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PERSPECTIVES IN THE ARGUMENTS ON THE RELEVANCE OF THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION

by MOHD. DARBI BIN HASHIM SUBJECT: Law Profession, Legal Theory, Professions Malaysia [1991] 1 CLJ iii (Apr) One of the significant developments in the Malaysian legal education in the past twenty years is the appearance of professional legal training in the universities. (The term university is used here to include MARA Institute of Technology which runs a law programme recognised for practice). The law faculties in the universities virtually prepare their students to join the learned profession directly upon graduation. (Although a certain period of internship or pupillage is required before a graduate can be called to the Bar, the requirement is nonetheless a mere formality). In this respect our university legal education resembles that of the American system. The basic difference is perhaps in the latter being a post-graduate programme whereas ours is undergraduate. Contrary wise, this emerging legal education system differs from that of the British. In Britain the legal education in the universities remains non-professional. The overriding function of the law faculties is said to be "to further the education of its undergraduate through the use of a particular discipline."1 In so far as the technical instruction for the profession is concerned, the law faculties do not consider it their responsibility to provide one. (Whether this situation in fact results from the reluctance of the British Bar to entrust professional education to the universities is, however, an interesting moot point.) Such a task is instead undertaken by either of the professional schools conducted by the Council of Legal Education or the Law Society. Accordingly, a law student in a British university, at least traditionally, would regard the time spent on the campus as a time of further education, and not as a time of professional training.2 It is not the aim of this essay, however, to expatiate on the merits and demerits of the two contrasting systems of legal education. It seeks to do something else. This is to draw attention to the tenacious problem of the American legal education model and the attendant controversy it has engendered among legal scholars. By locating the professional legal training in an academic environment the problem which has beset the American law schools is this: "to what extent should the university attempt to prepare students for the actual practice of their

future profession."3 Or, to put the issue differently, to what extent should the know-how in practice be taught in the law schools? This dilemma is endemic among the American legal scholars. Ironically it is in the course of their attempt to resolve the matter that a schism developed among them with one side emphatically advocating academic legal education and the other vocational. Such a development is regretted by some members of the academia, but for others it is regarded unavoidable. As Joseph A. Mc Clain Jr. said; It was one bound to develop when the apprenticeship method of legal education was abandoned and the primary task of legal training was delegated to the university law schools, with no provision being made for supplying apprenticeship training.4 The debates between the two schools of thought have spawned many established legal journals and periodicals. However, until today the issue remains, in the words of Justice Jackson, an unsolved problem.5 What is the distinction between a vocational and academic training in legal education which the adherents of the two contending views consider fundamental? Samford and Wood attempt to draw the difference as follows; Professional training or other forms of apprenticeship in general seek to teach people how to do things by practice in an environment where others are doing them. An academic training seeks to understand a way of doing things as a better preparation for doing them.6 The distinction between the two is thus quite clearly drawn. However, where the balance between the divergent demands should be struck by the law schools remains intricate and enigmatic. For those who sanction a vocationally oriented legal education they succinctly argue that the purpose of law schools is to train men and women for practice. Thus J.D. Morton expresses his view in the following term; in my view, there is no difference between academic and practical law teaching - there is only good and bad law teaching! ... Law is what legislators, Judges, lawyers work with - i.e., practise with. The only sort of law I know is practice law ... So-called academic law teaching may well be described as dealing with problems, which may not exist, in a possibly unreal fashion. "The function of law school is to teach law!"7 Professor Twinning candidly likened the training of a lawyer to that of a plumber when he delineated the educational functions of law schools. In his

words: What he (a lawyer) needs is a no-nonsense specialised training to make him a competent technician. A liberal education in law for such a functionary is at best wasteful; at worst it can be dangerous. Imagine the effect, ... on our drains ... if our plumbers had been made to study the history and philosophy of plumbing, the aesthetics of drains, housing policy, Roman baths, comparative plumbing, and a special subject in the water supply of the House of Parliament.8 Such views are not, however, isolated. Nor do they prevail only in the United States. Aggraval, commenting on a fellow-Indian barristers statement: It is not the business of the university to train people for the profession of law, but universities must concern themselves with merely the broad cultural education which a lawyer needs, says that such statement is "astonishing" and presents "an unclear and defective conception of the purpose of the study of law."9 Similarly the view is shared by the Latin American law teachers who, in drawing up the Declaration of Principles of Legal Education, declared that; Legal education ought not to be burdened with the tasks of general education [because to do so made more difficult the scientific teaching of law which] implements in the most satisfactory manner the double character of law school as a professional school and as an integral part of the university.10 Joseph H. Cooper defended such a position which law schools must adopt in a defiant note. He asserts; I do not believe that a law school would plummet to the lowest rung on the "university status ladder" by becoming more pragmatically and practitioner oriented. Even if a law school were ostracized by the "academic community", would there be a significant drop in the number and caliber of applicants (a brain drain so to speak)? I doubt it, for an individual who wants to practise law or acquire the knowledge and skills of a lawyer ... will not be deterred by a "trade-school" stigma.11 If the above arguments appear to be too mundane and ingenuous, the proponents of vocationalism in law schools have also sought to rationalize their stand on a more lofty premise. Hence Samuel I. Shuman believes that the surest defense against social and political abuse is a vocationally competent bench and bar, and therefore ... lawyers (should) be intensively trained in the techniques and skills of their trade.12

In essence, therefore, the adherents of the skill centred legal education cannot perceive the purpose of law schools other than "to prepare men for practice of law". And to be sure, law schools, in their view, cannot be a place "to provide a gracious period of growing up. Or, again, to provide an elaborate initiation into the legal profession, as elaborate initiations are provided for secret societies or fraternal societies".13 My own stand on this controversy is that while law schools no doubt have to train men and women for practice, their major responsibility is essentially to educate them. It is in the context of the students enlightenment and edification that their professional skills and proficiency are honed. Otherwise it would portend a baneful prospect to both the legal profession and legal scholarship in this country. Having stated my position thus, it is only appropriate that I should advance arguments to substantiate it. But before I venture upon such a task I wish to make a point of clarification. I do not wish to pretend here as though I am attempting to present wholly new arguments in support of the view why law schools should be academic. I am fully cognizant of the ubiquity of the polemic on the issue especially in the United States. As such it would be naive, if not disastrous, on my part to assume at this point that I could add anything novel to the debate. Hence what I seek to achieve here is something more modest. Anyone who is familiar with the debate whether law schools should remain academic or should become vocational cannot but be amazed by the extensiveness and the divergence of the arguments and views which endeavour to vindicate the academic status of law schools. In my view it is possible to capture these arguments into certain perspectives in order that they become more comprehensible. And this in my opinion remains yet the prestine aspect in the controversy. However, I would hasten to caution that the classification of the arguments into some recognizable categories is not meant to be a rigid one and exhaustive. Otherwise I would run the risk of committing the error of dogmatism and intellectual strait-jacketting, the very evil which the proponents of the arguments themselves sought to eschew. In my view thus the arguments against turning law schools in the universities into a vocational institution can be advanced from the following positions: (a) The higher goals of university education; (b) The importance of continuing liberal and theoretical studies; (c) Law as an aspect of liberal education; (d) The social relevance of law;

