research

ELSEVIER Research Policy24 (1995)97-114

policy

Building bridges for innovation: the role of consultants

in technology transfer
J o h n B e s s a n t *, H o w a r d Rush
Centre for Research in Innovation Management, University of Brighton, Falmer, Brighton, E. Sussex BN1 9PH, UK
Final version receivedSeptember 1993

Abstract

Recent models of the innovation activity depict the process as non-linear, and characterised by multiple
interactions, systems integration and complex networks. This paper examines the implications of technology transfer
within such models, identifying the components of managerial capabilities required to absorb and assimilate new
inputs of technology required for successful transfer. Particular attention is paid to the intermediary roles which can
be played by consultants in bridging the 'managerial gap', the changing nature and scope of services offered by
consultants and the contributions they can make within technology policy. Implications for government technology
transfer mechanisms are discussed and examples of innovative government technology transfer policies are reviewed.

1. Introduction The process through which technology moves

The importance of 'technological competence'
as a source of competitiveness, both at the level
of the firm and, in aggregate form, at the level of
nations has been firmly established [19,20]. By
technological competence we are referring to the
package of technological resources, skill and ex-
perience which give firms their distinctive com-
petitive edge [21]. Such competence can be built
up internally, through research and development
( R & D ) and through various organisational learn-
ing processes which enhance and maintain the
knowledge base [9,17]. However, even large and
well-endowed firms, and certainly smaller and
less experienced organisations, will at some point
need to look to external sources for inputs to the
process of building up technological competence.
* Corresponding author.
from outside sources to the organisation is 'tech-
nology transfer'. In recent years the complexity of
the transfer process has been examined by a
growing number of researchers whose findings
are beginning to impact upon technology policy
decision-making. This paper examines the inter-
active nature of the transfer process, reviews some
of the policy mechanisms which enable it to pro-
ceed effectively and, in particular, looks at the
role which can be played by consultants as an
integral part of policies aimed at stimulating the
diffusion of industrial best practice.
2. An emerging interactive model for technology
transfer
From the outset we should be clear that what
is transferred may take one of many forms. It
could be in the tangible form of a new piece of

