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South Africa’s World Cup
A Legacy for Whom?

Edited by

Eddie Cottle

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Contents

Foreword by Crecentia Mofokeng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Eddie Cottle 1 FIFA and the Sports-Accumulation Complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Dale T. McKinley 2 Economic Promises and Pitfalls of South Africa’s World Cup . . . . . . . 39 Patrick Bond and Eddie Cottle 3 Their Cup Runneth Over: Construction Companies and the 2010 FIFA World Cup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Michelle Taal 4 Scoring an Own Goal? The Construction Workers’ 2010 World Cup Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Eddie Cottle 5 The Trade Union Legacy of the World Cup: International Solidarity Revitalised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Vasco Pedrina and Joachim Merz 6 Informal Traders and the Struggle to Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Pat Horn 7 Lies, Misrepresentation and Unfulfilled Expectations: Sex Work and the 2010 Soccer World Cup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Vivienne Mentor-Lalu
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8 Washing FIFA Green: The World Cup and Global Warming . . . . . . . 175 Tristen Taylor 9 Soccer City: Who Drank All the Beer from the Calabash? . . . . . . . . . 193 Mondli Hlatshwayo 10 Green Point Stadium: FIFA’s Legacy of Unfair Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Mondli Hlatshwayo and Michael Blake 11 Tall Tales: Dissecting the Urban Legend of the Developmental Legacy of Durban’s Moses Mabhida Stadium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Aisha Bahadur 12 Mbombela: Corruption, Murder, False Promises and Resistance . . . . 281 Dale T. McKinley (with African Eye News Service) 13 Building Coliseums, Living in Shacks: Construction Workers in the Shadow of the World-Class City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 Tony Roshan Samara Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

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Foreword

This book is the outcome of three years of engagement, collaboration, research and struggle to improve workers’ conditions ahead of, during and after the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 2010 World Cup. What started as an effort to document the struggles of construction workers turned into a much bigger project as it became apparent that mega project development through sport is much more complex. In 2006 Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) formed a partnership with the Labour Research Service (LRS) to provide assistance for the campaign for ‘Decent Work towards and beyond 2010’, using the opportunity of the 2010 World Cup to promote decent working conditions in the construction sector in South Africa. Once the LRS reviewed the impact of mega sporting events on workers’ conditions, various new insights and perspectives developed. The research initially aimed to inform the response of workers and trade unions for their struggle to improve the conditions of workers, but it was soon clear that this would not be possible without looking at the sporting spectacle as a whole and FIFA’s role in capitalist globalisation and accumulation. After all, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Global Wage Report shows that workers’ share of wealth has dropped significantly under neoliberal globalisation and inequality worldwide has increased. The key question that we sought to answer was, would the 2010 World Cup produce anything different from what was being purported by its organisers, the South African government, host city managers and the media? In other words, would the promised benefits of the event reach ordinary South Africans and workers in particular? There was very little information available about what actually happens to workers beyond the promises and widespread claims of the event’s lasting ‘legacy’, with most studies (even more critical contributions) merely focusing on the
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economic and urban infrastructure legacies. Further, noting that FIFA was tied to transnational capital and that the World Cup was its raison d’être, FIFA’s claim of it being a benevolent organisation had to be questioned since it was always very reluctant to involve itself in the issues confronting workers, arguing that FIFA was not the employer. Yet the organisation demands the earth in concessions and guarantees from governments and captures and controls the market through intellectual property rights and various other provisions. This book provides a holistic analysis and critique of the impact of mega sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup and the developmental paradigm associated with it. This book challenges all mainstream studies and FIFA praise singers by providing rigorous analysis and concrete evidence of what was actually a sporting spectacular aimed at massive accumulation and extraction of wealth from South Africa and contradicts the developmental promises and supposed future prospects for shared economic growth. In many ways this book relaunches much-needed debate about the paradigms of development which have come to be dominated and engulfed by the hegemony of neoliberal ideology. It is a timeous intervention in the development and resurgence of a leftist discourse around the impact of mega sporting events, which have become part of a ‘natural’ four-year cycle within this period of capitalist globalisation and which have brought about more unequal exchanges for the world economy, its citizens and the environment. We hope that the lessons learnt in South Africa can be shared with workers involved in preparations for the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) European Football Championship in the Ukraine and Poland in 2012 and the World Cup in Brazil in 2014, among other mega events planned for the near future. Crecentia Mofokeng Building and Wood Workers’ International Regional Representative, Africa and the Middle East

