the lingering effect of the U.S. role in security reform in Liberia by citing a report from the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute which found that every armed group that plundered Liberia over the past 25 years had its core in these U.S.trained Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers.209 Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf attempted to convince other African states in opposition to AFRICOMs presence to reconsider mutual benefits that could exist through an effective partnership with the new Command. AFRICOM is undeniably about the projection of American interests, Johnson-Sirleaf stated, but this does not meant that is to the exclusion of African ones.210 President Johnson-Sirleaf urged that AFRICOMs purpose was to provide African states with the ability to develop a healthy security environment through embracing
206 207

Ibid., 120 Ploch 8 208 Tuckey, Beth. 2008. June 2008 Testimony: House Foreign Affairs Committee. Africa Faith and Justice Network. Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from <http://www.afjn.org/frontpage_features/frontpage_feature/afjn_briefs_house_staff_on_africom.html> 209 Ibid. 210 Reed 6

36 good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relationships.211 In response to Liberias offer to host AFRICOMs headquarters, the Chief of Defense for ECOWAS, General Andrew Azazi, stated that ECOWAS ultimately had the final say on any of the member states hosting the headquarters. Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf replied, If it is good (AFRICOM) we will take it, but if not we will not take it.212 After a November 2008 meeting between General Ward and Ethiopian officials, Prime Minister Meles Zanawi stated that Ethiopia was ready to work with AFRICOM and that the command could contribute a lot to ensuring peace and stability in Africa.213 In an attempt to rally support for AFRICOM, President Bush visited with Ghanaian President John Kufour. After a meeting, President Kufour stated, I am happy, one, for the President dispelling any notion that the United States of America is intending to build military bases on the continent of Africa, further noting, I believe the explanation the President has given should put fade to the speculation, so that the relationship between us and the United States will grow stronger and with mutual respect.214 Ghanaian Air Vice Marshall Julius Boateng affirmed, I have had had a chance to hear [U.S. officials] explain what is the reasoning behind the command, and its all about partnership.215 The Prime Minister of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, has said he would allow AFRICOM on Ugandan soil only on a temporary basis and only for a mission that is acceptable to the [Ugandan] government.216

211 212

Ibid. Ibid. 213 Ploch 7 214 Ibid., 22 215 Ibid., 27 216 Reed 7

37 Many on the African continent have expressed concern that increasing U.S. and Chinese engagement in Africa will lead to a colonial-era competition, which does not bode well for African success in the future.217 Furthermore, African analysts have argued that AFRICOM will only push China to begin to militarize its relations with Africa, which thus far have been centered on economic partnerships.218 Brig. Gen Robert Winful from Ghana expressed concern that AFRICOM would cause an influx of militarized presence from countries outside of Africa. What happens if China wants an AFRICOM? Winful posed.219 Algerian professor of Political Science, Ismail Maaref Ghalia stated that AFRICOMs focus was on weakening the increased presence of other powers like China.220 Bile Abdi, an unemployed worker residing in Somalia, expressed concern that the AFRICOM would only bring more harm to Africa.221 If America spreads itself in Africa, its enemiesRussia, Iran and Chinawill definitely come too.222 Kurt Shillinger, South African Institute for International Affairs analyst viewed much of the criticism towards AFRICOM as neo-imperialistical conspirational objections which, would eventually settle over time.223 Conflicting messages coming from the U.S. government in reference to the positioning of AFRICOM on the continent certainly did not aid in captivating the trust of African countries opposed to its presence on the continent. On October 15 2008, General Ward stated that discussions had not been conducted regarding a basing correction, a headquarters location on

217 218

Cooke 39 Giroux, Jennifer. 2008. Africa s Growing Strategic Relevance. CSS Analyses in Security Policy. 3(38): 3. 219 Reed 8 220 Fletcher, Pascal. 2007. U.S. Africa Command: Aid Crusader or Meddling Giant? Reuters. September 30. <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL30300688>. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Ibid.