(e) Social demands and responsibilities of lawyers and the profession; (f) The need for improvement in the standard of lawyering; (g) Vested interest in the profession and falsity of the academic-vocational dichotomy. These perspectives shall now be elaborated. (a) Higher Goals of University Education Increasing number of American legal scholars perceive their law schools as degenerating into the status of a trade-school. This situation has caused them grave concern and revulsion. Such trade-school image is an affront to their dignity as members of the university academic community and a derogation to their discipline as anything intellectual and scholarly. The vocational leaning of the legal education which is viewed as intellectually barren poses a hindrance to their effort to establish their identity and respectability in an academic context.14 For these scholars there prevails among them a conviction that there are, by a subjective value judgment, higher goals which the university education should strive for. Law schools by virtue of their being part of the university thus owe the moral obligation to assist and participate in the realization of these goals. What exactly the higher callings of the university education are have been variously expressed? For instance, it is said that the university should be a place where truth can be freely pursued.15 As regards the training a university education (legal or otherwise) is expected to provide, its primary purpose is to train a man to think clearly and to think constructively."16 Or as Mortimer Adler envisages it; Education is the process by which those powers (abilities, capacities) of men that are susceptible to habituation, are perfected by good habits, through means artistically contrived, and employed by any man to help another or himself achieve the end in view.17 Such a pursuit perhaps borders closely to Miltons educational ideal; (A) complete and generous education (is) that which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully and magnanimously all the office both private and public, of peace and war.18 The law schools obligation towards achieving those goals demands, therefore, that while preparation, at least in part, of lawyers for practice should remain one important goal, the legal education should not be confined to one such single

function. The need for law schools to be ceaselessly conscious of their wider responsibility, and not to recede into parochialism and self-centeredness, has been pointed out by Owen M. Fiss; Law schools are professional schools insomuch as they train people for a profession. But they are also academic institutions, and by that ... they seek to discover the truth.19 A similar sentiment has also been expressed by Francis A. Allen; The law schools are professional and, as such, are obligated to advance the goals and capacities of the profession. They must have the freedom to do so in the most effective ways possible. But, although this is no small duty and privilege, it is by no means the whole of the matter. In this country the law school is most often a part of the university. As such, it must share the universitys purpose and make its proper contribution to their achievement. And what are the universitys purposes in which the law school share? To create new knowledge, to organize and communicate knowledge, to identify and criticize values, to advance the humanistic arts. Freedom to fulfil these latter obligations is vital to the law schools.20 Some legal scholars are categorical in their views regarding the academic responsibility of law schools. John R. Peden, for example, asserts: the university [sic] function in teaching law should be educational rather than essentially vocational. There is general agreement that this educational function is performed in part by students learning to understand and work with legal institutions, processes and doctrines, and that these are also the ingredients of a vocational education ... The writer states his preference as follows; while a university certainly can teach in a manner which will assist students in their professional vocation, where conflict arises with educational objectives, the latter must prevail.21 Why the broader educational objective should preponderate in the situation is explicable by the reality that "(the) young lawyers lack of "know how" can soon be cured by experience", whereas " the young lawyer who does not have a broad background of scholarship and strong analytical ability, is not cured by a reasonably short experience in practice."22 Moreover; there are things the lawyer will get on his own or learn in the practice, and that there are some things he will not likely to get except in law schools. It would be silly indeed to offer in school most of the things that could normally be expected to learn in practice, to the exclusion or impairment of things that could

not be thus learned.23 What then should be the proper position which law schools should adopt in order to best discharge their duty to realize the higher ideals of university education in the specific field of their specialization? Attempts to outline such roles have been made. Edmund Cahn states as follows; one of the principal aims of education - in whatever faculty or discipline - is the communication and transmission of the truth. In so far as legal education is a species of education, it ought to be concerned with truth. In so far as its specific subject matter in law, it ought to be concerned with justice. And in so far as it prepares young citizens for practice of a profession of vast individual and social consequences, it ought to be concerned with their developing a sense of responsibility.24 Other writers have expressed similar views. Thus, law school is the centre of free inquiry and free expression; the primary function of a law school is to pursue a scientific and systematized knowledge of the law; law schools should teach the young man to become aware of his prejudice, to have great care of facts; legal education should aim towards the enhancement of the students capacity to realize their human potential. These statements, therefore, clearly demarcate the demands between the training of a lawyer and that of the allegorical plumber who Professor Twining spoke of. While a plumber can be indifferently oblivious, for instance, to the current state of water supply system in the housing estate, a lawyer, on the other hand, cannot simply turn a blind eye to the state of his profession. Besides performing the practical functions of the profession a lawyer is also responsible for the professions efficient and proper working and development. It is here, therefore, that it is important to realize how teaching-learning process in law should cultivate the development of professional tools and knowledge with their appropriate context. It is outrageously wrong then to treat all professions alike. When the teaching-learning process takes place in an academic institution there should be no retreat in the effort to sustain and encourage in the student continuing intellectual curiosity, personal involvement and social responsibility. In this regard, Charles W. Joiner locates the special role of the law schools as follows; the faculties of law are looked to by the profession and much of the rest of society as the disciplinarian of the law, the men who make honest attempts to rationalize legal doctrines and to ascertain, systematize, and critically examine raw data to aid in the improvement and development of institutions and guiding rules. So, the law schools have among their students many persons who have far broader goals than private practice. Such persons, though they may enter the profession of law, are likely to become social and institutional reformers on the

local, national and international scene. Law schools must not neglect these gifted persons, and these persons must be given time and the direction to study the concept and meaning of law in much greater depth.25 The myopia of the vocationlists regarding the higher callings of the legal profession is hence fittingly described by Alfred F. Conrad who says; For too many decades a majority of law professors and law students conceive the law schools as a device for teaching students to act like the practitioners of the generation which had gone before them. But we should ask ourselves what would be the status of agriculture today if the school of agriculture had taught farmers to do what the older generation of farmers were then doing; or the status of medicine if medical school had been content to pass on the tradition of senior practitioners. In any of the fields which are notable for their progress - whether it be agriculture or medicine or physics or chemistry - it has been the function of the schools not only to teach what is being done but to discover and test what ought to be done.26 Much of what had been said of the higher goals of university education would not, however, be achieved without the efforts of the law teachers themselves. It is vitally important, therefore, that law teachers recognize their essential position and role in the law schools. Their function indubitably goes beyond merely imparting the tricks of the trade. They must realize that the power and influence they command upon their students entail corresponding duties with regard to the mental and psychological development as well as the purely intellectual development of students."27 Thus law teachers should dare to venture "in the dark places and shed light on what he or she sees there";28 they should also "assist their students in becoming better thinkers to improve the quality, precision, and clarity of their thinking."29 In castigating those legal scholars who fail to realize these objectives in their teaching, Owen M. Fiss caustically remarks; Law professors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to discover. The law school ... is an integral part of the university, and by virtue of that membership and all the commitments it entails must be pure in its academic obligations.30 It has been further pointed out that law teachers would do well to make clear their educational role as such rather than to presume the assimilation of some new process that is unique to a lawyers intellect, in their contact with practitioners, the judiciary and the public. After having gone through the arguments of the academic lawyers we might, however, pose them quite a fair question; could not the ideals of the university