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Introduction

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Introduction
Eddie Cottle

The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 2010 Soccer World Cup was hosted by South Africa and was the first World Cup to be held in Africa. Both the South African government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), and FIFA have officially declared the World Cup a success,1 with President Jacob Zuma proudly stating that ‘South Africa had proved the Afro-pessimists wrong’.2 The World Cup has now come and gone, and South Africans have returned to their ‘normal’ lives. In addition to tangible economic benefits and sports legacy, the World Cup was supposed to provide intangible benefits, such as helping to forge a cohesive national identity and building a positive image of South Africa. But this was a transient moment and the World Cup legacy was more ‘mythical than practical’.3 As the tournament was drawing to a close, the cohesive effects of the event seemed to disappear with the spectre of xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals raising its ugly head,4 and with well over a million public sector workers preparing for strike action across South Africa.5 The promises of the trickle-down economic effects of the World Cup legacy evaporated almost as soon as the drops landed. Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence that the sponsors of mega sporting events often underestimate the costs and overstate the benefits.6 Despite this, mega sporting events such as the World Cup are seen by nation states as a panacea for addressing the challenges of economic growth and urban redevelopment.7 The increased competition by states to host the World Cup meant that South Africa had to raise the stakes and become the highest bidder even if it meant risking negative economic effects. In his letter to FIFA President Sepp Blatter, included in South Africa’s Bid Book, the then South African
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President Thabo Mbeki stated: ‘As the National Government, we unequivocally commit ourselves to provide every guarantee requested and every resource necessary to assure the FIFA executive of our ability to provide Africa’s stage in 2010 for a highly successful, prestigious international series of events.’8 Mbeki envisioned the World Cup as part of the powerful momentum of an African Renaissance that would ‘create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa’. That South Africa raised the stakes in the bid process by providing ‘every guarantee requested and every resource necessary’ was further reinforced by a letter from World Cup Bid Chairperson Irvin Khoza and Chief Executive Officer Danny Jordan stating that ‘our Bid is based on internationally established business principles and is substantially funded by leading multinational companies’ and ‘we offer FIFA passion, profitability, precision (in administration) and the spirit of the African people for Africa’s first World Cup’. One of these multinationals was Adidas, a key commercial partner of FIFA.9 While both the South African government and FIFA presented the 2010 World Cup as an ‘African World Cup’, in reality it was a South African World Cup, in the same way that the 2006 World Cup was seen as a German, not a European, World Cup. However, it seems clearer today that Mbeki had a longer-term vision of his African Renaissance: through the successful hosting of the World Cup, South Africa acted as a proxy for a reinvigorated image of Africa that would ‘send ripples of confidence from Cape to Cairo’.10 The stated intention was to overcome Afropessimism, and the economic legacy of the World Cup in South Africa was not to produce any immediate economic impact but formed part of a longer-term strategy to market the continent as a viable destination for foreign direct investment and tourism. This is essentially encapsulated in the 2001 regional development strategy of the African Union known as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and thus, according to Mbeki, the successful hosting of the World Cup in Africa ‘will provide a powerful and irresistible momentum to this resolute African Renaissance’.11 Mbeki’s approach has been criticised as consistent with what has been termed compradorism as he and his main allies have succumbed to the class limitations of post-independence African nationalism – namely, being in close collaboration with hostile transnational corporate and multilateral forces whose interests stand directly opposed to Mbeki’s South African and African constituencies.12 The provision of the South African government’s guarantees to FIFA and its commercial partners to ensure unhindered capital accumulation was part of the

