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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAUI414NGTON. G.G.

//
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30330

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AGAM- (M) (2 Mar 67) F(F OT

TO:

SEE DISTRIBUTION

UM J5S TRANSMISSION t It4BTIOI EU ITSI 01R T

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1. FoS Erded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division for period ending 31
____

~i

October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by
CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter. 2.cb19 rmation contained in this report is provided to the Com-

mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY;

LU_ I Incl
C, a/s

KENNETH G. WICK{HAM
Major General, USA The Adjutant General 0

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NFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont d) US Army Quartermaster School US Army Security Agency School V IWO*~ Traifsportatiofl School "'t&~ArmfPSV~ci-al Warfare School US Afmy Civil.'Affairs School

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CON FIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966

Ist BRIGADE 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS AND WARRIORS

CONFIDENTIAL

Best Available Copy

CONFIDEN TIAL
L -;W
AYE)-C
UWTt?
I=AXRWWIA

DIVIIC

12

uWa b 26

Operational Report for QuarterlY Period tmiding 31 October 1966 (R= CMM.65) (U)

TO:

See Distribuztion

Referencues z AR249 dtd 26 May 296, and I Ml Reg 1-3 dtd 29 septdser 1966.

UShIW Rag 870.2 dtd 19 July 1966,

of the Brigade were involved in neiiesr-trt sgiitoant uni ua entire reporting period with the exception of combat cp~ations during.e 26-30 October 1966. Training waas conducted concurrent with cenbat oparations and during periods wena units were refitting and prep&r. for *peration. of the k oertios.A 'L.) Cmbt i eriiW arei summary of the concept given balmw. nd exection of eaeb

1.
36e

Operation JMi PAUL

a. Dates: I Auut

JcM.

(Ihae ]a and Hi).

S eptmer 1966. Days in the fields

b. Minaeonst Codkt search and destroy operations in and provide security for the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG 10 Pass ua.a Relieve the 2nd RCI Marins Brigade south of 1 JT HOA. Conuict search and destroy operations northwiest of 'IVY HOA, and provide protection to civilians in the initial stages of the rica harvest. c. d. e. lcations Commanders PW =U Province, RVN. Bi3 Willard Pearsou

Forces involved: (1) USlit Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

Regiment (AMV).

(2) Others 2nd Korean WaAW Brigade, I47th 10fantrY (V/8 Cavalry OPCCN to 1/10 though 5 Septmer 1966). (See Inci 1, Combat After Action

f. Concept and RecutioN. Report, JMW PAUL JCKES. 2. oeration S1ARD.

a.
b.

Datess

6 Beptombew - 26 ocbar 1966.

anyu in the field:

Tar AN areas.

in the area of operations*

Provide security for 'IV! BOA South Airfield, RO MWRO Bay/Pass area and the land LOC from VUNG Bay to 'IVY HOA. c.Location: d, cmadrTo PHU3 Province,

Conduct search and destroy operations

Misionas

F0A To protect the rice harvest in the WVY and

against VCINVA foa

RVr.

Ba Willard Pearson.

FOR OT
660508

UT

CO

~f~ Q FXFDNTA~,"Lm,.u.s TI
D

Yooa

Inclosure

M1

CONF IDEN TAL

12 Novuber 1966 A D-C X ECET.Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS OSqv-6S) (U) e. Forces involvedt tj (2) V31 lt fUrlt, list lftbf D1ivIsio, Infantry, 4th Infantry Division OPOjI through 1 October 1966. (2) Others -47th Infantry Regiment (ARV ). (3ee Inclosure 2, Combat After

f. L:oncept and Vetutica. Action Report, Operation SW&FD). 3*Oeaion 0110W4.

a. Datese Coinenced on 31 October 1966 and will be covered in the next quarterly operations report. b. Nissiosn VO/NVA forces in the AO. o. d. Location. Commanders To conduct search and destroy operations agalnt WM YEN and JOi BOA Provinces, RVN. DO Willard Pearson.

B. Trainin. The mjority of the time covered during the reporting period was Spent in the conduct of tactical operatins. However, during periods of refitting and preparation for combat operations, units concentrated training efforts in those areas which could be impred on, as noted during previous operations. In addition to the ephasi placed on small unit tactics, the following training wPs organised and conducted at Brigade lovels 1. All innong personmel, officers and enlisted men, continued to be processed through the Replacement Detachment at IAN RANG where they received 6 days of intensified training in small unit tactics, weapons indoctrination, survival, land navigation, patrolling and physical conditioning. 2. Range firing contirned on established ranges with Small art, maidne guns, grenade launchers, hand grenades and mortars, 3. Flame thrower temn from each infantry battalion continued to receive proficiency training in the use of the portable flame thrower.

4. A three hour envirornental driver training course was conducted for all units to train and orient personnel to cope with driving conditions In Vietnam.
5. Selected personnel within the Brigade received specialized training in the use of the sniper weapon (Winchester, Model 70 rifle) and sniper techniques.
6. Tactical air training was established to femiiarize all units with proper air request procedures, types of air support and selection of
targeta.

7. Mobile training teams from the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artiller1 continued to train CIDG uwits in survey, fire direction, service of the weapon, am"rnition handling and forward ob erver prvedures.
B. Training was conducted for radio telephone operators in radio telepone security and procedures, use of the S01, aid operatl of the CC 106 and ARBC radios. 122 9. A three week cool. and bakers school was conducted at PHA" 2

CONFIDENTTAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AVW-C WB3ECT: A OpratiOnal Report for Quarterly Period 12 November 1966 riting 31 October 1966

(RCS cSUo-65) (U)

to train ae&ated perseasi to fill

adsting nineniSs fltan the

10. Trnining in fire support coordination was cmncted to as tablish techniques and increase the effectivenes of Infantry, artillery and Tao Air support during combat oyrations. 1. CH 47 helicopter ladder training was conduted to gtdbl b wecedures to be used by infantry battalion. in future operation. 12. The Squad tears Combat Reaction Couwe (I wee duration) M wa established on 2. Augst 1966 at PHAN RAINO, to inmtrmct =Ll unit loaders in the latest combat techniques. 13. A special 4 hour course in aduirdstration was given to all first sergeants, pernonnel WOO's, and ccWarw clerks within the Brigade with tration the objectve of increasing the efficiency and operation of a d throWhqut the Brigade. 1. A special Brigade training team was established and conduted a pre-combat orientation course for cpxaiy/battery siss units totaling approximately 4000 personnel of all grades of the let Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. 13. To assist the 1st Brigade, 4th Infartry Division to become operational, the lat Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted an Integration program whereby key personnel of the 1st Brigade, 4th InfaBz Division satellited on their counterparts to observe the functioning of the lst Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on a first hand basis. 316. On 23 October 1966, the Squad Leaders Combat Reaction Course was disoontirraed and replaced by the Combat NCO Academy conducted by the Replacement Detachment in MM RANG, RVN commencing 30 October 1966. The to purpose of the Combat NM Acadomw is- develop superb infantry squad leaders with exceptional endurance, skilled in the techniques of counterinsurgency operations, field craft, survival and leadership ability. The school is one week in duration and ooiy team leaders in the grade of 9-5 and outstanding Pf's and Sp4t's who are acting in a team leader or squad leader capacity are eligible to attend the school. 17. A seinar for squad leaders was held on 1,5 October 1966. Durir* the morning, free and uninhibited discussion pertaining to Brigade training program and small unit tactics was ccndctd. The mjor reccamendation made was the conversion of the Squad Leaders Combat Reaction Course to the Combat WO Academy, orientated toward outstanding 3-4's or E-3's as fire team or squad leader aspirants. Following a lunicheon in honor of the squad leaders attending the asainar, five guest presentationa were given on Artillery, Army Aviation, USd7 Tao Air, Chemical Warfare in Vietnam ard an floinjr discussion of mines and booby traps. The tio-fold purpose of the guest presentation was to inform the squad leaders of the latest battlefield techniques and allow then to erpain problem existing in each field to the experts. 18. A second sminar on artillery support was conducted for selected officers on 25 October 1966. The objective of this preatation/diecussion was to improve artillery support, coordination and r standing thrcugh the presntation ad mubeqemt analyis of two artillery strikes. The results of the seminar were? a. Th. artilley of the U.S. Army is extras]; effective during counterguerrilla warfare. b. The saifll4eulted in no recomendation for radical change In tactics or teelmiquesa.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AVE.C SIWE CTs Operatioa 12 Noviebr 1966 Rep-t for Quarterly Period Inding 31 October 1966 a. Intem, iAed traA.irg betwen omb" opers9 osm is r~cesuar7 to Insure the infuatrymm fulil uemtortans the new artillery concepts. 19. To prepare for the alrborne assault, the 2/327 f pro-airborne refresher training during the period 3-19 October possible contingen7 of oonductiR an and C2/320 Art' oondiot ed intenrified and C-130 -oc*-p loading pavoodres

1966.

Mail Clark@ concerning special za1 handlinA and postal regu3ation.

20. On 2e October 196.6, a special two hour clas ienm by the Brigade Postal Officer to all First Sergemts. Bttalion a Unit

C. I. The following OPLARS and OF" were pabliebed Auring the renrt rt period. The Brigade ms not called upon to exute MW tontinvency plas.~ 1. eliitati oFD 147-6 (JaM PAUL HOS) dated 5 August 1966 covering n of 4 arclight strikes.

2. OPORD 1.49-66 (JOHN PAUL Jons) dated 14 August 1966 covering relief of the 2d Korean Xarine Brigade by the the lot Brigade, Joist Airborne Division. 3. OPORD 153-66 (MAPD) dated 24 August 1966 covering wratection of the rice harvost in the TUf AN and HIM R1OW Valley and security of the

VUN RO Bay/Pas area.

4. OPLAN 16-6 (('onti eney CW SON) dated 16 Soptoaber 1966 covering relaf of the CUNG SON Special r. omp if it should ame urder VCi'WA attack. (Plan not executed). 5. OPLAN 167-66 (Cotingency TAX CAW) dated 21 September 1966 covoring the rei iL of the VAN CAIN 3~eial "oroemi, if it shmld om under VC/fVA attack. (Plan not executed). 6. OnAN 168-66 (Operation NARS.L) dated 23 September 1966 coveing reinforcenent by the 1st Brigade, 01st Airborne Division in the PLINJ area. (Plan not ecuted). 7. OPM 169-66 (Operation MMH CARCLI) dated 25 September 1966 Covering the reinforcement of U.S. Xarina units in the D RAW5 area. (Plan not executed). 0. WUN 171-66 (Operation ALLM) dated 11 October 1966 covering the deployment of the '. Brigade, 2Cst Airborne Division to the 1 M area. (Plan not ex et. 9. OME 176-66 (Operation M MMI0) dated 25 October 1966 covering the deployament of the let Brigade, Jost Airborne Division to condurct search and destroy operations wet of TUr HOL and south of cu S01 . D. 0A15 and Inc1=ofre- 3-, . See Inalour I and 2 for Task Fores orgazintion iganization of Bar Area Support. r

chz

1. The following is a liAst of losses inflicted on the emnj the rporting periods 4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AWIDC
aR=Ti 12 November 1966 OpRW=omel Rort for Quarterly Period Sding 31 October 1966

YC/)WA IDA (PC) ~V/NVA MWA (2ST) VOAVAC Rallier. Detainees Individual Cre U4d 2. of operatio-

nta IA (UO) WAVNA IA (39?)

20
69 101 29/11 2

34

230 la~ 36/6

10 83 79 9 52

384
50

5
Intslligmoe Problem Areast Problem Areas -

cmwaalability of basic photo coverage of ira

imposed by the wilmer, operations are being mounted without the benefit of basic photo intelligence of the area. Since the Brigade is highly mobile and subject to deployment aRwhere throughout the country on very short noticep the current lead time of at least a week ad a half which it takes to **quire photography of a new area is inadequate. Recently a separate battalion was sent on a search and destroy operation in the RIM HOA area. Photography of the area was received approxiemtely one week after the operation ended. Basic coverage need not be exceedingly recent to be of value. Primarly it is used to determine defensive positions, major trails, landing zone, and provide other intolligenc to supplement mp information. The scale of the basic coverage need not be large either sice the primary reqUireaent is resolution. There are photo system available which provide better than 51 resolution at the scale of 1/25,000 which is completely adequato for basic coverage. The advantage of small scale photography is that a single mission *an caer a larIp area in a sbort period of tim. For axmple, using An aircraft a single mission can be flown at a scale of l/,0D0 and cover an area of South Vietnam fro the Cambodian border to the coast in length and a all dee of latituds in width. Such a progrm# in fact, was copleted covering all of South Vietuam in 3963-196&. This photography is still being used, though it is outdated, by many intellpee age cies out of country simply because of the completenss of its coverae. Such a program, which, if flown every 6 months during opttme weather conditions for different sections of the country, would provide the photo-interpreter with comparative photograpbr, ensure basic coverage, and be avai'able on a ti*ly basis. The numer of photo missions now being flown by aircraft taking large scale photography eould be redeed eosiderably thereby speeding up the reaction ti of presently available aircraft and ensurIng that intelligence of a tactical nature was disseminated on a more timly schedule. Action Taken: lJ-I A progam of this nature would have to be

Disssons Dues to thie limted facilities and the restrictions

M28 CK00Ol

0524009 Sep 66, let Bri&ad, 23240CM Oct 66.

11st Airborne Division.

2-SITl~ #296 230001

SITr #298 250001 - 252400H Oct 66. st Brigade, 101t Airborne Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ki

CONFIDENTIAL
5Ipf3T. Operaional ROport for QUrterly Period 3ning 31 October 1966
(VI8 trFm-65) (U) AVE-C 1 oebr16

1. o woordinated at & bighu level than this -. adquartm sinc It yea "~do wdt her OW o0i 0"M MA at repipewlUtt. a *VOi MOSIM r,1ested that basic coverage of its area of egrmtronm at an aeeeptable scalo of lA5,00 and has suggested the above mentioned program to the 0-2 Air, I Field Force 1i7ettam.
F. Personnel. 1. Unit Strengtht at th 4~517 conclusion of the rqort-

a. Brigade personnel streng ing period war& os follow. hathoriaed Augmented (H?02) Assigned Present for Buty ase Ma~p - PIU RAO Net Yrevent for Duty b.

66

56 1002)

597

Unit strengths as of 31 October 1966 (assigned). Off lot Bn (Abn), 327th 2nd Bu(Abn),327th 2nd Bn (Abn),S502nd 2nd Bn (Abn), 320th HHC, let Bde Support On 326th ftgr 2/27 0ev 181 Mi 20th cow Inf Inf Int Arty

37 35
36

35 55

WO 1 1 1 3 1" 0 0 1 0

56 5

E 803 ?99 84a2 49O

540o
11o0 200 181. 16

8 1

c. The assigned strength was 125 pms t of the authorized augmented strength. The present for duty strength was 12 percent of the authorized augmented strength. d. and 2 detahed. a. Sice the last report, consderable progress has been made in improving strength accounting. The to priry areas - hoe pitaised and intransit personnel - continue to exist, however, during this quarter, the following corrective action was te .nt (1) P transit Parsonmsl - a viRnrea program to purge from urit morning reports all personnel assigned, not Joined, was inltiate. Otis hundred and te personnel who, on arrival in Vintwa wuv diverted to other unit@, were identified. A toax free USARV visited the igadet identify by name those men oa.rried not present for duty. As a result of these actions, over 250 personnel were dropped from the assigned strength of the Brigade. (2) Rospitalied personnel - a centralized control point for processing the reasignent of all medical evacuees was established by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnaym, on 25 &Wut 16. This nysten has worked well in insuring the reassignment of personnal who are edicall evacuated out of Vietnaw. On 26 October 1966, United Staten Army Vietnem extended thin concept to provide for the reasigment to a central medcal holding dotachwnt of persononel who are admitted to hospitals in V2tn. Upon release fr t the hospital, these personnel arwe reassigned back to their forwr unit. This procdure wil eliminate the 6 Of the not present for duty strength, 3U were in tv it,

75 on MR, 66 MrY, 53 leave, 23 in confinemmt, 30 in hospital, 7 AL

CONFIDENTIAL

.1
L 4

CONFIDENTIAL
AVE..C SUBI&WT: 12 November 1966 Operational Report for C'u2terly Period Ending 31 October 1966

(MRs oSF-65) (U)

9flaaec ngllm

9t~t stn
2.

*Aseciee with boepitalieed pereamwol me

Casualties

a. Casualties for the period (1 August thru 31 October 1966) were as follows: Operation JOHN PAUL JONE I 23
1

Operation 26

MAJU

WA
MIA b.

U2
0

169
0

Total casualties to date are as follows: KiA WU MIA 317 1713 2

3. Personnel Programs: The following programs were initiated and/or continued during the reporting period: a. hsiorialization: A memorsjisation board was established during the reporting period. This board will coord4.nate the memorialization of Brigade facilities at its Base Camp to honor troopers who have made the supreme sacrifice on the field of battle. b. Athletics- In conjunction with long range athletic programs for the PHil RANG base area, the Brigade received and distributed 30 company sized athletic and recreation kits to units in the Brigade. These kits provide a variety of sports and rocreational equipment sufficient to meet the needs of a company sized unit. c. Accuracy of Personnel Records: To insure that personnel records reflect complete and accurate data on all pere:nmel, a comprehensive records check was initiated. Because of tactical deployment of the Brigade, it we necessary to move the records frow base camp to the forward area to provide each individual trooper an opportunity to review and a-date his recordr. During this period 167 officers and 2637 enlisted men reviewed their porsodal files. d. Sponsor Program. The sponsor program for incoming officers was continued. This program includes a personal letter from the Brigade Commander to each incomirg officer and offer any further assistance required. Purpose of the program is to stimulate a feeling of "belonging" to the Brigade before arrival as well as to answer ar questions the newly assigned officer may have. a. Awards and Decortionst In addition to citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat, the following award and decorations were presentedi

a
OFF 16 0

_
0 12

S s)
38

Ma
74

U
1

a AMv
9

2V
12

14L OlD
15 63

M
0

Wo
EM 21

30
1

1
0

0
2

3
134

0
324

0
188

0
815

0
8

65 198

29

- let Bde, 101st Abn Div S1 Section Journal dtd 9 Noveber 1966. 2 - Ur. SIT 7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDEN TIAL
AVBD-C SUBJEM: Operational Report for Quarterly Period (ECS CSPMt.65) (u) 12 November 1966 ding 31 Otober 1W /
D

received an

2. WlErted Fractio: Driag the perfllsed the follevIh enlistod aoint;s

the Zrigade
allocations

E4
403 Miust September 441

35

B5
7

97
5 0

M
1 0

IV
0 0

163 79 139 64

October

66

19

g. P&f: The Brigade utilized 913 out of country R&R quotas during the period. At the present rate of llcation, 81.6% of the Brigade's personnel will be able to take an P0. Breskcsn far the period is as followsa Officers August September October 12 Warrant Officers 0 0 2 Relisted 3M M0 276

9 3M

hows visited the Brigade during the h. us0 Shows: Toe period. They performed for approximately 4 hours for the troops located at Tuy Hoa South. is Admniistrative Schools A Quarterly Adinistrative School was established to provide the highest caliber of administrative support for the Brigade. The Adjutant General has the responsibility for conducting the program of instruction. Attendance at the school is required for unit morning report cleyks, unit first sergeants, and battalion personnel staff NOt0. J. Postal Activities: Postal Activities involved the establishment of a postal school by the Adjutant General. The purpose is to provide the best possible postal service for the personnel of the Brigade. The response to this program was evident by the comment from the postal inspection by United States Army Vietnam on 27-30 September 1966. It was noted that mail was being expoditiovi1y proc~esed to "o troops in the field and that all aspects of postal operations aid activities were being met. k. Red Cross: (1) The Red cre j Recreational Unit began an acoelerted program during the period. The ysung ladies made weekly visits to TUT HOA to distribute literature and serve in the mess lines. The response to this progran has been excellent. (2) Following is a breadown of services rendered by the Red Cross during the period: AS Oc2t TOTAL Requests Received Leave Disability & Oovt Benefits Health & Welfare Reports Personal Problem FalyProb Others 31 38 6 321 1,002 102 28 18 0 U 667 M2 21.4 87 39 24 X

37

37

7 224 24 8
8_1

Total Served

3M 329 33f

- 975;

1. Brigade Officere ML3& tay Jntice Lecture: This two hour lectire was given to all officers in the Brigade and covered recent

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-C TBWECT: 12 November 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Lbtober 19&6 (2C8 aSz..65) (U) The lecture developments in the law as they pertain to military justice. counsels in Special Courts-Martial.
also pointed out the duties and responsibilities of the trial and defense

In addition, emphasis was placed on

the regulations and directives pertaining to the admirnistration of military justice in Vietnam. me Language Aids: English-Vietnamese language cards are being printed with short phrases, rank structure, weapons, days, and numbers. Distribution of these cards will be made down to team leaders. 4. Personel Planning:

a. Coordination continued for the scheduled rotation of approzinately 900 personnel during the month of December 1966. The Brigade request to spread this rotational hump from 7 November to 21 December was disapproved by Headqarters Unitad States Anw Vietnam. However, in case where the individual's replacement has arrived he may be reassigned to CHUS in advance of his normal DEROS. This is expected to facilitate the rotation of this large group of personnel. In addition, DERS personnel and replacements will be processed in and out of CAN RANH BAY effective on or about 1 November 1 6. b. An Arm Postal Unit organized at 0 strength was attached to the Brigade on 1 October 1966. The arrival of personnel to fill this unit will perait better postal service in the forward area and release of troopers presently engaged in postal activities at the Brigade Base Camp. 5. Problem Areas: Administrative problem areas ercountered during the reporting period included the following: a. Shortages or crltical ltS's, although reduced from the previous reporting period$ contirsied to exist. Cooks, aechanics, medical specialists, and wiremnire the most critical enlisted shortages. Shortages of 2 Aircraft Maintenance Officers and I Medical Service Corps Officer have continued throughout the period. b. The accelerated promotion of officers, particularly to the grade of captain, caused increased imbalances ik grade. Corrective action has included the diversion of majors and captains and the requisitioning of additional officers in the grade of lieutenant. 6. 7. orale: Morale remained "EXCELfT throughout the period. Staff:

Comnnders and Principa a.

