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25 January 1952
S()'E.JiCT: Dissemination of Combat -_._. .,,'
!J Pt::?:," ,', < ':IC:'!
, --'"'\
i :.' _ ...
FEa 1
TO: See :dlstributi on
.1. In aocordance with SR of Ccmbat Infer
mation, the attached }!,XTBACTS are forwarded to De::'Jartment ::;f the Army,
Army Field Forces and the Service Schoels for evalu2.tir;n and necessary
action. It may be in certain cases, fer these agencies
to take action. u:pcn a extracted item; in others, it may be
desirable to develo:p a cress-section of accuTnulated extracts en a
par'ticular subj ect befr:re ini tiatine; action; and eften, the extracted
item.serves.te,reaffirJIl cur doctrines and techniques.
2. Copiesef Dissemination Combat Information are forwarded,
wi th Department of the .Army to information ad0.ressees fcr use
at th.e headquarters cf the installaticn or activitJ concerned to keep
them, infor:ned theatre frc:m front line thr-:.ugh the
s tical mmand
. 3. Tllese are derived from re:/)rts w:lich are classified
For the breater convenience of the user, this Office dcwUbrades
each extracted item to the lowest classificaticn with security_
Uo effort 1-5 made tc paraphrase or delete any pl;)rti"n of the extracted
remarks, so that none of the oriGinal intent is lost.
4. Generally, the which pertain to training appear under
the classification of For combat inforillation of training
Talue at the CcmpaIl-Battery level, adclressees are referred to Army
Field Forces TR!'.I1HNG- BULLETIilS, which are also published under the
classification of
AJ;lv7J l!1'tlftl
1 1ncl
Extracts from sources
Lt Col, AGC
229 thru 249' ABet .Ad jut.ant General
1 C,1
Copy No________ __ ..__
_ f'f'U"R 'StM''('C.
Action Addressees
.. ' ...
at the. Arroz
, 1-:0 ' 3 ACOFSi Q.-.l'
, .
4-' 6 ACOFS, G-2
7- 21 AeOiS,
22- 41 ACOFS. "",,4
42- 51 CCMLQ
52- 61
62- 71 COl!'ORl>'
.73- 82, 0"5100:
, ,83" 92 "COFT
, 9.3- 94 Chief of '}.tlli"rerY H1st02:"Y
95-104 ", , ' . '
105-114 TSG,':'
115-116 TAG
" 'Office, Chief of !-I'ml FC,rces
liT Deput' Chief of Staff
118 Gl '
119 'G2"
120-130 Gj(4)
131-132 G4
133-137" RD
138 Chemical
,,139 ,Engineer
140 ' Medical,
14.1: ',Ordnance
,143 ; '/, Signal
145 Adjutant General
146 Budget'& 'Fiscal
141' Chaplain
148 Inro'rmation:
149' Frovost Marshal
150-152 ' J.rmy War 'College
153-154 Command & General Staff Ccllee
155-156 The Armored School
157-158 The ARtillery Schocl
159-160 The Infantry 'School
161-162 ArID1 General Scheol
163-164 Asst Comdt. The Art School.
165 ." AF]' Board No 1
166 ArF Board No 2
167 An' 3
168 AFF No 4
169 CO, Ui Arctic Test
r ,
SOU"TY 'Nm?!' e
2.::r::;::ASSIFI ED
ATTNG-64 35
.05/38(DOCr)(c)(25 Jan 52)
25 January 1952
SUbject: D1.ssem.1.natian of Combat Information
Information Addressees
copy No
170-179 CDIC, Europea." Ccmd'
180-189 CG, Trj.6ste US 'J.'Toops
190-199 C0t", US Forces in Austria
200-209 CDIC, Far East
210-219 ca, us AY!'lY, Alaska
220-229 qG, .YS. f'-:1'"llly, Pacific
230-239 es.)' us- Ai7JIY, Ca.ribbeW
.. Forces
240-243 Inspector Secretariat
244.263 8-3 (64)
2S4 A'} Eecords
265-274 Cories
C')f1'T!<lndir..g Generals
275-276 -"First Army .
277 278 Second Lrrny
-.>0 1,rTflY
231-232 :E'Jurth Army
28'3234 Fifth Army
2135-286 Sixth Army
287-290 Army M. Cemd, Ent J...FB, Cdo S:prings. Colo
291,-292 Supt, USMJ.. Ivest POint, NY
+ CI.!"'" :!!AC.' I..:ng'.E-, AFJ,}
295-296 Chief, i.rmy Advisory Gp. Air Comd & Staff ::.,eh, J...ir Univ,
Maxwell APB, Ala
297-,298 Com.it J Ma:r.-ine Corps Sch, Quantico. Va
299-300 C0::':1t, 11' Air (j'round Seh, Southern s, .
301 ,)C2 CClT'd. t, Intelligence Cor:ps Se;h, JjQrt nolablrd.
Baltimor3 19, Md
CO!::d.t" Th-:; Pruvost :.:::t.r;;:.'h:J.l. {h:nc.r11'::: 3cLou:;"
.,rIll ld L '$ II'
Fort Monroe, Virginia
2d Inf Div' After-Action Conference
2 Il07emoer 1951 Source 229
The time needed to cOElplete plans for a nA'.'J attack should be
at least two (2) and preferably three (3) days. Three (3) hours
are ne'eded to register artillery if no forward displacement is
inlTolved. The prinCipal time-consuming proble;;! is
amrmmi tion to the site in sufficiPnt 'Juan tities for both prepar'l tory
fires and for stockpilihg ag'linst. the contingency of a coun ter"lttack.
Prop'er reconnaissMce by a Company Commander rewires at least one
day_ ''There possible, it is desirabl:3 for Cmr.p""lny COfJ,manders to
reconnoi ter by.air in qdd{tion to making their .nap ground
reconnaissance. This talkes an additional half C:1Y.
A typ;i..c;i1fire support t?al!'. consisted of three (3) groups of
weapons: 75-mrn recoi11ess r:iflep, .50 cAliber machine gU.'"lS and
81-mm mortars. There were usually six (6), soo.etimes eight (5)
weapons in each gro'Up. . Groups were tied into a Fire Direction
Center by wire and radio. One officer 'Nas placed in charge of
each group, -'3.nd officers or rio'n-cOi'rnissioned obser'Jers were placed
with the assaulting battalions. Fire re"luests "lere phoned or
radioed to the FDC,v.rhich ty of fires and assigned
missions to one or more groups.' ''luplac8rr,ent sites for these groups
were predetermined and stockpiling of ammunition was brog1.ID well in
advance of the attack. (R-::.:3TRICTE:D)
* '* * ** * * *
Preparatory 'fires proved highly particularly where
the time of attack was varied. Converged sheaf firing is recommended
... . ,jlfl>l .... .,. ,., It
'F'orm No 73
(::c. evised 15 Oct 51)


