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Continental Philosophy Review 35: 325345, 2002. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

. THE TIME-IMAGE AND DELEUZES TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE

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The time-image and Deleuzes transcendental experience


VALENTINE MOULARD
Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN 38152-3530, USA (E-mail: vmoulard@memphis.edu)

Abstract. In this paper I examine the meaning of Deleuzes transcendental empiricism by means of the kind of experience that his project opens up for us an experience that I want to call transcendental. Primarily on the basis of his works on cinema, famously dedicated to freely investigating Bergsons thought, I argue that Deleuzes notion of the time-image, together with his search for its real and necessary conditions, consists in the liberation of experience from its Kantian limitative conditioning. I then examine both the new kind of subjectivity (the fissured ego) that emerges from this enlarged experience and the new conception of temporality (time out of joint) that subtends it. Finally, I try to bring out the concrete relations between (transcendental) experience, thought and the brain that Deleuze brings to light in his analysis of great cinemas reinvention of the relationship between time and movement. We believe that we think the strange and the foreign, but in reality we never think anything but the familiar; we think not the distant, but the close that measures it. And so again, when we speak of impossibility, it is possibility alone that, providing it with a reference, already sarcastically brings impossibility under its rule. Will we ever, then, come to pose a question such as: what is impossibility (impuissance), this non-power that would not be the simple negation of power? Or will we ask ourselves: how can we discover the obscure?; how can it be brought into the open? What would this experience of the obscure be, whereby the obscure would give itself in its obscurity? Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation. The film does not record the filmic process in this way without projecting a cerebral process. A flickering brain, which relinks and creates loops this is cinema. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II.

When Deleuze declares, in Difference and Repetition,1 that his philosophy is to be understood as a superior or transcendental empiricism, he is clearly situating himself in a very innovative position with regard to the history of philosophy. To apply the paradoxical formula transcendental empiricism to ones project is to point out the necessity, firstly, of overcoming the traditional dichotomies informing philosophy.2 I will argue that it is also, more radically and in a Bergsonian inspiration, to endorse the task of liberating experience

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from the conditions that, in Kants view, confine it to contingency and particularity. On the one hand, if Empiricism traditionally deduces the intelligible from the sensible, Superior Empiricism wants to resist validating a dogma about the essence of the mind, or of reality; yet its concern does lie primarily in the concrete diversity of the sensible. Indeed, as I will try to show, philosophical thinking for Deleuze aims directly at the very Being of the sensible (Sentiendum) in its immanence as opposed to desperately wanting to reach sensible beings through a series of intellectual reductions. On the other hand, Superior Empiricism is properly transcendental because it searches for the necessary conditions that ground this richness of the real, and in fact produce it. But for Deleuze, these conditions are not Kantian conditions of possible experience abstracted from the immanent incommensurabilities of the real that they try to mediate, or copied off of what they are supposed to condition and then projected back retroactively. They are, following Bergson, transcendental conditions of real experience: different in kind from what they condition, yet fitting the conditioned tightly enough that they immediately contain their own necessity.3 The method of Transcendental Empiricism thus consists in systematically unhooking familiar identifications (e.g., experience and contingency) and displacing traditional conceptual assumptions (e.g., the unity of the transcendental subject) for the sake of freeing experience from the negative requirements of a consciousness-centered science of knowledge. Beyond the epistemological foundations of possible, hence contingent experience which remains hostage to the idiosyncrasies of human consciousness, Deleuze searches for the differential ontological ground of an experience that is properly metaphysical in the Bergsonian sense, in that it goes beyond human experience, beyond the sensory-motor schemes and intellectual consciousness qua consciousness of the world.4 In contrast with the intentional model that subtends possible experience, the fundamental concept informing what I want to call the Transcendental Experience generated by Transcendental Empiricism is the unconscious an unconscious that is not merely psychological but also ontological, not simply actual but also fundamentally virtual: an unconscious which, in Deleuzes words, produces the impossible real.5 1. Breakdown of the sensory-motor situation: the time-image In accordance with his project of overcoming the unbridgeable gap between body and mind, or matter and memory, Bergson starts out by defining matter in terms of images. An image is a certain existence which is more than what

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the idealist calls representation, but less than what the realist calls a thing an existence situated half-way between the thing and the representation (MM 1).6 Insofar as we perceive them, objects and their qualities are therefore images, but images that exist in themselves (MM 2). The image is that which appears, it is the phenomenon. As Bergson tells us, everything that appears is in motion; everything, then, is a movement-image. For the image acts and reacts. It is not merely a basis for action and reaction, but the image in itself, in all its parts, is indeed action and reaction, immediately. Deleuze summarizes Bergsons original point of view as claiming that the universe consists neither in things, nor in consciousnesses, but in movement-images a machinic universe of movement-images.7 If the distinction between matter and mind does not come first, how do we get to the differentiation of things and thought? Bergsons first answer lies with pure perception. At the level of some images, the input does not prolong itself immediately into a reaction. All it is is a slight interval of movement, a little slice of time between two movements. So on the one hand, we have a type of image that undergo actions and react immediately let us call it matter. And on the other hand we have another kind of images that simply present a delay (cart) between input and output let us reserve the term sensorymotor situation for the latter type of image. This delay is none other than the brain; as a center of indetermination allowing for choice between several possibilities, it generates the difference between reflex-movement and cerebral activity. Although we are not, as yet, in the domain of consciousness per se, this tiny delay is the fulcrum we are going to need to account for the ultimately very complex experiences of perception, thought and memory that the Bergsonian notions of duration and virtuality aim at capturing. Now obviously, what cinema essentially does is produce images. This means, Deleuze points out, that it produces reality.8 Indeed, cinema generates a living and lived reality to the extent that it produces self-movement in images and as such, it produces its own autotemporalization. In other words, as Deleuze shows in his Cinema books, the cinematic image generates new circuits, and creating new circuits in art means creating them in the brain, too (N 60).9 By following through Deleuzes attempt at introducing concepts which relate specifically to cinema as a privileged mode of production of the real, I hope to bring out more clearly the new kind of experience that he is opening up for us, as well as the transcendental conditions for the generation of this experience a direct experience of time qua the very Being of the sensible; an experience which is all the more real in that it is transcendental. Traversed through and through by the empty form of time, the Deleuzian subject opens up to a kind of experience that necessarily exceeds the sensory-