Brigade Headquartrs: BG Willard Pearson COL Chester B. McCoid Be CO DCO

LTC Harry A. Buckley X0 1TC Donald E. Rosenblum S3

MU Jerry L. Demzn ML Harold P. Austin YMJ Marvin Rosenstein al 82 S4

MU Stephen C. Doherty
b. Battalion Commanders: LTC Joseph 1. Col.lins

85

CO, Tt

Bn (Abc), 327th Inf

ITC Joseph Z. Wasco LTC thward P. Abood

0, 2d Bc (Abu), 327th In! CO, Spt Ba

W, 2d Ba (Aba), 50d Inf LTC Frank L. Dietrich LTG William R. Madden Jr.CO, 2d fn (Abn), 320th Arty

CONFIDENTIAL

"

-;

' .... . ...

' .. .. .; .. '

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-C SUIJECT: 12 November 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Inding 31 Oatcher U366

(ma CSILU.40) (U)

a. Separate Campaniea: CPT Richard R. Maglin CT Robert & Steirar CPT Lloyd K. bardner C0, 2d Sqdn (Abn), 17th Car C0, Co A (.bn), 326th 3W CC, H!C, Ist Bds

1. Gafl. There were no major changes in the concept of logThe Brigadels Ewase Camp istical operations during the reporting period at PW; RANG continued to receive all classes of supply through the PHAW RAZH BAY or directly ANG Sub Area of the US Army Support Ceoand at CAM RAI. Units in the f rward area received Class I and V from CAM RA directly through the TUT HOA Sub Area of the US ArqT Support Command CAM =7 BAT. At the close of the reporting period a command decision was made to place the Brigade S-reon's office under Si staff euperviaion where it could be more closely correlated with thm casualty reporting activities of that section. 2. ORGANIZATION FOR WUPPORT a, &mort Battalirn:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control function of the Forward Sipport Element (iSE) located in the Brigade AO. It was organized into command, operations, comua ications and movement control elements. (2) Administrative Detachment: Provided for personnel actions, pay, and mail service to the forces in the forward srea. (3) Supply Detachment: Assumed responsibility for the receipt, storage and issue of all classes of supply. It also included a rigger team.

(4) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engina r, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery team, and contact team.
capmy D, 326th Medical Battalion: Established a (5) clearing station with an dO bed capacity, surgical section, holding section, emergency treatment section, and a dental section. b. Laurry and Bath Service: Was provided by TOT HOA Sub Area, US Army Support Command, CAM PRN Bay. Th , element established a shower udb and laundry service at TUY H0A South Airfield and a shower unit at TIY HOA North. c, Water: Was provided by Company A, 326th Engineers utilizing a 1500 gallon erdalator at TY HCA North Airfield throughout the reporting period. Additionally a 600 gallon erdalator was established TRE for a short time Units at in the forward area -f operations at DONG TOY HCA South Airfield received water from a water point establimed by HCA Sub Area. At the close of the reporting period, an additional tho TUY 3000 gallon erdalator was placed in service by the TOY HOA Sub. Area in the vicinity of PF HIEP, South of TOY HOA. d. raves Registration: Was provided by*T Y HOA Sub Area which located a collection point adjacent to Company D, 326th Medical Battalion at TOY HOA South Airfield. 3. MATFRI AND SERVICES: 10

CONF IDENTIAL

CONF IDENTI AL
AVBD-0 SUBJECT: 12 November 1966 Operational Report for uarterly Period Ending 31 Oetober 196 (Rs Csn-6 ) (u) a. %nfly: (1) Class I: "B" and "C" rations were consued regularly throughout the reporting ps'iod by forward elements. "A" ration supplements were consumed regularly by personnel at the Brigade Base Camp at PHAN RANlG. "A" ration supplements were received in the forward area. Throughcut several phases of the reporting period there were shortages of starches, ground coffee, fresh vegetables, ice, condiments and sugar* The amount of Class I issued equaled 808 short tons during the reporting period. (2) Class II and IV: The Support Battalion provided the bulk cf all 111 and IV supplies via direct support 0V-2 aircraft. TUY HOA Sub Area furnished the majority of barrier naterials. A total of 130 short tone were exended during the rep-ting period, (3) Class III: All classes of POL were received from the TUY OCA Area, Consumption for the reporting period totaled 847 Sub short tons. (a) (b) MOGAS DIESEL 170,625 gallons 50,200 gallons 21,225 gallons

(c) AVGAS

(4) Class V: The Brigade began all operations with its basic load of azun tion. All units, with the exception of 2/320 Arty continued to deploy with the on individual and on vehicle portion of the basic load, while Support Battalion retained responsibility for transporting and maintaining the bulk portion of the b;sic load. The 2/320 Artilery assumed responsibility for deploying its entire basic load Shortages of the fc -'Tng ite a were ex-. ri enced dur tn- the reporting period: (a) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Yellow,

(b) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Green.

(c) (d)

Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Violet. Cluter, Star, Ground.

(5) Maintenance: During the reporting period, command emphasis was placed c" all phases of the maintenance program. A Material Readiness Assistance. Team was requosted -ron US ArPy Victnam. The team conducted a courtesy ,inspection of subordinate units and completed its activities Just prior tj the close of the reporting period. This inspection revealed that .ome additional effort was required in the areas of small arms maintenance and records keeping. In spite of this, the Brigade achieved a decidedly low deadline rate throughout the entire reporting periods (a) The following number of job orders were received and completed during the reporting period: RECEIVED I Automotive 2 Animett Sgnal 281 546 954 COMPLETE 275 542 920

31

CONFIDENTA4L

.4-

CONFIDENTIAL
AM=ET, OpraUonal Report for Quarterly Period Ws1in& 31 Cs sUobe (zSfldGa ) (U) 6

D*Lea
j
6 r trument Servie

25%r
203 295 2M 291

T1Rco eota
(b) Transportatioa:

I Veld.alart Land transport rmadned the primary means of traznportJ.on from CAM RANH Bar to the Brigade Bale Cap at PM RAG. The use of vehicles in the forward ara" continued to be restrted. Approximtate.ly one third of the Veilee organic to the Brigade an attached units were utilized in the forward area. During the reporting period there van increasing use of land LWC's to convoy supplies from TUT HOA to outlying areas.

2. Air Transort: Air tr:naport by direct support CV2 flight from the P IM RANG Base Camp to TVY BOA remained the primary Means of bringing Mms 11 and IV item, personnel and mail forward. Normally, two CV2 alrcraft were received on a daily basis. In adition to sorties to and from base camp one sortie per week was Mode to NUL TRANG to obtain medical supplies. In addition, several sorties par week of C-123 and C-130 aircraft were received for the purpose of hauling bulk cargo. Sorties and total tonnage flown by direct support C72 aircraft were as folios SORTIS kgut SHORT TONS h22

September
October
(4s) Ar Resupply:

16

19

433

227

466

Throughout the reporting period,

runpb to comitted units was almoet exclusively by U1-ID helicopter, while CH-47 helicopters were used to displace &nd resupply the artillery.
The tollowing toenago was 24/ted by helicopter during the reportig periodt

37% algust September 363 October 383

Total 1121 Short tons

4.
(ZaclcsUrw 5)

NEICAL:

a. A simplifed medical evacuation request form was introduced durlng the reporting period. It simplified and expedited medevac reqmmsts. b.

Significant Diseases:

AUGUST Malaria ScrubTyphus Oastroentritie

epatitie N-P Problem Venereal lisease -12

SEflNU3ER

OCTOER 48 2

69 0

29 0 7 98

45 3 25
2

5
210

4
307

CONFIDENTIAL
-j

ii i i iiili I

i i I i

iiiil I

ii ii

CONFIDENTIAL
AVD-C SUBJECT. 12 November 1966 OPraticW9 Report for Qlrterly Peric' Ending 31 0t5ter 1966

4r

(M3 Ciani ) (U)

EA-UsT
FUC Respiratory Infections Heat Injury Skin Disorders H. Civil Affairs. 193 3 4 25

SZP"tR 48 10 55

OTO8D 116 11 2 82

i. Generals During this reporting period elements of the Brigade operated in three provinces, NfNH TAN, PW YN and KHAH HOA. The Greatest efforts in Civil Affains/Civic Action activities wre mad in PHU YE; Province, where the bulk of the Brigade operated during this period. Efforts in NINH TUAN, Province, where the Brigade Rear Area is located were directed mainly towards maintaining liaison with local OW officials and providing scme limited support to local Civic Action Projects. Operations in UHAN HOA Province were limited to providing support for tactical elements of the Brigade which operated, briefly, in that Province. 2. Civil Affairs: a. The most notable accomplishment of the Brigade in the field of Civil Affairs, during this reporting period, was the initiation cf the FW YEN Province Team Meetings. These were a regularly scheduled series of mectings between the Province Chief, all of his US Advisors (MACV, USAID, JUSPAO, OSA, and Police), and the Brigade Commander. These meetings provided a fortm for frark open discussion of nutual problems and for exchange of information on the various US sponsored programs being conducted within the province. Theso meetings were reinforced in their effectiveness by similar meetings at the Battalion-District Level. b. Other Civil Affairs activities included the maintenance and expansion of price stabilization, community relations, and t0(W cooperative efforts initiated during the Brigadels entry into its currunt AO. 3. Civic Action activities included the fclloings

a.

Civic Action ProJects Reported: Health and Sanitation Public Works

Transportation

8b 33
30

Labor, Commerce and Industry Agriculture and Natural Ru ource Education and Trainiag Public Affairs Comunity Relations Psychological Warfare and Cmmuncatione Refugee Assistance Public Welfare TOTAL REPO E PROJECTS

20 19 14 30 53 14 23 320

b. *Jadiem Shmw* operatios vere only conducted 3 tindurirc this roporting period. Difficulties encountered in conducting this high impact, short duration operation built around a S"Medicine Show" - ;. visiting ECAP (Medicial Civic Action Program) team and including security forces, psychological operations and intelligence persomel. These operations attempt, while performing civic actions, to influence the people towards GW and gain information concerning the hamlet VC infrastructure. 13

CONF IDENTItAL

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CONFIDENTIAL
AV
SUBJECT VPS O-ational Report for 12 oe r 1966 MrterlY Period Ening 31 Gtber 16 M

W 8 OR..$) (M
t opeesatin gem (1) Lack of troops to secure the operatio.s

(2) District OfficialA being unlling to divert effort from the Coukct of the rice harvest. (3) A shortage of MOW supplies.

va" a cambined 55,31 opration which C* These Opra. incladed civic action, psychological warfare and intelig nee personmel and which had the mission oft (1) (2) COOnaotimg civic aUetiW Oathering inUtlligenoe inforuation. Conducting psyeholofical operations.

(3)

(4) Getting the local GO officials eloer to the people, One of the operations nw fairly successful and resulted in h C KI (BC), 5VC captured and 1 suspected V being arrested by the National Police. d. Us' , l-.'s obtained from the ORemote Area HandbookO, specifications were dran up, plans madae,ad contracts let, for the procurement of 10 3gle Brand* hand operated washing schines. The purpose of this project was multifoldi (1) To provide washing machines for local inatitutional (orphanage, dispensary and hospital) use. (2) To stimulate the local eoneW.

(3) To help establish a new product which could be localy wmufactured and sold. a. A Brigade Voluntary Civic Action Pund and fud Council was established. This should prove useful in 1 funds for certain civic action projects which cannot be financed by appropriated funds. f. The major civic action project of the Brigade during this period was the support and protection of the fall FM I Province rice harvest. k total of I33.5 metric tons of rice wor harvested and reported. This represents 89% of the origimal Province barwet goal of 9500 mtric tons. The were furnished 6 2%tons trucks from 3 Septamber to 25 October and 1 light tactical raft from 13-21 Septembear to suppor the rice harvest. local officials expressed satisfaction for the protect~An provided the rice harvest. It is believed that only a munate portion of the harvest fell into Viet Cong hands. go During this period, Tam 9, Ulat Civil Affairs Company was detached from operatiowa control of this Brigade %w leaves oaly one Civil Affaire To (CA Tem 2$, last CA Ce) attadah to this arigade. This, in viesw of the widely separated areas covered by the Brigade, leaves the Brigade soommhat m-derstaffeA for Civil Affairs opamtion a a I. Chemical.

1. Ohemical fappwt provided was principally in the offdive use of iot Control Agents (RCS) and contitnal flea thrower preparation. The Biade only used one method of HOA dissemination during the reporting period, dlvery of 1(7 A3 CS filled grenades by expended 2.75 inch rocket pods from lov flring UN-= helicopters. O14

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CONFIDENTIAL
ii
AVBD-C SUBJECT 12 November 1966 Operational Report for Qurterl:, Period Dtling 31 a- ober 1966 (X3B CSFOR-65) (U)

2. Oft rta~ve tuvmil systM em'a lisfecnnd containing about 1OO meters of deep tunnel. After thorough searching and mapping by
Agineerap the tunnels were contaminated with C and sealed by explosives. ApproklmatelY 330 pounds of bulk CS were used in this operation, extending During this tunnel operation the KM MITE blower over a four day period. was used to a limitd degree since personnel were going to explore the tunnel system. There is an inherent danger in pumping the tunnels full of colored or white samoke and then entering for a search. 3. During Operation JO PAUL J0I0, ending on 5 September 1966, a total of three offensive strikes were conducted. All strikes were conductod using the UH-iD to drop X? A3 CS filled grenades. The first drop was made on a secondary target since the 'primary had fled by the time the RKA chopper arrived. This action painted up the need for a more respomenive system since likely targets tend to disperse unless engaged ruickly. This problem was solved by patting a helicopter on RCA strip alert during the day and utilising this same ship for flares at night. The second mission was conducted on the pr:.-t.nzy target; dug-in personnel on z hill side. As a result of unusual metesological conditions the burning CS did not drift up over the target and the results were considered to be minimal. The third mission was conducted on a suspected VC location and was mde at first light. Weather conditlone were perfect and the CS olmd remained in the area for approximately 20-30 minutes.

4. During Opertion SWARD only one RCA aerial mission was flown. This mission was made against suspected VC ambush sites and proved very effective in contaminating the hillside on which the ambush sites were known to be located. In addition to the RCA strike, the large tunnel com4 plex mentioned in parAgrajt P nbovu wqs 6: suvurod and destroyed during Operation SEJAR.
5. Durng this operation period 2 fl59 Cluster, rannister, CS bomblats wore obtained from the RON units departing this area. These 239's have an area coverage of incapacitating CS of approxdmately 25,000 square meters. In addition to the E159's each infantr7 battalion was issued two (2) 38's for ground employment of RCA CS on an imradiate basis.
6* a 4 October 1966 the Commanding General, lot Brigade, 101st Airborne Division initiated a letter to the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam concerning the present herbicide program. The present system has proven to be not as responsive as could be on certain operations to hit known VC crop in sufficient time to kill these crops. A recosendation was made that Sector FAC's be authorized to fly specially modified 0-1 aircraft so they could spray VO crops at proper times. These missions

would not be flown without prior approval of the Province Chiof. J. Enginee: (A Co, 326 &igr En Abn)

Operat I.us.
a b. Number of days in tactical operations: 86.

Mrmary engineer task was the sweeping of roads for mines. Opn JOFl PAUL JONE 2000 km of road swept Opn SEWARD 2200 km of road swept No mines destroyed/removed: 51

o. Attached as Tab A to Inclooure 9 to After Action Report

SWARD (Inclodure 2) is letter, Subject: Viet Cong Mines dated 23 September 1966, which outlines thu Brigade exrerience in r,.ate ndinig.

CONFIDENIAL

t4

CONF IDENTiAl_
AV-C
3BJKCT: 12 November 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Fnding 31 Oct 66 (RCS CSFc -65) (U) / d# The Driui dUscovered, 601=" V4 dntred ai gXtenmive tunnel system in lat September and the report is attached as Tab B to Inclosure 9 to After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (Inclosure 2). 2. Training. a. Total number of days in training; foot bridgeo c. 2 days spent in developing technique and proficiency in ladder exits from CH-47 helicopter and rappeling from cliffs. Concurrent training was conducted on familiarization and zeroing of the M-16 rifle. 3. Civic Action Froject a. 85 loads of fill material were deli vered and leveled for a Vietnamese school in TUY BOA. b, 31 loads of fill were hauled to TIN LIN4 Church in TOT HCA. Project was 50% complete when work was halted due to flooding of the area. 4,

b. 2 days devoted to assembly/disassembly of the floating

K. Signal communications instructions were cmducted concurrent witFloperations in the following areasa 1. General radio-telephone operating procedures and cammunications security,
2. In installation and operations procedures and communications security. L. Psycholog.l Warfare% The Brigade considers the Psychological Warfare e rttBe an extremely important adjunct to ground tactical operations. Leaflets are delivered primarily by a U-10 aircraft and a OH-h7 aircraft, both of which are assigned to the 5th Air Commando Squadron which is based at NHA TRANG. At times, organic aircraft have been utilized to drop leaflets or broadcast Psychological Warfare tapes. During Operation JOHN PAUL JONES, 9,083,000 leaflets were durpped and 58 hours of broadcasting time was utilized. The leaflets dropped and the tapes broadcast included 8 speci-" leaflets and 6 special tapes. During Operation SEWARD, 5,47,000 leaflets were dropped an! 60 :urs of broadcast time was utilized. There were 7 special leaflets and 4 special tapes made for 0erition SEWARD. Operation OFRONIMW I was one day old at the close of the reporting period and on that day 143,000 leaflets were dropped in sup.port of the operation. During the interim period between Operation Sa'ARD and Q&RONIMO I there were h25,OO0 leaflets dropped and 2 hours of broadcast time utilized. The majority of the broadcasts were made from aircraft, however, ground mobile speakdr teams have been utilized by the front line Infantry Battalions. See Inclosure 7 with Tab A to After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (Inclorure 2).

16

CONF tDFITJAL

.1

CONFIDLNTtAL
AVBD-C MJWECTS

I?

12 November 1966 0perational Report for uarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RO;S csFOiR-65) (U) SECT'ION 2 (C) OeemeraObsrvatot.aulRooamndatlons

Part I Observations (Lessons loarned) A. General.

Although the igade had an excellent kill rate during the re0crtlg period the problem re ir one of target acquisition And reduced reaction time when the ene is detected. In order to improve the kill rate In forth cmirN: operations the BrtCade will ut.lize the concept of "semi-guerril a tactics" i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics during -earth and destroy operations until contact is made and then operate oon-vntionally using all avadlable firepw er, nobility and reserves. The basic principleas of semi-guerrilla warfare have bew published for the guidance of all concerned. (Sea Incl 4).

1.

Items

Stay behind forces.

Discussion. Following the exploitation of B2 strikes battalions were extracted fr m the irua leav4 ng two racor dssance platonc with seven days rations as "stay behind" forces. After three days the platoons reported infiltration of enemy forces back into and through the area. Thv area was assaulted again by US forces utilizing the "stay behind" forces to secure LZ's and block routes of exfiltratidn from the area. Observation. A "stay behind" force should be ut~lla.d to capitalize on thEe e'nemyf tRw~mi~y tO 1'utUrfl to beade arnam after US forces have departed. 2. Item: Exploitation of B52 strikes.

Discussion. In exploitation of B52 strikes the Brigade conducted aireobile assaults directly into the strike area within 20 mites following the bombing. This method of exploiting strikes was effective and reduced the time required to get combat troops into the area. 9!ervaMja2.n By conducting rapid airmobile assaults directly time to reorganize into E52 strike araa the dazed enemy is given litto or evacuate the area.

3.

Ite.

Displacement of Co6pany CP's. are capable of fi4ag the location and Several probes -wlJ1 likely be made to careful rehearsal the VC will conduct a kill the maximum number of personnel possible.

Discussiou. The VC internal layout of t&Mcal C'. verify their information. After well supported attack on a CP to and capture as much equipment as

Observation. Company CP's should be relocated at least . every forty eg 4. jt. Interrogation techniques.

