INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION

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Expressio Unius Exclusio

Ishaan Vashishth

Expressio unius exclusion or Expressio unius est exclusio alterius to express one thing is to exclude another." MEANING
The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. In construing statutes, contracts, wills, and the like under this maxim, the mention of one thing within the statute or other document implies the exclusion of another thing not so mentioned. See 95.The maxim though not a rule of law, is an aid to construction. It has application when, in the natural association of ideas, that which is expressed is so set over by way of contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment. Thus a statute granting certain rights to police, fire, and sanitation employees would be interpreted to exclude other public employees not enumerated from the legislation. This is based on presumed legislative intent and where for some reason this intent cannot be reasonably inferred the court is free to draw a different conclusion. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting where a general term follows a series of specific terms, the general term is interpreted to include only things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated. That would have added a provision instructing the Supreme Court on interpreting the constitution by providing that the doctrine of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be used except in exceptional circumstances. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.

A principle in statutory construction: when one or more things ofa class are expressly mentioned

others of the same class are excluded.This is yet another maxim of statutory construction is i.e. expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Roughly translated, this phrase means that whatever is omitted is understood to be excluded. Thus, if a statute provides for a specific sanction for noncompliance with the statute, other sanctions are excluded and cannot be applied (Sprague v. State. The maxim is based on the rationale that if the legislature had intended to accommodate a particular remedy or allowance, it would have done so expressly; if the legislature did not provide for such an allowance or event, it should be assumed that it meant not to. The maxim has wide application and has been used by courts to interpret constitutions, treaties, wills, and contracts as well as statutes. LIMITATIONS Nevertheless, expressio unius est exclusio alterius does have its limitations. Courts have held that the maxim should be disregarded where an expanded interpretation of a statute will lead to beneficial results or will serve the purpose for which the statute was enacted. The general meaning of Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another Also known as The Negative Implication Rule. This rule assumes that the legislature intentionally specified one set of criteria as opposed to the other. Therefore, if the issue to be decided addresses an item not specifically named in the statute, it must be assumed the statute does not apply. An example would be Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), whereby court upheld an injunction against completion of a $100 million dam to prevent possible extinction of snail darters. The court found that the listed exemptions to the Endangered Species Act was exhaustive. Since snail darters were not in the list, they were found to be protected. (The express mention of one thing excludes all others) Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. Sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is

usually indicated by a word such as includes or such as. However, even words such as includes and including may be defined as terms in legislation, and no longer retain their common meaning. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. In construing statutes, contracts, wills, and the like under this maxim, the mention of one thing within the statute or other document implies the exclusion of another thing not so mentioned.

The maxim though not a rule of law, is an aid to construction. It has application when, in the natural association of ideas, that which is expressed is so set over by way of contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment. Thus a statute granting certain rights to police, fire, and sanitation employees would be interpreted to exclude other public employees not enumerated from the legislation. This is based on presumed legislative intent and where for some reason this intent cannot be reasonably inferred the court is free to draw a different conclusion. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CASSUS OMISSUS AND EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION The phrase cassus omissus has a misspelling. The correct phrase is casus omissus, which means a case left out. The second phrase, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the expression of one is the exclusion of the other. So the first phrase refers to an omission, and the second to two mutually exclusive alternatives. Non-Application of Rule By expressing one thing is [by implication] to exclude another. There is no room for the application of this principle where some reason other than the intention to exclude certain items

exists for the express mention in question. Thus what is said may be intended merely as an example or be included for abundance of caution or for some other reason; or the thing supposed to have been impliedly excluded may not have existed at the passing of the enactment.

EXCEPTIONS AND CITATIONS: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius 1. The rule here is that if Congress enumerates specific exceptions in a general prohibition, other exceptions will not be recognized in the absence of explicit legislative direction. 2. That is, unless the court chooses to disregard this rule. 3.As we have held repeatedly, the canon does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an associated group or series, justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence. 4. in their wonderful little book, Statutory Interpretation: the Search for Legislative Intent, Ronald and Sharon Brown provide a terrific illustration of this principle. Consider a statute that applies to apples, peaches, and oranges. Does this statute also apply to plums, they ask. Their answer, By not specifically including the specific term plums or a general term in which plums might be included, it appears that the legislature intended not to include plums. Indian Citations of the Maxim When the statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. It has been hither to uncontroverted legal position that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden.

