CU ReshapingNewYork November2011

RESHAPINGNEWYORK:
EndingtheRiggedProcessofPartisanGerrymanderingWith AnImpartialandIndependentRedistrictingProcess

ACitizensUnionReport
ResearchandPolicyAnalysisbyCitizensUnionFoundation WrittenandPublishedbyCitizensUnion
NOVEMBER2011

CitizensUnionandCitizensUnionFoundation 299Broadway,Suite700NewYork,NY100071976 phone2122270342fax2122270345www.citizensunion.org PeterJ.W.Sherwin,ChairRobertAbrams,CUFPresidentDickDadey,ExecutiveDirector FollowusonFacebookandTwitter
CitizensUnionoftheCityofNewYork ReshapingNewYorkReport
November2011
TABLEOFCONTENTS
1. EXECUTIVESUMMARY 2. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 3. INTRODUCTION 4. RIGGINGTHESYSTEM:HOWNEWYORKSTATESLEGISLATIVEDISTRICTSARE CURRENTLYDRAWN A. ABRIEFHISTORYOFREDISTRICTING B. NEWYORKSTATESREDISTRICTINGPROCESS C. THEAPPROVALPROCESS D. SUBVERTINGTHEPUBLICINTEREST i. PopulationDeviation ii. DividingCommunities iii. ProtectingIncumbentsfromCompetition iv. MarginalizingtheMinorityParty 5. THEHARMFULEFFECTSOFGERRYMANDERING A. NEWYORKSLESSTHANCOMPETITIVEELECTIONS i. MeasuringCompetitiveness ii. NewYorkStateLegislativeGeneralElections a. PartisanAdvantage b. IncumbentAdvantage iii. TheIncumbentReelectionRate20022010 iv. NewYorkCityGeneralElectionsforStateLegislature a. TheIncumbentAdvantage v. SpecialElections B. INCUMBENTINTERESTSOVERDIVERSEREPRESENTATION i. TheVotingRightsAct ii. MinorityRepresentation iii. RepresentationofWomen C. PROTECTINGPARTISANADVANTAGE D. LONGTERMINCUMBENCY i. OtherContributorstoLongTermIncumbency E. RISINGPOLARIZATIONANDPOLICYPARALYSIS F. DISSATISFACTIONANDDECLININGVOTERPARTICIPATION Page25 Page28 Page22 Page1
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6. SOLUTIONSTOGERRYMANDERING A. OPTIONSFORABETTERREDISTRICTINGPROCESS i. ThePathwaytoReform ii. TheElementsofReform a. WhoDrawstheLines b. HowtheLinesareDrawn c. PublicInvolvement/AccesstoInformation d. TheApprovalProcess B. CITIZENSUNIONRECOMMENDATIONSFORAN INDEPENDENTREDISTRICTINGPROCESS i. CreatingaNominationsCommitteetoSelectPotentialMembers ii. SelectingaNominationPool iii. FormingtheIndependentCitizensRedistrictingCommission iv. EstablishingFairCriteriafortheDrawingofLines v. CreatinganOpenandTransparentProcess vi. EncouragingApprovaloftheIndependentPlan C. RECOMMENDATIONSFOR2012REDISTRICTINGPLANS i. GivingGreaterOpportunitiesforMinoritiestoElect CandidatesofTheirChoice ii. EnsuringthatUpstateNewYorksCitiesareNotCarvedUp D. MAKINGREFORMAREALITY i. TheFutureofRedistricting ii. CommonGroundforReform iii. HistoricSupportforReform
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APPENDICES 1. NestingofNewYorkCityAssemblyandSenateDistrictsAfter2002RedistrictingCycle 2. LegislatorPositionsonIndependentRedistrictingCommissionAssemblyandSenate 3. DistrictPopulationsAndDeviationsOverTime,2000and2010AssemblyandSenate 4. MapsofDistrictDeviationsintheSenateandAssembly,2002RedistrictingUpstate NewYork,NewYorkCity,andLongIsland 5. CountyLinesCrossedbySenateandAssemblyDistricts2002Redistricting 6. ComparisonofRedistrictingReformLegislation 7. TheReShapeNYCoalition
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ExecutiveSummary
Theriggedsystemofredistrictingiscorruptingthespiritandrealityofrepresentative democracyinNewYork.Ithasbecomeaformofcollusionbetweenthetwoparties, drawingsafedistrictsthatprotectincumbentsandlimitvoterchoicebyeffectively endingcompetitiveelections.Thisinturnforcespowerinourpoliticstothemargins, givingdisproportionateinfluencetospecialinterests.Anindependentredistricting commissionwouldempowerpeopletochoosetheirpoliticians,ratherthanviceversa. Noelectionreformwoulddomoretohealtheharshbutartificialpolarizationofour politicswhileaddingrealaccountabilitytoAlbany.Itisareformthatcouldopenthe doortoallothers.Anditisanideawhosetimehascome. Withthereleaseof2010censusdatatoNewYorkearlierthisyear,theredistricting processisfullyunderwaytodrawlegislativedistrictsintimeforthe2012elections undertheoldsystemofpartisangerrymandering,evenasthepubliccallsforchangesto createafairandimpartialprocess. Theredistrictingprocessisakeydeterminantforhoweverycitizenandcommunitywill berepresentedatthestateandfederallevelsofgovernmentforthenexttenyears. Publicsupportforreformisstrongerandbroaderthaneverbefore,asexemplifiedby ReShapeNY,astatewidecampaignforredistrictingreformledbygoodgovernment groupsCitizensUnion,NewYorkPublicInterestGroup(NYPIRG)andLeagueofWomen VotersofNewYorkCity.ReShapeNYiscomprisedofacoalitionof37organizations fromacrossthestate,includingcivicgroups,issueadvocacyorganizations,unionsand businessgroupsunitedinthegoaltoreformourstatesredistrictingprocess.Public approvalforindependentredistrictingisalsoatanalltimehigh:76percentofvoters supportanindependentcommissionthatremovessomeoralloftheresponsibilityfor drawinglinesfromthelegislature(48percentsupportafullindependentcommission and28percentageanindependentcommissionwithsomelegislativeinput).1 Thecampaignsgoalissimple:creationofanindependentcommissiontodrawstate legislativeandcongressionaldistrictboundariesaccordingtofairandobjectivecriteria whileallowingforrobustpublicinputintotheprocess.ThemembersofReShapeNY, likeNewYorkersacrossthestate,havejoinedincallingforlegislativeactionbeforethe 2012electionstocreateanewredistrictingparadigm.
QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,KeepRace,JobProtectionOutOfRedistricting,NewYorkState VotersTellQuinnipiacUniversityPoll;CuomoShouldVetoLawmakers'Lines,VotersSay,October26, 2011.Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1667