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98 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
process equipment or embodied in a prototype
product. It could equally be in the form of knowl-
edge, codified via a patent licence or a set of
design specifications. It may be transferred em-
bodied in physical form or it may carry over in
the knowledge and experience of a particular
individual recruited to the firm. Technological
knowledge may be coded in explicit form or held
in a tacit mode, part of the informal knowledge
derived from experience with particular activities.
This multi-dimensional character of technology
transfer suggests that mechanisms to encourage
and enable it will need to be wide-ranging, yet
many formal processes and policies for technol-
ogy transfer make narrow assumptions about the
nature of what is being transferred and the chan-
nels along which it might flow.
A second point to make about technology
transfer is that it is not an instantaneous event
but a time-based process involving several stages.
These range from initial recognition of opportu-
nity or need, through search, comparison, selec-
tion, acquisition, implementation and long-term
use (involving learning and development). This is
a complex activity involving multiple actors and
elements and various different patterns of inter-
relationship; at each stage in the process there
may be a different set of influential participants
and issues.
Our understanding of the nature of the inter-
active process of transfer has been evolving from
a relatively simple version relating the interac-
tions between a supplier and a receiver of tech-
nology to more complex variants involving multi-
ple actors and influences. 1 In examining the lit-
erature on innovation and transfer twelve critical
points do emerge which we believe should be
taken into consideration in the development of
technology policy. These include:
i Perceptions about the nature of the transfer process mir-
ror and draw upon the deepening understanding of the inno-
vation process itself. Rothwell [23]provides a useful historyof
models of innovation, from an early period characterised by
simplistic linear models, through increasinglycomplexinterac-
tive models to a model characterised by an emphasis on
multiple interactions, systems integration and complex net-
works.
(1) Transactions in technology transfer are not
always on the basis of one-to-one but may also be
one to many or many to many. In addition they
may not proceed directly but may often operate
through various forms of intermediary. Carlsson
and Jacobsson [7] in their study of technology
transfer within various sectors of the Swedish
economy point out the critical role played by a
number of key 'bridging institutions', several of
which can, and in some cases, have been incorpo-
rated into the transfer policies.
(2) Technology is a multi-dimensional com-
modity and a particular package might not be
available from a single supplier but from a combi-
nation of sources. For example, in the case of
advanced manufacturing systems there are few
'turnkey' suppliers and policies aimed at the pro-
cess of transferring such technology have to take
into consideration the need for simultaneous in-
teraction with a number of suppliers of different
size, experience and competence. One way of
dealing with this problem has been the use of a
particular type of intermediate organisation, the
systems integrator, who effectively acts as a
'managing agent' on behalf of the recipient com-
pany, helping to enable and assure effective tech-
nology transfer [1].
(3) Technology does not remain static over
time but is constantly being modified [11]. Thus
each transaction in technology transfer is, to some
extent, unique and company-specific, involving a
particular configuration of technology. This mili-
tates against standard mechanisms for ensuring
technology transfer and argues for flexibility in
the design and application of such policies.
(4) Traditional models of innovation diffusion
assume that cost is the main motive for change
and that firms will respond directly to cost-re-
lated signals (e.g. [13]). This implies that policies
designed to promote or accelerate the uptake of
technology should stress the cost advantages.
However, empirical evidence on innovation adop-
tion suggests that a much wider set of influences
and motives are at work, and that it is the per-
ceived rather than the objective characteristics of
innovations which affect the adoption decision
[22]. Thus policy mechanisms need to be flexible
enough to raise awareness and to permit poten-
 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
tial users to explore and evaluate technologies
against their own particular and subjective crite-
ria prior to adoption.
(5) Diffusion studies have highlighted the im-
portance of 'opinion leaders' in a particular in-
dustrial community. If these can be identified and
technology is successfully transferred to them,
there is a greater likelihood of other finns follow-
ing suit. Thus an increasing number of policy
measures have been based upon the principle of
the demonstration effect, that by setting up some
examples of finns which have adopted a particu-
lar technology there will be encouragement and
reassurance for others to follow. However, it is
important in this connection to recognise the
range of opinion leaders within an industry; the
influential firms may not always be the most
technologically advanced or the largest. Further-
more the population of potential adopters
changes over time and thus the mechanisms and
cases used for demonstration need to be adapted.
(6) Where a particular pattern of innovation
(technological trajectories) becomes established it
helps define the track along which organisations
in a given sector will tend to move in order to
remain competitive. This bandwagon effect has
both positive and negative implications; in a posi-
tive sense it offers an accelerator effect to policy-
makers, encouraging transfer of particular tech-
nologies across the population of firms. However,
it may be that the trajectory becomes too nar-
rowly defined and may be inappropriate for par-
ticular types of firm. For example, there was a
strong trajectory in the early 1980s along the lines
of integrated computer-based factory automation;
this was given added support by extensive policy
measures to subsidise the exploration and imple-
mentation of such technologies. Yet this trajec-
tory was of primary relevance to large firms and
there were considerable risks associated with its
pursuit by smaller, less experienced firms.
(7) Traditional models of innovation assume
that information about innovations is freely and
widely available. Yet a variety of studies have
demonstrated that the reverse is often the case;
in particular there is often an awareness gap
amongst smaller enterprises which do not make
use of the traditional channels of communication
99
[12,18]. Policy measures thus need to include an
information promotion and diffusion component,
and one which makes extensive use of a wide
range of channels.
(8) Traditional interactive models often un-
derestimate the extent of user/producer interac-
tion in the process of innovation and re-innova-
tion. Yet as Rothwell [23], Von Hippel [30], Shaw
[28] and others have repeatedly highlighted, this
interaction is often a rich source of innovation.
Thus policies designed to enable transfer of tech-
nology should include facilities to encourage con-
tinuing interaction and exchange between play-
ers.
(9) As Voss [31] and others have highlighted,
there has been a neglect of the theme of imple-
mentation in innovation studies. Often there is
the implicit assumption that the point at which
adoption takes place is the end point of the
innovation process. Yet experience suggests that
simply possessing a technological resource is no
guarantee of its effective use, building technologi-
cal competence requires a learning process to
absorb and optimise the technology. The implica-
tion for policy support is that it should cover the
post-adoption period as well as promote or facili-
tate adoption.
(10) A further limitation of many models is
the assumption that users are homogeneous and
that standard solutions to the technology transfer
problem can be applied. Diversity amongst the
population of potential adopters of a technology
suggests that policy measures need to be flexible
and able to address a wide variety of firm types
and needs.
(11) There is often a strong cultural dimension
embedded within a particular technology; when it
is transferred to a different location implementa-
tion may fail because of an underlying cultural
mismatch [8]. One often cited example of this
phenomenon is the case of computer-based pro-
duction management systems such as Materials
Requirements Planning (MRP) which evolved in
the context of US engineering firms. Transferring
this technology to European sites, with a very
different organisational model and underlying
culture of working has not been entirely success-
ful and there are still problems with this technol-
100 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
ogy some 30 years after its original development.
Understanding the cultural determinants underly-
ing the success or failure of technology transfer
has never been a strong feature of technology
policy.
(12) A final point which is often inadequately
addressed in models of technology transfer is the
means by which firms learn to handle the process
better over time. Development of managerial ca-
pability in technology transfer is of particular
relevance in the case of transfers between indus-
trialised and developing countries where there is
a danger that a continuing state of dependence
on outside sources will evolve. However, such
concerns are equally applicable in the case of
SMEs. Encouraging the learning processes
through which firms gradually become better able
to handle the process of selection, negotiation,
implementation, etc. which constitute good tech-
nology transfer practice is an important policy
goal. [6,14,26].
3. Organisational capability in technology trans-
fer
The implications of the points raised above for
technology transfer policy are clear. Firms differ
not only in their technological competence but
also in their capability to absorb and assimilate
new inputs of technology. Managing such a com-
plex process requires high levels of managerial
skills and innovative capabilities on the part of
firms.
Such capabilities include the following.
(1) Recognition of requirements for technol-
ogy through a systematic and regular audit of its
current competencies and a comparison of those
which it needs to develop or acquire in order to
become or remain competitive. Essentially firms
should have a technology strategy and be able to
plan its growth and development.
(2) Exploration of the range of technological
options available (there may be several competing
solutions to the problem such as different ma-
chines, different technologies, different suppliers,
etc.) and search widely for these so as to get a
good fit with their needs.
(3) Comparison between all the options avail-
able which can be achieved through some form of
benchmarking.
(4) Selection of the most appropriate option
based upon this comparison.
(5) Acquisition of the technology (either
through direct purchase or via some form of
licence, collaboration, alliance, etc.) This is likely
to involve extensive negotiation around price,
specification, transfer of knowledge, property
rights, etc.
(6) Implementation of the technology within
the firm. This may involve extensive project plan-
ning and management activities and require con-
figuration of both technology and organisation to
get a good and workable fit.
(7) Operation of the technology and learning
about how best to use it. Over time this may
involve extensive learning and development; com-
petence is very much the product of this last stage
of accumulation and incremental development,
and much of what is represented by technological
competence is highly firm-specific and often tacit
in form.
Each of these activities could be further disag-
gregrated, but our point is that they are primarily
about managerial capabilities, the conscious
choices about what firms do when trying to trans-
fer technology. Performance of each activity can
be improved through experience, however, these
capabilities are often not present or only poorly
developed. Consequently, there is a high inci-
dence of failures or partial success in technology
transfer, particularly amongst the SME popula-
tion.
The lack of these managerial capabilities rep-
resents one of the main barriers to technology
transfer and is a key area towards which external
policy support might be directed [10]. Policies
should thus focus on closing the managerial gap
through mechanisms which encourage the devel-
opment of, or compensate for the lack of, rele-
vant innovative capabilities, especially in smaller
and less experienced firms. One possible element
in such policies is the use of consultants as inter-
mediaries to assist and advise firms, effectively to
compensate for a lack of capability.
 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114 101

