The Implicit Teleology of Psychoanalysis: Ricoeurs Interpretation of Freud

David Scholtz

Philosophy 3B: Culture and Hermeneutics Ms. C. F. Botha 22 August 2011

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Wo es war, soll ich werden. ~ Sigmund Freud

Introduction Sigmund Freuds theory of psychoanalysis claims that all human behaviour is driven by desire and repressed memory. In light of this, can Freuds texts be interpreted as containing the possibility of a progression beyond unconscious desire, without doing violence to his original ideas? Paul Ricoeur posits a dialectic counterpart to the regressive Freudian interpretation of the subject a teleology which, he claims, is already implicit in Freuds writings. I argue that Ricoeurs development is consistent with Freuds own ideas. I begin by tracing Freuds thought on mental processes and his theory of the unconscious. This is useful as a preliminary before I consider Ricoeurs engagement with Freud. I then give an overview of Ricoeurs project of a general theory of hermeneutics before explicating his account of language in psychoanalysis. Following this, I show how Ricoeur places language as the exchange between two possible directions of interpretation; an archaeology and a teleology of the subject. This leads to the question of whether Ricoeurs development of a teleological interpretation of the subject is consistent with Freuds own ideas. With reference to Ricoeurs interpretation of Freud, I argue that the possibility of teleology is indeed although a development of Freudian interpretation already present in Freuds writings. History of the Freudian Unconscious MacIntyre (1958: 6) notes that Freud did not consider himself to have discovered the unconscious, but rather the scientific method by which knowledge of the unconscious may be gained. The method referred to is, of course, psychoanalysis. It was developed and influenced by Freuds background as a neurologist, his selfexaminations and observations on patients suffering from hysteria although his method proposes to explain more than just abnormal behaviour. Freud initially seeks to present his theory of mental states and processes by means of a neurological theory, which accounts for behavioural changes physiologically and as occurring within a closed system. However, due to a lack of evidence for sustaining a physiological foundation for his model of mental processes, he turns to a purely psychological theory (MacIntyre, 1958: 22-6).

