Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz Author(s): Talal Asad Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 18, No.

2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 237-259 Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801433 . Accessed: 12/05/2011 10:12
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OF RELIGION: CONCEPTIONS ANTHROPOLOGICAL ON GEERTZ REFLECTIONS

TALAL ASAD

Untiversity ofHull
of This article examines Geertz's well-known definition religion,with its emphasis on meanings,and arguesthatit omits the crucialdimensionof power, thatit ignoresthe varying its derives from the of social conditions theproduction knowledge,and that initial for plausibility formsof religionso characteristic modern (Christian) of factthatit resemblesthe privatised society,in which power and knowledge are no longer significantly generatedby religious of A evaluation Geertz'stextis accompanied brief of institutions. critical by explorations some of in The the ways in whichpower and knowledgewere connected medievalChristianity. article withreference thehistorical to conditions for endswitha plea forinvestigating religion necessary and of theexistence particular practices discourses.

CliffordGeertz's essay 'Religion as a culturalsystem' is perhaps the most of influential, certainlythe most accomplished,anthropologicaldefinition religion haveappearedin thelasttwo decades.Originally to published I 966,it in in The interpretation cultures was reprinted his widely-acclaimed of (I973). Like most of his writings,it is carefully, almost fastidiously, put togetherand a represents styleof symbolicanalysisthathas been adopted by many of his some now distinguished in students, anthropologists theirown right.It has for even foundfavourwithmodernexistentialist theologians its concernwith It cultureas symboland meaning.1 is an obvious textwithwhichto begin an of and exploration thestrengths weaknessesof recent anthropological conceptionsof religion. I muststress evaluationof thattext,what thatalthoughthiswill be a critical and It less followsis exploration notrefutation. is concerned withthesoundness of to or otherwise individualclaims,and morewithtrying tracehow and why forms 'religion'have come to be presented, of historically specific mistakenly, status.It is first an as havinga paradigmatic and foremost attempt identify to in of Thatenquiry, obstacles theway ofcertain types enquiry. broadly speaking, has to do with the themeof power and religion-not merelyin the sense in whichpoliticalinterests have used religionto justify givensocial orderor to a in and but challenge changeit (an important question itself) in thesenseinwhich the for power constructs religiousideology,establishes preconditions distinctivekindsof religious authorises personality, specifiable religious practices and defined utterances, producesreligiously knowledge. In my attempt formulate to questionsrelating power and religionI shall to draw on the earlyhistory Western of This will undoubtedly Christianity. be
Mla,, (N.S ) i8, 237-59.

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seen as strangefor two reasons: first,because modern anthropology('the has fit itself to thought to address comparative scienceofhumanculture') rarely and of are Christian history, in matters thiskindmostanthropologists atleastas as traditional thesocietiestheyusuallystudy.The secondis thatGeertzmakes in aboutreligion but disquisition no explicit reference Christianity hisgeneral to and therefore may be felt it adduces examplesfromIndic and tribalreligions, of are relevant other to religions. thatcharacteristics Christianity notnecessarily understood thatGeertz'senterprise to is This may be so, butit mustbe clearly of and therefore discusa a-historical definition religion, a formulate universal, as or cannotbe regarded a priori irrelevant even marginal to sion of Christianity for it. I have focusedon Christianity a numberof positivereasons.The very is a on dearthof work by anthropologists Christianity itself reasonforurging richdocumentary sourceswhich theycan them to turnto the incomparably distinctive on draw on to formulate problemsforresearch religion.The early provides a particularly splendid field for analysing historyof Christianity But although has betweenpowerandreligion. Christianity haditsvery relations it with power, theorising and pursuingit in a way distinctive preoccupation for to thatthe thatis quiteunique,it would be a mistake anthropologists think is of relevance thekindsofsocietytheyusuallystudy. to problem therefore little on It Thereis a final reasonforfocusing Christian history. is partof mybasic and of forms,pre-conditions effects what argumentthatsociallyidentifiable from was categorisedas religionin the medievalepoch were quite different those so categorisedin modern society. Religious power was differently and thrust. There were different ways in which it distributed, had a different different selves whichit shaped and institutions, createdand worked through of and categories knowledgewhich it authorised respondedto, and different of made available. A consequenceis thattherecannotbe a definition religion viable because and to the extentthatthe effects these of which is universally Anthropoproduced,reproducedand transformed. processesare historically such definitions to whose plausibility todayis logists,however,continue offer thathave takenplace in the displacements strengthened the characteristic by of distribution power, religionand knowledgein Western (Christian) society, but which would not have made good sense in the Middle Ages. Geertz's and of is attempt onlythebest-known mostelaborate these.

Geertz begins by observing that the anthropologicalstudy of religion is stagnant,and suggeststhatresortto the conceptof culturewould reviveit. transmitted Culture is then definedas 'an historically patternof meanings of in embodiedin symbols,a system inherited expressed symbolic conceptions and develop their formsby means of which men communicate, perpetuate, attitudes towardlife'(I973: 89). This seemsto me a knowledgeabout and their of and one symptomatic a of questionableformulation theconceptof culture, is we weaknessin muchthat to follow.Culture, aregivento understand, enables and and knowledgeabout their perpetuate developtheir people to communicate, life: of towards but thereis no conceptof the relationship cultureso attitudes

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conceivedto 'life'itself, to thematerial or conditions activities maintainand for ing (or changing) life. Indeed the very expressions'knowledge about' and a as towards' suggest distanced life 'attitudes spectator-role, comparedto 'knowin' ledge from'and 'attitudes living.A consequenceof thisgeneralformulation is thatwhen religionis conceptualised laterin termsof communalsymbols,it in and discourses, and regarded will be isolatedfromsocial practices primarily The trouble withthisis thatit closes offthepossibility of terms consciousness. are ofexamining how 'knowledge'and 'attitudes' related material to conditions and to what extenttheyare formedby them. It is only and social activities, has area of investigation been dismissedfromthestartthat because thisentire between'a particular Geertzis able to asserta basic congruence styleoflife'and most often,implicit)metaphysic',which 'religious symbols 'a specific(if, formulate' (I973: 90). To what degree,ifat all, a 'congruence'actually exists, level (in language)or somehow by it whether takesplace at a purelydiscursive each other-such questionsare neverconsidered. 'life' and 'culture'imitating of is For Geertztheexistence a congruence a 'truism';all one needsto know is can described.2 how thatcongruence be fully of A This conception culture thescenefora definition religion. religion, of sets we are told, is '(i) a systemof symbolswhich act to (2) establishpowerful, in moods and motivations men by (3) formulating pervasive,and long-lasting of and (4) clothing theseconceptions conceptions a generalorderof existence that seemuniquely withsuchan auraoffactuality (5) themoods andmotivations a realistic'(I973: 90). This bold formulais intendedto articulate series of which will together establish statusof religionas a universal the disquisitions cultural phenomenon. task is to definesymbol. 'Symbol' will be takento denote 'any Geertz'sfirst whichservesas a vehiclefora conception object,act,event,quality,or relation is -the conception thesymbol's"meaning"' (I973: 9I). But thissimple,clear, statement-inwhichsymbol object,etc.) is differentiated butlinkedto (any from not conception meaning)-is latersupplemented others entirely (its by consistent out withit,foritturns thatthesymbolis notan objectwhichservesas a vehicle it the 'The fora conception, is itself conception: number written, 6, imagined,laid out as a row ofstones,or evenpunchedintotheprogram is tapesofa computer, a even as a conception symbolhas an intrinsic connexionwithempirical events fromwhich it is merely'theoretically' separable:'the symbolicdimensionof social events is, like the psychological,itselftheoretically abstractable from
9I).

a symbol'(I973:

9I).

