Commonplace Knowledge and Innovation Author(s): Ruth Amossy Reviewed work(s): Source: SubStance, Vol. 19, No.

2/3, Issue 62/63: Special Issue: Thought and Novation (1990), pp. 145-156 Published by: University of Wisconsin Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3684675 . Accessed: 04/11/2011 15:46
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Wisconsin Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to SubStance.

http://www.jstor.org

Commonplace Knowledge and Innovation

Ruth Amossy

THERE NOTHING IS MORE DIFFICULT eradicate than the obvious. to Whenever a deep-rooted notion refers to what we consider an "Eternal Truth" or a natural fact, its cultural relativity is forgotten. Its emergence at a given period, its dependence on a specific intellectual and ideological background and its possible dismissal in the future are simply ignored. Such is the case with the conception of "novelty" expressed by the notion of "stereotype," and with the modernity of this very notion. We generally feel that stereotyping, insofar as it opposes fruitless repetition to creative originality, has been recognized and condemned by countless generations. Of course, the term did not exist in the past, but one should not pay too much attention to a mere question of vocabulary. Moreover, stereotypes as frozen patterns, simplified schemas shared by a whole community, seem to be a universal feature of social life. Didn't the ancient Greeks already have a stereotyped vision of the Barbarians, and 17th-century France a stereotyped image of the Turks? Even in societies without writing, anthropologists have been able to single out group stereotypes.* However, there is a difference between our ancestors' collective images of foreign groups, and their ability to think in terms of "stereotypes." Societies of the past did not see in their common beliefs misleading preconceptions or collective opinions derived from habit. Similarly, repetition of well-known themes and the persistence of stable categories like "the Miser" or "the Collector" were not interpreted as blind adherence to the or dejd-dit, as lack of originality. The emergence of the noun "stereotype"in its figurative sense at the turn of the century coincides with a new awareness of the alienating power of prevalent cultural models. That inherited views and group categorization should be regarded as misleading a priori, that collective images should be considered an obstacleto intellectual and artistic innovation, was by no means obvious to past centuries. It is a conFortheseremarks, am indebtedto Franqois I Heranfromthe Revue de francaise Sociologie.

SubStanceN? 62/63, 1990

145

146 146

Ruth Amossy Amossy

temporary attitude, resulting from an evolution that started at the beginning of the 19th century. Its origins are well-known-the Romantic emphasis on individualism and originality led to a general condemnation of banality; trite themes, hackneyed figures had to be exposed. Since pejorative terms were needed to deprecate worn-out expressions and ideas, the words "commonplace" and "cliche"were seized upon. The first is none other than the topos of classical rhetoric interpreted, no longer as an element of inventio,building up argumentation through points of common agreement, but as a public place surrendered to the common herd. Clichefirst meant, like stereotype, a plate made by moldir,g a matrix of a printing surface, and making from this a cast in type metal. Later, around 1869, with the advent of photography, clichecame to mean photographic negative. By metaphorical extension, it came to define any frozen stylistic pattern.12In the 19th century, stereotypewas synonymous with cliche as far as printing techniques were concerned. However, only the adjective "stereotyped" was widely used to stigmatize repetitive structures; all definitions of the noun were restricted to typography. This position singles out the notion of "stereotype," which was introduced into current use rather late, when designations of formal and thematic banality already existed. Despite its semantic indetermination (it is still synonymous with cliche), it appears that the notion of "stereotype" was used more and more to condemn not only a lack of literary originality, but also consensus of opinion and classification of a group. In other words, social models and group judgments had to be perceived as negativebefore "stereotypes" could be described as simplistic collective images, like the happy-go-lucky, ignorant Negro or the tactful, gentle, dependent and of as course talkative woman. Twentieth-century dictionaries define stereotype "a standardized mental picture that is held in common by members of a group and that represents an oversimplified opinion, affective attitude or uncritical judgment" (Webster'sDictionary). Thus in the contemporary view, images held by individuals under the influence of their social environment cannot but be "preconceived and frozen, simplistic and clearcut."3 This development deserves some attention, as it is by no means selfevident. The inability of the first half of the 19th century to conceive of the and cliche (designed to stereotype,even when the notions of commonplace condemn stylistic and thematic banality) were well-established, is highly symptomatic. In a previous study on popular literature in the 1840s in or (as France,4I have shown that the "litteraturefacile" "industrielle" it was