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A. THENEEDFORASPECIALLEGISLATIVESESSIONTOPASS REDISTRICTINGREFORM
OneofthemostproductiveNewYorkStatelegislativesessioninyearsoccurredin2011, owingtotheleadershipofGovernorAndrewCuomo,SenateMajorityLeaderDean Skelos,AssemblySpeakerSheldonSilverandtheother210membersofthestate legislature.Leftonthetable,however,wasthecreationofanewimpartialredistricting processthatwouldendtheriggedpracticeofpartisangerrymanderingandusherina morerepresentativeandresponsiveerainstategovernment. ThestatelegislatureneedstoreturntoAlbanyinaspecialsessiontopasslegislation whichendsthepoliticalmanipulationforpartisanadvantageofthedrawingofdistrict linesandestablishesanindependentredistrictingcommissiontodrawlinesbeforethe 2012elections.Thepoliticallybalancedandimpartialcommissionwouldusefairand sensiblecriteriaandbeguidedbyclearguidelinesindrawingthemapstoensurethe processservesallNewYorkersandtheircommunitiesratherthanpreservestheAlbany statusquo. Though184ofthe212statelegislatorscosponsoredorpledgedtosupportsuch legislation,nobillpassedduringthelegislativesession.Thisinactionrevealstheworst tendenciesinAlbanytheinabilityoflegislatorstoworktogetherandforgesolutions thatthepublicdemandsandsupports.Nonetheless,redistrictingmustbereformed, andthepowermustshiftbacktothevoters,whoshouldpicktheirelectedofficialsat thepolls,ratherthanlegislatorspickingtheirvotersinhandcarved,safedistricts. GovernorCuomohaspubliclyandrepeatedlyreiteratedhispledgetovetolinesthatare notdrawninanindependentornonpartisanmannerfollowinghisintroductionofa programbilltoreformredistrictinginFebruary.Further,hedoesnotbelievethatthe currentbodyresponsiblefordrawinglinestheLegislativeTaskForceonDemographic ResearchandReapportionment(LATFOR)canbenonpartisan.2Twentyfourmembers oftheSenateDemocraticConferencehavecommittedtonotoverridetheGovernors veto3ifanindependentprocessisnotputintoplace,resultingintheredistricting processpossiblybeingthrowntothecourts.Thelegislature,therefore,faces considerableoppositiontotheprocessitiscurrentlyconductingtodrawlinesunderthe oldsystem.
Vielkind,Jimmy.Cuomo:ImstillvetoingLATFORslines.CapitolConfidential,TimesUnion.July6, 2011.Availableat:http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/73902/cuomoimstillvetoinglatfors lines/ 3 Reisman,Nick.SenateDemocratsToCuomo:GetOutYourVetoPen.CapitalTonight.April6,2011. Availableat:http://www.capitaltonight.com/2011/04/senatedemocratstocuomogetoutyourveto pen/
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WemustgetbeyondtheshorttermthinkinginAlbanythatneverseesbeyondthe horizonofthenextelection.Insteadofdoingwhatisrightandbeneficialforboth partiesinthelongrun,whatevertheirpoliticalfortunestoday,ourelectedleadersseem tothinkthatmajoritiescannotbebuiltthroughpoliciesthatareappealingtoNew Yorkersbutratherrequiretheelectoralinsurancepolicyofgerrymandering.The resultinglowvoterturnoutisnotsurprisinginapoliticalclimatelackingcompetitive electionswherevotersseenorealchoiceofcandidates,andmeaningfuldiscussionof publicpolicyandrealdebateonissuestakeabackseattopartisaninterests. Timeisrunningoutforreform,butwithpublicandlegislativesupportforreformatits strongestindecades,reformisstillnecessaryandpossiblethisyear.Thisisaonceina decadeopportunity.Timemustnotrunoutbeforevotersseethekindofreformthat theyneedanddeserve.Redistrictingreformcannotwaituntilnextyear,andNew Yorkersdeservefarbetterthanhavingreformpostponedyetanotherdecade.
B. THEREPORTSMAJORFINDINGS
Thisreportrevealshowthestatesredistrictingprocesscontributestouncompetitive elections,unaccountablepublicofficials,unsolvedpublicpolicyissues,andastate legislaturethatdoesnotreflectthediversityofNewYorkState.Asummaryofthe majorfindingsisprovidedbelow.
1. COMPETITIONATTHEPOLLSISHISTORICALLYLOW a. Thereelectionrateforincumbentsfrom2002to2010wasastunning96 percentwithonly38incumbentsin941racesrunningforreelectionlosing theirseats,consideringbothprimaryandgeneralelections. b. In2006,astriking100percentoftheincumbentsthatranforreelection werevictorious. c. Between1968and2010,competitioninNewYorkStatelegislativegeneral electioncontestsdiminishedgreatly,withtheaveragemarginofvictory increasingfrom33percentto51percent.Analltimelowin competitivenesswasreachedin2004,withtheaveragemarginofvictoryat 63percent. d. Between2002and2010,93percentofincumbentswoninracesthatwere eitheruncompetitiveoruncontested.Uncompetitiveraceswerewonby marginsof10percentormore.Theaveragemarginofvictoryneared61 percent.Eveninracesforopenseatsinwhichtherewasnoincumbent running,whichaccountedfor35percentofallracesduringthattimeperiod, theaveragemarginofvictorywas42percent.
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2. THENUMBEROFUNCONTESTEDELECTIONSHASINCREASED,LEAVINGVOTERS FEWCHOICESATTHEPOLLS a. Thenumberofuncontestedstategeneralelectionlegislativeraces(inwhich thereisnoopponentornomajorpartychallenger)increasedfrom1percent in1968to19percentofallseatsin2010. b. AssemblyDemocratsandSenateRepublicanshavefewercontested electionsthantheirminoritypartycolleaguesineachhouse,inspiteofthe largerenrollmentofDemocratsstatewide.IntheAssembly,Democratshad nomajorpartyopponentorwerewhollyunopposedin340racesbetween 1968and2010,whereasRepublicanswereunopposedinonly243races.In theSenate,thereversebreakdownoccurs165Republicanssawnosuch oppositionfrom1968to2010,whileDemocratswereunopposedinonly129 races.Onlywithlegislativedistrictsdrawntoweedoutcompetitionacross theaislewouldoneseesuchanadvantageforthepartyinpowerineach house. c. NewYorkhadthefourthworstvoterturnoutinthenationin2010,with only34.9percentofeligiblevotersvotingfortheirgovernor,thestates highestoffice,likelyinpartduetothelackofrealchoicesatthepolls. 3. THESTATELEGISLATUREDOESNOTREFLECTTHEDIVERSITYOFNEWYORK STATE a. InNewYork,minorityrepresentationintheStateLegislaturein2011is25 percent,wellunderthenearly42percentofminoritiesthatmadeupthe statesentirepopulationin2010.Womenarealsounderrepresented, demonstratinghowgerrymanderinghasbeenusedtokeepincumbents(who havehistoricallybeenwhitemales)inpowerattheexpenseofequal representation. Latinosmakeup17.6percentofthestatespopulation,yetonlyhold about9percent(19)ofseatsinthestatelegislaturein2011. AsiansAmericansmakeupover7percentofthestatespopulation, yettheyhold,andhaveonlyeverheldoneseat(0.47percent)inthe statelegislature. NewYorkranks31stinthenationintermsoftherepresentationof womeninitslegislatureat22.6percentofseats. 4. FRAGMENTATIONOFDISTRICTSCREATESVOTERCONFUSIONANDUNEQUAL TREATMENTOFCOMMUNITIESINEACHHOUSEOFTHELEGISLATURE a. Thelackofcollaborationbetweenbothhousesofthelegislatureindrawing lineshasledtoacomplexwebofsenateandassemblydistrictsoverlaying eachother. AllofNewYorkCityssenatedistrictscontainpartsof4ormore assemblydistricts,andoverhalfofthemcontain6ormoreassembly districts.
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Assemblydistrictsaresimilarlydiluted,withoverhalfcontaining3or moresenatedistrictsinNewYorkCity. b. With150assemblydistrictsand62senatedistricts,thereisnoneedtohave morethanthreeassemblydistrictsinagivensenatedistrict.Thecurrent fragmentationcreatesconfusionforvotersandresultsincollusionrather thancooperationamongthehousesinthelegislaturetorepresentnatural andconsistentcommunitiesofinterest,essentiallytreatingthesame communitiesdifferentlyineachhouse. c. Assemblydistrictsandtoalesserdegreesenatedistrictsoftencrossthe sametwocountyborders.Populationvariancesofcountiesmightrequire thatonedistrictconnecttoanothercounty,butthereisnoneedforacounty tobeparceledbetweensomanydistricts,crossingthesamecountylines morethanonce. Eighteenassemblydistrictscrossthesametwocountylinescrossed byanotherdistrict.TheErieNiagaracountyborderiscrossedby threedifferentdistricts.TheRocklandOrange,PutnamWestchester, JeffersonSt.Lawrence,DutchessUlster,BroomeChenango,and AlbanyRensselaercountybordersareallcrossedbytwodifferent districts.Fourassemblydistrictsdistricts106,107,108and127 evencrossthesamecountybordersasotherdistrictsintwoseparate instances. Sixsenatedistrictscrossthesametwocountylinescrossedby anotherdistrict.TwodistrictscrosstheBronxWestchestercounty linewhileanothertwodistrictscrosstheBronxNewYorkcountyline, therebyjoiningBronxresidentsindistrictsfromanothercountyin fourinstances.TwodistrictsalsocrosstheNassauSuffolkborderin thesenate. 5. REDISTRICTINGISCONDUCTEDTO,ABOVEALLELSE,BENEFITTHEPARTIESIN POWERINEACHHOUSE a. Inthepastthreeredistrictingcycles,DemocratsintheAssemblygained10 seatsin1982,6seatsin1992and4seatsin2002. b. DespitetherelativegrowthinDemocraticregistration,SenateRepublicans havemostlypreservedexistingmajoritiesinthepastthreeredistricting cyclesandevengainedtwoseatsin2002foratotalof38memberstaking officein2003. c. Communitieswiththesamedemographicsmayalsohavedifferentpolitical partyrepresentationbasedsimplyonthecollusionbetweenthetwo housesandtheresultingwayinwhichlinesaredrawn. Rochesteranditsenvironsareaperfectcaseinpoint.Thesame metropolitanregionhasvastlydifferentpoliticalrepresentationin eachhouse.IntheAssembly,theareaisrepresentedby3 Democrats;intheSenate,theareaisrepresentedby3Republicans. Thisowesinlargeparttohowthecityisdividedintodistricts.
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6. THEPOPULATIONDEVIATIONALLOWANCELEAVESGREATDISPARITIESIN REPRESENTATION a. NewYorkscurrentpracticeofa10percentdeviationinpopulationsize fromthelargesttosmallestdistrictinthestatelegislature(+/5percent) allowsadifferenceofover30,000peopleamongsenatedistrictsand 12,600amongassemblydistricts. Iflegislativelinesweredrawnfairly,thesizeofdistrictsthroughoutthestate wouldberoughlyequal.Indeed,federallawrequiresthatU.S.congressional districtsbeasnearlyequalinpopulationaspossible,allowingadifferenceof nomorethanoneperson.The10percentdeviationhasallowedforlarge populationgapsbetweendistrictsandthusdisparitiesinrepresentationfrom onecommunitytoanother.Whilethedeviationhasbeenusedincertain districtstocomplywithsegmentsofthestateconstitutionandtheVoting RightsAct,itmoreoftenthannothasbeenusedforthepurposeofpolitical manipulationandpartisanadvantage. 46percentofassemblydistrictsand30percentofsenatedistricts werebetween3and5percentfromtheaveragedistrictsizein2002. Fewerthan12percentofassemblydistrictsand17percentof senatedistrictswerewithin1percentoftheaveragedistrictsizein 2002. b. Thepopulationdeviationhasprovidedthelegislatureitsgreatesttoolfor partisangerrymanderingbyinflatingcertainregionsofthestateover others.AssemblydistrictshavebeenunderpopulatedinNewYorkCityto allowforgreaterDemocraticrepresentation,andoverpopulatedinupstate NewYorkandonLongIslandtominimizeRepublicanrepresentation.The reversehasoccurredinthestatesenatetomaximizeRepublican representationintypicallyRepublicanleaningareassuchasupstateNew York. EverydistrictinLongIslandintheAssemblywasoverpopulatedby nearly4percent,whileinNewYorkCity,districtswere underpopulatedbyasmuchas4percent(exceptfortheboroughof Manhattan,whichwasoverpopulatedbyaboutonly1percent). IntheSenate,alldistrictsinNewYorkCitywereoverpopulated,the highestbeing4percentinQueens,whileinthe36districtsoutsideof NewYorkCity,32ofthesedistrictswereunderpopulated(only4 districtsoutsideofNewYorkCitywereoverpopulated,allintheNew YorkCitymetropolitanregioninWestchester,RocklandandOrange Counties).
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c. Thereisnowbasedon2010censusdata,aswingof26percentbetween thelargestandsmallestassemblydistrict,adifferenceofnearly40,000 people.Inthesenate,thereisnowaswingof25percentbetweenthe largestandsmallestdistricts,adifferenceofover75,000people.Dueto shiftsinpopulation,manydistrictsoncewithinthe5percentallowancein 2010arewelloverthemaximumdeviationallowed,pointingtotheneedfor tighterdeviationstohelppreventthedisparitiesinrepresentationasthe yearsadvanceaftereachredistrictingcycle.Whileredistrictingeveryten yearsrecalibratesdistrictsizetoreflectpopulationshifts,drawingdistricts closetothe10percentmarginshowshowquicklyitcangobeyondthat acceptableallowance. Overonethirdofcurrentassemblyseats52of150afterthe2010 censusarenowabovethe5percentdeviationfromtheaverage districtsize. Similarly,overonethirdofcurrentsenateseats22of62after the2010censusarenowabovethe5percentdeviation.
C. RIGGINGTHESYSTEM:HOWNEWYORKSLINESARECURRENTLY DRAWN
Redistrictingistheprocessthatoccurstoredrawstatelegislativeandcongressional districtlinesinordertomaintainequitablypopulatedelectoraldistricts.Populations arenotstatic,andovertimeelectoraldistrictsnolongerrepresentthepopulations livingwithinthem.Redistrictingwasdesignedtoprotectthebalanceofpoweramong electoraldistrictsandamongstates,andensurethatthepublicisproportionallyand fairlyrepresented.Insteadredistrictinghasbecomeagrabforinstitutionalpowerby thosewhocontroltheredistrictingprocessinmanycases,asinNewYork,the legislatorsthemselves. InNewYorkincumbentlegislatorscurrentlygettodecidehowtheywanttheirown electoraldistrictsdrawn,andwhichvoterswillresideintheirdistricts.Thisessentially entrenchestheirpower,allowinglegislatorstochoosetheirvotersbeforevoterschoose them.Toensuretheredistrictingprocessdoesnotweakenthedemocraticprocess, CitizensUnionhaslongcalledforreformandatthiscrucialtimecallsforreformbefore thelinesarepermanentlydrawnforthenext10years,startingwiththe2012elections. Redistrictingthatisunderwaythisyearwillgreatlyinfluencewhoiselectedand,by extension,majorpolicydecisionsforthenextdecade.CitizensUnionbelievesthat controloftheredistrictingprocessmustberemovedfromthedirectcontrolofthe legislatorswhohaveselfinterestinthedrawingoflinesandplacedintothehandsof anindependentandimpartialredistrictingcommissionguidedbyclearandconsistent guidelinestoensureafairpracticethatisaccountableandindependentofpoliticalself interest.
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TheLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment(LATFOR)is currentlychargedwiththeresponsibilityofprovidingtechnicalplansforthe reapportionmentofstatesenate,assemblyandcongressionaldistricts,whicharethen approvedvialegislationbythefulllegislatureandsignedintolawbythegovernor.The appointmentprocessformembersofLATFORisinherentlyflawed,withlegislators sittingontheappointmentcommissionitselfandthushavingdirectcontroloverthe drawingofdistrictlines.Evenworse,themajoritypartiesofeachhouseeachappoint twomemberstoLATFOR,whiletheminoritypartieseachappointonemember.This hasledtothemajoritypartiesineachhouseessentiallydrawingtheirownlines,turning ablindeyetotheotherhousewheretheotherpartyiscurrentlyinthemajority. InadditiontocontrollingthemembershipofLATFOR,legislatorsinthemajoritiesof eachhouseuseseveraltoolstoretainandextendtheirgriponpower.Therulesfor drawinglinesarebothcomplicatedandtoolaxinNewYork.Theprimaryfederalrules thatthestatelegislaturefollowsinredistrictingarethosedeterminedbytheVoting RightsActwhichprotectstherightofminoritycitizenstoelectarepresentativewho willprotecttheirinterestsandbyseveralUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdecisions.U.S. SupremeCourtprecedentrequiresthatstatelegislativedistrictsarethesamesize withinatotal10percentdeviationandcongressionaldistrictsarenearlymathematically equalunlessthereissomelegitimateobjectivethatwillbeobstructedbythisrule.The leewayallowedforthesizeofstatelegislativedistricts,inadditiontotechniquessuchas splittingcommunities,drawingchallengersoutofdistricts,anddrawingpartisandistricts thatservetomarginalizetheminoritypartyofeachdistrict,allresultinpartisan gerrymanderingthathasinhibitedtheabilityofthelegislaturetoproperlyservethe public.
D. THEHARMFULEFFECTSOFGERRYMANDERING
NewYorksGerrymanderedAffectedLegislature Untilmostrecentlyin2011,NewYorksstatelegislaturehashistoricallyfailedtosolve pressingissuesinatimelymanner.Themuchmalignedbodygainedadegreeof credibilitythefirsthalfofthisyear,passinganontimebudgetanddemonstratingit couldforgecompromisesonintractableissueslikeethicsreformandmarriageequality. ItappearedthatundertheleadershipofGovernorCuomo,functionalgovernmentwas notonlypossiblebutdoable.Yetoldhabitsdiehard,andthestatelegislatureissowing theseedsoffuturedysfunctionbymaintainingthecurrentsystemofpartisan gerrymandering. Historicpolicygridlockhasresultedinalackoflegislativeactiononanumberofissues importanttoNewYorkers,perhapsmostnotablythealmostalwayslatepassageofthe statebudgetoverthepasttwodecades.Otherhistoricinactionordelaysincludesthe longtermfailuretoconsolidateandmakemoreefficientgovernmententitieslike
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schooldistrictsandpublicauthorities,andprovidemandatereliefforlocalities.Issues likeRockefellerDrugLawreform,highpropertytaxes,andaffordablehousinghave takenyearstoaddressinspiteofbroadpublicsupportforchange. Issuesofpoliticalreformhaveseenparticularstagnationinspiteofoverwhelmingpublic support.Thoughthestatelegislatureandgovernordeservecreditforthepassageof ethicslegislationwhichforthefirsttimeprovidesalevelofindependentoversightover thelegislatureandincreaseddisclosureofoutsidebusinessdealings,campaignfinance reformandredistrictingreformhavefailedtobeaddressed.NewYorknowhasthe highestspendinglimitsforcandidatesofthe45statesinthenationthathavelimits, allowingcontributionsofover$100,000topartycommittees.4Similarly,whilestates suchasCaliforniaandArizonahaveseenthecreationofindependentredistricting commissions,NewYorklagsbehindinremovingtheconflictofinterestinherentin legislatorsdrawingtheirownseats. Thelackofactionontheseimportantissuesislargelyduetotheincreasedpolarization ofdistrictsandthecreationofsafeseatsinwhichlegislatorsdonotfacemuch competitionatthepolls,amajorresultofpartisangerrymandering.Thelevelof partisanbickeringreachedanewlowinthesummerof2009whentheNewYorkState Senateenteredintoamonthlongdeadlock,therootcauseofwhichcanbetracedto thelastroundofredistrictingthatcreatedanevennumberofseatsinthestatesenate. Thelackofoutcomeshasledtoincreasedscrutinyofthestatelegislatureandits politicalprocesses.Dubbedthemostdysfunctionallegislatureinthenation,theNew YorkStatelegislaturehaslongbeencriticizedforitslackoftransparency,accountability andadherencetobasicnotionsofademocraticprocess.5 Voterstooareunsatisfiedwiththestatelegislature,withanOctober2011Quinnipiac pollfindingthat63percentofvotersdisapproveofthejobthelegislatureisdoing.6The lowopinionofstategovernmentcontributestothedisenchantmentofNewYorkers whowouldturnoutorchoosenottoatthepollsonElectionDay. ThePartisanDivide NewYorkhadthelongestrunningpoliticalpartysplitbetweenhousesofthelegislature inthenation,startingin1974withtheSenateunderRepublicancontrolandthe AssemblyunderDemocraticcontrolfordecades.ThischangedbrieflyinJanuary2009
Katz,Celeste.NYPIRG:NewYorkOnTrackToBeFirstStateWithContributionLimitOver$100,000, DailyPolitics.January21,2011.Availableat: http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2011/01/nypirgnewyorkontracktobefirststate withcontributionlimitover100000 5 TheBrennanCenterhasissuedseveralreportsonthedysfunctionalnatureoftheNewYorkState Legislature,thefirstbeingTheNewYorkStateLegislativeProcess:AnEvaluationandBlueprintforReform in2004. 6 QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,KeepRace,JobProtectionOutOfRedistricting,NewYorkState VotersTellQuinnipiacUniversityPoll;CuomoShouldVetoLawmakers'Lines,VotersSay.October26, 2011.Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1667
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whenthelegislaturewassworninandDemocratscontrolledbothhouses.Asaresultof the2010GeneralElection,RepublicanshaveregainedcontroloftheSenateand DemocratscontinuetoholdalargemajorityintheAssembly,meaningthatthereisa returntothestatusquothatexistedbetween1974and2008.Thislongstanding partisandividecanbeattributedto,amongotherthings,thelackofcompetitive electionsandthefactthatbothpartiesinpowerusetheredistrictingprocesstoensure thattheirmembersareprotectedfromseriouscompetition.
E. SOLUTIONSTOGERRYMANDERING:CITIZENSUNIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
The2010Censushasbeenconductedandthepoliticalramificationsofthenew legislativedistrictsthatwillbedrawnin20112012areenormous.FortheU.S.Houseof Representatives,NewYorkwilllosetwocongressionalseats,asitdidnotgrowin populationattherateofotherstatessuchasTexasandFlorida.Asidefromthepolitics ofredistricting,theStateLegislaturefacesincreasingpublicdissatisfactionwiththe functioningofstategovernment.Votersarealsodisappointedwiththelegislatureslack ofactionthusfaronredistrictingreformachiefcampaignpromisefromthe2010 electionsand48percentofvotersstatetheywouldfeelbetrayedthelegislaturewere toapprovedistrictlinesthesameoldwayandnotputinplaceanindependent commissionfor2012.7Publicoutcryforreform,combinedwiththerecentstridesstates likeCaliforniaandFloridahavemadetowardsinstitutingredistrictingreforms,arewhy CitizensUnionbelievesthatwemustseizethemomenttoensuretherightsofNew Yorkersarefinallyprotected. Thoughourpreferredapproachofconstitutionalchangestotheredistrictingprocessis nolongeraviableoptionbeforethe2012elections,statutoryreformsremainpossible beforelinesaredrawn.Whodrawsthelines,whatrulesdeterminehowlinesare drawn,theamountofpublicinputandtheapprovalprocessareallimportantfactorsin consideringanewredistrictingsystemforNewYork.Whileseveralmodelsexistfor eachofthesefactorsandareexploredinthisreport,itisclearthatamoreindependent processisneededinNewYork. Onelegislativeproposal,sponsoredbythenAssemblymemberMichaelGianarisand SenatorDavidValesky,sawadvancementinbothhousesin2010,passingtheSenate ElectionsandGovernmentalOperationsCommittees,andtheAssemblyGovernmental OperationsCommittee.Thelegislation(A.3432/S.2543)hasbeenreintroducedin2011 bynowSenatorMichaelGianarisandAssemblymemberHakeemJeffries,andhasthe supportofmorethanamajorityofmembersoftheAssemblyandstrongsupportamong DemocratsintheSenate.
QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,StormSurgeTakesCuomoApprovalToAllTimeHigh,Quinnipiac UniversityPollFinds;VotersWantGovToSpeakUpOnRedistricting.September20,2011.Availableat: http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1647
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Mostnotablyin2011,GovernorAndrewCuomohasputforthaprogrambill(S. 3419/A.5388)forredistrictingreformthatincorporatesmanyoftheelementsofthe Gianarislegislation.ItissponsoredbySpeakerSheldonSilverintheAssemblyandhas beenputintotheRulesCommitteeintheSenate.Whilethemeasurehassecured overwhelmingsupportintheAssembly,with96cosponsors,itsdeliberateintroduction intotheRulesCommitteeintheSenate,whereitcannotbecosponsored,enabledthe Senatemajoritytoeffectivelystallitsmovementandpreventindicationsofsupportby rankandfilemembersofbothparties. Statutoryapproachestoredistrictingreformhavepredictablyseenresistance, particularlyfromtheSenateRepublicanMajoritywhichclaimsthatlegislation introducedbyGovernorCuomoisunconstitutional.Inresponse,CitizensUnionandthe leadersoftheReShapeNYcoalitionreleasedalegalmemowrittenprobonobythe prestigiousinternationallawfirmWeil,GotshalandMangesLLP8,whichconcludedthat theCuomoredistrictingreformbillisindeedconstitutional,aswellassimilarlegislation introducedbySenatorsGianarisandValesky,andAssemblymemberJeffries.The legislationisconsistentwiththelegislature'sabilitytodelegateitspowersina circumscribedmanneranddoesnotviolatetheseparationofpowersbetweendifferent branchesofgovernment. Inperhapsoneofthemorecynicalactsof2011,ameasuretoamendtheState ConstitutiontoaltertheredistrictingprocesswaspassedbytheStateSenateinMarch. Thelegislation(S.3331)wassponsoredbySenatorJohnBonacic,andwhileheraldedby theSenateRepublicanMajorityascreatingamoreindependentredistrictingprocess andabsolvingtheconferenceofitscommitmentstovoterstopassredistrictingreform, itwasopposedbyreformadvocatesasnotcontainingatrulyindependentcommission andnotbeingeffectiveuntil2022.Asaconstitutionalamendment,itcouldnothave takeneffectthisredistrictingcycle,andthereforewasdismissedbyNewYorkUprising (aPACfoundedbyformerMayorEdKochsupportingreforminAlbany)asnotsatisfying theircampaignpledge. CommonGroundforReform Whilethelegislaturehasyettocometoconsensusaroundthedetailsofredistricting reforminadvanceof2012,thereisbroadagreementontheprinciplesofchangeas seeninredistrictingreformbillssponsoredinthelegislaturethatduringthe2011 legislativesession,asmentionedpreviously.
8
WeilGotshalMemorandumtoCitizensUnion.Availableat: http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Redistricting/WeilGotshal%20_Manges_memo_on_c onstitutionality_of_Cuomo_bill_FINAL.pdf
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Themajorredistrictingreformproposalsare: S.3419/A.5388(Cuomo/Silver) S.2543/A.3432(Gianaris/Jeffries) S.3331/A.5271(Bonacic/GalefpassedtheSenateonMarch14,2011witha voteof35to24,with3Senatorsabsentorexcused) S.660/A.5602(Valesky/Cahill) Allofthesebillspossessthefollowingcoreprinciples: 1) Legislatorsshouldnotdrawdistrictboundaries.Allfourproposalsrecognize theconflictofinterestthatoccurswhenlegislatorsdrawdistrictsforthevery officestheywillrunagainfor.Allfourproposalsputthedistrictdrawingpenin thehandsofnonlegislators. 2) Thosewithpoliticalinfluenceshouldbedisqualifiedfrombeingmembersof theindependentredistrictingcommission.Allfourproposalshaveprohibitions thatareaimedtopreventpoliticalinsiderstoocloselyaffiliatedwithlegislators andtherefore,alsohaveaconflictofinterest,fromdrawingmaps. 3) Majorityandminoritypartiesinbothhousesofthelegislatureshouldbe equallyrepresentedontheindependentcommission.Thebillsallreflectthe conclusionthatmajorityandminoritypartieshaveanequalstakeinafair redistrictingprocessandshouldthereforehaveequalrepresentationonany commissionthatdrawsthelines.Thiswillpreventmajorityparties,whether theyareDemocratsorRepublicans,fromusingredistrictingasapoliticalcudgel againsttheirminoritycolleaguesinthelegislature. 4) LessIncumbentProtection.Allproposalsseektopreventelectionswith preordainedoutcomesbyprohibitinglinesdrawntofavorordisfavorparticular incumbents,challengers,orparties. 5) Oneperson/OneVote,TheVotingRightsAct,Contiguity,andCompactnessare allcriteriaincommonfordrawingdistrictboundaries.Allproposals,in accordancewithfederallaw,identifyOneperson/OneVoteandtheVoting RightsActasbeingcriteriathatmustbefollowedinmakingmaps.Allproposals alsoincludecontiguityandcompactnessasgoalsindrawingdistrictboundaries. Giventhelackofactiontocreateanindependentredistrictingprocessfor2012,Citizens callsonthestatelegislaturetoreturninaspecialsessionthisfalltoenactstatutory redistrictingreformsandfulfilllegislatorscommitmentstovoters.
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CITIZENSUNIONRECOMMENDATIONS:ANewandImpartialApproach
GiventhestatelegislaturesauthorityundertheStateConstitutiontoapprovedistrict lines,theonlywaytoestablishanabsolutelyindependentredistrictingprocessis throughaconstitutionalamendment.Whilewestillsupportandpreferaconstitutional amendment,itistoolateforaconstitutionalamendmenttotakeeffectbeforethe2012 elections.Forthisredistrictingcycle,CitizensUnionhassupportedlegislationtocreate anindependentprocessthroughstatute,coupledwithpassageofaconstitutional amendmenttocreatepermanentreform. Withlittletimeremainingtoproposeandfinalizelinesfor2012,CitizensUnioncallson theGovernor,theStateSenate,andtheStateAssemblytoresolvetheimpasseon redistrictingandadoptatwostagedapproachinachievingredistrictingreform.The firststagewouldinvolveenactinglegislationthatcreatesalessthanidealreform approachfor2012,butonethatisconsistentwiththeprinciplesofcurrentreform proposalsputforwardbyGovernorCuomo,SenatorsGianarisandValesky,and AssemblymemberJeffries.Anindependentpanel,appointeddirectlyandequallybythe fourlegislativeleadersbutonwhichnolegislatorwouldserve,wouldinheritthework donetodatebyLATFORandbeguidedbyestablishedandagreeduponcriteria.The criteriawouldnotbeasstrongasoriginallyproposed,butsufficientlyclearsoasnotto continuetheriggedpracticeofpoliticalmanipulationinthedrawingoflinesforpartisan gain.Thisprocessandpanelwouldstillrecommendmapstothelegislature,which wouldhavethefinalsay. Inacceptingthislessthanidealapproach,CitizensUnionwouldinsistonitbeing coupledwithasecondstage.Thisyearsreformlightlegislativeapproachmustbe tiedtofirstpassageofamuchstrongerconstitutionalamendmentthatwouldbring wholesalechangetotheredistrictingprocessandcreateanewimpartialand independentprocessonepromisedtothevotersinthecampaignof2010. Werecognizethatastatutealonecannottaketheprocessentirelyoutofthehandsof thelegislature.Ourlongstandingproposal,therefore,isintendedtocreateadegreeof independenceby:establishinganindependentcommissionwithacertaindegreeof legislativeinput;givingthecommissionclearstandardstofollow;andrequiringthe legislaturetoactonitsplans,whilerecognizingthattheultimatedecisionstillremains withthelegislature,whichcanrejecttheindependentcommissionsrecommendations ifitsochooses.Aspreviouslymentioned,however,theGovernorhaspledgedtoveto anyredistrictingplanthatisnotindependent,sothereisgreateronusonthelegislature toacceptaplanthatisdrawnindependently. Withthegoalofestablishingafairsolutionthatwillputanendtopartisanmaneuvering andensurethatthepublicinterestisservedintheredistrictingprocess,CitizensUnion providesthefollowingrecommendationsandframeworkforcreatinganindependent commissionviastatuteorconstitutionalamendment.Ouridealsolutionisprovided
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below,andwhilewerecognizethatthereisnotcurrentlytimeforafullindependent processtounfoldforthiscycle,particularlywithregardstoforminganindependent commissionthroughanominatingpool,weprovidetheframeworkbelowforanideal statutorysolutionorconstitutionalamendmentcreatinganindependentcommission. Thisproposalwouldbetruncatedforastatutorysolutionfor2012,consistentwiththe goalsofcreatingamoreindependentandfairprocess. 1. CreationofNominationsCommitteetoSelectPotentialCommission Members WhileCitizensUnionwouldpreferthatanindependentcommissionbegivenfull authorityovertheredistrictingprocesswithoutsignoffbythelegislature,wesupport avenuestoallowlegislativeinputandforthelegislaturetomakeappointmentstothe commission.Wealsorecognizethatthelegislatureisunlikelytopasslegislation amendingtheconstitutiontofullyremoveitsroleintheprocess. CitizensUnionbelievesanominationscommitteeshouldbeformedtoselectapoolof candidatesforappointmenttotheredistrictingcommission.Inordertoadvance neededreformbefore2012viastatute,however,thereisnolongertimefora nominationscommitteetobeformed.Thetwostepprocessofanominations committeeinaconstitutionalamendmentwouldbeusedtoprovideadegreeof separationfromtheelectedofficialswhosedistrictlineswillbedrawnbythe commission.Wealsosupportprohibitionsonmembershiponthecommissionand requiringconsultationwithorganizationsdevotedtoprotectingthevotingrightsof minoritiesandothervotersinordertoremovepotentialconflictsandensurediversity. Legislativerepresentationshouldbebalancedwithstatewiderepresentationthrough appointmentsbythegovernor,attorneygeneral,comptrollerandchiefjudge,for example,toenhanceindependenceandprovideforbroaderperspectiveofthe nominatingcommission. Thenominationscommitteewouldbecomposedofeightmembers,withthefollowing individualsappointingmembersofthecommission: thegovernor4members,2fromeachmajorparty; thetemporarypresidentofthesenate2members; thespeakeroftheassembly2members; theminorityleaderofthesenate2members;and theminorityleaderoftheassembly2members.
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Nomemberoftheappointednominationscommitteeshall: holdorhaveheldwithinthepreviousfouryearsanelectedgovernmentoffice oranyotherpartisanappointedgovernmentalorpoliticalpartyposition; beemployedorhavebeenemployedwithinthepreviousfouryearsinany otherpositionbytheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,ortheExecutive Chamber; beorhavebeenwithinthepreviousfouryearsaregisteredlobbyistinNew York; beaspouseoforrelatedtoanymemberoftheUSCongress,theState Legislature,ortheExecutiveChamber;or holdorhaveheldapositionwithinthepreviousfouryearsasasenior campaignstafferforcandidatesrunningforofficeinNewYorkStateforstate orfederaloffice,orforpoliticalcommitteesoperatinginNewYorkState. 2. SelectionofaNominationPool Thenominationscommitteewouldthenselectapoolofnominees,ornominations pool,whichwouldrepresentthediversityofthestatewithregardtorace,ethnicity, andgender;wouldincludepersonsfromeachregionofthestate(LongIsland,NewYork City,HudsonValley,Northern,Central,SouthernTier,andWestern);andwouldinclude atotalof40persons: 15enrolledDemocrats, 15enrolledRepublicans,and 10personsnotenrolledineitherparty Nomemberofthenominationspoolshall: holdorhaveheldwithinthepreviousfouryearsanelectedgovernmentoffice oranyotherpartisanappointedgovernmentalorpoliticalpartyposition; beemployedorhavebeenemployedwithinthepreviousfouryearsinany otherpositionbytheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,ortheExecutive Chamber; beorhavebeenwithinthepreviousfouryearsaregisteredlobbyistinNY; beaspouseoforrelatedtoanymemberoftheUSCongress,theState Legislature,ortheExecutiveChamber;or holdorhaveheldapositionwithinthepreviousfouryearsasasenior campaignstafferforcandidatesrunningforofficeinNewYorkStateforstate orfederaloffice,orforpoliticalcommitteesoperatinginNewYorkState.
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3. FormationoftheIndependentCitizensRedistrictingCommission Theredistrictingcommissionwouldconsistofatotalof11membersselectedfromthe nominationspool.Inastatutoryapproachfor2012,however,thereisnolongertime foranominationscommitteetoformandselectcandidates,soadifferentapproachwill beneededtoformasindependentcommissionasispossibleinthetimeallowed.Eight oftheseselectedmemberswouldbeappointedfromthenominationspoolbyeachof thelegislativeleadersasfollows: 2membersbythetemporarypresidentofthesenate; 2membersbythespeakeroftheassembly; 2membersbytheminorityleaderofthesenate;and 2membersbytheminorityleaderoftheassembly. These8memberswouldthenappoint3additionalmembersfromthenominationspool, 1ofwhomwouldserveaschairofthecommission,foratotalof11members. CitizensUnionbelievesthatthestructureasoutlinedabovewouldbeasignificant improvementfromthestatusquoinwhichtheminorpartiesineachhouseare marginalizedbyhavingfewerappointmentstotheredistrictingbody.Further consideration,however,shouldbegiventothepresenceofgubernatorialappointments ontheredistrictingcommissiontoprovideastatewideperspectiveandgreater independence.Werecognizethattheremaybelegislativeresistancetosuch appointments;however,giventhefulllegislaturesultimateapprovaloftheredistricting plansandabilitytoamendafinalplanunderthisproposal,thisresistancedoesnothave asoundbasis.Intheabsenceofanominationspool,whichprovidesalayerof separationbetweenthelegislatureanditsappointments,CitizensUnionbelieves gubernatorialappointmentswouldbeanimportantadditiontothosethatwouldbe madedirectlybythelegislativeleaders. Nomorethan4membersoftheredistrictingcommissionwouldbeenrolledinthesame politicalparty,andmemberswouldbeselectedtorepresentthediversityofthestateto theextentpracticable.Asthememberswouldbeselectedfromthenominationspool, theywouldbecomposedofregisteredvotersoftheStateofNewYorkwhodonothold, orhavenotheld,anelectiveoffice,apartypositionoranappointmenttoapartisan position;havenotbeenemployedasalobbyistwithinfouryearsofselectiontothe redistrictingcommission;arenotthespouseorrelativeofanelectedofficialinthestate legislativeorstateexecutivebranchortheU.S.Congress;andhavenotheldasenior positioninacampaignforastateorfederaloffice,orforpoliticalcommitteesoperating inNewYorkStateforthepreviousfouryears.
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4. EstablishingFairCriteriafortheDrawingofLines Justasimportantaswhoholdsthepenindrawingdistrictlinesaretherulesthatmust befollowedintheformationofdistricts.Thecurrentmapsofdistrictlinesaredrawn forpartisangoalsratherthanintheinterestsofthevotingpublic,andoftensplit communitiesandresultinvoterconfusion. CitizensUnionspecificallyrecommendsthatfourmainrequirementsbefollowedinthe drawingoflines,consistentwiththerequirementsoffederallaw,includingthefederal VotingRightsActof1965(totheextentthattheyareappliedviastatute,consistentwith theStateConstitution): (a) allcongressionaldistrictsshallbeasnearlyequalinpopulationasispracticable; (b) eachdistrictshallconsistofcontiguousterritory;nodistrictshallconsistofparts entirelyseparatedbytheterritoryofanotherdistrictofthesamebody,whether suchterritorybelandorwater,populatedorunpopulated.Apopulatedcensus blockshallnotbedividedbyadistrictboundary,unlessitcanbedetermined thatthepopulatedpartofsuchblockiswithinasingledistrict; (c) senate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictsshallnotbeestablishedthatare intendedtoorresultinadenialorabridgementofminorityvotingrights includingtheopportunityofminorityvoterstoparticipateinthepoliticalprocess andtoelectthecandidatesoftheirchoice,includingbutnotlimitedtoinstances inwhichminoritypopulationsdonotcompriseamajorityofthedistrict;and (d) senate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictsshallnotbedrawnwithanintentto favororopposeanypoliticalparty,anyincumbentfederalorstatelegislator,or anypreviousorpresumedcandidateforoffice. Inadditiontotherequiredprinciples(a),(b),(c)and(d)above,thefollowingprioritized principleswouldbeusedinthecreationofsenate,assembly,andcongressionaldistricts totheextentpracticable. (i) themostandleastpopuloussenatedistrictsshallnotexceedorbelower thanthemeanpopulationofallsenatedistrictsbymorethanonepercent, andthemostandleastpopulousassemblydistrictsshallnotexceedorbe lowerthanthemeanpopulationofallassemblydistrictsbymorethanone percent.Innoeventshallthecommissionadvantageanyregionofthestate overanyotherbycreatingmultipledistrictsthereinexceedingorlowerthan themeanpopulationbymorethanonepercent. (ii) asenate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictshallunitecommunitiesdefined byactualsharedinterests,takingaccountofgeographic,social,economic, andotherfactorsthatindicatecommonalityofinterest,anddistrictsshallbe formedsoastopromotetheorderlyandefficientadministrationof elections.
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(iii) countiesshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts,excepttocreate districtswhollywithinacounty.Wheresuchdivisionofcountiesis unavoidable,morepopulouscountiesshallbedividedinpreferencetothe divisionoflesspopulouscounties.Totheextentpracticable,ifanyassembly districtoranysenatedistrictincludestheterritoryoftwocounties,thenno otherassemblydistrictorsenatedistrictshallincludeterritoryofbothofthe sametwocounties. (iv) countysubdivisionsshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts,except tocreatedistrictswhollywithinacountysubdivision.Forthepurposesofthis article,acountysubdivisionshallbeacity,exceptthecityofNewYork,a town,oranIndianreservationwhoseterritoryisexclusiveoftheterritoryof anycityortown.Countysubdivisionswithlargerpopulationsshallbedivided inpreferencetothedivisionofthosewithsmallerpopulations. (v) incorporatedvillagesshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts. (vi) thesenate,assembly,andcongressionaldistrictsshallbeascompactinform aspossible. Inpresentingitsplantothelegislatureandthepublic,thelegislatureshouldberequired tosubmitastandardizedscorecardindicatingcompliancewiththecriteriaand requirements,presentingtheplansscoreoneachoftheaforementionedprinciples. 5. CreatinganOpenandTransparentProcess Thecommissionshouldsubmitthefirstplantothelegislatureafterholdingrequired publichearingsthroughoutthestateinthefollowinglocations:Albany,Buffalo,Syracuse, Rochester,GlenCove,WhitePlains,andBronx,Kings,NewYork,QueensandRichmond Counties.Totheextentpracticable,meetingsshouldbewebcast. Regardingthematerialsusedforredistricting,thecommissionshouldmakeavailableto thepublicinprintformandinelectronicformontheinternet,usingthebestavailable technology,allredistrictingplans,relevantdataandwebbasedmapmakingsoftware usedtopreparesuchplans,informationonthemembersoftheredistricting commissionandallotherrelevantinformation.Thecommissionshouldberequiredto postplanssubmittedbythepubliconitswebsiteandconsiderpublicplansinthe formulationofitsplans. 6. EncouragingApprovaloftheIndependentPlan
CitizensUnionrecommendsthatthelegislaturehavetheopportunitytoprovide feedbackonuptotwoplanssubmittedbythecommission,andcanonlyamendathird planwithamendmentsthatmeetthestatutoryguidelinesestablished.Inaddition,the legislatureshouldbeconstrainedfrommakingamendmentsthataffectmorethan2 percentofthepopulationofanydistrict.Inastatutoryscheme,theabilitytocomment
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andamendtheplanisconsistentwiththestatelegislaturesauthorityundertheState Constitutiontoultimatelyapprovearedistrictingplan.Ideallyinaconstitutional amendment,theindependentcommissionsplanwouldnotrequirelegislativeapproval, butCitizensUnionrecognizesthatthestatelegislatureisunlikelytoapprovelegislation removingtheirroleintheapprovalprocess.Theprocesswouldworkasfollows: Thefirstplanwouldrequireavoteofthelegislaturewithoutamendments.Ifthe proposalisrejected,thecommissionwouldsubmitanamendedproposalafter hearingthereasonsgivenbythelegislatureregardingthefirstplansrejectionat apublichearing. Thesecondplan,again,wouldbevoteduponbythelegislaturewithout amendments.Ifthesecondproposalisalsorejected,thecommissionwould submitathirdplanfollowingasecondpublichearingatwhichthelegislature wouldtestify. Thethirdplanwouldbesubjecttothenormalamendmentprocesswithinthe establishedstatutoryguidelinesforredistricting,giventhelegislaturesultimate authorityoverredistrictingundertheStateConstitution. TheCourtofAppealsshouldbegivenoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverchallenges totheredistrictingplantopreventforumshoppingandtoallowfortheexpedited reviewofsuitsfrommembersofthepublic.
CitizensUnionRecommendationsFor2012RedistrictingPlans
Regardlessofwhatentitywilldrawdistrictlinesforthe2012elections,CitizensUnion hasanumberofrecommendationsregardinghowthemapsshouldbedrawn.Through ourresearchofthecurrentprocess,wehaveidentifiedinstancesinwhichcommunities havebeensplitapartandcertaingroupshavebeenmarginalizedinordertoprotect incumbents.Themapsthatwillbedrawnwillhaveaprofoundimpactoncommunities throughoutthestate,andwebelievethatthestatemusttakeactiontoallowforfair representationforallNewYorkers.CitizensUnionsrecommendationsforthelines drawnin2012arelistedbelow. 1. GreaterOpportunitiesShouldbeGivenforMinoritiestoElectCandidatesof TheirChoice Thediversityofthestateisnotreflectedinourelectedrepresentation,asdiscussedin Section5bofthisreport.Takingintoconsiderationgrowingminoritypopulationsin NewYork,particularlyinNewYorkCityandLongIsland,werecommendthefollowing:
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NewYorkCity AsianAmericansshouldbegivengreateropportunitiestoelect candidatesoftheirchoiceintheCityofNewYorkthroughthecreation ofoneormoremajorityminoritydistrictsineachhouse.Theborough ofQueenshasonlyoneAsianAmericanstatelegislatorintheAssembly, andAsianAmericanshavenorepresentationintheSenate.Itshouldalso benotedthatAsianAmericansareadiversecommunity,andthatSouth AsianscommunitiesarealsogrowinginNewYorkCity. Flushing,Queens;Elmhurst,Queens;SunsetPark,Brooklyn;and DykerHeights,Brooklynareareasforpossibledistrictsgiven growingAsianAmericanpopulations. Latinosshouldbegivengreateropportunitiestoelectcandidatesof theirchoiceintheCityofNewYorkthroughthecreationofoneormore majorityminoritydistrictsineachhouse.Latinosholdonly19seatsin thestatelegislature(9percent),whilehaving17.6ofthestates population. WashingtonHeightsandInwood,Manhattan;aswellasJackson Heights,Queensareareasforpossibledistrictsgivengrowing Latinopopulations. LongIsland GrowingBlackandLatinocommunitiesinLongIslandshouldbegiven greateropportunitiestoelectcandidatesoftheirchoice,particularlyin theStateSenate,andconsiderationshouldbegiventothecreationof opportunitytoelectdistrictswherethesecommunitiesdonotcomprisea majorityofthedistrict. ThetownofHempsteadinNassauCountyandthetownsofIslip andBabyloninSuffolkCountyareareasforpossibledistricts, givengrowingminoritypopulations. 2. CitiesinUpstateNewYorkShouldNotBeCarvedUp UpstateNewYorksurbanareashavebeendividedupforpartisanadvantageinboth housesofthelegislature.Considerationshouldbegiventorespectingtheexisting politicalboundariesofcitiessothattheseurbancommunitiescanremainwholeand havemoreunifiedrepresentationinthestatelegislature.Theseincludebutarenot limitedtothecitiesofBuffalo,Rochester,Albany,Syracuse,SchenectadyandUtica. NewYorkscitiesshouldberepresentedbyasfewdistrictsasdictatedbythe population,totheextentthatitprotectstheunifiedvoiceofthesecommunities.
F. MAKINGREFORMAREALITY
NewYorkStateisinneedoffundamentalchangetothewayinwhichlegislativedistrict linesaredrawn.Decadesofgerrymanderinghaveresultedinpolarizeddiscussionand
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ontoomanyoccasionsalessthanfullyfunctionalstatelegislaturethatshieldsitself fromcompetitionandthereforefromaccountability.Nowisthetimetoendtheself interesteddrawingofdistrictlinesbylegislators,andcreateanindependent commissionaswellasclearandconsistentrulesforthedrawingoflines. UnprecedentedSupportforRedistrictingReform Thefutureofredistrictingreformisinthehandsofthestatelegislature,whomust approvelegislationtocreateamoreindependentprocess,andthegovernor,whowould signthelegislationintolaw.Thereisunprecedentedandhistoricsupportforcreating anindependentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines,withamajorityoflegislatorsinboth houses,184of212,includingamajorityofbothconferencesineachhouseofthe legislature,supportingthecreationofanindependentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines accordingtofairandobjectivecriteria,asstatedabove. Inadditiontotheunprecedentedleveloflegislativesupport,publicopinionpollsshow thehighesteverpublicsupportforindependentredistricting:77percentofvoters supportanindependentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines.Thevotersalsoagreethat GovernorCuomoshouldvetolinesthatarenotdrawnbyanindependentcommission, with49percentofthosepolledinagreementandonly30percentdisagreeing.9 Whilethelegislaturehasconductedpublichearingsthroughoutthestatewiththeintent tosolicitpublicinputonhowmapsshouldbedrawn,asignificantnumberofthose testifyinghavepointedtotheneedtochangetheprocessitself.AtLATFORhearings throughoutthestate,thepublichascontinuedtocallforanindependentcommission andafairprocess,includingmembersoftheReShapeNYcoalition.Thepublichas spokenloudandclearinfavorofreform,andwillcontinuetospeakinfavorofan independentcommissiontodrawstatelegislativeandcongressionaldistrictboundaries accordingtofairandobjectivecriteriawhileallowingforrobustpublicinputintothe process. Pressurehasalsobeenmountinginthemedia,withaneweditorialnearlyeverymonth thispastyearfromnewsoutletsthroughoutthestateaskingforanindependentprocess tobeputinplaceinadvanceof2012asLATFORhascontinueditsroadshowofpublic hearings. LegislatorsmusthonortheirwordandkeeptheircommitmentsbyreturningtoAlbany inaspeciallegislativesessiontofinallyendpartisangerrymanderingandenact redistrictingreform.NewYorkershavealreadywaitedformanydecadesfor redistrictingreform.Thefulfillmentofthatpromisecannotwaitanothertenyears.
QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,August11,2011NewYorkVotersBackFracking,Despite Concerns,QuinnipiacUniversityPollFinds;MoreWomenInGovernmentMeansFewerSexScandals. August11,2011.Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1635
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2
Acknowledgements
Thisreporthasbeenseveralyearsinthemakingandtherearenumberofindividuals whohavebeeninstrumentalinresearchingdata,compilinginformation,and contributingtothewritingofthisreport. AuthorsforthisreportincludeRachaelFauss,ResearchandPolicyManager;DougIsrael, formerpolicydirector;SydneyBeveridge,formerpolicyassociate;andDickDadey, ExecutiveDirector.ThisreportwaseditedbyAlexCamarda,DirectorofPublicPolicy andAdvocacy;AdeliaHarrison,ExecutiveAssistant;andDeNoraGetachew,former policydirector. CitizensUnionthanksitsboardmembersRobertAbrams,JohnAvlon,RichardBriffault, GailErickson,GraceLyuVolckhausen,SallyRobinson,AlanRothstein,andGregSilbert fortheiractiveinvolvementintheorganizationsworkontheissue,andspecifically Avlon,Briffault,andRothsteinfortheirthoughtfuleditsandsuggestionstothe executivesummaryofthereport.Wealsothankthemembersofourstateaffairs committeewhohaveworkedonthisissuesinceCitizensUnionfirststartedaddressing redistrictingreformin2004inadvanceof2012. Atthestartofthisreportsresearch,valuableguidancetoitsapproachandcontentwas providedbyrespectedgovernmentexpert,GeraldBenjamin,adistinguishedprofessor andAssociateVicePresidentforRegionalEngagementandDirectoroftheCenterfor Research,RegionalEducationandOutreach(CRREO)atSUNYNewPaltz. Internswhohaveaidedinresearchandwritinginclude:GennadyKolker,DarenMills, LaurenRandall,JessicaLee,AndrewSlater,IlanaNovick,HannahRyu,LillianSmith,and KevinMaloney. CitizensUnionalsoacknowledgesitsgoodgovernmentpartners,specificallytheNew YorkPublicInterestGroupandtheLeagueofWomenVoters,NewYorkStatewho helpedformandleadthestatewideredistrictingreformcampaign,ReShapeNY.Alistof ReShapeNYssupportersisdetailedinAppendix7. Generousfundingfortheresearchanddevelopmentofthisreportwasprovidedbythe RockefellerBrothersFund,NewYorkCommunityTrust,MertzGilmoreFoundationand LilyAuchinclossFoundation.CitizensUnionthanksitsDirectorofDevelopment, BethanyWall,forherhelpinsecuringneededfundingforthisreport.
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ThelawfirmWeilGotshal&Mangesprovidedvaluableprobonoservicesonimportant issuesrelatedtotheorganizationslegalworkonredistricting. Andfinally,thetwoorganizations,CitizensUnionandCitizensUnionFoundationhave benefitedfromthesupportofourmanymembersandindividualdonors,including membersoftheboardsofdirectors,infundingourmultiyearworktoendpartisan gerrymanderingandusherinredistrictingreform. CitizensUnionoftheCityofNewYork BoardofDirectors PeterJ.W.Sherwin,Chair IanL.Kelley LuisGardenAcosta,ViceChair HaroldLevy RichardBriffault,ViceChair OgdenN.Lewis GenaLovett,Treasurer MarkLieberman ChristinaR.Davis,Secretary MalcolmMacKay Hon.RobertAbrams RandyMastro JohnP.Avlon,CoChair, TonyMattia MunicipalAffairsCommittee BruceRabb NancyBowe,Chair, LuisO.Reyes,Ph.D. NominatingCommittee AlanRothstein,Chair, GerrardP.Bushell StateAffairsCommittee LucyCabrera,Ph.D. RickSchaffer CurtisCole,M.D. KennethSeplow AllanH.Dobrin GregorySilbert MarkFoggin AnthonySmith EsterR.Fuchs,Ph.D. HectorSoto RobertM.Kaufman CitizensUnionFoundationoftheCityofNewYork BoardofDirectors PeterJ.W.Sherwin,Chair GeorgeS.Kaufman EricS.Lee Hon.RobertAbrams,President JudiRappoportBlitzer,ViceChair OgdenN.Lewis GailErickson,ViceChair LillianRodrguezLpez RobertM.Kaufman,ViceChair MarcD.Norman GraceLyuVolckhausen,ViceChair TomOsterman GenaLovett,Treasurer AnushaRasalingam ChristinaR.Davis,Secretary SallyRobinson KennethAustin TorranceRobinson NicoleGordon ClaireSilberman AshokGupta EdwardC.Swenson JohnR.Horan
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CitizensUnionoftheCityofNewYork StateAffairsCommittee AlanRothstein,Chair MarkAlcott PhyllisBamberger TomBergdall NancyBowe RichardBriffault GailErickson PeggyFarber EricFrawley WendyGoldstein NicoleGordon SusanHinko SallyRobinson MarjorieShea PeterSherwin ClaireSilberman GregSilbert AnthonyR.Smith JohnSnyder RogerWaldman
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3
Introduction
ThisreportistheculminationofseveralyearsofresearchbyCitizensUnionFoundationstaff.It hasbeenanevolvingproduct,asthepathofredistrictingreformhastakenmanyturns.Support forredistrictinghasgrowntremendouslywithinstategovernmentinrecentyearsandtheissue hasalsoseenaresurgenceofpublicandmediainterestwiththecompletionofthe2010Census andthestartoftheprocessofdrawingdistrictlinesforthestatelegislatureandtheU.S.Houseof Representatives.Atthispointintime,redistrictingreformisatoppriorityforNewYorkers,and onethatmustbeaddressedbythestatelegislatureinaspecialsessioninordertohaveanaffect beforethe2012elections. CitizensUnionFoundationintendsforthisreporttobebothrelevanttotodaysdebateinAlbany regardingredistrictingreformforthe2012cycle,andasanhistoricdocumentnotingtrendsof decreasedvoterparticipationandconfidenceinstategovernmentovertime,aswellasthelackof competitioninthestateselections.Tobalancethesetwogoals,weprovidesignificantresearchof thestateselectionsandalongtermviewofissuessuchaslegislativegridlockandpolarizationof thelegislature,whilealsonotingthesupportin2011forproposalstocreateanindependent commission.Thisreportutilizesthisresearchandcasestudiestodemonstratewhyredistricting reformisneededinNewYorkState,showingtheconnectionbetweenredistrictingreformandthe lackofactiononissuesofimportancetoNewYorkersinAlbany.Thereportisalsoaprimeronthe redistrictingprocessandthemeansbywhichcommunitieshavebeenmarginalizedandpartisan interestsandincumbencyhavebeenprotectedovertheneedsofvoters. Reformershavelongdecriedthestatesredistrictingprocess,andCitizensUnion,firstfoundedin 1897,hasbeenaparticipantinthecallforreformfordecades.Inthe1980s,wedrewourown legislativemaps,formingashadowcommission,andinthe1990s,wecontinuedtoadvocatefor amoreindependentandfairprocessfordrawingdistrictlines.Ashasoftenbeenthecasein Albany,reformhastakenabackseattootherissues,andentrenchedpartisaninterestshavefailed toaddresstheflawsofthestatesredistrictingprocess. Lookingaheadtothe2012redistrictingcycle,CitizensUnionwithitscoalitionpartnersfirstdrafted statelegislationin2005withthenAssemblymemberMichaelGianaris(DQueens),tocreatean independentcommissiontodrawlegislativedistrictlines.Legislativesupporthassteadily increased,andlegislationwasalsointroducedbyGovernorAndrewCuomoin2011which proposedthecreationofanindependentcommission,modeledaftertheGianarislegislation. Today,184ofthe212membersofthestatelegislaturehaveeithersignedontolegislation creatinganindependentcommissionorpledgedtosupportsuchareform. Publicsupportforreformisstrongerandmorediversethaneverbefore,asexemplifiedby ReShapeNY,CitizensUnionsstatewidecampaignforredistrictingreformformedinearly2011.
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ReShapeNYiscomprisedofacoalitionofover37organizationsfromacrossthestate,including civicgroups,issueadvocacygroups,unionsandbusinessgroupsunitedinthecommongoalto reformourstatesredistrictingprocess.ReShapeNYseeksanindependentcommissiontodraw statelegislativeandcongressionaldistrictboundariesaccordingtofairandobjectivecriteriawhile allowingforrobustpublicinputintotheprocess.ThemembersofReShapeNY,likeNewYorkers acrossthestate,havejoinedincallingforlegislativeactionbeforethe2012electionstocreatea newredistrictingparadigm. CitizensUnion,alongwiththeLeagueofWomenVotersN.Y.SandtheNewYorkPublicInterest ResearchGroup(NYPIRG)serveontheleadershipteamofReShapeNY.MembersoftheSteering CommitteeandendorsersofthecampaignincludeACTNOW,theAssociationforaBetterNY. CitizensCommitteeforNewYorkCity,CitizensforaBetterNewYork,theInterfaithAllianceof Rochester,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,NewYorkUprising,theLongIslandProgressive Coalition,theMentalHealthAssociationofNewYork,MinKwonCenterforCommunityAction,the PublicEmployeesFederation,theRegionalPlanAssociation,andTransportationAlternatives, amongothers.10 AnumberofhighprofileNewYorkersserveasReShapeNYscochairsfromacrosspartylines, includingFormerDemocraticNewYorkCityMayorEdwardI.Koch,formerRepublicanState SenatorFrankPadavan,formerDemocraticAttorneyGeneralRobertAbrams,andformer RepublicanCandidateforStateComptroller,HarryWilson.Thesecochairsarejoinedbysixother significantcivicandpublicserviceleaders:JohnAvlon,PhoebeBender,Dr.GeraldBenjamin,Rev. CalvinO.ButtsIII,GraceLyuVolckhausen,andLillianRodriguezLopez. Mediaattentionhasincreasedontheissue,asthelegislaturehasfailedtoenactlegislation creatingamoreindependentandfairprocess.Editorialshavebeenwrittenacrossthestatein recentmonthscallingforindependentredistrictingbytheNewYorkTimes,theRochester DemocratandChronicle,theAlbanyTimesUnion,theNewYorkDailyNews,theBuffaloNews, Newsday,theOneidaDispatch,theHenriettaPost,theGatesChiliPost,thePoughkeepsieJournal, WayneCountyMessengerPost,theStatenIslandAdvance,CrainsNewYork,theUticaObserver Dispatch,HudsonValleyJournalNews,SchenectadyDailyGazette,theCorningLeader,andthe HeraldCommunitypapersinLongIsland.Opedsandletterstotheeditorhavealsobeenprinted inpapersacrossthestate,pointingtofurtherpublicsupportforreform. GovernorCuomomadehisstanceknownonredistrictingreformduringthe2010campaign season,andhasnowrepeatedseveraltimeshispledgetovetodistrictlinesthatarenotdrawn independentlyorarepartisan.HehasfurtherstatedthathedoesnotbelievethattheLegislative TaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment(knownasLATFOR,whichisthe currentbodyresponsiblefordrawinglines)canbenonpartisan.Ignoringthepublicwilland continuingwithLATFORproceedings,thoughtheonlylegallymandatedprocessatthistime,will onlyendinGovernorCuomovetoingthelines,makingthisentireprocessawasteoftimeuntilthe powerofthepenisplacedinthehandsofanindependentcommission.
10
ThefulllistofReShapeNYcoalitionmembersisavailableinAppendix7.
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Thestatelegislatureisinanuntenablepositionhavingnotpassedreformsupportedbythepublic, civicgroups,theGovernor,themedia,anditsownmembersandcontinuingthestatusquo therebysowingtheseedsoffutureinactionandpolarizationonbigissues. CitizensUnionsrecommendationsasprovidedinthisreportprovidetheframeworkforan independentcommissiontodrawdistrictlinesaccordingtofairandobjectivecriteriawhile allowingforrobustpublicinput.Itmaybepasttimeforalltheelementsofthesereformstobe putinplaceforthisredistrictingcycle,butitisnottoolatetostillcreateanimpartialprocessfor 2012andamorelastinglevelofreformintheformofaconstitutionalamendment. TheworkthatisbeingconductedbyLATFORcouldeasilybetakenoverbyanindependent commission,whowouldconsiderthepublicinputgiventhusfarandseekadditionalcommentin drawingmapsforsubmissiontothelegislature.ThelastofLATFORspublichearingshave concludedsolicitinginputonthepublicbeforemapsaredrafted.Indeed,wewouldhopethatit wouldnotbecurrentlydrawinglineswithoutconsideringthepublicinputgivenatthesehearings. Notonlyisreformstillpossible,itisneededmorethanever. NewYorkgovernmentsawoneofthemostproductivelegislativesessionsinrecentmemoryin 2011.Redistrictingreform,however,isthemajorpieceofunfinishedbusiness.CitizensUnion callsonthestatelegislaturetoreturntoAlbanyinaspecialsessionandkeeptheirpromisesto finallyendpartisangerrymanderingandenactredistrictingreform.NewYorkershavewaited decadesforredistrictingreform,andwenowhaveaonceinadecadeopportunitytodrawthe linesin2012forthebetter.Wecannotwaitanothertenyearsforreform,andurgeimmediate actionbythelegislaturetoputanindependentcommissioninplacetofinishthejobofLATFOR.
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4
RiggingtheSystem:HowNewYorkStates LegislativeDistrictsareCurrentlyDrawn
Thepowertodrawcongressionalandstatelegislativedistrictlines,asmandatedeverytenyears bytheU.S.Constitution,hasbeenlargelylefttothestates.Statesmustundertakeredistricting followingeverycensus,andtheredistrictingprocessisakeydeterminantforhoweverycitizen andcommunitywillberepresentedatthestateandfederallevelsofgovernmentforthenextten years.HereinNewYork,aselsewhere,itisalsoakeyfactorindeterminingwhetherthestates minoritycommunitieswillhavesufficientpoliticalstrengthtoelectcandidatesoftheirchoice. UnderthecurrentsystemofredistrictinginNewYorkState,themajoritypartyineachhouseof thestatelegislatureisessentiallygiventhepowertodesigndistrictsthroughtheirappointment powerstothebodyinchargeofdrawingthemaps.Inpractice,leadersofbothhouses,withinput fromfellowmajoritymembers,havedeterminedhowdistrictlineswillbedrawnindependentlyof oneanother.Inonelegislativebill,theSenateandAssemblyledbythemajoritiesineachhouse havehistoricallypassedeachothersplanstopreservetheirownmajoritiesandtheseatsof incumbentsintheirparty,andtheplanhasbeenpassedwithlittleinputfromtheGovernor. Withaneyetowardmaintainingpowerandincumbency,politicalleadersuseamyriadoftoolsand carefulcalculationstocraftdistrictsthatminimizenotonlytheelectabilityofanoppositionparty orindependentcandidate,butalsoofinsurgentcandidateswithinthemajoritypartyaswellas communitiesthataregrowinginelectoralstrengththatcanpotentiallythreatenanincumbents holdonpower.
A. ABRIEFHISTORYOFREDISTRICTING
TheU.S.ConstitutionrequiresthatcongressionaldistrictboundariesfortheHouseof Representativesbereapportionedandredrawneverytenyearstoreflectpopulationshifts detectedbytheFederalcensus.11Asisthepractice,ineveryyearendingin"1",theallocationof congressionalseatsamongstatesfortheHouseofRepresentativesarereapportionedtoreflect changesinpopulation,withthenumberofastate'scongressionaldistrictsbaseduponeachstate's proportionofthenationalpopulation.Whilethenationaltotalnumberofcongressionalhouse seatshasessentiallyremainedstaticat435since1929,12reapportionmentineachstatemight alterthenumberofcongresspersonsthateachparticularstatesendstoWashingtonfollowingthe decennialcensus.
11 12
U.S.Constitution,Article1,2. 435seatswereestablishedbyPublicLaw625,whichtookeffectin1913.
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Datingbacktothecountrysfounding, politicianshaverealignedandredrawn politicaldistrictstoattainorprotect power.LegendhasitthatPatrickHenry triedtodrawJamesMadisonoutofhis districtinthelate1780s.13A Massachusettsnewspaperin1812 printedacomicaldepiction(atright)of anoddlyshapeddistrictthatgaverise toanameforthepractice.Accordingto lore,theartistandeditorlookedata cartoonanddubbeditGerrymander, acombinationofthenameofthen GovernorElbridgeGerryandthe amphibioussalamanderitresembled. Illustration1:"TheGerryMander"byGilbertStuart. Untilthelasthalfcentury,thecourtsor OriginallypublishedintheBostonCentinel,1812. thefederalgovernmentrarely intervenedinredistrictingefforts.However,priorto1960,thestateofTennesseehadfailedto reapportionthestatelegislaturefor60yearsdespitethegrowthandredistributionofits population.Consequently,theissuewasforthefirsttimetakentothecourtsinthelandmark decisionBakerv.Carr,14whichestablishedaplaintiffsrighttobringcasestocourttodetermine theconstitutionalityofastateredistrictingplan.Thiseventuallyledtothedecisionestablishing theoneperson,onevoteprincipleinGrayv.Sanders15in1961thatwasextendedtofederal electionsin1964underWesberryv.Sanders.16 ThesuitinBakerv.CarrwasbroughtbyCharlesBaker,avoter,againstthestateinfederaldistrict court,andJoeCarr,thestateofficialinchargeofelections.Bakerclaimedthathisvotewas dilutedasaresultofthestatesfailuretoreapportionandthatitviolatedtheequalprotection clauseoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution.Thefederaldistrictcourtdismissedthe complaintonthegroundsthatitcouldnotdecideapoliticalquestion.However,uponappeal,the U.S.SupremeCourtruledin1962thatacaseraisingapoliticalissuecouldbeheard.Thislandmark decisionsetaprecedentthatallowedfortheresolutionofredistrictingconflictsincourt, andopenedthewayfornumeroussuitsonlegislativeredistricting.