Freud divides the mind into the three provinces of the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. The first two are responsible for perception and memory respectively, while the unconscious is further comprised of different levels, each exerting its own influence. The first level of the unconscious is the Id, and is comprised of instinctual drives. These take the form of desires which seek satisfaction through objects. As such, a desires urge is to attain meaning through expression. I refer later to this point in my defence of Ricoeurs development of a teleology of the subject. At an intermediate level is the ego which operates as ones self-consciousness, that is, as indicating to the self its situation and its distinctness from that situation. This constituent provides the drive of self-preservation, halting the instinct of the Id when at variance with reality. The ego develops during ones childhood, and so this stage of life defines ones driving desires in adulthood. Lastly, the super-ego is an internalised moral voice inherited in childhood from ones father. (Thurschwell, 2000: 48, 81-2) Of particular importance is the id and its emerging desire with which the subject is constantly confronted. This desire is caught between the oppositional pair pleasurereality principles. Within the subject, instinctual drives cause tension which, according to the pleasure principle, always seek a release according to the object of desire. However, reality is not always conducive towards releasing desires tension, and so the pleasure principle becomes opposed by the reality principle. If the interplay between these two principles settles with minimal conflict, the latter principle will not prevent pleasure from occurring at all. However, it may require the subject to postpone the release of tension or to find a different means of release. This will result in normal behaviour and gratification of desire (Thurschwell, 2000: 846). There may, however, arise painful situations which cause greater conflict with ones desires. Traumatic situations opposed to pleasure suppress our memory of an event, along with the corresponding desire, from consciousness. Since the instinctual drive is not fulfilled, it looks for other avenues for satisfaction unconsciously, with the memory remaining repressed. In such a case, one inherits a memory incapable of being recollected by normal means, as well as a tendency to react in a determined manner in associated situations. This is the cause of neurotic behaviour. It is important to note that in both cases of behaviour being normal or neurotic, all behaviour is
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always determined by desire. In short, [o]urbehaviour isexplained in terms of the transformation of certain [unconscious] instinctual desires (MacIntyre, 1958: 267). In light of the determinism of the unconscious on behaviour, I regard one peculiar element of Freuds theory which does not seem to fully agree with desire as the driving force: sublimation. This concept is central to Ricoeurs development of a teleology of the subject. Sublimation is the ability of the subject to turn instinctual desire into behaviour unrelated to desire. This may be done for some higher purpose, a progressive ideal (the greater good of the community, for example), or just redirecting desire according to the restraints of reality. Freud sees sublimation as the basis of society, since people sacrifice the possibility of satisfying their desires in certain ways in order for more long term self-preservation (Thurschwell, 2000: 105-7). It is the possibility of a form of progression and, as such, is also the birthplace of art and culture (Pellauer, 2007: 49). A question Ricoeur raises on this topic is, could it be the true meaning of sublimation is to promote new meanings by mobilizing old energies initially invested in archaic figures? (Ricoeur, 1970: 175). I give an account of how this is addressed under Language and its Relation to the Interpretation of Desire. I also draw on the ideality of sublimation and its ability to harness desire for other means in my defence of Ricoeurs teleology of the subject. First, though, a word on Ricoeurs project. Ricoeurs Engagement with Freud The point is now reached where Ricoeurs reading and interpretation of Freud is considered. In Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur perceives hermeneutics as largely comprising a multitude of theories of interpretation, many of which seem in opposition to each other. His aim is to retrace the outer contours (Ricoeur, 1970: 27) of hermeneutics in order to come up with some general hermeneutics, inclusive of all the varying schools. The greatest opposition is found between Ricoeur's hitherto phenomenological method of proclaiming meaning, and the method of reducing illusion (demystification), of which Freudian psychoanalysis is regarded as a major representative along with Nietzsche and Marx. The conflict occurs inasmuch as the former approach takes for granted the transparency of consciousness, while the latter is suspicious of this very assumption and seeks to decipher the hidden
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meaning of consciousness (Simms, 2003: 48). In order to show how a hermeneutics of suspicion can be included in a general hermeneutics, Ricoeur argues that it also provides a method of reaching self-understanding. Ricoeur shows how psychoanalysis and phenomenology contain similarities in their methods of interpretation, and argues that the two approaches can cooperate in their quests to find the meaning of consciousness. Both analyse forms of confession psychoanalysis the confession of the patient (regarded with suspicion), and hermeneutics the fault in the human condition (Simms, 2003: 49) (approached with faith). These approaches are both a kind of interpretation of some hidden meaning. What Ricoeur finds especially useful in psychoanalysis is its foundation on history; patients cases are regarded as texts in need of interpretation. In this way, psychoanalysis provides particular human truths distinct from natural scientific truth which plausibly explain those patients behaviour. Specifically, these are explanations from and limited to desire. Psychoanalytic theory reaches an understanding of the subject by presenting the conditions for desire to have meaningful expression. Ricoeur considers Freuds theory 'liberating' (Simms, 2003: 54) in its displacement of consciousness, although he finds the lack of meaning in the Freudian subject problematic. To solve this problem, Ricoeur develops a teleological view of selfunderstanding based on the artistic nature of language. In the following section I show how Ricoeur unites Freuds interpretation of the unconscious with an interpretation of the subjects ideality. Language and its Relation to the Interpretation of Desire In order to understand Ricoeurs account of language as containing two possible directions of interpretation of the subject, it is first necessary to understand how language can be interpreted at all. Ricoeur proposes that what Freuds theory provides is one possible interpretation of human experience (Simms, 2003: 56), the semantics of desire which can be grasped only through the interpretation of the signs whereindesire is expressed (Thompson, 1983: 191). Since signs do not present straight-forward meaning, psychoanalytic interpretation considers conscious language as harbouring hidden