Geertz sometimes seemsto suggest Furthermore, that

of stresses importance keepingsymbolsand empirical the objectsquiteseparate: 'thereis something be said fornot confusing traffic to our withsymbolswith withobjectsor humanbeings,fortheselatter not in themselves our traffic are as symbols,howeveroften they mayfunction such' (I973: 92). Thus 'symbol'is sometimes aspectof reality, an sometimes itsrepresentation. of are These divergencies symptomsof the factthatcognitivequestionsare mixed up in Geertz's account with communicative ones, and this makes it difficult enquireintothewaysin whichthetwo areconnected. beginwith to To

thoseevents empirical as totalities' (I973:

At other he times, however,

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have done, that'a symbol'is notan object we mightsay,as a numberofwriters between or eventwhich servesto carrya 'meaning'but a set of relationships objects or events uniquely broughttogetheras complexes or as concepts,3 by significance.4 Now, ifwe start havingatonce an intellectual an emotional and can of defining symbolalongthese lines,5a number questions be raisedaboutthe whichexplainhow suchcomplexesandconcepts come to be formed, conditions is how theirformation relatedto modes of communication. and in particular Half-a-century ago Vygotskywas able to show how the developmentof of is children'sintellect dependenton the internalisation social speech.6This of means thatthe formation what we have herecalled 'symbols' (complexes, in in concepts)is conditioned, partat least, by the social relations which the whichhe or she is permitted growingchildis involved-by thesocial activities or encouragedor obliged to undertake-in whichother'symbols' (speechand significant movements)are crucial. 'What are the conditions(discursiveand which help to explainhow symbolscome to be constructed, non-discursive) as or as and how some of themare established natural authoritative opposed to elementin anthropological others?'thenbecomes an important enquiry.The as dangerof Geertz'sexposition,where 'symbols' are presented suigeneris,is of it that that could be ruledout. Itmustbe stressed thisis nota matter urging the to function-sucha distinction is studyoftheoriginofsymbolsin addition their status of not relevanthere. What is being argued is that the authoritative is concepts/discourses dependenton the socially appropriateproductionof the and other discourses/activities; two are intrinsically not just temporally and theyconstitute patterns, Systemsof symbols,says Geertz,are also culture sourcesofinformation' because'theylie outside 'extrinsic (I973: 92). Extrinsic, as world of theboundaries theindividual organism suchin thatinter-subjective are into of common understandings whichall humanindividuals born' (I973: in or 92). And sourcesof information the sense that'theyprovidea blueprint can be given a templatein termsof which processesexternalto themselves we form'(I973: 92). Thus culture of definite patterns, aretold,maybe thought as as 'modelsfor reality' well as 'models ofreality'. of of Whilethenotionof systems symbolsbeing'outsidetheboundaries the individual' is a bizarre one (are words we say to ourselves in silence not by symbols?),partof thediscussiondoes open up new possibilities speakingof is We modelling:thenotionof 'modelsforreality' well worthpursuing. arenot withknownow to theview that'symbols'mustonlybe concerned confined life towards (as thoughsymbolswereone thing and life and attitudes ledge about involved (not least of all control of the quite another)-there are practices are meansof existence), symbolsas representationsboththeconstitfor material of uentsand theproducts socialpractice (and so of'life').Nor does thisnotionof excludethepossibility conflicting of and culture conceptions discourses patterns -whether in the'models of' sense,or in thatof 'models for'.However, at the to end of this discussion,Geertzunfortunately regresses his earlierposition: double aspect: theygive meaning,thatis have an intrinsic 'culturepatterns bothby shaping reality objectiveconceptualform,to social and psychological themselvesto it and by shaping it to themselves'(I973: 93). This alleged
connected.7

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makesit verydifficult undertowardsisomorphism, to tendency incidentally, stand how social variation can ever occur-even if we were to attribute a within cultural to difference (tautologically) different pattern everysignificant of withits implication fit,that society.It is again the metaphorof reflection, seems to lead Geertzinto an impasse. By adoptingit, he moves away froma notionof symbolswhich focuseson therelations betweensociallysignifying and back to a notionof symbolsas and psychologically organising practices, and to states. meaning-carrying objectsexternal social conditions mental Yet it is evident that Geertz also thinksof symbols as 'doing' something. withsymbols;moreoften Occasionally,in his essay,itis people who do things with it is symbolsthatdo thingsto people. Always a person'sconfrontation of symbolsseemsto implytheimpossibility choosingfromamong them.This seems the case when concretereligioussymbols are said both to certainly is 'expresstheworld's climateand shapeit' (I973: 95). The notionof climate of as and conflicts over coursevague enoughto includesuchthings majordisputes loss and But then religious principle, even,forthatmatter, progressive offaith. so the notion of 'shaping' (an action so deliberate, controlled)somethingas nebulous and volatile as a 'world's climate'is not exactlyeasy to grasp. Of course this is not his only metaphorfor action by religioussymbols,but it Geertzhas when he treats is an indication thedifficulty of religioussymbolsas active. formulation their of rolewhichis clearer, and also at first Geertzhas another a sightmorepersuasive.Religioussymbolsact 'by inducingin theworshipper set distinctive ofdispositions certain (tendencies, capacities, propensities, skills, whichlend a chronic character theflowofhis habits,liabilities, pronenesses) to and activity thequalityofhisexperience' (I973: 95). And again,'symbols'areset againstmentalstates.There are hintshereof Radcliffe-Brown's theoryof the social functionof ritual,8but only hints. Careful thoughtwill show how are. the dubiousthepropositions Can we predict 'distinctive' ofdispositions set in fora Christian can worshipper modern,industrial society? Alternatively, we set say of someone with a 'distinctive' of dispositionsthathe is or is not a Christian?9 The answer to both questionsmust surelybe no. The reason,of in course,is thatit is not simply'worship'but social and economicinstitutions 10 are general, withinwhichindividualbiographies lived out, thatlend a stable character theflowofa Christian's to and activity to thequalityofhisexperience. If it is objected thatmodern,industrial societyis unique, or at any ratequite unlikethesmall-scalesocietieswhichanthropologists typically study,one can of definition religion mustcoverall cases or it ceasesto onlyreplythata general be general. These are, of course,an atheist's doubts. A committed Christian mightstill a want to say something bitlike Geertz-to claim,in otherwords, an internal for efficacy religioussymbols in and throughworship, evidence for which cannot (almost by definition) made available to an atheist.But it mustbe be stressed thatthisis only'a bit'likeGeertz.The dispositions withwhichGeertzis are concerned primarily social and not metaphysical, as such,evidencefor and mustbe accessibleat thelevelof social behaviour, ofinward their existence not

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us being.And that brings to a rather different objectionto Geertz'sformulation, froma believer'spointofview. Religious symbols, Geertz observes, produce two kinds of dispositions, moods motivations: and 'motivations "made meaningful" are withreference the to ends towardswhichtheyare conceivedto conduce,whereasmoods are "made meaningful" withreference theconditions to from whichtheyareconceivedto spring'(I973: 97). A modernbelievermightsay thatthisis not theiressence, becausereligious symbolsevenin failing producemoods and motivations to are stillreligious symbols:in other words,theypossessa truth independent their of Yet Christian effectiveness. a deeplycommitted surelycannotbe unconcerned of at theexistence truthful religious symbolsthat appearto be largely powerless in modern society. What are the conditionsin which religioussymbols can How does (religious)power create actuallyproduce religiousdispositions? (religious)truth? is The relationbetweenpower and truth an ancienttheme,and no one has in dealt with it more impressively Christianthoughtthan St Augustine. of Augustine developedhisviews on thecreative religious function power after his experience withtheDonatistheresy, that insisting coercionwas a condition of and to fortherealisation truth, discipline essential itsmaintenance.
attitude coercionwas a blatant to For a Donatist,Augustine's denialofChristian teaching: God had made men freeto choose good or evil; a policy which forcedthis choice was plainly The Donatistwriters the irreligious. quotedthesame passagesfrom Bible in favour free of will,as Pelagius would laterquote. In his reply,Augustinealreadygave themthe same answeras he would give to thePelagians:thefinal, individual ofchoicemustbe spontaneous; thisactof act but choicecould be prepared a longprocess,whichmendid notnecessarily by chooseforthemselves, their butwhichwas often imposedon them,against will,byGod. This was a corrective processof and warning,admonitio, which might even include fear,constraint, and 'teaching', eruditio, 'Let be inconveniences: constraint foundoutside;itis insidethatthewill is born'. external Augustinehad become convincedthatmen needed such firm handling.He summed up his He of in not attitude one word: disciplina. thought thisdisciplina, as manyof his moretraditional of Roman contemporaries as thestatic did, preservation a 'Roman way of life'.For himit was an a active process of corrective essentially punishment, 'softening-up process', a 'teachingby In eruditio. the Old Testament,God had taughtHis wayward inconveniences'-a per molestias Chosen People throughjust such a process of disciplina, checkingand punishingtheirevil disasters. The persecution theDonatistswas of tendencies a whole seriesof divinely-ordained by on 'controlled another catastrophe' imposedby God, mediated, thisoccasion,by thelaws of the Christian Emperors. . . his to Augustine'sview of the Fall of mankinddetermined attitude society.Fallen men had Even man's greatest achievements had been made possible only by a come to need restraint. harshness. was a greatintellect, witha healthy of 'straight-jacket' unremitting Augustine respect of of fortheachievements humanreason.Yet he was obsessedby thedifficulties thought, by and of thelong, coerciveprocesses, backintothehorrors hisown schooldays, that had made reaching humanmind. He said he thisintellectual activity possible;so 'readyto lie down' was thefallen the of die would rather thanbecomea childagain. Nonetheless, terrors thattimehad beenstrictly of for the canesto necessary; theywerepartoftheawesome discipline God, 'from schoolmasters' fromtheir own theagoniesof themartyrs', whichhumanbeingswererecalled, suffering, by by inclinations disastrous (Brown I967: 236-8).