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motor and intellectual boundaries of the Kantian conditioning of experience.10 In fact, the whole first chapter of Deleuzes TimeImage (Cinema 2) operating a transition from, hence a recapitulation of the prior volume titled The Movement-Image focuses on describing the breakdown of the actionimage.11 Put very simply, Deleuzes point is that when we are confronted with an excess of beauty or horror in images, with the sublime or the unbearable, our sensory-motor mechanisms jam. The movement-image that combines action and reaction is interrupted. This radical interruption of the movementimage throws it into a system different from that of the sensory-motor situation, and consequently transforms the movement-image into a qualitatively different kind of image. Deleuze calls this the time-image, which arises out of the pure optical and aural situation. As we will see, when the actual sensory-motor schemata break down, we get dragged down into the delay, or into the temporal dimension of the image the very interval which, for Bergson, constitutes the point of contact between matter and memory, on which the virtual cone of memory with all its layers constantly weighs so as to insert itself into the actual plane of immanence. When we encounter the sublime, then, we cannot but dive into the crack in which the pure form of time flashes. Inscribed in and defined by a system of sensory-motor situations directed toward action, the action-image belongs fundamentally to space and its linear chain of input-output succession. This linearity presents the unfolding of a story. It gives us a narrative in the form of a succession of presents. According to Kant, this succession is the kind of content that we must ascribe to the form of time in order to have any empirical experience, hence any knowledge. It appears, then, that although Kant saw the necessity of positing a transcendental form of time as conditioning the possibility of experience, he could not conceive of time itself in any other way than as mediated through space (a linear succession of presents), that is, in Bergsons view, as de-temporalized. But against Kant the question arises, as it does in Bergsons Matter and Memory and as it is echoed in Deleuzes famous second synthesis of time in Difference and Repetition, What makes the present pass? In Bergsonism, Deleuze echoes the argument from Bergsons Matter and Memory that the failure to distinguish properly between time and space amounts to a metaphysical confusion between what is and what acts, and the concomitant confusion between past and present.12 As pure becoming, the present cannot be said to be. It is not, yet it acts. The past, on the other hand, does not act (since it has ceased to be useful), which means that it does not pass; but precisely, it has not ceased to be. Deleuze writes, Useless and inactive . . . it IS, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being itself (B

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55). This means that in addition to the empirical past, constituted by old presents which have become past in relation to the new present, there must be, at the very same time, a pure past. This virtual past that has never been present is thus of necessity presupposed by the actual present as the condition without which the latter would not pass (i.e., no empirical experience would be possible); the virtual must both preexist the present and coexist with it. In Deleuzes words, It is the in-itself of time as the ultimate ground of passage. It is in this sense that it forms a pure, general, a priori element of all time (DR 111/82). But Kant failed to conceive of the pure form of time as a pure past. In fact there is a sense, Deleuze would argue, in which Kant is too empirical that is, not transcendental enough. By copying the conditions of possibility (i.e., time and space) from that which they condition (empirical experience as caught up in the sensory-motor situation), it looks as if Kant could only think time as an eternal present. A radically new thinking of time hence lies at the heart of Deleuzes displacement of the transcendental. Beyond the psychological present of perception and conditioning it transcendentally, the pure past points to the ontological unconscious and virtual memory as the ultimate basis for sensibility. This past that has never been present obviously escapes empirical experience. It is not given. In fact, this is one of Kants precious basic tenets; as he ceaselessly reminds us throughout the Critique of Pure Reason, Time itself cannot be perceived, although it is a transcendental condition of all possible intuitions.13 Deleuzes direct answer to this, as is suggested in Cinema 2, would run as follows: You are right, Kant, time itself as an empty form can certainly not be perceived; but it can be thought; this is indeed the most crucial import of your transcendental turn. Precisely, however, once run through the Bergsonian method of intuition, and thereby liberated from its traditional spatialization, time itself qua thought itself can be made sensible (CII, 29/ 18). In other words, while time remains properly transcendental (though not transcendent),14 it is also, at the very same time, necessarily immanent. Indeed, this precisely constitutes the core of Deleuzes affirmation of transcendental experience which, in accordance with his refutation of the transcendental unity of apperception, hence of the phenomenological accounts of subjectivity, is to be clearly distinguished from an experience of the transcendental. 2. The crystal-image and the fissured ego In Deleuzes view, it is not the case, as Kant would have it, that the transcendental subject grounds space-time. On the contrary, it is absolute time as the