as the usu3,l pa ttern in this terr.ain, otherwise IT.lUch of fire is
wasted.. However, artillery patterns must be varied ,if maximum
to be inflicted on the 01ack periods of
friendly arti11ery fire usually occurred at meal times, just after
dark, Imd before d,q'.mj consequently the enemy moved 'iround at these
times, '1ffording us a to, cfl,tch him in the ClpenlO
Difficulty was experienced in accurR.cy of when registrations
were made the day before an attack, It follows that Rrtillery
should be registered, by individu.al battery,
of .the attack. Aside from loss in a ccur;;wy , prematl,l,r'8 registration
"telegraphed, the pmch
on occ:J.sionsa,pd allowed
y to reinforce his positi'ons
, (H,'S'lRIC1'::D)
*.* '*, '* * '* *. * *
; ,
\ ,.
Terrain has usually dictated how Glosely 9ss:lul t ,31ements ..crm
artillery' fires. In some inst-:mces troops have followed
artillery ,fire by one hundred yards; in others, where vertical
distance was involved, troops followed the fire by many times this
distance. Precipi tollS prohibits c10se follow-up
of supporting a.rtillery. ;:Jhexe this happens troops may mo ','e under
the cover of .an air stri"e,,:or under recoilless 3:nd weqpons
fire. '
* * *,-. * .... '* .. * *
; ."'
sudcessful has, c':)rtain (1) a
simple plan; (2) a sing1e objective; (3) .a thorough reconnais
sance. Gr'eatest succes's wasexperienc-o'o wnere men mentally
conditioned. Tr.is condi WflS ::lchie'fed:ts a by-product of
making tions for the 3.tt!'lck. Orders should be re
ceived at least' the night before and pref")rably several days before
the attack. In one inst:tnce, to ;;J,id control, the route W-"lS m8.rked
by 1uminous markers plCiced by patrols prior to the a ttack., This
proved highly successfu1. In other cases the attacking forces used
the well-known technir:ue' of 1Ile.qring ":hite arm ba'1ds for easy identi
fication. Streams, ridge lines and other fea tures ,'rhich ''fere readily
distinguishab1e werp. selected as phase lines. The forfl1ation used
was invariablY,the file . 1acj< of observ2tion reduced s-"lfety
to our OllJn troops and because it in ,101 ved s-"lcrificing surprise,
15 Oct 51
---------------------------- ----
J1 W
U 1111 6i
preparatory fires' were usu,3:11y not used on ni",ht attacks. It was
found that the best timed attacks were those which placed friendly
forces on the objective just at dawn, thus eliminating the oPIX'rtuni
ty for the enemy to regroup under cover of darkness for a COllil ter
attack. The usual means of col!l!imnication was radio. It was agreed
that some light is to conplete darkno,ssj when there was no
moon indirect searchlight illumirl'1tion was used. The use of flares
in a night attack is not recommended as the enemy uses them extensive
ly and confusion results. (RSJ'l'RICTW)
Generally, the used in reduction of bunkers depend
largely on the type of construction of the fortification and the
availability of the desired weapon. aecoilless rifles were found
to be quite effective aga:inst bunkers carved out of rock. Hand
greesdes, rifle grenades, and phosphorous grenades were particularly
effective against log bunkers. The flame thrower has a great
psychological effect on the enemy, but bulk and weight of this
weapon make it unwieldy for use in steep terrain. The 105-mm and
ISS-mm Howitzers ::tnG five hundred (SOO) pound aerial bombs proved
to be very effective. Counter to experience in the campaign,
the enemy did not relinquish adjacent positicns when it bec3.'1le
tactically disadvantageous to renain. Pre-plannin' the reduction of
bunkers paid dividends. It assured te.amwork rather than relying
solely on the spontaneous :inspiration of the individual. Where time
permits, rehearsals prior to the attack are believed to be highlY
beneficial. (R1!SI'RICTED)
The ma:in problem in organization of defensive positions was
one of logistical support. Sectors of fire were properly designated.
'iUre was usually placed at night and installed correctly, employing
protective fire. Range cards and aiming stakes were used, though
!l(\t as extE"nsivley as they should be. li.ange cards for al-mm Mortars
Vlere affixed to the mortar tubes so thlt planned concentrations
could be fired.. Close supervision 'tras needed in clearing fields
of fire and in building fortifications. Al though communications
were normally adequate, a signal plan for the use of pyrotechnics
OCAFF Form No 73
(.Reviaed 15 Oct 51)
should be established in case of emergency_ ThG fire power of the
....-16 materially aided the Infantry in defemi"e roles and proved
to be very satisfactory whenever the 1'-16's 1vere suitably located.
Tanks were best eiilployed on the defense by assigning t.he..-n a v!l.de
valley. Tank firing s:1ould have been to direct fire
missions, as inclil-ect firing proved u..rlsatisfactory. Contdct points
shoul.'. have been designgted by higher headquarters rac.ner than
allo,Ting units concerned to pick Improved minefield doctrine
and proper repcrting and plotting' of mine installations should
materially reduce friendly casualties. It was recoJil.mended that
name.throwers be instal.led in defensive positions in the future to
reduce an assnul t on the position. (R2STRIC.l'Il:D)
Broad missions should be assigned, leaving details of the
patrols to the unit given the mission. If' the intent is to occupy
the ground patrolled and if' no enemy are on the position, the
patrol should be reinforced' quickly by enough persol'L.'191 to defend
adequately. 'i'he enenw 'will quite often move in an area
which has b8en patrolled but not occupied by forces Simply
b0cause he realizes it is to us. Patrols repeated to
the sarna location or over route very qUiel:ly result in
'lmbu31.es", Night patrol missions should be' assigned at least twenty
foUl" (24) hours in advance if planning is to result. (RS:>TRlcrED)
SOURCE: Cornrr."'.nd Report - loth 'mgr C En
DATE: February 1951 No, 230
------.....-------------------------------_ ........... .._
The sbortA.ge of tclephone wire and the short range of the present
radios with which the battalion is no"" e!,..lipped present problems
in communications. This battalion recommends that radios with
longer range be added to the i:ngineer
6fiitifii .'
OCAFF FormNo '71'\ e
artEria; 1Mm ytW
15 Oct 5
& OJ!l@TJWT '......
Q5 - TJJiBlLb
Com:;J'lnd 1l.eport - 2d :Jiv fu-ty
kay 1951 Source No. 231
Battlefield with continued during
; ay with considerable success in all except the "Torst wea ther con
ditions. It is recommended that either platoon of s8archliq,hts
be made organic to Division or th- t &'1 iPFSineer:.i3arci1
light Conpany be att3ched to the Corps