4. The role and nature of consultancy in the
innovation process
Empirical work on innovation systems gives
strong support to the view that it is the overall
system and the quality of interconnections within
it which affects successful technology transfer [7].
In particular it highlights the importance for many
firms of intermediaries in the technology transfer
process. Examples of such intermediaries include
technology brokers, university liaison depart-
ments, regional technology centres, innovation
agencies, and cross-national networks such as TII
(The European Association for the Transfer of
Technology, Innovation and Industrial Informa-
tion). Amongst this growing group of intermedi-
ary agencies, and of growing policy significance
are those firms and actors engaged in consultancy
and related advisory activity. Their inputs can be
direct, offering transfer of specific technological
competence, but they are often involved more in
a wider and more flexible interaction in the pro-
cess by providing a number of information and
related services which help to bridge the gap
between technological opportunity and (often
poorly articulated) user needs. Table 1 indicates
the type of bridging activities which might be
performed by such consultants. Over time this
process can be seen as first substituting or com-
pensating for a lack of and then development of
internal capability.
Traditionally consultancy has been seen as a
linear activity, implying a transfer of expert
knowledge from supplier to user. But its role and
impact is more subtle and has several other com-
ponents, both formal and informal, which are
increasingly being recognised as important in the
process of developing both technological compe-
tence and managerial capability. For example, in
addition to the linear expert model there is grow-
ing interest in what Schein [27] terms 'process
consulting', a catalytic, non-directive approach
which stresses learning and facilitation rather than
prescription. Increasingly consultants sell their
services on the basis of shared problem-solving
and have a clear commercial interest in develop-
ing longer-term partnerships as opposed to sell-
ing one-off products.
The diversity of the consultant role and the
flexibility in modes of operation and interaction
mean that there is considerable scope for consul-
tants to act as key bridging intermediaries across
a wide range of users. Experience suggests that
there are a number of ways in which consultants
can improve the operation of the innovation pro-
cess. First there is the direct transfer of spe-

Table 1
Intermediary roles of consultants
User needs Bridging activity Supply side
Technology Articulation of specific needs Sources of technology
Selection of appropriate options
Skills and human resources Identification of needs Labour market
Selection Training resources
Training and development
Financial support Investment appraisal Sources of finance - venture
Making a business case capital, banks, government, etc.
Business and innovation strategy Identification and development Environmental signals -
Communication and implementation threats, opportunities, etc.
Knowledge about new technology Education information and communication Examples of best practice
Locating key sources of new knowledge Emerging knowledge base
Building linkages with the external knowledge system
Implementation Project management Specialist resources
Managing external resources
Training and skill development
Organisational development
102 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
cialised, expert knowledge which has already been
obtained and assimilated by the consultants; this
is the traditional model of consulting practice.
Second there is the role of experience sharing,
either implicitly or explicitly. Here the consul-
tants act rather like bees, cross-pollinating be-
tween firms, carrying experiences and ideas from
one location or context into another.
A third role is that of 'marriage broker', pro-
viding users with a single point of contact through
which to access a wide range of specialist ser-
vices. These might be available from the consul-
tant in question or they might be provided by
other organisations known to the consultant. In
this role the consultant is acting as a channel and
selection aid to the user. The degree to which the
consultant is seen as independent is important
here; for example, consultants recommending
computerisation of a user's activities are likely to
be less credible if they have a close relationship
to a particular hardware or software supplier
than if they are impartial and able to provide
unbiased guidance in selection.
Fourth is the diagnostic role which consultants
play in helping users articulate and define their
particular needs in innovation. Many user firms
lack the resources or experience to understand
and prioritise their problems in such a way that
external resources and opportunities can be ef-
fectively utilised. Consultants can provide a valu-
able input to this first stage of innovation, by
creating a strategic framework for change; they
can also move from identifying needs in this
fashion to suggesting means whereby the identi-
fied problems can be solved. In this fashion they
are analogous to a general medical practitioner
whose main task is diagnosis and who then pre-
scribes from a variety of treatments (medicines,
diet, physiotherapy, further consultation and
treatment under a specialist, etc.).
This growth in the types of service offered by
consultants can be seen as part of the wider
expansion within the producer services sector
[15,24]. Indicators such as the increase in mem-
bership of trade associations for consultancy sug-
gest considerable expansion of the industry; in
parallel with this has come a move away from
reliance on traditional 'product lines' such as
Table 2
Typology of consultants
Expert ~-
v Process
Sector specific h.~ General
w
Small/1 man Large,
band multidisciplinary
Technology
Generalists
or app.lication w
specific - e.g.
total quality
specialists
Traditional ~ ~- New
consultancy entrant
background
accountancy services and towards a much broader
portfolio. Although further disaggregation is pos-
sible in terms of size, of sectoral orientation, etc.,
Table 2 presents an indicative typology.
Given such diversity it becomes possible to see
consultants as a flexible resource capable of fill-
ing the interstices within the overall innovation
system. Thus there is a strong case for mobilising
this resource within the framework of regional
and national policies designed to promote devel-
opment of technological competence, particularly
in the case of SMEs. The next section reviews
early experience of designing consultancy/
intermediaries into technology transfer pro-
grammes.
5. Innovation policy and a role for consultants
Most governments are now involved in some
way in supporting innovation at regional a n d / o r
national level but there is still wide variety in
both the underlying philosophy (from explicit in-
tervention to 'hands-off' posture) and the mecha-
nisms used. Some have made use of explicit poli-
cies targeted on particular sectors or technologies
and with the explicit aim of influencing the rate
and direction of innovative activity. Others have
opted for more general infrastructural measures
where the main objective is to create the condi-
tions within which innovation can flourish [23].
Despite this diversity there has been a degree
of convergence in policy-making over the last 15
years. First there has been a recognition of the
 J. Bessant, 11. Rush/Research Polio' 24 (1995) 97-114 103

generic and strategic nature of some technolo-
gies, notably the cluster around information tech-
nology (IT), which have prompted special action
programmes even in traditionally non-inter-
ventionist economies. Second is the adoption of
alternative mechanisms as a complement to the
traditional package of loans and subsidies for
investment; one of these has been the increasing
use of consultants as part of an emerging strategy
of technological competence building at a na-
tional level [4,29].
Early attempts to encourage the diffusion of
key strategic technologies (such as advanced man-
ufacturing technology or biotechnology) via tradi-
tional mechanisms were not entirely successful,
particularly at the level of the small/medium
sized enterprise (SME). Such firms often lacked
the technical and managerial ability to assess and
enter what was often perceived to be a radically
new and risky technological field. This condition
was exacerbated in some countries by a basic lack
of key skills to support in-house development
work; there was thus considerable need for exter-
nal assistance in various aspects of the technology
transfer process. Attempts were made to involve
the consulting sector through a combination of
awareness raising, feasibility study and develop-
ment projects. This had the effect not only of
providing assistance to SMEs but also of expand-
ing rapidly the supply side; many consultancy
companies were formed to participate in such
schemes and much latent technological skill was
mobilised as a result. Of course one unwanted
side effect of such rapid expansion was the lack
of quality control and there were instances re-
ported of poor and unprofessional conduct
amongst small sections of the emerging consul-
tancy sector [18].
Experience with various uses of consultancy as
part of larger promotion and diffusion policy
programmes suggests that this model was a useful
addition to the policy repertoire; as a result there
was considerable expansion during the 1980s
[4,29]. As outlined in Table 3, the roles played by
consultants in the diffusion programmes ranged
from capability building and attempting to reduce
the chance of failure through to cost reduction
and greater targeting of support. In some in-
stances, the use of consultants also allowed gov-
ernment agencies to move away from heavily cen-

