Linnea Calhoun Prof.

John Hardwig Philosophy 101, Section 8 October 25, 2011 In this paper I will attempt to prove that abortion is morally acceptable by examining the debate between pro-abortion and anti-abortion adherents. The debate is not, as political bias would have you believe, between those who believe in choice and those who believe in life. Choice and life are not mutually exclusive beliefs. Instead, the debate is between those who are anti-abortion and those who are pro-abortion. I would argue that both sides of the abortion debate are attempting to preserve the rights of their fellow persons. Both sides believe that a person has a right to life. But because the morality of abortion hinges upon the rights of the fetus, the answer to the abortion debate must lie in whether the fetus is a person or not. Most of those who are pro-abortion believe that a fetus does not have the same rights as a person, specifically the right to life. This belief is based on two ideas: that persons have the right to life, and that a fetus is not a person. If a fetus is not a person, then it doesnt have the same right to life that a person has, and therefore aborting a fetus is not immoral. This conclusion is sound as long as both assumptions are valid. As established above, both pro and anti-abortion groups agree that persons have the right to life, so it can be reasonably assumed that this assumption is valid for the anti-abortion argument. But the second assumption, that a fetus is not a person, is not mutually agreed upon because the definition of a

person is not agreed upon. Pro-abortion supporters must therefore defend their assumption by defining personhood with characteristics that a fetus does not have. For example, the pro-abortion definition of personhood includes characteristics such as consciousness, reasoning, the ability to communicate, and self-awareness. A fetus has none of these at conception, and in later stages of development may be capable of only one (consciousness), so such a definition of personhood supports the statement that a fetus is not a person. It follows that such a definition supports the idea that abortion is not immoral; however, it does not successfully prove that idea because it is inherently flawed. Many people who dont satisfy the definition are still considered persons and have the rights pro-abortion groups are attempting to deny the fetus. Comatose patients, as well as most infants, are among those who wouldnt be considered persons if this definition were valid. And because such people are, in fact, persons, the definition of personhood suggested by supporters of abortion does not prove that abortion is morally acceptable. Many anti-abortion groups have formed their argument in basically the same way. In their attempt to prove that abortion is not morally acceptable, anti-abortion groups argue that a fetus is a person and thus has the same right to life to which other persons are entitled. In contrast with the pro-abortion argument, this argument is sound so long as the definition of personhood includes only characteristics that a fetus has. In order to accomplish this, the primary antiabortion definition of personhood is the capacity, or potential, to develop characteristics like consciousness, self-awareness, and reasoning, not the characteristics themselves. Just as the pro-abortion definition supported the claim

that abortion is moral, this definition supports the claim that abortion is immoral. A fetus is genetically human and will, under the right circumstance, develop the aforementioned characteristics. It has the potential to develop them, and is therefore considered a person under this definition of personhood. But this definition, too, is flawed. First, there are a number of cases in which a nonperson would be considered a person under this definition. For example, brain-dead patients who are taken off of life-support have the capacity to exhibit the aforementioned characteristics, but they are not considered persons nor do they have the right to life, so this too must be an inaccurate definition of personhood. Without an accurate definition of personhood, those who are anti-abortion cannot prove that a fetus is a person and thus cannot prove a fetus has a right to life. But if a satisfactory definition of personhood cannot be found on either side of the debate, the morality of abortion must be found with a different set of reasoning. And if abortion is to be found moral without a definition of personhood, then it must be found moral regardless of a fetus state as person or nonperson. One argument that I believe accomplishes this is the argument put forth by one abortion supporter, Judith Thomson. Thomson argues that the right to life does not imply the right to use another persons body, and that it is therefore acceptable to abort an unwanted fetus. I believe one example that supports her basic premise is the fact that a mother is not legally or morally required to donate a kidney to her ailing son, even if he will die without it, and even though she can easily survive with one kidney. Her son has a right to life, but he does not have a right to her bodya fetus is no different. One criticism of this argument asserts that a woman is obligated to

carry a child to term because she chose to commit the act that resulted in her pregnancy. However, this is implausible. First, conception is not a crime, and therefore cannot be punished. A woman need not surrender her right to her body because she has committed no crime in conception. Further, because an unplanned pregnancy is necessarily accidental, it is unjust to violate a womans right to her body simply because she has become pregnant.

References Hinman, Lawrence M. "Ethics Updates - Abortion & Ethics." Ethics Updates Home Page. Moral Theory; Relativism; Pluralism; Religion; Egoism; Utilitarianism; Deontology; Duty; Human Rights; Anti-theory; Gender; Race; Multiculturalism;. University of San Diego. Web. 28 Oct. 2011. <http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Applied/Abortion/index.asp>. Thomson, J. "A Defense of Abortion". Philosophy and Public Affairs 1:1 (Autumn 1971): 47-66.