OT' .. _ A)!) H-;',VY .1TIL.:... HY
AV:lilabili ty of Ion!?, range h'3avy artHler:- provided c;reatly
desired and needed d:=pth to th,") battlefi.eld, both on th3 offense
and the defens8. 'I'o some e1.:tent the employ:.ent of heavy artillery
cOi:J.pensated for the of KOR;;.b.. It ''!as necess,')ry,
however, due to the lirdt,9d amount available'mJ the still relatively
broad Division and Corps fronts, to 811'ploy rnedium artill ':ry in
for1."rard areas, in ODe caSe in front of the iLrf'antry, to cover daytime
P;'l t ro1 s. ..: Hl.'.L ',,1 ....... )
l CO''QTD ''''''I . L'
30TJRC3: Comrr.and tteport - 187th j.bn RCT - [<.,edical Company
'h':arch 1951 30urce No. 232
1. Helicopters render superior service in patient evacuation
3nd plans should be m!'l':ie to increaSe the nur.J.ber of this n.ir
2. 'ill airborn8 operations behind enen}, lines should jnclude
a surgical team for emergency ope!'ations.
3. i'here must be J. full briefing of .::attalion .:iurgeons on
the tactical situ"J.tion and pl:1ns for operations.
IJ. ROY's should b8 if poSSible, in co:npan;v' size
to be utiliz?d as litter bearers. (CONFID<;,; Tl.\1)
OCAFF Form No 73
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