Table 3
Potential contribution of consultancy in capability-building
Characteristic
Capability building
Institution building
Failure avoiding
Lower cost
Targetting of support
Decentralised operation
Illustrative examples
Advice and information support via consultancy enabled the development of
key management capabilities in identifying needs, exploring and selecting innovations,
planning, implementation, project management, etc.
Such schemes also offered an opportunity for developing strategic capabilities across
the supply side - for example, mobilising a critical mass of technological knowledge and
skills in support of particular technologies
Providing targetted advice and direct technical and managerial support offered
opportunities to reduce the incidence of costly failures of investments through
transferring better innovation management practice - for example in selecting
appropriate applications of new technology and in project management
Providing innovation support through information and consultancy advisory
service was less expensive than direct subsidy, soft loans or other innovation
policy options
Using consultants as active intermediaries opened up the possibility of reaching user
firms more directly than traditional financial support mechanisms which tended to lack
focus and often failed to reach many potential users within a target group
Using consultants enabled a more decentralised mode of operation, involving
less monitoring and control by civil servants. Once the broad objectives of a programme
were set out it could be largely self-managing, with overall monitoring and
quality assurance provided by a small and specialist group, itself sometimes outside of
government but contracted with the specific project monitoring role
104 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
tralised programmes to ones which migrated to-
wards a form of self-management.
A typical example of the kind of consultancy-
based schemes now operating in many countries
is the UK's Enterprise Initiative. Launched in
1988, it brought together a number of existing
schemes with various new programmes to offer a
package of support aimed primarily at the small/
medium sized firm. The basic concept was that
firms could enter the programme at a basic level
with a visit from an 'Enterprise Counsellor' (often
a retired and experienced industrialist) who would
work with them to identify needs and potential
solutions. Support would then be available for
consultancy work to enable the firm to explore
key areas such as design, quality and manufactur-
ing technology; the scheme also included other
areas such as marketing, exporting and supplier
partnership development. In each case the fund-
ing from the state was partial (firms were re-
quired to make a contribution) and limited to a
maximum of around 15 days; any further work
would be undertaken at commercial rates. The
underlying idea was to encourage and enable
firms to enter new technological and commercial
fields by providing a subsidised hand to hold;
significantly this scheme replaced much of the
traditional financial support (via subsidy or soft
loans) for innovation in industry.
The scheme has extended the range of support
and advice available and operates as part of a
broader framework including awareness raising
and general information provision on the one
hand and (highly selective) financial support on
the other. Its management is decentralised with
the constituent schemes being run by project
managers appointed from outside the govern-
ment on a contract basis.
6. A specific case: Advanced Manufacturing Tech-
nology (AMT) support
The Enterprise Initiative shows how consul-
tants can be incorporated into fairly broad-based
firm level improvement programmes. The impor-
tance of their role can be further illustrated by
referring to a specific example of innovation pol-
icy which has made use of various kinds of inter-
mediary support through consultancy. Here we
focus on policies to promote the adoption and
implementation of advanced manufacturing tech-
nology (AMT).
Advanced manufacturing technology is a
generic term covering a range of broadly defined
technologies and techniques which have the po-
tential to improve performance across manufac-
turing industry. These include:
(1) advanced hardware and machinery (such as
automated assembly systems, vision systems,
flexible handling and high speed machinery);
(2) new materials technologies;
(3) new a n d / o r alternative manufacturing pro-
cesses (such as powder or laser technologies
applied in various contexts);
(4) advanced and integrated information systems
(for storage/retrieval, processing and com-
munications);
(5) new organisational and production manage-
ment approaches (such as total quality man-
agement, lean manufacturing and continuous
improvement).
The potential of AMT to help with the prob-
lems of manufacturing has always been recog-
nised. In the early days this was seen primarily as
improvements in efficiency through cost reduc-
tions but more recent developments suggest that
AMT can contribute major enhancements in the
overall strategic effectiveness of the firm, for ex-
ample, through better flexibility, speed of re-
sponse, quality of goods and services and more
frequent innovation of products. But despite the
clear attractions of AMT as a resource with which
to meet the manufacturing challenges of the late
twentieth century, the rates of diffusion and par-
ticularly of successful implementation remain rel-
atively low [25].
This does not appear to be a problem of the
performance or availability of AMT. Technologi-
cal development accelerated throughout the 1980s
in at least three directions; in improvements to
existing applications (faster, cheaper, etc.), in ex-
pansion into new application domains (from the
factory floor to design, logistics, distribution,
 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
planning and the supply chain), and in customis-
ing, whereby appropriate versions of A M T be-
came available to suit particular sectors, firm
sizes and price ranges [2]. Nor does it seem to be
a problem of general awareness; most industrial-
ists have been exposed to the A M T story via a
number of routes and there are many demonstra-
tions and reference sites available to reinforce
the message about its potential for improvement.
The problem appears to be one of tailoring
and matching A M T applications to specific user
needs, in essence, moving from the general to the
particular. At this level, and especially for the
smaller firm, there may be a role for consultants
to assist in the process of exploring, selecting,
implementing and operating AMT.
Policy interest in A M T grew out of develop-
ments in microelectronics during the late 1970s
when it became clear that significant competitive
advantage might be gained through the early
adoption of this technology in products and pro-
cesses. This view was based on a limited under-
standing of the technology and on a few dramatic
examples, such as the Swiss watch industry,
telecommunications equipment and electrome-
chanical office equipment, where simultaneous
product and process changes had major impacts
on price, performance and employment [3]. 2
Over the past 15 years various there have been
several shifts in the nature and rationale of A M T
support programmes [4]. Emphasis has moved
from what might be termed 'substitution innova-
tion' (which effectively improves upon what has
always been done) towards more radical forms
which exploit completely new options [16]. There
has also been a shift towards promoting more
integrated systems involving communication and
networking between different A M T elements
2 A typical view of the urgencywith which policymeasures
were taken at that time can be gained from the documenta-
tion which accompanied the launch of the UK's Microproces-
sor Application Programme in 1978; this argued that '...the
UK cannot afford to miss the microelectronics boat...'. A
blunter expression of the same sentiments appeared three
years later in a speech made by the then Minister for Infor-
mation Technology who argued that '...the choice for UK
firms today is stark-automate or liquidate!...'
105
within and between firms [2]. The potential appli-
cation domain has moved from the factory floor
to design, logistics, manufacturing administration,
and other areas. And A M T programmes have
increasingly come to recognise the importance of
organisational change in parallel with technologi-
cal, and to promote innovations of this kind,for
example, through total quality initiatives and or-
ganisational development work (cf. the DTI's
Manufacturing, Organisation, People and Sys-
tems programme (MOPS) and Eureka's Integra-
tion of Technology and Organisations programme
INTO).
6.1. Different consultancy players
With a field which has been expanding so
rapidly over the past 15 years it is not surprising
that there is considerable knowledge and experi-
ence available which might be tapped through a
consultancy support programme. The main policy
question is how to mobilise and manage this
diversity.
In the early days of AMT, consultancy was
dominated by technical and engineering-based
consultaneies and similar organisations. However,
just as the definition of A M T has broadened out,
so too has the range of firms active in offering
consultancy services. The following groups can be
identified as participants in the market; Table 4
summarises the strengths and weaknesses of each
group included in this analysis.
(i) 'major league' management consultancies,
which have moved into A M T consultancy from a
core business of accountancy, financial services or
general management consultancy. Such firms have
considerable strengths due to their size and re-
source base (especially following several mergers
amongst key players) and have a strongly devel-
oped image and infrastructure. Their business
development comes through a variety of routes
including some formal marketing, but much de-
pends on introductions which emerge through
existing accountancy and related work with clients
and through a highly developed personal net-
work. The major weakness of such firms is their
price which puts them beyond the range of many
106 J. Bessant, 11. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
smaller firms. A second weakness is that, despite
a numerically strong resource base, the actual
expertise in AMT-related areas may be limited.
Since good staff in this area tend to be highly
mobile and may not stay for long with any one
firm of consultants, this can lead to a lack of
depth and an inability to guarantee long-term
implementation activities.
(ii) traditional engineering and manufacturing
consultancies, a group which comprises many firms
who have been working in the AMT field long
before it became fashionable. Firms in this group
have considerable strength in terms of experience
and in-depth resources and many are large
enough to operate developed regional and sector
infrastructures. Business development comes
through a combination of client recommendation
and reputation, together with extensive network-
ing. Significantly this group has placed growing
emphasis on publicity (through various channels
such as conferences, video, trade press articles,
etc.) to draw attention to their work and to suc-
cessful case histories. As with the previous group,
the main weakness of such firms is their high cost
which makes them less attractive for SMEs.
(iii) software and systems houses, whose entry
into AMT consultancy has come from an expan-
sion from a narrow technical core. Such firms
have considerable strength in key areas (such as
software integration or customisation) but may
lack breadth across the whole portfolio of AMT
consultancy activities, for example, in the human
resources or manufacturing strategy areas. Their
costs are often lower than the above groups, but
they may be limited in the range of assignments
which they can take on.
(iv) hardware and systems suppliers, a group
characterised by the desire to add value to their
basic products through provision of consultancy
and support services. Some have also learnt a
great deal about AMT throughout a decade of
trying to catch up with competitive manufacturing
best practice and are now trying to capitalise
upon this experience. In this group strength comes
from knowing about some elements of AMT
equipment in depth but many lack the broader
experience or skills to offer a full portfolio of
AMT consultancy services. Many, for example
specialists in robotics or machine tools, can con-
tribute better as part of a larger consortium or by
forming joint ventures and strategic alliances with
other firms whose offerings are complementary.
Business development for this group often fol-
lows traditional market lines, building upon expe-
rience and reputation as equipment suppliers.
(v) human resource management consultancies,
where experience in organisational development,
management of change and other programmes
which emphasis team building, employee involve-
ment, etc. can be brought to bear on AMT-re-
lated techniques like total quality management.
Such firms have considerable strength in human
resource development but have a major weakness
in not being able to support the wider AMT
portfolio, and often lack experience in manufac-
turing strategy.
(vi) process industry contractors, where the en-
try point lies in the considerable experience which
such firms possess in configuring and integrating
large systems and in large-scale, long-term pro-
ject management. Firms here have considerable
strengths in managing major projects but lack
experience in the broader field of manufacturing
and in many of the core technologies and other
fields within the AMT consultancy service portfo-
lio.
(vii) universities and colleges, where there is a
potentially wide-ranging resource-base in most if
not all of the disciplines required in the AMT
portfolio. Increasing pressure on higher educa-
tion coupled with greater autonomy has led to
rapid increases in consultancy activity and with
this have come much higher levels of profession-
alism. Such institutions have major strengths in
resource base and have cost advantages since
overheads can be spread across teaching, re-
search and consultancy activity. They are also
well-linked into academic research and develop-
ment networks and can mobilise considerable
problem-solving resources through these. On the
negative side, there is a traditional image prob-
lem and (although this is gradually changing) a
potential conflict of priorities between consul-
tancy and other activities closer to the core busi-
ness of education. Additionally there is still
something of a gap between the academic and
 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114 107

