March 22, 2007 No.

14

The Beginning of American-Iranian Engagement

Ephraim Kam

On March 10, a one-day conference on the stabilization of Iraq was held in Baghdad.
The ambassadorial-level conference included representatives from Iraq itself and all of its
neighbors, including Iran and Syria, from the five permanent members of the Security
Council, and from several other states. The discussions focused on the question of how
to help Iraq deal with the problem of internal violence and reconcile its various ethnic
and sectarian groups. Conference participants described the meeting as a positive first
step and agreed to set up a working group that will address infiltration from across Iraq’s
border, oil, and the problem of refugees. Most importantly, the participants agreed to
prepare a follow-on conference that will meet soon, perhaps at the ministerial level,
although its precise mandate and timing were not decided.

A particularly noteworthy aspect of the conference was that it provided the setting for the
first public meeting in many years in which American and Iranian officials discussed a
central political issue. Working-level meetings have taken place in the past, without
advance publicity, to discuss discrete matters, such as those connected with American
military operations in Afghanistan. This time the meeting was official, it came after prior
notification, and it took on added significance with respect to the totality of relations
between the two countries. At the same time, the parties insisted on stressing that there
were no direct, bilateral contacts between them outside the conference plenary.

The Baghdad meeting between American and Iranian representatives stemmed from the
distress of both sides and their interest in moving the situation in Iraq in directions
favorable to their interests. The U.S. is caught in a bind because of its involvement in
Iraq and the administration is torn between unpalatable alternatives: to stay on and risk
even greater domestic and international opprobrium or to withdraw its forces quickly and
risk the further destabilization of Iraq and the further undermining of its credibility and
stature. Iran, for its part, is under growing pressure on the nuclear issue (including the
threat of future military action) and is concerned at the prospect that instability in Iraq
might spread into Iran. However, Iran also sees opportunities in the way the situation has
developed, with the elimination of Iraq as serious regional power that once blocked and
threatened it and the emergence of Shi’ites as a leading force in Iraq.

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These considerations led both the United States and Iran to change course and agree to
meet in Baghdad. The U.S. administration wants to explore all possibilities to stabilize
Iraq in the clear understanding that its military effort there must be complemented by
some political effort. In doing so, it can respond to proposals in the U.S. – such as the
Baker-Hamilton Report – to engage Iran on this matter. There is another factor. If the
administration does eventually decide to carry out a military attack, it wants to be able to
demonstrate that it first tried all other means of dealing with the nuclear issue, including
engagement with the Iranians. Iran, for its part, wants to exploit any engagement to
achieve several objectives: entrenched recognition of its status and influence in Iraq, the
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, and reduced pressure on the nuclear issue in
return for help in stabilizing Iraq.

The fact that U.S. and Iranian representatives sat together in Baghdad is important in and
of itself. By breaking the ice, it may make possible other meetings in the future. And if
the parties can overcome the scars of the past, such meetings may generate their own
dynamic. At the same time, real U.S.-Iranian engagement will have to overcome the very
formidable obstacles that have hitherto constrained contacts and prevented any
understanding or agreement between them. First of all, there is a high level of mutual
mistrust. The radical wing of the Iranian regime has consistently opposed any
engagement with the administration since it sees a rupture with the United States as one
main criterion of revolutionary Islamic authenticity. And in the United States, important
elements reject engagement with the Iranian regime, which they see as part of the “axis of
evil.” This suspicion is apparently the reason why, even in Baghdad, American and
Iranian representatives refrained from any direct bilateral contact.

Secondly, there are serious differences between the U.S. and Iran over the future of Iraq.
The administration wants to establish a stable, pro-western regime that will conciliate and
involve Sunnis, to prevent the emergence of a Shi’ite bloc linking Iran and Iraqi Shi’ites,
to block and balance Iran’s standing and aspirations in the Gulf, and to withdraw U.S.
forces in a way that minimizes damage to American standing and credibility. Iran has
contradictory goals: to create a stable but weak Iraq in which the Shi’ite element will be
tied to Iran and dependent on it, and to accelerate the departure of American forces in a
manner that weakens the regional stature of the U.S. The Iranian regime has no reason to
help the U.S. rehabilitate its reputation in the region.

Thirdly, if a serious U.S.-Iranian dialogue over Iraq does develop, Iran will almost
certainly demand an end to pressure on the nuclear issue in return for help in Iraq. It is
difficult to imagine the United States agreeing to such a demand, which would effectively
mean acquiescing in Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. Besides, even if Iran were willing
to help stabilize Iran, its influence is ultimately limited. After all, there is little that Iran
can do to conciliate Iraqi Sunnis; its ability to subvert the existing order is greater than its
ability to contribute to a peaceful new order.

Thus, there is not much room for substantial U.S.-Iranian engagement in the current
circumstances. However, the prospects that such engagement could lead to substantial
results would improve in one of two possible scenarios. The first is if the U.S.

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administration decides to withdraw its forces from Iraq, in which case the Iranians would
have an interest to engage in order to accelerate that process and take advantage of it in
order to entrench their hold on Iraq. The second is if Iran shows some willingness, in
response to greater pressure on it, to agree to a package deal on the nuclear issue that
would also include some understandings on the question of Iraq.

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