is the of of ClearlyGeertz'sformula too simpleto accommodate force thismotif religioussymbolism.Here it is not merereligioussymbolsthatimplanttrue but laws (imperial and Christian dispositions, power-ranging all theway from

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ecclesiastical)and other sanctions (hellfire, death, salvation, good repute, activities ofsocialinstitutions peace,etc.),tothedisciplinary (family, school,city, bodies(fasting, church, andofhuman etc.) prayer, obedience, penance, etc.).Augof network motivated of ustinewas quite clearthatpower, theeffect an entire practices, assumesa religious form becauseoftheend to whichitis directed, for of human eventsare the instruments God. It was not the mind thatmoved but power thatimposed the conditionsfor to spontaneously religioustruth, 11 and discourses practices wereto be systemthat experiencing truth. Particular denounced-made as much as possibleunthinkaticallyexcluded,forbidden, able; others wereto be included,allowed,praised,and drawnintothenarrative of ofsacredtruth. The configurations powerin thissensehave,ofcourse,varied in profoundly Christendomfromone epoch to another-from Augustine's Westof today-but the time,through Middle Ages, to theindustrial capitalist of the for the patterns religiousmood and motivation, possibilities religious have all variedwiththemand beenconditioned them. knowledgeand truth, by Geertzgivesreligious symbolsa greatdeal ofworkto do, and one consequence distinctions obscured,or are of theway in whichhe does thisis thatimportant whichinduceand denied. 'That thesymbolsor symbolsystems even explicitly we define dispositions set offas religiousand thosewhichplace thosedisposiare the same symbols ought to occasion no tions in a cosmic framework Let us grant thatreligious surprise' (I973: 98). But it does surprise! dispositions on arecrucially dependent certain religious symbols,thatsuchsymbolsoperate in a way integral religiousmotivation to and religiousactivity. Even so, the symbolicprocessby whichtheconcepts religious of motivation activity and are is placed within'a cosmic framework' surelyquite a different operation,and therefore symbols involved are different. anotherway, theological the Put discourseis not identicalwith liturgical utterances-of which, among other Christians will concede that,although things,theologyspeaks.12 Thoughtful theologyhas an essentialfunction, theologicaldiscoursedoes not necessarily and inducereligious dispositions, that, conversely, havingreligious dispositions of does notnecessarily dependon a clear-cut conception thecosmicframework is actor.Discourseinvolvedin practice notthesame as on thepartof a religious thatinvolvedin speakingaboutpractice. Geertz's reason for mergingthe two kinds of discursiveprocess seems to in springfroma desire to distinguish generalbetween religiousand secular The statement above is elaboratedas follows: 'For what dispositions. quoted mood of awe is religiousand not else do we mean by sayingthata particular a thatit springsfromentertaining conceptionof all-pervading secular,except a like vitality mana and notfrom visitto theGrandCanyon?Or thata particular case of asceticismis an example of a religiousmotivation,except thatit is directed towardtheachievement an unconditioned likenirvana of end and nota If conditioned likeweight-reduction?sacredsymbolsdid notat one and the one . same time induce dispositionsin human beings and formulate . . general of ideas of order,thenthe empiricaldifferentia religiousactivity religious or experiencewould not exist' (I973: 98). The argumentis that a particular dispositionis religiousonly because it occupies a conceptualplace withina

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cosmic framework. But thisraisesthe vital question,which Geertznowhere as considers, to how theauthorising processrepresents practice, the utterance or dispositionso thatit can be discursively relatedto generalideas of order-in short the question regardingthe authorising process by which religionis created.Indeed theways in whichauthorising discourses, based on a cosmolredefined ogy, systematically religiousspaces,have been of profound importance in the historyof Westernsociety. In the Middle Ages such discourses and rangedoveran enormousspace,defining creating religion: rejecting 'pagan' practices accepting or them;13 authenticating particular miracles and relics(the eachother);14 two confirmed saints'lives,both authorising shrines;15 compiling as a model of and as a model forthe Truth;16 requiring regulartellingof the sinful and thoughts, words,and deedsto a priestly confessor, givingabsolution to a penitent;17 regularising popular social movementsinto Rule-following or Orders (forexample, the Franciscans), denouncingthemforheresyor for on verging theheretical example,thebeguines, (for etc.).18 The medieval Church of on to absoluteuniformity practice; thecontrary, did not attempt establish its was alwaysconcerned specify to authoritative discourse differences, gradations, exceptions. What it sought was the subjectionof all practiceto a unified to sourcewhichcould telltruth fromfalsehood.It authority, a singleauthentic who established principle was theearlyChristian Fathers the thatonlya single 19 Churchcould become thesourceofauthenticating discourse. They knewthat the 'symbols' embodied in the practiceof self-confessed Christiansare not of withthetheory the'one trueChurch',thatreligion alwaysidentical required both authorised and thatthereis always a practiceand authorising doctrine, tensionbetween them-sometimes breakinginto heresy,the subversionof roleofinstitutional Truth-which underlines creative the power.20 The medievalChurch was always clearabout why therewas a continuous fromfalsehood, well as thesacredfromthe as truereligion need to distinguish for which the secular (religion from what was not religion), distinctions the and of authoritative discourses, teachings practices theChurch,and not the were the finaltest.21 Severaltimesbeforethe convictionsof the practitioner, the betweenthereligious and thesecularwas re-drawn, Reformation boundary of In but always theformalauthority theChurchremained pre-eminent. later rise withthetriumphant of modernscience,modernproduction and centuries, the would also be clearabouttheneedto distinguish themodernstate, Churches as 'thereligious'from'thesecular',shifting, theydid so, theweightofreligious of more and more onto the moods and motivations thebeliever.Social truth disciplinewould, in this period, graduallyabandon religiousspace, letting would stillbe needed to 'belief', 'faith'and 'conscience'takeits place. But theory define religion. It was in theseventeenth of century, followingthefragmentation theunity of and authority the Roman Church, thatthe earliestsystematic at attempts of was Herproducinga universaldefinition religionwere made. Significant 'Lord Herbert', writes bert'sDe veritate. Willey,
fromsuch men as Baxter,Cromwell,orJeremy differs with Taylor mainlyin that,not content the of he reducing creedto theminimum possiblenumber fundamentals, goes behindChristianity a and to whichshallcommandtheuniversal assent all menas men.It of itself, tries formulate belief

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in itself the as thattheold simplesituation, whichChristendom mustbe remembered pictured outsideand thesemi-toleratedJews within gates,had passed the world,withonlythefoulpaynim of away forever. Explorationand commercehad widenedthehorizon,and in manywriters the one of to century can see thatthereligwns theEast, howeverimperfectly known,werebeginning in with It pressupon theEuropeanconsciousness. was a pioneer-interest thesereligions, together of scholars withthemythologies classicalantiquity, of thecustomary preoccupation Renaissance for and to whichled Lord Herbert seeka commondenominator all religions, thusto provide,as he eirenicon seventeenth-century for hoped, themuch-needed disputes(I934: I I4).

And so Herbert produceda substantive definition whatlatercameto be called of NaturalReligion-in termsof beliefs(about a 'supremepower'), practices (its ordered 'worship'), and ethics (a code of conduct based on 'rewards and after life')-said to existinall societies.22Thus whatappearsto this punishments a anthropologists today to be self-evident, namelythat'religion'is essentially in or linkedto ideas of generalorder(expressed either both matter meanings of is a and it riteand doctrine) that has universal functions, in fact view whichhas a Frombeinga concrete ofrulesattached specific set to Christian specific history. and processesof power and knowledge,'religion'has come to be abstracted In an in universalised.23 thismovementwe have not merely increase 'religious a but of not toleration', certainly merely new 'scientific discovery', themutation a conceptand a rangeof social practices whichis itself partof a widerchangein this it themodernlandscapeofpowerand knowledge.To understand mutation is essential keep clearlydistinct to what theologytendsto obscure:theoccurrenceof events(utterances, practices, dispositions), and the authorising processes which give those eventsreligiousmeaning,and embody thatmeaning institutions. in concrete Not onlydoes Geertzequate two levelsof discourse(symbolswhichinduce and in dispositions thosewhichplacethosedispositions a cosmicframework),24 he also appears,inadvertently, be taking thestandpoint theology.This to up of is done by insisting the primacyof meaning,but withoutregardto the on discursive 'What any particular processesby whichmeaningsare constructed. about the fundamental nature of realitymay be obscure, religion affirms he 'butit must,ifitis notto consist shallow,or, all too often, perverse', writes, of the mere collectionof receivedpracticesand conventional sentiments we to affirm usuallyrefer as moralism, something' (I973: 98-9). It appearsthatto and conventional achievewhatis truly 'receivedpractices religion, sentiments' mustbejoined to discourses whichaffirm whichgivethesepractices something, a some cosmologicalmeaning.This is apparently simpleenoughrequirement, it field evangelism openedup: earlyChristians the of butthrough theentire is in late Roman empire; preachingfriarsin medieval urban centres;European missionaries Asia, Africa LatinAmerica.The demandthat practice in and a must 'affirm it a is that shouldbe able to state meaning, thefirst condition something', what is trulyreligion.The unevangelised seen typically for determining are as in either thosewho havepractices affirm but can nothing, whichcasemeaning be attributed their to practices (thusmakingthemvulnerable), as thosewho or do affirm something, probably'obscure,shallow or perverse'(an affirmation which can therefore confuted).In the one case religioustheorybecomes be necessaryfor a correctreadingof the mute ritualhieroglyphs others,for of reducingtheirpracticesto texts;in the otherit is essentialforjudging their