COrm:l-3nd Report - 3d En - l87th Abn ReT
;..,:ay 1951 Source 233
Il.ction on this Q3.te indicated clearly that lll1its must investigate
all high terrain fa?t;.lres v.'ithin their assigned:ireas. If this type
terrain is bypassed co::'pletely on 3.pprooch to fin:-ll obj0ctive, the
r<:nr and flank.s of the lll1it !'Ind adjacent units are extremely ,'jeopar
dized. (R;Jl'RIC'J.'W)
Difficult:r vms experiencoo by the ,Advance Gu,3rd Command9r in
learniw,; the situation of Covc:ring Force. ..rhe Covering Force
Commancier "l'ffiS responsible directly to t.he TasL Force Commander, not
the Guard Comm;mder, "nd tis communications wer':! governed
The big weakness of this plan vras the inability of the :cQv'ince
GURl"d Comrrnndar to knoyr the situation "md requirr;ments of the Covering
Force Cor:unander :in sufficient time to of the utmost assistance to
RecoIl1::,end thst in future operqtions the Force Corn:iander
be directly responsible to the Advance Guard Commando,X' who in turn
is responsible to the TiSk Force Commander. This method would give
the Gmrd Commander a gre.'l.ter latitude of action, permitting
him to commit his forces much more expeditiously to assistt,he Covering
Forc8 and in turn carry out his own mission of securing the un
interrupted march of the m-3in body.
:jp a.rtillery, wnic1 was an integral part of the Covering Force,
could not be placed.in -lcticn due to the intense small arms fire.
being received from eneIlW forces. In addition, these guns blocked
the road malting it l..'l'.possible to expedite arnrnlll1ition resupply and
evacuation of wounded parsonnel by vehicle. T01{ed howitzers were
a part of the'-idvance Guard. Due to the n-3ture of the terrain it
vms impossible to place these guns in a firing pGsition to be of
assistance to the Covering as quickly 'is was desirable. This,
plus the previously mentioned deficiency of command ch:lmels, dEnied
use of artillery to the Covering Forces for a prolonged period of

Recommend that in a Task Force of this t:y"pe, all artillery-be
eliminated from the Covering Force and SP artillery be used as part
of the Advance Guard. Tank fire can be used for direct fir2 with
the Covering Force. From. the position in column witi1 the
Advance Guard, the artillery will be free fron e..'1emy small arms fire.
Utilizing .:if' gWls J they can go quickly into acticn and furnish
maximum artillery_ support to the Covering Force yri th a minimum of
delay, particularly if the COvering Force is under the command of
the Advance GUArd If close-in artillery support is
nccessar;y to assist an advance guard too closely for
of their 01-n. artillery, this fire can bE'! given by the artillery with
the Main Body. (RZ3TRICTZD)

ARTIIJ..:':RY 1,;,\.3K BY PLi;N.:;s
'!he Battalion COTfI!nander again asled for the artillery.' He was
told that he could not eet artilJ ery because fire "Tas masked by planes
in the area.
Artillery support "!laS receiv8ci lJj ''1" Co',pany at approximately
1900 hours and verry effective. During this action, .3 Forward
Qbssrver with the tanks c"lncelled the artille..ry fire supporting
"1" Coltpany b:;r instructin:s the FDC that the artillery was landing
too close to friendly ground t.roops (''1'' Co). Actually, this fire
'.rms landing very accuratply in the d8sired by the COl!1.1Tlanding
Officer of "L".
It must be tha-t. the c131ling in or cancelling of
supporting fires is a command function 2nd responsibility. A
FOMrard Observer is an advisor, 3ven yr:len attached to a
command. But a Forvf_'1rd Observer not assigned or attached directly
to a UJ."1it should never take it upon hi:lself to interfp.re with
missicns being fired for the unit.
Command Report - 138th :H'\. Gp - hm1ex 6, Appl.'mdix I
DATE: J.qrch 1951 Source No. 234
l dFOlrSmONO/1
) II 11' J WClIES".
eVlse ct ' _ ;.,I _______
.. t"
-- TW;t

Difficulty was encount.ered in radio communication with sur
veillance r.sdClr sites. '::'he tt'ansmitters ,'lt these sites have a rated
po'!J'rer output of 40 W'1tts. Tests were conducted with various t:;pes
of ant8..Ylnae to deterldne the most sui table typ8 for 24-hour operation.
Distances range; from tW'enty-two (22) to forty-seven (47) miles.
,{ two (2) ','''ire, folded douulet type, fed by a 200 Ohlii
coaxial transmission line, V1'as found to provide satisfactory radio
telephone communication betvreen the t\ntiaircr:-l ft Opet'ations Room
and these sites. Th:i,s type of ,"ll1tenna "?-'ill be installed at each
surveillance radar si tee
* 1:- '* * * "* *
A staff stud;y was pr3pared on electrical power for tactical
equipment. It 'l'Tas recommended diesel drJ'h:m generf:ltors, Lodel
RD-14A, be aut orized for issue on 3 Jasis of one per 120-mm gun
Cormnand Report
. ,arch 1951
- 3d Inf Div Ji.rty
Over a period 1 i'arch-through 9 1951, two (2) platoons
of tanks ,imre train'ad to extent that on 7 ::arch through 9
they were used 3S artillery in support of 2Sth Infantry in their
crossing of the }i,qn Riv"!". One platoon of only four (4) guns
fired e.40 rounds in. t'.'lQ (2) hours fifty (50) minutes for a rate
of fire of 1.25 rounds per minut"J. For the above three (3) day
operation approxi:.liately 1500 rounds W(3re fired. (CONl7ID;i;:,TVL)
COInreand Rcopor t
i.:ay 1951
- 9th Inf Regt
.source No. 236