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Being of memory that grounds the subject and indeed, ultimately ungrounds it. Schopenhauer pointed out that before Kant we were in time; now time is in us.15 But as Keith Ansell Pearson argues, although this is not a mistaken reading of Kant, Deleuze radically reconfigures its sense by bringing Bergsonism to bear on Kants thinking of time. Following Bergson, says Ansell Pearson, there is for Deleuze a being of time, and it is we who exist and become in time, not time that exists in us, even though time is subjectivity (PAV 184). And he continues, quoting Deleuze: That we are in time looks like a commonplace, yet it is the highest paradox. Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live, change . . . Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul, or the spirit, the virtual (CII 111/823). With the transition to the time-image we have a direct presentation of time, or of the Being of the sensible, as opposed to the mere indirect representation we get in the movement-image. The passage from movement to time indeed consists in a reversal/overthrowing (renversement) of the Aristotelian relation between time and movement. Whereas in the sensory-motor situation time is still subordinated to movement insofar as time is relegated to being the mere measure of movement, in the pure optical situation it is movement that becomes subordinated, hence relative to time: the pure past necessarily preexists the moving present. Put otherwise, while the time-image is virtual, the movement-image remains actual. What, then, does this transition consist in? We know that its precondition is the radical breakdown of the sensory-motor situation, which necessarily fails to tear us away from habit and clichs, as a result of which it cannot generate a new kind of image. Deleuze says, We have schemata for turning away when it is too unpleasant, for prompting resignation when it is terrible and for assimilating when it is too beautiful . . . even metaphors are sensory-motor evasions, and furnish us with something to say when we no longer know what to do . . . Now this is what a clich is. A clich is a sensory-motor image of the thing . . . We therefore normally perceive only clichs. But if our sensory-motor schemata jam or break [cf. the sublime] then a different type of image can appear: a pure optical-sound image, the whole image without metaphor, brings out the thing in itself literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its radical or unjustifiable character (CII 32/20, trans. modified). This transition thus implies the excess, the violence of the unbearable as that which cannot be accommodated, thereby forcing us into a different, deeper dimension of experience. Knowledge, utility, morality all those practical interests which in Bergsons view normally preside over the work of the intelligence insofar as it is essentially directed toward action are no longer a factor

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in the constitution of experience. The act that defines the passage from the field of actual movement to the domain of virtual time, then, is the tearing of a real image from clichs. Now what is it that the movement-image gets connected to, if not to an action-image? What can play the role of a virtual image? The first answer that comes to mind is the memory-image, a recollection or a dream. Associationist psychology and psychoanalysis explain the phenomenon of dreaming or daydreaming (and even, in some extreme cases, of certain neuroses) as a turning away from the immediate interests of the present, provoking a rerouting of energy away from motor discharge. Cinematographically, the relation between action-image and memory-image appears in the use of the flashback. But the flash-back, Deleuze points out, is always only a conventional and extrinsic device which still indicates a causality analogous to sensory-motor determinism. It receives its own necessity from elsewhere, just as memory-images must receive the internal mark of the past from elsewhere (CII 67/48); the past or the imaginary thus remain relative to the present, or actuality. In contrast, the pure past must be past in itself, absolutely. The virtual informing superior empiricism consists precisely in its own internal necessity, which points to its transcendental status, as opposed to the external and contingent relations informing traditional empiricism. It appears that we must fill in a bit further the picture of the second synthesis we proposed earlier, and point to the birth of what Deleuze calls memory as a function of the future, in addition to memory as a function of the past. Mankiewicz had clearly understood that memory could never evoke and report the past if it had not already been constituted at the moment when the past was still present, hence in an aim to come. It is this memory of the present which makes the two elements communicate from the inside . . . (CII 72/52, my emphasis). Indeed, Bergson insisted that this memory of the present is the regular and necessary way in which the present is both constituted as an actual experience, and able to pass, hence to become past,16 for, as Bergson says, underlying our actual conscious perception, there is a doubling of the present. Coinciding with the twofold manifestation of the self (as both spontaneous actor and automatic spectator, acting and acted), this doubling is defined as a scission between the conscious action that the perception calls for on the one hand, and the virtual recollection that intertwines with it on the other. This recollection is virtual, Bergson writes, insofar as [it] is suspended in the air, and it does not correspond to any prior experience (ES 141). The interval between actual and virtual images is thus the site of a branching off of time.17 Time forks in and from itself, thereby allowing, in some exceptional cases, for a radical interruption of movement by hindering the compensation

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for the lack of motor discharge through linkage with memory and dream-images. For in fact, a dream-image is still conditioned by its attributability to a dreamer. The conception of subjectivity only gets truly renewed through its own splitting, which indeed consists in a transformation in kind when defined in terms of the pure optical situation, divorced from the possibility of representation by a unified consciousness. For Bergson, the memory of the present is the hinge that articulates the relationship of the actual and the virtual. It is the point of contact between (empirical) psychology and (metaphysical) ontology, the point at which the virtual cone of memory inserts itself into the actual plane of the psychological present.18 Clearly, the virtual image has no psychological existence for it lives outside of consciousness, in time.19 The point, or narrowest circuit, thus functions as an internal limit presupposed by all others from the increasingly wider circuits of memory and dream to the cosmic circuit of the pure past as the open totality at the basis of the inverted cone. I believe that it is, essentially, what Deleuze calls the crystal image. The narrowest circuit forms a crystal-image insofar as it contains only the actual image (or the object itself) together with its own virtual double which returns to cover it.20 [T]he real object is reflected in a mirror-image as in the virtual object which, from its side and simultaneously, envelops or reflects the real: there is coalescence between the two (CII 92/68). The formation of this image with two sides, actual and virtual, constitutes the point of indiscernability between the real and the imaginary. Although the actual and the virtual remain distinct in principle, as Bergsons diagram shows, they become indistinguishable in fact which means that the habitual work of intelligence, namely discernment, cannot be performed. The pure optical situation is no longer relative to a supposed intelligent subject; in fact, the distinction between subjective and objective . . . tends to lose its importance as we run . . . into a principle of indeterminability, of indiscernibility: we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental in the situation, not because they are confused but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask (CII, 15/7, my emphasis), i.e., the optical situation is no longer related to some Kantian transcendental unity of apperception. Beyond the movementimage, the crystal-image points to the reciprocal presupposition of the actual and the virtual; this reciprocity allows for the constant exchange between the two sides, the mutual search blinding and halting of matter and spirit (CII 101/75). Indeed, Deleuze points out, the scission between past and present as opening the future conveyed by the crystal-image coincides with the most fundamental operation of time (CII 109/80).21 Over and above the ground (fond)