38 the continentthats work thats down the road.224 Four days prior, however, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, stated, we (AFRICOM) have pretty much got a potential location in each regiona couple of countries have approached us about hosting and weve responded with preliminary dialogue.225 Other than mixed messages about bases and the mission of the Command, the American bureaucratic intricacies were difficult to comprehend.226 The political process involved in the creation of AFRICOM and its perception in the United States was also an enigma for the African understanding of AFRICOM. An AFRICOM officer noted that AFRICOM was seen as a massive infusion of military might onto a continent that was quite proud of having removed foreign powers from its soil.227 Rwandas Ambassador to the U.S., James Kimonyo, noted the importance of explaining that the United States will not make decisions or engage in combat on behalf of African forces.228 Lt. Gen Tsadkan Gebretensae of Ethiopia stressed that the United States must take into account that its interests are not always African interests (and vice versa), so AFRICOM must build on common interests between the two.229 Causes The main cause of AFRICOMs failed reception is the insufficiency by decision makers to effectively apply Americas changed security framework to AFRICOMs core structuring. This has manifested itself in AFRICOMs challenges three ways. First, a decision as to the permanent location of AFRICOMs headquarters has yet to be decided and articulated. Second,

224 225

Ploch 4 Ibid. 226 Esterhuyse 118 227 DeYoung 228 Ploch 8 229 Ibid.

39 the nature of the interagency cooperation built into AFRICOMs organizational structure and its ability to provide cohesive policy has not been adequately accepted and explained. Third, an understanding of the level of engagement on the continent is hazy, and the importance of the knowledge required to increase the value of engagement has been given little importance. Conditions and Trends Location Though reactions are mixed, the majority of African perceptions towards AFRICOM are not a negative reaction to the Command itself, but the possibility of the location of its headquarters in Africa. Few countries want to see the headquarters established on the continent. Appearing before Congress, General Ward explained that AFRICOM was focusing more on building programs and implementing initiatives, as opposed to searching for a host country for AFRICOM headquarters on the continent.230 Though Secretary Gates announced that no decisions regarding AFRICOMs headquarters would be made until 2012, considering and better articulating feasible options is still essential. As of now, three options exist for the location of AFRICOMs headquarters. The first option would be to maintain the headquarters in Stuttgart with no plans for a move elsewhere. Second, AFRICOM could accept the invitation of one of the African countries willing to host, and build the headquarters in Africa. The AU has seen success and efficiency in utilizing regional and sub-regional organizations in order to resolve challenges as they arise. Thus, the sub-regional system has been utilized by the AUs ASF through the PSC.231 The ASF has divided itself in to five regional brigades.232 If AFRICOM is effective in
Vandiver, John. 2009. AFRICOM Pleased With Capitol Hill Trip. Stars and Stripes. March 29. <http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=61658>. 231 Security and Development in Southern Africa. 12 232 See Figure 9 for ASF regional brigade structure
230

40 gaining more African trust in the next two years, it would be a possibility to follow the ASFs regional plan and create five regional offices. The Stuttgart +5 is a third option, which AFRICOM could consider. Interagency Approach While the U.S. military is specialized in a vast array of skills, its mandate and personnel does not intrinsically provide the DOD with the ability to initiate or effectively understand sources of underdevelopment and various levels of instability on the African continent.233 As stated by Vice Admiral Moeller, Weve understood for a long time that the challenges of Africa cannot be solved by the military alone. Economic development, responsive governance, health, crime and poverty are all pieces of the security environment.234 Confronting security challenges in Africa undoubtedly relies on the utilization of a three Ds strategy. The style of interagency coordination has yet to be sufficiently explained by officials from AFRICOM, as well as by supporters within DoS and USAID.235 Though there has been support for a whole government approach from other agencies, others have voiced their disagreement with the idea of the military taking on developmental and/or diplomatic initiatives. They would prefer a consultation-based approach to interagency coordination. Hence, disagreement within departments on the Department of Defenses new role has created mixed messages and confusion. Despite disagreements, many in all three agencies have explained how interagency cooperation would benefit U.S. policy towards Africa; however, how such efforts

Brown, Kaysie and Stewart Patrick. 2007. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoDs Expanding Role. Center for Global Development. <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/?type=48>. 12 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid., 11
233