OCAFF Form No 7-
'" sa 12'
(.Revised 15 Oct 5 ...
1. Patrols must utilize high ground desp1te the, - physical
effort and the slowness of progress. If lo"N ground, valleys,
villages, road junctions, etc, are to be searched, adequate security
must be maintained on the high ground overlooking these features.
2. Artillery PO parties and the Battalion TAP must accompany
the patrol. In thisregirnent it is often necessary for these groups
to establish relay stations in order to insure continuous communica
tion with the controlling agency.
3. Upon contacting and locating the eneIl\Y, it is usually far
more advantageous to fall Qack to ()()ver positions and make maximum
use of supporting artillery and mortars than to re'main in a small
aros engagement.
4. Patrols must know call signs of all adjacent
uni ts. patrols have ro.ad to rell on alternate means of
conruunication to their base. It i6 flC'.asiblemd highly desirable
to extend wire lines on company size patrols. The SCR 619 is better
suited for patrol action the 3CR 610, since the patrol need
not stop and set up the radio for communication.
5. It must be kept in mind that Company size patrols are bulky
and oftE".n times difficult to control. In many cases most Battalion
and Company Comnanders would prefer to utilize smaller groups,
feeling that they can accomplish the same results. (R"3'fRICT.])
The baSic concepts and principies of our doctrtne, when er.lployed
in the preparation of lines and field fortifications,
have been proved sound. Properly applied, they have, in most in
stances, guaranteed the retention of any ground.
. t
1. It has again been found that personnel and units will not
follow closely their supporting fires. Tbo oftpn there is a time
, OCAFF Form No 73
(Revised 15 Oct 51)
\;; .....________________ ________ _ c
----------------- -----------
G ' .:!etllilU
ti;Wfg !2iSAiJ,If'.
lag bet."reen the and the actual assault.
This likewise haa held true with tactical air support.
2. One B:!.ttalion has successfull.V utilized "dry runs If by
suppot"ting aircraft to their assault. ,\fter the planes h'ive
made their strike the ground has the cont-inu;:) to
make runs on the o"ujective the troops Advanee. 'l'his
unit has' utilized .50 caliber rrach;1n.e in support of tile attackiilg
units. This has been in of tbe 75-mm recoilless rifle ;'!hich
has limitation in this of tet'rain.
3. Close liaison ue efe<;ted and mai.ltained between ths
'mCP and the artillery 1hison ofti-cer. This wit h';l.S f'ounCi that
the best solution is to have ;')oth with their communication
equipm8nt, at the CP or forward CP. this location
the r0gimental CO and J-J can request and control both air and
artillery support.
4. Direct support (.50 and 76-mm fires) by organic
and attached tank units ,':as found to bE: extremely effective. '!he
comrntmder of the h'ld direc.t c("A.llnunication (SCn 300)
with the T:ml<:: Co1!mlandeJ;>, md could re1uest and control the fires
as required. Uso, tank fire 'V'aS l,ltilized to mark for air
'7/1.;:;ffi dUPPLY
Due to appreciable 1.."1 he-1t and the difficulty of
obtaining water on the high grolJIld eenet'ally occupied in 'a t,s c::'ic;'!l
situation, it is recomrlencied tMt each m:ln in the rifle cOFp:mies.
plus Some elenients of the heaVY lI1eapOI.lS company, be issued two (2)
canteens for summer use. fill)