education be attained by way of vocational training for after all such a training aims at making students to think like lawyers? Professor Reich does not think so. In his words; Many of the ills of legal education are symptomatic of the fact that it is primarily professional in orientation, although it should also be preparing students for lives of public service and scholarship. This confusion of goals is tacitly recognised, and an appearance of unity is maintained by the theory that all these are accomplished by the law schools special way of training the mind. But the unity rings false, and the schools do not accomplish all that they undertake.31 Some academic law teachers even view the concept thinking like a lawyer as "having taken a mystique which influences the shape of legal education and in need of critical examination.32 (b) Importance of Liberal Education Vitally connected to the preceding standpoint is the argument rooted in the conviction on the invaluability and indispensability of liberal education in the training of worthy members of the learned profession. Pronouncements to this effect are legion. "Practice in the skill", says Charles W. Joiner, "to be most effective should come after a broad liberal legal education"33 "Broad scholastic background is fundamental and there is no short cut to substitute it. The law school must develop it. The development is slow and unsure after a lawyer gets into the active practice."34 "Law students need a broad training in humanities and the basic legal subjects"35 "(T)he best preparation for law school is furnished by courses which concentrate on the goal of importing a liberal education, and do not attempt to anticipate the professional curriculum."36 Some scholars even argue that law schools must not only recognize the relevance and importance of students liberal education but they have the responsibility to refine it. Leleiko, for example, opines that the primary task of law schools is not to teach law but to educate men and women to be lawyers.37 Why the law schools task is such is explained by Douglas D. McFarland who says; After all the students must be trained for a lifetime by learning fundamental theories and flexible application of the law. The teacher teaches how to do something, rather than what to do in every instance ... What is important is the long range goal of preparation for practice.38 In a more elegant note Samford and Wood claim that the aim of legal education

should be to make students jurisprudentially literate.39 What does liberal education hold so much that it becomes crucial to the lawyers training? Some scholars and jurists believe that liberal education helps to nurture ethical values which enable a man to walk among men, to be of service to men. Hence a broad understanding of life and a knowledge of the profession and of the men who have pursued it is the best way of instilling high standard of ethical practice into aspirants to the law.40 Another virtue of liberal education is that it helps in the disciplining of the mind and exercise of better judgment - the qualities deemed essential both to students and practitioners. Thus Charles H. Russell notes that liberal education would give the student a rigorous mental training and it would fill his mind with a proper store of knowledge. And "a disciplined and well-furnished mind would contribute to a lawyers capacity to carry on his work."41 John R. Peden in reasserting the point that a lawyer with a general legal education is equipped to specialize in particular areas quoted Professor Gellhorn who said; A well-trained modern lawyer is not necessarily the product of instruction in every facet of the professional work he may ultimately be called upon to do. Everybody recognizes, in short, that able persons can learn without being taught.42 Statements such as above are perhaps resonant of what had been written by John H. Wigmore and Frederic B. Crossby as early as 1909 in a report to the American Bar Association; A (liberal) education is highly important for the knowledge and intellectual strength required ... (for) administration of justice and ... legislative leadership; (it) is essential to that scholarship which is needed for the scientific study and mastery of the law.43 That a good well-rounded liberal education assists a man to exercise better judgment in life is long recognized. Aristotle himself said; The man who has been educated in a subject is a good Judge of that subject, and the man who has received a good all-round education is a good Judge in general.44 Drawing lessons from this unexceptional truism many modern scholars have thus arrived at the position that the central purpose of liberal education is the education of judgment. Judgment is a rational activity; therefore, intellectual training can help to develop it. It is a practical activity, since everyone has to make judgment throughout his life.45 Instead of viewing liberal education as an anathema to legal training, as do the vocationalists, these scholars are convinced that it facilitates for the better understanding and perception of the law. Hence it

is asserted that; [T]he theoretical and doctrinal element is broader than the scope of legal theorizing. It also encompasses, or should encompass, physical, psychological, economic, or political theory in a manner that is calculated to relate law in its proper perspective and give it effective meaning.46 One of laws perspectives which is increasingly recognized today is its social relevance. (More of which will be said later). For lawyers, only if they are harnessed with broad education will they be able to understand the significance of law in society rather than using it as a craft dealing with the mannerless and sordid conflict of life. Any discussion on the liberal tradition in legal education is perhaps garbled if reference is not made to its important luminary, Oliver Wendell Holmes. It was Holmes, more than anyone else, who eloquently defended the liberal legal education. He once said; We have too little theory in the law rather than too much. Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a house ... It is not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the subject. The danger is that the able and practical minded should look with indifference or distrust upon the ideas the connection of which with their business is remote. At another time Holmes called for the relevance of all knowledge to the law and for the lawyers to develop the capacity to demonstrate this relevance. All that life offers any man from which to start his thinking or his striving is a fact. And if this universe is one universe, if it is so far thinkable that you can pass in reason from one part of it to another, it does not matter very much what the fact is. For every fact leads to every other by the path of the air. Only men do not yet see how, always. And your business as thinkers is to make plainer the way for some thing to the whole of things: to show the rational connection between your fact and the frame of the universe. If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology, the science of man to political economy, the theory of legislation, ethics, and thus by several paths to your final view of life. It would be equally true of any subject. The only difference is in the ease of seeing the way. To be master of any branch of knowledge, you must master those which lie next to it; and thus to know anything you must know all.47 Can one, however, accuse these exponents of liberal legal education of merely star-gazing in their high ivory towers when they in fact are benighted of the real

