Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
kendallcrawford@earthlink.net
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Warning
This presentation moves through slides very rapidly Taking detailed notes may result in unexpected ergonometric stress
Electronic Handouts Coming Later
Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
LEST WE FORGET
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Killed over 250 people, left 100,000 homeless, destroyed more than 17,400 structures and burned more than 2,000 acres
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October 8, 1871
The same day as the Great Chicago Fire the Great Peshtigo Fire roared through NE Wisc. 16 towns burned down, 1,152 people died and 1.2 million acres of forest burned (3.5% of Wisc.) Wisc.)
This forest fire started near Peshtigo, Wisc., which disappeared in an hour. The newspapers originated the word firestorm .
This was an industrial fire started by railway workers clearing brush for new tracks.
Today Scope s Tank Fire Suppression Basic Tank Fire Facts Norco & Buncefield Buncefield Investigation Tank Overfill Protection API RP 2350
(API Std 2610)
Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
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Presentation Order
Tank Fire Supppression
Tank Fire Facts & Conclusions Explanation & examples 2 Classic Tank Fire Incidents
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Seal Fire
July 23, 2000 -- Sealy, Texas Crude Oil
Daspit Tool
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Crude Oil Seal Fire Sealy, Texas Many Hours burn Pre-foam Pre-
without becoming full surface unless sunk! (Best way to sink a roof lots of water!)
Ken Crawford 4-1-2003
Some folks suggest putting a dry riser & foam chamber at stairway platform which can be connected to foam truck to protect personnel on platform
Ken Crawford 5-12-2005
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Tank Fire Facts Full surface fires in large tanks over 150 ft (45 m) dia need large monitors for suppression
Big Footcan rapidly turn seal fires into fully involved tank fires but GREAT for full surface fires
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Volunteer Fire departments may be better IF they have Industrial volunteer members
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
Especially Fire Chief and Training Officer Include volunteer departments if they will respond
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
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LOGISTICS
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LOGISTICS
LOGISTICS
Expertise Firewater [quantity & pressure at site] Foam concentrate [right type at site] Foam application equipment People
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Mutual Aid Means Sharing You can join a Mutual Aid t organization if you have no resources to share
It like going empty handed to a pot luck dinner s
Tank Fire Foam Basics Foam Concentrate is: the stuff you buy Foam Solution is: % of Foam Concentrate mixed with water
How much foam do we need? = Concentrate need? Putting foam on the fire = Foam Solution fire
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
(6% or 3% or 1%)
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Use bulk foam transport -totes or tank trucks -no buckets or pails
(drums may do but are labor intensive)
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
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Flow, GPM
18,000 17,000 16,000 Water-Foam Solution Flow Rate, GPM 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 0
Water-Foam Solution Flow Requirement, GPM at Varied Application Rates (in GPM/sq ft)
Application GPM/ft2
Application Rates
0.24 GPM/sq ft
0.16 GPM/sq ft
0.10 GPM/sq ft
20
40
60
80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
Tank Diameter
30 ft dia tank
60 ft dia tank
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Tank Fire Basic Fact Full Surface Fires Need Lots of Foam
150 ft dia tank 1% foam needs at 0.16 usgpm/ft2 300 Gallons per 10 minutes ~ 60 Pails, 5 drums, 1 tote
Gallons of Foam Concentrate Needed for Each Ten Minutes of Foam Application at 1%, 3% and 6% Concentrations
9000 Foam Concentrate, Gal/Ten Minutes 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 Water-Foam Solution Flow, GPM
6% Concentrate
3% Concentrate
1% Concentrate
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Ancient Adage
Ancient Adage
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Like the answer to: Where did you park your 737?
SWA Stopped at Burbank Chevron Station
Like the answer to: Where did you park your Pickup?