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meaning in need of explication. Due to the intersubjective nature of linguistic meaning, this latent meaning can be explicated and mediated by another the psychoanalyst. Due to this, interpretation is confronted with the problems of latent meaning and intersubjectivity. To interpret latent meaning is to understand the subject who gives expression to desire. This is done by regarding what is said as an indirect image of the self, where the spectacle is at the same time the mirage of self in the mirror of things (Ricoeur, 1970: 379). By deciphering this coded meaning, one reveals the unconscious of subjectivity which constitutes its own mode of expression (Ihde, 1971: 153). In this way, the route to self-understanding is indirect, since it is only by a detour of interpretation does one arrive. As for the problem of intersubjectivity, psychoanalytic interpretation occurs in a controlled intersubjective relation (between analyst and patient) (Ihde, 1971: 153), where the analyst is the interpreter and mediator of meaning for the analysand. This intersubjective relationship contains (i) the analyst interpreting the latent meaning of the analysands expressions; (ii) cooperation by the analysand to express what is repressed; and (iii) an overcoming of the trauma revealed (Ihde, 1971: 153-4). I now provide Ricoeurs development of the dialectic between regressive and progressive interpretations of the subject in Freudian psychoanalysis. Ricoeur characterises Freuds kind of self-understanding as an archaeology of the unconscious, as a hermeneutics of our origins in the form of repressed memories and childhood desires. By extension, all human behaviour is explained in terms of a manifestation of the ever prior (Ricoeur, 1970: 440). The limit of this direction of interpretation is where the unconscious intersects with consciousness, and is the same meeting point as the pre-linguistic origin of desire with language. In this way, language refers to something [pre-linguistic desire] which is unable to be represented. At the same time, however, desire is the origin of language in the form of the urge to say (Ihde, 1971: 157). Construed as such, Freuds interpretation of the subject can be called regressive, since it is ever directed towards the archaic below consciousness. However, since there is no intelligibility proper to desire as such (Ricoeur, 1970: 466), it is not enough to only regard the unconscious in becoming self-aware.
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Ricoeur states that only when consciousness posits itself as desire (Ricoeur, 1970: 466) can it make its way back to self-consciousness. This way is given in the form of a Hegelian teleology of consciousness the dialectical counterpart to Freuds archaeology where the truth of the unconscious lies in the subsequent moment of consciousness (Pirovolakis, 2010: 36). As such, this way of interpretation is Hegelian in how it finds meaning developing genetically from one form to another, and in its movement and aspiration towards true meaning (Ricoeur, 1974: 114). This progression locates the self between the appropriation of unconscious desire and the movement towards the ideality of the subject. A teleological interpretation draws from unconscious meaning in order to reflect and reach self-understanding not by transcending desire, but by recognising it as unsurpassable. Ricoeur locates the unity of the archaeology-teleology dialectic in the symbol of language. Although a symbol is a concrete expression, it points beyond itself to what is not immediately known both to ones unconscious desires and ones prospective living. As such, a symbols meaning is never fixed and contains a multiplicity of possible interpretations. The beauty of Ricoeurs engagement with Freud is his contribution of the role of language as being the exchange and thereby the unifier between desire and life, origin and aspiration, enabling the subject with the possibility of a progressive artistic synthesis (Pellauer, 2007: 49). The positing or emergence of the self is inseparable from its production through a progressive synthesis (Ricoeur, 1970: 464). By regarding language as a symbol containing two possible directions of interpretation, as pointing to both ones origins and ones ideals, Ricoeur holds that these interpretations are internal to one another. As our childhood constantly re-emerges, so too does our imaginative exploration of adult life (Ricoeur, 1974: 117). Ricoeurs Consistency with Freud The question of Ricoeurs adherence to Freuds original ideas is now raised. Pirovolakis (2010: 41) asks, To what extent does Ricoeurs dialectics do justice to Freuds supposedly major contributions to thought, namely, the concept of the unconscious and the process of repression? As such, an opponent of Ricoeurs interpretation may state that Freuds psychoanalysis is supposed to show the fundamentally regressive essence of human behaviour as always emanating from
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some past desire, and that Ricoeur does an injustice to this by unifying this regression with a teleology by means of language. In response to this, I agree with Ricoeurs observation that the possibility of a progressive interpretation of the subject is already present in Freuds writings. This can be seen in Freuds opposition of concepts and his (largely incomplete) attempt to harmonise their conflicts. An example of this can be observed in the concept of sublimation being a creative ideal to manage unfulfilled desires (Pellauer, 2007: 50). This ideal is striven towards not directly but by an approximation of, and thus in dialectic relation to, ones desire. Furthermore, that language is not only a symbol aimed toward desire but also toward aspiration, in the form of synthesising desire with life, is present in sublimations drive for meaning by way of an alternative, progressive means consistent with reality. Finally, Ricoeur observes that psychoanalysis is not confronted with pure force alone, but always with forces in search of meaning (Ricoeur, 1970: 151). This points to progressive possibility from the very source of behavioural drives in the sense that, if ungratified, desire still proceeds to seek expression otherwise. Conclusion I maintain that Ricoeurs development of the relation between the Freudian unconscious and language is consistent with Freuds own ideas. Freuds theory of the unconscious explains all behaviour in terms of latent psychical energies, which seek alternative modes of release if inhibited in their primary processes. Repressed memories in the unconscious with their attendant emotions cause neurotic human behaviour when these memories are prompted by associated situations. In this way, the unconscious exerts causal influence over behaviour. Ricoeur champions the displacement of the primacy of consciousness and the aim of demystifying hidden meaning. However, he posits a counterpart to this regressive interpretation of the subject with a progressive teleological interpretation. The latter considers the ideal aspiration of the subject as distinct from its opposed interpretation of the origin of desire, although the two interpretations relate to each other dialectically. The role of language in the interpretation of the subject is situated between this dialectic, and functions as an exchange between the two. I argued that the teleological direction in

Ricoeurs dialectic is also present in Freuds writing, and therefore consistent with Freuds own ideas.

Word count: 2481 (excluding references).

Reference List Ihde, D. (1971). Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. MacIntyre, A. C. (1958). The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul. Pellauer, D. (2007). Ricoeur: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Pirovolakis, E, (2010). Reading Derrida and Ricoeur: Improbable Encounters between Deconstruction and Hermeneutics. Albany: State University of New York Press. Ricoeur, P. (1970). Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. Translated from the French by Savage, D. London: Yale University Press. Ricoeur, P. (1974). Consciousness and the Unconscious. Translated from the French by Domingo, W. In The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Edited by Ihde, D. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Simms, K. (2003). Paul Ricoeur. London: Routledge. Thompson, J. B. (1983). Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jrgen Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thurschwell, P. (2000). Sigmund Freud. London: Routledge.

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Bibliography Protevi, J. (Editor). (2005). The Edinburgh Dictionary of Continental Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ricoeur, P. (1974). A Philosophical Interpretation of Freud. Translated from the French by Domingo, W. In The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Edited by Ihde, D. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Solomon, R. C. (1988). Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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