Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement Author(s): James Clay Moltz Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No.

6 (Jun., 1995), pp. 511-527 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645706 . Accessed: 27/09/2011 10:32
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REGIONAL TENSIONS IN THE RUSSOCHINESE RAPPROCHEMENT

James Clay Moltz
Oneofthe most recent inEast significant developments Asiahasbeentherapprochement between RussiaandChina, relationship a that broadened since has significantly thereestablishment ofofficial in ties 1989.Bilateral surged a height $7.8billion 1993, some trade to of in and 2.5 million persons crossed onceheavily this militarized border.1 newrelaThis level tionship brought anunprecedented ofdirect has about contacts between the Russian Chinese and populations-between individual traders, newly privatecompanies, respective the militaries, enterprises, government state and bodies.Butwhile there benefits these to havebeenobvious newties, they havealsoplaced considerable stresses the on socialfabric the of Russian Far far for East, region lessprepared these a dramatic changes the than relatively more marketized Chinese side. Chinese and have peasants city traders eagerly flooded the into territory oftheir northern neighbor search profits in of a life. the these and, perhaps,better From Russian side, however, developments havebeenviewed exacerbated decades Sinoof very differently, by and As Soviet isolation. oneRussian Easterner Far hostility mutual explains: "In short, thelong, between after drawn-out of relations period frozen [our] twohugestates, thaw beenreached which seemto be unprea for we has nor nor pared.Neither economically, organizationally,psychologically."2
James Clay Moltz is Assistant Director SeniorResearcher the and of of Califor Institute International Center Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Studies, Monterey, for and thanks Russianregional fornia.The author TamaraTroyakova providing newspapers assistance preparation thisstudy.He also thanks in of AdamMoodyand SarahDiehl fortheir An draft this of comments. earlier John Gilbert and AllenWhiting helpful for Garver, Rozman, in on at paperwas presented theconference "ChineseImmigration theRussianFar East,"Georof December1994. gia Institute Technolgy,
? 1995 by The Regents theUniversity California of of

1. ITAR-TASS,January 1994; RA Report 26, (Center Russia in Asia, University Hafor of waii at Manoa),no. 17 (July1994),p. 37. 2. Tat'yanaSmirnova, "Dyrkav Derzhavnom Zabore,"UtroRossii(Vladivostok daily),September 1992,p. 3. 22,

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512 ASIANSURVEY, XXXV, 6, JUNE1995 VOL. NO. Accurate not, or there a growing is perceptionthe in Russian Eastthat Far theChinese outtotrick are Russians, from steal them, perhaps over and take their territory. localRussian The press reports regularly theproblem on of low-quality Chinese goods,the"invasion" illegalChinese of immigrants, Chinese smuggling drugs contaminated andevenChinese of and food, spying. Theperceived failure repeated of official attempts stopping at illegal trade immigration only and has raised localfrustrations further. Although shared all Russians theregion, increasingly not by in the conservative political moodoftheRussian Eastis being Far exploited local by leaders haveattempted who toblame Chinese other political the for problems as well: crime, unemployment, housing shortages, inflation. and Indeed, Khabarovsk Governor krai Viktor Ishaev stated "A clandestine has that: policyof Chinese is expansionismbeing carried in theRussian East, out Far infringing andhumiliating Russian upon the people."3 January the In 1994, Russian government responded thisperceived to threat tightening by visa regulations Chinese for visitors. result been steep The has a decline border in trade-causing trade drop $5.6billion 19944-andleading total to to in to economic hardship both on sides.Officials the in Russian East, Far notably, haveresponded this to crisis appealing Moscow credits relief, by to for and with butnotfor return more a of openborders China. with could Ironically, relations China stable wellbe the most single imporin tant facilitatoreconomic of Far developmenttheRussian East,as wellas ofitsintegration thelarger Rim. Thus, alienating into Pacific in the China, in Russian Eastrisks Far losing largest most its and market Asia, valuable and theone Asian-Pacific that in political economy is interested Russian andbroader relations. Russiaas a For technology, trade, politico-military in its further reductions whole, fragile post-reform economy ill-afford can with Russo-Chinese whose trade, volume second is only trade to Germany. with nature Russia's In order come grips the to to of current center-periphthe and this examines evolving ery dilemma, article political, economic, milisince1985. Itbegins on situation theRusso-Chinese tary border, especially a key of of historical context these with brief a overview the developments, to Thestudy oftherecent the understandingunique problems rapprochement. of thenmovesto a moredetailed analysis recent changes well as (as borareas: border in problems) five specific demarcation, military relations, These highlight a growing data and relations. der trade, immigration,societal in and of relations Moscow the the gapbetween positive perceptionbilateral which view localRussian Eastern Far increasingly negative ofthe population,
KNR cherezgranitsu," proryv voennikh korabley Segodnya(Moscow 3. "Predotvrashchen daily),May 7, 1994,p. 2. Information Service,Daily Report: 24, 4. ITAR-TASS, February 1995; ForeignBroadcast 24, FBIS, DR/SOV),February 1995,p. 11. Central Eurasia (hereafter,