Ken Crawford 5-52005
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is an Embarrassing Answer
Honolulu 1980
Shell Deer Park have two 4,000 gallon tankers with120 GPM Edwards Edwards foam pumps. Internals lined with epoxy coating before adding foam foam
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Norco Louisiana
Orion - June 8, 2001 - Largest Tank Fire Ever Extinguished 270 ft (82 m) dia by Williams Fire & Hazard Control Remnants of TS Allison ~ 15 inches of rain Lightning protection is difficult -- AFTER the roof sinks. 65 min suppression out 13 hrs from ignition 270 ft (80 m) dia is 82% more surface area than 200 ft (60m) tank
June 8, 2001 270-foot diameter gasoline storage tank 32-foot-tall storage tank at 28 ft of its full 27032- foot325,000 barrel capacity; 160,000 barrels of gasoline remained in the tank after extinguishment
Ken Crawford 8-24-2006 8-24-
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5.2.4 Design Criteria for Foam Monitors and Handlines. 5.2.4.1 LIMITATIONS. LIMITATIONS 5.2.4.1.1 Monitor nozzles shall not be considered as the primary means of protection for fixed-roof fixedtanks over 18 m (60 ft) in diameter.
Ken Crawford 8-20-2006
NFPA 11 says --
270Gasoline Storage Tank Over the Top 270 Top Suppression Using two Big Gun monitors flowing 50% more water than total available at Buncefield
8,000 GPM
4,000 GPM
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Norco Orion?
Large full-surface Tank Fires need Large Monitors to extinguish You can put out one-half of t a full surface fire!
Ken Crawford 9-21-2006
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Flame Collapse
12 Minutes
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Buncefield Terminal Fire Sunday Dec 11, 2005 Aerial View of a World Class Event
Note small (vent or seal?) fires
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R.I.P.
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Buncefield Investigation
Bruncefield Incident Dec 11 15, 2005 First Interim Report Feb 21, 2006 Incident & Emergency Response Second Interim Report April 11, 2006 Environmental aspects Third Interim Report May 9, 2006 Cause Analysis - Overfill 4th Report called Initial Report7-13-06 Initial Conclusions & work ongoing
Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk
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1) Water pumped from lake to artificial pool used to produce foam 2) Fire engines, foam cannon and fixed fire-fighting units apply foam 3) Huge clouds of smoke produced 4) Water curtain protects intact tanks on eastern part of site. 5) Bunds fail to contain firewater contaminated with HC fuel. 6) Investigations find "large amounts" of run-off escaped from the site, contaminating ground and surface water.
Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
Twelve 150 mm (6 in) Fire Hose lays to Buncefield Fire site one plus mile from lake source
Six primary pumps each with two 6 hoses plus three booster pumps; four hydrosubs; 30 km (18 miles) of 6 hose; operated 24 hrs/day for five days at average 25,000 lpm (ca 7,000 GPM) with peak of 42,000 lpm (8500 gpm)
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Twelve 150 mm (6 in) Fire Hose lays to Fire site 1+ mile from water source. 18 miles of hose to flow 32,000 liters/min (8,500 USG/min) using UK New Dimensions initiative pumps & hose Dimensions
180 firefighters 250,000 litres (66,000 USG) foam concentrate USG) 25 million litres (7 MM USG) water 30 km (98,000 ft) high-volume hose high-
Other reports: up to 600 firefighters (probably due to shift relief); more foam and more water
Advisors included Kelvin Hardingham of Williams and Dr. Niall Ramsden from RPI. Much tank foam equipment, and experienced HC fire personnel provided by UK industry
Ken Crawford 9-21-2006
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Handheld hoses Truck mounted monitors (on foam trucks) Portable Big Guns & Foam Cannons Dual Agent (foam + dry chem) on Pressure Fires Med-Expansion Bund Pourers on pool fires
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
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Foam for API Storage Tank ConferenceSupplied in Bulk Buncefield - September 2006
Refilling fire truck w foam concentrate from tanker
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One method Used to Address Extensive Pool Fires in Berm Areas Around Tanks Medium Expansion Bund Pourers 25 to 35:1 expansion ratio low p 1.5 3 bar
Bund Pourer
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PLANNING
like -- get folks together with a beverage of their choice and say LET BRAINSTORM! S
Preparation for Tank Fires? API RP 2021 helps Planning Management of Atmospheric Storage Tank Fires
(2001 reaffirmed 2006)
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How will we notify and get the help needed on site at the incident?