Discussion. Interrogation techniques shou3d be oriented to n addition to the conventional ! line of questioning. the local guiWr Interrogation at the local guerrilla level will aid in the production of timely intelligence for the small unit commander.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AV1ED-C SUMT 1I flovmber 1966 Operation~al Report for Quarterly Per-iod Endirig 31"Oetober 2966 Part I Observations (Lessona Learned) Obcervaties.. I%*unit comander should prepare a list of questions5 whih be WU3 lke the M interrogator to ask the detainee and IN team$ shoiuldl be attacl'sd at battalion level. 5. TtemP~cb7 trrps.

Discussion. Personnel shw.nld be sitrsmely cautious upon discovering a-noPr-wbooby trap since it is often the bait for a nore erfctive, better concealed booby trap. Obemtion. Discovery of a =mmt~Y# cLbrious bcc* a . --

warrants a thoro"Fh,
6. Items

a entl search of the area for a better ooncea.L-.

Clearng of vi114ga.

noro effective booby trap.

be Discussion. An effective technique which cart employed to surround it at r~ight and use artillery illumination ea a vilIMge-e -to to flutsh out the tO. Observation. Use of this technique catches the eamy off guard and preclaudes- avng innoent civilian hampse troop movement. ?. Ita Wi fires.

tflsoeuiaons Since a basic problem is ma. of target acquisition the us* of ro-U1 r- baa been restricted to Indfes the oessy to swain in the area of operations. Additionally, 3udicioua us. of Wi fires reduces questionable amution eapemitu andt the resultant logistical support. It appears tactically unsound to %mie routine fires at night am a defetsive t~chnique when the Bigade has superiority in for", reserves, moblity and Lwavation and to actively seeking omtact Observation. HU1 fires should be used to interdict eneq hae broken contact following an engagement, UFia. azwn assembly areas and when enemy forces out nuaer ours and are prepared to attkak.

agres routes
8.

Items

Casualty evacuation.

Discussion. When too man troops becom involved in the evacuation of M~rA'IA, tactical amesntus can be loet. Cosualtier have ocoured as a result of soldiers attempting to aid their comaes, only to become casualties thamelves. Observation. Walking wouwWe should be used when possible to assist the se-los~wounisd'while the troops contine attacking the enemy, driving him off and clearing the field for casualty evacuation. 9. ies Cwound Immidiate Action Pbroee

Discussion. FreqUafttly Whent reQOm=iaeaI2Q elemaent mike contact, enm friees exfiltrate the area as the Wtrmbile imieiiate action force is being lifted into the ae" When possible a ground in-1 mediate action forca should infiltrate an area on foot at the ane time the reonnaiaaance elements are inserted into the aroa. izunediate aR observtion, ono Infiltration of i sisable ground force peamsite newy contacts. 18

CONFIDENTI AL

CONFIDENTIAL
AVE-C SUBJECT 12 November 1966 Operational Report fcr Quarterly PNriod E&dirg 31 October 1966 CRS CSFOR-65) (U)

PeL I Obervations (Zesa

Learned)

10. Items VC mining of roads in the BriCade area of operations requires a mena to counter this threat. In spite of patrolling an. ambushes, the VC Discus ';n, ur in order to inflict losses on friendly unita. continue to rFeh AN/PIC - 3 mine It has been found tmat sweeping the roads using te detector can effectively locate almost all mines, even those that have a low metal content. To be effective the seep mst be conducted on fc+ During Operstions JMN PAUL JONIS and SWARD, over 500 Ica of mad vi.-" swept, and approximately 50 mines were discovered. The rigade seuff :"d no and lost but me ehicle to these mines. casaties Observation . Carefa sweeping of roads fr min s an efof road.o tennst y counterVCeTf ailato inflict losses by s t means of controllingcaeeping at pase tiee and

fectiv

c necesar. c.MvoY Is2. Itemna A

Diries

on.

In September sniping at

nineer mine sweeping

This was countered inrnee dA arh TUY AN idreased betwe g pari madh '-. party. wit the sec increasing the flank securih fla Ii itally flank ederrate .h e-. Thip action did creen the actual ecame engaged Queast ci .y mid the intensity of these pagemets ina particularly hctp enwntero ecreased in late Septemer fire ware called in m the area fro which the eue airtriks +toca was coming. A three dvy serch and detroo cstion was mounted in the iately thereafter. Althoah fln seurty was alintaiod the area o

st2iping actvm:y sg.ifieanty decreased.

Observation. Sniping at convoys and sweep parties can b by concerted counter actions with troops cnSled "t least partTa and/or airstrikes. Particularly,-these measres nolude tha us- of cavalry units with convoys, cavalz7 platoo= on strip alr, PAC or AO overhead and the eomumder of the cavalry troop cent.olling froma an H-13. 12* item: A =as was required to de-3troy/deny a large annal

complex.
Discussion. The tunnel complex, with a total length of 14DO

meters, was dag in very strong, stable sll, The tunnels were about 53
feet in cross-section and had 12 to 17 fet of overhead cover. Reports indicated that the gas generator tunnel destruction kit wes not effective in destroying tunnels with more than six feet overhead cover. Initial test shots intiosted that collapsing the tunnels with conventional demolition would not be practical. B%s of CS powder were 'sed to cautairats

the tunnel interiors and conventional demolitions were used to close all entrances, thus preserving the efitectivenass of the uootamination.
CS powder and couventi onal demolitions can Obse -atione large turel eyste=. -'r be used to da,7

13. items

Land lines of coudnicatia arn required for suppIl

routes and momnt of heay vehicles in all weather. TIDang the monsoon season the bypasses which Discussion. were capletel satisfsactory in the dry season become completely impassable to traffic. Fords which have been a matter of inches deep become

torrents, in one case rising from 18 inches to more then 7 feet in less than 3 hours. In one location, large cul1ex-s were washed out three das in succession before attempts to maintsin the hjnpss by culverts were 19

CONFI DENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-C SUBJECTs 12 November 1966 Operati-nal .port for Quarterly Period Ernding 31 uctober 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) 2 Part I (bservatins (Lercne Learned) DridigL the gaps above th.e high water nut was the onl mw aebedone. to insure uninterrupted traffic flw. In one case, the hurried installation of a light tvctical raft crossed a limited number of vehicles over a "f or d" that had become ten feet deep. Observation. During the monsoon 5a5on fords and bypasses are only fair weather friends.ebridges and, in same cases, rafts p:%-"Ade the only dependable means of crossing traffic in all weather. C. Intelligence: 1. Items Enemy logistical shortages.

Diseusion- The enemy is comnistently short of medical supplies. Th7o sTW7fi e has caused an exeopticnally high rate of malaria among the enemy forces. In aidition, VC and guerriila troops are often armed with only grezde indicating a shortage of weapons among thefe forces. Interrogation reports and discoveries of weapons caches lend credence to the possibility that ammnition stores are in demand. The enemy, whether VC or 1VA forces, traditionally has no intent to engage in sustained combat. Observation. The lack of supplies does not have as great an impact on enemy forces as might be believed since their tactics are not based on sustained engagements. Although their recuperativ powers are inferior, cmapensation is offerea by the fact that contact on ,.12 established lines is nou-eistent, offering the enemy ample time to refit and reorganize at his leisure. His tendency, whether by choice or otherwise, to carry, a amall basic load is a distinct vulnerability. 2. Items Duration of engagements.

Dtscussion. The tactics of the enemy ars to avoid major contact unless hfla -assured an overwhelming advantaRge. Normally this of would include night combat, with poor visibility, and the absence of friendly artillery. Thus success in obtaining enemy kills and enemy weapons is most often obtained in short meeting engagements. Observation. Since the enemy is bent upon avoiding sustained comat all ef ortsa-Cbe mcde to obtain maximm results from all meeting engagements. Commanders must advocate aggressive and immediate actions to preclude abrupt lons of contact and subsequent escape of the enemy.

3. Item:

Fbod procurement by eneta

forces.

Discussion. Visual reconnaissance and photographic coverage has clearly il aatd large numbers of cultivated areas and herds of cattle in unpopulated and unexploited territories. These areas are undoubtedly a source of enemy food. Denial from major productive areas has had significant effects upon enemy stores, however, it has far from starved the enemy. Observed areas of food production must also be denied the enemy. Observation. The use of crop destruction and defoliation are a mea.ns wherebySaditional pressu-e can be applied to the enemy. Cattle in unfriendly territcries should be extracted, or, when that is not feasible, destroyed by GM forces.

4.

Items

Use of TW teams.

Discussion. The recent change in processing, categorizing, and 20

CONFIDE N IAL

CONFIDENTLQL
AVBD-C SUBJEOT: 12 November 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Pert I Oberstica (Western LeaniG)

handling of prisoners ham resulted in modifications of operational procedures. All prisoners mast be categorised by qualified Brigade personnel and appropriately processed. This system necessitates the transport of large mmbers of prisoners to the Brigade CP and taxes both their facilities and tFW personnel. The dispatch of IFW teams to operating battalions serves to alleviate most of this problem. Observations The employment of INP teams with coarntted battalions serves the ulpurpose of providing immediate tactical rogations as well as screening prisoners to determine their statuo. 5. Items Liaison with allied elements.

Discussion. Daily visits with CirO Camps and District Headquarters are c E b members of the intelligence staff. Information obtained is often dated 7 slightly and of varied reliability, however, experience in dealing with these sources soon prove their worth. These visits also serve to effect operational liaison and maintain rapport with scio eiements. Often it is possible to have CIDG units or Apache Teams conduct missions which augment our own capabilities* Observation. These liaison vr.sits have done much toward sup. plementing our intellience picture within the AO. D. Logistics: Item: Mtdevac Request Form.

Discussion: The original form for aerial medevac request included l line _-s-his created delays and confusion when requesting a medevac, particularly if commnications were poor or were relayed through another station. The medavac request form was greatly simplified and re-

duced to only 7 critical entries.

.Observation. possible, pariculrly E. Personnal: Item: Interpreters.

This incroased the responsiveness vf the

medevac system and eliminated corfusion. Routine report format must be kept as simple as when widely used at the lowest level. (See Incl 5).

Discussion: There are insufficient ARVN interpreters. Although the BrigadeThrequested 23 ARVN interpreters, not more than 15 were present for duty during the quarter. In order to supplement military interpreters, the Brigade has hired civilians through the permanent hire system. To date, nine livilian interpreters have been hired to be used in nonhazardous positions. Military interpreters formerly occupying these positions have been reassigned to combat elements. Observation: Hiring of civilian interpreters is of augmeinUg AMinterpreters. PART !I. Recommendations. an effective raans

A. That a minimum of four flyable CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade where supporting artillery is to be moved by an air route and

21

CONFIDENTIAL

CONF DELITIAL
AVW-C;

SUBJECT:

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (C cOR-65) (U) Sa

12 November 1966

ftrt I teervatiwes (Larsns Leane) forward logistical mupply pint. are established where no land ItC in available. Action Taken: Request made to CO, I Field Force Vietnam end approved.

B. That the use of ARVN CIDO and other indigenous para-ilitary forces (RY and PF units) in cooperation with US Forces continue to be maxinised to conserve and augment the fortee available to a US commander as wel as to improve the training, aggresaivenes, and confidence of the Vietnamese unit. ARVN Action Takent ltxma utilization is being made of para-wtlitary and ?rw'in al possible situatiow.

C. That consideration be given to limiting the use of CBU in air strikes throughout Vietnam. A high percentage of the bomlets do not explode an are later picked up by the Viet Cong and used in making booby traps and mines. Action Taken:

10lst Airborne Division through Headquarters, I Field Force to United States

bvy Vietnam with information to 7th Air Force. Approval has been granted by Headquarters, 7th Air Force to exclude the use of CR1 in missions flown in support of I Field Force tactical units.

Request by TWI 9-397A dtd 29 Sap 66 from ist Brigade,

D. That preparatirn of an LZ with Arty and Tac Air need not be habitually used since it is an indication to the enemy that we are going to make ar airmobile assault in the area and this gives him an opportunity to prepare to assault US troops landing in the area or flee the location. Action Taken: IRP or Battalion Reconnaissance forces are being inserted approximately one day's march from proposed IlZ. If the Reconnaissance element encounters VC in the LZ area an alternate LZ is designated. The objective is to enter the battle area clandestinely and surprise the enew.

5 Incl: WILLARD PEARSCU 1 - After Action Report, Brigadier General, USA operation JOHN PAUL JOMS ommanding 2 After Action Report, Operation SEWARD'--S &--3 - Staff Study and General Order, Reorganization 0 Bas Camp Ie ' 40D CeOIes . 1 - CO letter "Son-guarrilla Tactics' dated 20 October 1966 v - Madevac Mission Request For 11Th lst 34., 101st Abn Div DISflWTIOg 2 - CO, I flORC V, APO 96350 ATIW: 2 - Mest CofS For Force Deelomen
3 - CG, MAR ATT ,

AVFA-C 0&T o. DAWsig 20310 (h hnes

AVC-HIST APO)9630

I - CO, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campll, Ky 20 - 00, 22nd Mlitay iast Dot. AM196347

22

CONFIDEN TIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
*&

Iav&OO-Mw5
St JVCTs

(12 Vae 66)

Rpt for QaZtrly Period ]Ding 31 October Operatima-l 0e101 - 66 (c) 1966, 1

Readquarters, I Field Faoe vietuam, TOs

APO San Francisco 9635O 2 .3 DE[ C

Assistant Chief of Staff for lioe Dsvelopsent, Dppertmnt W-hingtn D, C. 20310 Of the AM',
CGmaisding aperal, United States Farces 96307 " Vietmo, APO 03

I- (C) 110ferenoe Section 1, parac (2). 2UiS headquarters rooOctober 1966, tVat the 1a25,000 basio photo coisra of South iebtam aobe reinstituted. rhe time required to obtain photo coverage vYaZvi cording to pinority assigned and the weather. For exa tle, new coverNge hile new coWerae Priorii Priority 11 requires thee to sevn days, for &rsevidah have been covered piwiounl= takes one day. Photogrsp within 60 days can be obtained in one d y. fe 02 Air is now inludAed in planning oonfweaoe for el1 operations. Neoesw7 photograpW is requested at that tim for the AO. Tral studies and LZ/PZ studies are made from
ne" o recent photography. n, Under normal ocLd'tiu adequate basia photo

intelligence of the AD should be in the bends of the units in mfficient

tim for planning. As a result of liaison 2. (0) Reference Section 1, pars. 3. a (). , lot Log and CBMSC, and by providvisits and peraal ocantacts vwith US a o orft resoauaoe, the shortages of starobast r ing assistance with I ffORC ground coffee, fresh vegetables, ice, oandsmatep sugar and other Item were alleviated by the end of the reporting period.
in short supply and appears an MARY's, ASR Qenades, hand, make y low, geen and vlolet hay, been periodically in short supply. CDSC Am* Setiou edrises that they are presently on bend at the ASP nd have been shipped to the tV Nos Sub Area. 4. (U) Reference Section 1, pars 4 b. 2he aLaria figure# represent Other a"e foond among oly caoes diagnosed in the unit's mdloa comps;. patients evaouated to hospitals without prior diagnosis established, bring the malaria totals to: August 117, September 115, and 0Otobrer 67.

N. (U) 11eference Section 1, Pams 3 a (4).

Clusters star, groud is

5.

(U) Reference Combat Operations After Action 11aport, Operation

Seerd, pera 4 b, PaP 4-3 and pw 5 b, pes 4-4. Operatim Sewad ev ered a large area with extensive troop dispersim JuStifing the Seaf two

CONFIDENTIAL

D:

AT.

DOD DIR 5200.10

AMA-0C-IST SUB

1k.

DEIC 1966
31 Octobe

,Gt Operatimnal Report for %artrly Period bIM 1966, laB iOB-66

medevac helicopters. Although the flying time avrapd appromtely two ho=* per day per airoraft, the "quiz mnt of tVo simltaneoua medevac ships oo unrred fruatly. Th future emploment of medevao helicopters should be contingent upon troop dispersion, sine of the AD and anount of otact. Beak up helicopter* wre on call from Mha fro to reinfor~e the unit stand-by aircraft if needed for this operation.
dated 20 November 1966y stated that while the reoamadation to use 0-1 aireraft slght be fessible, approl at Comat7 tern level vwOud be required. 7& (C) Reference Section I, par H g. The attahment of CA team by the 41st Civil Affairs Company is presently lader etly. It is expected that onUy one CA teme will iwain with the bu1.ide

6.

(C) Reference Section 1,

a&a I 6.

Reply tra CO(~osMACT,

8.

fire should be seleative, oclnoidnt with factual Intelligence data and exploited by friendly troop aneuver. The policy of selective fire, as reported by lot Btde, 101st Abu Div, insofar as pertains to interdiction In reasonable and well founded. The "quiet battlefield" eono6t when applied to harassing firs s, howevers, subject to tmrbt diseuscn. In application, contiued use of selective harassing f1re has mounted to pzaotioally no harassing fire. Ruassnug fire desiged to Sntsftpt an ony'ls fredas of movepent, disturb big, to love' his momle, to inflict astualtes adr the threat of casualtise have a definite value which was established in Sores and which hae been confirmed In Vietnam. The 34 Me, 25th raf Div has# at times, emss1ied a continuig heavy prcp of harassing artillery sad mortar fire. Duig Operation Paul 2mee 111, heavy haraing fire ws delivered daily by arillevy with 3d Bde, 25th f Div and It is sigtoant to note that enem activity in this area of operations vs. quite low. Ms cannot, of course, be totally ascrlbed to heavy hale ing fire; howe , the creodtability of heavy harasslig fire proAras is to be accorded #=9 subteatlatin. The selective "quiet battlefield" policy of baessing fires as applied b7 the reporting unit and the opposite polic of oontnus sand heavy harassing firm have value aid application In the oounteuinmurency environmt. Both policies are of merit andp to be truly offective, should be seplceyd inthongably. 9. (C) Reference Tab B to noclosurs 9 to After Action Report of Operation Sewardl; ubjects Thaml M ;structilm/Deial. Under the oi. . ctaoes described by the reporting unit, attempting to destMw ftm l

(C) Reference Section 2 (0) Part I, paza

B7s

Xnterdictio

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
A ',bOC-E =AM#e 2 :1 DEC MG.6 00*V&UatI~ Ulport for %mrterljy ftrid fhding 31 October 1966, ICS CBPM - 6t

comlmeae with the 175-M gun or the 8-incb howitzer represents an

injudicious employ nt of these weapona. The ransze involved and their canoiaitant large range probable errors, coupled with tb*

tnnel deai.

ead construction, vrtually precluded any chance of

sucoeme. This is f arther substatiated by the fact that large Amounts of explosives, purpouslefU placed by g-omd parties also failed to destr(T the emplez. Destmatica missions bg heavy artillery weapone =wat be earefully omaidered and executed. Of principal Imaportance to the sucess of such mission is roper selection of vapon, range end, eamourrentlr, the reduction of range probable error. In adition, a realstic evaluation of the target and Its vulnerability ast be accompli2sbda 10. (C) Referenoe paaraph 16, incloaure 1, After Action Report Opration John Faal Jones. At the present there are five aircraft equipped with hoist. The Comanodig Oftioer, 49th plas kits are available. 11. (U) Reference paragraph 2 a (3), inclosure 4, After Action Report. Operation Seward. The problem oonoerning contaminated ATVU has been corrected and step taken to prevent reourrence. 12. (C) Reference paragraph 3 A, inclosure 4, After Aotion Report Operation Seward. Twenty four each, 3 XV AC generators are on requisition for 1/101st Abn Div. Expeoted availabilily date is

to aodifY all aircraft for hoist capability " soon as modification

late February 12967. 13. (0) RPference paragraph 3 o, inclosure 4, After Action Report Operation Seward. The probleas of commnication between
Typhoon and Strike while located at TtW Hoe wre not unique. The problem of VEP system stem fron excessively long radio paths and mountainous terrain obstructing radio paths. Plans are being iaplement*d to extend higher quality VHP and miorowave system to the

Tur Hoev/w niop ares. FOR THE COMIANM&R

PAUL A. BVO=L
LTC, AGO

CAdut""A Th

nt

CONFI DENT IAL COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION SEWARD Ist BRIGADE AIRBORNE DIVISION

IOIst

DIPLOMATS AND WARRIORS

CONFIDENTIAL
AC,

ro

CONFIDENTIAL
DMARMT OF THE A@ HUMJARTIRB 1ST MOAD3 1W.ST A iE DIISC 6 Novatber 1966 Ombt Operatiorm After Action Report, Operation SWARD '(R MACV J3-32) (U) :

31
AVID-C SUBJACT:

AV 6 T

T1IU

Commanin General I Field Force Vietnm APO 96350

TOt

Coanding General USM tay ZAasiaance Command Vietnam ATTN: 4343 APO 96243

1. 2. 3.

(U) Nam of Operation: (U) Dates of Operation: (U) Location:

Operation SEWARD. 5 September through 25 October 1966*

PHU YIN Province.

4.
ision.