CLAY MOLTZ JAMES

5 13

The the could ultimately undermine rapprochement. article'sconclusion, political factors are likelyto have the that therefore, discussesthedomestic of (or resolution thesetengreatest impacton the successful unsuccessful) sions.

complex within Historically, RussianFar East has longhad an inferiority the borderregionsurand East Asia, as an underpopulated underdeveloped regions have been Its southern neighbors. fertile rounded morepowerful by forcein briefly occupiedby theUnitedStates(whichsentan expeditionary times, ownedbybothChinaandJapan.Majormili1918-21) and,atvarious during WorldWarTwo,theChinese also its tary conflicts threatened borders ouster revolution, theKoreanWar. The communist-inspired of foreign and all in and businesses the 1920s (from butVladivostok) Stalin'sexile of the on Koreancommunity theeve ofWorldWarTwo,moreregion'ssignificant a Russo-centric social environment. Decades artificial, over,created highly and existing antiforeign ofcommunist-inspired onlystrengthened propaganda in the populaculture.As a result, Soviet-era trends theregional anti-Asian the tionlived in a sortof Russiancocoon,isolatedfrom restof East Asia. for the These factors rendered regionwhollyunprepared the changesthat as and after Gorbachev's perestroika, the area was sudtookplace during contacts. foreign opento extensive denlythrown is The irony therecent of situation highlighted theregion'spre-Soviet by from Russia acquiredthe Amurand Ussuriterritories history. Long after of (1860)-considerathe China-through Treaties Aigun(1858) andPeking continued live to of citizens ble populations Chinese, Korean,and Japanese nearVladivostok, Far region andworkintheRussian East. In thePrimorskiy and retained trading enterprises forexample,Chinesenationals significant life playedan activerolein thebusiness of thearea. Chinese(and Korean) in railroad 1905. of laborwas crucialto the completion thetrans-Siberian in commerce Vladivostok, stilldominated Even by 1910,Chinesenationals to in with625 Chinesestores operating thecitycompared only 181 Russian a as a drugstore,majortheatre, well as criminal ones.5 Chineserestaurants, the 1930swith in it also thrived thecity.Indeed, was onlyin themidgroups the war and of hostilities thethreat general in Asia that riseof Sino-Japanese to wereforced leave theRussianFar East. Chinese(and Japanese) the vicrelations becamewarmer following Chinesecommunist Although in lastedonlyuntil1960. Duringtheseyears, opening tory 1949,thisbrief
daily),June15, 1994,p. 12. Vladivostok (Vladivostok "Zhili-byli kitaytsy," 5. YuriUfimtsev, by was controlled Chimoreover, some80% of business industry, construction In Vladivostok's nese contractors.

in Border History The Russo-Chinese

VOL. NO. 514 ASIANSURVEY, XXXV, 6,JUNE1995 the moveof did societies notallowfor free thenature thetwocommunist of of contact. tens thousands The orextensive ment peoples, of immigration, in camemostly theinstitutions to in Union Chinese studied theSoviet who technical the of central Russiaandwestern Siberia, while thousands Soviet regions, from more developed who to specialists went Chinacamemostly quite the remained isolated Far rather thebackward East.Thus, region than 1930s thelate to from midthe throughoutperiod the from foreign influences which witbuildup from 1960-84, Sino-Soviet military 1980s.Thehostile notably in border (most sites nessed conflicts several over contested armed in by off existing mistrust cutting all the Ussuri only worsened region 1969), populations.6 contacts between twoneighboring the