Table 4
Key players in the AMT consultancy market
Organisation Origins/motives for Strengths Weaknesses
entry
(i) Major Expansion into non- Size and resource Cost (especially for
accountancy and accountancy business base smaller firms)
management Regional Resource base not
consulting firms infrastructure always strong in
Image and depth
reputation
Contacts and
networks, especially
existing client base
Traditional business
(ii) Major area Cost
engineering and Size and resource
technology base
consultancies Regional
infrastructure
Experience and
range of skills
Contacts and
networks
Strong marketing
(iii) Software and Development of Technical Narrow experience
systems suppliers business from competence in key base
narrow technical core areas Narrow portfolio
into other fields of AMT support
services
(iv) Hardware Extension into other Reputation as Narrow range of
suppliers areas hardware suppliers services offered
Utilisation of Contact network as
experience as users of suppliers
AMT Strength in core
product areas
(v) Human resource Extension from Competence in Narrow resource
development change management human resources and base
consultancies type projects into organisation Only limited range of
TQM and related development areas AMT services offered
fields Lack of
manufacturing
experience
(vi) Process industry Experience in major Strong track record Most experience in
contractors project management and experience base process industries
and implementation Integration and less so in other
Experience in implementation manufacturing
configuring and skills sectors
integrating complex Limited resource
systems base
(vii) Universities and Expansion of Wide resource base Academic/industry
colleges activities into Access to national divide
consultancy and international Image and reputation
networks Lack of project
Low cost structure management skills
108 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114