(U) Covqmand Headuarter: 1st Brigade, 10lst Airborne DivBrigadier General Willard Pearson s 101st Airborne Division. the Brigade The on3" sigwmre the deof opera-

5. (U) R: Careanding Oerera.Ht Brigaj

6. (C) Task 0aizationt The task organization of at the initiat3on of peraon MSARD was as shown below. nLficant changes to this organisation driTng the operation tachment of the 5/27 Arty on I October and the teia'nation tional control of the 1/22 Iof on 13 October.
1/327 lot 2/327 In. 2/5ce Inf 1/22 iot 2/320 Arty B 12/30 Arty 5/27 Arty Bde Troope da 11C (-)

A 2/17 Cav A 326 zngr LRRP MP Plat (-) 181 MI Dot 20 Owl Doat 22 Nil Hist Dot 101st Avn See Tactical Air Control Past

406 311)

Spt s. FSE
7. (C) Su ting Forces: Emloyed in a direct support role. Provided general support (reinforein) oRIIp - 4 DMGADID ArT TSAR MNURVALBJ 3 DXCLASS" APTM 32 "MM'

a. 2/320 Arty:

b. B 1/3o Arty (OPCON): fires during the operation.

CONFIDENTIAL
I've-

7-

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-C
SUWJDT: Cabaht Operations After Action Report,

6 November 1966
Operation SY*ARD (nCS:

KtV J3-32) (U)

c. operation. 5/27 Arty C-): Provided general support fire during the

d. 10th ArPy Am nz: Provided two airmobils co panies in general support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and resupply missions. e. 179thAm Cc: Provided two flyable CH-4? alter ift on a mission support basls for use in displacing and rnsupplnl artllery waits. f. 183 Avn Co: Provided four and five 0-1 atroraft for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjus Ls and radio relay. . 5th Air Commando Squadron: Pay War Op.. Provided airlift support for

h. 245th Psy Ops Co: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support. i. 7th US Air Force- Flew Ws4 tactical air missions totaling 306 sorties; of these missions 18 were preplanned and 126 were imediate. The immediate strikes were requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the average response time from the initiation of the requests until time-over-target was twenty minutes. The results of these missions included 9 KBA (BC), 52 KBA (EST), 78 structures destroyed, 68 structures damaged, 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed, 7 autoratio weapons positions damaged, 2 boats sunk, 2 boats damaged, and trench complexes damaged. J. h5th Ber Op: Provided general support along Highways 1,

6B and 7B.
k. 498th Med Det (Aml): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.

8.

(U) Intelligence:

See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the let Brigade* lD-'T-rborne Division to conduct operations to protect the rice harvest in the TUY HOA and TUY AN areas; to conduct search and destroy operations to locate VC/NVA forces in the AD; and to provide security from VUNG RO Bay to TOY HOA. 10. (C) Cone.t of 0 ration: Offensive search and destroy tactics were generally useF hromu0~t Operation WARD to include securing the rice harvest aroas. The four maneuver battalions available to the Brigade were generally utilized by protecting the TUY AN rice harvest with one battalions protecting the rice harvest in the 0UN 10CK1 Valley with one battalion, securing the VING 10 Ba/Pass area with a third battalion, and having a fourth battalion as an immediate action force to exploit any

contact or suspected enemy location@ elsewhere in the AD.

(Operation Schematics) Tabs A, B, and C.

See Inclaoure 2

11.

(C)

keocution:

a. Operation SINARD was characterized by counterguerrilla tactics, primarily encompassing small unit actions and frequent contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces and small unit imediate action forces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included

CMhIR IfFMTIAL
A7

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-C SUBJET:

MACV 2) (U) .

6 November 1966 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SWARD (ROSt

mountainos jungles, rolling hills, dry and imundered rice paddies, sand dunes and beaches. b. SEWARD was initiated cocwurrently with the termination of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES at 0505001 September 1966. Brigade units were already deployed in the operational area. c. At the beginning of SNAID the 1/327 In! (-), prvious27 deployed as the I ORCEL reserve to NM RA, continued search and destroy operations to counter en=q threats in that area. Copany A, .he Mortar and Reconnaissance Platoons 1/327 Inf remained at TVff HOA to protect the rice harvest in the MIE NoM Valley. The 2/327 In! continued the protection of the rice harvest and conducted search and destroy operations in the TV! AN area, Concurrently, search and destroy operations were conducted by the 2/502 Inf northwest of TUY HOA. Defense of critical terrain and security of the VUN RO Bay/Pasa area was provided by the 2/22 Inf which was under the operational control of the lst de, 101st Abn Div (See Inclosure 2, Tabs A and B). On 7 September, A Troop, 2/17 Car conducted an amphibiou assault with one platoon northeast of lUY HA establishing blocking positions in support of the search and destroy operations of the remainder of the troop. The 1/327 In! (-) departed NINH RCA between 8 and 10 September after being relieved by Company P 1/22 Inf, and returned to conduct operations in the HIM ZUOW3 Valley. The mission at NINH HOA was soon thereafter cancelled and Compan B, 1/22 In! returned to the VUMRe Bay area. The 2/502 Inf was extracted on 10 September from its area of operation and the battalion minus was deployed to TU B0RG to counter an enemy threat to the rice harvest storage there. Company A 2/502 Inf remained at TUY H0A South Airfield as an immediate action force. On 13 September elements of the 2/502 Inf provided security for a 45th tgr Op convoy moving on Highway I from NINI HOA to TU 3010, and on 15 and 16 September the 2/502 Inf returned to TUY HOA South by helicopter and began preparation for future combat operations. On the night of 17 September the camand post of Company B 2/327 Inf came under attack and was overrn by an estimated one hundred VC. Ten US troops were killed and twelve wounded in the action. The 2/502 In! conducted an airmobile assault into an AO northwest of TUY HCA on 19 September. The tLBP was also inserted in conjunction with the 2/502 Inf and discovered a VC base camp complex. The 2/327 Wn (-) moved ooth by helicopter and overland to the southwest portion of its AO and established blocking positions in coordination with the 2/502 Inf attack. Two CID companies from DONO TRE provided blocking forces for these battalions. The 2/327 Inf discovered an extensive tunnel complex in the area which was mapped and then destroyed by the engineers. Between 28 and 30 September the 2/502 Inf was extracted form the DONG TE area and moved to TUY HOA South. Based on information received from an escaped POW, the ./327 Inf raided a VC prisoner of war camp in the southwest portion of its AO and twenty-three Vietnamese Nationals were liberated in the action on 3 October. Company C and the Mortar Platoon of 1/22 Inf was deployed by helicopter into the TV BOWG area to protect the rice storage there. On 4 October the 2/502 Inf deployed by helicopter and overlaid by vehicle to iTY AN and assumed the mission of the 2/327 Inf. Concurrently, the 2/327 Inf deployed to TUY HOA South and began refitting and preparing for future combat operations. (See Inclosure 2# Tab C). On 7 October the 2/327 In! conducted an airmobile assault west cf TUY BOA. The battalion secured critical terrain along Highway 7B and conducted search and destroy operations in zone until 10 October when it returned to TVY HOA South. This operation was in conjunction with an engineer effort to repair the road and bridges along Highway 73. During the period 11 and 12 October, two platoons from Company A 2/327 Inf were deployed to a location near PHAN HANG to provide security for the Air Force extraction of a downed 0-130 aircraft. The 2/502 In! conducted search and destroy

CONF IDENTI AL

CONFIDENTIAL
A79)-C
tU.ET

Combat Opantlon

6 Nvember 1966 After Action flport, Operatio SO= (ms,

ACT J-3) (U)

operatiOnS in An area southwest of Tf AN durit the period 13 thresh by 16 October to exploit hightngd and cortacta madid LR1P toams. 0) 13 October the 1/22 Ift was relieved in pince by the 1/8 Inf, and thu 1/22 Wn deploy"d to PLKIX by V7-2 a,0 0-2- - aircraft , d rctnrtwd to t!-c operational control of tne 4th Infantry Division. )n 19 and 20 October the 1/327 In! and 2/327 In, respectively, were relieved by Ceamnta of the 28th FOK Port of their ats ions in the HIE rJoiO Valley arA for the security of TUX HOA South Airfield. On 21 October OCmpany A 2/327 W conducted an airmobile "auit vest of TUT OA to provide seeufrty for engineer work parties repAiring Highway 73. Operation SWA terinated It 2400 hours 25 October following the relief of the 2/,5W Inf in tae WT AN area by the let Bla, 4Th Int mDv. 12. (C) Pavauta;

a. The 1st We, 1Olat Abn Div accom:lished its mission of protecting the T Y ,M and HIE fUOEG Vsl1ey.riee harvests securing the VUPD RO ay/Pas arma, and conducting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VCand NVA forces in the AO. b. The following losses were inflicted on the enaru during the operation 230 VCkV [IA BC), 142 VCAVA XIA (EIT), 9 VC/l [BA 0(c), 52 VC/NVA KM (CST), 6 NVAC, 34 civil defendants, 2 VCC, 871 detainees, and 10 ralliers. In addition, 80 individual and crew served Veapons, 40.5 tons of rice, ammunition and other equipment were oapbaed. c. Friendly lossee during the operation were as follows: 26 KIA, 169 WIA. 13. (U) Administrative Matters: See Inclosure 3, Personnel

a. Personnel and Administration: and Administration. b. Logistics:

See inclosure 4, Logistics,

c. Civic Action: The first lot of "Eagle Brand" washing machines was contracted for and delivered to the Brigade. Five of these machines have been donated to orphanages, hospitals and dispensaries in the TUY HOA area. U.. (C) Special SquiPeunt and Techniques:

a. In order to effectively ma,, oy CS agents and flasethrowers, teams were made available at Brigade level to be auployed on an moncall" basis A helicopter rigged for CS employmnt and charged flamethrowers were maintained on a thirty minute standby, b. 1000 and 2000 pourZ beebe with instantaneous fuses are good expedient. for clearing lading zones in certain types of 3ungle terrain. With the 1000 pound bom, clearing team work is still required to improve the landing zone; however, the 2000 pound bomb can be expected to create a clearing sufficient to land one 1N-1 helicopter. The use of an instantaneous fuze clear the vegetation with a nominal ground
cratering effect. c. Unloading troops by ladder from a CH-47 helicopter is an extremely slow process, and normally only landing vone clearing team should be unloaded in this manner. When on a resupply mission where landing zones are not readily accessible, the ma~ority of the items can be free dropped to the unite and t.:e mre sensitive item can be lowered by rope.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
AVID-C 6 Nuvtbe'n 1966 WETBJET Camat Operations After Act'en Report, Operation SARD (. tSu

3r

MACV J3-32) (U)

d. Me htiace artttwma P-dIir-ietrttt twidi g of indirenoue forces durir. iod6. tun contimed

15.

(C) C omm,,drs Ar- al.,,t

a. Lesone learneds

(1) ne units are operati: n limited area, pat~trrw of action mist not be established. Tactic _.L techr" ques mutst be varied in order to prohbit oneW forces from anticipating friendly move, ,-, or reaction. (2) Company comnand posts must be relocated at least eve*y forty-eight hours to safeguard against the enemy the lo, %lon arng and corducting raids, Enemy probing action against such locations at nigbt. is likely to be followed by an attack. (3) When small units are halted for any extended period of time, every precaution mat be taken, to inoludc -xttsive use of LP's, OPts and early warning devices, to preclude a sw- rise enemy attack.

(4) The VC frequently, having conducted a successful operation at one location, will return to the I )cation at a later date to conduct an identical operation. This applies particularly to raids and ambushes.
(5) When a patrol moves for an extended distance, consideration should be given to establishing hmtr ambushes at irregular intervals behind the patrol. In many instances this technique will prove successful in surprising and destroying a following enemy. (6) Units must insure that available communications are separated into two or more locations. In the event commnication facilities at one location are destroyed by the enemy, an alternate means of communication will still exist.

(7) Following the extraction of friendly forces from an area of operation, the enemy frequently infiltrates back into the sane locations from whi'ch he was previouslyr routed. The technique of leaving a smll stay behinds force in the area, following the extraction of the majority of the unit, is often successful in trapping the returning

r.
n

order to speed the segregation and processing of detainees. :](9)

(8)

IW teams should be attached at battalion level in

Interrogation techniques should be oriented on the

local guerrilla in addition to the conventional EEI line of questioning*

This can best be accomplished by having the unit commander prepare a list of detainee.quertions which he would like the NI interrogator to ask the (10) Whea clearing team are reqt'ired to clear a helicopter landing zone, valuable time can be saved by having an aviation representative present to provide guidance.

(II)

Persorel should be extremely cautious upon disoften just bait for a better

covering an obvious booby trap. This is concealed, more effective booby trap. (12) flush out the VC.

a village is to surround it at night and use artillery illumination to

An effective technique which can be employed to clear This method catches the enemy off guard and precludse

CONFIDENTIAL
3P
Is,

I-"K

CONFIDENTIAL
AVE-C SUBJECT: 6 November 1966 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation S31D (RCSs MACV J3-32) (U) haer troop movement. hatw4 imooet eivlie

(13) During the monsoon seaon fords and by-passes are 8 only fair weather frienea. Heavy rains and rapid runoff make it virtually impossible to satisfactorily install culverts to maintain byp'ates. The only satisfactory answer is bridging, or in same cases, ra.fting. (14) The standard ?edevac Request. Form was revised by the Brigade to reduce the number of items fro fourteen to seven. This revised form has proven to be simpler and moxe efficient than the old form. b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Although the Brigade had an excellent k rate in Operations JOHN PAUL JONES and SEWARD (208 VG KIA (C' 239 VC KIA (BC) respectively. Our biggest problem has been R'kns one of target acquisition. Our second major problem is the z. to reduce reaction time once the enemy is detected. (2) To improve our kill rate during ..: coming operations, battalion commanders and the cavalry troop cc.,nander will fully exploit, develop, and utilize the concept of "semi-guerrilla tactics". By this I mean we must become more like guerrillas, i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics, during search and destroy operations until contact is made. Then we remove the cloak of being a guerrilla and operate conventionally using all available firepower, mobility, and reserves. (3) Listed below are some techniques of stealth, deception, and surprise which I desire be employed more fully in our forthcoming operations. I am confident that the airborne soldier, once imbued with the necessity to "out-guerrilla the guerrilla", will, with his native ingenuity and resourcefulness, devise additional effective techniques and tactics.
(a) Clandestine Entry into the Battlefield: Move into the battlefield by foot rather than ride by helicopter, the noise and sight of which reduce the possibility of surprise. Enter the battlefield at night. guerrilla. (b) Ni ht erations: Steal the night away from the Night airmobi.le assalts, ambushes, patrols, and movement hidForces: When a unit is extracted folor insert a stay behind force on the battle-

mist become routine.

(c) St lowing an engagement, field*

(d) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (IRRP's): More aggressive and frequent employment on long range missions. Insert at dusk or dawn along likely avenuern of enemy movement; vary on occasion by insertion overland and resupply by air drop. Erperiment with platoon for an immediate offensive capability when enemy size LRRPIs is sighted. to provide When a stay behind force or a IRRP makes contact, plan to reinforce promptly rather than extract. For this, employ an immeiiate reaction force (platoon) on air strip alert with helicopters on stand-by, or insert platoons in advance on the ground concurrently with the LRRP or stay behir.d unit. The platoon and helicopter pilots on air strip alert must be briefed in as much detail as possible and motivated to react promptly. (e) Reinforce Rather than Extract:

C&NFIDET1AL
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AVB,-C SUB.JET:

6 November 1966 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operat!on SEW.ARD (RCS: MCV J)3-32 ) (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

(f) Reaction Force: Since the helicopter reveals the pn me of US forcesy Ow hips imra4 not be to first helieepten in the area in whi:h a reaction force is to be committed. As long as then is excellent radio oommunications, the first helicopter in the area should carry combat troops. Upon arrival at aor the reaction force I2 should promptly move out to block enemy escape routes while final ccorination is being made between the unit on the ground and the reaction force commander. (g) Limit Helico tar Traffic: Provide stay behind forces, IRRP's, and unit o trng bttlelli4 clandestinely with a minimm of 3 to 5 days rations to obviate need for helicopter resupply which prowtly telegraphs to the enexw the presence of cur forces. Prior to contact with the eney use helicopters for medevac or tactical emergencies only. (h) Rasupply echnicueas: Unlike the VV guerrilla who lives off the land1 we areqiited i our clandestine operations by the bulk and weight of C rations which limit the number of days our troops can operate without resupply by helicopter. The following are suggested ways to solve this problem: 1. with C rations. 2. Use rice and powdered soup alternately with C rations or the IRRP-rations. 3. Caohe supplies and operate clandestinely from a base carrying only obg day's supplies on the soldier. j. Resupply by helicopter at night. 5. Resupply during the day with the helicopter flying nap of the earth and supplies "kicked" out onto a DZ. (i) Silence the Battlefield: Eliminate artillery ELI fires, long range artillery, and Tac Air strikes near friendly troops unless promptly exploited by ground forces. Use LRRP rations when available or in combination

Ci) Thi Position: Construct and occupy obvious positions during daylight hours and then abandon them during the hours of darkness to move to ambush sites or to attack suspected ener- positions.
Back: Move out from a position in the (k) floubli afternoon and after darkness , radically change direction of march to attack a preselected target before dawn. (1) Use of Trails: "Beat the bush" rather than movs along main trails. The enemy employs trail watchers along main trails where he can generally observe advancing troops, Search along secondary and tertiary trails used by game which offer the guerrilla excellent concealment as well as an escape route. (in) Springing the Trap: When feasible, follow or observe a single or small party of-ener to locate larger forces or determine critical intelligence such as enemy positions, supply points, CPts, etc. Maneuver forces to ensure closing the trap and killing or captring the enemy force involved. Move on a wide front supported by reserves and firepower.

Cn) Cordon and Search: Encircle a village at night as secretly as possible, then search at first light using PF, RF, or ARVN 7

CONFIDENTIAL
3,R~

CONFIDENTIAL
AV]D-C SUBJICT: 6 November 1966 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SS4ARD (RCS: MACV J3-32) (u) j forces. Rehearse using same forces until this type operation can be accomplished effectively. Consider us& ot stay bWhiM forces after the (o) Im rove Marksanshi : Marksmanship is extremely important in fighting guerillas. Generally the enem will offer only fleeing glimpses of himself while trying to escape the advancing US soldiers. Therefore, if a continuous and supervised Marksmanship program is established -- each man firing 20-4O rounds daily except when on clandestine operations -- the enemy casualty statistic will rise, enemy morale will be lowered, and the enemy will be forced to engage US troops at a maximum range. This will reduce the effectiveness of his fire and give us time to commit immediate reaction forces. (p) Improve Zffeotiveness of the Sniper: Oreater emphasis should be placed on the role of the sniper. Too often we receive reports of the enemy escaping at ranges of 400-500 meters. A well trained sniper should be able to kill or wound the enemy at that range. Platoons should hbitually employ the sniper. (q) Counter Eney Snipers: Eemy snipers are a great refore, ccmptnies should organize sniper deterrent to US moraleQ killer teams to operate semi-independently to harrass the enemy. A sniper with a sniper rifle and telescopic sight could selectively kill while another team member adjusts artillery on the target. (r) Specialized Training: To be successful guerrillas, troopers must be instilled with pxatience and taught the fundamentals of camouflage, concealment, light and noise discipline, and to remain still for long periods of time. Too often a potentially effective ambush is prematurely disclosed by coughing, scratching, movement to relieve oneself and other restless activities. Our troops camouflage at night but seldom camouflage for day operations. Training should give added emphasis to proper conduct of the individual during ambush operations. () uad Area of Oerations: Consistent with communications capabilities, emphasize squads operating in areas of operation for 3 days without resupply. For example, one company operating by squads in zones, separated but mutually supporting, can cover a large area with thoroughness and stealth. Mission of squads: ambush at night, observe during daylight, and engage small enemy groups. Upon locating a significant eney force the platoon/copany consolidates on the squad to fix the enem and the battalion (-), standing by as an immediate reaction fTree, is brought to bear on the enemy to destroy him. (h) Once contact is made react rapidly with all available firepower and reinforcements without further regard to deception, stealth or surprise. Fblloi ng the engagement with the enemy, revert to semiguerrilla tactics until a subsequent contact is made. 16. (C) Recommendations: That a mininum of four flyable CH- J7 helicopters be the Brigade when supporting artillery is to be moved by an forward logistical supply points are established where no available and that a mininm of two mad evac helicopters be diecussed in Inclosure 4s (Logistics).

a. provided to sir LOC and land LX is provided as

b. That the use of ARVN, CIDO and other indigenous paramilitary forces (Rf and PF units) in cooperation ad coordination with US forces continue to be majnddsed to comerve or augment the forces available to a US commander, as well as improve training, aggressiveness and confidence of the Vietnamese unite.