in Soviet for Despite proposals dialogue thelate 1970sand early1980s, held to of conditions any for progress bilatin China firmly itsposition three from in reductions Soviet eral relations: Sovietwithdrawal Afghanistan, forces in forces theFarEast,andcessation Soviet to Vietnamese in of aid Yuri overtures Soviet under General Secretary AndroCambodia. Although someminor halted under more the concessions, progress China povoffered withthe rise of Mikhail conservative Konstantin Chernenko. Finally, in moved track. Gorbachev March normalization onto swifter a 1985, for on In July cooperation thereagreement technical 1985,a bilateral in of abandoned 1960)was signed.This projects (those starting industrial for the its trade, currency formed agreement, despite lackofprovisions hard It financial state-to-state predealings. setan important basisofsubsequent off it to in cedent signaling Russian willingness pickup where left andto rectify problems. past to toquiet domestic hand Gorbachev's inattempting opposition remaining Chiof with was a rapprochement China strengthened number unilateral bya for and reform military in economic nesepolicies both policy.In 1982, exfrom of reduction itstroop China a strengthfour ample, began 500,000-man men. These in followed a further by paring 1986to 2.95 million million, 1986-to in in his Gorbachev-in speech Vladivostok July allowed gestures concessions. of a and relations offerstring Soviet of speak a newerainAsian to Far to important and,more He pledged opentheRussian Eastto trade He from and withdraw Soviet Mongolia Afghanistan. also troops Beijing, for economic cooperation large-scale projects resuming suggested specific
on of armsrace from1960-84, 6. For moredetailedinformation thedynamics thebilateral (Seattle:UniNormalization Its International and Implications Sino-Soviet see Lowell Dittmer, Press,1992). versity Washington of

and Sino-Soviet Border Contacts Initial Negotiations (1981-1991)

JAMES CLAY MOLTZ

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withChina. Otherovertures followed.By late 1987, through negotiations withtheUnitedStates,Gorbachev agreedto a unilateral destruction the of 180 SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear Soviet missiles locatedin East Asia, as well as 256 other medium- short-range and missiles.7The thawhad begun. new initiatives Gorbachev's begana seriesof meetings overthenextthree yearsaimedat clarifying contentious the areasof theRusso-Chinese border, an obviousprerequisite improved for regional ties. By theend of 1987,the two sides had reachedagreement theprinciples would guide future on that demarcation theborder.8 theendof 1988,theborder beenmapped of By had by a jointaerialsurvey.The two teamsreachedagreement mostissues, on to allowing them pass thebasicplanon for consideration theplanned at Sinoin Sovietsummit spring 1989. Manypeople in theregioneagerly anticipated reopening relations the of withChina,whichwas stilla very distant neighbor. Indeed,as lateas 1986, stillhad onlyone border China's Heilongjiang Province withRussia station (at Suifenhe). Telephone callsto cities acrosstheborder to be placed just had in advancethrough in operators thecapitals, involving time-consuming demiscommunications. lays and frequent Travelof individuals goods reand fromMoscow or Beijing to providethe intervention quiredcomplicated documents. Postalservice existed the proper onlythrough national capitals. Sino-Soviet border trade found wayto overcome a theseobstaNevertheless, cles, reaching $350 million 1987. by of of The expansion trade relations the required establishment a new visa of to regime allowthenormal processing individuals coming acrosstheinternational border.In July visa agreement, 1988,thetwosidessigneda formal to border witheither diplomatic, a allowingcitizens crosstheinternational a or holders official, regular passport. Onlytheregular passport required visa in authorities China from In Russianauthorities. practice, however, regional began issuing"official" stampson passports (whichwere supposedto be in granted onlyby theChineseForeign Ministry Beijing)to provide greater whohad beenturned down(or did notwantto apply)fora access to traders Chiof was Russianvisa.9 Sincethenumber theseindividuals smallat first, But did difficulties. as theborder nesepractices notcause significant opened the widerin subsequent yearsand as theChineseeconomy expanded, stage of as conflict largenumbers Manchurian was set forpotential peasantsand
in "Sino-Soviet Normalization," 235. p. 7. Calculated from figures Dittmer, pointand the the as regarding border a starting the treaties 8. These included use of existing in areas. For moreon channels theborder river as of acceptance themiddleof mainnavigable Disputes?" Territorial "The End of theSino-Russian see thesenegotiations, GeorgeGinsburgs, 1993). (Seoul), 7:1 (Winter/Spring of TheJournal East AsianAffairs in of and of explanation theproblems theold system theevolution changes, 9. For a useful no. 25, see ChinaNews Agency(Taiwan),January 1994; RA Report, 17 (July1994),p. 43.