B. NEWYORKSTATESREDISTRICTINGPROCESS
Sincethe1980s,NewYorksLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchand Reapportionment(LATFOR)hasbeenresponsibleforassistingthelegislatureindrawing congressionalandstatelegislativedistrictseverytenyears.LATFORwasestablishedbyChapter45
13 14
Toobin,Jeffrey.DrawingtheLine,TheNewYorker.March6,2006. Bakerv.Carr,369U.S.186(1962) 15 Grayv.Sanders,372U.S.368(1963) 16 Wesberryv.Sanders,376U.S.1(1964)
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oftheNewYorkStateLawsof1978toresearchandstudythetechniquesandmethodologiesto beusedbytheU.S.CommerceDepartments'BureauoftheCensusincarryingoutthedecennial federalcensus.17 FundingforLATFORisprovidedeveryyearaspartofthebudgetbillfundingthelegislature,and includesLATFORscommittees,taskforcesandotherlegislativebodies.TheFY20112012budget providesfor$358,325totheTaskForceforAssemblypurposes,$358,325forSenatepurposes, and$1,142,109forjointoperations,fortotalfundingof$1,858,759.18 UsinghighlytechnicaldemographicandgeographicdataprovidedbytheCensusBureau,LATFOR ischargedwithaidingthelegislaturebyprovidingtechnicalplansformeetingtherequirements oflegislativetimetablesforreapportionmentofSenate,AssemblyandCongressionaldistricts.19 AfterreceivingthedatafromtheU.S.CensusbyApril1stofyearsendingin1,LATFORconducts hearingsandreceivesinputfromthepublicabouthowbesttodevelopplansthataddressthe interestsofcommunities,minorities,andthepublicatlarge.Eachhousethendevelopsitsown plan,withthestaffnotevenseeingtheotherhousesplanbeforetheirownisfinished.20The publiccantestifyandcommentonLATFORsplans,aswellassubmittheirownplans,though publichearingsarenotrequiredbylaw.LATFORmaymodifyitsproposedplansbasedonpublic input,thoughitisnotrequiredto.Whiletheprocessfordrawingmapsissupposedtofollow publicinputandfeedback,legislatorshavereportedthatatleastinsomeinstancesdistrict boundarieshavebeendrawninadvanceofLATFORpublichearings.Whennotformulating redistrictingplans,LATFORconductsresearchonboundarysuggestionsandCensustracts. LegislatorssitonLATFORasmembersandhaveadirecthandintheprocess.Thecommissionis madeupofsixmembers,includingfourlegislatorsandtwononlegislators,appointedasfollows:21 One legislator and one private citizen chosen by the Temporary President of the Senate,withthelegislatorservingascochair OnelegislatorandoneprivatecitizenchosenbytheSpeakeroftheAssembly,withthe legislatorservingascochair OnelegislatorselectedbytheSenateMinorityLeader OnelegislatorappointedbytheAssemblyMinorityLeader Thecurrentcommissionmembersare: AppointedbytheTemporaryPresidentoftheSenate: SenatorMichaelNozzolio(CoChair) WelquisR.Lopez
NewYorkConsolidatedLawsA.5A83m(1978). NewYorkStateLegislatureandJudiciarybudgetlegislation,A.4001A/S.2801A.Availableat: http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A04001&term=2011&Summary=Y&Text=Y 19 TheNewYorkStateLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment,see http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/ 20 Rizzo,Nick.RedistrictingReformersCharge,AlbanyShrugs.CapitalNewYork.December1,2010.Availableat: http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/culture/2010/12/870203/crookedlinesredistrictingreformerscharge albanyshrugs 21 StateLegislativeLaw,83m
18 17
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AppointedbytheSpeakeroftheAssembly: AssemblymemberJackMcEneny(CoChair) Dr.RomanHedges AppointedbytheSenateMinorityLeader SenatorMartinMalavDilan(CoChair) AppointedbytheAssemblyMinorityLeader AssemblymemberRobertOaks
C. THEAPPROVALPROCESS
TheproposedplansdevelopedbyLATFORinthepasthavebeencompiledintotwolegislativebills: oneforstatelegislativedistrictsandoneforcongressionaldistricts.Thelegislaturevotesonthe legislationasitwouldonanyotherbill.Itisworthnotingthatnotonlydoesthelegislaturehavea keyroleinshapingtheplansattheLATFORlevel,butitalsohasthepowertoaltertheplans throughthelegislativeprocess.Thispastredistrictingcycle,thebillswereS6796/A11014(withan amendingbillS7300/A11184)passedinApril2002creatingstatelegislativedistricts.22Thebilland amendmentwereeachpassedwithinadayoftheirsubmission.Congressionaldistrictswere createdwithS.7536/A.11750of2002,whichwaspassedwiththeuseofamessageofnecessity fromtheGovernor,negatingtheneedforthenormalthreedayagingprocess.Afterpassageby bothhouses,thebillsthengoontothegovernorforhisorhersignature. ThreecountiesofNewYorkCity(Bronx,Kings,andNewYork)arecoveredbySection5ofthe VotingRightsActof1965asamendedin1982,meaningthattheredistrictingplansapprovedby thestatemustbereviewedandapprovedbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticeforpre clearancebeforeimplementation.Section5preclearancerelatestolegislativechangestothe electionprocesssuchaspollingplacelocations,votingmethods,andboundariesforlegislative districts.Intheory,aproposedchangewouldbedeniedifitwouldnegativelyimpactminority groupmemberswithrespecttotheiropportunitytoexercisetheelectoralfranchiseeffectively. TheVotingRightsActisfurtherdiscussedinSection5bofthisreport.
D. SUBVERTINGTHEPUBLICINTEREST
Duetotheirnearabsolutepowerovertheprocess,legislatorsandLATFORcanmanipulatethe linesinsuchawayastofashiondistrictsmeanttoensurethemajoritypartyretainsorincreases itscontrolineachhouseaswellasreelectsindividuallegislators.Oftentimes,thesepartisan interestsruncountertothepublicinterest. Theprotectionofmajoritypartiesandincumbentshasbeenprioritized,andLATFORhasusedthe lackofrulesandcriteriafordrawinglinestoadvantageincumbentsandthepartiesincontrolof eachhouse.Pastpractices,whicharedescribedingreaterdetailinthefollowingsections,have included:drawingachallengershomeorpoliticalbasesoutofdistrictsafterhavingmounteda strongchallengeagainstanincumbent;goingtothemarginsofallowabledistrictpopulationsize
22
LegislationavailablefromLATFORathttp://latfor.state.ny.us/maps/amend.html
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toadvantageregionsofthestateoverothers;andthegerrymanderingofdistrictsanddividingof communitiestosplitthevoteofburgeoningethniccommunities. i. PopulationDeviation Thecentralgoalofredistrictingthatisestablishedbylaw,ifnotpractice,istoensurethatvoters areaffordedfairandequalrepresentation;themaintenetoffairrepresentationisanearequal distributionofpopulationbetweendistricts. InNewYorkState,theStateConstitutionrequirestherebe150assemblydistrictsandprovidesa formulaforthedeterminationofthenumberofsenatedistricts(currentlysetat62).23The averagenumberofpeoplerepresentedbytheselegislatorsasofthelastredistrictingin2002was 126,510perassemblydistrictand306,072persenatedistrict.NewYork's29congressional districtsaveraged654,361people,withadifferenceofonly1personbetweenthesmallestand largestdistrict.Thecurrentallowanceofa10percentdeviationinpopulationsizefromthe largesttosmallestdistrictineachhousehasallowedforlargedifferencesinrepresentationfrom onecommunitytoanotheradifferencebetweendistrictsofover30,000peopleinasenate districtandover12,600inanassemblydistrict. The2010CensusshowedthatNewYorkStatespopulationgrewto19,378,102residents,an increaseof2.1percent.Asaresult,afterthe2012redistrictingcycletheaveragestateassembly seatwillhave129,187people,theaveragesenateseatwillhave312,550people(assumingthere willstillbe62seats),andtherewillbe717,707peoplepercongressionaldistrict.NewYorkwill have27seatsintheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,downfrom29.Thisdecreaseisduetoother stateshavinglargerpopulationgainssuchasTexasandFlorida,whichsaw20.6and17.6percent growths,respectively.24 Alldistrictsmustcontainessentiallythesamenumberofpeopletopreservetheprincipleofone person,onevote.25Asprovidedincaselaw,however,statelegislativedistrictshavebeenallowed tobedrawnwithin5percentoftheaveragedistrictsize(either5percentaboveorbelowthe average,meaningthatthereisa10percentspreadbetweenthesmallestandlargestdistrict).26In practice,thisallowanceofdeviationhasallowedthosedrawingdistrictlinestooverorunder populatedistrictsinsuchamannerthatcreatesastrategicadvantageforonepartyovertheother. Currently,thesizeofcongressionaldistrictsmustbeofequitablepopulationasnearlyasis practicable,whichisahigherstandardthanappliedtostatelegislativedistricts.27Indeed,federal lawrequiresthatU.S.congressionaldistrictsdifferfromoneanotherbynomorethanoneperson. OtherstatessuchIowaandOregonhavesetasimilarlyhighstandardforpopulationequityby
23
NewYorkStateConstitution,ArticleIII,45.Itshouldbenoted,however,thattherewereconcernsinthe2002 redistrictingcyclethattheconstitutionwasfalselyinterpretedforpoliticaladvantage. 24 U.S.Census,availableat:http://2010.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ 25 Reynoldsv.Sims,377U.S.533(1964). 26 Brownv.Thomson,462U.S.835,84243(1983) 27 Wesberryv.Sanders,376U.S.1,78,(1964).
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requiring,orinpractice,holdingtoadeviationoflessthan+/1percent.28SpecificallyinIowa,the deviationpercentagevarianceforstatelegislativedistrictsmustnotexceed1percentandthe overalldifferenceinsizebetweenthelargestandsmalleststatelegislativedistrictsmustnot exceed5percent.29Asshowninthetablebelow,only12percentofthestateassemblyandsenate districtsdrawnin2002inNewYorkwouldliveuptoa1percentdeviationstandard.30 Table1:NewYorkStateDeviationfromAverageDistrictSize,2002 Deviationfrom Assembly Senate AverageDistrictSize Districts Districts Lessthan1% 18(12%) 11(17%) Between1%and3% 63(42%) 32(51%) Between3%and5% 69(46%) 19(30%) Deviationsfromthemeandistrictsizeareoftengreatandoftenrunrightupagainstthelegallimit, causingwidevariationsinpopulationfromthelargesttosmallestdistricts.Thesmallestassembly districtin2002wasDistrict78intheBronx(currentlyheldbyDemocratJoseRivera)witha populationof121,111constituents,accordingto2000censusnumbers.Thelargestassembly districtwasDistrict143(currentlyrepresentedbyDemocratDennisGabryszak),whichmakesup ErieCountyinwesternNewYorkandhouses133,038constituents,adifferenceofalmost12,000 constituentsorabout10percent,bumpingrightupagainstthelegalthreshold. Thesenatedistrictwiththesmallestnumberofconstituentsin2002wasDistrict48(currently representedbyRepublicanPattieRitchie),whichincorporatesportionsofOswego,Jefferson,and SaintLawrenceCountyinthenorthwesternportionofNewYorkwithapopulationof290,925. ThelargestsenatedistrictwasDistrict38(currentlyrepresentedbyDavidCarlucci),combining portionsofOrangeandRocklandCountylocatedjustnorthofNewYorkCity,withapopulationof 320,851,adifferenceofalmost30,000constituentsorabout10percent,againpushingthelegal threshold. ShiftingPopulations Underthe2010U.S.Censuscounts,52ofthe150assemblydistrictshavepopulationsmorethan5 percentabovetheaveragedistrictsizeutilizedin2002,accordingtoCitizensUnionFoundation research.Whilethenewlinesdrawnforthe2012electionswillcorrectsomeofthischangein populationtoensuremoreequalrepresentation,the5percentdeviationallowancehasmeant thatneartheendofthedecadeintheredistrictingcycle,districtshavewidelyvaryinsize,as shownonthetablebelow.Districtsdownstateexperiencedtremendousgrowthfrom2000to 2010,withthelargestassemblydistrict(AD1inSuffolkCounty,currentlyrepresentedby RepublicanDanLosquadro)seeingagrowthof18,243,nowhavingapopulationdeviationof18
Formoreinformation,seeStateofOregonRedistricting:FrequentlyAskedQuestions,OregonStateLegislature, http://www.leg.state.or.us/redistricting/faqs.htm 29 LegislativeGuidetoRedistrictinginIowa.IowaLegislativeServicesAgency.Availableat: http://www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/Central/Guides/redist.pdf 30 UnfairAdvantage:NewYorkStatesRedistrictingProcess,NewYorkPublicInterestResearchGroup,April2006. AlldataregardingNewYorklegislativedistrictsizesanddeviationsin2002comesfromthissource.
28
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percentfromtheaveragedistrictsizein2002.Thesmallestassemblydistrict(AD141inBuffalo, representedbyDemocratCrystalPeoplesStokes)sawadecreaseof21,937,andnowdeviates13 percentfromtheaveragedistrictsizein2000.Overall,thereisnowaswingof26percent betweenthelargestandsmallestassemblydistrict,adifferenceofnearly40,000people. Similarlyinthesenate,22ofthe62senatedistrictsin2010havepopulationsmorethan5percent abovetheaveragedistrictsizeutilizedin2002,asshownonthetablebelow.Thelargestdistrictin 2010(SD38,representedbyCarlucci)grewby26,525people,andnowdeviates13percentfrom the2002averagedistrictsize.Thesmallestsenatedistrict(SD60intheBuffaloarea,represented byRepublicanMarkGrisanti),sawadecreaseof27,900,andnowdeviatesnearly12percentfrom theaveragedistrictsizein2002.Overall,thereisnowaswingof25percentbetweenthelargest andsmallestdistricts,adifferenceofover75,000people.SeeAppendix3forthebreakdownin eachdistrict. Congressionaldistricts,whichweredrawntowithinonepersonin2002(either654,320or654,321 peopleineachdistrict)havealsogrownorlostpopulationbasedonthe2010censuscount,butdo notcomeanywherenearthecurrentdifferenceinsizeforstatesenateandassemblydistricts. Therearenodistrictsdeviatingmorethan10percentinbasedonthe2010censuscountandthe averagedistrictsizein2002,andthevastmajorityofdistrictsvarybylessthan5percent(24ofthe 29congressionaldistricts),asshowninthetablebelow. Table2:NewYorkStateDeviationfromAverageDistrictSize,2010 Deviationfrom Assembly Senate Congressional AverageDistrictSize Districts Districts Districts Lessthan1% 27(18%) 8(13%) 4(14%) Between1and3% 39(26%) 16(26%) 9(31%) Between3and5% 32(21%) 16(26%) 11(38%) Between5and10% 38(25%) 18(29%) 5(17%) Largerthan10% 14(9%) 4(6%) 0(0%) Thetendencytocreatedistrictswithsuchavariancefromthemeandistrictsizetranscendsparty lines.TheSenateRepublicanmajorityhadhistoricallyfixedupstatedistrictstobeunder populatedanddownstatedistrictstobeoverpopulatedtomaximizethenumberofRepublican districtsthattheycanwineveryyear.Conversely,theAssemblyhasaDemocraticmajorityand underpopulatesdownstatedistrictswhileoverpopulatingupstatedistrictstocreatemoredistricts inDemocraticfriendlyterritory(seemapbelow).Thispracticeisdonespecificallybypacking constituentsintodistrictswherethemajoritypartydoesnothaveanenrollmentadvantageand creatinglesspopulateddistrictsinareaswherethemajoritypartyhasanenrollmentadvantage. Bycarefullyconcentratingrivalpartysvotersandspreadingouttheirownpartysvoters,the partieshavecreatedwidedeviationsbetweenthesizesofdistricts,resultinginlessthanequal representationforvoters. Inpractice,thisarrangementhashistoricallyledtomoreRepublicansenatedistrictsupstateand moreDemocraticassemblydistrictsdownstate.Theimpactthishasonthepublicisthatithas givendownstatevoterslessthanadequaterepresentationintheSenateandconversely,upstate
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voterslessthanadequaterepresentationintheAssembly.Italsomarginalizesboththeupstate DemocraticvoteanddownstateRepublicanvotebydilutingeachrespectivegroupsvoting strength.SeeAppendix4fordetailedmapsofthedeviationsofdistrictsfrom2002.Specifically: EverydistrictinLongIslandintheAssemblywasoverpopulatedbynearly4percent, whileinNewYorkCity,districtswereunderpopulatedbyasmuchas4percent(except fortheboroughofManhattan,whichwasoverpopulatedbyaboutonly1percent). IntheSenate,alldistrictsinNewYorkCitywereoverpopulated,thehighestbeing4 percentinQueens,whileinthe36districtsoutsideofNewYorkCity,32ofthesedistricts wereunderpopulated(only4outsideofNewYorkCitywereoverpopulated,allinthe NewYorkCitymetropolitanregioninWestchester,RocklandandOrangeCounties). Legalchallengesfrombothmajorpoliticalpartiesoverthepastcoupleofdecadeshavefailedto overturnthispractice.In2002,plaintiffsinthecaseAllenv.PatakichallengedtheStateSenate redistrictingplanonthegroundsthatitfailedtomeettheequalpopulationrequirements,among otherthings.31Theplaintiffsallegedthatanhonestandgoodfaitheffortcouldnothavebeen madebecausethedifferencebetweenthesmallestandlargestpopulation(a9.78percent deviation)andthedeviationfromtheideal(2.22percent)weresogreatthattheycouldnothave occurredincidentally.TheyalsonotedthatdeviationsfromtheidealinpastSenateredistricting planshadneverbeenashighasinthecurrentplan.TheCourtfoundthatbecausethedeviation waswithinthelegallimit(despiterunningupagainstit)theplandidnotviolateequalpopulation requirements. TheCountingofPrisoners Inpastredistrictingcycles,NewYorkStatehasusedU.S.censusdataincountingpopulationsfor thepurposeofredistrictingstatelegislativeandcongressionaldistricts.TheCensusBureau currentlycountsinmatesasresidentsintheareawheretheyareincarcerated,asopposedtothe locationwheretheyareoriginallyfrom,eventhoughtheseinmatesarenotabletovote.Arecent changetostatelawfrom2010willrequireNewYorkStategoingforwardtoamendtheU.S.census datatocountprisonersintheirlastknownresidenceratherthantheirplaceofincarcerationfor thepurposesofredistrictingofcountyandstatelegislativedistricts,aswellascongressional districts.Whilethenewlawiscurrentlyunderalegalchallenge,LATFORhasdeterminedthatitwill followthelawaswrittenandallocateprisonersattheirlastknownresidencedespiteprevious indicationthatitwouldnotfollowthelaw.32 Thepreviousmethodofcountingwascontroversialforanumberofreasons.Criticsarguedit violatedtheStateConstitution,whichreads:Forthepurposeofvoting,nopersonshallbe deemedtohavegainedorlostaresidencewhileconfinedinanypublicprison.33Additionally,it wasarguedthatcountingprisonersindistrictswheretheycannotvotewhentheaveragesentence
Allenv.Pataki,No.02Civ.0618(NewYork2002),availableat: http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/nyscomdiv/may02/10171202006.pdf 32 Campbell,Jon.Nozzolio:Followingprisonercountlawwasalwaystheplan:UPDATE,PoliticsontheHudson. August4,2011.Availableat:http://polhudson.lohudblogs.com/2011/08/04/nozzoliofollowingprisoncountlawwas alwaystheplan/ 33 NewYorkStateConstitution,ArticleII,4
31
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is34monthsdistortsthevotingstrengthofcommunitiesbyinflatingruralcommunitiesvoices andweakeningurbancommunities,bothinupstateNewYorkscitiesandinNewYorkCity.34 ii. DividingCommunities Thoughbothhousesusethesamedemographicdatatodrawtheirlines,assemblyandsenate districtlinesoftenformstrangecombinationstogether,suchaspiecesofmanyassemblydistricts nestedinasinglesenatedistrict,orneighborhoodswithinanindividualdistrictjoinedbynothing morethanastripofhighway. CASESTUDY:BRIGHTONBEACH Undercurrentpracticeandalackof DividingtheRussianCommunity legalprecedentagainstpartisan Whilethemanipulationofdistrictlinesisoftenthoughtto districting,legislativeleadersare occurforpartisangain,incumbentshaveusedthepowerto affordedtheabilitytodrawlinesto drawlinestoprotectthemselvesfromchallengersinparty protectpartyinterests.Thelegislative primaries,oftenattheexpenseofcommunitiesthatare dividedbysuchefforts. leadershavealsousedthedrawingof districtboundariestoprotect In2000,formerAssemblymemberAdeleCohenofthe47th incumbentsandminimizethe districtinBrooklynnearlylostaprimaryelectiontochallenger competitiontheyface.Thishasledtoa SusanLasher,whoreceivedalargemajorityofhervotesfrom confusingoverlapofAssemblyand theburgeoningRussianAmericancommunityofBrighton Beach.Lasherreceived75%ofthevotesfromBrightonBeach Senatedistrictsthataffectsvotersand butultimatelylostbyaslim100votemargintotheincumbent theirpoliticalstrength. Cohen. Thoughsometimesnecessaryto Followingthecloseelection,andthesubsequentredistricting accountforpopulationshiftsandto effortintimeforthe2002election,thedistrictwasredrawn protectminorityvotingrights,this insuchawaythateliminatedthepredominantlyRussian sectionsofBrightonBeachonlytobereplacedwithsections extremeparsingofneighborhoodsand ofBayRidge,amovethatcriticsclaimhelpedCohenexpand creativemapmakingresultsindistricts herbaseinthedistrict.1Furthermore,accordingtoletters thatlackcohesionbetweenassembly securedbytheNewYorkSun,Cohensuccessfullyrequested andsenatedistrictlinesandthe havingseveralpollingsitesmoved,whichcriticsclaim presentedaburdentoseniorRussianvotersbyrequiringthem breakingapartofwhatcouldbenatural tomakealongertrektothepollsthantheyareaccustomed alliancesbetweenassemblyandsenate constituentgroupsandrepresentatives. totheirpreviouspollingplacewasonthegroundfloorof theirhighriseapartmentbuildings.TheSunalsocitesthe Thisdividesneighborhoodsand firingofseveralRussianAmericaninspectorsandthe communitiesofsharedinterestsand opportunitypresentedbytheBoardofElectionsforCohento addressaclassfornewinspectorsasfactorsthatweighed leavescertaincommunities 2 marginalized,withouttheabilitytohave greatlyinherfavor. acommonvoicefortheircommunity. 1 AdamDickter.RussiansLongforClout.TheJewishWeek. March142003. 2 JackNewfield.AnotherDirtyTrick.TheNewYorkSun.
Sept.102004.Availableat http://www.nysun.com/article/1523?page_no=1.
Wagner,Peter.NewYorktocorrectmiscountofincarceratedpeople.PrisonersoftheCensus,August3,2010. Availableat:http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2010/08/03/ny_law/
34
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CASESTUDY:BRONX DividingtheMosholuCommunity
TheMosholucommunitystraddlestheMosholuParkwayintheBronxandiscomposedoftwoneighborhoodswith sharedinterests,BedfordtothesouthandNorwoodtothenorth.Mosholuiscurrentlyrepresentedbythree separateassemblydistrictsAD78,AD80andAD81.ThedivisionofdistrictshaslefttheMosholucommunityat thefarendofeachofthesedistricts,andwithoutfulltimedistrictofficestaffintheneighborhood.Specificallyfor AD80,thecommunityisneartheendofahookthatconnectsthemuchlargerMorrisParkneighborhoodthrough theNewYorkBotanicalGardentotheedgeoftheJeromeParkReservoir.Thishasledtotheinabilityofthe communitytohaveasingularadvocateforitsissuesintheAssembly. Membersofthecommunityhavefeltthattheredistrictingin2002detrimentallyaffectedtheirrepresentation,and thatitismoredifficulttoadvocatefortheirinterests.Specificallyregardingarecentproposalforafiltrationplantto bebuiltinnearbyVanCortlandtPark,fundswereallottedforparkstooffsetthelossofgreenspaceinthe neighborhood.TheywereunabletoacquiresuchfundsfortheMosholuParkway,andfeltthatthiswasaresultof theirdivisionamongtheassemblydistricts. Priortothe2002redistricting,theMosholucommunitywasprimarilyservedbyAD80,andtherewasastate legislativedistrictofficelocatedinthecommunity.Thereisalsonolongerapoliticalclubinthecommunityduetoits fragmentationbetweenthethreeassemblydistricts.
Illustrationbelow
Illustration2TheMosholuCommunityanditsDivisionAmongAssemblyDistricts
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Nesting Thedivisionofcommunitiesanddilutingofneighborhoodsduetoredistrictingisnotlimitedto neighborhoodssuchasBrightonBeachorMosholu,asseeninthecasestudiesabove.InNewYork City,Senatedistrictsaremadeupofpiecesofmultipleassemblydistricts,asituationcalled nesting.Thelackofcollaborationbetweenbothhousesofthelegislatureindrawinglineshasled toacomplex Illustration3:NestingofDistrictsinBrooklynafter2002Redistricting(black webof boundarylinesdelineateAssemblydistricts) assemblyand senate districts overlaying eachother. With150 assembly districtsand 62senate districts,there isnoneedto havemore thanthree assembly districtsina givensenate district.The lackof collaborationbetweenbothhousesofthelegislatureindrawinglineshasledtoacomplexwebof senateandassemblydistrictsoverlayingeachother.With150assemblydistrictsand62senate districts,thereisnoneedtohavemorethanthreeassemblydistrictsinagivensenatedistrict.The currentfragmentationcreatesconfusionforvotersandresultsincollusionratherthan cooperationamongthehousesinthelegislaturetorepresentnaturalandconsistentcommunities ofinterest,essentiallytreatingthesamecommunitiesdifferentlyineachhouse.AllofNewYork Cityssenatedistrictscontainpartsoffourormoreassemblydistricts,andoverhalfofthem containsixormoreassemblydistricts.Assemblydistrictsaresimilarlydiluted,withoverhalf containingthreeormoresenatedistricts.Thefracturingofcommunitiesamongsomanydistricts makesadvocacyandarguablyeffectiverepresentationdifficult,particularlywhenacommunityis splitinsixpieces,asrepresentativesmaycontainasmallportionofoneneighborhoodandalarger portionofanotherthatmaydrownouttheothersvoice. TheneighborhoodsofBayRidgeandBoroughParkinBrooklynserveasprimeexamplesofhow thesplittingofasenatedistrictovermultipleassemblydistrictscanhaveanimpacton communities,asseeninthemapabove.SenateDistrict23,includedportionsofBrooklynand StatenIsland,anduntiltheredistrictingof2002,encompassedthenearentiretyofBayRidge. Afterthe2002redistrictingeffort,theneighborhoodwassplitandparceledoutamongtwosenate
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districtsSenateDistrict22,representedbyRepublicanSenatorMartyGoldenandSenateDistrict 23,representedbyDemocratDianeSavino.BayRidgeisalsodividedupbetweenfiveassembly districts:46,48,49,51and60. BoroughPark,whichwasnearlywhollyrepresentedbySenateDistrict22priorto2002,isnow splitbetweenfivestatesenatedistricts,asseeninthemaponthepreviouspage.Insteadof havingtocontactonlyoneortwostatesenatorstohavetheirneighborhoodsinterests representedinAlbany,BoroughParkresidentsfoundthemselvesdilutedamongfivestate senators.HavingfewerBoroughParkresidentsineachofthenewdistrictsofroughlyequalsize meant,ineffect,thatBoroughParksvoiceineachdistrictbecamefainterandeasiertodiscount whenitsresidentsneededtocallAlbanysattentiontoaproblem.35Additionally,acomplexwebof assemblydistrictscoversBoroughPark,includingAssemblyDistrict44,48and51.Pleasesee Appendix1foradetailedlistingofnestinginAssemblyandSenatedistrictsinNewYorkCity. AstheAssemblyDemocratsandSenateRepublicanshavehistoricallygiveneachhousefreereign overtheirownmaps,collaborationbetweenthehouseshassuffered,anddistrictsaredrawn withoutregardtotheothersmaps.Nestinghasresulted,whichhassplitcommunitiesbetweenso manydifferentsenateandassemblydistricts,preventingcommunitiesfromhavingaunifiedvoice inAlbany. CrossingCountyLines
Districtboundariesareoftendrawnwithlittleadherencetoorrespectfortheintegrityofpolitical subdivisionslikecounties,citiesorothergovernmentalentities,althoughtownscantbedividedin drawingdistrictsaccordingtothestateconstitution.Thisoccurstosomeextentbecausedistricts mustbeapproximatelyequalinsizebutmoreoftenbecauselinesaredrawnforpoliticalpurposes. CitizensUnionanalyzeddistrictsinrelationtoadherencetocountybordersintheassemblyand statesenate. Whilemostofthelanguageinthestateconstitutionprescribinghowredistrictingshouldbedone isnolongervalidbecauseitdoesnotfollowthefederalprincipleofoneperson,onevote,some languagerelatedtocountylinesisarguablystillvalid.Forthedrawingoflinesinthestatesenate districts,theconstitutionstatesinrelationtocounties,Suchdistrictsshallbesoreadjustedor alteredthateachsenatedistrictshallcontainasnearlyasmaybeanequalnumberofinhabitants, excludingaliens,andbeinascompactformaspracticable,andshallremainunaltereduntilthe firstyearofthenextdecadeasabovedefined,andshallatalltimesconsistofcontiguousterritory, andnocountyshallbedividedintheformationofasenatedistrictexcepttomaketwoormore senatedistrictswhollyinsuchcounty.36Courtprecedentsdo,however,indicatethatthefederal principleofoneperson,onevotereignssupremeamongredistrictingcriteriapotentiallyproviding latitudeforthedivisionofcountiesinthestatesenate.Thereappearstobenoprohibitioninthe stateconstitutionindividingcountiesintheassembly.
35
Lachman,Seymour.ThreeMeninaRoom:TheInsideStoryofPowerandBetrayalinanAmericanStatehouse.(New Press:NewYork,2006)p.93. 36 NewYorkStateConstitution,ArticleIII,Section4.Availableat:http://www.dos.state.ny.us/info/constitution.htm
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Inpractice,assemblydistrictsbothspanacrossmultiplecountiesanddivideupcountiesbetween multipledistricts.AssemblyDistrict127sprawlssevencountiesincludingChenango,Columbia, Delaware,Greene,Ulster,Otsego,andSchoharie.Fortytwototaldistrictsintheassemblyinclude partsofatleasttwocountieswithintheirborders.Twentytwodistrictscontainthreeormore countieswithintheirdistricts.Senatedistrictsalsoshowlittlerespectfortheintegrityofcounty linesorcompactness.SenateDistrict51sprawlssevencountiesincludingChenango,Cortland, Greene,Herkimer,Otsego,Schoharie,andTompkins.Twentyfourotherdistrictscontainpartsof atleasttwocountieswithintheirborders.Fourteendistrictscontainthreeormorecounties withintheirdistricts. Assemblydistrictsandtoalesserdegreesenatedistrictsalsooftencrossthesametwocounty borders.Eighteenassemblydistrictscrossthesametwocountylinescrossedbyanotherdistrict. TheErieNiagaracountyborder,forexample,iscrossedbythreedifferentdistricts.TheRockland Orange,PutnamWestchester,JeffersonSt.Lawrence,DutchessUlster,BroomeChenango,and AlbanyRensselaercountybordersareallcrossedbytwodifferentdistricts.Fourassemblydistricts districts106,107,108and127evencrossthesamecountybordersasotherdistrictsintwo separateinstances.Populationvariancesofcountiesmightrequirethatonedistrictconnectto anothercounty,butthereisnoneedforacountytobeparceledbetweensomanydistricts, crossingthesamecountylinesmorethanonce. Sixsenatedistrictscrossthesametwocountylinescrossedbyanotherdistrict.Twodistrictscross theBronxWestchestercountylinewhileanothertwodistrictscrosstheBronxNewYorkcounty line,therebyjoiningBronxresidentsindistrictsfromanothercountyinfourinstances. Formoreinformationonthecountiescontainedineachdistrictandinstancesinwhichdistricts crossthesamecountylines,seeAppendix5.
CASESTUDY:LONGISLAND
NewYorkStateSenateLinesCrackingMinorityCommunitiesinSuffolkandNassau SuffolkCounty SuffolkCountycoversapproximately75%ofLongIslandandextendsfromMontauktotheborder withNassauCounty.With1.5millionresidents,itisthesecondmostpopulouscountyinthestate afterthecountiesofNewYorkCity.37EastSuffolkCountyisquiteruralandsparselypopulated, whileWestSuffolkCountyisadenselypopulated,suburbanarea.Concernsoversenatedistrict linesinSuffolkCountyresidewithdistrictsinthewesternhalfofthecounty(thetownsof Huntington,Smithtown,Babylon,Islip,andthewesthalfofBrookhaven)wherethemajorityofthe populationresides.
37
CommonCauseNY,CitizensRedistrictingCommission.Availableat: http://www.citizenredistrictny.org/2011/10/suffolk/
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InlookingatthepopulationanddemographicchangesofWesternSuffolkCountyinthelast decade,themajorityofpopulationgrowthoccurredamongminorities,suchthatthepopulation wouldnothavegrownmuchatallifnotforaninfluxofminoritygroupstotheareasince2000. Between2000and2010,thenonHispanicBlackvotingagepopulationhasgrownby18%andthe Hispanicvotingagepopulationhasgrownbynearly68%(incontrast,thewhitevotingage populationdeclinedby0.7%).38AccordingtotheU.S.Census,Latinosalonenowmakeup16.5%of thetotalpopulationofSuffolkCounty.39However,whatisevenmorenotablethanthegrowing minoritypopulationsinSuffolkCountyishowextremelyconcentratedtheyareincertainpocketsof WestSuffolk,particularlyinIslipandBabylon.
AcloseupofthestateSenatelinesinWestSuffolkshowhowthedistrictshavebeencreatedto dividetheminoritycommunitiesbetweenthreeSenatedistricts,asshowninthemapsandanalysis belowdevelopedbyCommonCauseNYthroughitsCitizensRedistrictingCommittee.40 Illustration4:DivisionoftheHispanicCommunityinSuffolkCounty AlargevotingblockofHispanicshasessentiallybeendividedbetweenSenateDistricts3and4. WhenHispanicsmarchalongFifthAvenueinBrentwoodinourannualparade,theyhavealegin onedistrictandanotherintheadjacentdistrict,saidAssemblymanPhilRamos(D)ofCentral Islip.41