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that mustbe something existsbeyond But cosmologicalutterances. always,there the the words, and it is the the observedpractices, heard utterances, written by background to theory reachinto,and to bringout, that function religious of Geertzis thus rightto make a connexionbetween giving them meaning.25 as cognitive, a but wrong to see it as essentially and practice, religioustheory religionfroma neutralplace. The connexion between means of identifying of a is and theory practice fundamentallymatter power-of disciplines religious and utterances certain forbidding true religion,interpreting meanings, creating others.Hence thequestionsthatGeertzdoes not ask: and authorising practices What are the historical how does religiousdiscourseactuallydefinereligion? or as in conditions whichit can act effectively a demandfortheimitation, the How and practices? utterances of or prohibition, the authentication truthful does power createreligion? of whatkindsof affirmation, meaning, But let us followGeertz'sargument: in as Because all withpractice orderforitto qualify religion? mustbe identified human beings have a profoundneed for a generalorder of existence,says thatneed. It follows thathuman to Geertz,religioussymbolsfunction fulfil beings have a deep dread of disorder.'There are at least threepoints where but of chaos-a tumult eventswhichlacknotjust interpretations interpretability at capacities, the -threatens to breakin upon man: at thelimitsof his analytic and at thelimitsof his moralinsight'(I973: limitsof his powers of endurance, threats orderat to of symbolsto meetperceived ioo). It is thefunction religious in and moral):'The Problem Meaning of physical thesethree points(intellectual, on of pain, and injustice thehuman the recognizing, inescapability ignorance, irrationalities characteristic are of that these denying planewhilesimultaneously a theworld as a whole. And it is in termsof religioussymbolism, symbolism within whichitis conceived of to man'ssphere existence a widersphere relating and to rest,thatboth theaffirmation thedenialare made' (1973: io8, emphasis added). his the Notice how Geertzseemsnow to have shifted groundfrom claimthat something specificabout the natureof reality(however religionmustaffirm is that to religion ultimately obscure,shallowor perverse), theblandsuggestion of to a matter havinga positiveattitude theproblemof disorder, affirming of the justifiable, in simplythat some senseor other worldas a wholeis explicable, the 26 bearable. This modestview ofreligion(whichwould have horrified early is Church Fathersor medievalchurchmen)27 a productof Geertz'srecurrent desire to definereligionin universalterms:the Human Condition is fullof ignorance,pain and injustice,and religioussymbolsare a means of coming positivelyto termswith thatCondition. One consequenceis thatthis view such a function render would in principle every'philosophy'whichperforms Rationalist),or into religion (to the annoyance of the nineteenth-century a of make it possibleto think religionas a more 'primitive', less alternatively, withtheHuman Condition(to theannoyance 'adult' mode of comingto terms of the modern Christian).In eithercase, the suggestionthat religionhas a is universalfunction one indicationof how marginalreligionhas become in knowledge.As modernindustrial societyas thesiteforproducingdisciplined
each of its intergrading aspects . .
.

is a matter of affirming, or at least

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with the conceptionMarx had of religionas such it is actually consistent whichis other thanconsciousness ideology-that is, as a mode ofconsciousness no of external therelations production, to producing knowledge,but ofreality, expressingat once the anguish of the oppressed and the cynicismof the oppressor. Geertzhas much more to say, however,on the elusive questionof religious conceptionsof a general meaning:not only do religioussymbolsformulate withan auraoffactuality. orderofexistence, theyalso clothethoseconceptions has This, we aretold,is 'theproblemofbelief',a problemwhichanthropology always involves 'the prioracceptanceof fortoo long avoided. Religious belief of 'The existence bafflement, pain,and whichtransforms experience: authority' moralparadox-of theProblemof Meaning-is one of thethingsthatdrives totemicprinciples, the spiritual or men towardbeliefin gods, devils, spirits, . rest, of efficacy cannibalism, . . butitis notthebasisupon whichthosebeliefs fieldof application'(I973: i09). Here Geertz theirmost important but rather in belief itsorigin theexistence has of seemsto be sayingthatalthough religious but existence, bafflement, and moralparadox,it does not dependon their pain whichmakesit possibleto respondadequatelyto on an authoritative principle thatreligious belief standsindependently of them.Thus he seemsto be arguing the worldlyconditionswhich produce bafflement, pain, and moral paradox, is a withthem.He seems thatbelief primarily way ofcomingto terms although of in to be arguing, otherwords,that'belief'is independent itsobject-and this as Changesin theobject is surely on mistaken, logicalgrounds well as historical. of beliefchangethatbelief, and as theworldchangesso do theobjectsofbelief, of and and thespecific forms bafflement moralparadox,whicharea partofthat world. What the Christianbelieves today about God, life afterdeath, the is universe, not whathe believed8oo yearsago-nor is theway he respondsto the ignorance, pain and injustice same now as it was then.28 of whichlies at thecoreofhis conception Geertz'streatment religious belief, one is Christian becauseand to theextent that it ofreligion, a modern, privatised as of the emphasises priority belief a stateof mind:'The basicaxiom underlying call is the whatwe mayperhaps "thereligious perspective" everywhere same:he believe' (I973: i io). In modernsociety,where who would know must first in everyday life,or in an a-religious 'knowledge'is rootedeither an a-Christian apologisttendsnotto accept'belief'as theconclusionto a science,theChristian but However, theknowledgethathe knowledge-process as its pre-condition. promiseswill not pass (nor does he claim thatit will pass) forknowledgeof nor scienceprovides.His knowledgeofobjectsthat sociallife, forthesystematic stateof mind,not to a corpus of knowledge. But the claim is to a particular of reversal beliefand knowledgehe demandsis not a basic axiom to, say,pious of for century, whom 'knowledge' and 'belief' learnedChristians the twelfth at Christian 'belief'would thenhave werenotso clearly odds. On thecontrary, beenbuilton knowledge-knowledge oftheological of doctrine, canonlaw and of Churchcourts,of thedetailof clerical liberties, thepowers of ecclesiastical and of of office (over souls, bodies, properties), thepre-conditions effects conof of orders,of thelocationsand virtues shrines, fession, theRules of religious

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of the lives of the saints,etc. Familiarity withall such (religious)knowledge was a pre-condition normalsocial life,and belief(embodiedin practice for and discourse)an orientation effective for activity it-whether on thepartof the in religiousclergy,the secularclergyor the laity.Because of thisthe formand texture and function their of 'beliefs'would have been different fromtheform and texture function contemporary and of 'belief'29 -and so too oftheir doubts and theirdisbelief.The main pointis that'the basic axiom' underlying what Geertzcalls 'thereligious is perspective' not everywhere same. the Geertz specifies'the religious perspective'as merelyone among others -common-sense, scientific, aesthetic-and as differing fromthemas follows. From the common-sense perspective, because 'it moves beyond the realities of everyday to widerones whichcorrect completethem,and [because]its life and is concern notactionupon thosewiderrealities acceptance them, defining but of in faith them'.Fromthescientific perspective, because'itquestions realities the of everydaylife not out of an institutionalized scepticismwhich dissolves the world's givenness intoa swirlofprobabilistic but hypotheses, in terms what of it takes to be wider, nonhypothetical truths'.From the aesthetic perspective, a because 'instead of effecting disengagement from the whole question of an factuality, deliberately manufacturing air of semblance and illusion, it deepenstheconcern withfact seeksto create auraofutter and an actuality' (I973: I I2). to Geertzhas tried summarise whathe thinks commonsense,science,and aestheticsare about in contemporary society. It would not be difficult to disagreewithhim over his characterisations theseperspectives30 and also of with the apparentassumptionthatessentially our 'perspectives' must be the timesandplaces.31 However,themostimportant same as thoseofother pointto be made hereis thattheoptionalflavour conveyedin theterm'perspective' is whenit is appliedequallyto scienceand to religion modern verymisleading in society:religionis optionalin a way thatscienceis not. Scientific practices, techniques,knowledges,permeateand createthe veryfibresof social lifein no ways thatreligion longerdoes.32In thatsensereligion todayis a perspective as (or an 'attitude', Geertzsometimescalls it) but scienceis not. In thatsense, too, scienceis notto be foundin everysociety We pastand present. shallsee in a momentthe difficulties Geertz'sperspectivism that getshim into, but before thatwe need to examinehis analysis themechanics reality-maintenance of of at workin religion. about the functions religioussymof Consistentwith previousarguments that'it is in ritual-thatis, consecrated bols is Geertz'sremark behaviour-that thatreligiousconceptions veridical are and thatreligiousdirecthisconviction tivesaresoundis somehowgenerated' (I973: I I2). The entire longpassagefrom betweenarbitrary whichthisis takenswingsback and forth about speculations of and assertions what goes on in theimagination officiants, generalised about thisseemsa curiouscombination introspecas At of ritual imprinting. first sight one-but as Vygotsky33 tionistpsychologywith a behaviourist arguedlong in ago, the two are by no means inconsistent, so far as both assume that in psychologicalphenomenaconsistessentially the consequencesof various In Geertzstresses central environments. thisspirit, the stimulating importance of ritualto the 'religiousperspective', givingextendedexamplesfromHindu