Commonplace Knowledge & Innovation Commonplace Knowledge

147 147

called at the time) was never attacked on the basis of its stereotyped charshort acters. This is especially striking in the case of the "physiologies," works centered on the description of well-known types: the "Grisette,"the "Portiere"or dreaded French concierge, the "Old Maid," "the Clerk," "the Student," etc. There is nothing that seems closer to a standardized, simplified collective representation than these short publications, unanimously described as inferior mass productions. No mention, however, is ever made of their tendency to stereotype, since at this time the only value of the enterprise lay in its legitimate attempt at "typification." Knowledge was supposed to be achieved through systematic classification, definition and description of social categories; generalizations were considered indispensable in presenting an orderly and understandable picture of conthus carry out, in a shallow way, the temporary reality. The "physiologies" task that the encyclopedias of the 19th century achieve through serious compilation. It is easy to see why the notion of "stereotype" is excluded from the intellectual landscape of the time; it is much too close to the concept of "Type," defined by the Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIXe siecle of Pierre Larousse as an "objectgathering to a high degree all objects of the same nature" and a "cluster of characteristic features." Even if the resemblance is not perfect, it is enough to threaten the hegemony of the Typeand its cognitive powers. In short, a period so keen on the supremacy of types could not admit the notion of "stereotype," which remained outside of its field of vision. An important shift in perspective occurred when emphasis was placed not on the encyclopedic ordering of social reality, but on the way social discourse distorts reality. Side by side with ordinary dictionaries, a new or genre emerged: the "sottisier," dictionary of conversation, which became The latter is well-known as with Flaubert the Dictionnairedes ideesreques.5 an encyclopedia of public opinion, ironically displaying its stupidity. Widely circulated "categorizations" are no longer the way to Knowledge; or, rather, they are the way to commonplace knowledge, that is, to the realm of collective views and mere betise. This is subtly displayed in Flaubert's entries: Knowall theirsecretsand thantheirmistresses. Chambermaids. Prettier by betraythem.Alwaysdishonored the son of the family. Scholars- Laughable. be a scholar,you need only memoryand hard To work. Focusing on what is thought and said about a given group, and not about its problematic reality outsidesocial discourse, Flaubert exemplifies a

148 148

RuthAmossy Ruth Amossy

change that will gradually come to prevail in the 20th century-the transition from optimistic typification to general suspicion concerning collective categorization and consensus of opinion. The notion of stereotype grew and developed in this context; it soon came to be considered the plague of modern times. (Needless to say, a period increasingly obsessed with stereotypes finds it difficult to deal with "types"-they always threaten to turn into collective schemas. This is seen in the general 20th-century rejection of literary "types.") It is in such a general framework that the term "stereotype" found its way into cultivated circles, with the distinction between its literalmeaning and its subsequent metaphorical nature gradually becoming indistinct. in everyday language, it achieved currency among Increasingly frequent educated people. The word "stereotype" thus conveyed what these elites thought about collective images, widely-shared opinions, banality and innovation. It expressed commonplace views on... the commonplace. At this stage, it seems that the innovative powers of the notion come to an end. Having lost its novelty, the "stereotype"participates in a semantic network where it reinforces common views about the dangers of uncritical repetition and common knowledge. Anybody can use it to denounce the collective images that contaminate conversation and texts. Actually, criticism of stereotypying readily turns into a stereotyped judgment. Although it paradoxically condemns itself, by denying any cognitive potential for commonplace knowledge, the notion of stereotypes was successfully introduced in the 1920s into the vocabulary of the social sciences, where it demonstrated (against its own principles) how a notion deeply rooted in common social ground can bear fruit when transplanted to scientific areas of research. Let us briefly examine the innovation this commonplace notion, devised to condemn banality of thought and expression, brought about in the field of social psychology. It is generally admitted that Walter Lippmann first introduced the term "stereotype" into the social sciences. It is no wonder that the stereotype made its first "scholarly" appearance in a work devoted to public opinion in modern democracies. In his Public Opinion (1922), Lippmann stressed not only the negative, but also the constructive aspects of commonplace thought. The stereotype, he claimed, is a necessary feature of modern society. Our world is too vast and complex to be directly apprehended; the individual cannot but perceive reality through common patterns and images circulated by the media.