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citytraders (manyof Koreandescent) beganto crosstheborder seekingto market their products thegoods-starved in RussianFar East. At theofficial level,Gorbachev's long-awaited summit visitto Beijingin May 1989 resulted a number important in of including reesthe agreements, tablishment official of relations theresumption bilateral and of militaiy-toties. the of was military Among many repercussions thesummit theempowof erment thetwo sides' foreign ministers takecharge a new roundof to of intensified negotiations the disputed on border.After another Sino-Soviet twoyearsof meetings, Sovietand Chineseteamleadersfinally the initialed in an agreement May 1991that settled 98% ofthe7,400kmborder, covering in theterritories Vladivostok eastern from to Asia.10 But Tajikistan Central thedomestic chaos in theSovietUnionprevented earlyratificaits political tion. AfFollowing on thejust-completed up withdrawal Sovietforces of from in ghanistan early1989,theSovietUnionmovedaheadafter May summit the in on a variety unilateral of and multilateral reductions theirFar Eastern fromMongolia (completedin 1992), cuts in the forces:full withdrawal of number theshipsin theSovietPacific Fleetby one-third, paring and down of the overallnumber forcesin the Far East by 250,000 (to include of 120,000from Mongoliaand alongtheborder withManchuria).1I from By thetimeYeltsinhad ousted Gorbachev powerin December1991, the relations withChinaweremoving forward a steady at pace. Since then, in of of relations thecontext Russia's chaoticecorapidexpansion bilateral has new benenomicreforms center-regional and politicaldisputes created but fits, also manyunexpected problems.

Border Russo-Chinese Developments since the SovietBreakup (1992-1994)

on Negotiations BorderDemarcation in initialed May 1991,facedopposition border The Sino-Soviet agreement, on and by local authorities military figures bothsides. Manyfeltcheated by of the level without consultation regional made on thenational concessions of neededthesolidsupport bothheadsof stateto the leaders. Finally, treaty
21, Post, February 1992, p. 12; 13, 10. See TASS, February 1992; SouthChina Morning Post,March17, SouthChinaMorning Pressfrom Beijing(Kyodo),March12, 1992;Associated (Univerin abstracted SUPAR Report April22, 1992,p. 6; all articles 1992,p. 10; andIzvestiya, sityof Hawaii at Manoa), no. 13 (July1992),p. 44. Policyin the "China's Security of 11. On theinitiation thisprocesssee David Shambaugh, Post-ColdWar Era," Survival,34:2 (Summer1992), p. 96. On ForeignMinisterEduard in of Shevardnadze'sFebruary1989 announcement the reductions Far Easternforcesby Policyto China'sRegionalRole," The 250,000,see Lam Lai Sing,"FromMikhailGorbachev's 1993),p. 592. 7:2 of Journal East AsianAffairs, (Summer/Fall

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and push it through RussianParliament the ChineseNationalPeople's the 1992. A formal exchangeof the signedand ratified Congressin February Soviet the of documents tookplace in March,although breakup theformer (now loof sections Union in December1991 leftthevalidity thewestern of Asia) in question.In lateOctober1992,a joint catedin thestates Central Asian states and RussiametwithChineseofficials delegation theCentral of agreed in theSinoto their to inBeijingtoreconfirm commitmenttheborders seriesofnegotiations remaining on Sovietpact,setting stagefor final the the 12 disputes. all were concerned, thatreRusso-Chinese relations As faras bilateral in 55 1992 accordwerean isolated kmstretch the mainedafter February the and certain in Altairegion islandsand channels theAmurand mountainous to proved mostly be a technical Ussuririvers.The western Altaidemarcation of at was settled with initialing an agreement theMoscow the which problem, in highly summit September 1994. But theAmurand Ussuriareasinvolved proved muchmoreintractaissues,andtherefore contentious local economic ble. established since the Many of theseareas had not had clear sovereignty the to and treaties first that granted Amur Ussuriterritories Russia in thelate due historical had seen borders changearbitrarily to peculiar 1800s. Others rectification.13 summit The eventsthatrequired agreement signedin May lines the ruleof locating demarcation in themid1989 had proposed general in river butit did notestablish dle of particular jurisdictions areas channels, areas whereseasonal waterflows (including whereclaims were unclear14 Russian the of shifted mainchannels therivers).Since theSovietbreakup, because of the leadershave issuedseveralprotests Far Eastern government held of economic effects theloss ofhistorically grazing lands, fishing adverse to economic assets.15One of theproblems contributing reareas,and other of allowingthe has gionalfrustration been theportion the 1991 agreement of freepassage of Chinesevessels in the AmurRiver. Chineseviolations on tension the seasonshave occurred, causingconsiderable Russianfishing itself been violated has by cases, theRussianborder Russianside. In other for of Chinesevessels,often thepurpose illegaldisembarkations.
no. 1993), p. 35. 27, 12. TASS (Beijing),October 1992; RA Report, 14 (January thatin 1882 a Russiancolonelmanaged revealed tsarist document uncovered 13. A recently plying Chinesecounterpart his after in markers one area to Russia's favor to movetheborder (Izvestiya, on his of and bottle champagne getting signature a new agreement. after withbottle 28, 28, February 1995,p. 3; FBIS, DR/SOV,February 1995,p. 11). Zvezda, Zvezda,March4, 1993,p. 3; Tikookeanskaya see negotiations Krasnaya 14. On these no. March5, 1993,p. 1; bothin RA Report, 15 (July1993),p. 57. ViktorIshaev and krai Governor 15. On the Russian side, thishas includedKhabarovsk May 17, by See Evgeniy Nazdratenko. comments IshaevinIzvestiya, krai Primorskiy Governor in Pravda,August6, 1993,p. 1. by 1994,p. 3; also, comments Nazdratenko Komsomolskaya