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of India and Bali. The function ritualsin generating 'religiousconviction'is faith theyportray as postulated(thus,'In theseplasticdramasmen attaintheir it is it', I973: I I4), buthoworwhythis happens nowhere explained. Indeed, is 'Of state notalwaysachievedin religious is ritual: concededthatsucha religious are and course, all cultural performances not religiousperformances, the line or not so easy betweenthosethatare, and artistic, even political,ones is often to draw in practice,for,like social forms,symbolicformscan servemultiple purposes' (I973: II3). But what is it thatensuresthe participant's takingthe if symbolicformsin theway thatleads to faith theline betweenreligiousand and the is non-religious perspectives notso easyto draw?Presumably ability the will to adopt a religiousstandpoint mustbe therepriorto theritualperformworkswill notdo. modelofhow ritual ance,so thata simplestimulus-response And ifthatis thecase, thenritualcannotbe theplace where'religiousfaith'is but whereit is (literally) attained, playedoutand confirmed. Again, if we are to but understand how thishappens,we mustexaminenotonlytheritual itself, the of forms knowof entire rangeof availabledisciplinary activities, institutional of ledge and practice,withinwhich selves are formed,and the possibilities In otherwords, forthe anthropologist to 'attaining faith'are markedout. to on a explain 'faith' must be primarily matterof describinga dependence and not of intuiting mentalstatelying a and discourses, authoritative practices beyondthemsaid to be causedby ritual. to We havenotedmorethanonce Geertz'sconcern identify religious symbols to universalcriteria, and to distinguish the religiousperspective according from of clearly non-religious ones. It would appearthattheseparation religion fromscience, common sense, aesthetics, politicsand so on, enables him to it defend againstchargesof 'illusion','illogicality' thelike. Ifreligion a and has distinctive which does not in essence compete with others,and perspective, a which furthermore and unique, it performs function always both necessary 'falseconsciousness'. ina way thisdefence cannotbe accusedofgenerating Yet is he equivocal. Religious symbols createdispositions, observes,which 'seem' Is uniquelyrealistic. thisthepointofview ofa reasonably confident agent(who the mustalwaysoperatewithin denseness historically of givenprobabilities), or thatof a sceptical observer(who can 'see through' representations reality the of to thereality It itself)? is neverclear.And it is neverclearbecauseGeertznever examines whether,and if so to what extentand in what ways, religious 'experience'relatesto somethingin the social world believerslive in. This omission is relatedto his treatment religioussymbols as sui generis, of the precondition religiousexperience for (which,once registered, mustby definition be 'genuine'), ratherthan a conditionof social life (facilitating some objectivesand makingothers difficult). Towards the end of his essay, Geertzattempts connect,insteadof merely to the separating, religious perspective thecommon-sense and one-and theresult revealsan ambiguity basic to his entireapproach. First,drawingon Schutz, Geertzstatesthatthe everyday world of common-sense objects and practical acts is common to all human beings because theirsurvivaldependson it: 'A man, even large groups of men, may be aesthetically insensitive, religiously

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and unconcerned, unequippedto pursueformal scientific analysis, he cannot but informs that us individuals move 'back and forth betweenthereligious perspectiveand thecommon-sense perspective' (I973: I19). These perspectives so are utterly different, declares,thatonly 'Kierkegaardian he leaps' (I973: I20) can cover the culturalgaps that separatethem. Finally, Geertz concludes that and theritualended,returned conceptions define, again to thecommon-sense failsto register world,a manis-unless, as sometimes happens,theexperience as but thepartial form a widerreality of whichcorrects completes (I973: and it' I22, emphasis added). This curiousaccountofshifting perspectives changand ing worlds is puzzling. It is not clear, for example, whetherthe religious frameworkand the common-senseworld, between which the individual of moves, are independent him or not. Most of what Geertzhas said at the are of beginning hisessaywould implythatthey independent I973: 92), and (cf. his remarkabout common sense being vital to every man's survival also reinforces reading.Yet it is also suggestedthatas thebelieverchangeshis this perspectiveso he himselfchanges, and that as he changes so too is his So common-sense world changedand corrected. thelatter, any rate,is not at independentof his moves. But it would appear fromthe account that the religious world is independent, since it is the source of experiencefor the a and through thatexperience, sourceof changein thecommon-sense believer, but Geertz'sentire approach,in whichreligioussymbolsare suigeneris, in the the presentcontextit presents readerwith a paradox: the world of common fromthe sense is always common to all human beings, and quite 'distinct as differs from one groupto another, one culture religious world,whichin turn of worldaffects commonthe from but differs another; experience thereligious of sense world, and so thedistinctiveness thetwo kindsof world is modified, as world comes to differ, fromone group to another, and the common-sense from Geertz'sadherence differs from The one culture another.34 paradoxresults in to a confusedphenomenology which 'reality'is at once the distanceof an fromthe Truth,measurableonly by the privileged agent's social perspective world observer,and also the substantive knowledgeof a sociallyconstructed the but availableto bothagentand observer, to thelatter onlythrough former.
thatthereligious world(or perspective) ever is is world: there no suggestion anywhere in world.This last point is consistent with affected experience thecommon-sense by -changed. And as he is changed, also is thecommon-sense so world,forit is now seen 'Having ritually "lept" .
.

be completely lacking common in senseand survive' (I973:

II9).

Next,he

. into the framework of meaning which religious

fromthisparadoxwhichwill helpus evaluate Perhapswe can learnsomething conclusion:'The anthropological Geertz'sconfident studyof religionis therean of of embodforea two-stageoperation: first, analysis thesystem meanings ied in thesymbolswhichmakeup thereligion proper, and, second,therelating and of thesesystemsto social-structural psychological processes'(I973: I25). How sensiblethissounds,yethow mistaken, it surely, is. Ifreligioussymbols on are understood, theanalogywithwords, as vehiclesformeaning,can such

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of meaningsbe established independently the formof lifein which theyare of used?Ifreligious symbolsareto be takenas theelements a sacredtext,can we know what theymean withoutregardto thesocial disciplines which their by correctreadingis secured?If religioussymbols are to be thoughtof as the patternsby which experienceis organised, can we say much about that experiencewithout consideringhow it comes to be formed?Even if it be claimedthatwhat is experienced through religioussymbolsis not,in essence, is in thesocial world but thespiritual,35 it possibleto assertthatconditions the to kindofexperience accessible? social worldhave nothing do withmakingthat vacuous? Is theconceptof religious training entirely The two stageswhichGeertzproposesare, I would suggest,one. Religious or 'symbols'-whether one thinksof them in termsof communication of emotion-cannot be understood of cognition, guidingactionor of expressing of independently theirrelationswith non-religious 'symbols' or of theirarsocial life in which work and power are always crucial. My ticulationof I is linked argument, muststress, notjust thatreligious symbolsareintimately so change with it), or thattheyusuallysupportdominant to social life (and are to power (and occasionally oppose it). Itis thatsocialdisciplines intrinsic the force their and in their truthfulness. field whichreligious representations acquire of From this it does not follow that the meanings religious practicesand but are utterances to be soughtin social phenomena, onlythattheir possibility statusare to be explainedas productsof historically and theirauthoritative The anthropological and student religion distinctive of should disciplines forces. this a therefore beginfrom point,andnot,as Geertz does, from notionofculture of as an a priori totality meanings,divorcedfromprocessesof formation and effects power,hovering of above social reality. For fartoo long the well-knownbut increasingly unsatisfactory distinction betweentechnical instrumental) actionand expressive symbolic)action (or (or has determined majororientation anthropological of the of studies religion.36 In has itself and religion usuallybeen conceivedofas expressive, themainconcern has been to discover what, in particular and generalways, it signifies. This and in appliesequallyto theso-calledIntellectualist Symbolist writers, so faras bothareprimarily concerned enquireintostatements to abouttheworldwhich believer thereligious or in allegedly makes,whether directly indirectly, whether practicesor in exegeses of those practices.Studies of the social functions of reductionist tendto be either at religion ways ofarriving itsmeanings, (more or usefully)ways of describingsocial consequences which, althoughbrought about by religious institutions, may also be securedby 'secular'ones. Religion itselfis rarelyapproachedin termsof 'technicalaction'-that is to say, the which is used to produce of disciplining the body, of speech,37 religionin its for variety.Such disciplinesare preconditions specificformsof thoughtand action, but they must be taught and learnt,and are therefore themselves on and dependent a rangeof socialinstitutions material conditions. Geertz'stexthas thegreatvirtue stating of withsubtlety distinctive a position on a difficult conceptualproblem.It is partof themovement anthropology in whichhas forsome yearsnow been concerned takethesignifying to systems of othercultures more seriously thanwas thecase before-and also to employa