CONFIDENTIAL

55I

CONFIDENTIAL
a,
AVWD-C BJETi Cmbat .peration

KAUV JJ-32) (U)

6 November 1966 After Action Report, Operation SIMARD (RCS1

a. That corsideration be given to investigating apparent high dud rate of CBE ina!r atrl is throughout Vietnam. It appears that a high percentage of the bomoeta do not explade and are later picked up by the V and uued in .aking booby traps and mines. d. This Brigade continues to recomen 0-1 aircraft, equipped with spray tas, be made available to province and sector for immediate ad selective use in crop denial. This will eliminate long delays in obtaining approval and Insure greater nsponsiveness.

Brigadier General, USA Comanding Inclosuress 1-Intelligenoe 2-Schematic Diagram of Operation 3-Persormel and Administration 4-Logistics 5-Cosmunicatione 6-Civil Affairs 1-Pay War 8-Artillery 9-Egineer Distribution: 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff fpr Force Development, Dept of'the An*Washington DC 20310 1 - CO, USARPAC (ATTN: GPOP-NH)

1 - CG, MACV (ATN:

MAC J343)

1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J2) 2 - CC, USARV 1 - CG, USARV (ATfN: AVC Historical Division)

2 - CG, I FFORCEV 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky

1 - CG 1 - DCO 1 - X0 1 - S1

10 - S3
1

1 - S2 I - S5 1 - 10 1 - Sig
1 - FSE 3 - ALO
-

S4

I
CONFIDENTIAL
3J

CONFIDF NTIAL
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After t- ion Report, Operation

1.

(C)

Zamlta

The area of operations conxitd of flat lowland used

of rice; sandy beach areas bordering the South China for the cultivation with grass and rush; and j..Lcod forested mountains Sea; rolling hills c;oed forming a northern, southern, and western barrier around the arec. of operations. The sparse vegetation in the lowland provided good fields of fire, but poor cover and concealment. In the mountains, the heavy forest afforded poor fields of fire, but good cover and concealment. The two main avenues of approach The hydrography of the area was were along Hwy ma.(N-3) and Hwy 97 (E-W). critical with the flooded lowlands making overland operations difficult. 2. CU) Wath-i The period of the operation fcll largely within the autumn transition season. Heavy rains fell as predicted on approximately twenty of the fifty operational days. Overland routes were partirlly flooded and air operations were restricted by the peer visibility and ' - ceilings. These weather conditions generally favored the cnemy by co. . aling his activity and movement from aerial observation.

3.(C) snaaaa
a. The 5th hVA Division Hadquarters remains situated in the vicinity of the Ky Lo Valley (BQ 7585). This area has not been exploited by US forces and is undoubtedly a well developed safe area in which NVA/VC forces realize complete freedom of movement. b. The southern portion of the Hiau Xuong District is another relatively rugged and unexploited area which is presently being occupied by the 18B NVA Regiment. Discovery of two lW camps provides positive proof that PW camps are located well into enemy dominated territory and outside of friendly A-tillery fans. c. Although the total enesy strength in ihu Ien Province built up during the summer, friendly forces successfully accomplished the mission of denying enemy access to the rice produce which was harvested. The enemy, however, was able to obtain sufficint rice to sustain therselves in outlying clandestine paddies. The impact of major rice denial however, is bound to be felt during the months to come since enemy stores are significantly lower than last year. d. The. enemy has consistently returned to well known base areas via established routes and will continue to do so as long as friendly forces are not physically capable of occupying this terrain. They are thus based in areas they are familiar with, which meet logistical requisite; and allow them to maintain established local contacts. This feeling of security in the outlying areas makes the enemy partiolarly susceptible to a holiborno type assault in which reaction time may be slugyish. a. It has been conclusively determined that enery resupply is bein. offocted fran the coastal areas north cf Tuy An. f. here are indications that the local populace are responding favorable to friendly presence in Phu Yen Province. The number of informants has increased and in many oases provided accurate information leading to the discoviry of enemy installations. There has also been a recent increase of enemy atrocities and terrorism used in retaliation. g. Due to the fact that we were operating in generally the same area as Operation JO1I PLIL JONES adequate recent photo coverage of the TAOR was quickly accuired. Extensive use wns made o; this photography to locate small concealed iZ's and to brief I.RxiP personnel going into the area. In addition an extensive mosaic was ade to aid in properly assessing the terrain in connection with the rice harvest in Tuy An. Due to the familiarity with the terrain, the pilots and observers were able to more readily notice small changes during visual reconnaissance. Rod Haze missions are still not frequent enough or capable 1-1
T

CONFIDENTIAL

4a

CONFIDE!ItTIAL
Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat Operations -ftor .sction Report, Operation SZLRD, (cont'dI of being cotralled as to their TOT to the extent that signuni gence can be pined.
h.

nt lntelli-

The following COMS C was provided during Operation SEWbRD: (1) 6,854 transmissions over the Co.rar '.ot, Op/Intoel Net, and

dmin/Log Net were onnitored during the

.'iod 1-15 '-'tcnber 1966.

stchboard were

(2) 3,287 transmissions through the 'Strike' MonitorOd during the period 15 Sep - 25 Oct 1966.

(3) Telephone violations consisted of$ disclosure of a VIP itinerary; compromise of a classified call sign; and disclosure of unit strcngth.

4.

(C) Lngrn. ar.'.rlt:

a. The location of enemy PW amap, way stations, storage areas, and base camps havo often been reported but past exploitation produced negative results. Some success along these lines has been met in Operation SVWJD, particularly in one instance when a unit successfully surprised a PW camp by utilizing a devious route of entry thereby avoiding the early warning system established by the enemy. In the exploitation of entry into suspected areas all efforts should be made to utilize unorthodox mcans to gain mdaxinu surprise. b. There are indications that the eneny ncthcds of attack on FOB's and CIDG camps may be slightly modified now. 4nphasis is being placed on obtaining support from agents within the friendly peri=eter. It is also anticipated that attacks will be conducted without the use of preparatory fires; the absence of preparatory fires reduces friendly reaction time. c. The enemy has sophisticated its efforts to obtain information on friendly forces through the use of indigenous labor and friendly countermeas. ures must be improved. d. With the advent of more stringent requiremonts in the handling of captured personnel has come added requirenr.ts for the IPW Seotion. It is necessary that INW teans be attached to separate batt:.llons in order to properly categorize captives and facilitate p.oper processing of these individuals. 5. (U) The following is a breakout of enemy weapons and material loss-

es during Operation SEW"RD:

a. Weapons Captured; Mauser rifle 14-1 Garand rifle 14-1 carbino Pistol Flare pistol -

28 4 19 2 1

53 RPG-2
-A-47 MS 36 rifle M. 49 &C Thompson SHI M.-16 rifle b. Ammunitions Grenades Rifle grenade Mines

8 1 10

1 1 4 1

65 I 16

1-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTI'\L
Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After "ction Report, Operation

SEW.J3,

(contd)
Cl~m -

I
4 2600

Bang ore torpedo SA anmPnAItion 6o= Mortar

2.75 rocket 3.5 rocket

10
4 1

HPG-2 rocket M-79 Demolitions (lbs) c. Otherl 5 gael oil ca Generator

Motors Cattle 'vtorcycle

3 19 19 lb!

25 1
2 165 I

Treshing machine Protctive kask

Boats (dest) Boats (da,)

1 1
34

Salt (tons) Fish (tons) Rice (tons)

40.5

2 . 1.5

1
1-3

CONFIDENTIAL
3? I

CONFIDENTIAL
Tab A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Lembat Opurat'ios fter .Atioft

Report, Operation MeIJ

~*(0)

VO/WY. Initial Order of Battle Within 1/101 TAMh

a. *t the beginning of Operatinn SEW.AD the 95th and 183 NV. Regl. ments were confirmed as being present in Phu Yen Pro'ri-ce and consequently within the /i01 T.Oh. The 18B NV. ioaiment vas believed to be deployed in the eastern portion of Phu Yen Province (vicinity of Son Long Village, CQ 0164) and the 95th zegiment was believed to be deployed to the west (vicinity of border of khu Bon, , u Yen rrovince BQ 6878). b. The 95th Battalion (561st arty 3n), 68th Arty Roginer.t (NV 6 ) ws confirmed in Yhu Yen irovince, exact location unknot. c. The 85th VC Local Force Battalion was believed to be located southwest of Cung Son in the vininity of BQ 9t15. d. NIne (9) District and looi force units were believed Lo be located in tne province. 2. (C) a. Order of Battle Findings and Suazary in Operation &real Summary: Division Headquarters is believed to be iocat-

(1) The 5th N. in the vicinity of BQ 6892. (2)

during the period 5-7 September 1966 vicinity BQ 9056.

Elements of the 95th Aegiment (NV 6 ) were contacted by 2/502

(3) hs a result of numerous nSearch and Destroy" missions, porsonnel from elements of the 1SB Regiment were captured on 8 Sep 66. Interrogatior. reports revealed information indicating the movement of all elements of the 18 NVh. Regiment from vicinity of BQ 9656, across the Da Aang River and to the thu Yen/Khanh Hoa Province border vicinity CQ 0225. Mission of the 18B Regiment was to move to Area A-3 (probably northern Shanh Hoe Province) and attack ARVN/US troops in order to disrupt enemy operations permitting the acquisition of rice and food materials. See appendix I for Order of Battle information pertAining to organization and strength of tle 18B MVL Regiment.

(4)

The 85th VC Local Force Battalion was not contacted in force

during this operation. However, small elements of 7Tth VO Co (subordinate to 85th. VC Bn) rwere located at CQ 325291 (20 Oct 66), B 030338 (8 Oct 66), BQ 960338 (9 Oct 66) and BQ 94o303 (io Oct 66). It is believed that the 85th VO LF n is still located vicinity of BQ 9135 with its subordinate units operating independently and separated.

(5) Elements of the 307th VC 4F were contacted for the first time and as a result of detailed interrogation, information was obtained revealing dispositions of the following subordinate units: Battalion. (6) Small resistance groups (5-10 personnel), which more elements of the nine (9) district and local force units were contacted periodically with insignificant intelligence results.
b. Fnal VC/NVa dispositions at termination of Operation SEWRD are located in Appindix 3.

Ngoc Go - BQ 940891, Tbsp

Co - BQ 94M89, Doong Co (-) BQ 930875 on 1 Sep 66. See Appendix B for Order of Battle infozmatinn pertaining to organization and strength of 307th VO 1W

CONFIDENTIAL

O er tions 1 ct!: 7 4 t x i ' o t, Iclosur s (1ntc,1iL;;nno) to 4mb ll

flyort. Operation SEWMJ 1. Gshkja.
The regiment w-asformed it. lrch 1965 from cadre of the 308th

CONFIDENTIA
T Ile Bl rl ON CIT

Division and new recruits. In July 1965, the iLoEinont moved from ha Thinh erovince ON to Vaang Bih rrovinoe WN where it began preinfiltration training. In late Decemcr 1965 the aegiment departed M~h. Un 20 Jan 1966 the 183 Aegiment arrived in Laos, and in early 1airch it arrived in Cambodia Cu iong bit. The teginent moved to Darlac irrovince in april 1966 and remained for one month. During this month the iegiment, is believed to have participated in a battle in conjunction with elements of the 33rd and 66th regients, 147.. In May 1966 the iagt moved to ihu Yen irov to rulieve the 95tL 'V. Aog, in place, Eivin the 95th a chance to reorganize after havin, made cont-ct with. US troops. The date of relief was reportod to have been 15 Juj 66. During the period 0-25 June 66 the 1S Asegizent sustained 4$9 Kui (BC) most of which were from the 7th Bn. Elements of the 18B Argt have boon contacted in Hieu Xuong Valley, and at present the Aegt is believed to be located on the ihu Yon Nwih Hoa border.

b.

T&LUCOGj

The 16B Iegt w.s subordinate to the 325th XVe Div before entry into SVN, The hcgt went through a 9 month training program prior to entry into 3VN. This training program lasted from March to December 65. Training ws conducted in the following two major areas to c&.i~pny level.

1.

iLZLms
a. The NVj.

b. o. d. e. f. g. h. i. 2.

Civilian rroselyting dolicy Military Wroselyting tolicy rrisoners and Deserturs War Trophies The Disabled and Wounded Hate against US Iperialists Land and lice reforms Ethnic Minority iolicy

wTJr'riv rRTTUIIndividual Combat Diging Tronches Firing ?ractice Ambush Tactics Ataid Tactics attack of Strongholds attack of Helibore Operations h. attack of Tarks i. Carrying Heavy Loads. a. b. a. d. e. f. g.

Li. icNcx

(i) at present the Regiaent consists of 3/4 experienced personnel and i/ Draftees. It has been reported that there is friction between NV. and VC personnel. (2) Morale is low because of the following reasons: a. Fear of Air Strikes b. Lack of Medical Supplies c. Lack of Food not d. rrior to leaving MV1 prsonnel are T -I-3 -

ermitted to visit

theirms.

CONFIDENTIAL

ta Tab A to Inclosure I. (CZAtOllirnce) to Conixt CwrtUons Afte Lotio Report, Opurut6a SWARD C
the infilt . into 1Hthe 7th Bn icat 100 malars or -! sorted. Personnel who Contracta personnel who contracted malaria duri:g infiltratio:. were left behind. Despite losses, the regiment is a cohesive fshting organhzation with well trained c!Ato.
i., The 18B -tA is subordinate to the 5th WA. )ivision (aka Ret, along with the 95th Nong Truong url Sjte 5), "iach it possibly the 325th ivision. No third 5 or -regiment has bem. identifjgd.

sdiaX

CONFIDENTIAL

,,

* aZcaused the grostcet, mabe; of cazsuaties.

arin,

5Z

ht

B% 6092.

Last reported location of the 5th Div E s was vic Rhuoc 7an

e. "ZSzzQ: line trcopo carry rear personel meintain Front day ration supply. a 1i-le day ration, and a 15 (i days ration is 400 "raz;. of rice per man). Whon going into coobat each nan carries 2 sets of pajawas, 2 set of zaerimar, hamock, gas mask, Mosquito net and (raincover). Since arrival in country the 3SJ has had plastic sheets no nedi:al rcsupply. Uniforms consist of Tan/4 ry (Service Issue) and black (Local Issue) pajamas. hice suply points for the regiment during May and June were at T 8

Tinh

o ( w93030 and Dco Phuong (CQ840269).

f. 9SLU QI.NaII0lSt:

The following cover designations have

been used by the 183: (i) In NVN - Song Chu (2) During infiltration - hung DBa, Cong Truong 6, Worksite 60, Infitration Group 303 a, b, c.

(3) Pocent cver names - Hung De, Cong Truong 6, Worksite

60, Quano Trang, CcGcj Truonrg.

(4)

Battalions:

7th - Nong T ruong 2, lst Bn, Hj, H7, D204. 1st Ca - 31 2nd Cc - 132 3rd Ca - H33 4th Co - h34 8th On - 2nd Bn, 5th Co - 1015 i2, 303B, i4ri. Site 8.

6th Co - t(16 7th 0 o -- h137 (th Co 11.3

9th lin- 3rd Bn, 303C, agri. Site 9, Y3. 9th Go - 1139 10th Go H401 11th co - H41 12th Go -42

(5) Support Compapless

13th EZ

143

14th hort - H44 15th " - 145 16thi Info - 1416 17th rnens - H47 18th hcd - H48 19th Engr - H49 20th Recon - H5<, Chem Unit . (6) Lctte-r Boy D.ioMnratln ()Reg- .'s I Staff - 92.201 . Auar Seo - 92.202 .3 ?ol Service Soc - 92.2043 1--1-2

CONF {DENTIAL
A/b

CONFIDENTIAL
Appendix 1 to Tab A to Inclasur) 1 (IntelUi.nce) to Cvmft Operations

41

After Ao.on Report, Qpr.,ton SUAD

(b)

h n - UW/&
*let 2 2nd .3 3rd . 4th Ca Co Co Co
-

92.214 92.215 52.216 92.2.17

(51L2/Q.
(5.13/A/) (11A4/i) (5115/")

(c)

8th an - 92.218

1 5th Co - 92.219

2 6th Co - 92.220 -3 7tt C. - 92.-21 S8th Co - 92.222

(d) 9th Bn - 92.223 1 9t, Co - 92.22'~ 2 10th Co - 92.225 .2 11th Co - 92.226 4 12th Co - 92.227 (e) Suppcrt Units 2 H"4 -- 92.205 43 9Z.206
,

3 H45 - 92.207
i. ,1 f 7 & B h. - 92.208 - 92,209 - 92.210 - 92.23.1 - 92.212 Chem - 92.204 H46 H47 H46 E49 1150

(1) The 183 is arm-d with a combination of manufactured ChiCom nd Soviet weapone to includet (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (h) (2) S2n. mortars 12.mm MQs RD 46 L2G8 XL.47s Us carbines Pistols 75= AR .eapon.C. cr the regiment is

(g) SG-.3 MG

(i) B40
indicated below.
LPON 82cm mortar 3.2. 7mmiHM 75im M4E B-4

. possible total of -. av c

No
'2 2 2 6 4

atmra.tv

rnper ha.s been reeteivt-,2 on thIi m=tter. H H.. 2 2 2 6 4

l 1U CM..I' Cn .nt1

HN Bn 2 2 2 6 4

4
2 1

Ao 2

10 10 10 18 124-

() -mnition appears to be in adequatc supply but not plentiful. Aaourted cachcs do not indicate large quantities of mortar and i14 a -ition on hand and not much h-s been citurcd.
i. QTUVIT LF dZET fIli -. udV.L a 'IU YM 2nCVINCEs

2 May

Bi983675 M 93685 55705 3J382 O

.gt Hia 7th Bu 9th B. 'ear servlc " - nd Production

CONFIDEN TIAL
44/

CONFIDENTIAL
-ppinjix . to 24b & to Inlooeuro . (1 to ttelli.;Lnoo) o bat OPMUGzMt
-&fte" Action Report, Oper.ation SiP&D

19 ju.
L

926"9
84973705 C.4O6656 &,939564

7th Bn
9t, Cn 8tn 3n and icgt Ria Rcgt 0

27 J-Ln

Jl 1 is Jul
22 Jul 27 Jul

B(4983690 B54605
C60070

7th Bn
8th Bn

D%95O51C l707o
C 000635 B950510 Bq927847 BB2249(. 3,932562 B.964558

9th Bn U0/ BA

7 Aug
9 -uR U.2 v4i 15 23 ug Zug 7th .nd 9th Lns U/T. j3n

1.3 ix4~ B3,652553 CIC03473

29 .*ug 6.6790354

!.8B regt
U/1 3n .83 ngt

U/I Z-1
U/i Co Elements of 18D Regt

3 Be? 8 Sop
5 Sop

B,47287M
0.410290

C02027(

8th 3n 7th and 9th Bns

5. %LhGXHt as of Sept 66 the strength of the 183 RFgt is as

indicated below. T0T-L STRM8TH 18.5 iut 7th Bn 8th ".

9th 3n H.43 Co H.44 Co H.45 Co H.46 Co H.47 Co (RR) (Mort) (-) (Sig) C(rans)

CCas-T

.LIFTLD

1937 409
409 36 78 r6 .107 68 ]7

1765 377
392 398 71 52 97 63 26

H.48 Co (Med)
H.49 Co (Engr) H.50 Co (&con) Rgt H~

32
56 48 8i

32
36 40 81

CONDEN T IAL

CONFIDE NTIAL
5/e
Appengix I tc *oti 2. Tab A to Inclosure I (I'teli~ence) to Combat Operations xAeort, Operation SEW~~a 28. NVA Xigmnt Char'.. Qr& jtjoal

00

H0'0

CONFIDENTIIAL

CONFIDErTJAL
0
ippendix 2 to Tab . A to Inclosure I (Iztelli,ence) to Cribat Operations

ter actioni lepori- Operation S&WOt

1. Organizational Chart, 307th VC Main Force Battalion.

307

VC

Duong

go

ThapF

p:

2.