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Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and Military BorderDeployments with visittoBeijingin Decema Yeltsincompleted first yearin office his full southeastern withhis increasingly important ber 1992 to cement relations In accomplishments in Russo-Chiyet neighbor. one of themostsignificant of "Joint Declaration the nese relations, Yeltsinagreedto a broad-ranging Basis forMutualRelations the and between RussianFederation theChinese included clauseson thenonuseof force People's Republic." This document inbilateral cooperaof policiesin theregion, disputes, rejection "hegemonic" of and use, tionto promote nuclear nonproliferation no-first reduction border and of fortifications troops"to a minimal level,"initiation military-to-miliin economicand financial and cooperation, cooperation antary exchanges, 16 provided activities. The agreement titerrorist, antismuggling, antimafia and a thebasis forthefurther of relations established and stabilization regional field.17 number important of CBMs in thesecurity In July1994,forexample, RussianDefenseMinister Pavel Grachevand Chi ChineseDefenseMinister Haotianmetin Moscow to signa landmark A of of Military Activity." number agreement the"Prevention Dangerous on an areasare covered theagreement, against including: safeguards specific by and missilelaunch, lasers, a proaccidental banson theuse of eye-damaging esof One hibition againstelectronic jamming communications. provision codifiesa system tablishesa regimeof early warning. The agreement will or toward territory strays foreign whereby plane,helicopter, shipthat any "Close to territory."18 be warned withan agreed-upon off messagestating: in the demarcation talks, negotiator theborder According Russia's chief to is each side's ultimate military negotiations to withdraw goal of theongoing This proposed the mainforces least 100 kmaway from border.19 at regime of and or would require destruction withdrawal all tanks, artillery, aircraft hesithe from demilitarized the zone. Previously, Russiansidehad remained because in manyareas thiswill remove tantto agree to theserestrictions rail Trans-Siberian line.20 But Russianforcesto areas behindthestrategic
mezhdu Rossiyskoy deklaratsiya osnovakhvzaimootnosheniy ob 16. See "Sovmestnaya in (December18, 1992), printed thejournal Respublikoy" Narodnoy i Federatsiey Kitayskoy (Moscow),no. 1, 1993. Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka guard. In early1993,Russian on remained their forces military 17. Despitethisagreement, to oblastwere reported be engagedin a training autonomous in forcesoperating the Jewish television China.(See Ostankino weaponsagainst use nuclear exercise thepossible oftactical for no. (Moscow),April8, 1993; RA Report, 15 (July1993),p. 139.) report July14, 1994,p. 6. (Moscow),July13, 1994,p. 2; FBIS, DR/SOV, 18. Segodnya no. 1994),p. citedin Pravda,July17, 1993,p. 3; RA Report, 16 (January 19. G. V. Kireev, 117. by 20. See TASS, August25, 1992, citingcomments Russian Defense MinisterPavel 1993), p. 124. no. talks;RA Report, 14 (January troop Russo-Chinese Grachev after bilateral