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provided by the second synthesis and its inherent paradoxes (cf., the paradoxes of contemporaneity past/present, coexistence and preexistence, as described in DR 108/79), we are now encountering the third synthesis as the ultimate ungrounding (effondement) of time. Far from replacing the ground, the third synthesis provides its profound reason. In fact, says Deleuze, it is the pure empty form of time; as such, it is the transcendental condition of the Bergsonian metaphysics of the virtual as expressed in the notion of ontological duration. The crystal-image thus corresponds to a new, specifically Deleuzian conception of presence. While the present is usually defined as the given, the crystal-image does not give us the present no more than it gives us time; the crystal-image was not time, but we see time in the crystal. We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time. . . . This is the powerful, non-organic life which grips the world (CII 109/81). Beyond the empirical experience of vision, the crystal provides a visionary, properly transcendental experience. In the crystal we see presence qua splitting into past and present, into past and future even. For, [t]he crystal always lives at the limit, it is itself the vanishing limit between the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet. . . (CII 109/81). The crystal thus signifies the depth of the present itself, its very virtualization. From this point of view, we can say that just as the pure past distinguished from its own actualization in the recollection or dream-image stands for the whole of time at the level of the second synthesis, the present itself, as an encroachment onto the future, can now, in turn and at the same time, stand for the whole of time too that is, insofar as we manage to separate it from its own actual quality, namely succession. In the motor situation, we simply pass horizontally along an event, thereby confounding it with space. But in the purely optical situation, we introduce a vertical vision, in depth. The Cartesian coordinates of time and space are overthrown: depth is no longer a third dimension of space, but as the nth dimension of time which envelops all others, it becomes the very basis of space.22 Once unchained from actual succession and its concomitant continuous replacement of events one after the other, the new experience of the present is established inside one single event. Once virtualized, the present becomes the time of the event, a time internal to the event. The time of the event comes to an end before the event does, so the event will start again at another time. . . the whole event is at it were in the time where nothing happens, and it is in empty time that we anticipate recollection, break up with what is actual and locate the recollection once it is formed (CII 1312/100, my emphasis). Now, Deleuze argues, it is indeed great cinemas specificity to seize this Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a place in time which

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is incommensurable with the one they have in space. In Resnaiss Je taime, je taime, the main character remains locked up into a space that looks like something halfway between a padded cell and a womb, all the while traveling again and again through the numerous layers of a certain minute of his past, with all its rhizomatic and flickering paths of association, its loops and potentials. This Proustian experience is thus fundamentally grounded in a paradoxical element, in which not only do time and space fail to coincide, but also, consequently and more radically, in which we must posit a pure past irreducible to both the present that it has been (perception) and to the present in which it might reappear or be reconstituted (voluntary memory) (DR 160/122). To recapitulate, the kind of experience that great cinema opens up for us reveals involuntary memory, or the unconscious, as the site of the empty form of time. Whether we sense it as the abyss of the pure past and the coexistence of its sheets or as the violence of the event and the simultaneity of its peaks is not what matters most. In either case we have a true time-image, a direct presentation of time qua depth; in either case, we must extract from the feeling of the sublime a very concrete cerebral game. In the revelation of non-chronological time, [W]e constitute a sheet of transformation which invents a kind of transverse continuity or communication between several sheets, and weaves a network of non-localizable relations between them. . . . [W]e draw out a sheet which, across all the rest, catches and extends the trajectory of points, the evolution of regions. This is evidently a task which runs the risk of failure: sometimes we only form generalities which retain mere resemblances. . . . But it is possible for the work of art to succeed in inventing these paradoxical hypnotic and hallucinatory sheets whose property is to be at once a past and always to come (CII 162/123). In other words, as Deleuze puts it in What is Philosophy? Art struggles effectively with chaos, but it does so in order to generate from it a vision that illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation (WP 192/204, trans. modified). If the work of art has the power to invent such diagonal sheets of past, it is because it calls up all mental functions simultaneously, from recollection to forgetting through imagination and judgment. Now, Deleuze continues, what is loaded with all these functions, each time, is feeling (sentiment) (CII 163/ 124). What Deleuze finds in Resnais, for instance, is that his interest does not rest with characters themselves, but the feelings that they can extract from themselves. While characters are of the present, feelings plunge into the past. In Je taime, je taime, the character stays where he is; it is his desperate love for /guilt over the woman he killed that takes him back through the numerous layers of the past. If Resnais does any psychology, it is a psychology of pure

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feelings, and not a psychology of characters. Defined by transformation, redistribution, and circulation from one level of the past to another, feelings become characters. But when transformations themselves form a sheet which traverses all the others it is as if feelings set free the consciousness or thought with which they are loaded (CII 163/125). Following Bergson, then, the Deleuzian time-image prolongs itself naturally into a language-image and a thought-image. What the past is to time, sense is to language and idea to thought (CII 131/99). If there is a certain continuity between feelings and thought, this continuity is not given, but virtual. It has to be created from the very being of the sensible qua the ungrounding from which time, as the source of experience, springs. For Deleuze, the time-image is the genetic condition of such creation because, as Gregory Flaxman puts it, No longer linked by the sensory-motor schema, the relation between images becomes noncommensurable: between one image and another a gap opens, an interstice in which thought experiences its own duration.23 3. The fissure radicalized: time out of joint The inauguration of the time-image in great modern cinema coincides with the core of the transformation to which Deleuze subjects transcendentalism: time is fundamentally out of joint and its constitutive ceasura cannot be mended by an all-powerful synthesizing human subject.24 Time is no longer the measure of movement; instead, movement becomes one among many potential perspectives of time. The movement-image does not disappear, but now exists merely as one dimension (or power, puissance), i.e., the surface of an image that keeps growing and deepening exponentially, to finally exceed both actual spatialization and representability absolutely. One major consequence of this transformation is that sensibility can no longer be equated with perception; essentially defined in excess of the I, the faculty, or capacity of sensibility has been stretched to its own limit, thereby transcending itself. Forced to confront the other faculties and struggle with them instead of obediently furnishing them some raw material to be organized, virtual sensibility generates a new order of time. Articulated around either non-superimposable sides of the ceasura, this new order is revealed through a passive, static synthesis necessarily static as time is no longer subordinated to movement. While the ceasura constitutes the form of the most radical change, it is a form which itself does not change. As the point of heresy25 of time itself in the midst of a passive synthesis, the ceasura marks the birth of the cracked I (DR 120/89). For indeed, the receptivity inherent