CommonCauseNY,CitizensRedistrictingCommission. 2010U.S.CensusData,Availableat:http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36103.html 40 AllmapsinthissectionfromCommonCauseNY,CitizensRedistrictingCommission.Availableat: http://www.citizenredistrictny.org/2011/10/suffolk/andhttp://www.citizenredistrictny.org/2011/10/nassau/ 41 Vielkind,Jimmy.Redistrictingraisesbiasconcerns.TimesUnion,October5,2011.Availableat: http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Redistrictingraisesbiasconcerns2204924.php
39 38
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Then,againinBabylon,alargeBlackcommunityissplitbetweentheStateSenatedistricts4and8, asshowinthemapbelowdevelopedbyCommonCause.Ultimately,therearetwolevelsof crackingoccurring:first,individualracialminoritygroupsarebeingdividedwheretheymight otherwisehaveconsiderablevotingpower.Second,minorityracialgroupsasawholearebeing splitamongthreedistricts,whenagain,theymightbebetterrepresentedinaunifieddistrict.A lookatthe2008presidentialelectionresultsinSuffolkindicatesadisparityinthepoliticsofthe countyasawholeversusitsrepresentationintheStateSenate.SuffolkCountyvotedforBarack Obamabyamarginofabout5%,whichalthoughnotoverwhelminglyproDemocrat,isachallenge toitscurrentrepresentationinthestateSenate(9of9StateSenateseatsinLongIslandareheldby Republicans,allofwhomarewhitemen). Illustration5:DivisionoftheBlackCommunityinSuffolkCounty NassauCounty NassauCountyhasbeguntotakeonsomeofthecharacteristicsofitsneighbortothewest, QueensCounty.Populationdensityhasrapidlyincreased,with1.3millionpeoplenowlivingina roughly300squaremilearea,makingNassauCountyoneofthemostdenselypopulatedsuburbsin theU.S.42However,itsdemographymimicsthatofitseasternneighbor,SuffolkCounty,with
42
CommonCauseNY,CitizensRedistrictingCommission.Availableat: http://www.citizenredistrictny.org/2011/10/nassau/
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wealthier,whitercommunitiesmakingupthenorthshore(andlessdenselypopulated)partofthe countyandmorelowmiddleincomeandminoritygroupsinthesouthernhalfofthecounty.Aclose lookatthedemographicsofNassauCounty,andthetownofHempsteadinparticular,tells essentiallythesamestoryasthatofSuffolkCounty.BlackandHispanicpopulationshaveboomed inthelastdecadeandareclusteredintheSouthernpartofthecounty.StateSenatelinesfrom 2002againdividethesecommunitiesbyquarteringthedemographicallydistinctHempsteadand dividingBlackandHispanicpopulationsbetweenfourseparatedistricts.43 LikeSuffolkCounty,Nassauhasseenanincreaseinitsminoritypopulation,with68%ofthevoting agepopulationinCentralNassauminority.Overall,inNassauCounty,thenonHispanicblack votingagepopulationincreasedbyalmost16%andtheHispanicpopulationboomedbymorethan 48%.AlsoontheriseistheAsianAmericanpopulation,althoughthathasoccurredmorein northernNassauinrelationtothehugeriseintheAsianpopulationinnortheastQueens.TheAsian Americanvotingagepopulationincreasedby68%sincethe2000census,andwithAsiansalready makingup7.4%ofvoters,itisademographictowatchin2020.44 AcloserlookatthestateSenatedistrictlinesinNassauCountyagainshowsthecrackingof communities,similartowhatisoccurringinSuffolkCounty,asshowninthemapsbelowofthe TownofHempstead,alsodevelopedbyCommonCauseNY. Illustration6:DivisionoftheHispanicCommunityinNassauCounty
43 44
CommonCauseNY,mapsandanalysisavailableat:http://www.citizenredistrictny.org/2011/10/nassau/ Ibid.
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Illustration7:DivisionoftheBlackCommunityinNassauCounty
MinoritygroupsinNassauCountyaresplitevenfurtherthanthoseinSuffolkCounty,asstate Senatelinesdividethembetweenfourdistricts.Theveryobviouslydemographicallydistinctregion ofHempsteadisfractured,asshowninthemapabove. TheProtectedIncumbents SenateMajorityLeaderDeanSkelosinthe9thSenateDistrictinNassauCountyisaprominent figureinthegerrymanderingdebate.Despitehiscampaignpromisetosupportabanonpartisan gerrymandering,afterbeingelected,hehasrescindedhissupportforsuchameasureandhas calledanindependentredistrictingcommissionunconstitutional.45Furthermore,MajorityLeader SkeloswastherecipientofthecontroversialLATFORmemowrittenin2001abouthowto gerrymandera63rdStateSenateseatwhenthedistrictlinesweredrawnin2002,heservedas LATFORscochair.46Hisdistrictisalsoonethatfiguresintothenarrativeaboutcrackingminority groupsinNassauCounty,asthe9thdistrictisdrawntocrackbothBlackandHispaniccommunities.
Editorial.MajorityLeaderDeanSkelosmustnotbeallowedtobackoutofpromiseonredistrictingreform,New YorkDailyNews,March2,2011.Availableat:http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2011/03/02/201103 02_dean_the_deceiver.html 46 Seiler,Casey.Senatespokesmendueloverprospectof63rdmember.CapitolConfidential,TimesUnion. September19,2011.Availableat:http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/81427/senatespokesmenduelover prospectof63rdmember/
45
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SkeloscertainlystandstogainbycontinuingtogerrymanderdistrictlinesonLongIsland,especially asthenumberofregistereddemocratssurpassesregisteredrepublicans47inhishomedistrict. OtherstateSenatorsincrackeddistrictsincludeSenatorsOwenJohnsoninthe4th,CharlesFuschillo inthe8th,LeeZeldininthe3rd,KempHannoninthe6th,andJackMartinsinthe7th.Senator Fuschillosdistrictisparticularlyinteresting,asitmanagestocrackBlackcommunitiesinNassau CountytothewestandinSuffolkCountytotheeast.TheLATFORSuffolkCountyhearingin2001 providessomeimportanttestimonyfromcitizensconcernedabouttheirgerrymandereddistricts (transcriptsforthe2011hearingsinLongIslandwerenotavailableatthetimeofwritingthis report):

MynameisJudithCruz.IliveinBrentwood,NewYork,ahamletoftheTownofIslip.I'mhereto testifythattherehasbeenclear,intentionaldiscriminationbasedprincipallyonrace,whichhas beenthepredominantfactorindeterminingtheboundariesoftheLongIslandSenateDistricts.The SenateDistrictsdrawnbytheLegislatureforthe1970s,1980sand1990sshowaconsistentand unvaryingpatternofsplittingtheblackandHispaniccommunitiesSystematicallysplittingthe minoritycommunitiesdecadeafterdecadeunderminesdemocracy.Thispracticepromotesracial polarizedandsegregatedpoliticswhichhasacorrosiveeffectondemocracy.Thesplittingof minoritypopulationsdilutesthevotingpoweroftheminorityvoterandforcescandidatestowin electionsbyrespondingtothosevoterswhohaveavestedinterestinthestatusquo,likeschool financesandotherissues.TheredrawingofCongressional,StateSenateandStateAssembly Districtsmustlooktocorrecttheobviousdiscriminatorypracticewhichhastaintedourvoting processanddisgustedvoters.48
SimilartestimonywaspresentedfromotherresidentsofbothNassauandSuffolkCounties,almost allofwhomcitethesplittingoftheircommunitiesandcallforreformintheredistrictingprocess. However,theseconcernswerenotaddressedbythelinesdrawnin2002,whichkeptminority communitiesdividedbetweendistricts.Lookingaheadtoredistrictingin2012,thegrievancesof theresidentsofLongIslandcanbeexpectedtobethesame. Protectingincumbentsiscentralmotivatorforgerrymanderingandthedivisionofminority communities,andinfact,mostoftheSenatorsintheaffecteddistrictshaveheldtheirofficefor morethanadecade: SenatorLeeZeldin(R,SD3)firstterm(unseated1termincumbentBrianFoleyin2008,who inturnunseatedRepublicanCesarTrunzowhohadheldtheofficesince1972) SenatorOwenJohnson(R,SD4)firstelectedin1972;19terms SenatorKempHannon(R,SD6)firstelectedin1989;12terms(Assemblyfrom19771989) SenatorJackMartins(R,SD7)firstterm(defeatedincumbentDemocratCraigJohnsonin 2010byonly451votes) SenatorCharlesFuschillo(R,SD8)firstelectedin1998;7terms SenateMajorityLeaderDeanSkelos(R,SD9)firstelectedin1984;14terms(Assemblyfrom 19821984)
Confessore,Nicholas.DemocratsareGaininginState,RegistrationDataShows.NewYorkTimes,October10, 2008.Availableat:http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/nyregion/11register.html 48 LegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment,2001TranscriptsfromSuffolkCounty Hearings.Availableat:http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/docs/20010614/suffolk.html
47
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CASESTUDY:UPSTATENEWYORK49
DividingNewYorksOtherUrbanAreasforPartisanAdvantage InthelargercitiesinthestateotherthanNew YorkCity,citieshaveoftenbeensplitinto AVERAGEPOPULATIONFORSTATE multipledistrictsratherthanhavingasfew LEGISLATIVEDISTRICTSFOLLOWING2010 districtsaspossiblerepresenttheinterestsof CENSUS cities.VoterenrollmentfavorsDemocratsin theseurbanareas,andcitieshavebeensplit StateAssembly129,187(+2,667from eithertoshoreupDemocraticdistrictsthat 2002) containRepublicanleaningsuburbs,ortosplit StateSenate,assuming62seats thecitiesinsomemanypiecesthatthe 312,550(+6,235from2002) Democraticvotesaremarginalizedtomaximize Republicanrepresentation.Becausethereare constitutionalrequirementsthattownsnotbedivided,citiesareonthechoppingblockandare carvedupforpartisanadvantage. Illustration8SenateDistrictsinRochester Rochester Withapopulationof210,565asof the2010Census,Rochestercouldbe containedsolelyinonestatesenate districtandcouldbesplitbetween twostateassemblydistricts.The cityspopulationdecreasedbyonly 4.2%fromthe2000Census, meaningthatevenin2002there wasnotenoughofapopulationto necessitatemorethanonesenate districtin2002.50Thecityis currentlysplitbythreeassembly districtsandthreesenatedistricts, as showninthemaptotherightand on thenextpage.Rochesterscurrent stateassemblydistrictsareDistricts 131(HarryBronson,D),132(JoeMorelle,D),and133(DavidGantt,D).Thestatesenatedistricts areDistricts55(JamesAles,R),56(JoeRobach,R),and62(GeorgeMaziarz,R).District62hasa smallportionofthecity,andconnectsasfarwestasBuffalossuburbs.
AlldistrictmapsinthissectionobtainedfromtheLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchand Reapportionment(LATFOR)unlessotherwisenoted,availableat:http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/maps/.Mapsedited andfurtherillustratedbyCitizensUnionFoundation. 50 ForCensusdata,see:http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3663000.html
49
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Inbothcases,thecityissplittomaximizethemajoritypartyineachhouse,marginalizing RepublicansintheAssemblyandmarginalizingDemocratsintheSenate.Thus,gerrymandering allowsthesamedemographicstobeusedtotheadvantageofdifferentpartisaninterests. Illustration9AssemblyDistrictsinRochester Syracuse Illustration10AssemblyDistrictsinSyracuse ThecityofSyracusehaspopulation of145,170asof2010,adecreaseof only1.5%from200051.Itcouldbe containedwithinonestatesenate districtbutissplitintotwo,and whileitcouldnotbecontainedin onlyoneassemblydistrict,the divisionofthecitycouldbedoneina moremannerthatwouldbeless confusingtovoters.Syracusehas twostateassemblydistricts:District 119(SamRoberts,D)andDistrict 120(WilliamMagnarelli,D),asseen inthemaptotheright.Syracuses currentstatesenatedistrictsare District49(DavidValesky,D)and District50(JohnDeFrancisco,R). DavidValeskyisarelativelynew memberoftheSenatehavingbeenfirstelectedin2004,defeatingalongtermRepublican incumbent,NancyLarraineHoffman.
51
FortheCensusdata,see:http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3673000.html
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iii. ProtectingIncumbentsfromCompetition Theartofgerrymanderingisaneffectivetoolforprotectinglegislatorsandhasafforded incumbents,asdescribedinthespecialcaseofLongIslandgiventhesplittingofminority communities.Thecurrentredistrictingprocessgivesincumbentstheopportunitytoselecttheir constituentsaswellastargetparticularindividualstoensurethattheydonotchallengeforagiven seat.Theoutcomeofthe2002redistrictingeffortsofferedseveralexamplesinNewYorkCity aloneofhowtheprocesscanbeusedtoprotectincumbentsfrombothprimaryandgeneral electionchallengers.
CASESTUDY:THEBRONX,WESTCHESTER ProtectingGuy Vellela Illustration11SenateDistrict34

FormerRepublican StateSenatorGuy Vellelain2000hadto fightoffaspirited challengeforhisseat inSenateDistrict34 fromDemocrat LorraineCoyle Koppell52who received46percent ofthevotethatyear. Inordertoavoidthis levelofcompetition in2002,the redistrictingplan addedRepublican leaningEastchester tothedistrict, avoidingminority communitiesinMt. Vernon,Yonkersand Coopcity,whileincludingtheRepublicancommunityineastYonkersandportionsofRiverdale, andcraftilyslicingrivalLorraineCoyleKoppelloutofthedistrictbyoneblock.Vellelawasalso vulnerableduetoethicallapses,includinghisconflictedroleasChairoftheInsuranceCommittee whilehislawfirmrepresentedinsuranceindustrymembers.53
52 53
WifeofNewYorkCityCouncilmemberandformerAttorneyGeneralOliverKoppell. Hevesi,Dennis.GuyVelella,66,PoliticianBroughtDownbyEthicalLapses,Dies,CityRoom.TheNewYorkTimes. January27,2011.Availableat:http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/guyvelellaapoliticianbrought downbyethicallapsesdiesat66/
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LorraineCoyleKoppell,whofoundherselfinDemocratEricSchneidermansdistrict,describedthe districtingchangeinherneighborhoodinthefollowingway:Thinkofaballoon,andhowwhen youputyourfingerinaballoon,itchangesshape.Thatwasthedistrict,andthatpartofthe balloonwhereyourfingerwouldbewasmyhouse.54 ThebizarrelyshapeddistrictwonthedubiousPabloPicasso/SalvadorDaliAward,awardedbythe NewYorkPublicInterestResearchGroup,whodubbedthedistrict,"OopsISpilledMyCoffeeonthe Map."55 Havingwonreelectionin2002,Vellelalaterresignedin2004,beingfoundguiltyoftakingbribes forsteeringstatecontractstoclientsofhisfirm.
CASESTUDY:BROOKLYN MarginalizingHakeemJeffries
HakeemJeffriesin2000challengednineteenyearincumbentRogerGreen(D)intheDemocratic primaryinBrooklyns57thdistrict.Jeffrieswon41percentofthevote,animpressiveshowing againstalongtimeincumbent.Whentheredistrictingplansof2002wererevealed,thedistrict boundaryhadshiftedacoupleofblocksinProspectHeightsandJeffriesshomewasnolonger locatedinthe57thAssemblydistrict,asseeninthemapsonthefollowingpage. Thedistrictwascutoutbyjustthatoneblock,Jeffriessaid,Itsunfortunatethatthe dysfunctionalnatureofthelegislatureinAlbanyallowspoliticianstosliceanddicecommunitiesto meettheirownneeds.56Mostnotably,thenewlinessplittheProspectHeightsneighborhoodinto twodistricts. BecauseJeffriesthenresidedoutsideofthedistrictandotherportionsofhisbaseofsupportwere removed,hedidnotrunfortheseat.Ultimately,Greenwonanunopposedprimaryin2002and waselectedbackintooffice.Asitturnedoutin2004,RogerGreenwasfoundguiltyofpetty larcenychargesandwasforcedtoresignfromtheAssemblyonlytorunagainafterregrettinghis decisiontostepdown.In2006,Greendidnotagainseekelectiontothe57thdistrictassemblyseat, butinsteadmountedanunsuccessfulbidforCongress.Jeffriesultimatelymovedbackintothe57th AssemblyDistrict57andwonthe2006primaryelectionforthelegislativeseatwith64percentof thevoteandwentontowinthegeneralelection.
Cooper,Michael.CivicGroupsBackaBilltoStopGerrymandering.TheNewYorkTimes.March5,2005.Available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE7DF143CF932A25750C0A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewant ed=1 55 Robinson,Gail.IssueoftheWeek:Redistricting.GothamGazette.April1,2002.Availableat: http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/redistricting/ 56 Hicks,Jonathan.InDistrictLines,CriticsSeeAlbanyProtectingItsOwn.TheNewYorkTimes.November2,2004. Availableat:http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E4DE1F3DF931A35752C1A9629C8B63 57 AlldistrictmapsinthissectionobtainedfromtheLegislativeTaskForceonDemographicResearchand Reapportionment(LATFOR),availableat:http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/maps/
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Illustration12:AssemblyDistrict57 Before2002Redistricting
Assembly District 57
Illustration13:AssemblyDistrict57 After 2002Redistricting
Hakeem Jeffries
Hakeem Jeffries
CASESTUDY:ROCHESTER ProtectingSusanJohn
Otherdistrictshavechanged overtimetokeepmajority membersinpower,including formerAssemblywomanSusan JohnofAssemblyDistrict131 inMonroeCounty.The redistrictingprocessaddedto thesuburbantownsofher districtthatwereleaning Republicanahooktocapture votesintheDemocraticCityof Rochester.58Seepages46and 47formapsofotherRochester districts. Illustration 14: Assembly District 131 After 2002 Redistricting
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Redistricting,NewYorkStyle.TheNewYorkTimes.Availableat:http://documents.nytimes.com/redistricting gamesinnewyork#document/p6
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iv. MarginalizingtheMinorityParty
Inadditiontoprotectingincumbentsfromchallengers,linedrawersoftenseektomarginalizethe minoritypartybyshiftinglinestopitminoritypartyincumbentsagainstoneanotherinregionsof thestatewheretheminoritypartyhasanadvantageinpartyenrollment.Furthermore,ifa minoritypartylegislatorholdsaseatinwhathasbeentypicallyamajoritypartyregion,territory canbeaddedfromanadjacentmajoritypartydistricttobolsterthemajoritypartysenrollment advantageandpotentiallyunseattheminoritypartyincumbentinthenextelection.
CASESTUDY:UPSTATENEWYORK MergingandShiftingRepublicanAssemblyDistricts
HistoricallydistrictshadbeendrawnintheSenatetofavorRepublicansandintheAssemblyto favorDemocratseachpartyhavinghelddecadeslongmajoritiesintherespectivehouses meaningthatafterredistrictingoccurred,incumbentsoftheminoritypartyfoundthemselvesin newdistrictsthatnolongercontainedabaseofsupportforreelection.Incertaincases,minority partyincumbentswerepittedagainsteachotherbymergingtheirdistrictstocreatenewdistricts forpreferredcandidatesofthemajorityparty.SuchwasthecasewithAssemblymembersJay Dinga(RBroomeCounty),formerlyofAssemblyDistrict123,andRobertWarner(RBroome County)formerlyofAssemblyDistrict124,whosedistrictsweremergedintoanewlyconstituted District126.WarnerultimatelywonthePrimaryElectioninthenew126th.Themergealsoshifted anotherRepublicanAssemblyman,GaryD.Finch,tothecurrent123rdAssemblyfromthepre redistricting126th. Priorto2002,the123rddistrictsboundariescloselytrackedtodays126thdistrict.Finchsdistrict expandedfromthreecountiestofiveafterredistricting.StretchingfromCayugaLakeatits northernmostpointtotheborderofPennsylvaniaatitssouthernmosttip,ittakesFinchthreehours todriveacrosshisgerrymandereddistrict.Thenewlydrawn126thenabledDemocratDonna LupardotodefeatincumbentRepublicanRobertWarnerin2004followingthe2002redistricting. Seethemapsonthefollowingpagefortheevolutionofdistricts123and126.
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Illustration15:AssemblyDistrict123 Priorto2002Redistricting Illustration16:AssemblyDistrict123 After2002Redistricting
Illustration17:AssemblyDistrict 126Priorto2002Redistricting
Illustration18:AssemblyDistrict126 After2002Redistricting
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CASESTUDY:MANHATTAN ReducingMinorityPartyInfluence
AssemblyDistrict73ontheUpperEastSideofManhattanwasformerlyheldbyaRepublican memberoftheAssembly,JohnRavitz,from1991to2002,andwasaRepublicanstrongholdfor decades.Afterthe2002redistrictingcycle,District73waschangedsoastoaddmoreDemocratic votersfromadjacentAssemblyDistrict68,specificallyfromtwoNewYorkCityHousingAuthority (NYCHA)publichousingdevelopmentsites,theIsaacandHolmesTowersfrom92ndStreetto96th StreetnearFDRDrive.TheTowerscontainapproximately1,335people.59Ravitzchosetonotrun forreelectiontohisAssemblyseat,believingthathewouldnotbeabletowinwiththenew demographicsofthedistrict.JonathanBing,aDemocrat,wontheseatinthe2002electionagainst RepublicancandidateGailHilson. Illustration19:AssemblyDistrict73 Before2002Redistricting
Illustration20:AssemblyDistrict73 After2002Redistricting
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NewYorkCityHousingAuthority.NYCHAHousingDevelopments.Availableat: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/developments/manissacs.shtml
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5
THEHARMFULEFFECTSOFGERRYMANDERING
PartisangerrymanderinginNewYorkStatehashadanegativeimpactonourelectionsandpublic policymaking,puttingatriskthepublicstrustandconfidenceinthedemocraticprocess.While redistrictingoccursonlyonceeverydecade,ithaslastingaffectsthathaveprovedtobedamaging tothehealthofourdemocracyinNewYorkState.Specifically,ithascontributedto: makingourelectionslesscompetitive; advantagingincumbentsattheexpenseofcreatingopportunitiesformorediverse representationamongelectedofficials; preservationofpartisanadvantageattheexpenseoftheminoritypartyineachhouse; longtermincumbency; increasingpolicyinaction;and voterdissatisfactionanddecliningvoterparticipation. AdiscussionoftheincreasingdamageinflictedineachoftheseareasbyNewYorksredistricting processfollows.Theharmfuleffectsofgerrymanderingpointtotheneedforanimmediate remedythroughthecreationofanindependentcommissionandfairandsensiblecriteriaforitto followindrawingdistrictlines.
A.NEWYORKSLESSTHANCOMPETITIVEELECTIONS
Thenotionofcompetitiveelectionsinwhichvotershavearealandmeaningfulchoiceamong candidatesisattheheartofAmericasdemocraticprocess.Competitionamongavarietyof candidatesforpublicofficehelpstoensurethatvotersinterestshaveanequalchanceofbeing represented,andmeaningfulcontestsensurethatelectedofficialsremainaccountabletothe peopletheyrepresent.Theredistrictingprocesshastoooftenbecomeameansforstifling competition,eitherbydirectlydrawingcandidatesoutofdistricts,dividingnaturalcommunities andpoliticaljurisdictions,orbycreatingdistrictsthataresopolarizedthatonepartyisdominant. Whiletheredistrictingprocessneednotdirectlycreatecompetition,itisinherentlyunfairfor districtstobedrawntodeliberatelystiflecompetition. Whilegoverningauthorityisderivedfromtheconsentofthegoverned,candidatesfortheNew YorkStateLegislatureespeciallyincumbentshaveincreasingfacedlittleornooppositionatthe pollsasNewYorkselectionsprovidevoterswithfewerrealcandidatechoicesInfact,incumbents inNewYorkStatehavebecomesoinsulatedfromcompetition,oftenthroughthemanipulationof legislativedistricts,thatopportunitiesforchallengerstohaveafairchanceofcampaigningon competingideasandpolicysolutionsisincreasingnonexistent.
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Thislackofcompetitionhasledtoalegislaturethathistoricallyfailsmoretimesthannotto addressmajorvoterconcerns.Withoutthethreatofacrediblechallengeforoffice,incumbents arelessconcernedwithaccountabilityandresults,andaremoreapttostakeoutideological positionsandpandertotheirbaseofvoters,ratherthanthebroadpublicinterestneedsofthe state. InexaminingNewYorkCityandStateelectionresultsoverthepastseveraldecades,thisvery pronouncedlackofcompetitiveelectionsbecomesreadilyapparent.Acrossthestateandinthe city,electionsareseldomclose. Thesefindingsholdtrueandaremoredisconcertingforspecialelections,wherepartycandidates arenominatedinacloseddoorprocessbeforethespecialelectionaprocessthatcircumvents democracybyeliminatingtheabilityofrankandfilevoterstochoosetheirpartysnominee.The abilityofthepartyleadershiptochosetheirpartysnomineeforthesespecialelectionsfurther cementsthepartysholdonpowerinthelegislature. ThroughathoroughexaminationofNewYorkStateandCityelectionsoverseveraldecades CitizensUnionFoundationfoundthefollowing: Incumbentsonaverageexperienceda96percentreelectionratefrom2002to2010.In 2006,thereelectionratewas100%. Between1968and2010,competitioninNewYorkStatelegislativegeneralelection contestsdiminished,withtheaveragemarginofvictoryincreasingfrom33percentto51 percentduringthetimeperiod.Analltimelowincompetitivenesswasreachedin2004, withtheaveragemarginofvictoryat63percent. Thenumberofuncontestedstategeneralelectionlegislativeraces(inwhichthereisno opponentornomajorpartychallenger)increasedfrom1percentin1968to19percentof allracesin2010. i. MeasuringCompetitiveness Tomeasurethelevelofcompetitivenessofstatelegislativeelections,CitizensUnionFoundation analyzedstatelegislativeGeneralElectionreturnsfromoverthecourseof32yearsfrom1968to 201060.Itlookedatthemarginofvictoryandtherateatwhichthemajorpartiesinbothhouses areuncontested.WehavealsoanalyzedthegeneralelectionreturnsfromNewYorkCityfrom 19922010,andstatewidefrom2002to2010withafocusonthemarginsofvictoryintheseraces andthesuccessratesofincumbents,inparticular. Acompetitivenessscalehasbeenestablishedtoassesstheoveralllevelofclosenessofelection eventsduringthetimeperiods.Ingeneral,tobeconsideredcompetitive,anelectionmusthave amarginofvictoryoflessthan10percent.Thoseraceswithgreaterthana10percentmarginof victoryhavebeenclassifiedasnoncompetitive.Thoseracesinwhichtherewerenomajorparty challengersorwithnoopponentareclassifiedasuncontested.
DataupdatedbyCitizensUnionFoundationfromoriginaldatacontainedinStateLegislativeElectionReturns, 19672003,ThomasM.Carsey,WilliamD.Berry,RichardG.Niemi,LyndaW.Powell,andJamesMSnyder,Release Version1.
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Theelectionoutcomesarefurtherbrokendownintosubcategories(tight,close,comfortable,safe, landslide)toprovideagreaterlevelofanalysisoftheresults.
Table3:CompetitivenessScale
CompetitiveScale COMPETITIVE DegreeofCompetition Tight Close Comfortable Safe Landslide Uncontested Definition Marginofvictoryoflessthan5% Marginofvictorybetween5and10% Marginofvictorybetween10and 20% Marginofvictorybetween20and 40% Marginofvictoryof40%orabove Aracewithnomajorpartychallenger orwithnoopponent
NONCOMPETITIVE
UNCONTESTED
ii. NewYorkStateLegislativeGeneralElections,1968to2010 VotersseldomencountercontentiouselectoralcontestsforNewYorkStatelegislativegeneral electioncontests.Overthepastfourdecades,theselegislativeelectionshavebecomelessand lesscompetitive. In1968,almost13percentofNewYorkStategeneralelectionsweretightorclosewitha marginofvictoryoflessthan10percent. Todayinthemostrecentelectionin2010,only8.7percentwerethatclose. Intotal,only8.3percentofgeneralelectionsinNewYorkStatesince1968havehad marginsofvictoryoflessofthan10percent. Thefollowingisasummaryofthe4,625NewYorkStategeneralelectionsthathavetakenplace from1968to2010.Asisevidencedintheabovebelow,duringthepastfourdecadesover18 percentofraceshavebeenuncontested. Table4:NewYorkStateGeneralElections(1968to201061)
CompetitiveScale COMPETITIVE DegreeofCompetition Tight(<5%) Close(510%) Comfortable(1020%) NONCOMPETITIVE Safe(2040%) Landslide(>40%) UNCONTESTED NoMajorPartyChallenger NoOpponent Total:
61
Numberof Races 198 188 503 1245 1652 373 481 4,625
PercentofTotal 4.28% 4.06% 10.88% 26.92% 35.72% 8.06% 10.40% 100%
CategoryTotal 8.35%
73.51%
18.46% 100%
DatafromStateLegislativeElectionReturns,19672003,andupdatedwithelectionresultsobtainedfromtheNew YorkStateBoardofElections,availableat:http://www.elections.state.ny.us/2010ElectionResults.html
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Thelackofcompetitionhasalsoincreasedgreatlyovertime.Thefollowinggraphillustratesthe increasingmarginofvictoryinelectionsfrom1968to2010. Illustration21:AverageMarginofVictoryOvertime,NYSAssemblyandSenateGeneralElection Races,19682010

Average Margin of Victory New York State Assembly and Senate Races 1968 - 2010
70.00% 65.00% 60.00% 55.00% Margin of Victory 50.00% 45.00% 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Assembly Senate
Year
Theaveragemarginofvictoryhasbeensteadilyincreasingoverthelastfourdecades.Inthe Assembly,theaveragemarginofvictoryhitahighin2008at64percent. Withthelastelectionin2010,therewasanincreaseincompetitivenesswithanaveragemarginof victoryatnearly54percent,largelyasaresultofmoreRepublicanschallengingincumbent Democrats,perhapsridingthewaveofsupportseenforRepublicancongressionalcandidates. Nonetheless,theaveragemarginofvictoryin2010isstillwellabovethatof1968whenitwas32 percent.TheSenatehasseenarecentincreaseincompetitionfrom2006to2010,though2010s averagemarginofvictoryofalmost44percentiswellabovethe36percentaveragemarginfrom 1968.TheincreaseincompetitionintheSenateislikelyduetochangesinvoterenrollment,which havegivenDemocratsastrongerbasewithwhichtochallengeincumbentRepublicanSenators.
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a. PartisanAdvantage Aspreviouslydiscussed,from1980to2008,thelegislaturewassplit,withtheAssemblyunder DemocraticcontrolandtheSenateunderRepublicancontrol.Theramificationsofthissplitin controlcanbeseenclearlywhenexaminingwhichpartyhasthemostuncontestedraces.Though inaggregatethe62membersoftheSenateand150membersoftheAssemblyrepresentthesame numberofDemocraticandRepublicanvoters,wehaveseenanAssemblyinwhichDemocratsare morefrequentlyuncontestedandaSenateinwhichRepublicansaremorefrequentlywithout challengersingeneralelections,allinastatewithanenrollmentadvantageforDemocrats.Only withlegislativedistrictsdrawntoweedoutcompetitiondoesoneseesuchanadvantageforthe partyinpowerineachhouse. IntheAssembly,340Democratshadnomajorpartyopponentorwerewhollyunopposedfrom 1968to2010,whereasRepublicanswereunopposedinonly243races.IntheSenate,thereserve breakdownoccurs165Republicanssawnosuchoppositionfrom1968to2010,whileDemocrats wereunopposedinonly129races.Thechartbelowandonthefollowingpageshowthenumber ofuncontestedraces(wherethereiseithernomajorpartyopponentornoopponentatall)in eachhousefrom1968to2010. Illustration22:UncontestedGeneralElectionsintheNewYorkStateAssembly,19682010
Uncontested Elections New York State Assembly
60
50
Republicans No Major Party Opponent Republicans Uncontested
Number of Races
40
30
Democrats No Major Party Opponent Democrats Uncontested
20
10
0
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
2010
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Illustration23:UncontestedGeneralElectionsintheNewYorkStateSenate,19682010
Uncontested Elections New York State Senate
30
25
Republicans No Major Party Opponent
Number of Races
20
Republicans Uncontested
15
Democrats No Major Party Opponent
10
Democrats Uncontested
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Year
2010
b. IncumbentAdvantageLegislativeGeneralElections20022010 CitizensUnionFoundationhasexaminedtheelectionresultsforGeneralElectionsfrom2002 2010withaparticularfocusonthereelectionratesandmarginsofvictoryforincumbents.When oneexaminesthelevelofcompetitivenessinraceswherethereisanincumbentintherace(as opposedtoanopenseatelection)thelackofcompetitionbecomesevenmorepronounced.This hastodowithmanyfactors,includingnamerecognitionofthecurrentofficeholder,theabilityof incumbentstoraisemoney,otheradvantagesincludingtheabilitytomaildirectlytodistrict residentswithofficefunds,andingeneral,fewercompetitorssteppingforwardtotryandunseat anofficeholder.Addthemanipulationofdistrictlineseverytenyearstoinsulateincumbentsfrom challengestothesefactorsandthetaskoftopplinganincumbentisquitedaunting. Instarkcontrasttocandidateswinningelectionsforopenseats,incumbentsusuallywinbylarge margins.Between2002and2010,93percentofincumbentseitherwonbymarginsof10percent ormore,theaveragenearing61percent,orhadnomajorpartychallenger.Inopenraces,which accountedfor35percentofallracesduringthattimeperiod,theaveragemarginofvictorywas about42percent.Thetablebelowshowsthebreakdownineachhousewithregardtothe averagemarginofvictoryinincumbentandopenraces.
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Table5:AverageMarginofVictory,StateLegislativeGeneralElections,20022010
IncumbentAverage MarginofVictory ChallengerAverage MarginofVictory OpenSeatAverage MarginofVictory Senate 58.36% 17.02% 50.94% Assembly 62.77% 19.45% 38.53% TotalLegislature 61.49% 18.34% 41.67%
Whencomparingtheaveragemarginsofvictoriesinthecategoriesabovebetweeneachhouse,it isinterestingtonotethattheaveragemarginofvictoryforSenateopenseatsismuchlargerthan thatoftheAssemblynearly13percentagepointshigher.Thiscouldbeinpartattributedtothe largenumberofassemblymemberswhobringnamerecognitionandapublicrecordwhenseeking higherofficeintheSenatewhiletheseatisopenbynothavinganincumbentsenatoronthe ballot,theracestillhasanincumbentfromadifferenthouse.Forexamplein2010, assemblymemberssoughthigherofficeintheSenateinseveralracesSenateDistrict12sawthe electionofAssemblymemberMichaelGianariswithamarginofvictoryof63percentandSenate District31sawtheelectionofAssemblymemberAdrianoEspaillatwithamarginofvictoryof73 percent.Theoverallmarginofvictoryforopenseats,however,isstillwellbelowthatofracesin whichincumbentsarevictoriousbyabout20percentagepoints.

Evenwhenachallengerissuccessful,themarginofvictoryiswellbelowthatofsuccessful incumbents.Inthe4percentofraceslostbyincumbentsbetween2002and2010,theaverage marginofvictoryforchallengerstoincumbentswas18percent,wellbelowtheaveragemarginof victorywhenincumbentswinreelection(61percent,aspreviouslynoted). Overall,incumbentswonbylargemargins,asdemonstratedbythetablebelowandthetableson thefollowingpage.Whatshouldbenotedisthelargenumberofraceswhereincumbentsfaced nomajorpartychallengerorwerewhollyunopposednearlyathird(32percent)ofincumbent races. Table6:IncumbentRacesNYSAssemblyGeneralElections,20022010

CompetitiveScale Defeat Competitive Noncompetitive Uncontested
DegreeofCompetition LostElection Tight(<5%) Competitive(510%) Comfortable(1020%) Safe(2040%) Landslide(40+%) NoMajorPartyChallenger Uncontested(100%) TotalIncumbentRaces:
Numberof Races 18 9 16 48 151 220 65 159 686
Percentof Total 2.62% 1.31% 2.33% 7.00% 22.01% 32.07% 9.48% 23.18% 100.00%
CategoryTotal 2.62% 3.64% 61.08% 32.65% 100.00%
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Table7:IncumbentRacesNYSSenateGeneralElections,20022010
CompetitiveScale Defeat Competitive Noncompetitive Uncontested

DegreeofCompetition LostElection Tight(<5%) Competitive(510%) Comfortable(1020%) Safe(2040%) Landslide(40+%) NoMajorPartyChallenger Uncontested(100%) TotalIncumbentRaces:
Numberof Races 15 6 5 31 69 75 27 60 288
Percentof Total 5.21% 2.08% 1.74% 10.76% 23.96% 26.04% 9.37% 20.83% 100.00%
CategoryTotal 5.21% 3.82% 60.76% 30.21% 100.00%
Table8:IncumbentRacesNYSSenateandAssembly,GeneralElections,20022010
CompetitiveScale Defeat Competitive Noncompetitive Uncontested DegreeofCompetition LostElection Tight(<5%) Competitive(510%) Comfortable(1020%) Safe(2040%) Landslide(40+%) NoMajorPartyChallenger Uncontested(100%) TotalIncumbentRaces: Numberof Races 33 15 21 79 220 295 92 219 974 Percentof Total 3.39% 1.54% 2.16% 8.11% 22.59% 30.29% 9.45% 22.48% 100.00% CategoryTotal 3.39% 3.70% 60.99% 31.93% 100.00%
iii. TheIncumbentReelectionRate20022010 Takingtogethertheresultsoftheprimaryandgeneralelections,incumbentsarereelectedin largenumbers.Ofthoseincumbentswhoseekreelection,96percentweresuccessfulfrom2002 2010,withonly3.8percentofchallengersbeingsuccessfulintheirbidstooustincumbents,ora totalof33of970races.Thisextremelyhighratenotonlydiscourageschallengers,butalsovoter participation,astheresultsoftheelectionseempreordained. Table9:StateLegislativeIncumbentReElectionRatesAssemblyandSenate20022010

ResultforIncumbent WonSeat TotalLosses Total NumberofWins/Losses 941 38 978 PercentageofIncumbentRaces 96.12% 3.88% 100.00%
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iv. NewYorkCityGeneralElectionsforStateLegislature Liketherestofthestate,NewYorkCityhasexperiencedsimilardeclinesinthelevelof competitivenessofstatelegislativeelections.ThelackofcompetitioninNewYorkCitysgeneral electionsisinlargepartduetothefactthatofallregisteredvoters,68percentareregisteredwith theDemocraticPartyandonly11percentareregisteredwiththeRepublicanParty.62However, mostNewYorkCityassemblydistrictsarealsodrawninsuchamannerthattheRepublicanvoteis marginalized. UsingdataavailablefromtheNewYorkStateBoardofElectionsandborrowingfromthestatewide dataset,CitizensUnionFoundationsanalysisofNewYorkCitygeneralelectionsbetween1992 and2010revealthatduringthistimeperiod,astaggering95percentofstatelegislativegeneral electionraceswithinNewYorkCitywereeitheruncontestedorthevictorwonbyamarginof victoryofatleast20percent. Asthedatapresentedbelowshow,lessthan2percentofstatelegislativeelectionsthatoccurred inNewYorkCitysince1992weretightorclosewithamarginofvictoryoflessthan10 percent.Inaddition,NewYorkCityhasledthestateinuncontestedelections,especiallyinthe Assemblywhichbetween1992and2010experiencednearlya300percentgrowthinuncontested cityelections. Table10:NewYorkCityGeneralElectionsfrom1992to2010
CompetitiveScale Competitive DegreeofCompetition Tight(<5%) Competitive(510%) Comfortable(1020%) Safe(2040%) Landslide(40+%) NoMajorPartyChallenger NoOpponent TotalRaces: NumberofRaces 6 10 23 72 488 135 151 885 Percentof Total 0.68% 1.13% 2.82% 8.02% 55.03% 15.25% 17.06% 100.00% CategoryTotal 1.81%
Noncompetitive
65.88%
Uncontested
32.32% 100.00%
a. IncumbentAdvantageNewYorkCityGeneralElectionsintheStateLegislature WhilegeneralelectionracesinNewYorkCityarelessthancompetitivethanthestateasawhole inmostcases,theyareevenlesssowhenanincumbentisintherace.Thefollowingisalookat thelevelofcompetitionandtheoverallsuccessratesofincumbentsingeneralelectionsforstate legislatureinNewYorkCityfrom19922010.Overall,NewYorkCityseesevenlesscompetition whencomparedtotherestofthestate,dueinpartofcoursetothepartyregistrationadvantage fortheDemocrats,butalsointhewaydistrictsaredrawnforpartisanadvantage.