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more complex model of the workingsof language in the analysisof those lies in its attemptto bring togethera wide range of cultures.Its strength important questions-having to do withcognition and communication, authand and often ority disposition, practice itsrepresentation-not treated together in anthropological discussions religion.But an overallweaknessof Geertz's of position seems to be the hiatus it accepts between (external)symbols and whichparallels hiatusbetween'cultural the (internal) dispositions, system'and 'social reality'. Through my explorationof his text I have come to the a conclusionthatperhapsthefruitful responseto thiswould be not to attempt bridge between the two, but to move entirelyaway from that notorious withquestionsabout thesocial meandualism.Insteadof approaching religion ing of doctrinesand practices,or even about the psychologicaleffects of let conditions symbolsand rituals, us begin by askingwhat are the historical (movements,classes, institutions, ideologies) necessaryfor the existenceof In and particular religious practices discourses. other words,letus ask:how does To ask thisquestionis to seek an answerin terms the of power createreligion? and social forceswhichcome together particular at historical social disciplines moments, to make particularreligious discourses, practices and spaces possible.38What requiressystematic therefore the ways in are investigation socialdisciplines the which,in eachsociety, produceand authorise knowledges, to ways in whichselvesare required respondto thoseknowledges,theways in Universaldefinitions which knowledgesare accumulatedand distributed. of because and to the extentthattheyaim at religionhindersuch investigations essences when we should be tryingto explore concretesets of identifying and relations processes.39 historical
NOTES

comments. critical and toJohnDixon, TerryJohnson Sami Zubaida fortheir I am grateful 1 For example,Morgan: 'If Tillichhas defined culture terms in agreeableto good anthropology of in thoughnot substantially by (of thekinddemonstrated Geertz)and ifhis definition religion, to anthropologicalterminology,is not antipathetic anthropologicalmethod, then there is a beginningpoint for dialogue . . . thatdialogic point is the conceptof meaningin religionand culture'(1977: 371). Islam in 2 Geertz sucha description hiselegantly-written observed (I968), wherehe has attempted two 'classical'stylesof Islam, theone Moroccan and theotherIndonesian.In each case a contrasts abouttheparallelisms between historical figure providestheoccasionforgeneralising representative a an is a personality type,a styleof faith, formof culture.In the laterchapters attempt made to of but to semantic morerecent changesand conflicts, thisis difficult do in terms theoriginal describe commentators on and is framework, so resort had in an ad hocmannerto well-knownorientalist Islam. contemporary 3 The Russianpsychologist in distinctions thedevelopanalytical (I962) makescrucial Vygotsky and trueconcepts. Although, ment of conceptualthought:heaps, complexes, pseudo-concepts of use theserepresent stagesin thedevelopment children's oflanguage,the accordingto Vygotsky, intoadultlife. earlier stagespersist a of connexion betweenthought and 4 Cf. Collingwood (I938: book 2) for discussion theintegral emotion, where it is argued that there is no such thing as a universalemotional function cognitive/communicative every accompanyingall conceptualisation/communication: distinctive emotionalcast. If thisview is valid, thenthenotionof a generalised activity its own specific has emotion'(or 'mood') maybe questioned. 'religious of and thusthestructure cognition, central is to practice, thatsymbolsorganise 5 The argument

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6 'The historyof the process of the internalization socialspeech of is also the historyof the socialization children's of practical intellect' (Vygotsky 1978: 27): See also Luria& Yudovich (I959). 7 Readersfamiliar withAustin(I962) will recognise connexions whichI hererefer. the to They will also, I hope, note how unwiseis theuse of 'symbol'whichconflates variety quitedistinct a of problems. with social cohesion,we may well-knownpreoccupation 8 If we set aside Radcliffe-Brown's said to be inducedby certain kindsofpsychological states recallthathe too was concerned specify to of sentiments religioussymbols:'Ritescan be seen to be theregulated symbolicexpressions certain in be of to Ritescantherefore shown the [whichcontrol behaviour theindividual hisrelation others]. effect regulate, to social function to have a specific when,and to theextent that,theyhave fortheir of fromone generation anothersentiments which the constitution to on maintainand transmit

byLienhardt (I96I).

Vygotsky's genetic psychology-see especially 'Tool and symbolin childdevelopment' Vygotsin ky (1978). A cognitive conception symbols,as opposed to one concerned of withtherepresentation of meanings, recently has been revivedby Sperber(1975). A similar view was takenmuchearlier

9 Some ways in which'symbolisation' lack is well (discourse)candisguise ofdistinctiveness brought Christianwriters, where he argues that out in Maclntyre'strenchant critiqueof contemporary theirbe'Christiansbehave like everyoneelse but use a different vocabularyin characterising lack ofdistinctiveness' haviour,and also to concealtheir (1971: 24). 10 The phenomenon of declining church attendancein modern industrialsociety, and its progressivemarginalisation Europe at least) to those sectorsof the populationnot directly (in work process,is an illustration theargument of thatifwe arelookingfor involvedin theindustrial in in the causal explanations thisarea,thensocio-economicconditions generalare clearly indepenSee discussionin Luckman(I967: dentvariableand formal worshipthedependent. theinteresting ch. 2). 1l This was whyAugustine came roundto theview thatinsincere conversion was not eventually a problem(Chadwick I967: 222-4). 12 A modern theologian puts it: 'The difference between the professing, proclaimingand orientating way of speakingon the one hand, and descriptive speechon the other,is sometimes formulated the difference as between"speakingabout" and "speakingto". As soon as thesetwo the and unique character religious of ways of speakingare confused, original speech,so itis said, is can so corrupted thatreality-for-the-believer no longer"appear" to himas it appearsin professing
13 The series booklets of knownas Penitential manuals,withtheaid ofwhichChristian discipline to was imposed on WesternEurope fromroughlythe fifth the tenthcenturies, containmuch So materialon pagan practicespenalisedas un-Christian. forexample, 'The takingof vows or fromthemby springs treesor lattices, or and partaking of releasing anywhere exceptin a church, in are food or drink theseplacessacredto thefolk-deities, offenses condemned'(quotedin McNeill detailssee McNeill and Gamer 1938.) At thesame timePope Gregory 1933: 456). (For further the GreatA.D. 540-604) 'urgedthattheChurchshouldtakeover old pagan templesand festivals and of give thema Christianmeaning' (Chadwick I967: 254). The apparentinconsistency thesetwo of is attitudes or thanthesystematic (rejection incorporation paganpractices) lessimportant exercise is of Churchauthority whichmeaning assigned. by of in 14 'On theone hand,then, and bishopscomplained crudeand too-avidbeliefs unauthorized unexaminedwonders and miracles,while on the other theologians(possibly also these same to bishops) triedto come to termswith the matter.Althoughtheyattempted definemiracleby were not entirely appeals to universalnaturallaw, such definitions successful, and in specific, individual cases, common sense was a betterguide than medieval cosmology. When papal about Thomas Cantilupe's miraclesat London and commissioners down to hear testimony sa, in of Hereford 1307 'hey had in front thema scheduleof things ask aboutsuchwondrousevents: to came to learnofthemiracle, whatwordswere theywantedto know, forexample,how thewitness used by thosewho prayedforthe miracle,whether any herbs,stones,othernaturalor medicinal had accompanied the miracle; the witness was expected to say preparationsor incantations of abouttheage and social situation thepersonexperiencing miracle, the wherehe came something fromand of whatfamily; whether witness the knew thesubjectbefore well as after miracle, as the

society depends' (1952:

157).

speech' (Luijpen 1973: 90-I).