and practical needs of the practice life? They do not think so. These scholars point out that the fact that graduates do express deep regret in not learning policy and jurisprudential aspects of legal rules testifies to the relevance of liberal and theoretical education in law schools.48 Brendan F. Brown makes this claim; The vast majority of todays law students now demand a jurisprudential type of legal education which will include courses showing the background of the Anglo-American legal system, how it affects various parts of our society. This can only be done by teaching the jurisprudential science of law.49 The cognizance of the importance of the liberal element in legal education is not restricted to students. But, as George L. Priest has indicated: [I]ndeed, my experience with practioners suggests that they are desperate for new theories ... The law student of the future will be ... out of place without an education of increasingly greater sophistication in social science theory.50 Neither does such a view prevail solely in the United States. In Australia, for example, the Victorian Council of Legal Education has strongly urged law schools to reintroduce jurisprudence as a compulsory subject.51 By way of self-criticism some advocates of the liberal legal education have also made observations to the effect that if law students have developed a disdainful attitude towards theoretical and jurisprudential type of legal education it could not have stemmed solely from their predilection. Instead this mental lapse can be attributed to the fact that "we faculty members did not and do not know very much ... about social science, humanities, and philosophy." Accordingly, "we who are lawyers must accept substantial responsibility for failing to breathe enough life into the law to make it a more effective instrument of peace and human welfare."52 (c)Law as an Aspect of Liberal Education Some American legal scholars perceive the degeneration of the legal education into intellectual aridity as the ramification of its severance from the liberal arts discipline. Law, it is claimed, is but a liberal arts in specie. It is in the sphere of the liberal arts that legal studies rightly belong. As Roscoe Pound once remarked, the juristic law which governs us should be treated more as a social science like sociology, economics, and history, than as a logical one. Thus the haughty attitude of some law school men who regard any attempt at multidisciplinary approach to law as an unwarranted encroachment into their exclusive domain could be attenuated if those men are made to realize the true

nature and origin of legal education. As Brainerd Currie articulates; (It might be recalled) with profit that the study of Anglo-American law as such won its way into university purlieus in the first place at least partly on the basis of its claim to be recognized as an appropriate component of the course of liberal studies.53 Again John D. Appel reminds that; legal scholarship, though oriented to the specific needs of the profession, is in its nature a liberal arts - the art of increasing the fund of human knowledge by using the development of legal theory and institutions as means to a greater end.54 Tracing the historical development of the American legal education, Philip Lader commented: It is ironic that, while legal education in twentieth century American universities is taught to be the domain of the professional graduate school, the study of Anglo-American law was introduced to the university curriculum as an appropriate concern of the liberal Arts.55 In this regard too, modern scholars might profit to take note of Blackstones inaugural lecture as Vinerian Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford in 1758 where he made the following observation; [A] competent knowledge of the laws of the society in which we live [should be] the proper accomplishment of every gentleman and scholar; a highly useful, I had almost said essential, part of liberal and polite education.56 (d) Laws Social Relevance The challenge for law schools today to chart new path and direction for the dissemination of legal knowledge becomes more urgent with the greater awareness among scholars, lawyers and students regarding the relevance of law and legal institutions to human social conditions. This development, particularly in the West, is spearheaded by socially-oriented scholars of various persuasions - legal realism, sociological movement, legal studies movement, critical legal studies, law and society movement, to name a few. Central to their critique of the present state of legal education is that law is the cumulation or synthesis of human experience and endeavour; as such it is unrealistic to isolate the study of law from the reality of society. Thus they insist that students should be exposed fully to social realities of law. "(Should law schools) shield their students from ideas that challenge the efficacy or morality of law and lawyering (?)" asked Ted Finmann. "I should have supposed that an obligation in this respect was

exactly the opposite."57 The need to imbue students with the social perspective of law is well emphasised by David H. Vernon in the following terms; Law is only one element in a very complex society. Presenting it as a separate entity is unrealistic and incomplete. More extensive emphasis in the law schools on the historical background of the legal system, the philosophical foundations on which the system is built, and the role of law in society will provide prospective lawyers with a better understanding of the legal system within which they will work; and, thus will have the practical effect of making them more proficient lawyers.58 In the United States the genesis of the significant shift of focus by scholars from what is commonly known as law in books to law in action can be traced to the works of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Challenging the current view of his period that the heart of the law was its scientific completeness Holmes said; The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which Judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.59 A later scholar in the same spirit reiterates that: legal rules are not mere machines where one inserts a controversy and after turning some sort of crank, extracts a categorical decision. The practical function of legal rules is to serve as instruments of analysis, valuation, and responsible deliberation.60 That law should be viewed as a dynamic process in concrete human life vital to human progress and welfare has also been stressed. Statements by Professor Beale which are considered as prophetic today as well as at the time he spoke underscore this point. In his words; [L]aw is not merely concerned with the past and present. As the science of right, it is progressive, always testing its results in the scales of justice, always looking forward to a juster world which is to come through its improvement and growth. It has a place for the enthusiasm of the reformer and the prophet; for its constant effort as we have seen, is not only, by investigation, to discover the truth, but by prophetic persuasion to bring it to pass. It is at once historian, economist, philosopher, scientist and seer.61 The development that is taking place in the legal education today, where the

emphasis is the propagation of law with a human face, throws a challenge to law teachers, scholars and lawyers to review their current position and method to understanding legal issues and problems. As Edmund Cahn points out; The practice of law has a profound effect on humanity, and therefore an understanding of humanity and its destiny become of practical necessity for the lawyers. Lawyers therefore must have an education which has at its base the development of an understanding of and the commitment to humanity.62 A similar call is made by David M. Trubek: One of the declared goals of legal studies is to produce knowledge about whether the present generations of our legal system make sense for clients, for various parts of society, for nation as a whole.63 What becomes the central focus of the newly perceived direction in legal education, therefore, is the need to connect the technicalities of law and the social relations in which they operate. Many scholarly statements have thus been made stressing the urgency that law schools should discard the doctrinal education which views: law as body of percept and rules, deriving their authority from the will of a political sovereign, and detached from such orders as the historical, philosophical and sociological.64 George L. Priest points out that; It is accepted today virtually universally that the legal system can be best understood with the method and theories of the social sciences. It follows from this view, however, that one must abandon the notion that law is a subject that can be usefully studied by a person trained only in the law. Furthermore, it follows necessarily that one must reject the notion that the legal system is somewhat self-contained or self-sufficient instead of simply another setting for the expression of whatever are the deeper determinants of human behaviour.65 Steven H. Leleiko chooses a curt term to express his view on the issue. He says; The reality of legal principles and their role in society can only be understood fully if theory and practice are combined. This is impossible when direct experience is eschewed like a deadly disease ... Closely associated with the emphasis on student purity is the myth that true scholarship is separate from practical experience. It is difficult to conceive of original scholarship which does not combine the ingredient of practice, experience and research.66