Planning
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One Knowledge Source: Buncefield Investigation Dec 11, 2005 -- Incident Feb 21, 2006 -- 1st Progress Report -- plus -HSE Advisory for Self-Audits w Inspections SelfApr 11, 2006 2nd Progress Report May 9, 2006 3rd Progress Report July 4, 2006 HSE TAV Switch Alert July 13, 2006 Initial Report Aug 22, 2006 Release Site for work Sept 13, 2006 BP Start HC Removal
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk
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Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk
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Buncefield Aftermath Note foam & water in Bunds Which became a major issue
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May 9, 2006
Ken Crawford 5-10-2006
May 9, 2006 Cause Analysis: Describes overfill release scenario of Tank 912 and subsequent consequences resulting from unexplained overpressure
Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk
Overpressure magnitude
The magnitude of the overpressure generated in the open areas is not consistent with current understanding of vapour cloud explosions. A explosions.
Current best estimates of the overpressure are in the order of 700 to 1000 millibars in the car parks (10 to 15 psi). pp 54
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Buncefield Investigation
July 13, 2006 Initial Report Although prior reports were interim, detail is not repeated in this Initial Report The Investigation Continues
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
Unexplained Omission?
is actually the 4th Report Issued -after 3 Interim Progress Reports Cause: Tank Overfill attributed to equipment malfunction Still don Understand t Why Such Severe Overpressure Groundwater Contamination led to Declaring Major Accident to the Environment (MATTE) Resulting in COMAH Notification
No Mention of Operators
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Buncefield Investigation
Event massive vapor cloud & high overpressure explosion Cause TANK OVERFILL attributed to equipment malfunction (and???) Aftermath Extensive Community damage & loss of containment Closure of terminal for ??
(9 months prohibited access released for Work Aug 22, 2006)
Much uncertainty remains about why the explosion was so violent, generating overpressures a magnitude greater (700-1000 millibar) (700millibar) than current understanding of vapour cloud explosions would predict (20-50 millibar) (20millibar)
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Why and how did car get to this location in this condition?
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Buncefield Investigation Initial Report Report The paramount need is to ensure the integrity of the primary means of containment, i.e. to make sure that fuel does not escape from the vessels in which it is normally contained. (Keep the HC in the Tanks)
Buncefield Investigation Initial report 3:00 a.m. 5:20 a.m. 5:50-6:00 6:01 Level gauge stopped showing increase Calculated overflow begins Flow rate increases to 890 m3/hr First Explosion of several -- then tank fires
But flow ex P/L still 550 m3/hr (3,500 bbl/hr, 2,400 USgpm) USgpm)
Evidence suggests that the protection system which should have shut off the supply of petrol to the tank to prevent overfilling -did not operate. operate.
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
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Feb 21, 2006 -- HSE issues precautionary advice to fuel depot operators self-audit with advice selfHSE follow-up. 4-16-06 due date. follow4- 16June 13 HSE Publishes initial audit feedback
Aug 22, 2006 HSE Release Site for work Sept 13, 2006 BP Start HC Removal by Truck
Ken Crawford 9-16-2006
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Buncefield Investigation Stated Issues of concern arising from Investigation to date Design & Operation of Storage sites
Containment [of release and overfills]
Emergency Response
Judged Good [with room for improvement]
Buncefield Investigation
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26 Million Liters of Stored Firewaters The oil companies have assured us that they are working on this issue but that the clean up of the firewater is a complex process. find this continued delay unacceptable We and still await formal proposals from them and a date for clean up work to start.
(Note: proposal received September 12, 2006 and under review by UK EA) review Concerns include PFOS at ppb levels
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
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API Std 2610 9.2.9 Piping Piping or conduit passing through dike walls shall be designed to prevent build-up of excessive stresses on pipe or conduit as a result of settlement. Penetration of dikes (except drains) shall be kept to a minimum to eliminate leakage paths through the dike. The area surrounding the penetration shall be sealed with a high-temperature fire resistant material to prevent migration of liquids through the dike.
Ken Crawford 9-13-2006
Keep HC in Tanks
Ken Crawford 8-25-2006
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API RP 2350
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API RP 2350 Some basic principles (Section 1.4): Protection against overfills best achieved by: Awareness of capacity & inventory Careful monitoring and control of product movement High level detectors and/or automatic shutdown/diversion systems shall not be used for control of routine filling operations.
Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
specifically limited to petroleum facilities with aboveground storage tanks that receive Class I liquids from mainline pipelines or marine vessels.