Introduction

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strategy to rebrand Africa as a reliable partner for neoliberal globalisation. According to the Reputation Institute’s study of South Africa’s reputation among G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) conducted in January 2010 and followed up with a post– World Cup survey in August 2010, South Africa moved from a score of 44.6 to 49.11.13 What, then, is the legacy of the first FIFA World Cup held on African soil? Is it a legacy that will ‘create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa’ or is it a legacy wherein the first African country to host the World Cup actively participated in feeding a globalised mega sports-accumulation complex? When the term ‘legacy’ is used by Bid Committees, FIFA, Local Organising Committees (LOCs), government officials and mainstream economic think tanks, it is assumed to be entirely positive, with the argument advanced that benefits flow to communities as a matter of course.14 The government’s official FIFA 2010 World Cup website refers to ‘legacy’ as encompassing social benefits (referring to soccer and educational development, the Green Goal Programme and complimentary ticket fund); economic benefits (increased contribution to gross domestic product [GDP], job creation, increased tax revenue, increased tourism spend, additional hotel construction and increased income for Black Economic Empowerment [BEE] companies); infrastructural development (stadium and precinct development, transport, broadcast and telecommunications); and skills development and training (20 000 construction workers and 15 000 volunteers would be trained and their skills developed).15 In this definition of ‘legacy’, almost every activity forms part of the legacy of the World Cup. Yet some researchers have argued that ‘legacy’ is something that should have a lasting effect and thus the economic impact, unlike infrastructural development, cannot be considered a legacy when hosting the World Cup.16 Mega events, including the Olympics and World Expos, are short-term, onceoff events with a large-scale economic impact and a concentration of capital expenditure and labour especially in the construction, hospitality, transport and services sectors.17 Mega sporting events give true meaning to the notion of the reduction of time and space in which governments and the private sector are able to provide the infrastructure and services necessary to host the event (normally one month in duration) with a concomitant increase in the mobilisation of a flexible, highly exploitable labour force. This reduced time and space in which delivery of the event occurs highlights the central problem of the intensification of the exploitation of labour without commensurate improvements in wages and

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working conditions. Sport, and the FIFA World Cup in particular, is more than just a game: it is a globalised commercially viable enterprise. FIFA’s merchandising sales are controlled through a worldwide branded licensee programme:
FIFA has created the FIFA Brand Licensing Programme by licensing our marks in respect of the products of an elite group of companies. Those currently featured in this programme are Adidas, manufacturers of football equipment, Electronic Arts, designers of electronic games, and Nikkei, the Official Media Supporter in Japan. Each has a licence to use the FIFA Brand Marks in the advertising, marketing, promotion and sale of its licensed products or programmes, which in turn contribute to FIFA brand awareness and to the globalisation of the game of football.18

The branded licensee programme is coordinated and managed by the Global Brands Group, which has an office in Johannesburg, South Africa.19 The South Africa Bid Book reassured FIFA that the purchasing power of tourists attending the 2010 World Cup would be similar to that of previous World Cup events and that a local fan base of 12 million would drive the balance of the merchandise sales.20 FIFA therefore drives a globalised merchant class which places significant pressures on producers who in turn engage in aggressive wage repression of workers. The FIFA mascot Zakumi, for example, licensed through the Global Brands Group, was produced by Chinese workers who received a mere R23 ($3)21 per day.22 What is striking about the FIFA World Cup is its significance to capital accumulation in a period of capitalist globalisation where avenues for profitability have contracted significantly. Thus an important means for capital accumulation is not the production of long-lasting commodities that would saturate markets but the ‘production of the spectacle’.23 The production of mega sports spectacles such as the Olympics and the World Cup not only requires investment in new infrastructure, but also demands a vast amount of short-term employment and other resources. Due to the global but uneven levels of wage repression, consumers are driven by the global excitement to increased debt spending (both nationally and internationally). Host governments and host cities alike subsidise the events through the provision of the required infrastructure, security and other requirements which are invariably also debt-financed. In this way, the state becomes the guarantor of capital accumulation for both international and national capitalists.