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in this passive synthesis signifies the necessarily genetic force of thoughts transcendental experience the experience of its own duration. The dogmatic image of thought and subjectivity that Deleuzes time-image aims at disrupting is, as Flaxman writes, conceived in advance of empirical vicissitudes and thereby projects itself into the future as an anticipative matrix that turns any encounter into one of recognition (BS 11), which is to say that thought remains hostage to common sense and generality. In contrast, the split I that is born out of the passive synthesis can no longer provide a basis for the harmonious accord of the faculties; the I turns out to be an effect, produced by the discord of sensibility, memory and thought. In this struggle, its organs have become metaphysical.26 Sensibility no longer has to be based in a mediating and synthesizing consciousness; it now refers immediately to the unconscious Sentiendum qua the very being of the sensible, i.e., to images in the Bergsonian sense. Says Deleuze, . . . [a]t the same time as the eye takes up a clairvoyant function, the sound as well as the visual elements of the image enter into internal relations which means that the whole image has to be read, no less than seen, readable as well as visible. For the eye of the seer as of the soothsayer, it is the literalness of the sensible world which constitutes it as a book (CII 34/22, trans. modified). If I is originally another, who is it, then, that draws the transverse continuity between the levels of the virtual cone, allowing for the elements of the image to enter into non-localizable, internal relations, so that the image becomes readable? We have seen that the passage from movement to time-image fundamentally involves a reversal of the relation between time and movement; this in turn implies a depersonalization, first of movement, then of sensibility. Deleuze says, It is the brain that says I, but I is another. . . . And this I is not only the I conceive of the brain as philosophy, it is also the I feel of the brain as art. Sensation is no less brain than the concept (WP 199/211). Insofar as the time-image does not depend on a mobile or an object for its execution, or even on a mind for its constitution, what cinema is able to attain to, just like the brain, is automatic movement; it is the image which moves itself in itself, which means that it is neither figurative nor abstract. Now, Deleuze continues, It is only when movement becomes automatic that the artistic essence of the image is realized: producing a shock on thought, communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly. Because the cinematographic image itself makes movement, because it makes what the other arts are restricted to demanding (or to saying) . . . it

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converts into power (puissance) what was only possibility. Automatic movement gives rise to a spiritual automaton in us, which reacts in turn on movement. The spiritual automaton no longer designates as it does in traditional philosophy the logical or abstract possibility of formally deducing thoughts from each other, but the circuit into which they enter with the movement-image, the shared power of what forces thinking and what thinks under the shock (tans. modified. CII 204/156). Beyond Kantianism, the great pioneers of cinema lay claim to the immediate necessity of real experience as thinking. They pretend to force us irresistibly into the transcendental experience of the ultimate power at which sensibility, liberated from its formal conditioning in terms of possibility, becomes thinking. The event of what Deleuze also calls the nooshock marks, in principle, the displacement of the cause of thinking and perceiving; it is because this cause, as Gregg Lambert points out, can no longer be situated on the side of the subject, that thinking is no longer a logical possibility that one can either take up or not, but rather becomes a physiological imperative or, in Eisensteins words, a total provocation of the brain.27 But this purely sensitive, hence un-representable violence of a movement-image immediately inserting its vibrations within us would soon get confused, in bad cinema, with the figurative violence of the represented. The power of cinema would turn out to be a mere logical possibility, even though it does allow for the possible (or mediation) to be conceived in terms of the sublime (or violence). Its effect on the mind is to force it to think, and to think itself: to think the whole, as that which can only be as thought (or Cogitandum). For, Bergson insists throughout his writings, the whole is not given; it is not given, Deleuze adds, because it is the result of the indirect representation of time ensuing from movement. With the time-image, however, the relation between sensibility or the Sentiendum, that which can only be as sensed and thought (or the Cogitandum, that which can only be as thought) takes on a radically new form. In other words, with modern cinema the circuit or totality of cinema-thought relations is overturned. Deleuze argues that against Eisenstein, Artaud maintains that if it is true that thought depends on a shock which gives birth to it (the nerve, the brain-matter), it can only think one thing, the fact that we are not yet thinking, the powerlessness (impuissance) to think the whole and to think oneself, thought which is always fossilized, dislocated, collapsed (CII 218/ 167). As Blanchot diagnoses, then, what forces us to think is the very non-existence of a whole which could be thought. The limit to which sensibility is carried in its encounter with the sublime is insensibility as well; similarly, the limit to which thought is pushed within the circuit constituted by the open totality is

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an absolute Outside of thought, or the unthinkable. The logically postulated whole of dialectics cannot but be shattered, for it turns out that there is, on the one hand, the presence of an unthinkable in thought, which would be both its source and barrier; on the other hand the presence to infinity of another thinker, who shatters every monologue of a thinking self (CII 219/168). Necessarily encountered within thought itself, the unthinkable thus constitutes the very positivity of thought, its vitality, in the form of an irreducible Outside. And if this experience of thought concerns specifically, though not exclusively modern cinema, it is primarily a function of the change which affects the image, which has ceased to be sensory-motor (CII 220/169). This break with sensory-motor actualization implies, in a sense, a break between thought and world that is, a break with the Phenomenological accounts of subjectivity. Lambert justifiably writes, in obvious reference to Heidegger, that this break reveals precisely the shock that I am not yet thinking or that what is called thinking is a power that belongs to a subject who I am not (BS 279). However, I wish to suggest that more radically, the break between thought and world also signifies the radical breakdown of the phenomenological structure of Daseins being-in-the-world, hence of Daseins privileged access to the question of Being, and its consequent hope for a closing of the circle. I mentioned above that the time-image profoundly disrupts, or ungrounds, common sense, hence the generality of thought as mitsein. Indeed, as Len Lawlor points out in response to Merleau-Ponty, The decisive question is this: can Phenomenology be anything other than a phenomenology of subjectivity (as the general form of all subjects)? According to Deleuze, as soon as a philosopher turns immanence into immanence to consciousness, the difference between ground and grounded collapses.28 Deleuze explains that in contrast with Phenomenology (and for him, Kant is the first phenomenological thinker) and its desperate attempts at establishing the basis of a common cultural world over and above a natural world, we want to think transcendence within the immanent, and it is from transcendence that a breach is expected (WP 48/47). Faced with the unbearable, [t]he spiritual automaton is in the psychic situation of the seer, who sees better and further to the extent that he cannot react, that is, think. Which, then, is the subtle way out? To believe, not in a different world, but in the link between man and the world, in love or life, to believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which nonetheless cannot be but as thought. . . . Artaud never understood powerlessness to think as a simple inferiority which would strike us in relation to thought. It is part of thought, so that we should make it our very way of thinking, without claiming to be restoring an all-powerful thought. (CII 221/171, trans. modified).