John R. Peden also has something to add to the discussion; One of the functions of our law school is to awaken every student to the need ... to consider the law in its social context, and whether the law meets the needs of society, and to be aware that empirical data may be necessary in order to answer the question.67 However, the present teaching-learning process in the law schools is felt to be altogether inadequate and obsolete to meet the above demands. This has evoked some trenchant criticisms. Thus Robert Stevens quipped; [W]e are all prisoners of our structures ... Discussions of legal scholarship normally degenerate into pep rallies irrelevant to reality. We are all at the whim and will of forces that are largely beyond our control.68 David M. Trubek shares this view too when he says; [Law schools] ... paid too much attention to research on legal doctrine and too little to studying the law in action ... Law schools are never intended to include the examination of law in action. For the conventional law schools, legal education has consisted of the transmission of a set of skills, and knowledge of various systems of rules.69 The disconnection of law from the reality of its sociological contexts and the cannonization of legal texts are not without their adverse effects on the students. As Richard F. Devlin argues, the "discourse, and reasoning, of first year legal education inculcates primarily male, nineteenth century bourgeois values and "knowledge".70 (e) Social Demands and Responsibility of Lawyers and the Profession The relevance of law and legal institutions to human social relations as delineated above has never been so significantly perceived as at the present time when societies become more complex. The new situation presents new dimensions to the problems which members of the society face either individually or as a group. The need for law schools and lawyers, therefore, to become more responsive to the new and challenging demands in society and to positively contribute to the progress of human welfare is being passionately repeated and emphasised. Woodrow Wilson was among the earliest of people to draw attention upon the matter. He said; Every citizen should know what law is, how it came into existence, what relation its form bears to its substance, and how it gives to society its fibre and strength and pose of frame. But our concern is with the lawyer, and it is certainly he more than any other who needs to be versed in the philosophy and

history of law.71 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that lawyers should only concern with technical rules and procedures, Steven H. Leleiko demands that, "[t]he lawyers of today must be present to assist in the policy making decisions relating to law in every aspect of human life. "72 John P. Dawson shares a similar view; We are all well aware that it is through powers, conferred by law, that our society is managed and we continue to hope, improve from time to time. In a very large part of their work, lawyers - especially academic lawyers - must be concerned with the goals defined for social action, the means employed to achieve them, how these goals can be more effectively realized.73 For Ted Finmann, lawyers knowledge of society and human social affairs is indispensable if lawyers are to function effectively. According to him; the ability of law and lawyers to provide justice is related to our comprehension of the problem that social scientists and humanists explore ... To some significant extent, the ability of a lawyer to function effectively is related to whether the lawyer understands the role law plays in society.74 Thus lawyers today should make conscious effort to rid themselves of the image of a mere technician but instead try to realize the full potential of the possibly varied roles they command in society, which John R. Peden outlines as follows; The lawyers responsibility towards the public can be illustrated by the five functions of a lawyer: a wise counsellor; a skilled advocate; a person who does his part to improve his profession, the Court and the law; a leader of public opinion; and a man ready to answer the call of public service.75 In order that modern lawyers can discharge these divergent roles they undoubtedly need to be more intellectually informed and refined. However, the current practice in the law schools which studies law merely as a body of legalistic precepts or a melange of abstractions, separated from morals and the ideas of means-ends purpose for improving the common good of society is considered grossly inappropriate and inadequate to prepare lawyers to meet the new situation proficiently and effectively. Chief Justice Warren took up this point by saying that "[m]odern law school is not fulfilling its basic duty to provide society with people-oriented counsellors and advocates to meet the expanding need of our changing world."76 Arthur Lehman Goodhart on the other hand reminds that law schools must realize their proper role in society lest they might forget what Rashdall had noted regarding the noble contribution which lawyers made to the latter Middle

Ages. That is; From a broad political and social point of view, one of the most important results of the universities was the creation or at least the enormously increased power and importance of the lawyer class. Great are the evils which society still owes to lawyers, the lawyer-class has always been a civilizing agency. Their power represents at least the triumph of reason and education over caprice and brute force.77 (f) Improving the Professional Standard The contention for greater exposure of law students to the theoretical and jurisprudential aspects of the law is also impelled by the belief that it conduces efficient and responsible lawyers which in turn will enhance the general standards of the legal profession. To confine the training of lawyers to law office, therefore, will not suffice to generate highest professional standards in the Bar and the Bench. Knowing "how" is definitely only the first step. It is vital that graduates be made to know "why" if they "are to have a complete foundation on which to build increasing proficiency over the years." The crowning hallmark of the honourable profession is indubitably the high moral character of the members. It is only through liberal and philosophical studies in the law school, it is contended, that this ennobling virtue can be inculcated in the aspirants to the profession. As Douglas McFarland argues, "to think like lawyers" requires instilling in the students professional cognitive processes, and may also mean concern for strengthening of character. As the students are being prepared to become members of an honoured profession, nothing is then more objectionable than the notion that lawyers would be betteroff if they simply know their craft like plumbers and did not have their minds cluttered up with a lot of theory.78 The cluttering up of the graduates minds with theories which Mc Farland refers to is also essential for developing their sense of responsibility towards the profession. This point is highlighted by Griswold who says; [L]aw schools must be careful to keep first things first, to remember that they are not training lawyers primarily for the first month out of law schools, but for twenty years and more - for a professional career that normally lasts a lifetime. They must remember, too, that one of their most important functions is not the training of journeyman practitioners but rather the training of the men who must be leaders and set the standards and tone, and provide the imaginative insights for an important part of the community for many years after leaving law schools.79 If lawyers are expected to exercise leadership, not only within the narrow

confine of their practice, but also in the community in which they interact, it is then a disservice to them if their training is purely vocational. In fact as Woodrow Wilson pointed out, "the worst enemy of the law is the lawyer who knows only the technical skills." Accordingly, therefore, it is necessary that legal education should have its aim; to train persons in the understanding of the law, in sensitivity to its potential and limitations, in commitment to its ideal of justice and order, and in the skill to use and improve it in the service of client and community.80 In essence thus, legal education must train graduates to be able to apply their skills and law creatively and imaginatively. They must not only apply what is being practised but also to critically evaluate it in order to make improvements. In the words of Arthur Lehman Goodhart: the best lawyer is the one who can think as a lawyer. He must of course, learn the basic rules of his trade, but if he is to be more than a legal mechanic he must understand the true nature of those rules and the principles which they represent.81 Charles W. Joiner expressing a similar view says; It requires broad study if the lawyer is to have the background necessary to use intelligently (the skill he is trained in). Telling the law student what the law is, or how to perform an act, is not enough. There must be understanding on the part of the student - understanding of a sufficient nature so that in the light of changing circumstances the student will not follow that which has been told him. To have understanding requires broad, comparative study.82 The importance of jurisprudential and theoretical legal education to this end is incontrovertible for; it enhances lawyers to perform services beyond the scope of their narrow legal practice. It presents a true picture of the ... legal system and the forces which shaped it. It communicates the teleological purpose of the legal order to achieve justice both individually and socially.83 Closely related to the above argument is the need for law schools to make students see beyond the "conventional wisdom" of the practice. For only by lawyers realizing the shortcomings in their own method that they can be spurred into creativity, innovation and change. However, they can only move in this direction if they get proper training at the law schools. As Robert W. Gordon explains; Teaching any craft involves teaching its current customs, and one of the main