41 will work seamlessly has yet to be truly expanded upon. AFRICOMs interagency coordination can either be defined by a consultation-based approach, or a whole government approach. Engagement on the African continent The first issue regarding AFRICOMs engagement on the African continent is concerned with the level of engagement. Five levels of possible engagement exist: continental, regional, sub-regional, bilateral and local.236 Descriptions of how AFRICOM will engage with Africa have not been presented in a cohesive and coordinated manner. Various programs have been implemented in each level, yet no transparent mechanism exists to define the benefits of operating on a specific level, and the magnitude of the input gained from each level. The second issue is the quality of knowledge of Africas cultural framework possessed by those engaging on any level. C.D. Smith, from the Department of Defenses African Center for Strategic Studies, asks, Do we see what the Africans see? He further commented that in a lot of cases, we misinterpret, we dont understand, we dont get at the heart of the issue.237 Engaging on all levels in Africa requires an apprehension of the existing cultural values.238 According to the Cultural Intelligence Center, cultural intelligence (CQ) is defined as a persons capability to function effectively in situations characterized by cultural diversity.239 More so, culture is defined as multiple discourses, occasionally coming together in large systemic configuration, but more often coexisting within dynamic fields of interaction and conflict.240 The various tribal, ethnic, and religious forces that are present in Africa are cultural elements,
236 237

Chau vii Coon, Charlie. 2007. AFRICOM Struggles to Improve Image of U.S.. Stars and Stripes. July 10. <http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=54827&archive=true>. 238 Chau. vi. 239 Culture Intelligence Center, LLC. Retrieved on April 1, 2009 from http://www.culturalq.com/. 240 Varhola, Christopher and Laura Varhola. 2006. Avoiding the Cookie Cutter Approach to Culture: Lessons Learned From Operations in East Africa. Military Review. November-December: 73.

42 which exist below the surface of the immediate perception.241 Throughout Africa, local populations and central governments have views, which are much different from Americas. Analysis of Policy Options AFRICOMs status as a nascent Command places it in a position to confront major issues as they occur. Rather than offering various policy packages as courses of action AFRICOM can implement, the three major structural issues will each be analyzed according to the chosen criteria. Therefore, a suitable option within each issue can be placed together to create one feasible package. Criteria for Analyzing Policy Options The following criteria will be utilized to analyze potential options in each issue: 1. Absorption Feasibility: Assesses the acceptance of the policy options intended target group and others directly affected by the selected policy option. Tests if the selected policy option will be capable of being sustained and absorbed into the structure of the target group. 2. Administrative Feasibility: Assesses the capability of existing administrative structures within an organization/department to execute the implementation of the selected policy option. Analyzes the decision-making mechanisms, organizational structures, resource availability, and load-bearing capabilities of the intended decision makers/policymakers. 3. Political Feasibility: Assesses the political will and power of involved actors/stakeholders in implementing policies, programs and initiatives. Identifies the level of influence wielded by actors/stakeholders in ensuring the chosen policy option is encourages and executed. A litmus test is whether or not the actor/stakeholders acceptance of the policy option creates a policy that is upheld on paper only or actualized.

Major Issues
241

Chau 53

43 Location As previously stated, three options for the location of AFRICOMs headquarters currently exist: Remaining in Stuttgart, Germany, a move to Africa, or creating regional offices in Africa and maintaining the headquarters in Stuttgart (Stuttgart +5). Absorption Feasibility: The location of AFRICOMs headquarters affects those in Africa (if physical structures are placed on the continent) and those who operate out of the headquarters. Only one African country has been open to hosting the headquarters. The rest have been vehemently opposed. The request by the U.S. to build an office in Zambia was still opposed, which reflected the majority of Africas governments opinions on the matter. Administrative Feasibility: The location of the current headquarters is still effective in managing AFRICOMs daily operations. A move to Africa would require time spent and manpower to pick an approved location, and initiate the planning and construction of headquarters. The military, especially, is currently overstretched, and a location in Africa would require increased security personnel, which is not feasible at this point in time. Regional offices would require more administration to maintain seamless integration between all five offices, which is not a necessity as long as the headquarters remains where it is currently located with full operating status. Political Feasibility: As previously stated, Liberia is the only country open to hosting AFRICOMs headquarters. All other countries have strongly denied any building of AFRICOMs offices or headquarters within the boundaries of their location. Unless sovereignty is imposed upon, which is not a likely occurrence, there exists very small political will in Africa