Table 4 (continued)
Organisation Origins/motives for Strengths Weaknesses
entry
(viii) Training Extension into new Existing network of Lack of broader AMT
consultancies markets beyond contacts competence
traditional training Skills in human
resource
development aspects
of AMT
(ix) Early users Building upon Further up the Narrow range of
experience as users learning curve AMT services offered
(x) Contract and Expansion of services Strong resource base Gaps in resources,
research and markets Core technical especially in human
organisations competencies resource and
Existing industry strategic
networks management areas
SME experience Need to focus on
AMT services as a
strategic direction
not a by-product of
RA activity

industrial worlds, although for many institutions
this is rapidly closing with a variety of closer links
with industry (such as the Teaching Companies in
the UK 3) being formed. Business development
in higher education can build upon extensive
contacts on a local level, on introductions from
part-time students and in an increasing number
of cases, on full-time staff with resources and a
general marketing brief to promote take-up of a
wide range of services.
(viii) training consultancies, where the empha-
sis is on training and human resource develop-
ment but where increasing opportunities exist for
extending the range of work to include aspects of
AMT planning and implementation. One group
of such firms active in the UK are the erstwhile
statutory industrial training bodies, which can
often exploit their previous contacts on the train-
ing side as the basis for developing into other
3 The Teaching Company Scheme is a UK government
programme which links universities and industry through the
placement of post-graduate students in firms and whose work
is jointly supervised by a member of the University's staff and
a member of the company.
business areas. The main weakness here is, again,
an incomplete portfolio, with limited AMT imple-
mentation experience.
(ix) early users, where the main entry point is a
realisation that there is still relatively little expe-
rience of moving along the road towards exten-
sive and integrated use of AMT. Firms in this
group have learnt the hard way through projects
which began in the early 1980s and are now in a
position to exploit this experience as a commer-
cial opportunity.
(x) contract and industry research organisations,
which are able to build upon their networks of
support in technology within particular sectors.
As with traditional engineering and manufactur-
ing consultancies (group ii), organisations here
have always been active in the AMT field but
may now be in a strong position to develop
through their existing networks and out into a
wider market. Particular strengths would include
existing networks and experience and extensive
technological resources and experience, together
with a background which has included developing
and offering services to smaller enterprises. On
the downside, these organisations may lack the
complete portfolio of AMT services, particularly
 J. Bessant, 1f. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
in the areas which have recently come under the
AMT umbrella, such as strategy and organisa-
tional development.
6.2. Different users
The market for AMT consultancy services is
showing signs of segmentation and further devel-
opment of this trend can be expected. At a crude
level it is possible to identify at least three differ-
ent groups of users of AMT consultancy services,
each requiring a different approach.
The first group are the large companies for
whom the use of consultancy is a regular activity,
often directed to solving a particular technical
problem which the firm has not encountered be-
fore and which lies outside its normal range of
activities and beyond its existing resource base.
Examples here would be the use of consultancy
to enable moves into networked and integrated
manufacturing systems (as opposed to simply up-
dating old equipment with new technology), to
introduce new concepts (current topics would in-
clude Taguchi methods and quality function de-
ployment, for example) or to develop a strategic
plan and framework for the competitive use of
information technology (rather than simply using
IT to support information processing activities).
In addition, other motives for using consultants
include those of providing short-term extra re-
sources (for example, in supporting the opening
of a new facility), to provide external support and
momentum for courses of action already favoured
within the firm or to provide a mechanism for
implementing unpopular changes.
The underlying assumption in this market seg-
ment is that users have considerable experience
of consultants and can manage the process well.
Price is often less significant than non-price fac-
tors like competence, rapid response and avail-
ability. Competition in this area is intensive and
activity is dominated by the major accountancy
and management consulting firms, as well as the
major engineering and technology consultancies
(groups (i) and (ii) in the previous section).
The second market segment is that dominated
by the smaller enterprises (SMEs) and is charac-
terised by a relative inexperience in using either
109
AMT or the services of consultants. As a result
there is often a need for extensive 'hand-holding'
and longer-term involvement. Motives for using
consultants here include a need to identify where
and how AMT can be deployed to support the
business (identifying opportunities), assistance in
formulating and implementing an integration
strategy, project management and implementa-
tion skills, and the development of the broad
manufacturing organisation in areas like quality
and co-ordination systems. For very small enter-
prises there may also be a need to provide basic
training and skills transfer in the general areas of
good production operations and management
practice.
Since most smaller firms have not traditionally
used consultants but are now facing new market
and technological challenges for which they re-
quire external advice, this segment offers consid-
erable growth potential. Unlike large firm rela-
tionships, however, SMEs may need more of a
long-term partnership with closer involvement in
project implementation as well as planning. Mar-
keting to such firms is much more open and
depends on a variety of channels, including cold
calling, trade advertising, demonstration facilities,
word-of-mouth recommendation, etc. Industry-
based networks, such as operate around trade
and technical associations, and regional represen-
tation offer opportunities for business develop-
ment.
An important feature of such SME-focused
work is the international dimension. Newly indus-
trialising countries and those involved in catching
up, such as Spain, Greece and Portugal within
the European Union (EU), and Eastern Europe
beyond that, are characterised by having high
percentages of SMEs and even large enterprises
in these countries are relatively inexperienced
and backward in the appreciation of basic manu-
facturing management and AMT. Thus experi-
ence gained in developing and offering a portfo-
lio of services suited to smaller firms may be of
considerable value in developing an international
business opportunity.
The third market segment is not composed of
direct users but rather of agencies involved in
promoting industrial development such as na-
110 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
tional government departments or ministries of
industry and regional authorities, or, at the inter-
national level, several of the Directorates-Gen-
eral of the EU, various agencies of the United
Nations (e.g. the United Nations Industrial De-
velopment Organisation and the United Nations
Development Programme) and the Common-
wealth Secretariat. Here the pattern of industrial
policy intervention has increasingly been to pro-
