A key issue for U.S. policymakers in the region.

does Chinas growing prominence in Central Asia negatively affect U.S. interests? cannot yet be fully answered. At present, and for the near to medium term, the United States should not be overly concerned about Chinas role in the region, and in some respects should welcome Beijings approach in Central Asia. There are obvious shared interests between Washington and Beijing in this part of the world, and it is logical for the two, as well as for Moscow, to cooperate in addressing common challenges. These problems include, among others, terrorism, religious extremism, and drug trafficking. The problems of Central Asia are too numerous and too complex to be addressed effectively by the United States alone. Central Asians also lack the capacity to address them individually, and have proven incapable of pulling together more cooperatively to address their political, social, and economic challenges. Washington should encourage multilateral solutions and look for opportunities to engage with China (and Russia) whenever possible. Engaging today will help build the trust and confidence needed to reduce possible tensions over Central Asia that could possibly arise in the future between the three powers, whether it be over the direction of Kazakh energy exports or the remaining U.S. bases in the region. Nonetheless, the United States should pay close attention to the development of Chinas relations with Central Asian states to guarantee that China does not become a problematic influence in the region. Chinas unconditional engagement may serve to undermine U.S. goals of political reform. As Central Asian and Russian oil and gas begin to flow to market, economic competition among the major powers may become more intense, especially because these energy resources will become available during a period in which the United States maintains a regional military presence. Over the long term, should China (and perhaps Iran) become a more dominant presence in Central Asia, the United States will need to remain vigilant to ensure that its interests to promote political development, free trade, economic openness, and stable societies free from extremist influence are not sacrificed in the process. Overall, Chinas emergence in Central Asia will continue to grow based on a long history of interaction and apparent mutual interest. China has rediscovered its place in the region and is developing pragmatic channels to achieve its interests there, particularly in the fields of security and natural resource extraction. Chinas relations with Central Asia in and of themselves, however, are not a major foreign policy priority for Beijing. For the foreseeable future, Beijings Central Asian diplomacy and strategy will be more a means to other ends; in particular, to promote an alternative multilateral mode of international diplomacy, stable management of Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations, continued domestic economic development, and stability in Chinas western regionparticularly in Xinjiang. By and large, China pays close attention to Central Asia so it does not become a problem. Central Asian nations, meanwhile, have more to gain from the United States and Russia at present than from China, making their ties with China a lower (although growing) priority for them. Chinas chief objective is strategic denialto deny the rise of elements that will challenge Chinas internal security; deny the use of Central Asia by the United States to contain China; and deny a Russian monopoly of influence on its border. China will most likely give significant attention only to those problems that directly affect its vital interests, such as counterterrorism and other border security and transnational questions. Central to this will be the attention paid to the role of the Uyghurs in China-Central Asian relations.

It is also clear that Chinas goal is to foster regional cooperation only to the point where it fits into its own national interest. If China can achieve its aims bilaterally, and not through the SCO, it will. The SCO, however, provides a very useful vehicle to address transnational threats and opportunities. Moreover, the regions inability to apply collective action will minimize Chinas reach, making it likely that Beijing will have considerable influence in some states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but less in others. Chinas regional position will be most affected by the actions of the United States and Russia. The United States is the most important near-term influence on Central Asian states and thus will have a large impact on the regions security calculations in the future. Russia also has enduring importance to the region, and may undermine many of Chinas goals if it chooses to exercise its many levers of influence. In summary, the United States and Russia will have to deal with a more comprehensive Chinese presence in the region in the years ahead. Diplomatic and strategic hedging in the region has already begun. This is not a return to the Great Game of the nineteenth century, however. China, Russia, and the United States are too integrated with each other to threaten a clash over what is still a second-tier priority to each of them. However, given the intermingling of Great Power interests in this region, increased tension is possibleand probable. In the best of circumstances, the United States, China, and Russia will recognize their convergence of interests, and work together with the region to shape a more secure, prosperous, and stable Central Asia.