API 2350 is CONSISTENT WITH NFPA 30
Aboveground storage tanks with less than 600 gallons capacity. capacity Aboveground storage tanks with over 600 gallons capacity that receive or contain Class II or Class III liquids. Aboveground storage tanks that contain noncombustible liquids and other non-petroleum products. Aboveground storage tanks that contain Class I liquids received from other than mainline pipelines or marine transfer (such as receipts from tank trucks, railroad tank cars, transfers from other tanks, facility process units, private pipelines, and crude oil production facilities). Underground storage tanks.
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Expanded coverage to include Class II as well as Class I starting with tanks above 1320 USG Excludes Process tanks, service station tanks whether above or below ground, underground & loading or delivery from wheeled vehicles (tank trucks, tank cars).
Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
1.2.1 APPLICABILITY Specifically limited to tanks associated with marketing, refining, pipeline and similar facilities containing Class I or Class II petroleum liquids. Underground storage tanks Above ground tanks of 1320 US gallons (5000 liters) or less Tanks that are integral to a process Tanks containing Class III liquids Tanks containing non-combustible liquids Service Stations (whether above or below ground) Loading or delivery from wheeled vehicles (such as tank trucks or railroad tank cars) 1.2.2 CONSISTENT WITH NFPA 30
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API RP 2350
3rd Edition Jan 2005
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API RP 2350 4th Edition 200x (2007?) Same Scope as 3rd Edition Improved guidance (friendlier?) Classify Tank Operations (risk base?) Revised Definitions?? (probably) Incorporate Human Factors?? Levels of Protection Concepts Protection
[Conceptual Alignment with IEC 61508, IEC 61511 & NewS84.01]
ANSI Status??
Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
Process Design
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Hydrocarbon Layers of Protection Is Really from the Inside Out Protect by Keeping Hazards IN
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May 9, 2006 interim report says Tank 912 OVERFILL was release source
Tank 12
Tank 912
Damaged Office Building
Certain aspects of installation and testing the high level safety system to prevent tank overfill are critical in ensuring that it works properly
Operators of establishments similar to Bruncefield are advised to carry out immediate checks where TAV level switches are fitted to their storage tanks. Operators should check TAV level switches fitted with change over (double throw) reed switches.
The switches are tested by using a lever or plate fitted to the head of the switch, which can be raised to simulate a high level of liquid in the tank. If the switch is working, then alarms and trips tank. connected to the switch should operate. It is critical that after this test the lever or plate is returned to returned the correct position and locked into place, using a special padlock switch being inoperative in normal operating mode even though it gives the appearance of functioning normally when tested.
supplied by the manufacturer, and in accordance with the manufacturer instructions. Failure to do this can lead to the s
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The relevance of the installation and performance of these (TAV) switches in respect of the Buncefield incident is only one of a number of lines of enquiry. It is therefore inappropriate to comment on its relevance in the particular circumstances of Buncefield. Buncefield. is also too early to say when the It Buncefield investigation will conclude, or what it might say regarding these switches. switches.
HSE Disclaimer
Significance for Storage Tank Operators Ensure tank overfill protection is robust robust
Suggestion review API RP 2350 Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks In Petroleum Facilities 3rd Ed Check for TAV Switches & follow HSE advice
Review training & proficiency Review emergency response plans Who ya gonna call?(apologies to Ghostbusters)
CHALLENGES: PERSONNEL, LOGISTICS, KNOWLEDGE 911 not prepared for terminal fires Consider & participate in mutual aid organizations
(no free lunch participation must be substantive)
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Keeping Product in Tanks isnt brain surgery -- but it does require: planning, procedures, qualified personnel, the right equipment and resources --- and PROPER EXECUTION
Ken Crawford 4-1-2005
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NFPA 30 2007 -- BIG CHANGES (high probability) Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code All Aboveground Storage Tanks to be tested, inspected, repaired and maintained in accordance with API Std 653 & API RP 12R1.
(did not previously reference API standards).