Commonplace Knowledge & Innovation Commonplace Knowledge In the greatblooming,buzzingconfusionof the outerworld,we pick up what our culturehas alreadydefinedfor us, and we tend to perceivethat whichwe havepickedout in the formstereotyped us by ourculture.6 for

149

Lippmann called stereotypes "pictures in our heads," and sees in them one of the "fictions" through which "the adjustment of man to his environment takes place," the range of fiction extending "all the way from complete hallucination to the scientist's perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model."7 It is interesting to see how Lippmann raises new issues by using a notion borrowed from commonplace use. Investigating the relation between individuals and public affairs, he can no longer confine himself to mere condemnation of collective representations. In his thoughtful exploration of democratic societies, he brings out the multiple functions of stereotypes in social life. Originally a pejorative term meant to denounce banality, the stereotype becomes a concept through which the relation of man to his environment can be re-evaluated. No precise definition is needed to further Lippmann's analyses. On the contrary, he achieves his most fruitful insights by weaving a series of metaphors ("pictures in our head," "fictions") around a term both familiar and rather vague. He thus opens it up to new connections, eventually displaying its positiverelation to cultural mediation, social representation and cognitive schematization. Lippmann's "stereotype" was adopted by the social sciences, where it gave birth to a considerable amount of scholarly work. As expected, research has developed both in the experimental and the theoretical fields. In the experimental domain, Katz and Braly started in the 1930s a pioneering work on "Verbal Stereotypes and Racial Prejudice" that was to have a lasting effect on social psychology.8 They developed a technique aimed at determining and measuring the content of stereotypes. Ten ethnic groups were selected as test-cases. One hundred Princeton undergraduates were then asked to read through a list of 84 adjectives and to pick the characteristics they thought most appropriate for each of the selected ethnic groups. Another group of students was asked to rate these adjectives on the basis of the desirability of the given traits. Statistical processing of the collected data displayed the preconceived images of racial groups common to the Princeton population in 1932. Thus the Germans were thought to be scientifically-minded, industrious, stolid, intelligent, methodical, extremely nationalistic, progressive, efficient, jovial, musical, persistent, practical. As for the Jews, they were shrewd, mercenary, industrious, grasping, intelligent, ambitious, sly, loyal to family ties, persistent, talkative, aggressive, very religious.

150 150

RuthAmossy Ruth Amossy

Katz and Braly's method brings us one step further;it createsthe very object it seeks to investigate. The social scientist generates an object called a "stereotype;" it raises it to the status of an autonomous entity, and produces artificially a "reality" nowhere else to be found. Now there is a stereotype of "the German," "the Jew," "the Woman," "the Bolshevik," etc., capable of being examined and described, measured in its intensity and followed in its evolution. The stereotype of "the German,"for instance, can be analyzed "BeforePearl Harbor and After"9where it appears that it did not undergo any significant change in an American women's college in 1941; it is only in 1942 and 1943 that "aggressive," "cruel"and "arrogant" appear along with the more favorably-rated traits. Later experimental methods all develop along the same lines, and according to the same principles. It is interesting to note that even before the adjective checklist, an early technique based on the rating of photographs was developed by Rice in 1926-7. In it, a photograph-for example, a man with a string In tie-is to be matched with a label ("AmericanSenator"or "Bolshevik").10 the photograph device, Lippmann's "pictures" acquire even more consistency, as if they were coming to life. Experimental studies of stereotypes have developed on two levels. First of all, new methods of analysis were invented and improved. Let us only mention Edwards (1940) who defined the four "dimensions" of the stereotype: contents,or the traits making it up; uniformity,the amount of agreement on these traits;direction,their favorable or unfavorable quality; and intensity,the degree of favorableness." Such a framework allowed for quantitative analyses presented in the form of tables and graphs. Secondly, an incredible amount of research has been devoted to the study of specific stereotypes. A few examples: "A Comparison of racial stereotypes of 1935 and 1942,"12 "Encountersbetween Blacks and White Liberals:the Collision of Stereotypes"'3 and "L'identite bretonne: notes sur la production de l'identite negative."14 Beside the ethnic domain, social sciences are investigating the stereotypes of social classes, old age, sex images, public opinion issues and others. The fecundity of the notion of "stereotype" in research on social groups is more than obvious. It is less clear on the theoretical plane, where no consensus has been reached. According to Katz and Braly, the stereotype is first a working hypothesis; definitions necessarily follow the experimental stage. Definitions, however, did not automatically follow; and when they did, it was only to create a confusion much criticized by social scientists.