One of the most important rules of construction-of statutes, constitutions and similar instruments seems to be the rule that the expression of one subject, object, or idea is the exclusion of other subjects, objects, or ideas. This rule is ordinarily used in law books in its Latin form as given above in the title of this article. The writer of this article recently had occasion to collect the cases in Wisconsin where this rule had been applied by the Supreme Court, and because of the fact that it is almost impossible to find these cases in the Digests, the result of this labor is reproduced here for the benefit of those who may have occasion to use the rule in the future. The rule has been applied by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to the state constitution, to the rule against perpetuities, to the power of the legislature, to powers of counties, to city charters, to the statute enumerating actions that survive, to the statute declaring marriages void, to the construction of private contracts, and to many other subjects as will be shown in this article. So far as we have been able to find this rule of construction was first applied to the state Constitution in Wisconsin in the case of State, ex rel. Crawford vs. Hastings Judge Crawford, who was elected to the office of associate justice of The Supreme Court, applied to the secretary of state to have his salary for six months audited. He presented the Dean, Marquette Law School. THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW audited salary warrant to the defendant, the state treasurer, who refused to make payment. One of the defenses was that Judge Cole had already collected the salary and the other defense was that the warrant had not been counter-signed by a new officer-the comptroller of the State. It is in connection with this second defense that the point of construction arose; the specific point being whether or not the legislature could create a second auditor when the constitution only mentioned one. The rule was applied, to the effect that as long as the constitution stated that the secretary of state was to audit the bills, that this expression excluded anyone else being authorized to audit the bills.

It was contended that as long as the legislature had not been prohibited from creating a second auditor, that the legislature' had the right to do so. In other words, the defendant looked for prohibition in construing that clause of the State Constitution. The Court met the proposition squarely: "Every positive delegation of power to one officer or department implies a negation of its exercise by any other officer, department or person." The above case is an important one because in construing a State Constitution it would be second nature to look for prohibition in the constitution, the state being a sovereign, as distinguished from the created Federal Government in whose constitution we must look for grants of power rather than prohibition, but this rule of construction is so strong and was applied with such vigor here that the Court held that the expression that the secretary of state should be the auditor excluded the idea that anybody else could be an auditor. A positive delegation of power to one officer in a State Constitution was held to be a prohibition against delegating this same power to anyone else. According to our research the rule was next applied to the Rule Against Perpetuities, in Dodge vs. Williams, 46 Wis. 70 at 96. That case points out that the English Rule Against Perpetuities applied to personalty as well as realty. The Wisconsin Statute, at that time, applied only to realty, and our Court very pointedly held that the expression of one excluded the other The case of Steinlein vs. Halstead, involved the validity of an assignment under a statute. The statute enumerated certain requirements. The defendant claimed the assignments were void because the attachment of a certificate, not one of the require EXPRESSIO UNIUS , but which was quite generally used in the practice, had not been made. The Court repudiated this contention by stating that the enumeration of the requirements in the statute excluded all others not enumerated (See middle of page 294). This is a plain application of the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius to a statute. In the case of State, ex. rel. Priest vs. Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 54 Wis. 159, we

have the same application of rule to a statute, but the statute is peculiar in that it stated that no student shall be required to pay any tuition fee for one year next succeeding his admission to the university, with certain exceptions. The student wanted to make additional exceptions to the statute, but the Court rejected the idea, stating that the enumeration of certain exceptions in the Statute excluded all other exceptions, and applied the rule, which we are here discussing We have an interesting case in Towsley vs. Ozaukee County,. The statute enumerated certain officers to whom the County Board was required to furnish fuel and stationery. The plaintiff was a County Surveyor, and surveyors were not named in that statute. The County has given the plaintiff an office in the Court House, but refused him fuel and stationery. The Court sustained this refusal on the ground that the plaintiff was not among those named in the said statute; and applied the rule we are discussing,--that the naming of certain officers amounted to the exclusion of others. This is a simple case, but it shows how far the rule has been extended when applied to the construction of statutes. In the case of Wisconsin Telephone Co. vs. City of Oshkosh, we have a construction of a city charter. The city charter of Oshkosh did not mention telephone or telegraph companies among those to whom franchises or licenses could be issued and the Court held, for that reason, that the city had no power to license them, and applied the rule, with the following language: "The charter having thus expressly stated what the common council might license, without naming telegraphs or telephones, has, by necessary implication, prohibited the exaction of such license of either of those companies. Expressio unius est exclusio .alterius." In the case of Farrall vs. Shea, we have a well-known case involving the statute on survival of actions. A quotation from the middle of page 565 will tell the whole story: "When the legislature provided that actions for the recovery of personal property should survive, it would have been easy and highly proper to.have added "or real property,"

"It is fair to assume that, had the legislature intended other restrictions upon the right of action, it would have expressed the same in the statute. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." This last case has been followed in Swenson vs. Swenson, In the case of J. I. Case Plow Works vs. Niles & Scott Co. We have the application of the rule to private contracts where the plaintiff undertook to bring in certain I implied warranties. The Court denied this contention and used the following unmistakable language, in the middle of page 604: "The contract as written must be taken as the final and conclusive evidence of all that was intended or agreed upon. The familiar rule, 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius' clearly applies."

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http://www.answers.com http://legalsutra.org Jacky Giradet and Jacques Pecheur, CLE international