Command Report - 38th FA. 3n ".. In! Div SOURCE:
May 1951 Source ao. 237 DATE:
The Fire Direction Center prepared a comprehensive fire plan
------------------- ._-' -_.. --
f. &,:J
calling for concentrations both a
100d of an10n friendly positions.
The Infantry had foxholes with overhaad cover lor each m9n, the
plan being to fire VT on friendly positions in case of enemY in
fil tration tactics. The amount of work that this necessitat.ed
later paid great dividends for our :troops , for th8 enemy was driven
off our positions 'by VT fuzed shells .!:.'ired over friendly
troops. (RJ.1JTR1CT, .D)
t 1 \ ,
Command l{eport - lOth C
April 1951 . 30urce lio. 238
The Reconnaissance is continuallY out gathering engineer
infor:111 tion. It would facilitat!3 m'hters considerably ifa "Land
Polaroid" camera "f-rcre added to that section's T!O&E. It would ",..nabla
them to return from a reconnaissance with pictures of bridges needing
repair, bad sActions of r03d, etc. l'his would help in planning
COr.1Il1and Report - 3dllgr C 3n - Staff Journal
April 1951 30urce No. 239
Since the area in which the Divisional elements were involveO.
had been previously defended durin'"?, the .J'llW withdrawal,
there countless scattered dome of these had been
properly recorded and vrere easily and quickly removed, The majority
however, W3re small isolated groups or fields of mines, often'
booby-trapped and found or.lf when friendly troops were injured withiri
that ,qrea. 2ven 'P.ric.h the aid of mine field reports the rf'lYloval
of the was made difficult by the inaccuracies of
the reports. r"ore and better training is required for all ranks
and branches if highest efficiency iliith minimum casual ties to
friendly troops is to be obtained..
""'"-'-------- --,-'
OCAFF Form No 73
.::' (aevi.eel 15 Oct 51)
------------------., -- --
35 Sii F j3iI.lPj}P!'i}J!"
Command Report - 3d Inf Div
Source Eo. 240
in operations in' orea has proved a definite require
ment of additional officers in Division headquarters, over and above
those authoriz3d in T/O['c3 7-11;, to i:lsure efficient, smooth and
accurate of the headquarters.
The T/O for the 0-3 Section is:
G-3 Lt Col
Asst G-3
Off I"ajor
Asst G3.pt
G-3Air ;":J.jor
Liaison Off Capt
Liaison Off Capt
Liaison Off Capt
Ixcept for the ;'ssist!:'lnt Officer, all of the T/O positions
are full time jobs "vhich do not pm.-mit tho .lse of these offic(-'>-I's
for a(.di tional duty. ;'ihen Psychological';arfar8 'Mas
to 0-3, '!fith the require;:ent that an offic.3r be put on full time
duty in this assignm'3!lt, the .Assistant Offict:r ":-a5 d81eted and
the Psychological 'arfare Officer was substituted in his pl3.ce. tJhder
the T /0&:;', only the 0-3 and 3.sSi.3tant G-3 are Avail3ble to actually
operate as Pl3Il.5 and personnel.
In order to ade:F<.ately plan future oper:ltion, keep track of
and inspect directed activities, conduct special projects such as
task force op3rations, visit units to check operqtions and assure
tha t all concepts of the COI'lIllanding General lre carried out, and to
provide qU'11i.f.ied and tr'ined replacements in the event of sudd.en
loss of the 0-3 or .'J.ssist.ant G-3 it is recommended that the T/O
be augmented by the a.ddi tion of two (2) kajors, G-3 Plans,
I.lspections and 5peci3.l Projects Officers.
The 7/0 for the G-2 Section is:
G-2 Lt Col
Asst G-2
0-2 C3ptain
Order of Battle C.'3.ptain
Photo Int erpr at er Captain
(.Revised 15 Oct 5
, '-..'
Photo Interpreter Lieutenant
Prisoner Captain
Interrogator Prisoner Lieutenant
Prisonflr Lieutenant
InterrogRtor Lieutenant
Comment: Interrog?tors assigned when autho
rized by Lepartment of the Army (Section lIB, 7-lI'J Nov lS
Al though the Photo InterprAters <:!nd Prisoner Interrogators are,
on occasion, available for additional duties, t.hRir primary duties
so often requir:,; their full attention that they cannot be relied on
to regularly devote. their time to addi tion3.1 duties.
In order to produce positive :intelligenc'3 information in this
ThE'E.tre, sever'll aRencias not norm'lly associated 'l'T1 th the office
of the !iCOFS G-2, have been '3.nd are being exploited.
'lhe 3d CIC .uetachrnent, '.'Thich normally lnploys a limited number
of n:ltiv8 agents in its routine
has been ('.eveloped into a positive as well as a counterintellig.:mce
ag\3ncy, employing a large number of native
has attached a teJm of positive age..'1ts (TLO) to the.
Division. A IntelligEnce Platoon, containing an agent team,
has b"Jcn operating with the Division. Central control of these
various agencies is essential to insure coorjina t10n '''ri th the
t.:lctical units for the mo':emcmt of linecrossers, coordination 'l"dth
FSCC for artillery fire, and coorciina tion among agencies to
prevent duplication. In addition, logistica.l support must be giVEn
these agencies. All of this adds up to a full time job for a compnny
grade officer from the G-2 "8ction. dmce the job is too important
and too time consuming to be given to an officer as an additional
duty, it is recommended that the T/O be augmented by the addition
of a Captain or Lieutenllnt, 0-2 ,l.gent Control OfficRr.
In order to coord:ina te the intelligence functions 'of the Division
Light Aviation 38ction anJ to insure th-1 t the maximum amount of
intelligence information is obtained tln'ough the section, it is
necess3.ry that an officer from the G-2 Section remainat the Division
airstrip at all times. This officer briefs pilots and observers on
the current enerrw situation and outlines sensitive are1S for ob
servation, deL)riefs pilots and obServers upon completion of mission,
schedules obs
3rw'1tion flights, makes fre1uent flights himself to
-.- "'SafZ,. L
- '.' " OCAFF Form No 73
5ffffWW "'SQS'1%iW
(A.evised 15 act 51)
observe critical areas to note changes in enemy disposition and
to check reports of other observers. ,i.ll of the thus
secured is sent immeriiately to ).COFS, G-2. Sinc:3 this is a full
tiu8 job, it is recoumenrJed that the T/O be -1ugmented by the
",dditim of a C3.ptajn or Lieutenant, G-2 -l.ir Officer.
The T/O for the G-4 Section is:
G-4 Lt Col
Asst G-4 l':ajor
Asst G-h Transport!j,tion ;'ajor
tor Officer ",-0
The one transportation officer now authorized the Division
advisr?s the G-4 on transportaLion requirements of the Division,
maintains a daily truck av?il,qbility t!:lble, controls the allocation
and operation of cargo vehicles within the Livision, and prepares
traffic circluation plans, jncluding alternate routes and dotours,
in Goordination with G-J, Division ,.:ngineer and Provost
On rail mOV06 he maintains liaison vrith local RIDs regarding pro
curement of rail tr<:l.nsportation, prepares transportJ.tion anneX,9S
for movAment oroers, and furnishes all units of the Division vrith
the railroad requirements for lO.'lding, blocking ,nd bracing. On
water moves he coordir.a tes with port ':lUthori ties as to number Md
t-.1pe of ships required, supi:;rvises the activities of unit embarkation
officers, and coordinates "Tith port authorities for move.; ..,mt of
both equipment and personnel in both the outloading and unloading
phases. J:ie must coordinate with the.ir Force on the air drop of
supplies when necessitated oy the tlctic3.l situntion. On Division
moves it is necessary th:t a transportation officer go forl'.:ard
with the advance echelon 'tnd th'3.t a representative remain at the
rear until the move is completed. In view of the volUDe and variety
of -Nork required of the transportatj,on it is recommended
that the T/O be by the "lddition of a Captain, G-4 Eotor
Tr'lnsportation R3F,;liating Officer and ;,ssistant Supply Officer,
and "l Captain, G-4 Passenger and TT'ansportation Officer
and Supply OfficJI'.
No proviSion is ma3e in the T/O of an Infantry .v]V)'.Slon for
a Post O:'ficer, 'mel only one officn.r, in the grade of I'Cajor,
is allocated to the upecial Service .:i8ction.
'!he Post ';xcbange SJ'stsm, as it opel'a.tes in :orea, rC)quir8s
bCAFF Form No '7-'!..