Commonplace Commonplace Knowledge& Innovation Knowledge Innovation

151 151

No doubt the confusion started at an early stage. As "a picture in our head," the stererotype was a vague notion hardly worthy of inclusion in scientific terminology. Whereas the author of PublicOpinion,a professional journalist, was not very keen on scientific terminology and methods, his successors insisted on accuracy and scientific rigor. They set out to define the stereotype in order to elevate a common notion to the dignity of a scientific concept. Thus the stereotype came to be described in textbooks and encyclopedias as a "belief,"but also as a "concept," a "schema,"15'16 an an n or "idea,"17'18 "opinion,"1an "image,"20 a "collective representation."21 Now, how can anything be simultaneously a belief and a concept, not to mention the other heterogeneous definitions? No wonder that the semantic proliferation of the term made it an unsatisfactory concept for many social scientists. If the Encyclopedia Psychology (1972) only notes at the entry of stereotype:"a term whose meaning varies," Harding, in the International Encyclopedia the Social Sciences,does not hesitate to deplore the fact that of "the broad and undiscriminating usage of the noun 'stereotype' is now too well established to be dislodged."22 The relationship between fecundity and innovative powers, on the one hand, and so-called "scientific rigor," on the other, needs to be re-examined. My contention is that the stereotype has fertilized research on social issues not in spite of, but because its indetermination. It has proved of a most flexible, and therefore convenient, notion. Retaining the multiple connotations of its current use, enriched with Lippmann's imagery and theoretical considerations, it could be made to serve various purposes. Each discipline has exploited its malleability so that it could answer its own specific needs. As a consequence, a new set of questions could be formulated and explored around the notion of "stereotype" in each field. Let us take the example of the "belief-concept" issue. From the 1930s on, the stereotype acquired a privileged status in the study of group interrelations. "Images" in my head of Arabs, Negroes, Communists or policemen largely determine my attitude and thus my behavior towards them. If "women" in my eyes are weak, inferior in intelligence and dependent, I will tend to judge every woman not according to her own achievements, but in accordance to so-called "female characteristics."This ready-made picture represents my belief about women-"belief" being used here "in a generic sense to include knowledge, It opinionsand faith."23 is in this context that the stereotype was re-defined as a belief or, in a milder form, as its cognitive component. We read that "Stereotype denotes beliefs about classes of individuals, groups, or objects which are preconceived,"24 and that "A belief that is simple, inadequately grounded, at least partially