307th VC MF 13n Order of Battle Findings|

a. The 307th VC kF Sn has a strength of approximately 300 personnel effective 4 Sep 66. Each copany has approxm.tely 100 personnel. The battalion has 2 LMG (French Tullier) and approxiniately 250 rifles to include US caliber .30 Yd, German Nuscra, US carbines and Soviet carbines. b. The 307th VC MF Bn was last located in vicinity BQ940291 on 1 Sep 66. C. The mission of the 307th VC MF n was to organize cadre in the hamlets of Phu Yen irovince. The battalion us to avoid contact with the lst 13de 101st "bn Div t all cost. d. Personalities: Thap - CO of Thap Co and 307th VC AT Bn Duong - CO of Duong Co. Ngoc - CO of Ngoc Co Tuan - ilat Ldr of H-3 platoon, Duone Co. Phu - .sst ?lnt Ldr of H-3 platoon, Duong Coo
3

CONFIDENTIAL

'/4,

CONE IDEI'\ITIAL
appendix 3 to Tab -&to Inclosura 1. (Intelligence) to Cchst Operations amt~r "ction Deport, Opeation SEWAMD

5th KiL Div H 95th MV., liar 1w NUV. Rost 7th Bn, 183 NVA A{%,t 8th Bn, "C14 9th Dn, 95th Bn, 68th arty Rqit Duong 0 Cc. 307th VC MP 0n Ngcc o, Thap Co, /I 'JO Co U/1 3 VCO Squads "'" Concentrated .Atooa VCO Dtspeniazy U/IVC c U/I VC Bn U/I 70 Go U/ 2 VC Co 0 Ui/I V0 Bn U/I V0 tint U/I 2 VC Cos U/I 270C Cosn U/I 2 70 ilatoona 1/17 UOn 1)/I 70 Dn a3 U/I V0 Platoon U/I yC ?latoon 30th.VC NPBn

M,6892

-22

flW959
B,49656 04 02 70 3227 ^V O= 2 z7S77 5LA089 B4Q94M8I IJ 4940891 0,075955 C%,009195 %12434 B1,7a1732 D.2383 5..m9lsth -4..9847?5 C023704 C%009708 Cta07936 Cg070703 C%155650 C093614 01409595 1'918525

1930 400C 30 127 100 100

Oct 10 Oct 6 Sep

12 aug 4. Sep
I

100
--

--

30
-

5 6 15 6

Oct cot Sep Oct

28a-U&

300 i50
-17

12 '"ot
22 Sop 16-Sep Sep 12 Oct 6 Sep 15 Sep Z4 Sep 16 Sep

200

200
-

C.40Q8470

300
-4 -

G%125369 C,477335

15 Sep 3Oct
Oct

CONFIDENT IAL

47Inclosure 2
aB f oflova:

(Operation Schmatics) to Cclbat Operations Af ter Action Report,

Operation achmatice for the three phases of the operation are attached
TAB 9

TAB A - lift Haavwt Pvt~aUtin"e "a~.d 5 Sep - 3 Oct TAB C - Period 4 - 25 Oct

2-1

CONFI DirIAL

MY/N

OPERATIN SEWAR
L~JJ

TAS~ru

*-AZ9II*

"/7

*n
JLI

IST AN

OE,DI

IIST

OPERAION EWAR

CONFIDONT IAL
CAd

IAM SEP 6S~

1-32 7/NP

IST

BCE, 101 ST A8N DIV

OPERATION SEWARD

\/2

PERIOD

5SIWP-30LT

lu gwj

/Ar

7~ry

1Sr SOC I01ST ASN DIV\

OPERATION ISEWARD
\ig/t

WA4

PERIOD 4-23 OCT

ir

lp

44

CONFIDEINTIAL
Inclosure 3 (Personnel ard Administration) to Ceembat Operations After Action 4Report, Operation 2WLRD

1 (C) UNIT SYR

ZOS:

a. egdzaing of COnntMUCan
(I) The Brigade personnel Strengths at the begirming of Operation SEWARD were as follows: Authorized Augmented (MTOE) Assigned Present for Duty Airhead - Ty Hias Base Camp - Phan Rng Not Present fir Duty

4490
5488 4335 (3354) (1002) 1153

(2) The assigned strength was 122% of the auionted authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 97% of the augmented authorized strength. (3) Of the Not Present for Duty Strength; 410 were hospitalized, 403 were intransit, 237 were ^n 71Y/SD status, 67 cn leave, 22 in confinement, and 14 AWOL. b. Conclusion of Operation -MD. "A-RD

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation were as follows: Authorized Augmented (MTsE) Assigned Present for Duty 4517 5937 5057

Airhead - Tuy Hoa

Base Camp - Phan Rang Not Present for Duty

(4065)
(99,) F00

(2) The assigned strength was 131% of the augmented Authorized strength. The ;rpsent for duty strength was 12% of the augmented authorized strength. (3) Of the Not Present for Duty strength; 304 were hospitalized, 310 were intransit, 158 were on TDY/SD status, 55 on leave, 21 in confinement, 9 AWOL, and 23 detached. (4) A "Scout Dog" platoon was assigned to the Brigade en 4 September 1966, however, they did not arrive until 26 September 1966. (5) An An7 Postal unit ws attached to the Brigade on 1 October. The arrival of personnel for this unit will permit better postal service in the forward area and release of troopers presently engaged in postal activities. e. The increase in strength during Operation SEWAD was due to the arrival of 751 replacements who were reassigned to subordinate units as follows:

1/327
2/327 2/502

140
121 17'

2/320

98

Spt Bn 71 Septate 144 Ccapanies

2 (C) CASUALTIES:
a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

UNIT
HHC-UMP 1/327 2/327

KIA
3 9 3-1

-q
5 22

79

MLA1 Fk] DRALEILL

2/502 Z/320 A 2117 A 3261tSW T=

CONFIDErUTIAL 35
8 4 2 26 14. 10 169

b. Total casualties to dzte;

317 3 (U) 7VRSMIM a.

1713
PCG4S'

The Red Cross Recreational Unit began an accelerated progror, durins the

operation. These yon ladie made weki visits to Thv Ho to distribute literature and serve in t?.j met* lines. The response to this pogran has beery

exceflent.
b. To USO shows visited the Brigade during the period. They performed for approximately 4 huars for the troops located at Tuy Hog South, c. Classes were given in administration and postal operations.

d. A vigorous program to purge fro unit mrning repots all pereonnel assigned, not Joined, was initiated. One hundred two personnel who on arrival in Vietnam were diverted to other units, were identified. Simlarly, Is? personnel who were diverted before they departed CMJS wore identified. A team from USRV visited the Brigade to identify by name every man csrried not-presentfor-duty. As a result of these actions over 250 personnel were dropped from the assigned strength of the Brigade.

4. (U) PERSONNSL PUNNDM

areas:

Planing during the period involved the tofloiri

a. Coordination continued for the scheduled rotation of a~roimtely 9W personnel during the month of December 1966. Replacements are being closely mcnitored'to insure their arrival is comensurate with anticipated rotational losses. b. The Brigade hired 5 civilian interpreere to replace ARVN interweters in administrative and rear area jobs. This will allow better utilization of ARVN interpeeters attached to the Brigpae.

1 CONFI DEINTtAL

CONFI DENTIAL
Incloaure 4 (Logiatle) to Coabet Cperationa Afte? Action rt& Operttilon

L. Support Battalion: (1) Hesdouarters Detachent: Provided the coand and it wa organised into control 4f the Forward Support El nt (FSE). cand, operations, couications and movement control elementa. (2) Supply Detachment: Plas responsible for the eoeipt, otorage and issue of all clases of supply. It also provided a ri&zgr section.
for small arse

(M artillery, engineer, autm~otive, signal an cuam-ter'ainteAeta hment- Pre ided repair capaility
It vas organized into a shop office, recovery and

naster equipment. Contact team.

(4) Co D, 326th Medical Battalion: Established a clearing stattion vith an 80 bed oapacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an mergency treatment section. and a dental section. b. Supporting Forces: (1) Tuy Hoa Sub Area, Cm Ranh Say Support Conmand: coand and control of the supporting logistie area. Provided

(2) -- th Aviation Battalion: Providd twn Ai-mobile eomnies e.uippad with UH-lB and U-iD hulicopters for Support of both tactical and logistical operations. (3) 3th Aviation Company: Provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts and personnel to end from the forward area. Inconsistent allocation of CV-2 aircraft adwrsely affected transportation planaing and disrupted the generally smoth flow of supplies to thv forward
area.

(4) 179th Aviation Ccpany Ainmobile Xeditm provided CH-47 Helicopter Support. (5) 498th Aviation ompww (Air Ambulance); provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation. 2. (C) MOTE&UL AND~kV~fd

a. Supply: Tuy Hoa Sub Area was located in the vicinity of the Brigde's Forward Support Elcount (YU). This reduced a-vmmnt time of supplies. (1) Class I: 09 and "C ration & wzar oonsmod during the operation. Supplements to the -" ration consisting of fresh mot, flour, broad, fresh fruit and vegetables, condiments and ground coffee were received sporadically, and often in far less aaatity than desired or authorized. The Brigade experienced a critical shortage of starches to include potatoes and rice. Ground coffee was unavailable for approximately five A1 weeks. A total of 420 short tons of Class I were issued to im d104 ration supolemnta 171,782 NB- rations and 51,040 rations of meal, combat, individual. The shortage of ice remain-ed a protlen throughout the operation. Pee a it&_all&Anc. or ice normaly remained below one pound pur am per day. The ice shortage waa partly solved by the shipwint of ice by O"K boat frm Nb Trang to Tu Hoa and the air transport of 4000 pounds daily from Nh Trang to Tcy Hoa South Airfield aboard the Brigades M8 CV-2 aircraft. Neither expedient was able to cove with the dman"d of the Brigadv, as all ice so obtained was shared with the rapidly eXphnAing FWF tro., strength in the Tuy Hea Area. The opening of a 15 tea per day ice plant by Psaific

CONFI IDENT IAL

4

.1

CON F)DEN TIAL

Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Opr*tions After Action Leport, Operation 3 WMARD Arefltt srd "Iginr tmr greatly alien"ated the prble foere shr time. Hoeer the cancellation of M-boat and air shients of ice, plus the continuing troop build-up in the Ty M area son reeted a demand exoding the plants output. (2) Clas II and IV: Support Battelhon (Rear), at Phan Rang provided 43 short tons of Class II and XV it s. Jungle boots and Jungle Fatiquos were received in sufficient ozantity to support all comhht slasmnts of the Brigade. Barrier anez-ials nvrv occasionally in short supply and sandbags beame an especially hard to obtain item. I (3) Class HI: Th Tuy Hea Sub Area provided all types of Class III and .IA in sufficient ouantity to support logistical and tactic-1 operations. A total of 395.9 short tons of POL wore issued during the opertion, to include 25,2CO gallons of bIESEL and 18,400 gallons of AI-S, and 89,200 gallons of MOGA5. Contamiuated AWAS was received on three separat. occasions and curtailed activitiea of tho Brigade Aviation Section. (4) Class V: The Brigade entered the operation with its bsic load. Tuy Hoa Sub Area maintained .4 day level of munition. A total of 801 short tons of Class V were issued. Yellow, green end violet smoke grenades and signal illuminating ground star clusters were in short supply throughout the op'ration. (5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion established a water point at Tz l North Airfield utilising a 1500 G4 Erdlator. Units oa at Tuy Hog South Airfield drew water from the Thy Hoa Sub Area water point. b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detnshsont received 117 autotive, 583 signal, 269 amament, 120 instrument, 177 service and 105 engineer job orders. Of this number, all but 5 autmeotive, 23 signal, 3 a&mament, 4 instrument, 9 service nnd 7 engLneer jobs were completed. c. Transportation: (1) Ground Transportation: An average of 2D - 2j t3n triucks per day were utilized in support of the Priade. (2) Air Transportation: (n) Fixed Wins:

'

i CV-2 sircraft flew 637 sorties totalling 8,504 PAX and 753 short tons of cargo.
2 C-123 aircraft supported the Brigade with 3 sorties for a total of 29 PAX and 14 short tons of cargo.
400 PAX and 83 short tons of cargo.

C-13O aircraft fl

. total of 16 sorties carrying a

(b) Rotary Wing: 1 Both UH-ID and CH-47 helicopters were used in support nf committed forces. Normally, two CH-47 aircraft supported the Brigade on a day to da basis. Their utiliation was restricted primarily to blk hauling of artillery amunition and Class III. 2 Anq helicopters lifted a total of 3928 short tons of supplies in support of the Brizade. d. Other Services: (1) Graves Registration was provited by the 229th Quartermaster

CONFIDENTIAL
5-3

(JON'1FIK
Inlonrt 4 (Aogistics) to Combat Operations After

IIAL
ction Reprt, Operation

SEWARD (2) Bath faaiJt te wero provid d at both 7%q e North s

SeaM MuifflS by the UlM~

wuanatr Cempaw.v
--. Ty Hoea South Airfield

(3) Laundry serviCLS was 'St3blihed by the 22th Quarterm.ster Company. 3. (G) rLiDICAL:

a. The revised Medevac Request Pom was used for the first tiar throughout an entire operation. It proved much simpler and mare Cficient thaft the older form. b. Stringent measurea were taken to reduce the incidence of malat., Commind emphasis ws pl"ed on the rolling down of sleeves at sundown, use of mos-nAito be and insect repellent, continuous insecticide spring programs, and enforced dosage of Chloroouine Primaquine and Dixcinodphenylssda (DDS). These precautions depressed the rate of malaria significantly during the month of September 1966. The extensive area of operations, com ined with an increase in FIMF troop strength overtaed the capability ol one medevec helicopter. Accordingly, an urgent recuest was made for additional medevac helicopters. Eventually, a "DUSTOFf" Operations Center was established with suveral aircraft to provide coverag. throught the area of operations. a. Patients Treated: (1) (2) WIA flA 121 26 157 563 232

(3) Non-Battle Injury (4) (5) Disease Returned to Duty

(6) Evac.ated to Hospital (7) Remain in Holding (8) Total Patients Treated

5#3
26 841

d. Hospitalized Personnel Categorized by Wouwds: (1) Head 3 9

(2)

Cheat

(3) Abdomen
(4) Uper Extremities
lober Extmities

3
55
57

(5) 4.

(U1)SWAlfaz

a. The organira-tion for logistical support during Operation SEWARD was adequate. b. One medical evacuation helicopter cannot provide adequate coverage for a Brigade deployed over an extensive area of operation. Frer~Aently, two or more medevao mission requests are received at the same time frm widely separated unite. The problem becomes critical if the mzdevac aircraft must leave the area of operptions entirely to transport patients to a supporting field hospital. This necessitates diversion of

CO ,N -tFNTIAt F

UNCLASSIFIED
Incloge 4 (Loltics)to Cwmpt Oprations Mar -,ction ItPort, Operation

70

uility helicopters fer

to the area of operations.

ymse be

W" l

tw

vs

V%

Vai

5.

(U) c000=81M:
a. Zuept for continued rai-.menta the 'urrent o
se continued.

eranc arganiation

for support should

b. Additional medevc helicaptere must be provided when the are of op~rationes becos too exteanive t-r one ai raft to support. It is preferablu that at least two medevat helicopters be provided in order to answer two siaultamous aedevao requvsts frm widely separated points. Onb medevc helicopter can then rwain in the area of operation when the other

aircraft is transporting patients to a field hospital outside the mre of

operations.

UNCLASSIFIED
4-'

13lesw 5 (Cms~ww teom) to omet Olvfttam After htlam Rhpot, Operation $woo (11)

CONFIDENTIAL
,

97f

. (U) 3adit
FACT h#4 the joi 2. (0)

~s h~1piWartami%= = istNa" ad 0 bmw~m ilaLm t @inaa eeateaw eywuu

lukei during the preview opration.

operationes

a. VHF Section - Provided comanications between rrigtde CP and Battalion Traim areas at TUT HCA South Airfield am diepUced the sate to the am Battalions Trains Area in the vicialty of PI HIV (3). b. Canniaation Center Section - CooUmad to provide secum teletype service to I FFDFM'. The services waft eqanded frum a )-a duplex circut t a full duplex and another half lmx circuit to enable the Arignis to handla the incresad traffic. The seotion also continued to provide internal motor mesenger service. ". 3wtcbcaz4Aire Section - Continued to maintain the eatablehed ystem. The nmber of loca suberibere increased to 85 while terminating lateral c1rcuits to nt Me, 4th Iuf Div.

d. PA Radio Se t on - Provided FM Radio Nete within the Brigade exteming retransmission stations to CHAP CHAl Mountain with relay stations at the DOtG TRE and VUO BA areu. a. AM Radio Section - Continued to operate a secure RTT g secure asts to the *Anever battalions at DONG TRI and TV AN.
Net between 7V1 BOA and PM RAND, extend f. Maintenanoe Sectien - Contined to provide maintenance suport for the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Comparo and attachei~te.

Lv. I F7OVIV S1gna Support - 54th Signal Battalion cortinued to provide circuits into the area systemi, a secure RTT to I FFMCtV, and single side band phone patch net between MUY HOA, MiN RMAG and HA TRANO.

3. Problem areast
a. ] vipmnt shortagbs - Twlve 301 AC generator vere requisitioned on 020 priority in November IM6 end requisitioned on 23 Aug 66 as replaeents for the PZ75 generators, which have proved unreliable.

Y195 tramnmitter ooaUti to present critical maintena Insufficient f1oats are available to mintain a co 'til 1 opertti.onul ey tem, even though LU AN radios ae amnuolidated wider Brigade control.
b.

probles.

a. Typhoon and Strik Rear telephone circuits ooatimLe to provide marginal service with nmmerous interruptions.

CON FIDENTI AL
5.4

73

Telo~ay 6 (Clvil

A!!alrs I to Combat Operatimtst

Alter Action Report,

Operation SHAMD
1. CivIl Affairs Aetietios during Oporation SW'J centered minL oh improving and ex vadir progrnms initiated during Opration JOHN PAUL MM..

a.
MON27 mtftp

A significant step in this direction ws the expansion of the beoqmem tw Commag Gan and th Pieiam Cast to
CovaetfeLl agelcv rrese t I"

include participants from all other =

this Province. b. Therm as also increased cooperation a, the District - Battalion level. As the battalions spread out and started operating indcpendently within districts, they also tied in closely with District Chiefs anAd MACV Sub-Set-1' Advisors. c. New MACV regulations concerning categoriing civilian detainees into one of several categories were implemented during this period as were new orders concerning death, injury and property daage to non-oaubtants. 2. Civic Action Activities during Operation SEWARD were highlighted by the incre.sed activities of the Battalion S-5a and the enhanced capability of the Brigade to suort thee activities through close ties with in country agencies and the estab.ishment of a Brigade Civ4c Action Supply Point at Phan Rang. a. This supply point was established with about 45 tons of American Christmas Truck and Train ASSN. Supplies which were shipped to the Brigade in late August 1966. By keeping this material in the Phan Rang Base Area, it can be held ready for distribution when and where needed, while not encumbering the ffward elements of the Brigade with 45 tons of additional supplien to

move around.
b. Som 158 Civic Action Projects were accomplished and reported during Operation S3WARD. These included: Health and Sanitation 49

Public Work Transportation

Com erc. and Industry Agriculture and Natural Resources Education and Training Coanunity Relation Coamunication Refugee Assistance

17 15
1 9 7 23 13 14

3.
Brigade.

Other notable events during Operation SEWAD included: a. Tha detachment of VA Teeam 9,k 4t Civil Affairs CaMpaq from this This leaves only one Civil Affairs Team in support of this Brigade.

b. Members of the S-5 Section of this Brigade provided area familiarization and orientation training to S-5 personnel of the lot Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, which had just arrived in country. c. The full rice harvest in Phu Yen Province we cOmplated on 25 October, 1966. This Brigade had protected and supported the accomplishment of this harvest, which yielded 17,343.5 imtric tons or 89% of the Province goal of 19,500 metric tons of rice.

d.

A Brigade Voluntary Civic Action Fund was established and re-

gulatione governing its operations were published.

6-S

CONFID NTI4.L
F
7 mrstioa

Telwe

7 (Po,'oue
8A I

eA1

Awtaft)

Arter to comat opertlent

Ation

hpert,

(U)

1.

(0)

Operation m S

a.

Leaflats a A total of 5,947,000 leafletes1were drcpped during

of lalet.a i represertativ of

the operation. See Tab A for eaxipla those usaed on the opertior.

b. Loespeker. A total of 60 hours of lvdspeaker appettle -. and the Oroud were delivezred by tSAF U-0 aioraft, l-ID haitoo.-" :

3.eak.oe

lmation and Mae Harveot the operatone

Ten. The Vhiesis used in the appe ls wae OIMd31OI, DmorelA total of taur We

m tapee were mAde durin

mRer, Three persowlased, specialtied, ad localized c. leaflets ed tour special tape. were directed toward enW i.t. end friendly rioe horet locations in the operational area. It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation, contributed extensively to the dMoralization of sarriving ermW. peoreorl. By the closing date of the operation, a total of ten ralliers had surrendered themelves to Bigade personnel. d. laews L-arnedt

(1)

When new leaflet@ are produceed, particularly special

leafleta, at leat 200 copies of the translation should be inoluded; these copes -. ll be used an handouts to VIP visitors. (2) Leaflet basee should be coated with a water re istant mubstar=e (i.e. plastio, wax, eto) and more securely bound an a greater precaution against inalment weather. (3) An emmm3 of the oontents sbould be clearly dlsplayed on the cutside of a]l leaflet boxes along with the qwantity and gemral cla seifloations (4) An augmentation to the Brigade of one sohool trained Py War officer and tao enlistedmen has been apprpvd. The peruonnel have been requisitioned and should be assigned on an expedited bsi.

(5) A requiremnt exists for one interpreter to be available to woft with the Pay War tem on operations. ueedad for use b7 thr

Ground
Tabt

(6) A portable rW-hol. speaker i Speaker ?e"n.

A - Iaets

C-I

CONFIDENTIAL

1.

English Translation for 245N-35-67 Tills is fli C=C t l f flCS IT

These Souch Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers 9Auc the U.S. 101st Airborne Division an Besptanber 24th, near Tuy 116& Phu Yen in Protinee. They were being Se4j in a Viet Cong prison cW tken they
-

suffered atstrntmsnt, star. .t.on and disease

smec

for almost two

years.