(Revised 15 Oct 5,
----------------_._.- ---_. _ .. "--'

the full time assignmr;;nt. of two {2} ofi'ic8!"S at the .:Jivision level.
3upplies mll3 t be dra"m B. t 1"u.san, signed. for b;y an offic2r, moved
to the Uivision truck or rail, broken Go units for sale,
accounted for on a basis. Ti1is system re
(jUires one offic9r between Division and Pusan,
dra'.ring and moving offlcer working 'lt the
Division PX point, controlling and allocatillg s::'ocks, sup0rvising
s31es, records. It is recommended
that the T/O be by the addition a Captain 3.nJ. a
Post v.ffi.cer. (.:iECRET)
the occUtn tiOtld I;hlfensive positbns, in order to
inflict casualties on the eiui';Jr ,:tud to m3.ke the riverline untenable
for him, sniper positbns "I'rere pr;::par.!O!d ne'lt' the river bank in
position to fire on dctivity on the f3r shore.lhese poSitions
were prepared at niJ,ht "lnd '!'rare ','mIl C,qillQufl-:lged. ,':.ft(;r cOI'lpletion,
vrere occupied prior to oo,j'light 3.nd \'T8r(; v:,cated 9nly :lfter
dArk. The positions -"r-:r:} mos t effective. Casu"l ti8S inflicted
frol:l them every day. To supp18ment th8se fire3, pl'ltoons of the
Tank futtalion and i"c, occupied hull defil1de positions
on the low hills ncar the ri to snipe at appr opri;l tc targets
across the river. l'hese fires, together with the :ii&I fire of
Division /u"til13ry, made the enemy posj.tions the river' so costly
to :na intain t "TiSre virtuall:;; a even before the
gener8.1 withdrawal beganio (R
COIllJTI.r"1nd B,"port - hq 8th US !forea (;U3AK)
Sec II: .iupporting .i)ocuments
Book lIt Chemical
DATI: June 1951 Source No. 241
A napalm 'dxing te'3TIl consisting of eight (8) enlist ed members
of this org8nization d(;part3d the base 15 June and returned
OCAFF Form No 73
(.Revised 15 Oct 51)
-----------------_. -- --,
uoFW(lt6'Nfi; 16Jb
to the company 23 June, after having mixed 43,000 gallons of napalm.