Introduction

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Thus, South Africa did prove the Afro-pessimists wrong, as though the country was trying ‘to escape from the undignified position called underdevelopment’.24 What the World Cup highlighted is that Africans have attained global recognition that they are ‘developed’ enough to meet FIFA’s stringent criteria in pulling off a world-class mega sporting event with its architectural legacy as its trophy. But attaining this new-found image came at a huge financial cost to the host country in order to meet the expectations of the ‘developed’ world. Mimicking the North’s advanced infrastructure for a luxury mega sporting event such as the FIFA World Cup came at the expense of meeting other, more pressing social needs. The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa has generated – and will continue to generate – much debate about its legacy and socio-economic impact. Most of these debates centre on the sporting, infrastructural, tourism and GDP contribution of the World Cup to South Africa’s development. Very little mainstream research looks concretely at how this mega sporting event has impacted on workers in both the formal and informal economy and the World Cup’s consequent contribution to increasing social inequality in South Africa. Nor do most of these debates look at FIFA’s sports-accumulation complex that drives the exploitation of host nations and workers. Thus, most analyses fail to see the class interests that are served by mega sporting events. This book seeks to address the question of whose interests were served through the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and to consider whether this mega sporting event will genuinely contribute towards uplifting the living standards of the working class in South Africa. In other words, what is the nature of the legacy that is left behind for South Africa and will the 2010 World Cup live up to its developmental promises? A key factor in understanding the nature of the legacy is an examination of FIFA and the globalised sports-accumulation complex. Dale T. McKinley (Chapter 1) looks at the evolution of soccer and its organisation, providing a critical analysis of its transformation from a publicly developed and owned sport to one that has come to be privatised in the form of FIFA and the sports-accumulation complex. The transformation of FIFA as an organisation has been driven by a triad of corruption, privatisation and the selling of the Soccer World Cup. This has allowed FIFA to exert huge influence in determining development policies of host countries and enforcing the mechanisms of capital accumulation through the issuing of licences to private partners. In turn, this has enabled FIFA to develop mutually beneficial intra-elite relationships and thus to use local economies to extrapolate wealth to corporations and FIFA itself. The example of South Africa’s

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2010 Soccer World Cup provides ample evidence of this. The chapter also explores whether there is an alternative to the now dominant world sports-events model. Can such events be organised differently, without the current exploitative character? In all mega sporting events, ‘reputable’ private firms are contracted to provide economic impact assessments for host countries. Invariably these studies provide a positive assessment of the event and its impact on the host country and its cities. Patrick Bond and Eddie Cottle (Chapter 2) look at the 2010 World Cup economic impact assessments as researched by Grant Thornton, the consulting firm which authored the economic benefits in South Africa’s bid document for hosting the event. This chapter examines (within the mega sporting-development worldview) why the original guestimates on income for government, investment and job creation changed so dramatically in the run-up to and following the World Cup, the (un)sustainability of the stadiums and the socio-economic implications for the South African economy.25 A key area of government expenditure to host the World Cup is in the provision of stadiums and related infrastructure. Michelle Taal (Chapter 3) examines the nature of the boom in South Africa’s construction sector from 2004 to 2009 and analyses the increase in the wage gap, demonstrating the direct impact of the mega sports-development project on construction workers’ lives and the redistribution of public resources to the wealthy. The chapter demonstrates that the key reason for the dramatic increases in costs associated with the World Cup infrastructure may have had more to do with the bid rigging and price fixing by the ‘Big Five’ construction companies involved in the delivery of the infrastructure than with the 2008 global financial crisis. In relation to this mega growth in the construction companies’ profits, in large part contributed through the World Cup, Eddie Cottle (Chapter 4) examines construction workers’ organised response. He looks at the nationwide strike by 70 000 construction workers in July 2009, which was unprecedented and significant in several respects. Workers were unified and the strike enjoyed widespread support from the South African public and media, despite it potentially setting back progress on World Cup projects. However, the pressure placed on the trade union negotiating team by the Department of Labour and the FIFA LOC proved lethal in undermining the demands of workers and demobilising the national strike. This chapter sets out an analysis of the World Cup strike as well as lessons for the labour movement. The construction workers’ actions in South Africa also had an international dimension which helped secure important successes for workers’ struggles elsewhere, especially in relation to FIFA.