44 to have the headquarters stationed there. Governments would perceive AFRICOM in a very negative light, and would view the headquarters as an intrusion and flexing of U.S. military source. Amicable partnerships would fall under heavy strain. More so, funding for a new location would have to come from increased resources. Many in congress have accepted the African reaction to the headquarters positioning on the continent, and as they hold the power of the purse, would not be willing to fund such a venture. Interagency Approach Absorption Feasibility: Security issues in Africa have strongly supported the evidence of linkages between security and developmental issues. More so, African governments have focused on security sector development, which is composed of integration between security and development. Programs already exist in Africa that create linkages between security, development and diplomatic engagement. Therefore, a whole government based approach towards partnerships between AFRICOM and African organizations, governments and communities would be beneficial. The whole government approach would be easily absorbed. However, a consultation based approached could also be followed. However, it would set back programs, which already exist within the framework of many programs in Africa. Administrative Feasibility: AFRICOM has been structured to operate on a whole government approach. From the civilian Deputy, to the presence of USAID offices within AFRICOM, the intrinsic nature of AFRICOM is to operate on a whole government approach. Thus, a consultation vs. whole government based approach is a matter of will. The capabilities exist and are already in the works for a whole government approach. To

45 initiate a consultation based approach would require restructuring AFRICOMs organizational structure. Political Feasibility: Senator Feingold and other members of congress have called for a whole government based approach towards Americas foreign policy engagement. Those in charge of ensuring it occurs are for its implementation. The DoD has designed a new command based on this approach, which shows their willingness and approval of such an approach. The DoS approved of one of their own joining the Command as a Deputy, and USAID agreed to the building of an office within AFRICOMs structure, that would be filled by a representative from USAID. Thus, it would appear that the political will of those holding the power over either approach have chosen a whole government approach. Engagement Absorption Feasibility: The programs offered by AFRICOM have been accepted by IGOs such as the African Union, regional and sub-regional organizations, and most governments. Civilian organizations and local communities have also approached AFRICOMs potential as a partner in program implementation and evaluation as possibility. Each possible level of engagement has mechanisms that are already working on confronting Africas security challenges. Thus, the intended targets in Africa would easily absorb any level of engagement. It is a question of how deeply connected AFRICOM would like to be in Africa. Administrative Feasibility: Ambassador Yates serves as AFRICOMs Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military affairs. Her entire office is built for engagement between AFRICOM and governments as well as civil organizations. AFRICOM is currently conducting

46 programs that involve developmental projects, and have collaborated with various stakeholders on each level of engagement. Therefore, the administrative capability to function on all levels exists. Political Feasibility: Decision makers within AFRICOM have explored all options for level of engagement. General Ward has engaged with leaders from African governments and Ambassador Yates has participated in discussions with civil organizations and visited the worksites of local and national NGOs in order to understand work that is being done on the ground. Therefore, it appears as if the chosen option by the power holders within AFRICOM has been to engage in all five levels. There has been no indication that AFRICOMs leadership is willing to focus on less than the five possible levels of engagement. Recommendations Location It is my recommendation that AFRICOM remain in Stuttgart, Germany. Bottom line, African governments are against the building of AFRICOMs headquarters or regional offices on the African continent. Civil organizations and the people view the presence of AFRICOMs headquarters on the continent as evidence of Americas militarization of U.S. policy towards Africa, and fear such presence would only invite more harm. The DoD spent $100 million to renovate the Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart for AFRICOMs use, thus there already exists a functioning administrative and operating base. The power of the purse to pursue building of new headquarters elsewhere is mainly held by Congress, and there is no indication that there would be a willingness to accept the building of AFRICOMs headquarters or offices in Africa.

47 Absorption X Administrative X Political X

Stuttgart Africa Stuttgart +5

AFRICOM should indicate that there are no plans to build AFRICOMs headquarters in Africa, or establish regional offices. It should be made clear to stakeholders in Africa that the current location of the headquarters will be permanent. In meetings with governmental officials and civilian organizations, AFRICOMs officials should state a commitment to a complete focus on building effective programs in Africa and not on hoping to earn enough trust capital to build AFRICOMs headquarters or offices on the continent. Interagency Coordination Approach A whole government approach is the most viable option for interagency coordination. Though African stakeholders could absorb both approaches, the administrative structure of AFRICOM was designed around a whole government based approach to interagency coordination. To move towards a consultation-based approach would alter the defining characteristics of the Commands new approach towards Americas security framework. Furthermore, the ability for AFRICOM to have been created and funded with a whole government approach in mind signals the political will of those in power to utilize this approach and gauge its effectiveness. Absorption X X Administrative X Political X