This is5 a good enumple of the "Glorious LjberatjonR promised by the Viat Cong 'National Liberation Front'. their oountryuen. Sup 'ort your government against the Viet Cong. "Liburntion'. 7-A-1 Help stop Viet Cong This is how thec Viet Cong treat

MUish Translation for 245N-35-67 THIS IS VIET CONG flLIBVATICW4

These Souath Vietnmeee citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division on September 24~th, near Tqy Hoa In Phu Yen Province.
mi~ff"

They vere being held In a Viet Cong priaon ea*~ whtere thaV
-

d streatmants starv~tioa andi disease

sce for almit, two years.

Ibhis is a good exampe of the 0Olorious Liberation" proadsed by thb Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". their countrylmen. Support your goverreent againot the Viet Cong. Liberation-,7-'4elp stop Viet Cong
?his is how the Viet Cong treat

Moglish Trazwlation for 245N-35-67

TIlS IS VIET CCX4G OLIMMA'TIC" These SmbVietnaaae, citizens were found byW soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airbore Division on Septcuber 24th, neAr Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Povinee. They weto being hold in a Viet Cong prison camp where th~y
-

sulffered mist reatmmnt, starvation and disease

some for almost two years.

This is.a good examplo of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the Viet C"n "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat

their couatryuien. Support your gCove-nmnt against the Vit Coa.

"ibertion".

Help stop 7!et Cong

Tab A to Inolorire 7 (Pechological Warfiu)

Report, Operation SAR;D

to Coab^t After Action

C)

j~i: '

I."

AK
Thg4ab Translation for 24s5N-35-67
THIS IS VIET CO.G 'LIBUFATICU" These South Vietnamee citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. lOst Airborne Divisioa on September 24th. near Tuy Ha in Phu Yen Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they

suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years. This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" prordsed by the Thia is bow the Viet Cctg treat

Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". their codtrymen.

Support your gover.nent against the Viet Cong.

Help atop Viet Cong

"Libertion"

7-A-4

?-a-4

Tab A to Inclosure 7 (Psycological Wartaw) to Cobat After Action Report, Operation SdARD

E9Y7ONE WILL PU Y THEE PEOPLE

The people whose picture you see on the reverse aide have Just been liberated from a V.G., prison camp by members of the American lOl0t Airborne Division. Besides Mr. Truong, f-Xuan, the Chlf of My-Trun Hamlet,

Mr. Troung-Tung, secretary of Phuoc-Thin Hamlet, Mr. Hoeng-Kim, Chinh, the Self Defewse Corps Private Second Class and Mr. Trftng-Van Di, South Vietnamese soldier there are Mrs. Vo-Thi-amp Mrs. LaM-Thi-An, a Aree-

Mr. Nguyen-Hang and Nguyhn-fkong, four innocent civilians.

Their thin bodies and their haggard faces vini prove that during their imprisonment they were without clothee, rdstreated, and suffered miserable at the hands of the V.C. Now, all of them have been fed in a temporary

camp and treated by MR medical personnel to restore their health before returning home. Because of the V.C. we see scenes such as these. Help the South Vietnamse Oovernment b ing security and safety to your land, and give yu a nw life of peace and good will.

7-A-5

Tab A to Inclosum 7 (Psychological Warfcx-) Report, Operation SEWARD Leaflet No.

to OCbat After Action

tro

245N-17-67

Drawind of two Vietnamese working in rice field and talking. Dialogue to the effects The harvest idU go we l. The free M3rAl Bldilr* are pretecting mmr fields and workers, ttlerefor we em~ work idth- paee of
mind knowing we aro safe from the Viet Cong attack and thievery. (NOTE: This typo leaflet was used effectivly to depict the hard working pesant in VC controlled areas)

FRONT:

Work in peace.

The 10st I protecting your rice harvest.

Dong-bao hay tam gat lua. Su-Doan 101 dang bao-ve mua

lua cua ba con.

/ '- .

-,,,

7-A-6

Tab A to InelovArv- 7 (ParcholOgiaal wa&re) t" Ome~ tft'er ;' t:Lon Report, Operation SEARD

POOPle, You mist out (harvest) your rice.

The 101st will protect you.

7-A-7

CONFIDENTIAL
Inoloeure & (Artillery) to Combat Operation ation SWARD MU After Action Report, Oper1, (C) Mission: 2nd BttAlion (Airborne), 320th Artillery direct support of lt Brigade, 101st Airborn Division. Batter B, lt Battalion (towed), 30th Artillery reinforced 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 320th 2. (C) Execution:

alert. Unite a. 5-7 Sep: All units were placed on st-n !-' continued maintenance program and training for the uoeom1.ng operation 4 Initial positions at the beginnina of the operation wer.: (1) Rqs try CQ219hU C=21941 SF987829 BQ99421 CQf11675 0S let Bde OS lst Bdo DS 1/327 DS 2/327 R 0/2/320

(2) Stry A (3) Btry B (h) try C

(5) Bhl/30th Arty

HOA b. On 4 September, due to an operation in the H111% area Battery D (Provisional) was organized with two tubes from /2/320th Arty and two tubes from /2/320th Arty. This unit continued as -.firing element through the end of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES and into Operation SWARD. Their initial location was CQ078347. c. 7-10 Sep: On 7 Sep C/2/320th Arty displaced two tubes forward to BQ970455 to support elements of 2/502d Inf. Two 3/ ton trucks were carried forward by CH-0i and closed at 1630 hours, d. On 8 Sep, C/2/320th Arty displaced to coord BQ945580 in DS 2/502 Inf. The unit moved by CH-47 and closed at 1630 hours. a. On 9 Sep, A/2/320th Arty displaced by CV-2 to DCNO TRE then overland to B056795 in direct support of 2/327th 16f. Unit closed at 1630 hourse
8 f. 10-16 Sep: 10 Sep B/2/320th Arty dispknced to CQ09006 by convoy at 1530 hours. Closed at 1945 hours. Unit in direct support of 1/327th Inf. C/2/320th Arty began displacement by CH-47 t, CW19411 in GS lIt Bde, 101st Abn Div. Unit closed -t 1630 hours. B/?/320th Arty from CQ090068 to CQ166135 by road to give better coverage to the operation of 1/327th In!. 1/327th In! replaced by 2/502d Inf for this particular phase of the action.

g. On 12 Sep the base camp began moving to CQ205443 to mke room for the development of TUY UOA South Airfield complex. 0/2/320th Arty also displaced to the new CP area and located at CQ203h3. Both elements closed at 1545 hours. On 16 Sep 0/2/320th Arty displaced to OQOD7834a8 in DS 1/327th Inf. On this date D/2/320th Arty was deactivated. 6 On 16 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced from CQ16 135 to COQ219411 in GS 1st 3de, 101st Abn Div. h. 17-30 Sep: On 17 Sep the Hqs element displaced back to CQ219411n, its original CP area. A/2/320th Arty displaced by road from 319679S to coordinate B090870 4 and closed at 1630 hours. Unit in direct support of 2/502d Inf. On this date the attalion suffered losses of one Lieutenants one Staff Sergeants and one Specialist Four KIA and one Lieutenant severely wounded in action with B/2/327th In!. i. On 19 Sep A/2/320th Arty displaced from BQ956795 to BQ908704 closing at 1630 hours. The purpose was to protect rice convoys

8-'

CONFIDENTIAL

(Ot'

CONFIDENTIAL
Inelosure 8 (IrUllery) to Combat Operatios After Action Report, Operation SWARD (U)
which would be leaving fros the TUT M area. Unit also answered calls for fire from the SF camp elementa on patrols vithin the range of the

a. 22 Sept B/2/32Oth Arty displaced to COQ1676 in direct support of 2/327th Inf. B/1/30th Arty then had its' mission changed to relnforcing B/2/320th Arty. 26 Sep 9/2/320th Arty displaced fra
CQ113h76 to CQ069733 in Dm2/327th Inf clositg at 1100 hours. C
28 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced back to CQfl1676 and closed at 1M5 hours with the mission of d&.et support of the 2/327th In!. k. 1-20 0ot: On 1 Ot A/2/320th Arty displaced from BQ90C704 to CQ2I594. in 08 let Me5 i0ost Abn Div. Undt closed at .150 hours on 7 Oct 66. A/2/320th Arty displaced to X4h22 in direct auppnrt of 2/327th Inf and closed at 1430 hours. 1. 9 Outs C/2/320th Arty nmod 3 tubes to vio coordinates CQO355 in direct support of 2/327th Inf. One seotltn of the Bn 730

was utilied to augment the firs direction on the following day ene more
tube Joined the battery forward. The rewaiung two pieces and the one section of Bn IDO displaced back to CQ219hl1 in GS, let Pde, 101st Aba

Div*

v. On 12 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced to

ade, slat Div. Abu
n.

39Lhl aS, lot

OS

B/2/320th Arty. Closed at 2230 hours.

On 13 Out A/2/32Qth Arty displaced to CQi3454

o. On 24 Oat C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ235279 by convoy in direct support 2/22d In!, 4th Inf Div, and displaced back to CQ21-lU when it was relieved by C/5/27th Arty. p. 21-26 Oats 21 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced by CH-h? to CQ043389 in direct support 2/327th Inf covering engineer work parties. q. 22 Oct Hqs 2/320th Arty displaced to CQ32369 and began setting up a new base camp. r. 1730 hours. 24 ct A/2/320th Arty displaced to OQ39368 closing out at GS 1st Me, 101st Abu Div and began training for future

operations. a. 25 Oct A/2/320th Arty and B/2/30th Arty displaced to

CQ237370 and CQ237369 in 05, lst Bde, 101st Abn Div and began training for future operations. Both units dlosed at 1800 hours.

3.

(C) Problem Ares:

a. On 13 Out 66 3/2/320th Arty had a round fall short on Highway #1, resulting in I U KIA and 2 US WIA. The cause was determined to be a malfunctionig in sight. In the future, after each healobile assault or displacement the basic period test will be performed on each howitser to detect and correct an irregularities It is also SOP that the gunner continually watches the first three digits an they change. b. On 7 Oct B/2/320th Arty was firing a mission for an artil-

ley forward observer who was maldng corrections based on sound sensings
from the infantry. On a subsequent valley, thm were 2 US WIA and 1 US

KIA. Extrema caution should be used then this uethod'of ajustent is

necessary and the words Danger Close' included in the observers request. Further coordination and training which is currently being conducted should remedy this problem.

8-2

CONFIDENTIAL
'SI

CONFIDENTIAL
hInlosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SWARD (U) c. Muale burst: On 8 Oct A/2/320th Arty experienced a muzzle burst while firing high acLe iminions in the Hrrrawmnnt and It.er-

dietio

vvesatigation rave.Zad no ml practic' within t:. f.In battery. Although it was an unfortunate incident it must be accepted as an occupational hazard. 4a. (c) Contments:

pequ% Tom (10) peweaml

iUd

a fti

(?) aialuly,

a. To insure a batter understandin of artillery adjuatmet all INO's have instituted training within the Infantry Battalions to train persoml down to squad level, in artillery adjuatment. During periods of little activity coordination enabled the artillery to fire several short service practices. This training will reap rewards in future operations since more personnel are now capable of adjusting artills. be With the arrival of the lat Bde, 4th Inf Div this Battalion set up an orientation for the offi"r and eenor non-oomdesioned officers to supply them with our lessons learned and methods of operation in a counter-inurgency operation. Officers and NCO's were attachod to each of the batteries for a two day period. An orientation course for both Infantry and Artillery personnel was conduoted at the 4th Div's let Bde CP for 3 days on 13-15 Oct to orient them on the situation and problem faced by the Free World Forces in Vietn&2. The Radar Section including their equipmnt, oollocated with the Radar of Hq 2/20th Arty until their set became fully operational. Several mortar and artillery missions were fired to orient, and train their crew for tkheir mission.

CONFIDENTIAL

.4

CONFIDENTIAL
9I Deaoure 9 (Owineer) Operation SWrARD (U)
1. to Combat Operations After Action Report, tor liis a. M n oamugs1. with t"e 3Mt
ftv 3n, the Pi ade swept total of 55r km of roads for mines during Operation SWJAD. 26 mines were detected and destroyed. No losses were suffered by the Brigade to wine# on roads during the operation. Incidenta of suiping increased significantly on Route YPtE in late Sep-

(a) bgepin of 3e

tember but after an airstrike and a counter-action by 2/502 Inf and A2/17

Cav sniping was infrequent.

The MP Platoon did yoeman service in pro-

viding escort for the engineer sweere on Route PURPLE. A letter describing the Brigade experience in Operation JOHN PAUL JONES and Operation SWJARD is attached as Ireloeure 1. 2. (G) Road Opening Significant raad openings were accomplished

during Operation SEWARD. Route 6B from TUT AN to LA HAX was opened in early September and two supply convoys were rman to LA HAI. In aidSeptember a convoy was run from HIM HDA to TUT HOA up Hwy 1. This route was used several imse subseequently, the last time being 25 October.
They taUon supported the Brigade in Operation SWARD in many areas. swept*Routea YELU0 and BLACK daily and for such of the operation swept Route 'WIITE as well. In late September and early October they provided direct support to the 1/327 Inf in the HU MiONG Valley with 1 or 2 squads. A total of seven bridges were installed on Rote PURPLE during A platoon from the 39th Sngineers did the work on the operation. The 20th Engineer Bttalion provided supopening Route 61 to LA HAX. port in the NIM HOA - TU BMO area and supplied one company reorganized as infantry to operate with the 1/22 lot in the TU BUGO area.

3.

(C) Support by

4Sth Engineer oup: The 39th Engineer Bat-

4.

(0)

Support of the Enginees: The Brigade provided security

SON for engineer moves to CUONG and to DONG TRZ and back. Each of these moves required security of roads for periods of 4 to 5 days and required approodmately one battalion.

5. (C) Destruction of tunnel System:

In late September Co A

2/327 Inf discovered an extensive VC tumel eyatem. This system was deetroed/denied using CS pader and dunolitione. The report on this turml system is attached as Appendx 1.

6.

(0)

Lessons Learned:

a. Duri g the monsoon season, fords and by passes are only fiar weather friends. Heavy raine and rapid runoff make it virtually impossible to saUsfactorily InstaU. culvert. to maintain by passes. The only satisfactory answer is bridging, or in some cases, rafting. b. Sniping at convoys and sweep parties can be at leasot partianly controlled by concerted counteraction with troops and/or air strikes. 8 powder and couavntional demolitions can be nsed to a. successfully destroy/dery V tunnel system.

9-1

CONFIDENTIAL
6q&7

For Official Use Only

DEAR2MWT OF THE ARMY HLZQJATDS IST BRIGADE lMST AM=t? AVBD-EIK SUBJET: Viet Cong m nes DIVISTON1 23 September 1966

TOI

See Distribution

1.

Reference, Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam, dated December 1965.

2. Attached as inclosures 1 thu 8 are sketches and description of Viet Cong nines/fuses not listed in reference 1 above and found on MSRfa of the let flrigade AC in Phu Ten Province. 3. Hining incidents along these routes usually occur at places where road cuts/craters have been repaired on hard surface roads and random placement along the travelled way of loose or natural surface roads. Anti-personnel mines are usually found on and near the shoulders of roads in areas where some cover exists against small arms attack. 4. Route clearing oper-tions by A/326 Engineer Battalion during the past 40 days have resulted in removal/destruction in place of 8 each Antipersonnel mines and 30 Anti-vehicular mines. 5. The AN/PRS-3 Portable Metallic :Uine Detector has proven very reliable in pinpointing the location of Viet Cong mines even where the smal blasting cap is the only metal present in the mine. Extensive use of these detectors (1800 bm of road cleared during month of August 1966) has caused un increased deadline rate which has been rectified by additional float items and expediting the maintenance effort required. 6. In conduct of the daily road clearing operations a close visual in-. spection preceding the detector is absolutely necessary along the shoulders of the road, around culverts and underneath bridges. Mounted clearing parties have proven unsatisfactory even on paved rocds. 7. The initial sweep alone a route will take substantially more time than subsequent sweeps done on a daily basie. Route clearing time is cut in half by having teams start at each end, meet and retv-n to the starting point. The use of 2 detectors in one party and having I or 2 on stand-b' with the clearing taam when detectors are available hns been advantageous. After the initial sweep and for planning parposes a rate of 3 km/hr for hard surface roads and 2 km/hr for loose surface roads has been established by this unit for the Phu Yen Province. 8. Under no circumstances should impatience cause a movement to go ahead of the clearing detail. Timely reporting of route clearance by the engineers to the Brigade TOC is a must., No method of mine detection is 100% foolproof, however, the unit and the individual can take positive measures to protect themselves from injuries due to enemy land nines. Vehicles should never travel roads subject to mining before they are cleared unless the tactical situation clearly dnmands the movement in spite of the risk of lifb and equipment. Insure that all vehicles are sandbagged and that personnel in the vehicles ride over the sandbags and do not sit on wheel wells. Remain aler

For Of ficial Use Only

For Of ficial Use Only

Viet MR Mines 23 September 1966 and watchful at all times while moving on foot along roads nnd trails.

IM To

~mU

6 Incls as DISTRIU5"r:
A - Plus

WILLIAM' IE 2d Lt, ADC

Ast

I 2 1 1 2

552 2 5 2 2 50 65 -

CO, I FMW CG, lst Car Div (AM) CG, 101st Abn Div, Pt Campoll, Ky CO, 82d Abn Dlv, Ft Bragg, NC CG, The Egr Sch, Ft Belvir, Va CO, 18th Enr &W Enr, I FFV Co, ist Bde, th Inf Div CC, 28th Regt, 9th ROK Div CO, 45th Engr Bn C0, 39th Enr Bn SAj 47th ARVN Regt Hqs MACV, ATTN: $343, APO 96243 X0 Ede Fzp

For Official Use Only

7/

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DEPARWhI ,TOF THE AMY4 HEADQUARTRS 13? BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DTIV!SIOW AV/ID-E U3,7RCt TaU=4 Dwt-tr.oga/haui& 5 November 1966

TO-

See Distribution

1. Attached is a description (Inel 1-4) of a vast tunnel complex discovered by the 2nd Dettallon (Arborne), 32th Infantry, on 23/24 September 1966 in the Phu Yen Province, Republic of Vietnam, and of the nethods used to destroy/deny the system. This tunnel complex, according to captured documents, was used by the 7th Battalion, 18B North Vietnamese Ar.y Regiment, prior to that Regiment's engagement with the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on 20-24 une 1966. 2. It is believed that the leneth, depth of cover, numerous entrances/ exits and the type of soil make this system unique in comparison to any other tunnels/caves that this unit has encountered or those reported by units operating in War Zone D. FOR THE COMMANDE:

4 Incl 1 - General Lata 2 - Demolition Puihods

3 - Use of RCA

DAIDA DAVID A. K C 1st Lt, AX Asst AG

4 - Photo Folio (Limited Distribution) DISTRIBUTIONs 2 - CO, :/327 Inf

2 2 2 2 2 CO, 2/327 lsf CO, 2/502 Inf 00, 2/320 Arty C, A2/17 Cay CU, 1 FF1

2 - CG, 101st Abn I,iv Ft Carpbell, Ky 2 - CG, 82d Abn Div, Ft Pragg, KC 2 - CG, The Engr Sch, Ft Belvoir, Va - Cr., 1ath Engr Bde, APO 96307 5 - Ews, I FPv 2 - CO, Ist Bde, 4th Inf Div 2 - CO, 28th Regt, 9th Inf RK Div 2 - CO, 4Sth Engr Gp 2 - 00, 39th Enr Ba 2 - SA, 47th ARVN Regt 2 - Hq'sp MACV, ATTN" S3 4, APO 96243 60
20 - Bde Br Center and 2 - Codt, Cml the Chief ofSch, Ft MClellans Ala Engineer EGTE-MK, Washington, DC. 2 -Office of

After Action Report (Opn Seward5

60 - Quarterly Operations Report Tab B to Inclosure 9 to After Action Report for Operation SEWARD

"

, j

GiMALL 1.
fit

DATA

Location.
Uit.co Date.

BQ962656 and OJ
A, 2nd f, 327th Inf, let

,53.See Sketch at Tab A. B, 10st Abu My.

2,

3.

23/2

Sep 66.

5.

Width.

29 ft -

ft. f

6.
7. 8. 9. 10.

Height. 4 ft- 5
Cover. 12 ft -

.9

7 ft. 18 vertical shafte, 3 trench entrances,

Etranee/Edt .

Ecavation Effort - 5000 man days with approx 3300 cu yae earth rmved. Use. This tunnel syst.. had the nenceseary spece and adequate ventilation to shelter more than 1000 men. Except for an occasional width constriction where boulders were encuntered, this system would also allow the VC to double time throughout its course. There was evidence to' indicate that the system had not been sed for 2 or more months, The system had been very deliberately abandoned with no equipment left behind; however, no booby traps were left installed.

11.