[<'our (4) mechanized flame throwers were in "1;4 tanks
of ,the 7th Infantry Division by a team of five (5) enlisted men in
two (2) working da:'s. '!his installation included test firing of
the flame throwers.
in Kor'3an operations has sho'/m less Chemical Class V
item,::; '3 .employed during an offensive than during a defensive
This is believed to be the r01son for an oV3rall
drop in issues from th0 mSAK AdV'1nce Ch!3ffiical lJepot. (C01,iFIDGLTIAL)
- Hq 8th LTS ;\rITtY' Korea (WSAK)
Book 3: ACOFS G-2
June 1951 Source No. 242
'lIhe of active guerrill!3.s. operating in friendly rear
areas '!TaS <3stim.::lted 7,500 on 25 June. Unless major reinforcements
succeed in infiltrgting friendly lines, it is believed that
guerrilla strength will rem3in at -'1pproxim':Jtely the level
ind.3finite1y, losses being offset by local recruiting. Guerrilla
activity during June was confined to raids on 8m31l to''TilS and
villages in isolated areas in sC9rch of food.
CommandH.eport - l87th Abn Inf Ragt - 1st Bn
March 1951 Source No. 243
"".'1 ' 'r IriS 15
15, Oct

!' ::

,. a ern' BTta.
i. .
Our per SoMel .us ed but wer e no t too a ccur '1 te with
this weapon. (CONPIDENTIAL)
Command Report.- 36th Engr C Gp
March 1951 SO URCE NO. 244
Effective this month a report sect.ion has been established
with the responsibility of C',oordin"ting all reports requj.red by
......., >,.
Group and qy. higher Headquarters. The large number of reports
has made such a section in order to keep subordina te .
units, abreast bfrequireinents and suspense dates. (RESTRICTED)
Report ,of US ArmY Aircraft Flying Accident from Commanding General,
2d Infantry Division to Commanding General EUSAK
August 1951 Source No.
A combination of high altitude (:1500 ft msl), high temperature
F), and no. wind (under: 10 mph) may make a normal helicopter
landing and take off impossible. (RESTRICTED)
Conunand Report ,2d Infantry Division
M.:iY 1951 Source No. 246
A successful application of psychological warfare principles

vras illustrated when an infantry regiment p"ncountered an estimated
300 enerrw in a road block. A division liaison plane effected a
prearranged SCR 300 contact with. the loudspeaker plane and with the
Forward Controller. All ground fire was stopped while the Voice
Plane broadcasted. rhe enentf was told that further resistance was .
hopeless, th9t the only alternative to destruction 72S surrender,
and that surrender would be accepted if they would walk down the
road toward the UN Forces., Several groups of enemy responded by
vmlking down the road and surrendering. Other groups were seen
moving north, apparently feeling that the promised lull would be a
good time to effect an escape. In any event, there VIas no further
resistance from that particular road block. After the time stipu
lated, a final message w:::\s broadcast the effect that those vlho
had not taken the opportunity to surrender would noW' be slain. The
artillery immediately placed a concentration on the road
along which the The operation vms successful,
therefore, in convincing many of the Communists to surrender while,
a t the same t:iJ:1e, lO1flering the 'l'd.ll to fight of thos e who remained.
SOURCE: CorrillBnd Report - 2d Inf Div Appendix D - Operations
DATE: May 1951 Source No. 247
Units are urged to utilize fougasses in the organization of
pOSitions. Eight (8) dug-in improvised flame throw,,,rs (napalm
thickened gasoline) already are installed COVering the jW1.ction of
two (2) valleys. These fougasses cover two (2) probable
avenues of approach to a' portion of the Line manned by elements of
"'in infantry battalion. Each fougasse will produce a mass of flame
twenty-five (25) to forty (40) yards in range and one-third (1/3)
that in width, sirnila::- in effect to a napalm bomb but on a reduced
scale. &lch is buried and sandbagged at a thrit;>r degree (300)
angle from the horizontal, or is horizontal if the target is down
hill, with the uncovered end facing the .enemy avenue. A
propelli...'!g, exploding, and igniting charge of to 2 pounds of
block TNT (or equivalent explosivo), two (2) grenades (or
one 81-mm WP round) and a either with or without
t,a.ricl 15 Oct !..

",.. If+.
"n assSStlZ::
blasting cord (primacord) is taped to the center of the barrel
head is buried. Activation will be either by remote control
through manually operated electric or by a primacord
J_ead from the nearest foxhole, thus assuring detonation when a
lucr,3.tive target presents itself. (RF...:i'rRICTED)
SOURCE: Conmand Report - I US Corps
DATE: May 1951 Source No 248

Al though an all-out attempt to recapture SEOUL by the enenw
appeared iminent during the first days of May, railheads for divi
sions wore retain8d in STItH,iI., together wi th the ammunition at
ammunition supply point 54. Bridges and switches were left intact.
'!his '!fas as a result of lessons loorned on previous retrograde move
ments and subsequent advances.
As United Nations counteroffensive progressed northwards,
only minor repqirs were required to rail lines in operation
once again. (RESTRICTED)
Conm3nd Report - 76th Engineer Canst En
March 1951 Source No. 249
The administrative reports required of the unit present a major
problem. An example is Command Report, of which this writing is
a part, which consumed fiVD hundred and sixty (560) pages, .qnd is
required monthly. (RESTRICTED)
\ OCAFF Form No 73
s :; Ii;; 6:::"1 &
l (.Revised 15 Oct 51)