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Vasco Pedrina and Joachim Merz (Chapter 5) outline the campaign ‘Fair Games Fair Play: Decent Work towards and beyond 2010’, an international initiative of the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) which sought to use a mega sporting event such as the World Cup as a lever to profile the conditions of construction workers, to objectively strengthen unions through increased recruitment of workers and to aid the overall struggle to achieve decent work in the construction sector. This chapter demonstrates how trade unions in Switzerland, in partnership with their South African counterparts, successfully lobbied FIFA in Zurich to provide moral support for decent working conditions. This, together with a successful campaign to highlight the plight of construction workers, led to the development of a new organising strategy for construction workers worldwide. In many respects the campaign to improve construction workers’ conditions tied to a development critique by a global union federation of a mega sports event was a world first. The campaign holds numerous lessons for workers in other countries such as Brazil who will be the host of mega events in the near future. With growing unemployment worldwide, many workers, especially in the global South, are finding work opportunities in the informal economy. Pat Horn (Chapter 6) looks at how the vast majority of informal traders in South Africa were marginalised by the World Cup and how they lost their incomes due to FIFA’s notorious restrictions and regulations. She documents the struggle of informal traders to negotiate to secure their rights with city planners before and during the World Cup and how they organised and mobilised to defend crucial spaces within host cites. Sex workers, sex worker rights activists and some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had hoped that the World Cup would provide the impetus for the political will necessary to finally speed up the slow and arduous lawreform process, and to help shift the debate from moral condemnation of sex work to a focus on sex workers’ rights. Vivienne Mentor-Lalu (Chapter 7) explores the debates and discussions about sex work which are not unique to the World Cup, as they seem to surface before most major sporting events, reflecting a background assumption that sport spectators and increased tourism will increase the demand for sex workers, who travel either voluntarily or are trafficked to the host country. Although there seems to be little evidence to support this, the same rumours and speculations emerge time and time again, and South Africa’s World Cup was no exception.

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In the aftermath of the World Cup, it is also necessary to contemplate FIFA’s claim of having hosted a ‘green tournament’. Tristen Taylor (Chapter 8) looks at the context in which FIFA’s claim is made and the rationale behind it. This chapter shows how the negative environmental impacts of the South African government’s actions in energy generation dwarf the environmental damage of the World Cup itself. There is a growing trend in the world for major polluters to drape themselves in green, even if their core activities are inherently polluting. FIFA and the South African government launched the infamous ‘Green Passport’ endorsed by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). At the same time South Africa’s state-owned power utility (Eskom) is building the world’s fourth-largest coal-fired power station that will pump out carbon emissions equivalent to ten World Cups every year. Declaring the Cup (and by association FIFA and South Africa) ‘green’ is a propaganda ploy to keep the cash rolling in and to deflect attention from the real environmental challenges facing host nations. The hosts of mega sporting events, politicians and city planners are often fixated with the idea of a ‘world city’ and claiming ‘world-class’ amenities which they see as a panacea for the growth of the city in a highly globalised world competing for foreign investment. The hosting of the 2010 World Cup was therefore seen as an opportunity for South Africa’s host cities to market their ‘world-class’ status. Those who build the city and its infrastructure to host the mega sporting event are rendered invisible: their labour is required to build the infrastructure and provide services, but their presence in the city is not encouraged. Four case studies look at the socio-economic implications of mega project development on the cities of Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Mbombela (formerly Nelspruit), examining the impact of the stadiums and their infrastructure on the respective communities. Mondli Hlatshwayo (Chapter 9) explores the spatial impact on Johannesburg of the Soccer City Stadium. Because this stadium was built in the outskirts of the city, its construction did not have the same direct spatial impact as in the case of the other host cities. Despite this, the stadium costs were in part covered by service-delivery budget cuts and marginalised the largest number of informal workers in the country. Mondli Hlatshwayo and Michael Blake (Chapter 10) describe how Cape Town was initially planning to host the World Cup in Athlone, a working-class community, with plans by the local and provincial government to invest in infrastructure and stimulate local economic development. Instead the project was moved to Green Point, a more affluent, historically white community, at the demand of FIFA and at a huge financial cost to a highly unequal and racially divided city. In the case of Durban,