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The status of the whole is modified. The whole is no longer a kind of Hegelian, open yet integrating and reconciling totality; rather, it has become the Outside qua force of dispersion. This means that the interstice, the fissure (the impersonal brain), has become primary with regard to continuity. The brain is here operating a junction which is to be distinguished from a unity.29 Not only does the brain constitute the non-unifying joint between thought and world, but it is also itself a non-unity, a center of indetermination traversed by little cerebral deaths.30 Henceforth, the relation between thought and world has to be conceived as an operation of differentiation rather than in terms of association. Therein lies perhaps Deleuzes most profound argument against phenomenology; for him, it is the brain that thinks, and not man, man being a mere cerebral crystallization (WP 198/209), a residual creation of the creative process of evolution. As I suggested before, for Deleuze the brain is no less sensation than concept, no less feeling than thought. Once again, it appears that its faculties do not coordinate their efforts in accordance with some magical pre-established harmony such as, for instance, the concept of man itself; rather, the primacy of the fissures, intervals, or little deaths informing the very structure of the brain point to its fundamentally pathological duration. The anomalous experiences that particularly interest Deleuze in the cinema books such as the traumatic sensations generated by the sublime, or the hallucinations stemming from the powers of the false those delirious experiences, Ansell Pearson points out, are for Bergson positive facts that consist in the presence, not in the absence, of something. They seem to introduce into the mind certain new ways of feeling and thinking (PAV 182). In contrast with common sense and the usual opinion, including such Urdoxa as the Cogito or the mind, genuine thought for Deleuze thus proceeds by creation, production, differentiation, rather than recognition and representation. Through his analysis of cinemas ability to reveal a pure optical and aural situation, Deleuze is here radicalizing the Bergsonian conception of the brain as delay or distance (cart) between excitation and response, as well as the distinction between virtuality and possibility so central to Bergsons work. But as Deleuze points out, there is a sense in which in Bergson, this interval remained subject to an integrating whole which was embodied in it, and to associations which traversed it (CII 274/211). Indeed, in Matter and Memory the virtual unconscious is constantly weighing on the plane of actuality, pushing to insert itself, thereby at once transforming itself, into the psychological present. According to Bergson, what keeps us from sympathizing with the whole and intuit the entirety of the past is the mechanism of our practice and interest oriented intelligence, whose essential function consists in discerning,

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i.e., literally cutting up the real. Although for Bergson, the whole is not given in fact, it could be in principle, if we were able to liberate the infinite powers of intuition. At the same time, however, this whole remains open to unforeseeable creations. But Bergson nevertheless insists on defining it in terms of simplicity. I believe that from a Deleuzian point of view, it looks as if the Bergsonian whole could still be accounted for in relation to the simple act of intuition of a consciousness. Even though Bergsonian intuition is clearly rooted in the concrete, immanent and fundamentally incommensurable being of the sensible, the metaphysical experience it yields does not escape psychological determination. Although it is informed by the virtual (hence non-psychological) dimension of the pure past, the Bergsonian experience of duration only becomes an experience through its process of actualization. It may be argued, then, that although Bergson allowed for cracking open the Kantian account of time and experience, Deleuze had to impregnate Bergson with his own monstrous child in order to tear away transcendental experience from psychological experience. Finally, to contrast it with Bergsons approach, Deleuzes conclusion could be summarized as follows: We no longer believe in a whole as interiority of thought even an open one; we believe in a force from the outside which hollows itself out, grabs us and attracts the inside. We no longer believe in an association of images even crossing voids; we believe in breaks which take on an absolute value and subordinate all association. It is not abstraction, it is those two aspects that define the new intellectual cinema. . . The brain cuts or puts to flight all internal associations, it summons an outside beyond any external world (CII 276/212). As usual, Deleuze means what he says, and he means it literally. There is no abstraction because he does not shy away from the radicality of his thinking through metaphors, however inspiring or poetic they might be. This radicality of philosophy, he points out in What is Philosophy? is demanded by the constant necessity for thoughts struggle with opinion and its schemata, as well as with thoughts degeneration within opinion itself (WP 195/207). He finally argues that on the basis of the recent progresses in our scientific knowledge of the brain, our lived relationship with the brain or, as he puts it, our livedbrain is becoming more and more fragile, less and less Euclidean and goes through little cerebral deaths (CII 275/211). As Steven Rose puts it, the nervous system is uncertain, probabilistic, hence interesting (WP 203/216). In radicalizing Bergsons interval, that is, the center of indetermination that constitutes the fundamental fissure of the I, Deleuze is affirming the real necessity not simply the mere logical possibility of the form of an experience based in the unconscious that he thinks great modern cinema reveals