Consultation Whole Government

48 The Institute for the Study of Diplomacys report suggests interagency cooperation could be effective if new levels of integration, linking tightly together such entities as DODs Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the State Departments Bureau for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and USAIDs Bureau for Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance were paid more attention to.242 Thus, offices that share mostly the same mission within each department/agency could operate together more efficiently, without creating a divisive breach of departmental territory. Establishing coherent goals shared by all three stakeholders should be the first step in effectively explaining the whole government approach the Command is taking. It would be in the best interest of AFRICOM and the DoD to establish a joint report amongst all three departments outlining the common vision, goals, objectives, and plans of action shared by all. Therefore, a transparency would exist that could diffuse the confusion and doubt presently in the minds of most Africans. Second, developmental projects should be headed by USAID and DoS, while implementation efforts are carried out by the existing manpower within the DoD. Third, attention should be paid to the amount of funding directed to USAID and the security assistance budget within the DoS. Major criticism from officials within the two has stemmed from what is perceived as disproportionate and inadequate funding. Engagement All three criteria allow for AFRICOM to format its level of engagement according to any of the three options. Absorption X Administrative X Political X

All Levels
242

Pickering, Thomas R. and Chester A. Crocker. ed. 2008. Americas Role in the World: Foreign Policy Choices for the Next President. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. <http://isd.georgetown.edu/Americas_Role_in_the_World.pdf>. 44.

49 Continent Continent, Regional and Subregional X X X X X X

Therefore, it would be wise to gauge what engagement option would be the most effective in allowing AFRICOMs interests to be well received and understood in Africa. Civil society in Africa has proven to be capable of addressing many security challenges. 243 Due to its grassroots engagement, it has been able to work effectively in areas where some international organizations are reluctant to venture.244 Engaging on all levels is essential to successful AFRICOM programs. Understanding the perceptions of individuals and groups on these various levels would benefit AFRICOMs mission tremendously.245 By doing so, the U.S. will be capable of understanding the social and political dynamics in African countries and regions. Such engagement will also allow AFRICOM use various partners in each level for successful planning, implementation and evaluation of all programs. As previously stated, many civil organizations are capable of understanding local and community wide security challenges. Thus, listening to their perspectives and gaining knowledge of their needs and successful strategies is an imperative element to AFRICOMs progress. U.S. policymaking in Africa falls of short of the comprehension that governments, people and institutions in Africa do not share the same perception of the world. The lens through which beliefs, values and mental outlooks are shaped, are not defined by Western cultural norms. Africas complexity does not allow for the simplification of sources of conflict and definitions of social and political interaction. As long as policy and military leaders in the U.S. continue to
243 244

Aning 10 Ibid. 245 Chau vii

50 view Africa through a homogeneous lens, AFRICOMs potential effectiveness as a suitable policy solution will be fruitless.246 In the past, one-hour cultural briefs conducted during preparation for deployment often misrepresented the culture and diminished its importance in planning operations.247 It is not just in AFRICOM and the DoD where an understanding of heterogeneous culture on the African continent is lacking, but in other departments as well. FSOs in the DoS spend short stints in countries around the world, and never truly develop a complete understanding of the intricate composition of a countrys cultural makeup. Answers to the complex challenges on the African continent cannot be expected to be found within the Western or American cultural perception and framework. Instead, they exist in the minds and hearts of most Africans who want to see a stabilized and developed Africa. Part of understanding culture in Africa, is gaining awareness of the increasing need and support of African solutions for African problems. Increasing the capacity of African militaries and civil organizations to maintain peace and security, as well as create innovative solutions is of much value. The art of this understanding will be in how effective AFRICOM will be in coinciding American interests with those of traditional allies and partners in Africa.248 In military education institutions and civil policymaking departments and agencies, a greater amount of study must be geared towards understanding the cultural complexities of the African continent. Future leaders must learn early on and often about the cultures, traditions, and diverse African approaches.249 For U.S. governmental officials expected to interact with African governments and civilians, one meaningful visit means much more than 10 terse
246 247

Chau., vii Varhola 73 248 Munson, Robert. 2008. Do We Want to Kill People and Break Things in Africa? Strategic Studies Quarterly. Spring: 99. 249 Chau 56