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Aisha Bahadur (Chapter 11) describes how city planners who are ardent supporters of the ‘world-city’ paradigm attempted to push the poor out of the city but met resistance from several sections of the working class. She describes the change from the decision to renovate the ABSA Stadium to rather build the new Moses Mabhida Stadium, and how the city’s leadership put in motion plans for Durban to be repositioned as ‘Africa’s premier sporting destination’ with the aim of securing major sports events in the future, including the Olympics. Dale T. McKinley and the African Eye News Service team (Chapter 12) investigate how in Mbombela the land where the World Cup stadium is built was fraudulently bought by corrupt politicians in the municipality from a poor community for just R1 and how the ensuing construction fomented sustained and radical resistance from the community. They critically expose how the entire tender and construction process was riddled with political factionalism, murder, corruption and a disdain for any public accountability largely emanating from leading ANC politicians and council officials, but they also cover the courageous fightback of a few honest politicians and community/civil society members. Tony Roshan Samara (Chapter 13) discusses the role of workers in three cities attempting to climb the urban hierarchy towards world-city status through the hosting of mega events in 2010 – namely, Cape Town, South Africa, which was a host city for the World Cup; Shanghai, China, which hosted the World Trade Expo; and New Delhi, India, which hosted the Commonwealth Games. World-city status is achieved in a number of ways. Cities can become prominent leisure and recreation destinations, financial centres, or renowned architectural and historical sites on a global scale. The highest-status cities, such as New York, Paris and Hong Kong, often combine many of these traits. What Samara draws attention to in the cities under discussion are two distinct realities: on the one hand, the condition of workers; and on the other, the reorganisation of urban space to better accommodate the vision of what a world-class city looks like. He demonstrates the dynamic relationship between these two phenomena, as these cities depend on cheap, abundant labour, yet are unequipped, and perhaps unwilling, to positively integrate these workers, and their wider communities, into the urban fabric. This dynamic goes to the heart of the contradiction of the world-class city, precisely because the large, visible concentrations of poor workers upon which it depends puncture the fantasy image it seeks to create. The conclusion of this book is that the positive legacy of the 2010 World Cup for South Africa’s economic development, tourism and employment creation has been grossly exaggerated. Indeed, a considerable negative impact has been

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left through higher levels of both public and individual indebtedness, the high opportunity costs associated with the event, the displacement of local spending, and the reinforcing of already high social inequalities in income among and within cities. Cities are now sitting with enormous maintenance costs for the white elephant stadiums, which means that cities will compete for funds from the national fiscus which otherwise could have been redistributed to poorer cities and rural towns to render services and welfare to the working class and poor. On the other hand it will also mean an increased burden on taxpayers and the middle classes, whose municipal rates, taxes and utilities’ costs will increase in an economic environment that is hostile to their already precarious class position and levels of household over-indebtedness. It is our intention to demonstrate how the world’s most popular workingclass sport, soccer, has been appropriated and transformed away from the interests of the working class. Soccer has become a commodity owned by a globalised merchant class represented by FIFA and through which the collaboration of national governments and capitalists is sought as FIFA descends in its pursuit of profits on host nations every four years. We hope that through this book we will convince you of the need for governments and civil society organisations to challenge the unfettered power of FIFA and those associated with it to reclaim the human and public nature of the sport.