152

Amossy Ruth Amossy

inaccurate and held with considerable assurance by many people is called a stereotype."25 These definitions often appear in sections devoted to "prejudice"and "ethnic relations." Indeed, preconceived beliefs in typical characteristics associated with a sexual, national or religious group, and negative evaluation of these characteristics, are the very core of prejudice. Similarly, what I believe to be true about "the Jew," "the Negro" or "the American" is bound to have a direct impact on my affective response towards these ethnic groups. If action is taken along these lines-if I do not consider a Negro or a woman as fit for a given job as a result of my stereotyped beliefs, mere prejudice gives way to actual discrimination. This oversimplified account only aims at showing how the stereotype came to be used in the analysis of prejudice. (Some textbooks even assimilate stereotype and prejudice. Closely linking the two notions, Grawitz simply notes: "Prejugeest plus courant, mais plus pejoratifet plus chargeaffectivement"-"Prejudice is more common but more pejorative,and affectivelymore serious. ,26 On the other hand, the notion of stereotype has been widely used in issues related to the sociology of knowledge. Gordon Allport, in TheNature of Prejudice (1954), already equated stereotyping with ordinary categorization, arguing that "our experience in life tends to form itself into In clusters."27 the first phase of social research, stereotypes were generally liable to distort described as "a false classificatory concept" (Young, 1947)28 our understanding of the surrounding world. Being second-hand, frozen and rigid, they were thought to hinder intellectual processes. Furthermore, they were proved to be an obstacle to cognition even on the perception level. In 1940, a picture representing a luxury villa with a beautiful lawn was shown to white children in the United States; they were then asked what the Negro woman was doing in the picture. Some of them answered she was cleaning the house, although there was no Negro woman at all in this particular photograph.29 In a second phase of the research, stereotypes have often been described as concepts or schemas, participating like them in any cognitive process.30If concepts are "organizations of experience with certain classes of objects (persons), based on perceived relationships," then, Vinacke argued in 1957, stereotypes are concepts.31It is interesting to note that the issue of typification vs stereotyping, evaded by the 19th century as well as by contemporary current use, is dealt with at length in the social sciences. Seeing no essential difference between sound categorization and stereotyping, some social scientists, like Asch, deplore that so much energy

Commonplace Knowledge Innovation Commonplace Knowledge & Innovation

153 153

is being spent condemning what is in itself an indispensable cognitive process.32It is impossible to sum up here a debate that goes on for several decades. (For a more detailed presentation of this specific issue, see Amossy, 1989.)33 I only wanted to show how stereotypes came to be defined in terms of concepts, thus contributing to the reflection on categorization and cultural models in cognitive processes. This brings us back to the innovative powers of a flexible notion taken from everyday use. Indeed, the common term kept its ideological implications-inferiority of collective thinking, the assimilation of "common" with "commonplace" and "fruitless"repetition, opposition between the preconceived, biased opinion of the masses and the precise, verified statements of science. But all these acquired a new significance when they came to describe social attitudes and group interrelations. In their new context, they illuminated the nature of public opinion. They raised important issues concerning the way social groups react to each other and perceive themselves in relation to "images" circulated by their culture. They led to an analysis of prejudice and social identity, as well as to crucial insights on the relation between socialization and cognition. It is the displacement, and not the deconstruction, of a commonplace notion that fertilized many areas of the social sciences. In each field, the stereotype was linked to a new set of questions that led to its re-definition, and to which it contributed fresh insights. To bring about a new understanding, it took the form of a metaphorical net, a working hypothesis allowing experimentation and a problematic concept leading to theoretical discussions. In all these aspects, it proved fruitful insofar as the current notion, loaded with all its commonplace knowledge, was worked out in a new context. Parallel to the social sciences, semiotics have dealt since the 1960s with stereotyping in the mass media, in publicity, cartoons, school textbooks, popular literature and so on. These studies lay bare the mechanisms of various sign systems participating in what Edgar Morin aptly called "l'industrialisation l'esprit."4The combined efforts of different disciplines de eventually led to a growing awareness of stereotyping in the educated middle classes. This awareness was also reinforced, and transmitted to larger audiences, by the merciless progress of the cultural industry. So the notion of stereotypes, borrowed by scientific research from commonplace knowledge, travelled full circle and came back at last to its place of origin. In so doing, it deeply affected contemporary cultural production and gave birth to new strategies both in popular and avant-garde literature. I would like to emphasize two central points. First, the growing awareness of stereotypes in a large audience modified the criteria currently