JAMES CLAY MOLTZ 519

of bilateral relations have apparently recent CBMs and theexpansion other (CISChinesethreat.Multilateral eased Russianconcerns thepotential of talkscontinue be held on theseisto China) and bilateral (Russo-Chinese) at put of sues.2' Notably, current estimates thenumber Russiandivisions or withmanyof themreported be at less than40% to below 40 divisions, of facing Chinaat an actual strength. This putsthenumber Russianforces (compared 500,000a decade to strength todayof onlysome200,000troops ago). A largenumber high-ranking of Chinesemilitary delegations have visited Chinese including numerous their Russiancounterpartsthepasttwoyears, in Russianweapons. At the local level, military-industrial officials ordering have been portvisitsby Chineseshipsto Vladivostok by Russian there and Chineseofficers have made first-of-theirshipsto Shanghai.More recently, of the forces, including kindvisits regional to detachments theRussianarmed with 1994 visitto the Transbaikal Military District.Consistent September new on of these measures, important agreement non-targeting nuclear an 1994 visitby ChineseChairweaponswas approved during September the man Jiang Zeminto Moscow.22 Thisjoint statement pledgedbothsides to a aimedat theother's following territory, detarget nuclear weaponscurrently the StatesandRussia. Combined similar pactreached earlier between United withtheDecember1992 agreement, pledgehas gonea longwaytoward this attackacross thisincreasingly reducing either military's fearof a surprise fears among to the porousborder.But ithas donenothing alleviate growing of the influx Chinesecivilians, thelocal Russianpopulation regarding rising mostof them undocumented. BorderTrade,and Immigration Customs Regulations, can commercial relationship be The positive side of thenew Russo-Chinese of 13 ties seen in therapidexpansion border since 1989. By mid-1993, river Province linkedthe from and 3 ports, airports, 4 roadbridges Heilongjiang as border a whole to region theRussianFar East. AlongtheRusso-Chinese now roadsandrailconnections link19 workthe (excluding western section), the between two sides,withtwo additionalstations ing border checkpoints to has planned. Otherinfrastructure continued developas well. In August AmuroblastbeHeihe and neighboring 1992,direct postalservicebetween between 25 phonelineswereestablished gan. The nextyear,thefirst direct
with China. talks Russia,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 21. The multilateral include roundof The groupheld its tenth roundof talksin June1993 in Beijing,witha subsequent meetings taking place in March1994 in Moscow. See Xinhua(Moscow), March10, 1994; RA no. Report, 17 (July no. 1994),p. 145; also Xinhua(Beijing),June 1993;RAReport, 17 (July 11, 1993), p. 133. 22. ITAR-TASS, September 1994; FBIS, DR/SOV,September 1994,p. 9. 6, 7,

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phonelinks international thetwosides. By 1995,Chinaplansto have direct and of of availableto a significant portion thepopulations Heihe,Suifenhe, Hunchun City. into By the early 1990s,manymoreChinesebegan to cross the border numbering some 500,000in 1992.23 One reason Russia forvisitsand trade, of controls theChineseside of on fortheincrease was a loosening economic before1992 had limitedChinese border the border. Chinese regulations withRussianenterprises $500,000in exports to companies engagedin trade to in and theprovision only50 workers jointventures Russia. Because of of in however, theseregulations changed early1992 thesuccessofborder trade, to allow $1 million trade in and 100 workers.24 early1992,China's State In economicfreedoms threecitiesbordering to Council also granted greater tradeand and City)in order promote to Russia (Heihe, Suifenhe, Hunchun in to regional development. Some of thesepoliciesweresimilar nature the Provearlier suchsouthern zonesas Shenzhen Guangdong in ones granted to the of provinces, Russian ince. Fromtheperspective China's northeastern in development plans. Regionalofficials Far East figures centrally economic region to of have created limited zones in a number townsalongtheborder incentives to (to offer special currency regulations acceptrubles)and other Russiansto shopthere.By 1993,theseprovinces succeeded had encourage in acquiring krai'sforeign trade.25 43.5% ($302.5 million)of Khabarovsk on Russianregional Also moving forward theChineseside-often against a project, grandiose opposition-has been the TumenRiver development in area linking trading region theborder schemeto developan international in interested theproject China,North Korea,andRussia. Chinais especially of Japan a access to theSea through channel becauseit wouldgive it direct since Japawithpiersand other blocked obstacles thathas been physically WorldWar II. Dereasonsduring for closed theriver military nese troops it have supported local officials Russia's for spiteU.N. funding theproject, shouldgo to Vlathat instead development funding onlygrudgingly, arguing or regional ports. divostok, Nakhodka, other on In a number border of areas,regional governments bothsideshave set local of citizens free zones allowing cross-border holding passage up special and includesuch regionsas a residence permits.These zones are limited the oblast. Within of autonomous zone alongtheborders theJewish five-km the but is movement permitted, onlybythosewholivewithin zones,visa free of visas. Problems illegalChinese to are zone. Others required havenormal have led intothesezones and exit intothe restof Russia,however, entry
no. 25, 23. ChinaNews Agency(Taiwan),January 1994; RA Report, 17 (July1994),p. 43. no. March8, 1992,p. 1; SUPARReport, 13 (July1992), 24. ChinaDaily (Businessweekly), p. 38. 2, daily),February 1994,p. 2. KrasnoeZnamya(Vladivostok from 25. Figures