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as transcendental experience. It is an experience insofar as it produces feelings and thoughts, yet it remains transcendental insofar as those feelings and thoughts are not of that which appears on the screen; they are, rather, the direct presentation of time as thought experiencing its own mad duration. These radically new circuits in the brain constitute real and necessary conditions for the immediate revelation of the empty form of time. Beyond the ultimate rationalizations of both classical cinema and traditional philosophy conveyed in the movement-image and its concomitant positing of the possibility of a harmonious knowledge over and above the incommensurability of man and world, Deleuze wants to isolate a deeper level of absolute heresy rooted in the original splitting of time. The interaction between man and world ultimately obeys a new order, independent of any common structure between the two. If, as he clearly advocates throughout his writings but more specifically in Difference and Repetition, one has to start with difference, if one has to put difference in the origin, it means that the source of experience cannot be abstracted from its immanent existence, that is, from its internal necessity qua transcendental experience. Notes
1. Gilles Deleuze, Diffrence et Rpetition (Paris: PUF, 1re d. 1968 / 8 me d. 1996); Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), hereafter DR. As I hope to make clear, Deleuzes philosophy of difference does not in a Bergsonian fashion aim at simply eliminating such traditional dichotomies as idealism vs. empiricism, and such apparent oppositions informing both schools as thought/experience, Being/ non-being, or continuity/discontinuity. On the contrary, Superior Empiricism proceeds by first radicalizing those distinctions, so as to put into question, and eventually displace profoundly, the very principle of their distinction. The traditional principle of non-contradiction, which establishes external (hence spatial and quantitative) differences, makes way in Deleuze for a principle of internal (hence temporal or qualitative) difference. For a detailed and luminous account of the fundamental shift in the conception of difference that Deleuze articulates, see his 1956 La conception de la diffrence chez Bergson, in Les tudes Bergsoniennes IV (Paris: PUF, 1956); trans. Melissa McMahon in The New Bergson, ed. John Mullarkey (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999). For instance, Deleuze writes, If philosophy is to have a positive and direct relation with things, it is only to the extent that it claims to grasp the thing itself in what it is, in its difference from all that it is not, which is to say, in its internal difference . . . we must effectively recognise that that difference itself is not simply spatio-temporal, that it is not generic or specific either, in short that it is not exterior or superior to the thing (80/43). Henceforth, the first page numbers will refer to the French, and the second ones to the English translation.

2.

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3. It is important to insist on this fundamental difference between the Bergsonian-Deleuzian conception of the necessity informing the transcendental realm on the one hand, and the Kantian account on the other. The Kantian transcendental conditions of possibility are negative conditions of necessity in the sense that in his view, we would not be able to perceive, or, for that matter, to have any experience at all, if it were not for the positing of such conditions. In short, Kant claims that the forms of space and time are necessary conditions without which phenomenological experience would not be possible. However, as Bergson clearly suggests, Kants transcendentalism fails to establish what I would call the necessity of the necessity. For instance, Bergson writes, [The Kantian Critique] gives itself space as a ready-made form of our perceptive faculty a veritable deus ex machina, of which we see neither how it arises, nor why it is what it is rather than anything else [Lvolution cratrice (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1988), p. 206; Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Random House, 1944), p. 224, hereafter CE]. In contrast, Bergson and Deleuzes Transcendental Empiricism searches for conditions of reality instead of conditions of possibility that is, it aims at generating the positive categories of thought rather than determining them through analysis (CE 208/226). In this sense, I want to say that Bergson and Deleuze are looking for a deeper kind of necessity (e.g., how and why the form of space is what it is rather than anything else). Beneath or beyond the negative necessity invoked by the Kantian Critique, Superior Empiricism thus points to the fundamental positivity of the real and its conditions: in this consists both their internal necessity, and the virtually illimited field of their transformative and creative actualization. 4. Against the famous Husserlian proposition that consciousness is of something, Deleuze insists that Consciousness is something, in La Logique du Sens (Paris: Les ditions de Minuit, 1969), p. 362; The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 311, hereafter LS. 5. Deleuze and Guattari, LAnti-Oedipe (Paris: Les ditions de Minuit, 1972), p. 62; AntiOedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), p. 53. 6. Matire et Mmoire (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1997), p. 1; Matter and Memory, trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 9, hereafter MM. 7. In his lectures on Bergson (internet). 8. Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 58, hereafter N. 9. A similar idea is present in Bergsons Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1997); The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books), hereafter 2S. Bergson writes, Thus mountains may, since the beginning of time, have had the faculty of rousing in those who look upon them certain feelings comparable with sensations, and indeed inseparable from mountains. But Rousseau created with them a new and original emotion. This emotion has become current coin, Rousseau having put it in circulation. And even to-day, it is Rousseau who makes us feel it, as much and more than the mountains (my emphasis, 38/41). 10. It is important to note that the criticisms directed at Kants conception of time in this paper only take into account his thinking as it is expressed in the Critique of Pure Reason. As the reference to the sublime below suggests, Kants thinking about time in its relation to the subject and experience is elaborated further in the Third Critique, as a

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11.

12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

result of which it arguably escapes a lot of these criticisms as Deleuze suggests in both his Kant lectures (internet) and in the second chapter of DR. But to address this new aspect of Kants transcendentalism would lead us into a different project, of a much wider scope than that of this paper. Cinma 2: Limage-Temps, (Paris: Les ditions de Minuit, 1985); Cinema 2, The TimeImage, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), hereafter C II. Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), hereafter B. See esp. the Analogies of Experience in The Analytic of Principles, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), e.g., p. 296, hereafter CPR. Here, Deleuze is not only echoing but also radicalizing the fundamental distinguishing feature between Transcendental Idealism (Kantianism) and Idealistic Realism (Platonism). Unlike Plato, Kant is not making any metaphysical claims as to the existence of things-in-themselves. Because his project in CPR focuses on the epistemological issue of finding a ground for scientific knowledge, he is content with leaving the issue of the ontological status of things-in-themselves aside, since according to him, they precisely elude absolutely possible experience, hence the domain of knowledge as well. To say that time is transcendental is to affirm that it is a necessary condition of all possible experience, that it has to be assumed for any knowledge to be possible. It does not necessarily imply that it exists objectively in some other inaccessible realm; on the contrary, Kants transcendental move here aims at demonstrating the subjectivity of time. We will see that for Deleuze, this is not quite enough. In The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), p. 424 [quoted by Keith Ansell Pearson in Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 184, hereafter PAV]. See what Bergson calls the phenomenon of dja-vu (or rather, dja-vcu) in Le souvenir du prsent et la fausse reconnaissance in Lnergie spirituelle (Paris: Quadrige/ PUF, 1996); Mind-Energy, trans. H. Wildon Carr (London: MacMillan and Co., 1920), hereafter ES. This is what Deleuze calls Bergsons third diagram, which, Deleuze points out, Bergson does not feel the need to draw (109 note 22/294295 note 23).