objects of law teaching has always been to familiarize students with the body of conventional rhetoric and practices. But I think it is bad teaching that encourages an unreflective acceptance of the current conventions. Teachers also ought to expand their students mind beyond the current professional wisdom, to show them that the going ways of doing things ... are not the only possible ways; and to develop the skills of critical evaluation of the going ways and of alternatives to them.84 In so far as the scholars of the Critical Legal Studies are concerned they are rather explicit in their stand as to what resides behind this professional conventional wisdom. As Robert W. Gordon again points out, the Critical Legal Studies teachings; encourage lawyers ... to make reflective decisions about how to perform it; insist that all such decisions, including the decision to acquiesce in what seems to be the current consensus, involve political choice; and what push people to recognize, justify and to take responsibility for the political choices that they make in their careers.85 Despite the wide recognition today of the indispensability of humanities studies in the law schools curriculum and the exigency that students be imbued with substantive vision, yet as many scholars still feel, law schools are only paying lip service to such needs. Stewart Maccauly, for instance, commented that; we have failed woefully to introduce students to what really goes on in practice and how law is actually used in [our social] life. If we made the curriculum reflect the actual work of lawyers and the actual role of legal institutions, we would prepare our students better for practice.86 If the law schools have such indifferent attitude it is because the law teachers persist in teaching law in the sterile vocational fashion and decry the philosophical approach as an indulgence of the eccentrics. Perhaps these teachers might do well to be reminded by the observation made in 1954 by Joseph A. Mc Clain Jr; During the past twenty five years the young lawyer who has reflected less credit than any other on the profession, has been the one who attended some law schools which purported to put primary emphasis on practical training, and which often advertised that its faculty comprised successful practitioners who could make great contribution to law instruction because of their vast practical experience. Most often the graduate of such a school possessed no real scholarly ability and training, but was preoccupied with practical slants and tricks of the trade. The young lawyer who has reflected the greatest credit on the profession, and

who generally has the greatest professional progress, is the one who received thoroughly sound analytical and scholarly training on a high level basis, with relatively little emphasis on the so-called practical know-how while in the law school.87 (g) Professional Vested Interest and Falsity of the Academic-Vocational Dichotomy Some scholars have come to perceive the opposition between the vocational and the academic approach to law studies as one not in a nature of a purely pedagogical debate or issue. But there is a sinister side to it as well. They point out that the claim that law schools should be more technical and more professional was initially egged on by some vested interests in the profession. This assertion subsequently permeated the academia and was accepted as the perceived wisdom of the legal education. Thus Robert Stevens speaking of the American Bar Association caustically remarks that it has never really cared about scholarship; most of its members have never taken seriously the academic branch of the profession. In fact, the "academic branch of the professional has been used to control entry to the profession" and help it create a unitary profession.88 His advice to law teachers who are concerned with the development of legal scholarship in the universities, therefore, is that they better use their energy for something useful than worry about the "frequently narrowminded and sometimes bigoted views of the practising profession.89 There are also, however, scholars who consider the dichotomy between the two approaches to legal studies as false and argue that there should be no contradiction between the academic and the practice. It has been remarked thus; the development of a sense of value in general and in relationship to each course and legal skill is probably the most practical part of all legal training, and a must for a lawyer who is going to succeed. In other words, the vocational aspect of lawyering in the main requires, as a pre-requisite to real success, the ability to make the judgments. Such an ability is greatly helped by the study of philosophy in context with each course and as an independent subject ... [P]roperly taught substantive and procedural courses of great practical and vocational value have a large amount of philosophic material in them.90 David H. Vernon further argues that law teachers have much to gain if they, instead of continuing to see the practical and theoretical aspects of law studies as mutually contradictory, realize that; [t]he teaching of legal doctrines and analysis might be improved if (1) more time were spent relating the theories being taught to reality; and (2) more emphasis were given to the use of appropriate historical, philosophical, and social science materials, including among others psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics, in the course of helping students understand the

legal process.91 It remains now my task, for completeness, to explicate on the relevance of the foregoing exposition to the Malaysian legal education scene. I propose to do this, however, by conjecturing three possible responses that might arise among those concerned with the legal profession in this country regarding the proper stand our law schools should adopt in fulfilling their legal education tasks. First, there can be the view which obstinately clings to the belief (and this is in spite of the overwhelming pronouncements to the contrary by eminent scholars, jurists and statesmen) that there is nothing wrong in our law schools being vocationally oriented; for after all the system worked in the past and as such there is no need to change the way things are. As I consider such a viewpoint a matter more of faith than reason and rationality, I shall just ignore it and pass on. The second response is the argument that even though the Malaysian legal education system resembles that of the American, in that universities undertake the task of preparing students for practice, it does not ipso facto follow that our legal education will be similarly afflicted by the maladies of its American counterpart. There is thus the confidence that Malaysian law teachers and law faculties are quite capable of looking after their own yard and thwart any tendency towards vocationalism. However, I do not share such confidence and optimism. Unless there is a high degree of consciousness on the law teachers part to arrest such a tendency the law schools here will very soon degenerate into a trade school. I envisage this situation because there are already indications germane to such a development. In the first place there is the inherent difficulty which law teachers face in trying to strike the balance between academic education and the training for practice - a difficulty which provokes a comment by Robert Stevens that "[t]he law teacher is schizophrenic. He lives in perpetual confusion about whether the audience is the legal profession or the scholarly world."92 In such an ambivalent situation they can easily veer towards vocationalism because the demands of the practice can be determined with certitude - that is, knowledge of rules and the ability to generate them using generally recognized techniques, whereas what helps to make an academic discipline is not fixed, unique, determinate, or controversial. Indeed changeability, eclecticism and controversy are probably essential qualities of academic life and the continual questioning about what makes an activity academic is central to its academic nature. Added to this dilemma are the pressure of time and resources, and available texts. What this means in most cases is that despite the realization on the part of the law teachers to teach law differently, (efforts towards this can be evident by the presence of some perspective courses in our law schools curriculum) they end up doing little more than teaching legal rules and technical skills. The most that law teachers seem to add is perhaps some discussion on policy as