vide advice and consultancy support as well as
direct investment support, in an attempt to en-
hance industrial competence and competitiveness
through innovation. This follows from a growing
awareness of the complex nature of technology
transfer and the need to support it with a number
of information and advisory services as well as
with equipment and money.
Many of the transfer schemes which these
agencies/departments have developed are tar-
geted to a greater or lesser extent at SMEs. The
rationale behind this varies but includes a belief
that larger firms do not require support of this
kind and a view that SMEs are a vitally important
source of industrial development and hence of
employment generation and economic growth.
Given the increasing availability of funds un-
der such schemes it is important for AMT consul-
tants to be aware of the processes of policy for-
mulation, the criteria required for effective par-
ticipation and the lessons learned from policy
monitoring and evaluation. This suggests that
successful contractors would have access to pol-
icy-making and monitoring networks, be able to
offer a wide portfolio of SME-related services
(including basic planning and more sophisticated
AMT support) and have considerable in-house
competence in core areas of AMT. In addition
access to industrial networks to enable rapid dif-
fusion of good practice, links to international
networks and partner institutions, and links to
R & D and academic research networks would
represent valuable strengths.
6.3. Policy examples using consultants in A M T
A number of AMT policies have made use of
consultancy services as part of their programme
of support. One of the earliest examples of con-
sultancy was the UK's Microprocessor Applica-
tion Programme, which was designed to promote
the accelerated adoption of microelectronics in
products and processes. Launched in 1978, it had
three main elements, an awareness raising and
information scheme, a consultancy scheme
(MAPCON) and a more traditional subsidy/soft
loan scheme for investment support. MAPCON
was designed to try and bridge the emerging gap
between a general awareness of the potential of
the new microelectronics technology and the spe-
cific needs within user firms, particularly the
smaller and less technologically experienced, by
subsidising an exploratory feasibility study by con-
sultants. This had two important effects for the
UK; first, it did largely succeed in helping less
experienced firms learn about the technology
(even if the outcome was not always a develop-
ment project). And second, it provided a mecha-
nism for mobilising what were, at the time, scarce
electronics engineering skills; with the guarantee
of subsidised consultancy fees, many new firms
were set up by technical specialists who had not
previously been in the consulting business, for
example, in universities or in retirement. MAP-
CON had some problems, notably the early diffi-
culty of quality control amongst the many new
entrants to the field, but its streamlined mode of
operation, rapid turnaround and response to the
needs of smaller firms was well-regarded by users
[18]. One indicator of its success was that the
basic model was applied in almost all of the AMT
support programmes which succeeded MAP.
One important feature of the MAPCON expe-
rience was the degree to which it highlighted
multiple roles for consultants within the innova-
tion process. Whilst there was a need for tradi-
tional expert consultancy aimed at helping solve a
specific technical problem there were other roles
which were more closely related to developing
managerial rather than simply technological ca-
pability within user firms. These included helping
explore and articulate internal needs for innova-
tion, developing business, product and manufac-
turing strategies, providing assistance with selec-
tion and investment appraisal and justification,
implementation support and project manage-
ment, and advice on marketing, human resource
 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
and other questions surrounding the innovation
process.
A similar pattern of development can be found
in the German case, where the current AMT
programme (Projekt Fertigungstechnik) places
considerable emphasis on ensuring that the nec-
essary capabilities in planning and implementa-
tion are present within the firm before innova-
tions based on AMT proceed. These can be pro-
vided through consultancy, subsidised on a simi-
lar basis to that in the UK; with the current
extension of the programme to cover the newly
unified L~inder, this option may be an important
component of the policy.
In the case of Ireland, a programme called
'AMT Ireland' was launched in 1987 as part of a
wider set of policy initiatives aimed at improving
the industrial base of the country. The scheme
established four centres of excellence, based on
universities and with the intention of building
links between the research base and the indus-
trial community, (which is primarily composed of
SMEs). These centres were intended to provide
consultancy support and advice to local firms and
there has been considerable learning on the part
of the centres, the scheme management and the
user community. In particular the simplistic model
of linear transfer from university research to in-
dustrial application has given way to one which
recognises the high variety of needs and the ne-
cessity of working in more interactive mode. In
addition it also became clear that setting up
groups with a high level of technical skills did not
necessarily provide an effective consulting base;
the key inter-mediating skills of consultancy re-
quire time, training and experience to develop.
This theme of training of consultants, and of
users forms a key strand in the Norwegian BUNT
(Business Development Using Technology) pro-
gramme in support of AMT. BUNT was a pro-
gramme specifically targeted at improving techno-
logical competitiveness of SMEs which ran be-
tween 1989 and 1992. Consultants were drawn
from private industry, local government, national
research institutions, etc., many of whom re-
quired training in order to be in a position to
provide effective support to the firm. Conse-
quently, a development programme which in-
111
cluded ten days of training and twenty days of
close follow-up work on a case study company
was introduced to provide quality assurance.
MINT (Managing the Integration of New
Technology) is a proposed new EU programme,
part of the SPRINT (Strategic Programme for
Innovation and Technology Transfer) activities
which is scheduled to be launched in 1993. It has
been heavily influenced by the Norwegian BUNT
programme although its design also builds upon
experience in other EU countries which have
made consultancy a key feature in AMT support,
including Germany and the UK. MINT is tar-
geted at SMEs and attempts to address the capa-
bility gap problem directly by providing an um-
brella of support and advice to firms wishing to
upgrade but not necessarily knowing where to
start or which technological route to take.
The programme is to operate at national level
and is designed to promote the take-up of new
technologies through the use of specialist innova-
tion consultants. It involves 24 co-ordinating bod-
ies across the Community (many of whom, like
PERA International in the UK have direct expe-
rience of earlier schemes involving consultancy)
who are responsible for selecting, training and
supervision of innovation consultants who will
assist SMEs in developing plans for adopting and
implementing new technologies. The emphasis is
on initial articulation and exploration and the
output from such activity may well be access to
other support schemes for investment or contact
with expert consultants or specialist equipment
suppliers.
A key feature of this early stage capability
support and development is the emphasis on
training, of both consultant and users. The idea