JAMESCLAY MOLTZ 521

Russian authoritiesenforce to regulations strictly,cooperation more in with thelocalpoliceandborder guards. Many Chinese continue enter country to the under false pretenses do and notreturn home.There no reliable are estimates theactual of figures, but estimates from vary around 200,000 over million. to two After Russian the Parliament passed new"LawonEntry Exit" 1992, a and in Russia abolished itsofficial passports (leaving with it only diplomatic regular and passports). ButChina notreciprocate, problems did and continued Chinese of with use official questionable Russia pressure passports, finally leading to China into formal negotiations a newcustoms on in regime February 1993. Butthese negotiations notstem huge ofillegal could the tide Chinese that in entered 1993, which stretched Russian control totheir border staff limits. IllegalChinese a issuein theRussian immigration became serious political FarEast, the a of dominating localpress.After nearly year further negotiaand tions, twosides the narrowed differencescustoms their on controls coma to pleted newagreement December in 1993in Moscow.According its an terms, China agreed adopt Russian to the which system, required invitation letter visafor Chinese and all of holders regular These passports. regulations went effect January Thedate these on 29.26 of was finally into changes notaccidental. that of ChiRussian authorities calculated thousands illegal nesewould return their for to home villages Chinese NewYearcelebrations. Theaimofthe was and newregulations toprevent illegal the of reentrythese other Chinese on 10.27Thenecitizens the after NewYearbegan February that also revised border gotiations led to these regulations putinto placea of to Russia from China.These system strengthen inspectionsgoods entering nowhaveto beara special would certificate they passed that had products for examination theChinese Industrial Service Import-Export by Inspection to which the would Goods, verify products' quality according standards provided Russian authorities. by sentiments theRuson Thenewregulations soothed temporarily political In economic effects. sianside.However, alsohaddramatically they negative This border China thefirst of 1994, half trade with dropped precipitously. to to but occurred only Chinese not in exports Russia, alsoinRussian exports
B. Minister N. Pastukhov and 26. Theagreement signed Russian was by Deputy Foreign Ambassador Russia to Xinhua January 1994;RAReport, 8, Chinese Wang Jinqing. (Beijing), this account theagreements of suggests No. 17 (July 1994), 37. Notably, p. however, Chinese on of notes thesignificance that Chinese view regulations the may the differently. author The who people hold diplothe regulations: newagreement that new "The says Chinese Russian and from exit matic service and passports their and children agewillbe exempted entry, and under merely a Chinese for audience is transit visas."Whether misleading this language intended was difficultjudge. to novogodnikh kanikul," 27. Vladimir Oshchenko, "Kitaytsy pokidaut Primor'ye vremya na Vladivostok, February 1994, 11. 9, p.

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Russian China, Chinese as traders previously had purchased products with their profits before returning home. In Russia'sPrimorskiy trade krai, $55 In dropped from 1993level(toapproximately million).28 Amur 78% its to by oblast during first the quarter, Russian exports Chinadropped 81%, For from $100million 1993to$19million 1994.29 China's in in Heilongjitrade with Russia-figures angProvince-the dominant partner border in in showed decline trade 45% compared thesamequarter 1993.30 a in of to trade with From Moscow, however, decline border hasbeenviewed the in a certain levelofdetachment. Russia, with China beenvery has For trade in profitable, Russia with runningsurplus some$2.4billion 1993from a of Russo-Chinese of$7.8billion. total trade Part thereason this that of for is the in China-unlike developed Western powers Japan-isinteresteda and equipment, variety Russiantechnologies, of including powergeneration machine aviation and hardware. Indeed, trucks, tools, equipment, military to is manufactured make 80%ofRussian goods up exports China.Thistrade on agreeconducted mostly an intergovernmentaloron interenterprise basis ments, through not border trade. or Thetotal figure border during was$2.5billion,3' 31% of for trade 1993 overall trade.To thesatisfactionthetwocentral of governments, perthis is over the Peng centage declining time.Indeed, during Chernomyrdin-Li in in summit Beijing May1994, went great to to lengths downboth leaders in trade, deflecting attention playtheimpact therecent of declines border instead theexpanding contracts to enterprise-to-enterprise andgovernment Zemin to in on eve visit sectors.32 Jiang purchases other Similarly, the ofthe Yeltsin that Moscowin September commented "economic 1994, President He that must tiesbetween countries be raised a newlevel."33 added our to territoriesthetwo of the border trade wouldremain, given largeadjacent level not its but that countries, implied itshould exceed current ofone-third "natural normal." and oftotal a trade, levelhe found for of trade summit the and posting lowoverall Moscow figures Sincethe to attentionregional have to 1994, central the governments begun paymore a severe ofconsumer lack In trade goodshas ledthe problems. particular, for economic to to Far Russian East'sgovernorsappeal Moscow special privmemconservative have These and ileges subsidies. dynamics alsoinvolved
1994), 4:11 (November Far East Update(Seattle), chart Russian in adapted from 28. Figures statistics). Russiangovernment p. 5 (citing no. April27, 1994,p. 3; RA Report, 17 (July1994),p. 46. 29. Izvestiya, no. 7, 30. TASS (Beijing),June 1994; RA Report, 17 (July1994),p. 36. February 1994,p. 9. 7, 4, 31. Izvestiya, February 1994,p. 3; FBIS, DR/SOV, 32. ITAR-TASS,May 27, 1994; FBIS, DR/SOV,May 27, 1994,p. 4. 30, 1994,p. 8. August 30, 1994; FBIS, DR/SOV, 33. ITAR-TASS,August