154

Ruth Amossy Amossy

used to distinguish mass literature from canonic or avant-garde texts. Denunciation and deconstruction of widely circulated frozen schema are no more the exclusive privilege of the elites. They are a recurring feature of texts written for large, relatively unsophisticated audiences anxious to prove their ability to demystify the stereotypes they are fed daily. I have tried to exemplify this in my analyses of autobiographies and biographies of Hollywood female stars, where the presentation of the movie idol relies In heavily on the "real woman behind the glamorous image"35'36 these best-sellers obviously belonging to what Bourdieu calls the "champde it grandeproduction"37 appears that the notion of stereotype has introduced into popular literature new strategies based on a pseudo-deconstruction of collective images. In other words, the notion of stereotype, by introducing new models in the field of contemporary literature, has been an agent of ferment and an innovative tool in popular culture as well. We are left with an unsolved question-and this is my second pointconcerning the fecundity of the notion of stereotype as far as artistic creativity is concerned. I do not have any kind of general answer to offer; only an example which is, in my opinion, symptomatic of some contemporary trends. I here refer to the work of Roland Barthes, since he ideally exemplifies what I would call the effects of our modern obsession with stereotypes. Awareness of collective frozen patterns being a condition sine qua non for anyone aspiring to cultural distinction, detection and rejection of stereotypes can turn into a genuine mania. As an avant-garde French intellectual, Barthes is constantly trying to confound Doxa, and constantly feeling that it threatens to reappear in some new disguise. Does not each idea, even new, soon "solidify" (stereosmeans solid) and become a collective opinion? According to Barthes, this endless attention to stereotyping accounts for the dynamics of his own writing: Doxa calls for paradox(a), which in turn becomes Doxa, and so on.3839 Moreover, the most subtle strategies to outsmart stereotypes and collective stupidity are accompanied, in Barthes's texts, by a perpetual awareness of their mechanisms and eventual failure. As a result of an implacable logic, those who most try to avoid collective images are bound to find them everywhere; those who want to escape the realm of common knowledge are caught in a dizzying perpetual motion that allows for no rest in some stable 'Truth." In displaying this dynamic, symptomatic of the contemporary avant-garde, and in making it into a central theme of his work, Roland Barthes paradoxically demonstrates how the notion of stereotype can innovate in the cultural production of the elites.

Commonplace Knowledge Innovation Commonplace Knowledge &Innovation

155 155

Barthes shows that we can never be "on the other side" of stereotyping-only in its margins, where we try to grasp and outdo it. On a different level, I would like to suggest that we cannot yet go beyond the notion of stereotype, even if it seems to have by now fully exploited its potential for innovation, both in the social sciences and in literary production. Social psychologists only continue an exploration begun half a century ago, with similar methods and goals. Literaryreflection seems to have reached, with Barthes, a limit that can hardly be exceeded. The research on the commonplace is in its turn sinking into repetition. Nevertheless, the notion of stereotypes still dominates our intellectual landscape, not because it still innovates in any field, but because the social conditions that account for its rise and success have not undergone any radical change. The notion of stereotypes reinforces the basic values of moder democracy and serves its interests. It contributes to the denunciation of prejudice, the demystification of the mistakes and excesses of public opinion, and to laying bare the dangers of cultural industrialization. On all these grounds, it is impossible to dismiss it or to leave it behind. The only possible position on this issue seems to be the critical one. If we cannot go beyond the notion of stereotype, we can at least stand on its ultimate border, where the many questions it raises can be revealed and analyzed. TelAviv University

REFERENCES

2. Ruth Amossy & Elisheva Rosen, Les discoursdu cliche.(Paris: CDU-SEDES, 1982)

1. Michael Essais stylistique de structurale. 1971) (Paris: Rifaterre, Flammarion,

3. Louis-Marie de et humaines. Morfaux,Vocabulaire la philosophie des sciences

(Paris:Colin, 1980) 4. Ruth Amossy, "Le (st6reo)type et la litterature industrielle au XIXe sikcle. 64,1989. L'exemple des physiologies," Romantisme 5. Anne Hershberg-Pierrot, Flaubert le dictionnaire ideesrecues.(Lille:Presdes et ses Univ de Lille, 1988) 7. Ibid, 10. 8. D. Katz & K.W.Braly, "Racialstereotypes of 100 college students,"J. Abnormal & SocialPsych,28,1933, 280-290. 9. Dorothy W. Seago, "Stereotypes:Before Pearl Harbor and After," J. Social Psych,23,1947,55-63. 10. S.A. Rice, "Stereotypes:A source of error in judging character,"J. Personal

6. Walter Public 1922)61. (NewYork: Lippmann, Opinion. Penguin,

Research, 5,1926-27.