Terrain. The tunnel a. trench system is on an elongated open plateau bounded by a steep wooded bluff on the south and by i-olling wooded slopes on the north. Parts of the plateau near the village of 7WN0 THAN (3) BQ9665 are under cultivation with crops of corn and soue areas are covered with dese vegetation. The most open parts of the plateau are covered with helicopter punji stakes 10, - 121 tall and in some areas dense bands of antipersonnel punji stakes are also encountered. The plateau has an extensive covered trench system muach of which had firing positions and is concealed by running along the edge of the dense vegetation bordering the open space. This trench system connected the 3 otherwise separate tumel system,. The area is completely inaccessible by ground vehicle but well used trails from 4 directions intersect in the village. Artillery Bombardment. On 27 September 1966 the tunnel system was bombarded with B inch howitser and 175m- gun concentrations. Forty rounds of 8 inch anmunition with delay fusing was fired at the northenmost ccuplez. At the range of 13,000 meters the 8 inch concentration was clustered in a fairly tight pattern approximately 200 meters by 75 meters. With the delay fusing each shell made a crater 5 feet deep and 10 feet in diameter. Although hits were scored within 5 feet of the tunnel centerline, there was eo damage to the tunnel system other than minor loose dirt shaken from the air shafts. The 17im concentration at the southern tunnel complex from a range of 21,00 meters had a much wider diapersion, created smaller craters and did no damage to the tunnels.

12.

13.

Destruction Effort. a. Material. 39 0 lbs explosives and 43 ea 8 lb - bag C3 pwdr.

b. Man power. security.

5 squad days for Engineers and > company (-) days for

7ze7
ri>

-% N'

'24'

'

y:<KS

RK

7-0: 09

IA'i

OS

'#G.I

/~ i

?irst test shot for entrance closure.

as Ccnditionso The entrance was a 4 ft. diameter verticAl shaft approximatelY 20 ft. deep in clay soil with heavy laterite content. Two branches of imal, qpr.dat437 .3 ft. VIe9 au 5 ft, hlh bswae '.ff at rw ana~m to saab othe,.

I !

"qF'

'' '

Vegetatio

'

-/ Jo Tunnel Boulders Tunnel

Shaft

201

b. Materials Used. 1 ea 40 lb shape charge 2 ea, 40 lb cratering charge I aa 2, lb block C4 100 ft detonating cord 8 ea non electric blasting caps 6 ft time fuse 3 ea fuse lighters 20 ft adhesive tape mmoss

co Procedure.. The shape charge was placed as shoun on sketch with the Deek recessed into the wall of the tunnel for support on the rear end and supported on the front by a scissor, made of bamboo. Stand-off was approx 18 e.
.
-\

-Charge

Tunnel ShpdCharge

0-Saft

(1) Back blast of the shape chane blew out a concave Area6 ft. In]
Inal 2 dia and 2 ft. deep,hole approx 1 ft. of earth the opening and I of the tunnel. 6 The resulting bore and was 0* ft. in dia at from the coiling ft. i da at

ft. back tapering down to 3-Is mnches at 8 ft. back. do any cleaning out of the bore hole.

It was not neceary to

im m-

(2) 30 minutes after the blast there were still gases and a he vry brown dust present in the tunnel. h5 Xrutes after the blast the NCOIC went into the tunnel and stayed for af10 minutes, after which he had difficulty breathing and was exhausted tupn . trng the tunnrl. One hour ar'. 1.-e blast 2 men started priming and placi ,- Le 2t'n' i 6,arges in th- bo-e hoie. After approx 25 minutes one man tecnse unrrclous from 2.-1ck of CXYZcf1 md the ethr m ans also B utlft frem lAck t o*ygn ten atracted from the ftwel. Proteetvn ms were Wern at 2l1 tif.es due to lingering CS Used by A Co, 2/327 Inf. 2 hours after the initial blast the NCOIC reentered the Oznmel and completed the priming of the charges, (3) The resulting explosion from the two cratering charges blew eart and rock 50 into the air from the shaft and 20t into the air f om an air shaft 30m away from the blast. A 200 ft. safety distance was adequate. Most of the narth and rock blown into the air settlcd back into the shaft which fonied a crator approx 12 ft, dia and L-5 ft. deep. The entrance shaft was completely destroyed and sme collapse of the tunnel did occur. (Sketch).

/6

Vegetation

'
,,~1

~
rtr

Location
.

of Charges

~I

'..4

. .

*Shaft

//.I

,'"'

Tunnel

TOP VIEW

CROSS SECTION No further effort was made to use this method due to the apparent danger to persormel and the unacceptable time required (approx 3 hrs/shaft). Safety requirements would also preclude the proper use of RA. 2. Second test shot for entrance closure. a. Condition. 2 each entrance shafts; 4 ft. dia. x 18 ft. deep and hO ft. apart. Soils are red clay with slight laterite content and very stable.

a 0 .

a Ae
Shaft TUNEL couRSE

b. Material. were used.

Same a- para lb except that 3 ea '0 lb cratering charges

2-

The 40 lb shaped charge was placed between the twe shaft. at approx 20, from each one. The resulting bore hole vu large enough to alow placement of 3 cratering chartes at 8 ft depths side by side. d. Results. The reultit crater failed to extend into eithrr .9haf t and 4 the expected displaoement of earth into the shafts or cave-in .. , th -cnoctint tunnel did not occur. These results give testimorW to the exT.e-ne inblity of the soil of this area. tAbeequently a separate shot at eali nrafL, oet up as deslbad in ma 3, i used to uffhtiwsv e2ela each shaft

0,

''rocedure.

3o

Final method for enitrance closure.

a. Condition. ame as par& b above.

bo

Materials.

Sae as par a (2).

c. Procedures Shaped charge was set up arrox 8' from the entrance shaft and at a point that Is not over the tunnel properg

Tunnel

Shaft

The resulting bore hole allowed placement of 2 ea cratering charges one on top of the other and approx 41 below the ground surface. Charges were tamped by refilling the loaded bore hole.

\ \"\ .""-/,

Vegetation
B

ore Hole

2 dratering Charges

spoil ttd

Tunnel

Shaped charges placed on the spoil around the holes wore not effective as the loose material fell back into the bore hole. Issue stand off frame was used at all times. d. Results. The resulting blast from the cratering charges caused earth

2-3

to heave into the entrance shaft, fnr- rng an effectng seal rud pro, b? lapse of portions - the tunnol. T - procedure was used tc etfe-tt'rily ulose the 18 usable ent ances/exits to t:._s tunnel. complex. T'he ,c:uaJ ' IaZ ur'-dJ shock also closed nearby air shafts. h, Test shot for tuwal destruction. a. Condition. Approx 100s of tunnel 3 ft wide and L ft - 5 ft high with 12 ft - 15 ft of ever head cover (natural), soils were rad elkv with heavy laterite content and boulders throughout the course. b. Materials, 7 ea 40 lb cratering charges I ea dud shaped charge

//

7 lbs tetrytcl

200m det cord '5 non electric blasting caps

4 ft time fuse 3 ea 8 lb - bags CS powder (RCA) c. Procedure. 7 cratering charges were placed 30 ft - 40 ft apart on the floor of the tunnel, dual primed with det. cord/caps and tetrytol, and Qied into a main line of det. cord. The 3 bags of CZ powder were wrapped with 6-B turns of dot. cord and tied into the main lino. This pridng and placement took 4 men approx. 2 hre. d. Results.
the tunnel.

The blast blew out all air vents and entrance shafts along
entrance shafts. Several cracks

LittIk damage was done to th

were seen on the surface but no cave in occured except at the air vents. Examination of the interior the following day showed quantities of loose earth on the floor and an enlargement of the tunnel cross section at the area where the cratering charges were placed, but due to the depth of cover and the blow out at the air vents there were no serious cave-ins along the tunnel. The tunnel appeared to be structurally sound after this blast and was open and passible through the entire area of the blast. Except for contamination by the CS powder, which was severe enough to cause the skin to burn, the tunnel appeared to be completely useable. Because of ;his result no further effort was made to collapse the entire tunnel system, but the methods previously described were used to seal all entrances after contamination of the tunnels.

F',

2-4t

4
4-

USE OF RCA
1. General. The use of CS powder has been developed by a Joint effort of the Brigade chemical section and the onginerr on the site. On small tiwral/

caves where complete destruction could be attained in acceptable time and with

reaonable qu-ritties of Giolitieas material the CS powde Was no- used. it is felt that the effectiveness and persistency of CS psder in tunroi that can b completely sealed will be inefni' . When partially ';-sc to air and weather, such as in covered trenches, the life of the medqr blc.., into the earth would deny the use of these facilities for fro 2 to 3 months. 2. Materials. The CS powder, Riot-Control Agent 0-chloro-benzal malononitrile, CS-I comes sealed in 55 gallon drum (which were later destroyed to deny their use to the enemq) with ten 8 lb. bags in egoh drum. A crescent wrench and screw driver are required to open the containers. The CS powder is further sealed in sturdy paper bags of double thickness which stand up under extensive handling. Each bag is folded one tie end to end and wrapped with 6-10 turrs of detonating cord with a running end of 3-4 feet left for tying into the main line of det. cord for simultaneous detonation. Approximately 25 ft. of dot. cord is required for each bag. 3. Procedure. All the necessary bags are primed near the entrance shaft of a particular leg of the tunnel. The det. cord main line is directed from the surface into the shaft and run in each direction from the shaft. One man can carry 2 bags of CS in the tunnels described. These are dropped at 30 ft 50 ft intervals along the main line of dot. cord and tied onto the main line. This procedure is followed for each shaft of the tunnel system. Each main line will have a separate fuse (non electric) with a short timo delay (2 - 3 minutes). As soon as all branches of the tannel are primed the fuses are ignited at the sane time so that, personnel can stand clear of the entrances to avoid the minor amount of gas which blows out. Immediately after the last shot has fired the engineers start the sealing of the shafts to contain the contamination. 4. Results. After the blasting of the CS bags the fine powder could be seen suspended in the entrance shafts and on occasion the powder would be blown to the surface. A heavy concentration of the powder was present throughout the tunnel complex. The bags were completely blown to shreds and the powder could be seen embedded in the walls of the tunnel. 5. NITY MITE: The Mty Mite, a small portable air blower, has the capatility of forcing colored smoke through a tunnel system. The blower produces 40 ofm of air and can be used effectively in tunnels up to 200m in length to determine the location of hidden entrances, exits or air shafts. The Mity Mite was used only briefly on this tunnel cnmplex as engineer work parties were going to search and map the entire complex for a detailed report. Since the burning smoke grenades consume valuable oxygen in the sealed tunnel shaft it wa considered best not to use the Mity Mite, thereby lessening the danger of asphyxlation to personnel working in the tunnel. A potential use of the Mity Mita is to force fresh air from the surface into the tunnels.

Incl 3 3-1

Tab A to Inolaoure 2 to Opemtional Report for Qrteriy Period Endiz 31 October 1966 (Rcs CS M-65)

QDM TRZ

TUY AN~~

1 ]Y HO

10

i..4

2-A-1

Tab

to Inlosure- 2 tx Operational Report for Quart ri- Poriod Ending

31 October 1966

(RC3 CSFCH-65)

BOW3 CAU 0 DONG TP'

4-

AN TUYJ

TUY HOk

0)

G E-OiIMO I

TU BON

SCALE

1:250,000

-'---

VI

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DEPARTMENT OF 7HE AfMf

HE

ARTDW 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBNE DIVISIO APO San Francisco 9637 20 October 1966 '

/2

AVED
SUBJECTs Semi-uerrILU Tactics

TOs

Battalion and Separate Comr-ry Comamaders

,joH 1. (U) Although the Brigade had an excellent kill rate in respectivel ; PAUL JONES and SEWARD (205 VC IA (BC) and 236 VC KIA (BC) Operations
,ur biggest problem has been and remains one of target acquisition. Our second major problem is the need to reduce reaction time once the enemy is dotoctod. 2. (C) To improve our kill rate during forthcoming operations , desire that battalion comwnders and the cavalry troop commander more fully exploit,

develop, and utilize "zho concept of "semi-guerrilla tactics". By this I mean we must become more lihe guerrillas, ie., adopt guorrilla tactics$ during search and destroy operations until contact is made. Then we remove the cloak of being a guerrilla and operate conventionally using all available firepower,
mobility, and reserves, 3. (C) Listed below are some techniques of stealth, deception, and surprise which I desire be employed more fully in our forthcoming operations*

I am confident that the airborne soldier, once imbued with the necessity to "out-guerrilla the guerrilla", will, with his native ingenuity and resourcefulness, devise additional effective techniques and tactics, a. Clandestine Entry into the Battlefields Move into the battlefield by foot ather than ride by helicopter, t1i noise and sight of which reduce the possibility of surprise. Enter the battlefield at night.

be

Night Operations, Steal the night away from the guerrilla.

Wl.-"n a unit is extracted following an en- Z rce on the battlefield.

Night airmobie assaults, amiBshes, patrols, and movement oust become routine. c, Stay Behind Forces: gagement, leave or Inse t y

d. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (IRRPls): Mre aggressive and frequent employment on long range missionse Insert at dusk or dawn alone likely avenues of enemy movement; iary on occasion by insertion overland nn'

resupply bv6 air drop. Experiment with platoon size U1RP's to provide for an
immediate offensive capability when enemy is sighted.

,t) 7"/IL

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AVED SUBJECT:

20 October 1966 Sei-uerrilla Tactics

1.26

e. Reinforce Rather than Extract: When a stay behind force or an LRR? makes contact, plan to reinforce promptly rather than extract. For this employ an immediate reaction force (platoon) on air strip alert with helicopters on stand-by, or insert platoons in advance on the ground concurrently wi'th the LPRR or stay behind unit. The platoon and helicopter pilots on air strip alert must be briefed in as much detail as possible and motivated to react promptly. f. Reaction Forces Since the helicopter reveals the presence of US forces, C&C ships should net be the first helicoptersin the.area in which A reaction force is to be committed. As long as there is excellent radio cornmunications the first helicopter in the area should carry combat troops. Upon arrival at an LZ the reaction force shnuld promptly move out to block enemy. escape routes while final coordination Is being made between the unit on the ground and the reaction force cornial

and units entering battlefield clandestinely with a minimum of 3 to 5 days

rations to obviate need for helicopter resupply which promptly telegraphs V the enemy the presence of our forces. Prior to contact with the enemy u'e helicopters for medevac or tactical emergencies only.

g.

Limit Helicopter Traffics

Provide stay behind forces, WRRPs.,

h, Resupply, Techniques: Unlike the VC guerrilla who lives off the land, we are limited in our clandestine operations by the bulk and weight of C rations which limit the number of days our troops can operate without resupply by helicopter. Thu following are sug&&sted ways to solve this problem. (1) rations, Use MS/P rations when available or in combination with C

(2) Use rice and powdered soup alternately with C rations or the IRRP ration. (3) Cache supplies and operate clandestinely from a base carrying only one day's supply on the soldier. (4) Resupply by helicopter at night, (5) Resupply during the day with the helicopter flying nap of the earth and supplies "icked" out onto a DZ. i. Silence the Battlefields Eliminate artillery H&f fires, long rarwe artillery, and TAC Air strikes near friendly troops unless promptly exploited by ground forces. Jo LM= Positions Construct Mt occupy obvious positions during dayligft hours mid then abandon them durtig tko hours of darkness to move to ambush sites or to attack suspected enemy positions;

-2-

'I1

AVBD

20 October 1966

SUBJECTs

Semi-Guerrilla

nct.c..

ove out from a position in the aftarnoon an k. Doublm Bks .fter darkness f.l ically change direction of march to attack a pro,lccted target before dawn. 1o Use of Trails: "Beat the brush" rather than move along rnin trails. The enemy eploys trail Vwtchers alonf, main trails where he can generally cbperve advancing troops@ Search along secondary and tertiary trails used by gbme which offer the guerrilla excellent cnncealmont as well as an escape route, m ! the ra W feasable, follow or observe a single hen :r small Arty of enemy Ircate larger forces or determine critical intellicence such as enemy positions, supply points, CPI W, etc. Then maneuver forces to ensure closIng the trap and. killing or capturing the enemy force involved. Move on a wide front supported by reserves and firepower. n, Cordon and Search: Encirclo a village at night as secretly as pm:ssible, then search at first li.ht using fl,RF, or ARVN forces. Rehearse using same forces until this type operation can be accomplished effectively. Consider use of stay behind forces after the search. oa Improve Markamanships Mbrksmanahip is extremely important in fighting guerilas Generally the enemy will offer only fleeting glimpses of himself while trying to escape the advancing US soldiers. Therefore, if a ccitinuuus and supervised marksmanship program is established - each man firing 20.,40 rounds daily except when on clandestine operations -- the enevt casualty statistics will rise, enemy morale will be lowered, and the enemy will be forced to engage US troops at a maximum range* This will reduce the effectiveness of his fire and give us time to commit ismediate reaction forces p. Ipove Effectiveness of the Snixr. Greater emphasis should be placed on the role of the sniper, Too oten we receive reports of the enemy escaping at ranges of 4O0-500 meters A well trained sniper should be able o kill or wound the enmy at that range, Platoons should habitually employ sniper. ve q* Counter Enew Sni sney sipera are a great deterrent to US morales Therefomrev coin -- ould organise sniper killer teams to opc:ate semioindependently to harrass the enemy. A maniper with i sniper rifle and telescopic sight cQuld selectively kMl * i another team member . adjust* artillery rn the targets .e cdali. Trailrs To be successful guerrillasi troopers. met be inst eZdith ience and taught the fundawntals of camouflage, concealmnt, light and noise diocipline, and tp reaWA still for long periods of time. Too often a potentially effectiv* ambush is prematurely disclosed by coughing, scratching, movement to re.Aweo oneself and othez restless activitles. Our troops camwuflage religiously at night but seldom cawouflage for da# operations. Training should give addW emphasis to proper conduct of the individual during =Abuuh operations.

cI

II

I I I II

AD
SUBJEC:s Semi-Guerrilla Tactics

20 October1966

a. Squad Area of Ogerationes Consistent with coumunication. capabilities, emphasize squads operatr.nr in areas' of operatipn for 3 days without resupply# For example, ono commy operating by squads in sones, separated but mutually suppcr+i.v, can covsr a large area with thekrughness and stealtho Mission of squades sambush at. night, observelduring daylight, and engage small enemy groups. Upon locating a significant enemy force the Platon/company consolidates on the squad to fix the enemy and the battalion %-) standing by aa an Immdiate reaction forces is brought to bear on the enemy to destroy him,,.

4. surprise

(G) oce contact is made react rapidly with all available fireFollowing the engagement with the eneiy, revert to semi- uerrilla

peer *nd reinforcements without further regard to deception, stealth, or tactics until a subsequent contact is madee

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t- WIMR P&A SV Brigadier General, USA ComWaan

DISTRIBUTIONs B Plus 0- 10
,Bde Rep Tng Sch

1. 2.

REQULSTOR NUA&R PATIENTS & NATIONALITY B. C. D. ROUTINE PRIORITY URGENT TACTICAL NkTURE OF INJURIES

3. CATEGORY A.

4.
5.

SzCURITY OF PIK.UP SITE

LOCATION OF PICK-UP SITE_

_..

6.

RADIO FREQ CALL SIM.. DUFINITIONS OF CATi(OuiIES (USARV Reg 59-1) A. ROUTINE
-

7.

Patients who re'uire evacuation within 72 hours.

B. PRIORITY - For patients reouiring prompt medical care not available locally. Such patients must be evacuated within 24 hours. C. U - For emergency cases which must 1'e moved imnediately to save life or limb or to preyewc co eplnleat of a serious illnesa. Psychiatric cases therefore are ro ceided urgenL. D. TACTICAL URENT
-

The imediati evacuatior. oX the casualty is

absolutely essential to the accomplisirment of the unit's tactical mission.

lot Bde, 101st Abn Div Form 2U7R, 7 Sept 66 (Revised)

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UINC LASSI1FIED
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DOCUMENT COITROL DATA

rSoewairp '100f-iie. I t i file. 600 di abstracta"d vo*4aimA ?img A c Tivi rv (catpoev~e ammohP)
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HQ DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C.

20310

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report
4. Cesl~ve NOTES

Lessons Learned, HQ, Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Divisi.on

e)
lel. el.

'p.@,wanhtul l

Experiences of unit eagdin counter insurgency operations 1 Aug to 31 Oct 1966.

S. AU 74Otisi "PFlmd mme. V~E'ia

C -, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

6. REKPORT DAYK 7.; iOTAL P40 0PACES 7L .

OF Alaws

12 November 1966
Me. CONTRACT ON GOAN T NlO.

97
on. ORIMMG.NA'W

IAFPOf4T NuMSEN!IS

T71

b.

PROJEC

NO0.

660508
66, O*NERPPOPY NOIS*

C.NIA

(Any ethet n0iberm U..!"1,e

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aeeend

10

01$TINUTIOPI STATEMENT

I1

SUPPLEMENTARY

NOTES

12. .'PONSONINC- MILITARY ACTI IFTY

N/A
118AISTRACT

DA,

OACSFOR, Washington, D.C.

20310

DD

IN.es'1473

UNCLASSIIE
Secunity C a'kat