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the the what illnesswas involved,how manydays he had seen theill personbefore cure;whether were also asked in cure was completeand how long it took forcompletion.Of coursewitnesses eventitself occurred'(Finucane the whatyear,month,day,place and in whose presence wonderful
1977: 53).

in 15 By beingauthorised, shrines turn servedto confirm ecclesiastical authority: 'The bishopsof in the powerwithin Western Europe came to orchestrate cultofthesaints sucha way as to base their the old Roman citieson thesenew "towns outside the town". Yet it was througha studiously from city-St Peter's,on the the withgreatshrines thatlayat some distance articulated relationship beyondthewalls of Tours-that thebishopsof VaticanHill outsideRome, SaintMartin's,a little in theformer citiesoftheRoman Empireroseto prominence earlymedievalEurope' (Brown 1981: 8). 16 The life of St Antonyby Athanasius was the model for medieval hagiographies, and the privationand Antoninesequence of earlylife,crisisand conversion,probationand temptation, again withknowledgeand authority, was reproduced renunciation, miraculouspower, together for confession shouldbe mandatory The LateranCouncil of 1215 decreedthatannualprivate of of the separately all Christians: sex 'Everyfidelis either shallafter attainment yearsof discretion to at to his confess sinswithall fidelity hisown priest leastonce in theyear:and shallendeavour fulfil the of reverently receiving sacrament the thepenanceimposedupon him to thebestof his ability, for at by Eucharist leastat Easter:unlessithappenthat thecounselofhisown priest some reasonable of otherwise let cause, he hold thathe should abstainfora timefromthereception thesacrament: burial. and when dead let himlack Christian the him duringlifebe repelledfromentering church, be in statute frequently lest Wherefore thissalutary let published thechurches, anyassumea veil of excuse in the blindnessof ignorance'(quoted in Watkins1920: 748-9). In spite of its profound havenotyetstudiedtheroleofprivate confession of anthropologists religion historical importance, in in theconstruction It thisdiscipline, theMiddle Ages types ofdistinctive ofspirituality.was through but in and later,thatspecificsins were createdas experience-not merelyin the confessional, in in life-in actscommitted omitted, wordsspokenor overheard, theverycontemplaor everyday in entertained everydaylife. Thus out of the avoidance or the absolutionof tions of possibility a life sins was constructed large part of the spiritual available to laymen. Manuals of particular and its consequenceswith astonishing the confession multiplied categoriesof sin, its conditions in was a continuous itself Confession network, whichthepower process,a pervasive relentlessness. of of the Church produced not only the self-knowledge the subject, but also the systematic ordinances of society.Manuals forthe guidanceof priestand penitent, knowledgeof a Christian on writings-all fed treatises canon law, summas,sermonliterature, mystical councils,decretals, of intoand grewon thepractice confession. (See Lea I 896.) of to to reaction ecclesiastical authorities theFranciscans 18 For a brief introduction thevarying see and thebeguines, Southern I970: Chs. 6 & 7. 'Beguines'was thenamegivento groupsofcelibate women dedicatedto the religiouslifebut not owing obedienceto ecclesiastical authority. They and werecriticised, denounced and in flourished thetownsofwestern Germany theLow Countries, in century. finally suppressed theearlyfifteenth 19 Thus Cyprian:'Ifa mandoes nothold thisunity theChurch,does he believehimself hold of to that For and the If thefaith? a manwithstands resists Church,is he confident he is intheChurch? the and setsforth sacrament unity,when he says, the of blessed Apostle Paul has the same teaching, one one one one "There is one body,one Spirit, hope ofour calling, Lord,one faith, baptism, God". we to we This unity oughtfirmly hold and defend, especially who presidein theChurchas bishops Let also to be itself and undivided. no one deceivethebrethren one thatwe mayprovetheepiscopate of let the by transgression' (quotedinBettenson by falsehood; no one corrupt truth ourfaith faithless
17

in literature (Baker 1972: andagain that

41).

the to for The Churchalwaysexercised authority readChristianpractice itsReligiousTruth.In all that thiscontextit is interesting theword 'heresy'at first including designated kindsof errors, and it acquired its specific errors'unconsciously'involved in some activity(simoniaca haeresis), of of doctrine theCatholic modernmeaning(theverbalformulation denialor doubtof anydefined of controversies the sixteenth century (Chenu Church) only in the course of the methodological
20

I956:

264).

I968: 276).
21

was theprincipal basis of religiosity. Knowles In theearlyMiddle Ages, monasticdiscipline

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(I950: 3) observesthatfromroughly the sixthto thetwelfth 'monasticlifebased on the centuries Rule of St Benedict was everywhere norm and exercisedfromtime to time a paramount the on and apostoliclifeof theWestern Church . . . the influence the spiritual, intellectual, liturgical life concerned was monastic, and theonlymonastic onlytypeof religious availablein thecountries code was the Rule of St Benedict'. During this period the very term'religious' was therefore with the later emergenceof non-monastic reservedfor those living in monasticcommunities; vows by whichtheyweresetapart orders,thetermcame to be used forall who had takenlife-long membersof theChurch(SouthernI970: 2I4). The extension fromtheordinary and simultaneous of transformation the religiousdisciplinesto lay sectionsof society fromthe twelfth century onwards (Chenu I968) contributed the Church's authority to becoming more pervasive,more than before-and so too the articulation the concept and complex and more contradictory of practiceof lay 'religion'. For an illuminating sketchof the history the conceptand practiceof of in and religious discipline earlyChristian medievalperiodssee LeclercqI957: I29I-302. foundthemselves culturally in unfamiliar missionaries the 22 WhenChristian territory, problem of and of identifying theoretical 'religion'becamea matter considerable difficulty practical importin the for was ance. For example,'TheJesuits China contended that reverence ancestors a social,not from a religious, it different for Catholicprayers thedead. They act,or thatifreligious, was hardly not but as the wished the Chinese to regardChristianity, as a replacement, as a new religion, not finest But highest fulfilment their of aspirations. to their opponents appearedto be merely thejesuits lax. In I 63 I a Franciscan a Dominicanfrom Spanishzone ofManila travelled and the from (illegally, the thePortuguese viewpoint)to Pekingand foundthatto translate word mass, thejesuitcatechism of used the character which was the Chinese description the ceremonies ancestor-worship. of tsi, observedChineseChristians One night and theywentin disguiseto sucha ceremony, participating were scandalizedat what theysaw. So began thequarrelof "the rites",whichplaguedtheeastern and missionsfora century more' (Chadwick I964: 338). Anthropologists todayareless consciousof such difficulties of perhapsbecause not much of practical consequencehangson theirdefinitions exoticreligion. 23 Phasesin thegradualevacuation specificity of from in discourse theeighteenth publicreligious in are century described Gay I970. 24 The results equating of thesetwo discursive levelsseemto be connected Geertz'sambiguous to conceptionof symbol discussedearlier,in which an object's existenceand its representation are as criticism his review in equallyidentified thesymbol's'meaning'.Crapanzanohas made a similar article C. Geertz,H. Geertz,and L. Rosen, Meaning order Moroccan on and in society: 'Althoughit is impossible. . . to treat adequatelytheproblemsraisedby Rosen's workand theworkof theother contributors . . , I would like to suggest that the problemsfindtheirsource in a failureto . the and functions symbols(I use 'symbols'hereloosely of differentiate carefully referential indexical as a short-hand) to betweentalking aboutsymbolsand talking and, as a corollary, distinguish about theuse ofsymbols'(I98I: 854). 25 The way in which representations occurrenceswere transformed of into meanings by Christiantheologyis analysedby Auerbachin his classic studyof representations realityin of summed up in this early passage: 'The total contentof the sacred Westernliterature-briefly was placed in an exegeticcontextwhich oftenremovedthe thingtold veryfarfromits writings was forcedto turnhis attention sensorybase, in thatthereaderor listener away fromthesensory occurrenceand toward its meaning. This implied the danger that the visual elementof the of occurrences Let mightsuccumbunderthedensetexture meanings. one examplestandformany: It is a visuallydramatic occurrence thatGod made Eve, the first woman, fromAdam's rib while Adam lay asleep; so too is it thata soldierpiercedJesus' side, as he hungdead on thecross,so that blood and waterflowedout. But when thesetwo occurrences exegetically are interrelated the in doctrine thatAdam's sleepis a figure Christ's of as the death-sleep; that, from woundin Adam's side mankind's mother after flesh, primordial the Eve, was born,so from wound in Christ'ssidewas the born the mother of all men afterthe spirit,the Church (blood and water are sacramental symbols)-then the sensoryoccurrence pales beforethe power of the figural meaning.What is perceivedby the heareror reader. . . is weak as a sensoryimpression, and all one's interest is towardthecontextof meanings.In comparison, Greco-Romanspecimens realistic directed the of presentation are, thoughless serious and fraught with problemsand far more limitedin their in conceptionof historical movement,nevertheless perfectly integrated theirsensorysubstance.