51 PowerPoint-driven briefings.250 Cultural intelligence cannot be a one-liner during a briefing, or a footnote in a report. Rather, all officials in various governmental departments that are expected to deal with Africa must be better educated and prepared to understand different cultural elements on the African continent. Conclusion Many topics raised in this paper present challenging issues that warrant further research and focus. What can be strongly concluded is that Africa is rising as an area of geostrategic importance in the international system. It is a resource rich continent with a high population growth trend. As the continent begins to effectively resolve security challenges that deter many countries from actualizing their economic and political potential, Africa will become a key global player in the future. Other countries that have taken a more serious engagement in the continent prove this fact. The ambition of African countries to achieve self-sufficiency will lead to a new Africa that is more capable and stable. All recommendations, if implemented, should increase the success and positive perception of AFRICOM in all levels on the African continent. Senator Feingold should push for increased communication between all U.S. stakeholders involved in AFRICOM and U.S. policy towards Africa. Within the framework of the above recommendations, a report outlining and expanding upon elements of U.S. policy towards Africa should be created. It should outline the complimentary roles each agency will play, and emphasize the role of Africa as a partner as opposed to a spectator. However, it is not just the African perception of AFRICOM that dictates the effectiveness the new command will have in being a new policy direction. Two other areas of

250

Ibid.

52 concern exist. First, is the political will of decision makers in the U.S. Second, is the physical capability of the U.S. military. The political will and effort of policymakers in the U.S. hold the fate of U.S.-African policy in their hands. On March 11, 2008 Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs Chairman, Senator Russ Feingold, stated in a hearing that, This part of the world [Africa] is far too important for us to rely on narrow feeble policies, or half-hearted ad-hoc measures.251 The old archaic framework of African engagement that the U.S. has operated in and is still in danger of repeating is no longer a viable option. The U.S. must create a cohesive policy goal and commitment towards Africa. Various goals and stances exist making it difficult to ascertain one main U.S. policy perception towards Africa. Many questions remain about the ability of the U.S. to address all of its future security needs. The U.S. military is currently overstretched. Though the QDR replaced the BUR and its overlapping two war structure, the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have recreated the two major regional conflict scenarios outlined in the BUR. Is Africa an essential military commitment? How will the U.S. balance all of its military commitments around the world? The answer to these questions cannot be found in the reactions of Africans to a new command, or in the level of importance Africa is to U.S. security interests. Rather, it is in the halls of the White House, Pentagon and Capitol Hill that the other side of AFRICOMs battle for importance, effectiveness and acceptance will be fought.

Feingold, Russell. 2008. Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold at a Hearing on Evaluating U.S. Policy Options on the Horn of Africa. March 11. <http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=305904
251

53

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59

Figure 1: Non-Economic Aid to Africa (1996-2006)

fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/62657.pdf

60

Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup New Command Setup

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/85/USAFRICOM_United_States_Africa_Command_Map _Draft_.jpg

61

Figure 3: Current and Potential Effects of Environmental Degradation

62

http://www.eoearth.org/image/GEO4_ch6_fig_6.7.jpg

Figure 4: Countries Requiring Food Assistance

63

http://www.eoearth.org/image/GEO4_ch6_fig_6.9.jpg

Figure 5: Effects of Weak Governance

64

Harlow, Hap. 2008.

Figure 6: HIV Prevalence

65

World Health Organization; 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic

Figure 7: Malaria Prevalence

66

http://www.itg.be/itg/Uploads/MedServ/malariaworld2005.jpg

Figure 8: Youth Bulge Density

67

Harlow, Hap. 2008.

Figure 9: African Standby Force (Brigade Setup)

68

Appendix A: The Unified Combatant Command System


The Unified Combatant Command (UCC) system was created National Security Act of 1947. A UCC is a military command which has a broad, continuing mission under a single commander and which is composed of forces from two or more military

69 departments.252 Changes to the UCC system are done so through the UCP (Unified Command Plan). The UCP establishes combatant command missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates geographic areas of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.253 Currently, there are six geographic commands and four functional commands. Geographical Commands U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) U.S. Europe Command (EUCOM) U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Functional Commands U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)

252 253

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/unified-com.htm Ibid.