NewYorkStateBoardofElectionsenrollmentinformationforNovember2011.Availableat: http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_nov11.pdf
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Instarkcontrasttothefewelectionsforopenseatsinwhichnoincumbentisrunning,raceswith incumbentsareusuallywonbylargemargins.Between1992and2010,nearly96percentofNew YorkCityincumbentseitherwonbymarginsof10percentormoreorhadnomajorparty challenger.Cityincumbentslostonly2.8percentofraces,andtheiraveragemarginofvictorywas justover74percent,12.5percentagepointshigherthantheaverageforincumbentsstatewide.In openraces,representingamere7.8percentofallNewYorkCityraces,theaveragemarginof victorywas65.5percent.Openraceswerelesscompetitivethanthoseinwhichincumbentswere defeated(thoughincumbentsweredefeatedonlyin2.6percentofallraces). Table11:AverageMarginofVictory,NYCStateLegislativeGeneralElections,19922010

IncumbentAverage MarginofVictory ChallengerAverage MarginofVictory OpenSeatAverage MarginofVictory Senate 75.90% 42.68% 72.10% Assembly 73.87% 47.85% 61.97% TotalLegislature 74.43% 45.60% 65.64%
Table12:NYCAssemblyIncumbentRacesfrom1992to2010inGeneralElections
RaceCategory Defeat Competitive Noncompetitive Uncontested ThreattoIncumbent LostElection Tight(<5%) Competitive(510%) Comfortable(1020%) Safe(2040%) Landslide(40+%) NoMajorPartyChallenger NoOpponent TotalIncumbentRaces: NumberofRaces 13 1 4 7 48 343 73 99 588 PercentofTotal CategoryTotal 2.21% 2.21% 0.17% 0.85% 0.68% 1.19% 67.69% 8.16% 58.33% 12.41% 29.25% 16.84% 100.00% 100.00%
Table13:NYCSenateIncumbentRacesfrom1992to2010inGeneralElections
RaceCategory Defeat Competitive Noncompetitive ThreattoIncumbent LostElection Tight(<5%) Competitive(510%) Comfortable(1020%) Safe(2040%) Landslide(40+%) NoMajorPartyChallenger NoOpponent TotalIncumbentRaces: NumberofRaces 10 3 2 9 14 111 38 44 231 PercentofTotal CategoryTotal 4.33% 4.33% 1.30% 2.16% 0.87% 3.90% 58.01% 6.06% 48.05% 16.45% 35.50% 19.05% 100.00% 100.00%
Uncontested
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Table14:NYCSenateandAssemblyIncumbentRacesfrom1992to2010inGeneralElections
RaceCategory Defeat Competitive ThreattoIncumbent LostElection Tight(<5%) Competitive(510%) Comfortable(1020%) Safe(2040%) Landslide(40+%) NoMajorPartyChallenger NoOpponent TotalIncumbentRaces: NumberofRaces 23 4 6 16 62 454 111 143 819 PercentofTotal CategoryTotal 2.81% 2.81% 0.49% 1.22% 0.73% 1.95% 64.96% 7.57% 55.43% 13.55% 31.01% 17.46% 100.00% 100.00%
Noncompetitive
Uncontested
v. SpecialElections
AsthetrendsofdecliningcompetitivenessofNewYorkStatesgeneralandprimaryelectionsis troubling,sotooisthewayinwhichthelegislaturefillsopenseatswhenvacatedduringthemidst ofaterm. Whenavacancyoccursinthestatelegislatureduetoretirementorothercircumstances,the governorhasthepowertocallforaSpecialElectiontofillit.Eachpartysleadershipselectsits candidateaccordingtoitsownsetofrules.Longbeforethepublicgetstothevotingbooth,the partycommitteesvotefortheirnominee.Rankandfilevotersareleftoutofthepartynominee selectionprocessentirely.Thisprocesshasallowedthemajoritypartyleadershiptohandselect thosecandidatestheywanttofillopenseatsthatoccurinbetweenelectioncycles,further strengtheningthegriptheyhaveonpowerintheirhouse. CitizensUnionFoundationreleasedinApril2007itsfirstbriefingpaperonspecialelectionsand vacanciesinNewYorkState,findingthatanastonishingnumberofstatelegislatorswerefirst electedinaspecialelectionnearlyathirdor31percentoflegislators.CUFreleasedanupdated reportearlierthisyear,findingthat26percentofthelegislaturetakingofficeonJanuary1,2011 wasfirstelectedinaspecialelection,butwiththepossibilityof10specialelections,theratecould jumpto30percent.63 Theprocessleaveslittlebuttheceremonyofaspecialelectionwhenvoterturnoutisabysmally lowwithchoicesbetweenhandpickedpartynomineeswhowilllikelybecomelongterm incumbents,giventhegenerallackofcompetitivenessinstatelegislativeelections.Inmanycases, thosethatgetthedominantpartynodarepartyloyalistsorstaffmembersfortheoutgoing legislator.Thisformofnepotismhashelpedthepartiesmaintaintheircontrolofthelegislative body.
CitizensUnion.CircumventingDemocracy:TheFlawedProcessforFillingVacanciesinStateGovernment,2011 Update.June2011.Availableat: http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_CircumventingDemocracyReport_June2011.pdf
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CASESTUDY:MANHATTAN
TheSpecial67
FormerStateAssemblyMemberJerroldNadler representedthe67thAssemblyDistrictof Manhattanfrom19771992.In1992,Congressman TedWeissdiedadaybeforetheprimaryelection andNadlerwasnominatedtoreplaceWeissto representthe8thcongressionaldistrict.Hewas electedeasilythatNovember,winningtheseatinhis ownrightaswellasaspecialelectiontoservethe restofWeiss'term. Nadlersmovetohigherofficecreatedavacancy thatwastobefilledthroughthespecialelection processthatNovember. Longtimelegislativeaideandcampaignmanagerto Nadler,ScottStringerwontheDemocraticpartynod inacloseddooranddisputednominationprocess andwentontowinthespecialelectionweekslater. After13yearsinoffice,Stringerwonabidfor ManhattanBoroughPresidentin2005creating anothermidtermvacancyinthe67th.Despitehis admissionthattheprocesswasridiculous,1 StringerbackedanotherofNadlerslongtimeaides, LindaRosenthal,tosucceedhim. Rosenthalhadservedfor13yearsastheManhattan DistrictDirectorandDirectorofSpecialProjectsfor CongressmanNadler.Asexpected,shewonthe Democraticnodinthecloseddoornomination processandwontheseathandilywithwellover twicethevotesofhernextcompetitor.
BerkeyGerard,MichaelandJoshuaBrustein.NotSo SpecialElections,GothamGazette.2/17/2006Available at: http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/iotw/20060217/ 200/1765
1
th
Theselectionprocessforfillingvacanciesin thestatelegislatureinvolvesthenomination ofcandidatesbypartycommitteesfollowed byaspecialgeneralelectionscheduledata datesetbythegovernor.Acandidatemay alsopetitiontogetontheballotasan independentcandidateunderanewly createdpartylabeltocompetewiththe partybackedcandidates.Candidateswho runindependentlyofthemajorpartiesneed tocollect1,500signaturestoappearundera partynamethattheycreate.64 Thepartynominationprocessreplacesthe usualpublicprimaryelectionwithafew hundredpartymemberswhonarrowthe fieldofaspiringcandidatesdowntoonefor eachpartylinewithoutanydirectinputfrom rankandfilevoters.Votersaregiventhe opportunitytochoosefromthesecandidates atthespecialelection,butwithsomany legislativedistrictsdominatedbyasingle politicalpartyinthisstate(dueinparttothe wayinwhichlegislativedistrictsare gerrymanderedtofavormajorityparty incumbents),acandidatewhowinsthe dominantpartynodrarelyfaceschallenging competitionatthepolls.Thesespecial electionsprovidevoterswithlittlereal choice. Additionally,veryfewpeopleturnouttothe pollstovoteinthesecontests.Inlastyears legislativespecialelections,twooftheseven Assemblyraceshadturnoutsoflessthan4 percentofregisteredvoters.Eveninthe specialelectionwiththehighestturnout,just 12percentofregisteredvoterswenttothe polls,whichislessthanaquarterofthe turnoutthedistrictreceivedafewmonths
lateratthegeneralelection.
HowCandidatesGetontheBallotforaSpecialElection,GothamGazette,February17,2006, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20060217/200/1764.
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Thespecialelectionprocessraisesadditionalconcernsconsideringthe97percentreelectionrate ofincumbentlegislatorsinNewYorkState.Duetothepowersofincumbencyamongother factors,dominantmajorpartycandidatesthatwinthepartysnodarepracticallyassureda lifetimepositioninthestatelegislatureshouldtheyseekit.Eventhoughtheymayhavejustafew monthsofincumbencybythefallgeneralelection,theseofficialsarealreadyentrenchedand rarelyfaceviableopponents.
B.INCUMBENTINTERESTSOVERDIVERSEREPRESENTATION
Oneofthegoalsofarepresentativedemocracyistoensurethatthecitizensofthecountryhave fairrepresentationingovernment,specificallyinelectedoffice.Acomparisonofthestates demographicsandthemakeupofthestatelegislaturerevealsthatthebodyisnotnearlyas diverseasthestateasawhole.Theredistrictingprocess,infavoringincumbents,ensuresthatthe electedbodyisslowtoreflecttodemographicandculturalchangesinthestatespopulation.
i. TheVotingRightsAct
TheVotingRightsActwaspassedin1964,withSection2and5relatingtothepossiblediluting effectofredistrictingonminorityvotes.Section2prohibitsstateandlocalgovernmentsfrom adoptingpractices,procedures,orredistrictingplanswithadiscriminatoryeffectthatresultsin votedilution.Accordingtothelaw,avotingpracticeisdiscriminatoryifminoritieshaveless opportunitythanothermembersoftheelectoratetoparticipateinthepoliticalprocessandelect amemberoftheirchoice.65Votedilutionreferstoredistrictingplansinwhichminority communitiesarecompressedintoasmallnumberofdistricts(packing),orspreadthinlyamong variousdistricts(cracking),ineffect,fracturingtheirvotes,andreducingtheirrepresentation. TwoUnitedStates TypesofDistrictsForMinorityRepresentation SupremeCourtcasesset 1.Majorityminoritydistricts:Morethan50percentofthevotersina criteriaforwhatfactors districtarefromthesameminorityracialorlanguagegroup. constituteviolationsof Section2.InThornburgv. 2.Minoritycoalitiondistricts:Atypeofmajorityminoritydistrict wheretwoormoreminoritygroupsformacoalitiontoelectcandidates Ginglesthecourt oftheirchoice. determinedthatfora violationofSection2to 3.Minoritycrossoverdistricts:Minorityvotersmightcompriseless occur,aminoritygroups than50percentofthedistrict,andstillelecttheirchosen representativeswithsupportfromsomecrossoverwhitevoters. presencewithinthesingle memberdistrictin 4.Minorityinfluencedistricts:Minoritiesconstituteasizableportion questionmustbelarge ofthedistrictsvotingagepopulation,butnotenoughtocontrolthe enoughtoconstitutea resultsofanelection(lessthan50percent). majority,thegroupmust
65
SeeBartlettv.Strickland,129S.Ct.1231,1246(2009).
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bepoliticallycohesive,andtheremustbeevidencethatthewhitemajorityvotestogetherwiththe specificpurposeofdefeatingtheminoritygroupspreferredcandidate.66 Inanothercase,theSupremeCourtsrulinginBartlettv.Stricklandaffectsthepopulationcriteria thatmustbemetinorderforplaintiffsinlawsuitstodemonstratethatvotedilutionhasoccurred underSection2.67Thecourtruledthatstatesarenotrequiredtodrawopportunitytoelect districtsinwhichracialminoritiesmakeuplessthan50%ofthepopulationofaparticulardistrict (seedistrictsasdescribedincategories2through4onthetableabove).Therulingallowed, however,stateofficialstochoosetodrawopportunitytoelectdistrictsevenifthepopulationfalls shortofthe50%requirement,thoughasstatedabove,challengesunderSection2wouldnotbe heard.68Bartlettdoesnothowever,addresswhetheraSection2claimcanbebroughtbymultiple minoritygroupswhosenumberswouldnotbeenoughtomeetthe50%alone,butwhoseinterests align,andcancollectivelyelectcandidatesoftheirchoice. Section5,likeSection2,alsoprovidesprotectionfortherightsofminorityvoters.UnlikeSection 2,Section5isdesignedtocoveronlyspecificjurisdictions:towns,states,orcountieswitha particularlyegregioushistoricalrecordindilutingminorityvotes.Insomecases,thismeansan entirestate,inothersonlyacityoftown.Currently,onlythreecountiesinNewYorkStateare coveredbySection5asamendedin1982,allinNewYorkCity:Bronx,Kings(commonlyknownas Brooklyn)andNewYork(Manhattan).Anyvotingchangesproposedbythestatemustbe reviewedandapprovedbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticeforpreclearancebefore implementation.Underpreclearance,anylegislativechangestotheelectionprocessfrompolling placelocationsandvotingmethodstoboundariesforlegislativedistrictsmustbesubmittedtothe DepartmentofJusticeforapproval.Aproposedchangeisdeniedifitwouldnegativelyimpact minoritygroupmemberswithrespecttotheiropportunitytoexercisetheelectoralfranchise effectively.69Coveredjurisdictionscannotadoptvotingchangeswithadiscriminatorypurposeor retrogressiveeffect.Achangeisretrogressiveifitputsminoritiesinaworseposition(intermsof abilitytovoteforacandidateoftheirchoice)thanifthechangedidnotoccur.70TheDepartment ofJusticeevaluateseachchangeunderthesecriteria.Communitygroupsandotherinterested partiesareencouragedtowritelettersandcommentstotheDepartmentofJusticeregardinga particularapplicationforpreclearance.
SeeThornburgv.Gingles,478U.S.30(1986). SeeBartlettv.Strickland,129S.Ct.1231,1246(2009). 68 NAACP,TheImpactofRedistrictinginYourCommunity::AGuidetoRedistricting,18,Availableat: www.maldef.org/resources/publications/Redistricting_Manual.pdf 69 Section5oftheVotingRightsActrequiresstateandlocalgovernmentscoveredbyformulasspecifiedintheactto obtainapprovalfromtheAttorneyGeneralorajudicialpanelbeforeimplementinganychangeinastandard,practice orprocedurewithrespecttovoting.TheActwasamendedin1970toincludejurisdictionsthathadliteracytestsas ofNovember1,1968andwherelessthan50percentofthevotingagepopulationwasregisteredonthatdateor votedinthe1968presidentialelection.InJuly1970,theAttorneyGeneralfiledadeterminationthatNewYorkState maintainedaliteracytestenactedin1922thatadverselyaffectedminorityvotingparticipationandinMarch1971,the U.S.CensusBureaufoundthatfewerthan50percentofvotingageresidentswereregisteredinthethreecountiesof theBronx,Kings,andNewYork.ThesedeterminationsrequiredtheBronx,Brooklyn,andManhattantobecoveredby theactandsubjecttopreclearancebytheDepartmentofJustice. Formoreinformation,seeDougMuzzio,VotingRightsAct,GothamGazette,June2003,availableat http://www.gothamgazette.com/article//20030610/17/420 70 NAACP,17.
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Somestatesandmunicipalitieshave CASESTUDY:QUEENS amendedredistrictingrulesfortheirown TheDivisionofMinorityCommunities electionsrelatedtominorityvotingrights, includingCaliforniawhichpassedastate AtahearingheldbeforetheSenateDemocratic votingrightsactin2002.Thebill,which MajorityTaskForceonReapportionmentinDecember amendsCaliforniaElectionsCodeSection 2010,membersofseveralgroupsrepresenting 140251403271,expandsonvotingrights minoritycommunitiestestifiedastotheirlackof grantedunderthefederalVotingRights representationintheboroughofQueens. Actby,amongotherthings,granting TheRichmondHillcommunitytestifiedastothe standingtogroupswhoaretoo divisionofRichmondHillsIndoCaribbeancommunity geographicallydispersedtoelecttheir candidateofchoicefromasinglemember intofiveseparateassemblydistrictsAD23,25,31, 32and38thusnotallowingthemtoelectasingle district.Thiseasesthepathfor candidatewhorepresentstheirinterestsora proportionalvotingsystemstobeusedas candidatewhoisIndoCaribbean.Accordingtothe remediesforminorityvotedilution.In testimonyofonegroup,theRajkumariCenterfor 2008,aballotinitiativewaspassedin IndoCaribbeanArts&Culture,thecommunityis Californiathatcreatedanindependent reportedtohaveover500,000individuals,whichis redistrictingcommission.Californiasnew wellabovetheaveragenumberofconstituentsina systemisdiscussedfurtheronpage93. statesenatedistrict306,000. OtherorganizationsspoketothelackofAsian Illinoisrecentlyadoptedlegislation,the Americanrepresentationinthestatelegislaturein 2011IllinoisVotingRightsAct,aimedat spiteofEasternQueensbeinghometooneofthe preventingvotedilution.Illinoishasa largestandmostconcentratedAsianpopulationsin hybridsystemofredistrictingwitha theUnitedStates.AccordingtoAsianAmericansfor combinationofinputfromthelegislature Equality,theirpopulationinQueenshasincreased andanindependentredistricting dramatically,yetthereisonlyoneAsianAmerican commission.72TheActstatesthatnew statelegislator. legislativedistricts,reflectingthe2010 census,canbedrawntocreatecrossover Bothgroupsnotedthatredistrictingcausedthe districts,coalitiondistricts,orinfluence divisionoftheircommunitiesinspiteoftheirgrowing numbers,andurgedthestatetokeeptheir districtstothebenefitofracialand communitiesintacttoallowthemtoelectcandidates languageminorities.Thebillwas whobestrepresentthem. introducedattheurgingofadvocacy groupsfromChicagosChinatown,which hadbeendividedintothreestateSenatedistricts,fourstateHousedistricts,andthree congressionaldistrictsfollowingthe2000census.Leadersbelievedthesedivisionsdilutedand dividedthevotingpoweroftheneighborhoodsresidents.Opponentsofthebillobjectedtothe
Availableat:http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=1307 Illinoislawgiveslegislatorsthefirstopportunitytodrawthedistrictmaps.Iftheyfailtomeetthedeadline,aback upcommissionisused.72ThemembersofthecommissionareselectedbythePresidentofthestatesenate,the Speakerofthestatehouse,theHouseMinorityLeader,andtheSenateMinorityLeader.Eachselectstwomembers.

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drawingofdistrictsunderwhattheysawasthebehestofaspecificminoritygroup,andnotthe generalneedsofallIllinoisvoters.Itpassed,however,witha543majority.73 ii. MinorityRepresentation
Whileeffectiverepresentationdoesnotrequiretheelectedlegislatorforaparticularcommunity beanindividualofthatparticularracialorethnicgroup,thepersistentgapbetweenminoritiesin NewYorkandminoritiesinelectedofficeisnotable.Forthepurposesofthisanalysis,weuse populationdatafromthe2010U.S.Census.74 InNewYork,minorityrepresentationintheStateLegislatureconsideringthosetakingofficein January2011is25percent,whichiswellunderthenearly42percentofminoritiesthatmadeup thestatespopulationin2010.Itshouldbenotedthatpercentagesofpopulationdonotalways indicatethatanequivalentnumberofseatsshouldbeheld,asminoritypopulationsmaybespread throughoutthestate,insomeplacestoothinlytoholdaseat.
LatinorepresentationintheStateLegislatureisverydisproportionate,withHispanicsandLatinos makingup17.6percentofthestatepopulationasof2010,yetonlyholdingabout9percent,or19, ofthestatelegislativeseatsin2011.Whilenearly32percentofNewYorksLatinopopulation livesoutsideofNewYorkCity,18ofthoseLatinolegislatorsrepresentedpartsofManhattan, Brooklyn,QueensortheBronx.TheonlyLatinoRepublicanlegislator,PeterLopez,waselectedin 2007andrepresentsSchoharieandGreeneCounty.75 AsianAmericansareveryunderrepresentedaswell.AsiansAmericansmakeupover7percentof thestatespopulation,yettheyholdonlyoneseatinthestatelegislature,or0.47percentofall seats.GraceMengwaselectedtothatseatinAssemblyDistrict22in2008andsucceededEllen Young,whowaspreviouslythesecondAsianAmericanlegislatortoholdthatseat.Itshouldbe notedthatAssemblyDistrict22,coveringtheneighborhoodofFlushing,Queensistheonly legislativeseatthatAsianAmericanlegislatorshaveeverheldinNewYorkState.
AspartofCitizensUnionsReShapeNYcampaign,acoalitionofAsianAmericangroups,including MinKwonCenterforCommunityAction,theKoreanAmericanVotersCouncil,andtheKorean AmericanLeagueforCivicAction,amongothers,joinedwithCitizensUnioninreleasingdata showingthatanumberofdistrictsinNewYorkCityhavesubstantialAsianAmericanpopulations. Fifteenassemblydistricts,tenofwhichareadjacenttoeachotherandanotherfiveofwhichare clusteredtogether,haveAsianAmericanpopulationsofatleast20percentaccordingto2010 censusdata.76Similarly,sixstatesenatedistricts,threeofwhicharenexttoeachotherineastern QueensandanothertwoadjacentinsouthernBrooklyn,alsohavepopulationsexceeding20

73
Byrne,Dennis.IllinoisWackyWayofRedistricting,TheChicagoTribune,March14,2011.Availableat: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/20110314/news/ctoped0315byrne20110314_1_influencedistrictselection lawminority 74 U.S.CensusDepartment,Availableat:http://factfinder2.census.gov Survey,availableat:http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en 75 NationalAssociationofLatinoElectedOfficials,http://www.naleo.org/downloads/3_NALEORacestoWatch_fin_10 06.pdf 76 Thefullreportisavailableat:http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_Asian American_Representation_StateLegislature_May2011.pdf
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percent.TheAsianAmericangroupsannouncedsupportforindependentredistricting,believing thatafairerandmoreindependentredistrictingprocesswouldbettertakeintoaccounttherapid growthoftheAsianAmericanpopulationinNewYorkandtheneedtodrawdistrictsthatallowfor opportunitiestopossiblyelectmoreAsianAmericanstopoliticalofficeinsteadofsimply protectingcurrentincumbents.
AfricanAmericanshavefaredbetterinthestatelegislature,havingaslightlyhigherlevelof representationthanthegeneralpopulationofAfricanAmericansinthestate,withAfrican Americansmakingupabout16percentofthelegislaturein2010andabout14.4percentofthe population.
Thetableandchartbelowshowthebreakdownofminorityrepresentationasapercentageofthe statespopulationandwithinthestatelegislature.
Table15:Ethnic/RacialCompositionoftheNewYorkStateLegislature,201177 Percentof Percentof Percent Group Legislators Legislature Population Difference White,NonHispanic 158 74.53% 58.3% +16.70% BlackorAfricanAmerican,Non 34 16.04% 14.4% +1.64% Hispanic HispanicorLatino 19 8.96% 17.6% 9.11% AsianAmerican 1 0.47% 7.3% 6.83% NativeAmerican 0 0.00% 0.3% 0.30%
Illustration24:2011MinorityRepresentation
MinorityRepresentationinNewYorkStateLegislature vsPopulationofNewYorkState
90% 80% 70% 60% Percentage 50% 40%
74.5% 58.3% 17.6% 16.0%

Percentof Legislature, 2011 Percentof Population 2010
30% 20% 10% 0%
14.4%
9.0%
7.3%
0.5%
0.3%
0.0%
White,Non Hispanic
BlackorAfrican American,Non Hispanic
Hispanicor Latino
Group
AsianAmerican NativeAmerican
AllpopulationdatabasedonU.S.CensusBureauAmerican2010Census.Dataonminorityelectedofficialsbasedon CitizensUnionscompilationofdatafromtheNationalConferenceofStateLegislators(LegislatorDemographics); reviewofAsianAmericanlegislativesuccession;andthereviewofraceswatchedbytheNationalAssociationofLatino ElectedOfficials(NALEO).
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Asameansofcomparison,minorityrepresentationinstatehousesacrossthecountryshowsa similarpatternwith824ofthe6,399legislatorsofaracialorethnicminority,comprising12.8 percentin2004,whileU.S.Censusdatafrom2000showthat30.9percentoftheU.S.population wasAfricanAmerican,Latino,AsianPacific,orNativeAmerican.78 Accordingtoareportanalyzingthe2003NewYorkStatelegislature,minoritylegislatorswere overwhelminglyDemocrats(94percent),whereaswhiteswereonly44percentDemocraticand55 percentRepublican.Minoritylegislatorswerealsomorelikelytobeincumbentsthanwerewhite legislators(78percentcomparedto70percent)andwerealsolesslikelytobechallengersorrun foropenseats(22percentcomparedto30percent).However,agreaterpercentage,37percent ofminoritylegislators,ranunopposed,comparedto25percentofwhites.79 Whatisalsointerestingtonoteisthataccesstomoneyisnotthesameforallcandidatesorforall incumbentseither.InNewYork,whiteAssemblywinnersraised61percentmorethanAfrican Americansand19percentmorethanLatinosinthe2004election.80
iii. RepresentationofWomen Therepresentationofwomeninlegislativeofficehasaslightlymoreelusiveconnectionto redistricting,giventhenearlyequalpopulationsofwomenacrossdistricts.Itisclear,however, thattheproportionoffemalelegislatorsinstatelegislaturesnationwidedoesnotmatchthe respectiveproportionsofthepopulation.Becauseredistrictingfavorsincumbentswhohave historicallybeenmostlywhitemales,itisonemoreobstaclefacingwomenintheireffortstohold office,asmenhavelongheldadisproportionatenumberofseatsinstatelegislaturesacrossthe country. InJanuary2011,womenmadeup22.6percentoflegislatorsinNewYorkState,with37inthe Assemblyand11intheSenate.Asaresultofthe2010elections,womendidnotsucceedin pickingupanyseatsintheSenate,despiteaconcertedeffortbytheSenateDemocratstorun womenagainstmaleRepublicanincumbents.IntheAssembly,womenlostseats,withonedefeat inthe2010primaryelection(GinnyFields)andthreeotherfemalelegislatorsretiringwhowereall succeededbymen.Inonlytworaceswasaseatpreviouslyheldbyamalelegislatorwonbyanew femalelegislatorClaudiaTenney,whosucceededDavidTownsend,whoranforCountySheriff, andAravellaSimotas,whosucceededMichaelGianaris,whoisnowastatesenator.Thenational averagefortheproportionofstatelegislativeseatsheldbywomenis23.4percent,meaningthat NewYorkranks31stinthenationintermsoftherepresentationofwomeninitslegislature.81
MeganMoore,MoneyandDiversity:2004StateLegislativeElections.TheInstituteonMoneyinStatePolitics, March2006.Availableat:http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200603292.pdf 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 TheNationalConferenceofStateLegislators, http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/WomensNetwork/WomeninStateLegislatures2011/tabid/21606/Default.as pxandCitizensUnionsanalysisofcurrentfemalelegislatorsinNewYork.
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Womennowholdevenfewerseatsnow,withspecialelectionsthisfallfillingthevacanciesof threeseatspreviouslyheldbywomennowbymen.82 Incumbencyandthesubsequentlackofcompetitionareconsideredtobethelargestbarriersfor womenastheyseekelectiontoCongress.83Inaddition,womenhavebeenfoundtobemorelikely toruninopenseatelections,whenaseatbecomesopenduetoredistrictingorotherfactorssuch asresignationordeath.84Womenhavebeenfoundtobeascompetitiveasormorecompetitive thanmeninCongressionalspecialelections,givingfurthercredencetotheargumentthatmore openseatswillleadtomorewomenrepresentatives.85Indeed,in1992,womenmadegainsin Congressinpartduetotheincreasednumberofopenseatelectionscausedbyredistricting.86 Dubbedtheyearofthewoman,1992wasmarkedbytheinfluxofwomeninCongress,inpart duetoincreasedcompetition.
C.PROTECTINGPARTISANADVANTAGE
RepublicanshavecontrolledtheNewYorkStateSenateandDemocratshavecontrolledtheNew YorkStateAssemblyforoverthirtyyearswithoutinterruptionsince1974,withtheexceptionof justtwoyearsintheStateSenatefrom2009to2010.Thisentrenchedgulfbetweenthetwo houseshascontributedtohistoricstatelegislativegridlockandisakeyfactorindiscouragingbi partisanpolicymakingandadynamicjointlegislativedeliberativeprocess.Thispartisanship pervadestoday,andhistorydictatesthatvoteswilllikelycontinuetobecastaccordingtoparty lines. OneconsequenceofNewYorkslongdividedlegislatureistheongoingmarginalizationofthe minoritypartyineachhouse.BecauseintheNewYorkStateLegislaturetheminorityandmajority powerswerefixedforsolong,thelevelofpartisanshipincreasedovertimeandlegislative proposalsproposedbytheminoritypartywerealmostneverenactedintolegislation.Infact, institutionalstructurespreventedminoritypartymembersfromconsideringorvotingon legislationtheysupported,thoughreformshavebeenputinplacetoallowsponsorstoforce actiononlegislationincommittee. Thishighlevelofpartisanshipledtolackofinterestonbothsidestoreachcompromiselegislation andresultedinanoverwhelmingnumberofonehousebillsthatareintroducedeachyearonlyto languishincommittee.Infact,therearemorebillsintroducedintheNewYorkStateLegislature thaninanyotherstate,andyetNewYorkhasthethirdlowestenactmentrateinthecountry. Between1997and2001,ofthe77,154billsintroducedintheAssemblyandSenate,only3,552
AssemblymembersRoAnnDestito,AudreyPhefferandNettieMayersohnhaveallleftofficesinceJanuary2011. Palmer,BarbaraandSimon,Dennis.ThePoliticalGlassCeiling:Gender,StrategyandIncumbencyinU.S.House Elections,19781998.Women&Politics.Vol.23,No.,2001,Page59. 84 Ibid. 85 Gaddie,RonaldandBullock,Charles.StructuralandEliteFeaturesinOpenSeatandSpecialU.S.HouseElections:Is thereasexualbias?PoliticalResearchQuarterly.Vol.520,No.2.1997. 86 Palley,Mirian.Elections1992andtheThomasAppointment.PoliticalScience&Politics.Vol.6,No.1,1993.