either a part of received judicial opinion or as unsupported and unauthorized personal moral speculation. In short, despite the best intention, law teachers end up providing something close to the kind of education for which critical legal scholars damn American Law Schools.93 The curricular structure of our law schools shows strong leaning towards vocational training. This feature of the Malaysian legal education can perhaps be explained by the exigency to gain acceptability and approval from the profession when the law schools degrees came up for evaluation for recognition for practice purposes. In the result there is entrenched a perception in the law schools that the more practical and more professional their curricula the more congenial they will be to the profession. Closely related to this state of affairs is the general subservience of the law teachers to the Bar and the Bench. The belief is that the epicentre of law in the country is the practice. In such a situation there is an irresistible tendency to uncritically orientate the legal education to meeting the needs of the practice. In term of the pedagogy, most law teachers are positivistic, uncritical and unimaginative. Their teaching seldom transcends the repetitive imparting of legal rules and information which could be applied to solve legal problems. The corollary of this is the lack of participation by law teachers and students in discussions of broader issues in societies which go beyond rules of application. Another observable drift in our law schools is the growing marginalization of the theoretical and jurisprudential courses. Students display a general dislike, hostility and impatience towards jurisprudentially oriented courses and a perceptible click of minds switching off when some theoretical or critical question is raised. Surprisingly too there are law teachers who consider teaching such subjects as wasteful, irrelevant and esoteric. In the result, even though there could still be found courses in legal history and jurisprudence in the curriculum they are there, at best, more as part of tradition, at worst, aping blindly what others have done elsewhere. Closely associated with the above observation is the emerging perfunctory attitude among the students which aims at nothing else than to get through their law studies as quickly as possible so that they can join the practice and build their career - a development symptomatic of the general vocational orientation of our universities where education is geared towards the labour market and students trained for a job. Such an attitude provides nothing but a fertile ground for the germination of the narrow, superficial and sterile learning-teaching process of law. The third and final response that I anticipate is the argument which asserts that since our universities and education system are rather steeped in the British tradition, where the theoretical learning is still retained, the danger of our legal

education sliding into a trade-school type of training is, therefore, unlikely and remote. Such an argument, in my view, fails to appraise the whole situation and there is a danger in resting upon such laurels. It is true, as I pointed out earlier, that English legal education in the universities retains the elements of liberal education and aims to prepare an individual not for practice but to acquaint him or her with general legal principles and techniques.94 In fact it has been commented that the English system is perhaps the; better medium for grounding the young lawyer in the practical aspects of his occupation than is the American schools attempt to give practical training.95 On the other hand, it has also been acknowledged that the legal education in the British universities is defective and inadequate in several ways to produce excellent results. In the first place, the English legal corpus itself as an object of intellectual inquiry is puerile and jejune. English law being a single precedential jurisdiction, it has been pointed out, has led to non-critical and limited exposition.96 In terms of the teaching method employed in the British law faculties (and which is emulated uncritically in the local universities) the aim has been to teach law and not to train students to think. The law teachers do not regard it as their task to go outside the traditional doctrinal framework used by English Judges in rationalizing their decisions.97 The scenario that one gets in the law faculties is thus the student studies the law, he reads the cases with little thought of questioning them, and all he cares is only to know them. In regard to the law curriculum, what John W. Wade has to say of the Australian is equally applicable to the British; this is, the law schools continue to have vague, repetitive or undefined goals and insufficient and untested methods for achieving the elusive goals.98 In sum thus, the close affinity that our education system had had with the British system is no sure guarantee against retrogression in our legal education. Even though the set-up of the British legal education has the potential to allow for a richer and stimulating analysis of legal doctrines and issues it ends up suffering similar legal narrow-mindedness and dogmatism of vocationalism because of the deficiency in its teaching method and curricular structure. Conclusion Legal academics, practitioners and students in Malaysia must quickly realize the importance of theoretical and jurisprudential studies in the law schools. In my view many of the legal issues which our country came up against could have been constructively and ingeniously resolved if those entrusted to handle them were better informed in humanities, history and philosophy. Moreover if we are

all concerned with the need to indigenize our legal system (which is long overdue) it is ineluctable that the issue should be primarily conceived from the theoretical, social and jurisprudential perspectives rather than the strict and pure doctrinaire and positivistic standpoints as some scholars tried to do. Similarly the promotion of justice and human welfare in our society will be better served if lawyers and Judges are exposed to the human study of law, instead of trying to make them more practical and more professional. However, this situation cannot be brought about if those in charge with the administration of justice in this country are blinkered intellectually, without the slightest knowledge of sociology, economy, political science or philosophy. But if the profession continues to be repleted with such individuals, it is the law schools and law teachers who have first to take the blame. References 1. Aggraval, Arjun P., "Legal Education in India", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 12. No. 2, 1959. 2. Allen, Francis A., "Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 33, No. 3 1983. 3. Appel, John D., "Law as a Social Science in the Undergraduate Curriculum", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1958. 4. Brown, Brenden F., "Recent Trends in United States Legal Education", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1974. 5. Cahn, Edmund., "Some Reflections on the Aims of Legal Education", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1958. 6. Calabresi, Guido., "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom: Correspondence", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 35 No. 1 1985. 7. Conard, A.F., "Academic Preparation for the Practice of Law: Colloquy", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 14, No.1, 1961. 8. "New Models of Justice", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 24, No. 2 1972. 9. Cooper, Joseph H., "The Law School Way", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1975. 10. Currie, Brainerd., "A Place of Law in the Liberal Arts College", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1953. 11. Dawson, John P., "Legal Realism and Legal Scholarship", Journal of Legal

Education, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1983. 12. Derber, Milton., "What the Lawyer Can Learn from Social Science", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1963. 13. Devlin, Richard F., "Legal Education as Political Consciousness-Raising or Paving the Road to Hell", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1989. 14. Edlund, William., "Contemporary English Legal Education", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1957. 15. Finmann, Ted., "Critical Legal Studies, Professionalism, and Academic Freedom: Exploring Tributaries of Carringtons River", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1985. 16. Fiss, Owen M., "Of Law and The River," and of "Nihilism and Academic Freedom: Correspondence", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1952. 17. Goodhart, Arthur Lehman., "Law and the Universities", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 5, No.1. 1952. 18. Gordon, Robert W., ""Of Law and the River", and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom: Correspondence", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1953. 19. Griffith, J.A.G., "Academic Preparation for the Practice of Law", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1961. 20. Holton, Thomas., "Outline for an Integrated Law Curriculum" Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1972. 21. Hunts, Alan., "The Role and Place of Theory in Legal Education: Reflections on Foundationalism", Legal Studies, Vol. 9 No. 2, July 1989. 22. Joiner, Charles V., "Legal Education: Extent to which "Know-How" in Practice should be Taught in Law Schools", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 6, No. 3 1954. 23. "Symposium on Philosophy and Legal Vocationalism: Theoretical Consideration and Practical Proposals: A Plea for Flexibility in Content and Timing", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1966. 24. Lader, Philip., "Experiments in Undergraduate Legal Education: The Teaching of Law in the Liberal Arts Curriculum of American Colleges and Universities", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 25, No. 2. 1973.