Requires ALL tanks storing Class I and Class II liquids to have overfill protection in accord with API RP 2350. (previously required only Class I tanks receiving
(Also Requires all terminals to establish procedures to check and remove water bottoms in accordance with API 1501, 1621 and 2610 or STI Bulletin "Keeping water out of your tanks" )
Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
API 12R1 - Setting, Maintenance, Inspection, Operation and Repair of Tanks in Production Service STI SP001 - Standard for Inspection of Aboveground Storage Tanks 3rd Ed. July 2005 API RP 2350 - Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities, 3rd Ed. Jan 2005 Facilities
The IFC meets in September 2006 for hearings on code changes. Since the IFC references many NFPA 30 requirements, expect these to apply there also Ken Crawford 4-5-2006
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Buncefield Investigation
Buncefield Investigation Event massive vapor cloud & high overpressure explosion Cause Tank Overfill attributed to equipment malfunction (300 Tonnes ~ 100,000 USG) Aftermath Extensive Community damage & loss of containment
(9 months prohibited access Aug 22, 2006 released for Cleanup Work 9-13-06 BP began trucking fuel site not released for normal operations)
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Tank Examples - Layers of Protection Tank Fill & Drain Valves (chain & lock) Firewall (bund) Firewall drain valve (chain & lock) Grading away from tank Metering in & out charts & computer Operating staff (on-site & off-site) (onoffGauging equipment (redundant on separate power) Automatic shutdowns Procedures & Training? Tank Inspection Site security (physical & cyber/electronic)
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13th Annual Les Williams Advanced Flammable Liquid Firefighting Foam Technology Workshop - May 2006
DO: Use tote tanks or bulk trucks for foam supply DO: Understand monitor reach capability as function of angle DO: Train facility management in ICS (before they take command)
Ken Crawford 5-14-2005
13th Annual Les Williams Advanced Flammable Liquid Firefighting Foam Technology Workshop - May 2006
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Facility-Specific Planning
Netherlands Antilles
Leaders & helpers & equipment? Where will you get enough foam concentrate & water & move to site? Where will you stage equipment and set up for suppression?
Eight 625,000 BBL (100,000 M3) Floating Roof Crude Oil ca 275 ft dia
How will you protect exposures? Where will run-off go? Time Time -- Time
Facility-Specific Planning
Richmond California
Access!!
Leaders & helpers & equipment? Where to get foam concentrate & water & move to site? Where to stage equipment and set up for suppression? How to protect exposures? Where will run-off go? Time Time -- Time
Dutch engineers first used this layout so crude could gravity feed through the process areas. If there is a boilover IT WILL!
Ken Crawford 4-1-2003
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Bruncefield Incident Dec 11 14, 2005 Third Interim Report May 9, 2006 Cause Analysis - Overfill Initial ReportJuly 13, 2006
Much uncertainty remains about why the explosion was so violent, generating overpressures of a magnitude much greater than current understanding of vapour cloud explosions would predict. For example, a method in current use would predict overpressures of 20-50 millibar (mbar) in the open areas of the Northgate and Fuji car parks. The current best estimates of the overpressures that actually occurred in these areas are of 700-1000 mbar, leading to extensive damage to adjacent buildings. Annex 6 describes the mechanics of fire and explosion hazards from fuels such as petrol, as currently understood. Further work is needed to research the actual mechanism for generating the unexpectedly high explosion overpressures seen at Buncefield. This is a matter of keen international interest,
December 12, 2005 -- Police have said they had found nothing malicious" in the incident, which happened in Hemel Hempstead on 11 December, 2005. Shortly after incident UK Fire Expert me, what To s interesting is how this fire and cloud could initially have made such a big bang. In an open space you would expect a flash of fire which would have burned out quickly, not a big explosion
May 9, 2006 Interim Report pp 55
The investigation has, so far, been unable to establish why the ignition of the vapour cloud and the explosion propagation in the relatively uncongested environment of the adjacent car parks caused significant overpressures
Ken Crawford 6-2-2006
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Introduction to Safety Around Tanks Workshop - June 2006 On Wednesday, December 7 (4 days before the incident) a videotape by al-Qaeda's deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, was shown on the Internet calling for attacks against Gulf oil facilities. The video had first been released on Sept. 19 and shown on Al-Jazeera TV. "I call on the holy warriors to concentrate their campaigns on the stolen oil of the Muslims, most of the revenues of which go to the enemies of Islam," said al-Zawahri, the Egyptian deputy of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. "The enemies of Islam are exploiting such vital resources with incomparable greed, and we have to stop that theft with all we can and save this fortune for the nation of Islam. The cause of yesterday's disaster was not immediately known, said Total SA, the French oil company that operates Buncefield in a joint venture with Texaco. Source Newspaper/TV reports
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