behind this is that there is often a lack of under-
standing on the part of the consultants about the
particular problems and needs of SMEs in find-
ing and articulating problem areas, and a lack of
experience on the part of users in how to work
with consultants and how to develop strategic
innovation plans and so on.
From the above it is clear that there is no
single blueprint for the use of consultants within
technology transfer programmes. There are many
potential actors on the supply side, from tradi-
112 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
tional 'professional' consultants to relative new-
comers such as universities which have technical
skills but may often need some training and de-
velopment in the area of consulting skills. Equally
there are diverse user groups, ranging from so-
phisticated large firms to those for whom consul-
tancy is a new experience. None the less, the
experience of these programmes does tend to
support the view that consultants provide a valu-
able intermediary role, especially in reducing the
uncertainty associated with the innovation pro-
cess, and they represent an important addition to
the armoury of policy mechanisms in support of
technology transfer.
7. Emerging policy issues
The increasingly complex view of the innova-
tion process has been widely recognised and ab-
sorbed in academic circles and, although progress
has been slower in the field of policy and prac-
tice, there are sufficient examples of programmes
having been developed which attempt to take
on-board the lessons inherent in more interactive
models of innovation and transfer. Although the
use of consultants may not be the only means by
which to bridge the managerial gap, there has
been considerable growth in the number of inno-
vation policy programmes which embrace some
form of consultancy activity to provide an inter-
mediary role in the process of technology trans-
fer. Nevertheless, there remains sufficient evi-
dence of the continuing attraction of the linear
model (to both academics and policy-makers) as
an implicit blueprint for technology transfer.
Many policies still appear to be based upon the
simplifying assumptions of the linear model, and
are often less effective as a consequence. Even
where consultants or other bridging agents are
employed in transfer schemes, independent eval-
uations suggest that there is still considerable
room for improvement [18]. A number of inter-re-
lated policy issues still need to be addressed in
order to improve the operation of such ap-
proaches and we conclude our paper with an
outline of six outstanding issues.
The first is the problem of matching consul-
tants and users. Traditionally consultancy services
have been used primarily by large organisations
and there exists a well-developed pattern to the
relationship; large firms know how to make effec-
tive use of consultants. The same is not true of
small firms, nor of newer consultancies, and a
number of problems can result from this. For
example, inexperienced users may not be able to
control or direct consultancy assistance, or to
manage the relationship to greatest effect.
Equally, inexperienced consultants may make ex-
pensive mistakes by trying to force fit inappropri-
ate solutions, or they may attempt to offer stan-
dard 'packaged' solutions across a widely differ-
ent population of users. There are also issues of
operational style, the pattern of behaviour within
the relationship which works for a large company
may be inappropriate for a small firm, and vice
versa.
There is thus a need for systems to ensure a
good fit between supplier and user; the analogy
can be drawn with a matchmaking agency which
tries to ensure compatibility by considering the
different attributes of the two prospective part-
ners. Closely associated with this is the possibility
of providing some form of training, of users in
how to make use of consultants and of consul-
tants in how to work with different types of
clients. Some schemes already include such train-
ing, for example, the B U N T programme in Nor-
way which has had a marked effect on the out-
come of innovation projects [5].
The second issue is of quality control and
project monitoring and management systems. This
problem follows on from the previous question of
how to maintain high standards within a pro-
gramme which may well involve considerable ex-
pansion of the numbers of active consultants
within a sector or country. As more people be-
come involved in the process, so the risk in-
creases of poor quality service and even of fraud
and other dishonest practices; the damage which
such 'cowboy' consultants can inflict is not only to
individual projects but also to the credibility of
the whole programme [18]. There is thus a need
for some form of quality assurance within the
system, to vet prospective suppliers of consul-
 J. Bessant, H. Rush/Research Policy 24 (1995) 97-114
tancy services, to monitor their performance on
projects and to improve the long-term operation
of such consultancy based schemes. Whilst gov-
ernments clearly cannot be seen to endorse par-
ticular consultants, they can act to establish ac-
ceptable standards and to restrict support for
consultancy services to those suppliers who can
demonstrate capability and integrity, for example,
by operating some form of qualification or ap-
proval process.
A third issue relates to project management.
Operating such a quality assurance scheme, and
ensuring that the goals of a consultancy support
p r o g r a m m e are met requires close working rela-
tionships with industrial users and with the con-
sultancy supply side. This intensive, programme-
specific activity may not always sit well within
government departments and there are a number
of examples where project m a n a g e m e n t has been
decentralised to specialist units within the civil
service (for example, the M A P C O N p r o g r a m m e
in the UK) or contracted out to suitable external
agencies (for example, the Fertigungstechnik pro-
gramme in Germany).
A fourth issue concerns the out-reach of policy
programmes. A criticism of traditional policies is
that they often only reach the larger firms and
those well-connected with the network for inno-
vation support; consultancy programmes offer the
advantage that they can take the message to a
broader audience. This 'missionary' work needs
to be recognised as a long-term education and
development process rather than a short-term
consultancy, and subsidised as part of infrastruc-
ture development within industrial policy.
The fifth point is the emphasis increasingly
being placed on schemes to become self-financing
after a set period of time. The argument is that if
the organisation providing the consultancy ser-
vices is good and grows and develops a reputa-
tion, then in time it will no longer need the state
subsidy. Whilst there is a case for this in respect
of technology transfer and support to larger and
more experienced firms, it can be argued that the
longer-term development of awareness and of
managerial and technical capability is of national
strategic interest and requires continuing subsidy.
There is, otherwise, a danger that consultants will
113
tend to work with those groups of firms able to
support a direct commercial relationship, with
the risk that a large group of less experienced
firms will be excluded.
Finally, with the proliferation of technical op-
portunity and the increasing complexity of market
environments for manufacturers, the temptation
is for a similar expansion in support policies,
mechanisms and services. This can have the un-
desirable effect of confusing potential users and
some form of one-stop access point for a wide
range of government policy support is now an
increasingly popular idea. Consultants, as the
front-line agents of such innovation support might
well provide a mechanism for enabling this sim-
pler entry level.
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