25. Leleiko, Steven H., "Legal Education - Some Crucial Frontiers", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1971. 26. McClain, Jr., Joseph A., "Legal Education: Extent to Which "Know-How" in Practice Should be Taught in Law Schools", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1954. 27. McFarland, Douglas D., "Students and Practising Lawyers Identify the Ideal Law Professor", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1986. 28. Monahan, John, Walker, Laurens., "Teaching Social Science in Law", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1985. 29. Morton, J.D., "Academic Preparation for the Practice of Law", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1961. 30. Mudd, John O., "Thinking Critically About "Thinking Like a Lawyer"", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 33, No. 4. 1983. 31. Peden, John R., "Goals for Legal Education", Journal of Legal, Education, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1972. 32. Priest, George L., "Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1983. 33. Redmount, Robert S., "A Conceptual View of the Legal Education", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1972. 34. Russell, Charles H., "Liberal Education in Law", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1958. 35. Sampford, Charles, Wood, David.," "Theoretical Dimensions" of Legal Education - A Response to the Pearce Report", The Australian Law Journal, Vol. 62, No. l, 1988. 36. Shuman, Samuel I., "Symposium on Philosophy and Legal Vocationalism: Theoretical Considerations and Practical Proposals: Introductory Remarks by the Chairman", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1966. 37. Siedman, R., The State, Law and Development, St. Martin Press, New York, 1978. 38. Stevens, Robert, "American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1983.

39. Thomson, Alan, "Critical Legal Studies in Britain" in Critical Legal Studies, Fitzpatrick, Peter, Hunt, Alan, (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987. 40. Trubek, David, M., "A Strategy for Legal Studies: Getting Bok to Work", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1983. 41. "The Place of Law and Social Science in the Structure of Legal Education", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1985. 42. Tunks, L.K., "Academic Preparation for the Practice of Law", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1961. 43. Vernon, David H., "Education for Proficiency : The Continuum", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1983. 44. Wade, John H., "Legal Education in Australia - Anomic, Angst, and Excellence" Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 39, 1989. 45. Ward, Champion, F., "Liberal and Legal Education", Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1953. Endnotes: 1. Griffith, 1 J. Legal Ed. 18 [1961]. 2. Ibid, 17. 3. Tunks, 1 J. Legal Ed. 43 [1961]. 4. 3 J. Legal Ed. 302 [1954]. 5. 3 J. Legal Ed. 277 [1975]. 6. Samford and Wood, 1 ALJ 39 [1988]. 7. 1 J Legal Ed. 35 [1961]. 8. Quoted by Cooper, 3 J. Legal Ed. 269 [1975]. 9. Aggraval, 12 J. Legal Ed. 231, 247 [1959]. 10. Quoted by Montrose, 1 J. Legal Ed. 130 e.n. 7 [1961]. 11. Op. cit., 270.

12. 2 J. Legal Ed. 169 [1966]. 13. 1 J. Legal Ed. 55 [1961]. 14. Thomson, "Critical Legal Education in Britain", in Critical Legal Studies, 185, (Fitzpatrick, Peter and Hunt, Alan eds. 1987). 15. Finmann, 2 J. Legal Ed. 183 [1985]. 16. Goodhart, 1 J. Legal Ed. 1 [1952]. 17. Quoted by Redmount, 2 J. Legal Ed. 130 [1972]. 18. Ibid. 19. 1 J. Legal Ed. 24 [1985]. 20. 3 J. Legal Ed. 403 [1983]. 21. 4 J. Legal Ed. 388-9 [1972]. 22. Joiner, 3 J. Legal Ed. 307 [1954]. 23. Ibid, 308. 24. 1 J. Legal Ed. 1 [1958]. 25. 2 J. Legal Ed. 179-180 [1966]. 26. 2 J. Legal Ed. 202 [1972]. 27. Peden, op. cit., 382. 28. Calabresi, 1 J. Legal Ed. 23 [1985]. 29. Mudd, 4 J. Legal Ed. 706 [1983]. 30. Op. cit., 26. 31. Quoted by Peden, op. cit., 380. 32. Mudd, op. cit., 704. 33. Op. cit., 301.

34. Mc Clain Jr., op. cit., 309-310. 35. Peden, op. cit., 392. 36. Currie, 4 J. Legal Ed. 430 [1953]. 37. Leleiko, J. Legal Ed. 504 [1971]. 38. 1 J. Legal Ed. 101 [1986]. 39. Op. cit., 43. 40. Russell, 1 J. Legal Ed. 20 [1958]. 41. Op. cit., 14. 42. Peden, op. cit., 383). 43. Ibid, 15. 44. Quoted by Ward, 4 J. Legal Ed. 425 [1953]. 45. Ibid. 46. Redmount, op. cit., 142. 47. Quoted by Russell, op. cit., 17. 48. Wade, 2 J. Legal Ed. 196 [1989]. 49. 3 J. Legal Ed. 283 [1974]. 50. 3 J. Legal Ed. 441 [1983]. 51. See Samford and Wood, op. cit., 36. 52. Leleiko, op. cit., 526. 53. Op. cit., 428-429. 54. 4 J. Legal Ed. 490 [1958]. 55. 2 J. Legal Ed. 127 [1973].

56. Quoted by Philip Lader, ibid. 57. 2 J. Legal Ed. 203 [1985]. 58. 4 J. Legal Ed. 561 [1983]. 59. Quoted by Leleiko, op. cit., 508. 60. Cahn, op. cit., 1. 61. Quoted by Griswold, J. Legal Ed. 439 [1953]. 62. Op. cit., 10. 63. Trubek, 4 J. Legal Ed. 588 [1983]. 64. Op. cit., 283. 65. Op. cit., 437. 66. Op. cit., 509-510. 67. Op. cit., 392. 68. 3 J. Legal Ed. 442-3 [1983]. 69. Op. cit., 586, 588. 70. 2 J. Legal Ed. 214 [1989]. 71. Quoted by Currie, op. cit., 434. 72. Op. cit., 508. 73. 3 J. Legal Ed. 409 [1983]. 74. Op. cit., 191-2. 75. Op. cit., 394. 76. Quoted by Leleiko, op. cit., 502. 77. Quoted by Goodhart, op. cit., 3.

78. Op. cit., 101. 79. Op. cit., 443. 80. Holton, 2 J. Legal Ed. 195 end note 2 [1972]. 81. Op. cit., 1-2. 82. Op. cit., 297. 83. Brown. op. cit., 285. 84. 1 J. Legal Ed. 5 [1985]. 85. Ibid., p. 6. 86. Trubek, op. cit., 588. 87. Op. cit., 306. 88. Op. cit., 445-5. 89. Ibid, 444. 90. Joiner, op. cit., 178. 91. Op. cit., 561. 92. Op. cit., 446. 93. Samford and Wood, op. cit., 33. 94. Edlund, 1 J. Legal Ed. 17 [1957]. 95. Ibid, 25. 96. Edlund, op. cit., 18. 97. Abel-Smith and Stevens, cited in Siedman, The State, Law and Development, 1978, 368. 98. Op. cit., 199.
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