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bills,lessthan5percent,werepassedbybothchambers.87TheStateLegislaturein2008 introduced18,239bills,andonly1,634werepassed,representinganenactmentrateof9 percent.88 Asacomparison,theStateLegislaturein2009introduced15,367bills,andpassedonly1,882, representinganenactmentrateof12percent.89Whileanimprovementoverpastyears,it appearsthatthenewpartybreakdownofbothhousesofthelegislaturehasnotledto significantlymoreefficientlawmaking.Infact,votesarestillcastintheStateSenateaccordingto partylines.Thefinalpiecesofthestatebudgetin2010werepassedintheSenateaccordingto partylinevotes,aswellasothersignificantpiecesoflegislationsuchtheMetropolitan TransportationAuthority(MTA)fundingpackagetopreventseriousfarehikesandservicecutsin 2009. Thelowenactmentratedemonstratedinpreviousyearsholdstrueforthe2011legislativesession. Fromthebeginningof2011toJune24th,atotalof8,500billswereintroducedintheAssembly and5,836wereintroducedintheSenate.Only677billspassedbothhouses,thusonlyabout9.4% ofthe14,336billsintroducedwillreachthegovernor.Votingwithpartyleadershipalsopersisted throughthe2011legislativesession.TheaverageDemocraticmemberoftheAssemblyvotedwith SpeakerSilver97.41%ofthetime,whileassemblyRepublicansvotedmostindependentlyofthe Speaker,votingthesameasMinorityLeaderKolb90.94%ofthetime.IntheSenate,Republicans votedwithMajorityLeaderSkelos98.87%ofthetimeandSenateDemocratsvotedwithMinority LeaderSampson95.22%ofthetime.IndependentDemocratsvotedmostindependentlyofthe MajorityandMinorityleader,insteadvotinginlockstepwiththeircaucusleaderSenatorKlein 99.26%ofthetime.90 ThePartisanMakeupoftheNewYorkStateLegislature Anexaminationofthemakeupoflegislaturesacrossthecountrysince1974revealsthatofthe stateswithbicamerallegislatures,NewYorkhadthelongestrunningpoliticalpartysplitsincethat time,withtheSenateunderRepublicancontrolandtheAssemblyunderDemocraticcontrolfor decadesuntilJanuary2009whenthelegislaturewassworninandDemocratscontrolledboth houses.Asaresultofthe2010GeneralElection,therewasareturntoRepublicancontrolinthe Senate,meaningthatthereisagainasplitincontroloftheStateLegislaturebetweenthe DemocratsintheAssemblyandRepublicansintheSenate.Thislongstandingpartisandividecan beattributedto,amongotherthings,thelackofcompetitiveelectionsandthefactthatboth partiesinpowerusetheredistrictingprocesstoensurethattheirmembersareprotectedfrom seriouscompetition.
BrennanCenterforJusticeatNYUSchoolofLaw,TheNewYorkStateLegislativeProcess:AnEvaluationand BlueprintforReform,2004,page36.Availableat: http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_new_york_state_legislative_process_an_evaluation_and_blue print_for_refo 88 BrennanCenterforJusticeatNYUSchoolofLaw,StillBroken:NewYorkStateLegislativeReform,2008Update, 2008,page25.Availableat: http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/still_broken_new_york_state_legislative_reform_2008_update/ 89 NewYorkPublicInterestResearchGroup,ReviewofLegislativeAction2009Session. 90 NewYorkPublicInterestResearchGroup,ReviewofLegislativeAction2011Session.Availableat: http://nypirg.org/pubs/goodgov/2011.06.28_NYPIRG_2011_Session_Analysis.pdf
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Oftheotherstateswithlegislaturesthathavehousessplitbetweenthetwoparties,mosthave undergonechangesinpowerinrecentyears.Oftheotherstateswithwellstaffedlegislatures andlongersessionterms,onlyMassachusetts,wherebothhouseshavebeenconsistently controlledbyDemocrats,hasexperiencedasimilarlackofchangeinpower(itdoesnotcurrently haveasplitbetweenthepartiesinitslegislativehouses).
From19752008,DemocratscontrolledtheStateAssemblyandRepublicanscontrolledtheState SenateinNewYork.Thetablebelowshowsthepartisansplitinbothhousessince1980.
Table15:OverviewofStateswithSplitLegislatures,CurrentandRecent91
State Alaska CurrentMakeup Split: RepublicanHouse TiedSenate Split: RepublicanHouse DemocraticSenate SingleParty:Democratic HouseDemocraticSenate Split: RepublicanHouse DemocraticSenate Split: DemocraticHouse RepublicanSenate Split: RepublicanHouse DemocraticSenate SingleParty: DemocraticHouse DemocraticSenate Split: DemocraticHouse RepublicanSenateSenate SingleParty: RepublicanHouse RepublicanSenate Split: TiedHouse RepublicanSenate Split: RepublicanHouse DemocraticSenate PriorMakeup RepublicanHouse RepublicanSenate DemocraticHouse DemocraticSenate RepublicanHouse, DemocraticSenate DemocraticHouse DemocraticSenate DemocraticHouse DemocraticSenate DemocraticHouse DemocraticSenate DemocraticHouse RepublicanSenate DemocraticHouse DemocraticSenate RepublicanHouseTied Senate DemocraticHouse DemocraticSenate RepublicanHouse RepublicanSenate ElectionYearwhen ChangeOccurred 2008
Colorado Delaware Iowa
2010 2008(previouslysplit from19852008) 2010
Kentucky
1998
Louisiana
2010 2008(previouslysplit from19932008) 2010(alsopreviously splitfrom19752008) 2008(previouslysplit from20032006) 2010(alsopreviously splitfrom20052006) 2007
Nevada
NewYork
Oklahoma
Oregon
Virginia
InformationonpartisancompositionofstatelegislaturescompiledfromtheNationalConferenceofState Legislatures.http://www.ncsl.org/.Forthe2011partisancompositionofstatelegislatures,see http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/2011_Legis_and_State.pdf.Forpost2010electionpartisancompositionof statelegislaturesseehttp://www.ncsl.org/tabid/21253/default.aspx.
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Until2008,inspiteofdecliningenrollmentintheRepublicanParty,Republicansmaintaineda majorityintheStateSenate.RedistrictingfortheRepublicanMajority,therefore,hasbeenmore aboutmaintenanceandpreservation,ratherthan Table16: bolsteringthemajority.Afterthe2002redistricting, ResultingPartyMakeupof Republicansgainedtwoseatsinspiteofthisdecreasing NewYorkStateLegislature, enrollmentasaresultofpartisangerrymandering.In byElectionYear 2008DemocratsbrieflygainedcontroloftheSenateby (19802010)92 twoseatsbutRepublicanssoonseizedbackcontrolin (Boldingindicatesredistrictingyears) 2010withthedefeatof3incumbentDemocratic Senate Assembly legislators,andnowhaveamajorityof32members. Year RepDem DemRep Thisrecentwin,coupledwiththeircontroloftheSenate 1980 3525 8862 until2008despitedecliningenrollment,demonstrates 1982 3526 9852 thepowerfuleffectofpartisangerrymandering. 1984 3526 9654 1986 3526 9456 Overthecourseofthelastthreedecades,Democrats 1988 3427 9258 havemanagedtocontinuallyincreasetheirnumbersin 1990 3526 9555 theAssembly.Inthepastthreeredistrictingcycles, 1992 3526 10149 Democratsgainedtenseatsin1982,sixseatsin1992 1994 3625 9456 andfourseatsin2002.Democratshaveespeciallymade 1996 3526 9753 gainsintheAssemblyinNewYorkCity,where 1998 3625 9852 DemocraticenrollmentoutnumbersRepublican 2000 3625 9951 enrollmentbyafactorofgreaterthan5to1andthe 2002 3824 10347 RepublicanPartyisoftencriticizedforfailingtoprovide 2004 3527 10446 leadershipandadevelopaneffectivefarmsystemto 2006 3428 10545 groomcandidatesforoffice. 2008 3032 10941 2010 3230 9951 Withtheeffectsofthe2002redistrictingpotentially fading,theAssemblysawalossofDemocraticseatsin the2010GeneralElection,andDemocratsnowhavea9951majority,whichcannolonger overturnavetowithoutobtainingvotesfromaRepublicanmember.Thisgaincouldalsobe attributedinparttothegroundswellofsupportseenforRepublicansinCongressionalelections,in whichfiveseatsheldbyDemocraticrepresentativesinCongresswerelosttoRepublicansinNew York. Overall,from1996to2011,NewYorkexperienceda19percentincreaseinDemocraticParty enrollmentandnearly6percentdecreaseinthenumberofRepublicanPartyregisteredvoters(it shouldbenotedthatthestatespopulationincreasedduringthattimefrom18.6millionto19.4 milliona4percentincrease).93Additionally,enrollmentintheRepublicanleaningConservative Partydecreasedfrom1.57percentin1996to1.28percentin2011ofallregisteredvoters. Conversely,thestateisexperiencingagrowthintheDemocraticleaningWorkingFamiliesParty
Ibid. EnrollmentdataobtainedfromtheNewYorkStateBoardofElections,availableat: http://www.elections.state.ny.us/EnrollmentCounty.html.PopulationdataobtainedU.S.CensusBureau,2010data.
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enrollment,withenrollmentcurrentlystandingat42,682membersin2011,upfrom34,289in 2006.TheIndependencePartyhadperhapsthelargestgain,increasingfrom70,114in1996to 425,891in2011.Itshouldbenotedthatunaffiliatedvoterscontinuetorepresentalargesegment ofallvoters,atasteady20percentoverthelast14years,currentlyat2,288,512in2011.94 Table17:NewYorkStatePartyEnrollments,1996201195 Republican Democratic Unaffiliated Registered Republican Democratic Unaffiliated Total Percentof Percentof Percentof Voters Party Party Voters Registered Total Total Total Nov.1996 2,998,511 29.51% 4,738,254 46.63% 2,052,021 20.19% 10,162,156 Nov.2006 3,130,122 26.82% 5,507,928 47.20% 2,350,073 20.14% 11,669,573 Nov.2010 2,920,366 24.73% 5,853,921 49.58% 2,390,178 20.24% 11,806,744 Nov.2011 2,824,680 24.64% 5,660,246 49.38% 2,326,786 20.30% 11,461,679 Illustration25:StateSenatePartyRepresentationOverTime(byElectionYear)
PartyRepresentationintheNewYorkStateSenate
60 24 50 27 25 25 25
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NewYorkStateBoardofElections.EnrollmentInformationavailableat: http://www.elections.state.ny.us/EnrollmentCounty.html 95 Ibid.
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Illustration26:StateAssemblyPartyRepresentationOverTime(byElectionYear)
PartyRepresentationintheNewYorkStateAssembly
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41 45 46 47 49 51 51 52 52 53 54 55 56 56 58 62
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D.LONGTERMINCUMBENCY Inadditiontothelongestpartisandivideinthenation,theNewYorkStatelegislaturehasoneof thehighestratesofincumbentreelectioninthenation,inpartduetotheprotectionof incumbentsintheredistrictingprocess,asnotedinSection4ofthisreport. Acrossthecountryinthe1930s,overhalfofallstatesenatorsandstateassemblymemberscycled outofofficewitheachelection.Bythe1990s,however,legislatorswereservingforlongerterms andonly23percentofstatesenatorsand25percentofstateassemblymembersturnedoverwith eachelection.NewYorkslegislatureisconsistentlyamongthetoptenstateswiththelowest turnoverrates.96CitizensUnionFoundationhasquantifiedthelevelofturnoverinNewYorkfrom 1999to2011,findingthatturnoverhititspeakwith22percentofseatsturningoverduringthe mostrecent2009/2010legislativesession,andalowof9percentduringthe20072008session.97
96
Benjamin,Gerald.ReforminNewYork:TheBudget,TheLegislature,andtheGovernanceProcess.CitizensBudget Commission.ConferenceonFixingNewYorkState'sFiscalPractices.Nov.1314,2003,p7.Availableat: http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/report_reformnys_11102003.pdf 97 CitizensUnion.ExaminingTurnoverintheNewYorkStateLegislature:20092010Update,February2011. Availableat: http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_ExaminingTurnover_Update_Feb2011.pdf
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Overall,thereelectionratefortheNewYorkStatelegislaturehasaveraged97percentfrom1998 to2010.Themaincauseofturnover,however,isnotelectoraldefeat. Whenincumbentsdoleaveoffice,itismostoftennotduetovoterschoicesatthepolls.While votersdecisionsoncandidatesarelimitedtothosewhomakeitontheballot,electedofficials choiceofwhethertostayinoffice,seekotheroffice,orretireismuchlessrestricted,andthus turnoverissubjecttomanyfactors.Thereasonswhyelectedofficialschoosetostayinofficeor pursueparticularpathsmayseempersonal,butinmanycases,decisionsaremadeduetopolitical considerations.Losingaprimaryorgeneralelectionisonlythethirdmostcommoncauseof turnover,atabout21percentofallcasesofturnover,withthemostcommoncausesofturnover beinglegislatorsseekingelectiontoanotheroffice,orretiringfrompubliclife.98 Thisdatahighlightstheslowandsteadymoveawayfromthenotionofacitizenlegislatorserving thepublicforseveralyearsandthengoingbacktotheirestablishedprofession.Infact,whatwe areseeinginmorestatesacrossthecountryisaprofessionalizationofthelegislature.99 Aslegislatorshavestayedinofficelonger,theyalsobegantoidentifythemselvesprofessionallyas legislators,ratherthanlawyers,consultantsortheirotherpriorprofessions.In1964,notoneNew YorkStatelegislatoridentifiedhisorheroccupationassuch,butby1988,twothirdsofthe AssemblyandhalfoftheSenatedescribedthemselvesaslegislators.100 i. OtherContributorstoLongTermIncumbency Incumbentsgainmanybenefitswhileinofficethathelpthemstaytherebeyondtheredistricting process.Theseincludetheabilitytoestablishandmaintaincontactwithvoters,theuseof governmentresourcestodosothroughtaxpayerfundedmailersandsupportstaff,andfringe benefitslikecoveringallappropriatetravelexpenses.Incumbentstypicallyenjoyincreasedname recognitionfromearnedmediaandotherpublicityandtendtohavestrongertieswithparty organizations.Thisinevitablymeansthatincumbentsfinditmucheasiertosolicitcontributions andraisecampaignfunds.InNewYorkespecially,incumbentscantappartyresourcestodealwith thecomplicatedballotaccessrequirementswhichoftenpreventschallengersfromrunningfor office.Othercontributorstothehighincumbentreelectionrateareprovidedbelow,whichpoint totheneedforfurtherreformstotheelectionprocess. CampaignFinance Oneofthemainbenefitsofincumbencyistheabilitytoraisefunds,whichiswelldocumentedand playsamajorroleinwhogetselectedeachelectionseason.AccordingtoareportbytheInstitute fortheStudyonMoneyinStatePolitics,thesuccessrateofincumbentsrunningforstate legislativeofficenationwidehasbeengraduallyincreasingsincethe20012002elections,when89 percentofincumbentswon.In20032004and20052006elections,92percentofincumbents
98 99
CitizensUnion.ExaminingTurnoverintheNewYorkStateLegislature:20092010Update. Benjamin,p.7. 100 Ibid.
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won.In20072008,incumbentsenjoyedanevenhigherwinrateof94percent.101InNewYork, from20072008,in91percentoflegislativeraces,incumbentsraisedmoremoneythan challengers,and99percentofthoseincumbentswonreelection.102 InNewYork,individualscandirectlydonateupto$16,800toaStateSenatecandidate,$8,200toa StateAssemblycandidateand$60,700toastatewidecandidate.Additionally,NewYorkershave severalotheroptionstosupporttheirpreferredcandidatesfinancially,suchasbydonatingto PoliticalActionCommittees(upto$150,000),politicalparties(upto$102,300forelection purposes)orpartyhousekeepingaccounts(unlimited).103 NewYorksgeographicalsizeandexpensivemediamarketsrequirewellfundedcampaigns, puttingpressureoncandidatestoraiselargesumsofmoney,andlawsthatpermitlarge contributionsallowthosewhohavethesupportfromtherightnetworkstogetahead.According toa2006reportbyCommonCause/NewYork,55percentofcontributionstostatecandidates exceededthe$2,100allowableamountfordonationstofederalcandidates.104Campaigncoffers arelarge,andsoarethecontributionsthatfillthem. Needlesstosay,incumbentswithnamerecognition,partynetworks,andotheradvantageshavea mucheasiertimeofraisingcampaigndollarsthannewcomers. BallotAccess CandidatesrunningfortheNewYorkStatelegislaturehavetocontendwithsomeofthemost complicatedballotrequirementsinthecountry.Thishaspreventedcandidatesfromrunningfor officeandhasledtothedisqualificationofcandidatesattemptingtochallengeincumbentsfor electedoffice. Thetechnicalaspectsoffilingpetitionscanbecumbersome,leadingtofrequentmistakesthatmay notbeeasilydetectedbythecandidates.Forinstance,electionlawhasveryspecificrequirements aboutthenumberingandpaperforpetitions. TorunfortheStateLegislature,acandidatemustcollectsignaturesfromindividualseligibleto voteinthatrace,basedon5percentofthatpartysenrollmentinthedistrictorsubdivision.Party candidatesmustcollect1,000signaturesfortheStateSenateand500fortheStateAssembly.
NationalInstituteonMoneyinStatePolitics.TheRoleofMoney&Incumbencyin20072008StateElections: 20072008ComparedtoPreviousCycles,http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=423&ext=4 102 NationalInstituteonMoneyinStatePolitics.TheRoleofMoney&Incumbencyin20072008StateElections, AppendixBavailableathttp://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=423&ext=12 103 CitizensUnion.IssueBriefandPositionStatement:StateCampaignFinanceReformwithPublicMatchingFunds, May,2008,availableat http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/IssueBriefs/2008IB_CampaignFinance.PDF.SeealsoKatz, Celeste.NYPIRG:NewYorkOnTrackToBeFirstStateWithContributionLimitOver$100,000,DailyPolitics.January 21,2011.Availableat:http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2011/01/nypirgnewyorkontracktobe firststatewithcontributionlimitover100000 104 CommonCause/NY.The$2,100Club:WhatNewYorkStatePoliticalCampaignsCost,HowMuchThoseCostsare RisingandWhosFootingtheBill,March2006,p.3.http://www.docstoc.com/docs/37337544/WhatNewYorkState PoliticalCampaignsCostHowMuch
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Candidatesrunningindependentlyofthepoliticalpartiesmustcollecttwiceasmanysignaturesas theircompetitors.105 Thepetitioningprocessperiodforthestatelegislaturelasts37days(41daysforindependent candidates),whileotherstatesandlocalitiesallowalongerperiodoftime.106InNewYork, petitionsignersmaysignonlyonepetitionforeachofficeperelectionandaftersubmitting petitions,candidatescurrentlyhavethreebusinessdaystocorrectanyerrorswiththeBoardof Elections.Inpractice,thisracetoaccumulatesignaturesismoreofatestofcampaignresources thanofacandidatespopularity. Acandidateforstatelegislativeofficemustresideinthedistrictforatleast12monthspriortothe election,withdispensationgivenimmediatelyfollowingredistrictingyearswheredistrict boundariesmaychange.Acandidatesresidencymayalsobesubjectedtochallenges,whichcan leadtocourtbattlesaswell. PetitionchallengesareacommonpracticeinNewYorkState.Whileobjectionscanbemadeby anyregisteredvoter,theyaremostlyleviedbyestablishmentandpartybackedcandidatesagainst insurgentswithlessresourcesandcampaignsavvyinanattempttogetthemeitherkickedoffthe ballotorasameanstoforcechallengerstosquanderprecioustimeandresourcesdefendingtheir petitionsattheBoardofElectionsorinthecourtroom.107Themainobjectionsfiledagainst candidateschallengethenumberofsignaturesonacandidatespetitionorchallengethe residenciesofthevotersandwitnesseswhosignedthepetitions.Toprotectagainstsuch challenges,candidatesusuallyobtaintwotothreetimestherequiredamountofsignatures. Objectionstopetitionshavetobespecificandinwriting,andtheyhavetobemadewithinthree daysafterthepetitionisfiled,andnotonthelastdaytofileapetition.Unfortunately,insteadofa publiccampaign,manystatelegislativeracesendupbeingdecidedbeforepartyappointed commissionersattheboardsofelectionsorinthecourtroomwherecandidatesarebumpedoff theballotorforcedtofightclaimsagainstthem.
E. RISINGPOLARIZATIONANDPOLICYPARALYSIS
Untilmostrecentlyin2011,NewYorksstatelegislaturehashistoricallyfailedtosolvepressing issuesinatimelymanner.Themuchmalignedbodygainedadegreeofcredibilitythefirsthalfof thisyear,passinganontimebudgetanddemonstratingitcouldforgecompromisesonintractable issueslikeethicsreformandmarriageequality.ItappearedthatundertheleadershipofGovernor Cuomo,functionalgovernmentwasnotonlypossiblebutdoable.Yetoldhabitsdiehard,andthe statelegislatureissowingtheseedsoffuturedysfunctionbymaintainingthecurrentsystemof partisangerrymandering.
Formoreinformation,seeUnderstandingtheLabyrinth:NewYorksBallotAccessLaws,DeNoraGetachewand AndreaSenteno,GothamGazette.June2009.Availableat: http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/governing/20090629/17/2954 106 Kane,Alex.GettingontheBallotinOtherCities.GothamGazette.June2009.Availableat: http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/Voting/20090630/17/2962 107 Israel,DougandMatthewGertz.BallotBumping,NYCsBloodsport,GothamGazette,July2005, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/voting/20050727/17/1492
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Historicpolicygridlockhasresultedinalackoflegislativeactiononanumberofissuesimportant toNewYorkers,perhapsmostnotablythealmostalwayslatepassageofthestatebudgetoverthe pasttwodecades.Otherhistoricinactionconcernedthelongtermfailuretoaddresshighproperty taxes,localgovernmentandschooldistrictconsolidation,affordablehousing,andmandaterelief forlocalities.SocialissuessuchasRockefellerDrugLawReformalsotookdecadestoresolvein spiteofbroadpublicsupport. Thelackofactionontheseimportantissuescanbeattributedtoinparttheincreasedpolarization ofdistrictsandthecreationofsafeseatsinwhichlegislatorsdonotfacemuchcompetitionat thepolls,aresultofpartisangerrymandering.Dubbedthemostdysfunctionallegislatureinthe nation,theNewYorkStatelegislaturehaslongbeencriticizedforitslackoftransparency, accountabilityandadherencetobasicnotionsofademocraticprocess.108 Inaninfluentialreportissuedin2004bytheBrennanCenterforJusticecrystallizedwhatmany citizensacrossthestateofNewYorkhadsensedforyearsthatNewYorkStateslegislative processwasbroken.109Throughananalysisofthelegislativeprocess,includingalookatvoting procedures,introductionandpassageofbills,andtherolesofcommitteesintheprocess,the reportgeneratedstatewideattentionandledtothedubbingoftheNewYorkStatelegislatureas themostdysfunctionallegislatureinthenation.Whilethereportfocusedontherulesusedby bothhousesregardinglegislationandchamberoperations,itexposedthenegativeaspectsofa leadershipdrivensystem,whichissharedintheredistrictingprocess. Itcanbearguedthatlegislativebodiesneedleadersandthatpartydisciplinecanplaya constructiveroleinthepassageoflegislation.Whentherankandfilelegislatorsarealmost guaranteedreelectioneveryyearwhentheyabidebythewishesofleadership,however,thereis lessincentivetorocktheboatandfightthegoodfightonbehalfoftheissuesvoterscareabout. Inreturnforgoingalongwiththesystemasithasoperated,legislatorsreceivecommitteechair posts,stipends,memberitemsfortheirdistricts,financialsupportforcampaignsfromparty cofferscontrolledbytheleaders,anddistrictlinesthataredrawntominimizecompetitionand favortheirreturntooffice.Inexchangefortheseprotectionsandpoliticalperks,thetwo legislativeleadershavebeenaffordedagreatdealofpowerandauthorityoverthelegislative process. Thoselegislatorswhoseektoreformthecurrentprocessfacenumerousinstitutionalobstaclesto advancingbillsthatwoulddisruptthepowerbalance,whichareoftentheveryfocusofthebills. Theseobstaclesleavereforminthelurch,aslegislatorsmayfearpoliticalretribution.Major reformsoftenonlyoccurinresponsetoscandalsorpiquedpublicinterestthatresonatestoalevel wherelegislatorsfeelvulnerableatthepolls,suchaswhatrecentlyoccurredwiththepassageof ethicslegislationin2011.YetevenasthepublicisincreasinglydisenchantedwithAlbany,this
TheBrennanCenterhasissuedseveralreportsonthedysfunctionalnatureoftheNewYorkStateLegislature,the firstbeingTheNewYorkStateLegislativeProcess:AnEvaluationandBlueprintforReformin2004. 109 BrennanCenterforJusticeatNYUSchoolofLaw,TheNewYorkStateLegislativeProcess:AnEvaluationand BlueprintforReform,2004,pg1. http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_new_york_state_legislative_process_an_evaluation_and_blue print_for_refo/
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dissatisfactionunfortunatelyoftenresultsinalackofparticipationonthepartofthepublic,rather thanaconcertedpushforreformwithreallegislativeresults. PolicyInaction Aslegislatorshavelargelybecomeinsulatedfromcompetitionatthepolls,bothfromoutsideand withintheirparties,theyhaveavoidedtheaccountabilitywhichcomeswithfacingserious electoralchallenges.Thisinsularityfromcompetitiveelections,andaccountabilitytothepublic, hascreatedastagnantpoliticalprocessandsystemthatismorepronetopanderingtopolitical basesthanitistosolvingthestatesmostpressingproblems. ThelevelofpartisanbickeringandinactionreachedanewlowwhentheNewYorkStateSenatein thesummerof2009enteredintoamonthlongdeadlock.Withatenuousholdonthemajority (3230),theSenateDemocratslostcontrolofthehouse.AmotionwasintroducedonJune8,2009 thatelectedPedroEspada(DBronx)tothepositionoftemporarypresidentoftheSenateand DeanSkelos(RNassau)asmajorityleader,essentiallygivingtheRepublicansamajority.Itshould benotedthattheoriginsofthedeadlockedSenatebeganwiththe2002redistricting,whenan additionalseatwascreatedintheSenatetocreateatotalof62seats,makingitaneven numberedbodyandthusmorepronetogridlock.Becauseofapopulationshiftrecordedinthe 2002census,thethenRepublicanmajoritywasconcernedthataSenatedistrictwouldneedtobe createdinNewYorkCity,thusresultinginthelossofaRepublicanleaningdistrictinupstateNew York.ThislosswasavoidedwhentheSenateincreaseditssizebyoneseat,successfullyusingthe ambiguityintheStateConstitutionregardingthenumberofSenateSenatestoallowthemto createanadditionalseat.110 Duetothestatelegislaturesconsistentlackofactinginabipartisanornonpartisanmannerto addresssomeofthestatesmostpressingconcerns,therehasbeenahighlevelofparalysison manykeyissuesthatmostlegislatorswouldagreeneedtobeaddressed.Tobesure,therehave beenstridesmadeinrecentyears,particularlyin2011,andthelegislatureisnotwithoutits significantcontributionstostatepolicymaking.Evenwiththesuccessof2011,therewere concernsthatdealswerehammeredoutbehindcloseddoors,andwithoutsufficientinputfrom rankandfilemembersofthelegislature.111Thereisaconsistentpatternofissuesnotbeing addressedatall,ornotbeingaddressedinatimelymanner.Timelyissuesleftunresolvedbythe legislaturein2011includethefollowing: UnderthefederalAffordableCareAct,eachstatemusthaveahealthcareexchangein placeby2014.NewYorkhasoptedtocreateitsown,buthasnotyetcometoan agreementastoitsstructure.AdvocateshaveclaimedthatthedelaymayresultinNew Yorkslossoffederaldollarsforimplementation.112
110 111
Dadey,Dick.Stopgerrymanderingsafeseats,soincumbentsengage.July26.2009.CrainsNewYorkBusiness. Spector,Joseph.WhatEverHappenedtoTransparency?PoliticsontheHudson.June24,2011.Availableat: http://statepolitics.lohudblogs.com/2011/06/24/whateverhappenedtotransparency/ 112 CitizensActionofNewYork,NewsAdvisory.http://citizenactionny.org/2011/06/advisoryhealthadvocatescallon leaderstopasshealthexchangelaw/6091
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Issuesofpoliticalreformhaveseenparticularstagnationinspiteofoverwhelmingpublic support.ThoughtheStateLegislatureandGovernordeservecreditforthepassageof ethicslegislationwhichforthefirsttimeprovidesalevelofindependentoversightoverthe legislatureandincreaseddisclosureofoutsidebusinessdealings,campaignfinancereform andredistrictingreformhavefailedtobeaddressed.NewYorknowhasthehighest spendinglimitsforcandidatesofthe45statesinthenationthathavelimits,allowing contributionsofover$100,000topartycommittees.113Similarly,whilestatessuchas CaliforniaandArizonahaveseenthecreationofindependentredistrictingcommissions, NewYorklagsbehindinremovingtheconflictofinterestinherentinlegislatorsdrawing theirownseats. NewYorkremainsoutofcompliancewiththefederalMilitaryandOverseasVoters EmpowermentAct,orMOVEAct,whichrequiresthestatetosendmilitaryandoverseas voterstheirballotsatleast45daysbeforetheelection.Giventheproximitybetweenthe primaryandgeneralelectionsunderthecurrentschedulewithprimariesinSeptemberand thegeneralelectioninNovember,thereisnotcurrentlyenoughtimeforballotstobe mailedbythisdeadline.Thestatelegislaturethusmayneedtomovetheprimarydate earlierintheyear.TheAssemblyhasputforwardlegislationinfavorofaJuneprimary, whiletheSenatefavorsanAugustprimary.Thelackofactionthusfarcomplicatesthe electionschedulefor2012,asredistrictingmusttakeplacebeforecandidatescanpetition ontheballot.114 Evenwhenprogressismadeandpolicyissuesareaddressed,theyareoftenaddressedlate,often puttingNewYorkStatedeadlastinaddressingnationaltrends.Onerecentexampleisthe legislaturesenactingofnofaultdivorceafteryearsofinaction.NewYorkwasthelaststateinthe nationtoenactreformstoremovearequirementthatspousesprovetheothercommittedanact suchascruelty,adulteryorabandonmentinordertodivorce.Thisresultedincostlytrialsover whowastoblameforthedissolutionofamarriage,and,insomecases,falseclaimstomake allegationsfittherequirementsofthelaw.115 Aperenniallylateitemtobeaddressedbythelegislatureisthestatebudget.Whilebudget reformswereenactedin2007whichrequiredtheformationofjointconferencecommitteesto hashoutdifferencesbetweeneachhousesbudgetandcreateadeadlineforrevenueconsensus, theprocessremainslessthanidealandtakesplacelargelybehindcloseddoors. Thebudgetnegotiationsin2009and2010largelydidnotadheretothe2007reforms,withno conferencecommitteesbeingformed,meaningtheonlyavenuefordeliberationonthebudget
Katz,Celeste.NYPIRG:NewYorkOnTrackToBeFirstStateWithContributionLimitOver$100,000,DailyPolitics. January21,2011.Availableat:http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2011/01/nypirgnewyorkontrack tobefirststatewithcontributionlimitover100000 114 FormoreinformationseeFauss,Rachael.SummerintheCity:Beaches,BarbecuesandBallots?,June2011. GothamGazette.Availableat:http://gothamgazette.com/article/governing/20110628/17/3552 115 Kolker,CarolynandHurtado,Patricia.DivorceEasierasNewYorkLawEndsNeedtoLie,BloombergNews.August 16,2010.Availableat:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20100816/breakingupnotsohardtodoasnewyorks divorcelawendsneedtolie.html
113
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Formoreinformation,see: DrugPolicyNews.DrugPolicyAlliance.13July2006and19Aug.2005, http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/pressroom/pressrelease/pr081905.cfm. CriminalJusticeTransitionAlliance,Availableat: http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice/index.php?option=com_content&vie w=article&id=49&Itemid=102 TheManhattanInstitute.RightSizingJustice:ACostBenefitAnalysisof ImprisonmentinThreeStates.CenterforCivicInnovation.Sept.1999. Availableat: http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/cr 8.htm 116 SienaResearchInstitute.Availableat: http://www.siena.edu/uploadedfiles/home/parents_and_community/community_page/sri/sny_poll/10%20July%20S NY%20Poll%20Release%20%20Final.pdf 117 Hakim,Danny.125DaysLate,aStateBudgetWithNewTaxes.TheNewYorkTimes.August3,2010.Availableat: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/nyregion/04albany.html?src=mv
wasonthefloorpriortothe finalvote.Public disappointmentinthebudget processispalpable,withthe maintargetoffrustration beingthelegislaturethe SienaResearchInstituteina July2010pollfoundthat nearlyhalfofNewYorkersgive theStateLegislatureanFfor itsworkonthestatebudget thatyear,whileaboutone quartersayGovernorDavid Patersondeservedafailing grade.116Thestatebudgetin 2010wasalsonotfinalized untilAugust3rd125days late.117Whilein2011thestate budgetwaspassedontime andconferencecommittees wereformed,theprocesswas rushed,withmessagesof necessityissuedtoallowvotes onbillsthatlegislatorshad onlyfirstseenafewhours before.Legislatorswerealso limitedintheamountoftime theycouldspeakonthe arguablythemostsignificant pieceoflegislationpassed eachyear. Aparticularissuerelatedto thestatebudgetthathasseen alackofactionanddelaysis thefulfillmentofacourt orderedmandatetoprovide NewYorkCityspublicschools withadequateresourcesto provideasound,basic
CASESTUDY: RockefellerDrugLawReform
Onehighprofileexampleoflegislativestagnationrevolvedaround effortstoreformthestatesarchaicRockefellerDrugLaws.Enactedin 1973,theRockefellerDrugLawsmadeNewYorkStatesminimum sentencesforfirsttimedrugoffenderssomeofthestrictestinthe country.TheRockefellerDrugLawstiedjudgeshandsbyrequiringa onesizefitsallpolicyfordrugoffendersthathasledtoaballooning prisonpopulation,andwascriticizedasbeingdiscriminatory.In1980, 11percentofprisonerswereincarceratedfordrugfelonies,andby 2003,thatnumberroseto38percent.WhileAfricanAmericanand LatinosconstitutelessthanaquarterofNewYorkspopulation,93 percentforthosecurrentlyincarceratedfordrugoffensesbelongto thosetwominoritygroups,accordingtotheDrugPolicyAlliance. StrongoppositionformedtotheRockefellerDrugLawsfromboth averageNewYorkersandpoliticiansalike.In2004,over80percentof NewYorkerssupportedreformingthethirtythreeyearoldlaw.In 2006,apollbyZogbyInternationalfoundthat77percentofthose polledthoughttreatmentshouldbeapriorityoverjailtimefordrug offenders.Similarsentimentswereexpressedbyavarietyof organizations.TheconservativeleaningManhattanInstitutecalledfor therepealofthemandatoryminimumsentencesandsupported releasingthosefoundguiltyofdrugcrimesonly. Whilesupportforreformgrewinmanycorners,thelegislaturedidnot actuntil2004whentheypassedtheDrugLawReformAct,signedinto lawbyGovernorPataki.Thelawreducedthemandatorysentencing fromindeterminatesentencesof15to25yearstolifewith determinatesentencesrangingfrom8to20years,andproposed treatmentasasentencingoption,amongotherreforms.Sinceits inceptionin2004,however,only142prisonerswerefreed,andmany opponentsofthelawclaimedthereformsdidnotgofarenough.Only in2009didfurtherreformsgetenactedaspartofthe200910budget.
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educationaccordingtotheCampaignforFiscalEquitydecision.Theissuelanguishedinthe legislatureforyearsasformerGovernorPatakisoughttoavoidaddressingitbyfilingappealsin courtandprovidinglittleifanyleadershiptobreaktheimpassethatexisted.Whilethelegislature underGovernorSpitzerdevelopedaplantoimplementincreasedfundingoveramultiyear period,theplanwasonlyfullyfundedforoneyearanddisparitiesremainineducationfunding.118 Delayshaverunthegamutofpolicyissues,withmentalhealthpolicyalsofailingtobeupdatedto addressgrowingneeds.ThelegislaturefailedforfiveyearstopassabillknownastheMental HealthInsuranceParitybillorTimothysLaw.Thisbillwasnamedfora12yearoldboyTimothy whocommittedsuicidein2001.Hisinsurancedidnotcoverthementalhealthtreatmentthatmay havepreventedhisdeath.ThislawnowrequiresNewYorkStatehealthinsurerstocover treatmentforsubstanceabuseandmentalillness.ThebillwasfinallypassedinDecemberof 2006,fiveyearsafteralargecoalitionofgroupsincludinghospitals,andteacherandschool employeeunionsstartedadvocatingforthebilltobepassed.119 Anotherexampleoflegislationthatwasseverelydelayedandputoffbythelegislatureisthe SexualOrientationNonDiscriminationAct(SONDA).SONDAwasputforwardtoamendNewYork Stateshumanrightslaws.SONDAwouldforbiddiscriminationbasedonsexualorientationin employment,publicaccommodations,housing,education,andcredit.Thebillwasoriginally introducedintotheAssemblyin1971.Everyyearfrom1993until2002thebillreceivedmoreand moresupportintheAssembly.Thebillalsohadsupportfromthemajorityofsenators.Thebill howeverwascontinuallystalledincommitteeandneverreachedthesenatefloor.Finallyin2004, reportedlybecauseGovernorPatakisoughtthesupportofaleadinggayrightsorganizationinhis nextreelectioncampaignthebillwasfinallysenttothesenateandpassedin2004. Duetotheperceptionthatthedemocraticprocessisbroken,andthesubsequentlackof outcomesonmajorpolicyissuesnottomentioncontinuingethicalscandalsthelevelof satisfactionandpublicconfidenceinthestatelegislaturehasdiminishedovertime.Whilethis couldbesaidofattitudestowardslegislativebodiesnationwide,publicdissatisfactionwithNew YorkStateslegislatureiscoupledwithavoterturnoutthatisdismalcomparedtootherstates. Whileitistruethatvotersarereelectingincumbentseachelectionseason,asmallpercentageof theeligibleelectorateisshowinguptothepollstodoso,andtheirchoicesarebeingnarrowed beforetheygettothepolls.Datashowsthatincumbentsrarelyfacecompetitivechallengesin eitherprimaryorgeneralelectioncontests.Thestrengthofincumbents,coupledwithwhatwas thelongeststreakofpartisandivideofthetwohousesofastatelegislatureinthenation,has producedasystemthatisbothgridlockedandinsular.
CampaignforFiscalEquity.NYRankedFourthfromLastinFairDistributionofEducationFunds.October12,2010. Availableat:http://www.cfequity.org/home/ny_ranked_fourth_from_last_in_fair_distribution_of_education.php 119 Formoreinformation,see:http://www.timothyslaw.org/supporters.htm
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F. DISSATISFACTIONANDDECLININGVOTERPARTICIPATION
Thegrowingsenseofpartisanship,ethicallapses,andofabrokensystemofstategovernance lackingtheabilitytoaddresskeyissueshascontributedtothepublicsdissatisfactionwiththe performanceoftheirelectedofficials. Votersareunsatisfiedwiththestatelegislature,withanOctober2011Quinnipiacpollfindingthat 63percentofvotersdisapproveofthejobthelegislatureisdoing.120Thepollalsoshowed tremendouspublicsupportforindependentredistricting:76percentofvoterssupportedan independentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines.VotersalsoagreedthatGovernorCuomoshould vetolinesthatarenotdrawnbyanindependentcommission,with45percentofthosepolledin agreementand35percentdisagreeing.Thelegislatureslackofactionthusfaronredistricting reformachiefcampaignpromisefromthe2010electionsinaSeptemberpollledto48percent ofthosepolledsayingtheywouldfeelbetrayedthelegislatureweretoapprovedistrictlinesthe sameoldwayandnotputinplaceanindependentcommissionfor2012.121Atatimewhen satisfactionissolow,votershaveclearlyconnectedtheissueofredistrictingwiththeperformance ofstategovernment. Thelowopinionofstategovernmentcontributestothedisenchantmentofvoterswhowouldturn outtothepollsonElectionDay.Since1980forstatewideelectionyears(alsoknowasthe midtermperiod),onlyin1994didNewYorkStatehaveanaboveaverageturnout.By2006,New Yorkdroppedtonearly6percentbelowthenationsaverageturnout.In2010NewYorkhadthe fourthworstvoterturnoutinthenation,withonly34.9percentofeligiblevotersvotingfortheir governor,thestateshighestoffice.122SeethegraphonthenextpageforNewYorksrateof turnoutcomparedtothenationalaverage.
QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,KeepRace,JobProtectionOutOfRedistricting,NewYorkStateVotersTell QuinnipiacUniversityPoll;CuomoShouldVetoLawmakers'Lines,VotersSay.October26,2011. 121 QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,StormSurgeTakesCuomoApprovalToAllTimeHigh,QuinnipiacUniversity PollFinds;VotersWantGovToSpeakUpOnRedistricting.September20,2011. 122 AllturnoutdatafromMichaelMcDonald,UnitedStatesElectionsProject,availableat http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm
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Illustration27:NewYorkStateTurnoutTrendsNonPresidentialElectionYears123
Turnout of Eligible Voters Non-Presidential Election Years
50.0% 45.0% 40.0% Percentage Turnout 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 1982 1986 1990 1994 Year 1998 2002 2006 2010 35.0% 33.1% 42.1% 38.1% 43.4% 38.4% 41.1% 42.7% 38.1% 38.6% 36.1% 34.9% 34.9% New York U.S. Average 39.5% 40.4% 40.8%
Whiledissatisfactionwithelectedofficialsandpoliticsissuretotopthelistofwhyvotersstayat homeonElectionDay,manyarenotgoingtothepollsbecausevotersrarelyhaveanopportunity tochoosebetweentwoviablecandidates,especiallyinpartyprimaries,whicharetantamountto electioninalargeportionofNewYorksdistricts.Incumbentswilllineupsupportandusethe advantagesaffordedtothembyvirtueoftheirofficelikepartisangerrymanderingtohelp ensuretheyarereelectedeveryotherNovember.Withcontestsdecidedbeforevotesarecast, voterschoosenottocasttheirballots. Toincreasevoterturnout,itisessentialthatelectionsoffervotersmeaningfulopportunitiesto selecttheirrepresentatives,whichwouldbemademorelikelythroughamoreindependent redistrictingprocess.Whileinterpretationoffindingsonthesubjectareatopicfordiscussion,124 inananalysisof2006competitivecongressionalelections,competitiveraceswereshowntobe thekeyfactorindrawingvoterstothepolls,evenmoresothanthepresenceofhigherprofile officesontheballot.Anauthorofoneofthereports,MichaelMcDonaldofGeorgeMason University,concludedthattheexpectedbenefitofvotinghasadirectinfluenceontheresultsof theelection,aswellasthelevelofturnout.Ratherthanbeingapathetic,McDonaldpostulates thatvotersaremakingastrategicdecisionnottobothervotingwhentheyrecognizethelackof
DataobtainedfromUnitedStatesElectionsProject.Turnoutismeasuredbytherateatwhichthevotingeligible populationvotedforthehighestofficeontheballot. 124 Matsusaka,JohnG."ElectionClosenessandVoterTurnout:EvidenceFromCaliforniaBallotPropositions."Public Choice76(1993).SpringerLink.26July2007Availableat:http://www.springerlink.com/content/gr67358r4j1q2w2r/
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impactthattheirvoteshaveonmostraces.Hesuggeststhatpatternsofcompetitionandvoting suggestthatmanypeoplecanovercomevotingimpedimentsiftheyseeareasontodoso.125 TheNonprofitVoterEngagementNetworkhasalsofoundthatmorecompetitionandfewer barrierstovotingtranslateintohighervoterturnout.126Theyfoundthatstateswithcompetitive electionsforCongressorGovernorsawasmuchas40percentgrowthinturnoutin2006over 2002,versusonly16percentforstateswithnoncompetitiveelectionsthatyear,asshowninthe graphbelow.TheNetworkupdatedsomeoftheirfindingsfor2010electionaswell,statingthat generallyvoterturnoutgoesupinmoststatesthathavegreaterelectoralcompetition,and notingthatthepresenceofstatewideelectionsalsoplaysaroleinturnout.Evenwithastatewide election,NewYorkwasdeemedanextremecaseofuncompetitiveelections,withlandslidesin racesforgovernorandsenate.127Aspreviouslynotedinthisreport,uncompetitivestatelegislative electionsarealsoalltooprevalent. Illustration28:AverageTurnoutforStateswithCompetitiveElections,2006
Turnout in 2006: Competitive vs. Non-Competitive Elections
50% 45% 45% 40% 35% Percentage 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Competitive Non Competitive 37%
McDonald,Michael.RockingtheHouse:CompetitionandTurnoutinthe2006MidtermElection,TheForum,The BerkeleyElectronicPress,2006,p.6. 126 Pillsbury,George,JulianJohannesen,andJeffArp.AmericaGoestothePolls:aReportonVoterTurnoutinthe 2006Election.NonprofitVoterEngagementNetwork.25July2007Availableathttp://www.nonprofitvote.org/wp content/uploads/AGttP.pdf. 127 NonProfitVOTE.AmericaGoestothePolls2010:AReportonVoterTurnoutinthe2010Election.Availableat: http://www.nonprofitvote.org/voterturnout.html
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6
SOLUTIONSTOGERRYMANDERING
A.OPTIONSFORABETTERREDISTRICTINGPROCESS
The2010Censushasbeenconductedandthepoliticalramificationsofthenewlegislativedistricts thatwillbedrawnin20112012areenormous.FortheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,NewYork willlosetwocongressionalseats,asitdidnotgrowinpopulationattherateofotherstatessuch asTexasandFlorida.Asidefromthepoliticsofredistricting,theStateLegislaturefacesincreasing publicdissatisfactionwiththefunctioningofstategovernment.Publicoutcryforreform, combinedwiththerecentstridessomestateslikeCaliforniaandFloridahavemadetowards institutingredistrictingreforms,arewhyCitizensUnionbelievesthatwemustseizethemoment toensuretherightsofNewYorkersarefinallyprotected. Thoughourpreferredapproachofconstitutionalchangestotheredistrictingprocessisnolongera viableoptionbeforethe2012elections,statutoryreformsremainpossiblebeforelinesaredrawn. Whodrawsthelines,howtheyaredrawnintermsofcriteriaandrules,theamountofpublicinput andtheapprovalprocessareallimportantfactorsinconsideringanewindependentredistricting systemforNewYork.Whileseveralmodelsexistforeachofthesefactors,itisclearthatamore independentprocessisneededinNewYork. Onelegislativeproposal,sponsoredbyAssemblymemberMichaelGianarisandSenatorDavid Valesky,sawadvancementinbothhousesin2010,passingtheSenateElectionsandGovernmental OperationsCommittees,andtheAssemblyGovernmentalOperationsCommittee.Thelegislation (A.3432/S.2543)hasbeenreintroducedin2011bynowSenatorMichaelGianarisand AssemblymemberHakeemJeffries,andhasthesupportofmorethanamajorityofmembersof theAssemblyandstrongsupportamongDemocratsintheSenate. Mostnotablyin2011,GovernorAndrewCuomoputforthaprogrambillforredistrictingreform thatincorporatesmanyoftheelementsoftheGianarislegislation,sponsoredbySpeakerSheldon SilverintheAssemblyandputintotheRulesCommitteeintheSenate.Whilethemeasurehas securedoverwhelmingsupportintheAssembly,with96cosponsors,itsintroductionintothe RulesCommitteeintheSenate,whereitcannotbecosponsored,hasallowedtheSenatemajority toeffectivelystallitsmovement. Overall,allofthemeasuresrecognizethatthelegislaturehasusedthecurrentsystemtopromote partisanandincumbentintereststhathavenotservedthebestinterestsofNewYorkers,andseek toreformtheprocessbyremovingresponsibilityfromthelegislatureindrawingdistrictlines. Whileeachoftheproposalshasitsstrengthsanditsweaknesses,therearemanyworthymeasures containedineach,andallshouldbeseenasstartingpointsfordiscussionsonacomplexissueand
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notasfinalpiecesoflegislation.Thissectionwilloutlinesomeofthekeyconsiderationsand proposalsthatarepartofthatdiscussion. i.ThePathwaytoReform Notwithstandingthemeasuresthatwillmakeupareformproposal,thereareseveralwaysthat reformtotheredistrictingprocesscanunfoldprocedurally:throughstatute,througha constitutionalamendment,orthroughaconstitutionalconvention. ThroughStatute Inmanywaysthepassageoflegislationthroughthetypicallegislativeprocessisthepathofleast resistanceforaccomplishingredistrictingreform.TheproposalsbySenatorsMichaelGianarisand DavidValeskyandAssemblymemberHakeemJeffries,aswellasGovernorCuomosprogrambill wouldattempttocreatereformthroughthismechanism.Thisprocesswouldrequirethe introductionofareformbillinbothchamberstochangetheredistrictingprocess.Thelegislation wouldthenneedtomovethroughrelevantcommitteesineachhouseandtothefloorforavote. Shouldbothhousesnotpassidenticallegislation,thehouseswouldhavetoconferencetocreatea billacceptabletoboththatwouldthenbeforwardedtotheGovernorforapproval.Whilethisis theleastcumbersomemethodofachievingreform,itisnotwithoutitsshortcomings.Specifically, legislationcouldnottakethepowerawayfromthelegislaturetohavefinalapprovalover redistricting,asthispowerisdelineatedintheStateConstitution. ThroughConstitutionalAmendment Aconstitutionalamendmentapproachisfavoredbymanyasthemostfarreachingand permanentmeanstoreformtheredistrictingprocess;however,thewindowofopportunityfor changingtheStateConstitutionbeforethe2012electionshasclosed.ByamendingtheState Constitution,finalapprovalcouldbeplacedwithanonlegislativecommission,andwouldnothave tobesubjecttoavoteofthelegislature.Also,ifnewredistrictingprocedureswereenumeratedin thestateconstitutionthelegislaturewouldnotaseasilybeabletotweakthelawshouldtheynot bepleasedwiththeoutcome.Thiscutsbothways,however,asshouldtherebeunexpected consequencesofthereforms,itwouldbemuchmoreburdensometotinker.Theprocesswould requirethatareformbillpasstwoconsecutivelegislaturesandbesignedbytheGovernorand thenbeforwardedtothevotersintheformofaballotquestion.Voterswouldholdultimate responsibilityforitspassage.Itisnolongerpossibleforconstitutionalreformstobeenactedfor the2012redistrictingcycle;however,asthelegislaturewouldhaveneededtopassthe amendmentsintwoconsecutiveyearsandthevoterswouldhaveneededtosubsequently approvethemeasure,preferablyinthe2010electionstoensureathoughtfulandunrushed redistrictingprocess. TheSenateRepublicanConferencesupportedinthe2011legislativesessionaconstitutional amendmentsponsoredbySenatorJohnBonacic(R)thatwouldmakechangestotheredistricting process,notablycreatingamorebipartisanstructure.128Thelegislation,however,couldnottake affectuntil2022,asitwouldneedtofirstbepassedbytheAssembly,andthenpassedagainin
128
S.3331of2011,availableat:http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S33312011
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2013or2014bythelegislature,signedbytheGovernorandthenapprovedbythevoters.Though theSenateRepublicanConferencemaintainedthatthisfulfilledtheircampaignpledgestoreform theredistrictingprocess,reformadvocatesdecriedthemeasureasfalsereformandmere posturing.129 ThroughConstitutionalConvention Athird,andperhapsmostonerous,methodforreformingtheredistrictingprocesscouldoccur throughthepassageofaproposalthatisbroughtthroughastateprocesscalledaConstitutional Convention.AccordingtoArticleXIX,Section2oftheNewYorkStateConstitution,everytwenty yearsvotersareallowedtheopportunitytovoteforaconstitutionalconvention.Thelast opportunitywasin1997,whenitwasrejectedbyvoters.Thenextsuchopportunityforvoterswill bein2017,whichwillbeafterthe2012redistrictingcycle.TheConstitutionalsoallowsforthe legislaturetovoteforaconstitutionalconvention,thoughitisunlikelythattheywilldoso,asit canbeanunpredictableprocessandmightleavethelegislaturewithlesspower.Atconstitutional conventions,threedelegatesareelectedfromeachSenatedistricttherebyfavoringlegislators andotherpoliticiansalreadyrepresentingsuchdistrictsshouldtheyseektobecomedelegatesand reducingthelikelihoodofreformandfifteendelegatesareelectedatlarge(byvoters statewide).Proposedchangestotheconstitutionadoptedbytheconventionmustthenbe approvedbyvoters.Thelastconventionwasheldin1967,whichresultedintherecommendation toreassignthetaskofredistrictingfromthelegislaturetoabipartisancommission.130This proposalwasrejectedbyvoters. Itshouldbenotedthatreformoftheconstitutionalconventionprocessissupportedbyawide rangeofgoodgovernmentgroups,includingCitizensUnion,aswellastheNewYorkCityBar Association.Thegroupsurgethatchangesbemadetonotallowforlegislaturestoserveas delegates,asitallowsfordoubledipping,andforthedelegateselectionprocesstobe reformed.131 ii.TheElementsofReform Whatevermethodisundertakentochangethestatesredistrictingprocess,reformwillultimately requireNewYorkselectedleadersandthepublictoaddressthreemainpoints:(a)whodrawsthe lines;(b)howthelinesaredrawn;and(c)whattheprocessisforapprovalofdraftplans. 1. WhoDrawstheLines ManyoftheproposalsadvancedinNewYorkStatetoreformtheredistrictingprocesscallfora newcommissionthatwouldbeinvestedwiththepowertodrawthedistrictboundaries.While
Benjamin,Liz.KochtoSenateGOP:ConstitutionalAmendmentNotCuttingIt.March14,2011.CapitolTonight. Availableat:http://www.capitaltonight.com/2011/03/kochtosenategopconstitutionalamendmentnotcuttingit/ 130 Formoreinformation,seetheReportoftheTaskForceontheNewYorkStateConstitutionalConvention,NYCBar, availableat:http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/603 ReportoftheTaskForceontheNYSConstitutionalConvention.pdf 131 ReportoftheTaskForceontheNewYorkStateConstitutionalConvention,NYCBar
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theappointingauthoritiesvary,manyproposalsshareincommonaprohibitiononlegislatorsfrom servingonthecommission. Themostfarreachingofthebillsinthisrespect,theGianaris/Jeffries,ValeskyandCuomo legislation,wouldcreatean8personcommitteetoselect40nomineeswhowouldbeeligibleto serveontheredistrictingcommission.Twomembersofthecommissionwouldthenbeselected fromthispoolbyeachofthe4legislativeleadersandthese8memberswouldthenselect3 additionalmemberstocompletethe11memberredistrictingcommission.Therewouldalsobe strictlimitsonwhocouldbenominatedtothepoolofnomineesandwhocouldserveonthe commission.AsisrequiredbytheStateConstitution,thebillsleavefinalapprovaloftheplansin thehandsofthelegislature. Theotherbillsthathavebeenintroducedprovideforcommissionstobeappointedinseveral differentmanners,mostthroughpowerofthefourlegislativeleaders.Inthedevelopmentof modelsforthecreationofanewcommission,thereareseveralkeyconsiderations,suchasthe numberofmembers,whethertouseanominationspool,whotheappointingauthoritiesare, andprohibitionsorcriteriaformembershiponanominatingbodyandtheredistricting commission. CASESTUDY:ARIZONA CONSIDERATIONSFOR TheArizonaIndependentRedistrictingCommissionand CREATIONOFAREDISTRICTING NominationsPool COMMISSION In2000,thevotersofArizonapassedProposition106with54%of
NumberofMembers Mostredistrictingreform proposalsrequireanodd numberofmemberstoensure thereisatiebreakingvote. Numbersofmemberson commissionsvaryandareoften arrivedatbytakinginto considerationwhowillbedoing theappointingandwhatlevelof agreementispreferredto advancetheplans(simple majority,majorityplusone, etc.). NominationsPools Someproposalscallforpotential membersofthecommissionto firstbesubmittedtoa nominationspooltobeselected byvariouselectedofficials.ThenominationspoolintheGianaris/JeffriesandCuomomodel potentiallyallowsalargearrayofelectedofficials,includingnonlegislativestatewideofficials,to
thevote,allowingthecreationoftheArizonaIndependent RedistrictingCommission.1Thecommissionismadeupoffive members,andmayconsistofnomorethantwopeopleofthe samepoliticalpartyservingonthecommissionatanyonetime. ArizonasCommissionforAppellateCourtAppointments nominatestwentyfivepersonsforconsiderationtositonthe independentcommission.Tennomineesmustberegisteredfrom eachofthetwolargestpoliticalpartiesinthestate,andfivemust beregisteredtootherpartiesorbeunaffiliated.Candidatesfor thecommissionmusthavebeeneitherregisteredwithapartyfor threeconsecutiveyearspriortonominationorunaffiliatedforthis lengthoftime.Duringthattime,theycannothavebeenelectedto anypublicoffice,excludingschoolboard,cannothavebeenpaid ascampaignstaff,andcannothaveregisteredasapaidlobbyist. Fromthelistoftwentyfivenominees,eachofthefourlegislative leadersappointsonemember.Thesefourappointeesthenselect afifthmemberfromthenomineespoolfromapoliticalpartynot yetrepresentedonthecommission. 1 Proposition106textavailableat: http://www.azredistricting.org/?page=prop106
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selectmembersforthepool,withtheintentofprovidingabitmoreindependencefromthose makingthefinalappointment,andalsoplacesregionalrequirementsonthecandidatesthatare submittedtothepoll,increasingtheoddsthatthecommissionitselfwillreflectregionalandeven ethnicorracialdiversity.Arizonausesanominationspool,asisdescribedinthecasestudyatleft. Manymodelsbypassthisstepentirelyandallowappointingauthoritiestoselectfromthe populationatlarge,withcertainrestrictions. AppointingAuthority CASESTUDY:PROPOSITION11 Appointingauthorities CaliforniasCitizensRedistrictingCommission undermostmodelsinclude CaliforniaProposition11,alsoknownastheVotersFirstAct,appeared theGovernor,eachofthe fourlegislativeleaders(the ontheNovember4,2008ballotinCaliforniaasaproposed amendmenttotheCaliforniaConstitutionthroughinitiative. SpeakerandMinority Proposition11wasapprovedbyaslimmarginof50.9%ofthevote. LeaderoftheAssembly Proposition11changestheprocessthatisundertakenonceeveryten andtheMajorityand yearsofdrawingthestate's120legislativedistrictsandfourBoardof MinorityLeaderofthe Equalizationdistrictsbyremovingtheresponsibilityfordrawingstate Senate)withafinal linesfromthestatelegislatureandgivingittoanew14member memberbeingselectedby commissioncomposedofpublicmembers. thosealreadyappointed, Proposition11enactedthefollowingprovisionstocreateacitizens typicallytocreateanodd redistrictingcommission: numberedbody.Each Changestheauthorityforestablishingthedistrictboundariesof leaderistypicallygiventhe theCaliforniaStateLegislatureandBoardofEqualizationfrom authoritytoappointeither electedrepresentativestoa14membercommission. oneorseveralmembers, Governmentauditorsaretoselect60registeredvotersfroman withalllegislativeleaders applicantpool.Legislativeleaders(RepublicanandDemocrat havinganequalnumberof leadersinthestatesenateandstateassembly)canreducethe appointees.Allowingall pool;theauditorsthenaretopickeightcommissionmembersby fourleadersequal lottery,andthosecommissionerspicksixadditionalmembersfor 14total. appointmentpower RequiresthatthecommissionmustincludefiveDemocrats,five ensuresthatbothmajor Republicansandfourmembersofneitherparty. partieswillberepresented, Forapproval,districtboundariesneedvotesfromthree butalsothattheminority Democraticcommissioners,threeRepublicancommissionersand partyofeachhouseis threecommissionersfromneitherpartyforatotalof9of14 representedandnot members marginalized.
WhoCouldServe Reformeffortshavealso focusedonestablishinga setofcriteria,oralistof disqualifications,forwho canserveon commissionswiththe intentofminimizing conflictsofinterestand
InordertoserveonthecommissionenvisionedbyProposition11, commissionapplicantsmust: Beregisteredvoters Showconsistentvoterregistrationforthepreviousfiveyears. Havevotedintwoofthelastthreegeneralelections. Inthelast10years,theapplicantoracloserelativecannothave beenafederalorstatepoliticalcandidate,lobbyistordonorof $2,000ormoretoacandidate.
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commissionersthatarebeholdentopartiesorspecialinterests. Asmentionedearlier,manyoftheproposalsforreforminNewYorkStateseektostrictlyprohibit electedofficialsfromservingonthecommission.Thefollowingareseveralrequirementsthat havebeenoutlinedinthecurrentreformproposals:

CommissionersshouldberegisteredvotersoftheStateofNewYork; Commissionerscannothold,orhaveheld,anelectiveofficeorpartyposition,havebeen appointedtoapartisanposition,orbeenemployedasalobbyistwithinaspecifiedamountof timebeforeappointment(oftentwoyears),orbethespouseofanelectedofficialinthestate legislative,judicial,executivebranchortheU.S.Congress; Commissionersshouldrepresentmultiplepoliticalpartieswithnomorethanaspecified amountfromonepoliticalparty.Forexample,theGianaris/JeffriesandCuomoproposalsstate thenominationspoolshouldincludefifteenDemocrats,fifteenRepublicans,andten candidatesnotenrolledasaDemocratorRepublican.TheArizonaindependentredistricting commissionconsistsoffivememberswiththefifthandfinalmemberofthecommission, appointedbytheotherfourandofapartynotalreadyrepresentedonthecommission. Commissionersshouldreflectthediversityofthestategeographically,racially,ethnically,and bygender.TheproposalsbyGianaris/JeffriesandCuomoincludesastrictrequirementof geographicdiversityfortheselectiontothenominationspool,butamoreadvisorypositionfor thefinalcommissionstatingthattotheextentpracticable,themembersoftheredistricting commissionshallreflectthediversityoftheresidentsofthestatewithregardtorace, ethnicity,genderandgeographicresidence.
ApprovalbyCommission Howthecommissionadvancesaplantothefinalapprovalauthorityhasbeenthesubjectof deliberationaswell.Mostdiscussionscenteronwhatpercentageofthecommissionshouldbe requiredtovoteinsupportofaplanforittoadvance.Thehigherthethreshold,themore consensushastobereachedwithinthecommission.Asimplemajorityisoftenthoughttobetoo lowofathresholdasamajoritypartysappointmentswouldsimplyneedtoswingachair appointedbythebodyintheirdirectiontocontroltheprocess.Asimplemajorityplusone ensuresthatatleastonememberfromeachofthetwomajorpartieshastoagreetosupportthe planputforward,andthatatleastonememberofoneofthetwominoritypartieshastosupport theplan.Asthenumberofmembersonthecommissionincreases,therecouldbeconsideration giventoincreasingthethresholdtomajorityplustwo,three,etc.Modelshavealsobeen advancedthatrequirethatthechairvoteinfavorofanyplanbeforeitisadvanced. 2. HowtheLinesareDrawn Asimportantaswhodevelopstheredistrictingplansaretheguidelinestowhichthose commissionsadhereinthedrawingofdistrictlines.Thecurrentslateofproposalsforreformdo notthrowtheentirelistofcurrentguidelinesoutthewindow,butratherbuildupon,givemore importanceto,oraddadditionalmeasurestoensurethatlinesaredrawninthebestinterestsof thevotersandthestateofNewYork.
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CONSIDERATIONSFORTHE DEVELOPMENTOFREDISTRICTING GUIDELINES Thefollowingtopicsofconsideration arecommonwhendiscussingwhat guidelinescommissionsshouldfollowin thedrawingofdistrictlines: IncumbentandPartisanBlind Redistricting:Incumbentand partisanblindredistrictingcriteria seektoreduceorminimize politicalconsiderationsfromthe redistrictingprocess.Several reformexpertshavecalledforan incumbentblindredistricting processwherebythelocationof incumbentshomescannotbe revealedtothosedrawingthe maps.Othermeasuresspecify thatdistrictboundariescannotbe drawntofavororopposeany candidateorpresumedcandidate runningforoffice.Partisanblind redistrictingissimilarinthatitis eitheraccomplishedthrough limitingtheuseofelection informationinthecourseof redistrictingorthroughlanguage thatstatesthatredistricting shouldnotbeusedtofavorone partyoveranother.
CASESTUDY:FLORIDA Amendments5and6
OnNovember2,2010,thevotersofFloridaapprovedtwo measurestoenactredistrictingreformsinthestate Amendments5and6.Theamendmentssetforthstringent criteriaforthedrawingofdistrictlines,withAmendment5 relatingtostatelegislativelines,andamendment6relatingto congressionaldistrictlines.DistrictlinesdrawninFloridamust nowadheretothefollowingrequirements: Noapportionmentplanordistrictshallbedrawnwiththeintent tofavorordisfavorapoliticalpartyoranincumbent; Districtsshallnotbedrawnwiththeintentorresultofdenyingor abridgingtheequalopportunityofracialorlanguageminorities toparticipateinthepoliticalprocessortodiminishtheirabilityto electrepresentativesoftheirchoice; Districtsshallconsistofcontiguousterritory. Districtsshallbeasnearlyequalinpopulationasispracticable; districtsshallbecompact;and Districtsshall,wherefeasible,utilizeexistingpoliticaland geographicalboundaries
MinorityVotingRights: Preservingtheabilityfor minoritiestoelectrepresentatives oftheirchoiceisanimportant 1 Fein,Alan.RedistrictingReforminFlorida.TheHuffingtonPost. componentofanyredistricting November8,2010.Availableat:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan andisrequiredbyfederallaw.In fein/redistrictingreforminf_b_779713.html 2 fact,undercertaincircumstances Editorial.GaetzsJugglingAct.TheNewsHerald.November14,2010. Availableat:http://www.newsherald.com/articles/gaetz88568editorial (whenaminoritypopulationis largeenoughtocompriseadistrict republican.html andraciallypolarizedvoting patternsexist)thedrawingofspecialmajorityminoritydistrictsisrequiredundertheVoting
Thestatelegislaturewillstillberesponsiblefordrawingand approvingdistrictlines,butnowwillberequiredtofollow criteriathatwilleliminatemanyofthetacticsusedinpartisan gerrymandering.ThoughFloridahasmoreregisteredDemocrats thanRepublicans,20outof25,Floridacongressionalseatswere inRepublicanhands,andthepartybreakdowninthestate legislaturewassimilarduetothepackingofDemocratsintoa smallnumberofdistricts.1 SupportersoftheamendmentsincludedtheLeagueofWomen Voters,AARP,NAACP,DemocraciaAhora,FloridaLeagueof Cities,FloridaAssociationofCounties,andFloridaSchoolBoards Association,amongothergroups.Oneofthemostvisible opponents,RepresentativeMarioDiazBalart(R)headedthe statesredistrictingprocessin2002,allegedlycreatinga congressionaldistrictthathelaterwonwhichrunsfromheavily RepublicansuburbanMiami,acrosstheuninhabitedEverglades, toheavilyRepublicanSouthwestFlorida.2
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RightsAct.Additionally,inNewYorkCityaspreviouslydiscussed,redistrictingplansmust receivepreclearancefromtheJusticeDepartment,asthreecountiesreceivespecial protectionunderSection5oftheVotingRightsActthathavehistoricallybeendistrictswith votingrightsviolations:Bronx,NewYorkandKings(morecommonlyknownasBrooklyn). Whiledistrictsinmanywayshavebeendrawntoincreaseminorityvotingrepresentation therehavealsobeeneffortstothecontrary.Packing(puttingthebulkofminorityvoters intoasmallnumberofdistricts)andcracking(dilutingminorityvotersacrossmany districts)aretoolsusedtodilutetheminorityvote. PopulationEquality:Underfederalcaseprecedent132,legislativedistrictsmustbedrawn within5percentofthemeanSenateorAssemblydistrictsize.Asmallermarginofdeviation hasbeenproposedtomakedistrictsmoreequalinpopulationsothattheycanmorefully realizetheprincipleofoneperson,onevote.Thisstricterstandardwouldalsoreducethe legislaturesabilitytostrategicallyoverpopulateorunderpopulatedistrictstomaximize theirpower. Compactness:Compactnessisagenerallyacceptedcriterionthatholdsthatdistrictsshould becomposedofatightlydefinedareasothatrepresentativesmaybeabletomoreefficiently communicatewithandprovidecaseworkservicestotheirconstituents,andsothat constituentsresideinrelativecloseproximitytooneanother,thereforepotentiallyhaving interests,issuesandageneralsphereofreferenceincommon.However,compactnesshas beendefinedindifferentways:thelengthofthedistrictboundary,howwelladistrictfits insideasquareorcircle,andtheweightedaverageofthecenterofpopulationofadistrict.A districtthatfareswellunderonestandardmayfarepoorlyunderanother.Bizarrelyshaped districtsareoftenanindicatorthatpoliticalorotherinterestshavetrumpedthismeasure. ThecreationofmajorityminoritydistrictsasrequiredundertheVotingRightsAct,however, oftenrequirescontortedboundariesinordertogroupminoritycommunitiesintoasingle district. Contiguity:ContiguityisacurrentlyrequiredcriterioninNewYorkStateand,infact,is requiredinnearlyeverystatesconstitution.133Simplyput,contiguityrequiresthatallparts ofadistrictbeconnected.However,someportionsofdistrictsareoftenconnectedtothe corebyariverwithnobridge,astretchofhighwayorothersuchmeans.Somejurisdictions haveoptedtoapplyastrictersetofguidelinesrelatedtonaturalandmanmadebarriers suchashighways,waterwaysandislands. KeepingGeographicandPoliticalBoundariesIntact:Ameasurecallingforgeographicand politicalboundariesintactwouldmaintainthatdistrictboundariesshallconformtothe existinggeographicboundariesofacityandcountyorotherjurisdiction,andshallpreserve identifiablecommunitiesofinteresttothegreatestextentpossible.Someproponentshave calledforredistrictingplanstoprovideforthemostwholecountiesandthefewestcounty fragmentspossible,andthemostwholecitiesandfewestcityfragmentspossible.TheNew YorkStateConstitutionrequiresthatdistrictboundariesnotdividetownsor,withincities, blocks.Italsorequiresthatcountiesremainintactunlessitspopulationrequiresdivision
132 133
Wesberryv.Sanders,376U.S.1,78,(1964). AllAboutRedistricting.LoyolaLawSchool,ProfessorJustinLevitt.Availableat:http://redistricting.lls.edu/where state.php
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betweenmultipledistrictsforthestatesenate.134NewYorkCitysredistrictingprocessfor citycouncildistrictsrequiresthatifanydistrictincludesterritoryintwoboroughs(thesame ascounties),thennootherdistrictmayalsoincludeterritoryfromthesametwo boroughs.135 PreservingCommunitiesofInterest:Forthepurposesofredistricting,communitiesof interestcanbedefinedbysimilaritiesinsocial,cultural,ethnic,andeconomicinterest,school districts,andotherformalrelationshipsbetweenmunicipalities.However,respecting existingboundariesandcommunitiescanoftencomeintoconflictaseffortstokeepone communityofinterestorpoliticalsubdivisionintactcansometimesunintentionallyresultin thedivisionofanothercommunity. NestedDistricts:Currently,SenateandAssemblydistrictingplansarenotcoordinatedwith oneanotherintheirdesign.Asaresult,thedistrictboundariesonthetwosetsofmapsare somewhatalientooneanotherandtheSenateandAssemblydistrictsoverlapmorethan theymatchup.CriterionlimitingthenumberofAssemblydistrictsthatcanbeinaSenate districtandviceversaseektobringaboutamorecoherentrepresentationforcommunities thataredividedamonganarrayofSenateandAssemblydistricts. Competitiveness:Toincreasethelevelofcompetitioninelectoralcontests,twostates, ArizonaandWashington,haveoptedtoincludeacompetitivenessclauseforthedrawing ofdistrictlines.However,theseclausesaresubordinatetoothercriteria,suchasequal population,adherencetotheVotingRightsActandrespectforcommunitiesofinterest. Competitivenessclausesrequirethatdistrictsbedrawninsuchamannerastoincrease competitioninthedistricts.Thisapproachhasbeenoftencriticizedasoverlyvagueand potentiallyinconflictwithmoredesirablemeasuresthatcouldlimittheabilityofpartiesand legislatorstodrawdistrictsinanoncompetitivemanner.Arizonascompetitivenessclause requiresthattotheextentpracticable,competitivedistrictsshouldbefavoredwheretodo sowouldcreatenosignificantdetrimenttotheothergoals.TheSuperiorCourtinArizona recentlyupheldachallengetothestates2002linesonthegroundsthattheydidnotliveup tothecompetitivenessstandardenumeratedintheirguidelines.Competitivenessisoften seenasbeingtothebenefitoftheminoritystatewidepoliticalpartyascreatingmore competitivedistrictswouldmakeincumbentsmorevulnerableandincreasetheprobability thataminoritypartymemberwouldwinelection. ItshouldbenotedthatCitizensUniondoesnotsupportexplicitlyrequiringacompetition criterioninanewredistrictingmodel,butratherthatcompetitionshouldnotbe discouraged,ashasoccurredunderthecurrentredistrictingprocess.Thisiswhywesupport thatacriterionthatwouldstatethatdistrictsshouldnotbecreatedtodiscourage
NewYorkStateConstitutionArticleIII,Section4,Notown,exceptatownhavingmorethanaratioof apportionmentandonehalfover,andnoblockinacityenclosedbystreetsorpublicways,shallbedividedinthe formationofassemblydistricts,norshallanydistrictscontainagreaterexcessinpopulationoveranadjoiningdistrict inthesamesenatedistrict,thanthepopulationofatownorblockthereinadjoiningsuchassemblydistrict.Townsor blockswhich,fromtheirlocationmaybeincludedineitheroftwodistricts,shallbesoplacedastomakesaiddistricts mostnearlyequalinnumberofinhabitants 135 NewYorkCityCharter,Chapter2A,52.
134
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competition,orforthepurposeoffavoringoropposinganyparty,incumbentorcandidate foroffice. MidDecadeRedistricting:Growingoutofamiddecadecongressionalreapportionmentthat tookplacein2003inTexasthatredrewthestates32congressionaldistricts,somestatesare makingeffortstoeitherencourageorpreventsimilarmaneuveringsbetweenthe10year redistrictingcyclesthatoccurimmediatelyfollowingthereleaseofU.S.CensusData.
3. PublicInvolvement/AccesstoInformation Fosteringpublicinvolvementinthepoliticalprocessisvitaltoawellfunctioningdemocracy. Becausethedrawingofdistrictlinesisconductedbyasmallfew,allowingtheindividualsitaffects tohaveachancetoreviewtheproposalsandthedatathatinformstheprocessisessentialto garnerpublicsupportandensureafairerprocess.Providingforpublichearingsandcomment periods,providingaccesstosoftware,dataandothertechnicalinformationarekeyaspectsofthis component. PublicHearings BeforethelastsetsoflinesweredraftedinNewYorkStatein2002,LATFORheldelevenpublic hearingsandanadditionaleightwereheldaftertheplansweredraftedbutbeforetheywere submittedtothelegislatureforapproval.Transcriptsofthesehearingsweremadeavailableon theTaskForcewebsite136andtheTaskForcealsomaintainedalogofthetestimonyof participants,whichispartoftherecordthatwassubmittedtotheDepartmentofJustice.The submissionsarepublicrecordandaremadeavailableforinspection,asrequiredbythe DepartmentofJusticerules,whentheStatesubmitsthelegislationforpreclearanceunder Section5oftheVotingRightsAct.CopiesofthesubmissionsarealsomadeavailabletotheTask Forcemembersastheyarereceived. PublichearingsareunderwayinNewYorkforthe2012redistrictingcycle,andwillbeheldina totaloffourteenlocationsbyNovember2nd.Thesehearingsarebeingheldpriortothereleaseof draftredistrictingplans,totogatherpublicinputregardingcongressionalandstatelegislative districtsfollowingtheCensusof2010.137Transcriptsandvideoofhearingshavebeenmade availableontheLATFORwebsite.LATFORmembershavestatedatthehearingsthattheyplanto holdhearingthroughoutthestateafterplanshavebeendraftedtoelicitspecificcommentsonthe maps. SomeofthereformproposalsinNewYorkrequirethathearingsbeheldthroughoutthestate, whichisnotcurrentlyrequiredunderstatelaw.TheGianaris/Jeffries,ValeskyandCuomo legislationwouldrequirehearingsindesignatedlocationsthroughoutthestate,andtheCuomo legislationfurtherstipulatesthathearingsaretobewebcast,ifpracticable.
NewYorkStateTaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment.July2007 http://www.latfor.state.ny.us 137 NewYorkStateTaskForceonDemographicResearchandReapportionment.NoticeofPublicHearing.June2011. Availableat:http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/hearings/20110627/
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AccesstoInformation Currently,theTaskForceholdshearings,acceptspublicsubmissionsofplans,andmakesdataand mapsavailableinelectronicandprintformats.TheTaskForcelaunchedthewebsite www.latfor.state.ny.usin2001toimproveoutreachandcommunicationwiththepublic.As previouslymentioned,transcriptsandvideoofhearingsareavailableonthewebsite,aswellas mapsforthe1992and2002redistrictingcyclesand2010censusdata.138 TheBrookingsInstitutioninJulyof2010releasedasetofprinciplesfortransparencyandpublic participationinredistricting,believingthatincreasingtransparencycanempowerthepublicto shapetherepresentationoftheircommunities,promotepubliccommentaryandeducatethe publicabouttheelectoralprocess.139Regardingtheirspecificprinciples,theybelievethat redistrictingplansshouldbeavailableinnonproprietaryformatsandthatthedataandsoftware necessarytocreateredistrictingplansanddefinecommunityboundariesbepubliclyavailable online.Otherrecommendationsforgreatertransparencyincluderequiringpublicmapsbemade availableontheredistrictingbodyswebsite,andthatthecommissionconsiderpublicmapsinthe drawingofdistrictlines. 4. TheApprovalProcess Whileguidelinesforredistrictingareoftenenumeratedinstatelaworinstatesconstitutions, thosewiththepowertodrawthelinesoftenmanipulatetheprocesstoprotectincumbentsor maximizeoneparty'sadvantageatthepolls.Afterlinesaredrawn,theytypicallyeitherare approvedbythelegislatureorthecommissionthatisalsochargedwithdevelopingthelines,and inmanycasesifnoplanisapproved,thecourtsareauthorizedtogetinvolved.Assuch,thefinal approvalofacommissionsredistrictingplanisanextremelycrucialstepinhowtheredistricting processiscarriedoutandisvitaltothefinalproduct. ApprovalAuthorityandDisputeResolution Theapprovalauthorityforredistrictingplansdiffersamongstates.CurrentlyinNewYorkState, redistrictingplansfromtheLegislativeTaskForceonReapportionmentandDemographicResearch aresubmittedasbillsandcanbeamendedandalteredbeforeavotebybothhousesofthe legislatureandsubmissiontotheGovernorforfinalapproval.Theplanmustthenbesubmittedto theU.S.DepartmentofJusticeforapprovalunderSection5oftheVotingRightsAct. InArizona,theindependentredistrictingcommissionhasresponsibilityfordrawingandapproving districtlines.Whilethelegislaturedoesnothaveasayinthefinalapproval,thelineshavetobe certifiedbytheSecretaryoftheState.TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticemustalsoapprovetheplan. Shouldtheydisapprovetheplan,theCommissionhastoredesignthemapuntilfinalapproval.
138 139
SeetheLATFORwebsiteat:http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/ TheBrookingsInstitution.PrinciplesforTransparencyandPublicParticipationinRedistricting.July12,2010. Availableat:http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0617_redistricting_statement.aspx
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InIowa,whilethenonpartisanLegislativeServicesBureauischargedwithdrawingstateand congressionaldistrictboundaries,thelegislaturehasthefinalresponsibilityforenactingboth congressionalandstatelegislativedistrictplans.TheBureaumustdevelopuptothreeplansthat canbeacceptedorrejectedbythelegislaturebyamajorityvote.Ifthelegislaturedoesnot approvethefirstthreeplansbytheBureau,itmustitselfapproveaplanbySeptember1st,orthe stateSupremeCourtwilltakeresponsibilityforthestatedistrictsandmustadoptavalid redistrictingplanwithin90days.TheGovernorhasvetopoweroverplans,regardlessofhowthey aredeveloped. NewJerseyismuchlikeArizonawhereneitherthelegislaturenorthegovernorhasanyvetoor amendingauthorityandtheapprovalisleftuptothecommission.However,ifthecommission doesnotdevelopaplanintheallottedtime,thestateSupremeCourtappointsanothermember tothecommission,andthecommissionwillthenattempttoreachadecision.Ifthecommission stillcannotreachadecision,thebodywillvoteontheirproposedplansandsubmitthetwoplans withthemostvotestotheStateSupremeCourt,whichwillchooseoneofthoseplans. Lastly,itshouldbenotedthatthepubliccan,andoftendoes,filelawsuitschallengingdistrictlines. Insuchacase,implementationisdelayeduntilthelegalchallengesareexhaustedandthecourts haveissuedaruling.
B.
CITIZENSUNIONSRECOMMENDATIONSFORANINDEPENDENT REDISTRICTINGPROCESS
ANewandImpartialApproach
GiventhestatelegislaturesauthorityundertheStateConstitutiontoapprovedistrictlines,the onlywaytoestablishanabsolutelyindependentredistrictingprocessisthroughaconstitutional amendment.Whilewestillsupportandpreferaconstitutionalamendment,itistoolatefora constitutionalamendmenttotakeeffectbeforethe2012elections.Forthisredistrictingcycle, CitizensUnionhassupportedlegislationtocreateanindependentprocessthroughstatute. Withlittletimeremainingtoproposeandfinalizelinesfor2012,CitizensUnioncallsonthe Governor,theStateSenate,andtheStateAssemblytoresolvetheimpasseonredistrictingand adoptatwostagedapproachinachievingredistrictingreform.Thefirststagewouldinvolve enactinglegislationthatcreatesalessthanidealreformapproachfor2012,butonethatis consistentwiththeprinciplesofcurrentreformproposalsputforwardbyGovernorCuomo, SenatorsGianarisandValesky,andAssemblymemberJeffries.Anindependentpanel,appointed directlyandequallybythefourlegislativeleadersbutonwhichnolegislatorwouldserve,would inherittheworkdonetodatebyLATFORandbeguidedbyestablishedandagreeduponcriteria. Thecriteriawouldnotbeasstrongasoriginallyproposed,butsufficientlyclearsoasnotto continuetheriggedpracticeofpoliticalmanipulationinthedrawingoflinesforpartisangain.This processandpanelwouldstillrecommendmapstothelegislature,whichwouldhavethefinalsay.
Inacceptingthislessthanidealapproach,CitizensUnionwouldinsistonitbeingcoupledwitha secondstage.Thisyearsreformlightlegislativeapproachmustbetiedtofirstpassageofa muchstrongerconstitutionalamendmentthatwouldbringwholesalechangetotheredistricting processandcreateanewimpartialandindependentprocessonepromisedtothevotersinthe campaignof2010. Werecognizethatstatutealonecannottaketheprocessentirelyoutofthehandsofthe legislature.Ourlongstandingproposal,therefore,isintendedtocreateadegreeofindependence by:establishinganindependentcommissionwithacertaindegreeoflegislativeinput;givingthe commissionclearstandardstofollow;andrequiringthelegislaturetoactonitsplans,while recognizingthattheultimatedecisionstillremainswiththelegislature,whichcanrejectthe independentcommissionsrecommendationsifitsochooses.Aspreviouslymentioned,however, theGovernorhaspledgedtovetoanyredistrictingplanthatisnotindependent,sothereisgreater onusonthelegislaturetoacceptaplanthatisdrawnindependently. Withthegoalofestablishingafairsolutionthatwillputanendtopartisanmaneuveringand ensurethatthepublicinterestisservedintheredistrictingprocess,CitizensUnionprovidesthe followingrecommendationsandframeworkforcreatinganindependentcommissionviastatuteor constitutionalamendment.Ouridealsolutionisprovidedbelow,andwhilewerecognizethat thereisnotcurrentlytimeforafullindependentprocesstounfoldforthiscycle,particularlywith regardstoforminganindependentcommissionthroughanominatingpool,weprovidethe frameworkbelowforanidealstatutorysolutionorconstitutionalamendmentcreatingan independentcommission.Thisproposalwouldbetruncatedforastatutorysolutionfor2012, consistentwiththegoalsofcreatingamoreindependentandfairprocess. 1. CreatingaNominationsCommitteetoSelectPotentialCommissionMembers WhileCitizensUnionwouldpreferthatanindependentcommissionbegivenfullauthorityover theredistrictingprocesswithoutsignoffbythelegislature,wesupportavenuestoallow legislativeinputandforthelegislaturetomakeappointmentstothecommission.Wealso recognizethatthelegislatureisunlikelytopasslegislationamendingtheconstitutiontofully removeitsroleintheprocess. CitizensUnionbelievesanominationscommitteeshouldbeformedtoselectapoolofcandidates forappointmenttotheredistrictingcommission.Inordertoadvanceneededreformbefore2012 viastatute,however,thereisnolongertimeforanominationscommitteetobeformed.Thetwo stepprocessofanominationscommitteeinaconstitutionalamendmentwouldbeusedtoprovide adegreeofseparationfromtheelectedofficialswhosedistrictlineswillbedrawnbythe commission.Wealsosupportprohibitionsonmembershiponthecommissionandrequiring consultationwithorganizationsdevotedtoprotectingthevotingrightsofminoritiesandother votersinordertoremovepotentialconflictsandensurediversity. Legislativerepresentationshouldbebalancedwithstatewiderepresentationthrough appointmentsbythegovernor,attorneygeneral,comptrollerandchiefjudge,forexample,to enhanceindependenceandprovideforbroaderperspectiveofthenominatingcommission.
Thenominationscommitteewouldbecomposedofeightmembers,withthefollowingindividuals appointingmembersofthecommission: thegovernor4members,2fromeachmajorparty; thetemporarypresidentofthesenate2members; thespeakeroftheassembly2members; theminorityleaderofthesenate2members;and theminorityleaderoftheassembly2members. Nomemberoftheappointednominationscommitteeshall: holdorhaveheldwithinthepreviousfouryearsanelectedgovernmentofficeorany otherpartisanappointedgovernmentalorpoliticalpartyposition; beemployedorhavebeenemployedwithinthepreviousfouryearsinanyotherposition bytheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,ortheExecutiveChamber; beorhavebeenwithinthepreviousfouryearsaregisteredlobbyistinNewYork; beaspouseoforrelatedtoanymemberoftheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,orthe ExecutiveChamber;or holdorhaveheldapositionwithinthepreviousfouryearsasaseniorcampaignstaffer forcandidatesrunningforofficeinNewYorkStateforstateorfederaloffice,orfor politicalcommitteesoperatinginNewYorkState. 2. SelectingaNominationPool Thenominationscommitteewouldthenselectapoolofnominees,ornominationspool,which wouldrepresentthediversityofthestatewithregardtorace,ethnicity,andgender;would includepersonsfromeachregionofthestate(LongIsland,NewYorkCity,HudsonValley, Northern,Central,SouthernTier,andWestern);andwouldincludeatotalof40persons: 15enrolledDemocrats, 15enrolledRepublicans,and 10personsnotenrolledineitherparty Nomemberofthenominationspoolshall: holdorhaveheldwithinthepreviousfouryearsanelectedgovernmentofficeorany otherpartisanappointedgovernmentalorpoliticalpartyposition; beemployedorhavebeenemployedwithinthepreviousfouryearsinanyotherposition bytheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,ortheExecutiveChamber; beorhavebeenwithinthepreviousfouryearsaregisteredlobbyistinNY; beaspouseoforrelatedtoanymemberoftheUSCongress,theStateLegislature,orthe ExecutiveChamber;or holdorhaveheldapositionwithinthepreviousfouryearsasaseniorcampaignstaffer forcandidatesrunningforofficeinNewYorkStateforstateorfederaloffice,orfor politicalcommitteesoperatinginNewYorkState.
3. FormingtheIndependentCitizensRedistrictingCommission Theredistrictingcommissionwouldconsistofatotalof11membersselectedfromthe nominationspool.Inastatutoryapproachfor2012,however,thereisnolongertimefora nominationscommitteetoformandselectcandidates,soadifferentapproachwillbeneededto formasindependentcommissionasispossibleinthetimeallowed.Eightoftheseselected memberswouldbeappointedfromthenominationspoolbyeachofthelegislativeleadersas follows: 2membersbythetemporarypresidentofthesenate; 2membersbythespeakeroftheassembly; 2membersbytheminorityleaderofthesenate;and 2membersbytheminorityleaderoftheassembly. These8memberswouldthenappoint3additionalmembersfromthenominationspool,1of whomwouldserveaschairofthecommission,foratotalof11members. CitizensUnionbelievesthatthestructureasoutlinedabovewouldbeasignificantimprovement fromthestatusquoinwhichtheminorpartiesineachhousearemarginalizedbyhavingfewer appointmentstotheredistrictingbody.Furtherconsideration,however,shouldbegiventothe presenceofgubernatorialappointmentsontheredistrictingcommissiontoprovideastatewide perspectiveandgreaterindependence.Werecognizethattheremaybelegislativeresistanceto suchappointments;however,giventhefulllegislaturesultimateapprovaloftheredistricting plansandabilitytoamendafinalplanunderthisproposal,thisresistancedoesnothaveasound basis.Intheabsenceofanominationspool,whichprovidesalayerofseparationbetweenthe legislatureanditsappointments,CitizensUnionbelievesgubernatorialappointmentswouldbean essentialadditiontothosethatwouldbemadedirectlybythelegislativeleaders. Nomorethan4membersoftheredistrictingcommissionwouldbeenrolledinthesamepolitical party,andmemberswouldbeselectedtorepresentthediversityofthestatetotheextent practicable.Asthememberswouldbeselectedfromthenominationspool,theywouldbe composedofregisteredvotersoftheStateofNewYorkwhodonothold,orhavenotheld,an electiveoffice,apartypositionoranappointmenttoapartisanposition;havenotbeenemployed asalobbyistwithinfouryearsofselectiontotheredistrictingcommission;arenotthespouseor relativeofanelectedofficialinthestatelegislativeorstateexecutivebranchortheU.S.Congress; andhavenotheldaseniorpositioninacampaignforastateorfederaloffice,orforpolitical committeesoperatinginNewYorkStateforthepreviousfouryears.
4. EstablishingFairCriteriafortheDrawingofLines Justasimportantaswhoholdsthepenindrawingdistrictlinesaretherulesthatmustbefollowed intheformationofdistricts.Thecurrentmapsofdistrictlinesaredrawnforpartisangoalsrather thanintheinterestsofthevotingpublic,andoftensplitcommunitiesandresultinvoter confusion.
CitizensUnionspecificallyrecommendsthatfourmainrequirementsbefollowedinthedrawingof lines,consistentwiththerequirementsoffederallaw,includingthefederalVotingRightsActof 1965(totheextentthattheyareappliedviastatute,consistentwiththeStateConstitution): (a) allcongressionaldistrictsshallbeasnearlyequalinpopulationasispracticable; (b) eachdistrictshallconsistofcontiguousterritory;nodistrictshallconsistofpartsentirely separatedbytheterritoryofanotherdistrictofthesamebody,whethersuchterritorybe landorwater,populatedorunpopulated.Apopulatedcensusblockshallnotbedividedby adistrictboundary,unlessitcanbedeterminedthatthepopulatedpartofsuchblockis withinasingledistrict; (c) senate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictsshallnotbeestablishedthatareintendedtoor resultinadenialorabridgementofminorityvotingrightsincludingtheopportunityof minorityvoterstoparticipateinthepoliticalprocessandtoelectthecandidatesoftheir choice,includingbutnotlimitedtoinstancesinwhichminoritypopulationsdonot compriseamajorityofthedistrict;and (d) senate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictsshallnotbedrawnwithanintenttofavoror opposeanypoliticalparty,anyincumbentfederalorstatelegislator,oranypreviousor presumedcandidateforoffice. Inadditiontotherequiredprinciples(a),(b),(c)and(d)above,thefollowingprioritizedprinciples wouldbeusedinthecreationofsenate,assembly,andcongressionaldistrictstotheextent practicable. (i) themostandleastpopuloussenatedistrictsshallnotexceedorbelowerthanthe meanpopulationofallsenatedistrictsbymorethanonepercent,andthemostand leastpopulousassemblydistrictsshallnotexceedorbelowerthanthemean populationofallassemblydistrictsbymorethanonepercent.Innoeventshallthe commissionadvantageanyregionofthestateoveranyotherbycreatingmultiple districtsthereinexceedingorlowerthanthemeanpopulationbymorethanone percent. (ii) asenate,assembly,orcongressionaldistrictshallunitecommunitiesdefinedbyactual sharedinterests,takingaccountofgeographic,social,economic,andotherfactorsthat indicatecommonalityofinterest,anddistrictsshallbeformedsoastopromotethe orderlyandefficientadministrationofelections. (iii) countiesshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts,excepttocreatedistricts whollywithinacounty.Wheresuchdivisionofcountiesisunavoidable,morepopulous countiesshallbedividedinpreferencetothedivisionoflesspopulouscounties.Tothe extentpracticable,ifanyassemblydistrictoranysenatedistrictincludestheterritory oftwocounties,thennootherassemblydistrictorsenatedistrictshallincludeterritory ofbothofthesametwocounties. (iv) countysubdivisionsshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts,excepttocreate districtswhollywithinacountysubdivision.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,acounty subdivisionshallbeacity,exceptthecityofNewYork,atown,oranIndianreservation whoseterritoryisexclusiveoftheterritoryofanycityortown.Countysubdivisions
withlargerpopulationsshallbedividedinpreferencetothedivisionofthosewith smallerpopulations. (v) incorporatedvillagesshallnotbedividedintheformationofdistricts. (vi) thesenate,assembly,andcongressionaldistrictsshallbeascompactinformas possible. Inpresentingitsplantothelegislatureandthepublic,thelegislatureshouldberequiredtosubmit astandardizedscorecardindicatingcompliancewiththecriteriaandrequirements,presentingthe plansscoreoneachoftheaforementionedprinciples. 5. CreatinganOpenandTransparentProcess Thecommissionshouldsubmitthefirstplantothelegislatureafterholdingrequiredpublichearings throughoutthestateinthefollowinglocations:Albany,Buffalo,Syracuse,Rochester,GlenCove, WhitePlains,andBronx,Kings,NewYork,QueensandRichmondCounties.Totheextent practicable,meetingsshouldbewebcast. Regardingthematerialsusedforredistricting,thecommissionshouldmakeavailabletothepublic inprintformandinelectronicformontheinternet,usingthebestavailabletechnology,all redistrictingplans,relevantdataandwebbasedmapmakingsoftwareusedtopreparesuchplans, informationonthemembersoftheredistrictingcommissionandallotherrelevantinformation. Thecommissionshouldberequiredtopostplanssubmittedbythepubliconitswebsiteand considerpublicplansintheformulationofitsplans. 6. EncouragingApprovaloftheIndependentPlan
CitizensUnionrecommendsthatthelegislaturehavetheopportunitytoprovidefeedbackonupto twoplanssubmittedbythecommission,andcanonlyamendathirdplanwithamendmentsthat meetthestatutoryguidelinesestablished.Inaddition,thelegislatureshouldbeconstrainedfrom makingamendmentsthataffectmorethan2percentofthepopulationofanydistrict.Ina statutoryscheme,theabilitytocommentandamendtheplanisconsistentwiththestate legislaturesauthorityundertheStateConstitutiontoultimatelyapprovearedistrictingplan. Ideallyinaconstitutionalamendment,theindependentcommissionsplanwouldnotrequire legislativeapproval,butCitizensUnionrecognizesthatthestatelegislatureisunlikelytoapprove legislationremovingtheirroleintheapprovalprocess.Theprocesswouldworkasfollows: Thefirstplanwouldrequireavoteofthelegislaturewithoutamendments.Iftheproposal isrejected,thecommissionwouldsubmitanamendedproposalafterhearingthereasons givenbythelegislatureregardingthefirstplansrejectionatapublichearing. Thesecondplan,again,wouldbevoteduponbythelegislaturewithoutamendments.If thesecondproposalisalsorejected,thecommissionwouldsubmitathirdplanfollowinga secondpublichearingatwhichthelegislaturewouldtestify.
Thethirdplanwouldbesubjecttothenormalamendmentprocesswithintheestablished statutoryguidelinesforredistricting,giventhelegislaturesultimateauthorityover redistrictingundertheStateConstitution.
TheCourtofAppealsshouldbegivenoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverchallengestothe redistrictingplantopreventforumshoppingandtoallowfortheexpeditedreviewofsuitsfrom membersofthepublic.
C.
RECOMMENDATIONSFOR2012REDISTRICTINGPLANS
Regardlessofwhatentitywilldrawdistrictlinesforthe2012elections,CitizensUnionhasa numberofrecommendationsregardinghowthemapsshouldbedrawn.Throughourresearchof thecurrentprocess,wehaveidentifiedinstancesinwhichcommunitieshavebeensplitapartand certaingroupshavebeenmarginalizedinordertoprotectincumbents.Themapsthatwillbe drawnwillhaveaprofoundimpactoncommunitiesthroughoutthestate,andwebelievethatthe statemusttakeactiontoallowforfairrepresentationforallNewYorkers.CitizensUnions recommendationsforthelinesdrawnin2012arelistedbelow. 1. GivingGreaterOpportunityforMinoritiestoElectCandidatesofTheirChoice Thediversityofthestateisnotreflectedinourelectedrepresentation,asdiscussedinSection5b ofthisreport.TakingintoconsiderationgrowingminoritypopulationsinNewYork,particularlyin NewYorkCityandLongIsland,werecommendthefollowing: NewYorkCity AsianAmericansshouldbegivengreateropportunitiestoelectcandidatesoftheir choiceintheCityofNewYorkthroughthecreationofoneormoremajority minoritydistrictsineachhouse.TheboroughofQueenshasonlyoneAsian AmericanstatelegislatorintheAssembly,andAsianAmericanshaveno representationintheSenate.ItshouldalsobenotedthatAsianAmericansarea diversecommunity,andthatSouthAsianscommunitiesarealsogrowinginNew YorkCity. Flushing,Queens;Elmhurst,Queens;SunsetPark,Brooklyn;andDyker Heights,BrooklynareareasforpossibledistrictsgivengrowingAsian Americanpopulations. Latinosshouldbegivengreateropportunitiestoelectcandidatesoftheirchoicein theCityofNewYorkthroughthecreationofoneormoremajorityminority districtsineachhouse.Latinosholdonly19seatsinthestatelegislature(9 percent),whilehaving17.6ofthestatespopulation. WashingtonHeightsandInwood,Manhattan;aswellasJacksonHeights, QueensareareasforpossibledistrictsgivengrowingLatinopopulations. LongIsland Growing BlackandLatino communitiesinLongIslandshouldbe given greater opportunitiestoelectcandidatesoftheirchoice,particularlyintheStateSenate,
andconsiderationshouldbegiventothecreationofopportunitytoelectdistricts wherethesecommunitiesdonotcompriseamajorityofthedistrict. ThetownofHempsteadinNassauCountyandthetownsofIslipand BabyloninSuffolkCountyareareasforpossibledistricts,givengrowing minoritypopulations. 2. EnsuringthatUpstateNewYorksCitiesAreNotCarvedUp UpstateNewYorksurbanareashavebeendividedupforpartisanadvantageinbothhousesof thelegislature.Considerationshouldbegiventorespectingtheexistingpoliticalboundariesof citiessothattheseurbancommunitiescanremainwholeandhavemoreunifiedrepresentationin thestatelegislature.TheseincludebutarenotlimitedtothecitiesofBuffalo,Rochester,Albany, Syracuse,SchenectadyandUtica.NewYorkscitiesshouldberepresentedbyasfewdistrictsas dictatedbythepopulation,totheextentthatitprotectstheunifiedvoiceofthesecommunities.
D.
MAKINGREFORMAREALITY
NewYorkStateisinneedoffundamentalchangetothewayinwhichlegislativedistrictlinesare drawn.Decadesofgerrymanderinghaveresultedinapolarizedanddysfunctionalstatelegislature thatisunabletomeettheneedsofthepublic,andthatshieldsitselffromcompetitionand thereforefromaccountability.Nowisthetimetoendtheselfinteresteddrawingofdistrictlines bylegislators,andtocreateanindependentcommissionaswellasclearandconsistentrulesfor thedrawingoflines. i. TheFutureofRedistricting Thelegislaturemustreturninaspeciallegislativesessiontorespondtotheincreasingpublic pressuretocreateamoreindependentsystemofredistricting.Inspiteofoneofthemost successfullegislativesessionsinrecentmemory,thelegislaturefailedtopassredistrictingreform legislationsomethingthat184ofthe212membersofthelegislaturesupportedbycosponsoring legislationorpledgingtheirsupportduringthe2010campaignseason,throughtheeffortsof CitizensUnionandotherreformgroupsasdescribedbelow.Shouldthelegislaturefailtoact beforethelinesaredrawnfor2012,theyfaceavetobyGovernorAndrewCuomowhohas repeatedlypledgedthathewillvetolinesthatarenotindependentorthatarepartisan,andhas voicedhisbeliefthatthecurrentbodyresponsiblefordrawinglinestheLegislativeTaskForcefor DemographicResearchandReapportionment(LATFOR)cannotactinanonpartisanmanner.If LATFORcontinuesonitscourseofdrawinglinesandthelegislaturefailstohandoveritsworkto anindependentcommission,thelineswillbevetoedandthelegislaturewillnothavesufficient numberstooverrideaveto.Thecourtswillthendecidetheredistrictingplans,possiblyappointing aspecialmastertodrawnewplans. NewYorkersdeservedistrictsthatadequatelyrepresentthem,andlegislatorswhoareresponsive totheirneeds.Underthecurrentsystemofredistricting,incumbentsfacelittleoppositionatthe polls,andthusoftendonotneedtokeeptheconcernsoftheirconstituentsinmindwhenmaking
importantpolicydecisions.Fortunately,legislatorshaverespondedtothemountingpublic pressureforreform,andmanyhavemadepubliccommitmentstocreateanindependent redistrictingprocess. ii. CommonGroundforReform Whilethelegislaturehasyettocometoconsensusaroundthedetailsofredistrictingreform,there isbroadagreementontheprinciplesofchangeasseeninredistrictingreformbillssponsoredin thelegislaturethatduringthe2011legislativesession.Themajorredistrictingreformproposals are: S.3419/A.5388(Cuomo/Silver) S.2543/A.3432(Gianaris/Jeffries) S.3331/A.5271(Bonacic/GalefpassedtheSenateonMarch14,2011withavoteof35to 24,with3Senatorsabsentorexcused) S.660/A.5602(Valesky/Cahill) Allofthesebillspossessthefollowingcoreprinciples: 1) Legislatorsshouldnotdrawdistrictboundaries.Allfourproposalsrecognizetheconflict ofinterestthatoccurswhenlegislatorsdrawdistrictsfortheveryofficestheywillrun againfor.Allfourproposalsputthedistrictdrawingpeninthehandsofnonlegislators. 2) Thosewithpoliticalinfluenceshouldbedisqualifiedfrombeingmembersofthe independentredistrictingcommission.Allfourproposalshaveprohibitionsthatare aimedtopreventpoliticalinsiderstoocloselyaffiliatedwithlegislatorsandtherefore, alsohaveaconflictofinterest,fromdrawingmaps. 3) Majorityandminoritypartiesinbothhousesofthelegislatureshouldbeequally representedontheindependentcommission.Thebillsallreflecttheconclusionthat majorityandminoritypartieshaveanequalstakeinafairredistrictingprocessand shouldthereforehaveequalrepresentationonanycommissionthatdrawsthelines.This willpreventmajorityparties,whethertheyareDemocratsorRepublicans,fromusing redistrictingasapoliticalcudgelagainsttheirminoritycolleaguesinthelegislature. 4) LessIncumbentProtection.Allproposalsseektopreventelectionswithpreordained outcomesbyprohibitinglinesdrawntofavorordisfavorparticularincumbents, challengers,orparties. 5) Oneperson/OneVote,TheVotingRightsAct,Contiguity,andCompactnessareall criteriaincommonfordrawingdistrictboundaries.Allproposals,inaccordancewith federallaw,identifyOneperson/OneVoteandtheVotingRightsActasbeingcriteria thatmustbefollowedinmakingmaps.Allproposalsalsoincludecontiguityand compactnessasgoalsindrawingdistrictboundaries.
iii.
HistoricSupportforReform
Thefutureofredistrictingreformisinthehandsofthestatelegislature,whomustapprove legislationtocreateamoreindependentprocess,andthegovernor,whowouldsignthe legislationintolawandhasthebullypulpittopushthelegislature.Thereisunprecedentedand historicsupportforcreatinganindependentcommissiontodrawdistrictlines,withthemajorityof legislatorsinbothhousessupportingsuchachange. CitizensUnionhasplayedacrucialroleinsecuringthesupportoflegislatorsforredistricting reform.Aspartofitscandidateevaluationprocess,CitizensUnionhasforthelastseveralelection cyclesaskedcandidatestheirpositiononestablishinganindependentredistrictingcommissionin itscandidatequestionnaire.Fortheelectionin2010,candidatespositionsonthisissuewerea keycriterioninCitizensUnionssupportforcandidates.CitizensUnionalsoin2010asked candidatestheirpositionsonestablishingstricterrulesforthedrawingoflines,suchas requirementamaximumofa1percentdeviationinthesizeofdistricts. Legislatorsalsosignedpledgesduringthe2010campaignseasonfromNYUprising,aPACformed byformerNewYorkCityMayorEdKochthataimedtogetlegislatorsontherecordforreformin Albany.WhilenotanofficialmemberofNYUprising,CitizensUnionhasservedinanadvisoryrole, providingpolicyguidanceandstrategicsupporttothegroup.Pledgesweresecuredfrom53ofthe 62membersintheSenateinsupportofthecreationofanindependentcommission.IntheState Assembly,84ofthe150membersmadesuchapledge. OncethelegislatureconvenedinJanuary2011,manylegislatorssignedontolegislationthat wouldcreateanindependentredistrictingcommission,eitherGovernorCuomosredistricting reformbill,A.5388,intheAssembly(nosponsorscansignonintheSenateduetoitspreviously mentionedintroductionintotheRulesCommittee),ortheGianaris/Jeffrieslegislation, S.2543/A.3432.CitizensUnionthroughitsReShapeNYcampaignsoughttoholdlegislators accountablefortheircampaignpledges,releasingtalliesoflegislatorsupporttothepress, providinganupdatedlistingoflegislatorssupportontheReShapeNYwebsite,reshapeny.org,and coordinatingandsharinginformationwithcoalitionmembers.Throughtheseefforts,184ofthe 212membersoftheStateLegislaturehaveeithercosponsoredorhavepledgedtosupportthe creationofanindependentredistrictingcommission. RegardingGovernorCuomosprogrambillandotherreformlegislation,supportisstronginthe Assembly.Amajorityofassemblymembersduringthelegislativesession97intotalsupported GovernorCuomosredistrictingreformbillascosponsors.Thesupportisalsobipartisan:a majorityofDemocrats(62of99)andamajorityofRepublicans(32of51)intheAssemblysupport ascosponsorsGovernorCuomoslegislationtocreateanindependentredistrictingcommission. ThelegislationwouldfirstbedebatedintheGovernmentalOperationsCommittee,where8of11 committeemembersarecosponsorsofthelegislation.WhencombiningsupportforGovernor CuomoslegislationandAssemblymemberJeffriesbill,105assemblymembershavecosponsored legislationtocreateanindependentredistrictingcommission.Thetablesonthenextpageshow thebreakdowninsupportintheAssembly,andAppendix2showsafulllistoflegislatorspublic pledgesandcosponsorshipofredistrictingreformlegislation.
Table18:AssemblyCoSponsorsofIndependentRedistrictingLegislation
ASSEMBLY SupportforIndependentRedistrictingLegislation During2011LegislativeSession:CoSponsors Cuomo/Silver Support JeffriesLegislation(A.3432) Legislation(A.5388) TotalSponsorsSignedOn 97 79 ConferenceSupport Democrats 64 51 Republicans 32 27 Independents 1 1 Total 97 79
Table19:AssemblyOverlappingSupportforLegislationCreatingIndependentCommission
ASSEMBLY ConferenceSupportforIndependentRedistrictingLegislation During2011LegislativeSession SupportforLegislation Dem Rep Ind SponsorsOnlyCuomo/Silver 15 11 0 Legislation(A.5388) SponsorsOnlyJeffries 2 6 0 Legislation(A.3432) SponsorsBothCuomo/Silver 49 21 1 andJeffriesLegislation ConferenceTotal 66 38 1 TotalAssemblySupport 105
IntheSenate,similarlegislationhasbeenintroducedbySenatorsMichaelGianarisandDavid Valesky,thoughaspreviouslynoted,GovernorCuomosreformlegislationisnotabletohaveco sponsors.OnthenextpagearetablesshowingsupportintheSenateforthereformbills.
Table20:SenateCoSponsorsofIndependentRedistrictingLegislation
SENATE SupportforIndependentRedistrictingLegislation: CoSponsorsDuring2011LegislativeSession GianarisLegislation Support ValeskyLegislation(S.660) (S.2543) TotalSponsorsSignedOn 22 16 ConferenceSupport Democrats 22 15 Republicans 0 1 Total 22 16
Table21:AssemblyOverlappingSupportforLegislationCreatingIndependentCommission
SENATE ConferenceSupportforIndependentRedistrictingLegislation During2011LegislativeSession SupportforLegislation Dem Rep SponsorsOnlyGianaris 11 0 Legislation(S.2543) SponsorsOnlyValesky 4 1 Legislation(S.660) SponsorsBothGianarisand 11 0 ValeskyLegislation ConferenceTotal 26 1 TotalSenateSupport 27
Inadditiontotheunprecedentedleveloflegislativesupport,publicopinionpollsshowthehighest everpublicsupportforindependentredistricting:77percentofvoterssupportanindependent commissiontodrawdistrictlines,asnotedpreviously.ThevotersalsoagreethatGovernor Cuomoshouldvetolinesthatarentdrawnbyanindependentcommission.140 AtLATFORspublichearingsheldthroughoutthestatethissummerandfall,thepubliccontinually testifiedinsupportofindependentredistricting.Othersfavoredtheuseofsensiblecriteriafor drawinglines,suchasnotsplittingcommunitiesandconformingtoexistingpoliticalboundaries suchascities.Bothindependentredistrictinganddefinedandobjectivecriteriaarefundamental elementsofthemajorredistrictingproposalssupportedbythelegislature.Thepublichasspoken loudandclearinfavorofreform,andwillcontinuetospeakinfavorofanindependent
QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,StormSurgeTakesCuomoApprovalToAllTimeHigh,QuinnipiacUniversity PollFinds;VotersWantGovToSpeakUpOnRedistricting.
140
commissiontodrawstatelegislativeandcongressionaldistrictboundariesaccordingtofairand objectivecriteriawhileallowingforrobustpublicinputintotheprocess. Pressurehasalsobeenmountinginthemedia,withaneweditorialnearlyeveryweekthis summerfromnewsoutletsthroughoutthestateaskingforanindependentprocesstobeputin placethisyearasLATFORcontinuesitsroadshowofpublichearings. LegislatorsmusthonortheirwordandkeeptheircommitmentsbyreturningtoAlbanyinaspecial legislativesessiontofinallyendpartisangerrymanderingandenactredistrictingreform.New Yorkershavealreadywaitedformanydecadesforredistrictingreform.Theyandwerefuseto acceptpostponingreformforyetanothertenyears.