Notes
1. Government Communications. 2010. ‘Government assessment of the 2010 FIFA World Cup™’. Media release, 14 July, http://www.sa2010.gov.za/en/node/3353 (accessed 20 October 2010). 2. FIFA News. 2010. ‘Presidential letters stress legacy’, FIFA.com, 26 July, http://www. fifa.com/worldcup/news/newsid=1278066/index.html#presidential+letters+stress+ legacy (accessed 20 October 2010). 3. Udesh Pillay, Richard Tomlinson and Orli Bass. 2009. Development and Dreams: The Urban Legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup (Cape Town: HSRC Press), p. 4. 4. Franz Kruger. 2010. ‘Are patriotic fervour and xenophobia two sides of the same coin?’ Mail & Guardian online, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-07-05-are-patriotic-fervourand-xenophobia-two-sides-of-same-coin (accessed 19 October 2010). 5. SAPA. 2010. ‘PSA members embark on public-service strike’, Mail & Guardian online, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-07-29-psa-members-embark-on-publicservice-strike (accessed 20 October 2010).

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6. Victor Matheson and Robert Baade. 2004. ‘Mega-sporting events in developing nations: Playing the way to prosperity?’ Working paper no. 04-04, Faculty Research Series, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, Worcester, Massachusetts. 7. Matheson and Baade, ‘Mega-sporting events in developing nations: Playing the way to prosperity?’ 8. South Africa 2010 Bid Company. 2003. Africa’s Stage: South Africa 2010 Bid Book (Johannesburg: SA 2010 Bid Company), p. 3. 9. South Africa 2010 Bid Company, Africa’s Stage: South Africa 2010 Bid Book, p. 9. 10. South Africa 2010 Bid Company, Africa’s Stage: South Africa 2010 Bid Book, p. 3. 11. South Africa 2010 Bid Company, Africa’s Stage: South Africa 2010 Bid Book, p. 3. 12. Patrick Bond. 2002. ‘Thabo Mbeki’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Breaking or shining the chains of global apartheid?’ Progressive Response, Vol. 6, No. 9. 13. Fienie Grobler. 2010. ‘World Cup boosts SA’s reputation’, Mail & Guardian online, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-10-13-world-cup-boosts-sas-reputation (accessed 15 October 2010). 14. Chris Gratton and Holger Preuss. 2008. ‘Maximizing Olympic impacts by building up legacies’, International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 25, No. 14. 15. GCIS. 2010. ‘The legacy of the 2010 FIFA World Cup™’, GCIS, http://www.sa2010. gov.za/node/2926 (accessed 20 October 2010). 16. Gratton and Preuss, ‘Maximizing Olympic impacts by building up legacies’. 17. Collette Schultz Herzenberg (ed.). 2010. Player and Referee: Conflicting Interests and the FIFA 2010 World Cup (Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies), p. 1. 18. FIFA. 2010. ‘Brand licensing’, FIFA.com, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/marketing/ marketing/licensing/brands.html (accessed 20 October 2010). 19. See http://www.globalbrandsgroup.com/en/locations/safrica.html. 20. South Africaa 2010 Bid Company, Africa’s Stage: South Africa 2010 Bid Book, Chapter 6, ‘Commercialisation’. 21. Calculated at ZAR7.4 to USD1 at January 2010, http://www.x-rates.com/d/ZAR/USD/ hist2010.html (accessed 20 October 2010). 22. Michael Hamlyn. 2010. ‘Chinese workers earn R23 a day’, Times Live, 29 January. 23. David Harvey. 2010. ‘The enigma of capital and the crisis this time’. Paper prepared for the American Sociological Association Meetings in Atlanta, 16 August. 24. Gustavo Esteva. 1977. ‘Development’. In Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (Johannesburg: Wits University Press; London and New York: Zed Books), p. 7. 25. There may be variation in figures in the different chapters of this book. This is due to the constant changes in estimates and costs before, during and after the World Cup, and figures will vary depending on sources used by the different authors for their respective chapters.

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© 2011 Zapiro – Reprinted with permission – For more Zapiro cartoons visit www.zapiro.com

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