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They do notknow theantagonism betweensensory appearance meaning, antagonism and an which the and permeates early, indeedthewhole,Christian view ofreality' (I953: 48-9). As Auerbach goes in on to demonstrate, Christian theory thelaterMiddle Ages invested representations everyday of life with characteristic figuralmeanings,and so with the possibilitiesfor distinctive kinds of religiousexperience. Figuralinterpretation, Auerbach'susage,is notsynonymous in withsymbolis ism. The latter close to allegory, whichthesymbolis substituted theobjectsymbolised. in for In figuralinterpretation representation an event (Adam's sleep) is made explicit the the of by of representation anotherevent (Christ'sdeath) which is its meaning.The latterrepresentation fulfils former technical the (the term, Auerbachtellsus, wasfiguram implire)-itis implicit it. in 26 Cf. Douglas (I975: 76): 'The person withoutreligionwould be the person contentto do withoutexplanations certain of kinds,or contentto behave in societywithouta singleunifying principle validating social order'. the 27 When thefifth-century bishop ofJavolsspreadChristianity theAuvergne,he foundthe into a festival withofferings theedgeofa marsh. . "Nulla estreligio on peasants'celebrating three-day in in stagno",he said:Therecanbe no religion a swamp' (Brown I98I: I25). Formedieval Christians religionwas not a universalphenomenon:religionwas the site on which universalTruth was produced,and itwas clearto themthatTruthwas notproduceduniversally. 28 Thus Auerbach in writes: 'The view ofreality worksoflate (I953: SSS) expressed theChristian from thatof modernrealism'.But as he is careful and antiquity theMiddle Ages differs completely in to pointout, thisdoes not mean thatthereis nothing common betweenmedievaland modern views, butthatwhatis commonis differently arranged. 29 The assumption mentalstatecharacteristic all religions been of has that'belief'is a distinctive thesubjectof recent discussion.Thus Needham (I972) has arguedthatbeliefis nowherea distinct nor institution theconductof social life.Southwold (I979) for mode of consciousness, a necessary that do to takesan almostdiametrically opposed view, asserting questionsofbelief relate distinctive in mentalstates,and thattheyare relevant any and everysociety,since 'to believe' always designates a relationbetweena believerand a propositionand throughit to reality.Harr6(I98I: 82), in a criticismof Needham, makes the more interesting observationthat 'belief is a mental state,a groundeddisposition,but is confined people who have certain to social institutions and practices'. 30 Itis startling see 'thescientific summedup thusina lineand a half.Philosophical to perspective' to consensus.In theAnglo-Saxon world recent attempts define'science' have not reacheda firm in havebeenformulated and aroundtheworksofPopper,Kuhn,Lakatos,Feyerabend; in arguments has been to abandon the France, that of Bachelard and Canguilhem. One important tendency as at attempt solving what is known in the literature 'the demarcation problem' which is based method. Geertz'ssuggestion on the assumptionthattheremust be a single,essential,scientific 'dissolves the world's givennessinto a swirl of probabilistic is thatthe scientist hypotheses' as as that there no scopeforexperimentation. is questionable thecomplementary suggestion inreligion On thislatterpoint thereis massiveevidenceagainstGeertz,even ifwe confine ourselvesto the a historyof Christianasceticism.Equally, the suggestionthat 'art' is a matterof 'effecting an disengagementfrom the whole question of factuality, deliberately manufacturing air of truth all writers semblenceand illusion' would not be takenas a self-evident and artists. For by example, when the art-critic Bergerargues,in his brilliant essay 'The momentof cubism', that betweenthe paintedimage and reality, and by so cubism 'changedthe natureof the relationship betweenmanand reality' a about doingexpressed new relationship (I972: I45), we learnsomething visual factuality. How do Geertz's phrases about 'the aesthetic cubism's concernto re-define relate suchconcerns? to perspective' 31 The ways in whichtheconceptof 'art'-and therefore thepractice art-has been progresof since classicaltimesis briefly indicatedin the Introduction Collingwood to sively transformed forms representation analysed length Auerbach(I953). For a of are in at (I938). Breaksin discursive in transformations thenature knowledgesincetheseventeenth of fascinating argument concerning
32 In case some readers are temptedto thinkthatwhat I am talkingabout hereis not 'science' (knowledge)but 'technology'(practical application),whereasGeertzis concernedonly with the I thatany attempt make a sharpdistinction to betweenthetwo is based on a former, would stress of naive view of thehistorical practice both (cf.Musson & RobertsonI969). My pointis thatboth

see century, Hacking (I975).

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of are 'science' and 'technology' together basic to the structure modern lives, individual and and that'religion'in anybutthemostvacuous senseis not. collective,
3 Vygotsky I978: 58-9.
3
3

A similar criticism made by Wood (I98I) ofHorton. was Cf. the finalchapter Evans-Pritchard in (i956), and also the Conclusion to Evans-Pritchard

(I965).
36 One of the earliestformulations of this distinction modern social anthropologywas in Radcliffe-Brown's-asforexamplein thispassage (I939): 'The verycommontendency look for to of of of theexplanation ritualactionsin their purposeis theresult a falseassimilation themto what an acts. In any technical of may be called technical activity adequate statement thepurposeof any a act But ritual particular or seriesofactsconstitutes itself sufficient by actsdiffer from explanation. some expressive symbolicelement them'(I952: I43). or in technical acts in havingin all instances between what we call practical, Beattie (I964: 202) put it this way: 'Now the chiefdifference for and ritualor "magico-religious" common-sense techniques doing things, ways of doing them lies basicallyin thepresenceor absenceof an institutionalised symbolicelementin what is done'. Leach (I976: 9) has includedthe distinction More recently, withina tripartite scheme: 'We can threeaspectsof human behaviour:(I) natural activities thehuman usefully distinguish biological of whichserveto alter metabolic the body-breathing, heartbeat, processand so on; (2) technical actions, physicalstateof the world out there-digging a hole in the ground,boilingan egg; (3) expressive of whicheither aboutthestate theworldas itis, or elsepurport alter to actions, simplysaysomething means'. It will be clearwherereligionfits into thisscheme,and how it is to be it by metaphysical studied. 37 Since Mauss's famousessayon 'Techniquesof thebody', there has been, untilveryrecently, in littleinterest culturally acquired techniquesof the body. Some valuable work is containedin BlackingI977 andPolhemusI978. Most ofthiswork,however,is focused thebodyas a medium on and not as a medium of practicaldiscipline.Techniques of the body are not of communication, determined meansforachievingsocial merelyculturally 'symbols',theyare also essential practical and psychologicalobjectives. Particulardisciplinesof the body (culturallyacquired physical a makeitpossibleto perform particular kindofdance,military industrial potentialities) manoeuvre, workprocessor asceticexercise whichwould nototherwise possible.Itis notwhatthey be meanbut here.This appliesalso to speechtechniques, so faras theyare in what theyenablethatis relevant for among thepre-conditions producing legal, political,religious, effects. In aesthetic, educational, whose workis directly concerned with'cultureand symbolism'will not my view anthropologists be able to appreciatethe fullimplications thispoint unless theybegin to take the problemof of transformations historical seriously. 38 Foucault'spioneering workon power and knowledgeis, of course,directly relevant sucha to project. 39 Dumont has perhapscome nearest to questioning feasibility a universaldefinition the of of thata changein relations entailsa changein whatever related.If is religion:'I shalltakeforgranted has withsome other our influences play) at throughout history religion developed(to a largeextent, in a revolution social valuesand has givenbirth scissiparity, itwere,to an autonomousworld as by will have changedin theprocess. of politicalinstitutions speculations, and thensurely itself religion and we Of some important visiblechangeswe areaware,but,I submit, arenotawareofthechange as in theverynature religion livedby anygivenindividual, a Catholic.Everyoneknows that of say a of of was formerly matter thegroupand has becomea matter theindividual principle, religion (in and in practice leastin manyenvironments situations). at and But ifwe go on and assertthatthis of is withthebirth themodernState,theproposition notsucha commonplace as changeis correlated medievalreligion was a greatcloak-I am thinking the thepreviousone. Let us go a little further: of MantleofOur Lady ofMercy. Once itbecamean individual it affair, lostitsall-embracing capacity and became one among otherapparently of equal considerations, whichthepoliticalwas thefirst born. Each individual as may,of course,and perhapsevenwill,recognise religion philosophy), (or thesame all-embracing consideration itused to be socially. on thelevelofsocial consensusor as Yet of ideology,thesame personwill switchto a different configuration values in whichautonomous values (religious,political,etc.) are seemingly are juxtaposed, much as individuals juxtaposed in society' (I970: 32). Dumont has a subtle sense of the mutationof religionin modernWestern of history,and the implications thisfactforcross-cultural conceptionsof religion.But I would

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suggestthatthe emphasisshould be not on 'configurations values' but on practices, of powers, is discourses, otherwise there alwaysthedangerthat(a) we mayassumea consensus a levelwhere at there notone, (b) we mayforget themodernstate compulsive a way thatmodern is that is in religion is not, and (c) we may thinkthatan essentialist definition religionin termsof 'meanings'is a of plausibleenterprise. Indeed, Dumont at timesseems to be proposingthata universaldefinition, excludingonlymodernChristianity, possiblein terms a specifiable is of configuration values. of

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