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RESHAPINGNEWYORK:

QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,KeepRace,JobProtectionOutOfRedistricting,NewYorkState VotersTellQuinnipiacUniversityPoll;CuomoShouldVetoLawmakers'Lines,VotersSay,October26, 2011.Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1667

WeilGotshalMemorandumtoCitizensUnion.Availableat: http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Redistricting/WeilGotshal%20_Manges_memo_on_c onstitutionality_of_Cuomo_bill_FINAL.pdf

QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,August11,2011NewYorkVotersBackFracking,Despite Concerns,QuinnipiacUniversityPollFinds;MoreWomenInGovernmentMeansFewerSexScandals. August11,2011.Availableat:http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1635

Toobin,Jeffrey.DrawingtheLine,TheNewYorker.March6,2006. Bakerv.Carr,369U.S.186(1962) 15 Grayv.Sanders,372U.S.368(1963) 16 Wesberryv.Sanders,376U.S.1(1964)

AppointedbytheSpeakeroftheAssembly: AssemblymemberJackMcEneny(CoChair) Dr.RomanHedges AppointedbytheSenateMinorityLeader SenatorMartinMalavDilan(CoChair) AppointedbytheAssemblyMinorityLeader AssemblymemberRobertOaks

Lachman,Seymour.ThreeMeninaRoom:TheInsideStoryofPowerandBetrayalinanAmericanStatehouse.(New Press:NewYork,2006)p.93. 36 NewYorkStateConstitution,ArticleIII,Section4.Availableat:http://www.dos.state.ny.us/info/constitution.htm

CASESTUDY:THEBRONX,WESTCHESTER ProtectingGuy Vellela Illustration11SenateDistrict34

WifeofNewYorkCityCouncilmemberandformerAttorneyGeneralOliverKoppell. Hevesi,Dennis.GuyVelella,66,PoliticianBroughtDownbyEthicalLapses,Dies,CityRoom.TheNewYorkTimes. January27,2011.Availableat:http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/guyvelellaapoliticianbrought downbyethicallapsesdiesat66/

Illustration13:AssemblyDistrict57 After 2002Redistricting

Illustration15:AssemblyDistrict123 Priorto2002Redistricting Illustration16:AssemblyDistrict123 After2002Redistricting

PercentofTotal 4.28% 4.06% 10.88% 26.92% 35.72% 8.06% 10.40% 100%

Thelackofcompetitionhasalsoincreasedgreatlyovertime.Thefollowinggraphillustratesthe increasingmarginofvictoryinelectionsfrom1968to2010. Illustration21:AverageMarginofVictoryOvertime,NYSAssemblyandSenateGeneralElection Races,19682010

Numberof Races 18 9 16 48 151 220 65 159 686

CategoryTotal 2.62% 3.64% 61.08% 32.65% 100.00%

Numberof Races 15 6 5 31 69 75 27 60 288

CategoryTotal 5.21% 3.82% 60.76% 30.21% 100.00%

drawingofdistrictsunderwhattheysawasthebehestofaspecificminoritygroup,andnotthe generalneedsofallIllinoisvoters.Itpassed,however,witha543majority.73 ii. MinorityRepresentation

AfricanAmericanshavefaredbetterinthestatelegislature,havingaslightlyhigherlevelof representationthanthegeneralpopulationofAfricanAmericansinthestate,withAfrican Americansmakingupabout16percentofthelegislaturein2010andabout14.4percentofthe population.

74.5% 58.3% 17.6% 16.0%

30% 20% 10% 0%

BlackorAfrican American,Non Hispanic

Colorado Delaware Iowa

2010 2008(previouslysplit from19852008) 2010

Senate Democrats Senate Republicans

CitizensUnion.ExaminingTurnoverintheNewYorkStateLegislature:20092010Update. Benjamin,p.7. 100 Ibid.

WhoCouldServe Reformeffortshavealso focusedonestablishinga setofcriteria,oralistof disqualifications,forwho canserveon commissionswiththe intentofminimizing conflictsofinterestand

commissionersthatarebeholdentopartiesorspecialinterests. Asmentionedearlier,manyoftheproposalsforreforminNewYorkStateseektostrictlyprohibit electedofficialsfromservingonthecommission.Thefollowingareseveralrequirementsthat havebeenoutlinedinthecurrentreformproposals:

Wesberryv.Sanders,376U.S.1,78,(1964). AllAboutRedistricting.LoyolaLawSchool,ProfessorJustinLevitt.Availableat:http://redistricting.lls.edu/where state.php

SeetheLATFORwebsiteat:http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/ TheBrookingsInstitution.PrinciplesforTransparencyandPublicParticipationinRedistricting.July12,2010. Availableat:http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0617_redistricting_statement.aspx

Thethirdplanwouldbesubjecttothenormalamendmentprocesswithintheestablished statutoryguidelinesforredistricting,giventhelegislaturesultimateauthorityover redistrictingundertheStateConstitution.

TheCourtofAppealsshouldbegivenoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverchallengestothe redistrictingplantopreventforumshoppingandtoallowfortheexpeditedreviewofsuitsfrom membersofthepublic.

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