18. See Bergsons famous diagram of the cone, MM 169/152.

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19. As Ansell Pearson points out, psychological consciousness is born and emerges into being only when it has found its proper ontological conditions. And it is only once the leap has been made into the being of the past that recollections [hence representations as well] are able to gradually assume a psychological existence. The past can never be recomposed with presents since this would be to negate its specific mode of being (PAV, 180). 20. This, says Deleuze, is Bergsons first great diagram. It is crucial to note that the narrowest circuit (AO) is also a point (of indiscernibility) because it is precisely not an AA circuit. As Deleuze, quoting Bergson, points out, it contains only the object O itself with the consecutive image which returns to cover it (memory immediately consecutive to perception) (CII 65 note 4/45 note 4).

21. We must bear in mind, as Peter Pl Pelbart notes, that although there is in Deleuze, as in Heidegger, a certain privilege of the future, it does not, for Deleuze, coincide with the problematic of finitude. Rather, it has to do with infinite possibilities for the creation of the new, signified by Deleuzes reference to the Outside. As Pl Pelbart says, le futur nest pas, pour lhomme, une anticipation de sa propre mort, la possibilit extrme de son tre; il nest rien qui ressemblerait a un tre-pour-la-mort, car ce nest pas partir de lipsit quil est pens, mais dun flux proto-ontique. Si, dans llaboration de ce futur par Deleuze, lOuvert est une rfrence importante, elle renvoie au Dehors plutt qua ltre (Le temps non-rconcili, in Gilles Deleuze, une vie philosophique, ed. Eric Alliez (Le Plessis Robinson: Institut Synthlabo, 1998), p. 99). 22. In Cinema and the Outside in The Brain Is the Screen, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), hereafter BS, Gregg Lambert explains that Eisenstein had announced as early as 1929 the discovery of a fourth dimension of cinematographic duration spatially inexpressible, time added to three-dimensional space the appearance of which is the result of overtonal conflicts between visual and sound images (p. 253). Now, Lambert continues, because visual and aural overtones are [for Eisenstein] a totally physiological sensation. . . they function as conductors that introduce new effects within the spectators perception-consciousness system and engender the possibility of newer and ever finer affective capabilities (p. 254). Lambert judiciously points out that this discovery concerns what Eisenstein (and later Deleuze) would discuss almost in terms of a new synthesis of the sensible, the being of the sensible, a body that exists before discourses, before words, clichs, and ready-toorder representations the I FEEL of the cinematographic subject (ibid.). Although I find Lamberts reading illuminating in many respects, I contend that it is a mistake to identify Deleuzes take with Eisensteins in this instance even though Deleuze obviously found some inspiration in Eisensteins discovery. Ultimately, however, Deleuze

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23. 24.

25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

30.

thinks that Eisensteins cinematography and montage remain hostage to the system of the movement-image, that is, that it remains caught up in a system of re-presentation, as opposed to the direct presentation of time that the crystal-image generates. I am trying to argue that for Deleuze, with the crystal (or time-image), time is not merely a fourth dimension OF space (which would still make time dependent on space); rather, to say that time is the nth dimension of space is to insist that it has become its ultimate power (puissance). Time thereby exceeds space absolutely, which means that time has become independent of space (or movement). Indeed, I believe that this independence which Bergson expressed in terms of the difference in kind between duration and simultaneity is precisely one of the central imports of Deleuzes third synthesis. Introduction to BS, p. 6. The famous phrase from Hamlet, The time is out of joint, is the opening sentence of Deleuzes Kants Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. vii. Borrowed from Foucaults archeological works (both The Order of Things and The Archeology of Knowledge), this term is picked up on by Deleuze in his Foucault book as signifying the heart of the archeological method, which precisely consists in inventing those transversal sheets, independently of any resemblance or analogy, that is, of any common structure between the elements thereby put into relation. For a detailed account of this passive synthesis, see in particular the last 20 pages of the second chapter of DR, as well as all of Chapter 4 of DR, entitled Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible. Cinema and the Outside, in BS, p. 258. The Eisenstein quote, from The Filmic Fourth Dimension, in Film Form, trans. Jay Leyda (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1949), is also mentioned by Lambert. Len Lawlor, The End of Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and MerleauPonty, Continental Philosophy Review 31/1 (1998) pp. 1534. In What Is Philosophy? Deleuze writes, The brain is the junction not the unity of three planes [of philosophy, art and science]. And he continues, If the mental objects of philosophy, art and science (that is to say, vital ideas) have a place, it will be in the deepest of the synaptic fissures, in the hiatuses, intervals, and meantimes of a nonobjectifiable brain, in a place where to go in search of them will be to create, in Deleuze and Guattari, Quest-ce que la philosophie? (Paris: Les ditions de minuit, 1991), p. 196; What is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchnell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 208, hereafter WP. The little cerebral deaths Deleuze is here referring to are the death of the synapses themselves, i.e., the death of the material basis for neuronal transmissions and connections. This leads, according to Steven Rose (quoted by Deleuze), to the ever greater importance of the factor of uncertainty, or rather half-uncertainty, in the neuronal transmission.

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