156

Ruth Amossy Amossy

11. Allen L. Edwards, "Studies of Stereotypes;I. The Directionality and Uniformity of Responses to Stereotypes,"J. SocialPsych,12,1940,357-366. 12. Max Meenes, "A Comparison of Racial Stereotypes of 1935 and 1945," 1. SocialPsych,17, 1943, 327-336. 13. A. Poskovil, "Encountersbetween Blacks and White Liberals:The Collision of Stereotypes," SocialForces, 55:3, 1977, 712-727. 14. F. Elgoet, "L'identite bretonne: notes sur la production de l'identite 24,1980,43-67. negative," Pluriels-Debats, 15. Steven Penrod, SocialPsychology. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall,1983) 16. Ezra Stotland & Lance K. Canon, Social Psychology: CognitiveApproach. A (Philadelphia:W.B. Saunders, 1972) 17. Joseph Sumpf & Michel Hugues, Dictionnaire Sociologie. de (Paris:Larousse, 1973) 18. Norbert Sillamy, ed., Dictionnaire de (Paris:Bordas, encyclopedique psychologie. 1980) 19. H.J. Eysenck et al, eds., Encyclopedia Psychology,Vol. 3. (West Germany, of 1972) 20. Muzafer & W. Caroline Sherif, SocialPsychology. (New York:Harper, 1969) 21. Emilio Wilems, Dictionnaire sociologie,adaptation francaise par A. Culde livier, 2e ed. augmentee. (Paris:Marcel Riviere, 1970) 22. John Harding, "Stereotypes,"International Encyclopedia the SocialSciences, of ed. D.L. Sills, Vol 15. (New York:Macmillan, 1968) 23. David Kretch& RichardCrutchfield,Theory Problems SocialPsychology. and of (New York:McGraw-Hill,1948) 151. 24. Marie Jahoda, "Stereotype,"in A Dictionaryof the Social Sciences(London: Tavistock, 1964) 25. Roger Brown, Handbook SocialPsychology. (New York:The Free Press, 1965. of 26. Madeleine Grawitz, Lexique SciencesSociales, ed. (Paris:Dalloz, 1983) 2e des 27. Gordon Allport, TheNatureof Prejudice. (New York:Addison-Wesley, 1954; reprinted Anchor Books, 1958) 19. 28. Kimball Young, SocialPsychology 2nd ed. (New York:Crofts, 1947) 190. 29. Otto Klineberg, SocialPsychology. (New York:Holt, Rinehart,Winston, 1940; reprinted 1954) 489. 30. T.E. Perkins, "RethinkingStereotypes," in Ideologyand CulturalProduction, ed. Barrettet al. (New York:Croom Helm, 1979) 31. Edgar W. Vinacke, "Stereotypesas Social Concepts,"J. SocialPsych,46,1957, 223-243. 32. Solomon Asch, SocialPsychology. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall,1952) 33. Ruth Amossy, "La notion de stereotype dans la reflexion contemporaine," Litterature fevrier 1989. 73, 34. Edgar Morin, L'esprit temps.(Paris,Grasset, 1962) du 35. Ruth Amossy, "Autobiographiesof Movie Stars-Presentation of Self and its Strategies,"PoeticsToday7:4,1986. 36. Ruth Amossy, "La mise en scene de la star Hollywoodienne: de textuelle,1989. (auto)biographies,"Cahiers Semiotique 37. Pierre Bourdieu, "Le marche des biens symboliques," L'Anneesociologiqe, 1971. 38. Roland Barthes,RolandBarthes RolandBarthes. (Paris:Seuil, 1975) par 39. Roland Barthes,Leqon. (Paris:Seuil, 1978)