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of Russian bers the Duma, some whom using casetorally of are this support for their nationalist aims. A more serious problem, theofficial from government's perspective, has beenthecontinued inadequacy transportation of between twocountries. the Thisfactor slowed economic has the rapprochement of Russiaand China considerably, causing problems especially enterprises for located beyond the immediate border areas. hasalsocontributed It tofrequent delays thefulin fillment existing of contracts to bottlenecksborder due at crossings in and customs. According Russia'sMinister Foreign of to Economic Relations Oleg Davydov, some25?/o-30% bilateral of contracts notimplemented are duetoa lackoftransportation.34 same Atthe time, however, regional some leaders haveopposed bridge new projects citing "threat" illegal the of Chinese.

As Russia'sregional leaders readily point sinceChina's of out, acceptance theJanuary visaregime,significant 1994 a has loophole beendiscovered by Chinese to a hoping enter Russiawithout visa. Existing regulations allow registered Chinese tourist and Russian agencies their to bring counterparts Chinese tourists theRussian Eastfor to Far But visa-free short-term, trips. of thousands Chinese havesimply their abandoned tours soonafter arrival, and work.As a Russian finding illegal residences seeking border official the ofexisting lamented about ineffectiveness regulations: "They[theChias In Far nese]enter completely legally, tourists."35 theRussian East,an of into led Russian travel investigation these practices tothe banning several firms had a history "depositing" Chinese their that of without monitoring In forces carried return.36 hopesof apprehending Chinese, illegal security inMay1994, outOperation "Inostranets" (foreigner) apprehending suspected in them. ofthe1,657 Out and illegal immigrants deporting persons caught Chinese.37 Primorskiy 75% were krai,
34. ITAR-TASS, May 23, 1994; FBIS, DR/SOV,May 24, 1994,p. 15. Kitaytsami," KrasnoeZnamya, "Inostrantsy okazalis' v osnovnom 35. LudmilaBryzgalina, attitudes toward illegal Victor Kozlov,notedaboutpopular K. May 28, 1994,p. 6. The official, " Chinesebusinessmen (called "shuttles"): . . . on thewholeit shouldbe said thatPrimorskiy particularly their of effect in fill He residents havereally their oftheseshuttles." complained had are to who "stealing" housing from local residents, themselves struggling getbyin thesetroubled economictimes. prestupnikami," Vladivostok, 36. NikolaiNepsha,"Kitayskie turisty stanovyatsya rossiyskimi July 1994,p. 3. 7, krai "Priissuedby thePrimorskiy administration, 37. Official report illegalimmigration on (Vladivostok daily),July 2, Migratsiu," Vladivostokskoe Vremya ostanovat' Nekontroliruemuyu group. Koreans(6%) constituted largest the 1994,p. 2. Of therest, North

in Growing Complaints the Russian Far East and China'sNortheastern Provinces

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of talkson the specifics the the regarding ongoingborder Local unrest to leadinglocal officials has channels also continued, Amurand Ussuririver krai into ownhands. In May 1994,Khabarovsk Governor takematters their in to Chinesevesselsseeking navigate RusIshaevissueda decreerequiring at withkraiauthorities least 24 hoursin watersto register sian territorial also Chineseaccess to Russianchannels advance. The newregulation limits for use due to the frequent underthe coverof darkness to daylight hours, or leaders, It and trade, immigration. is notclearhownational illegalfishing, will reactto thislocal measure.But an operation local Chineseboatpilots, by conducted Russian borderguardsin the called "Zaslon" (undercover) illegal over100vessels,confiscated in region June1994stopped Khabarovsk Chinesepoacherswho numerous fishing gear (fixedgill nets),and arrested Russian overto Chineseauthorities.38 and weredetained, questioned, turned up stepped as a result of patrols local waters that authorities reported Chinese of theoperation. lodged krai Nazdratenko Primorskiy Governor measures, on Building these in border negoin strong protests early1995to alleged"giveaways" thefinal coveragein receivedconsiderable tiations withChina.39These complaints to Moscow to issue assurances theChiforcing press, thelocal and national of regardless local the woulduphold treaty the nesethat Russiangovernment opposition. Chinese Perspectives for columns Beijing,Chiin portrayal theRussianpressas fifth Despitetheir not to be motivated economics, by nese illegalsin theRussianFar East tend Rusoftransit as they seekto pass through scams politics.Some arevictims to Europeor theUnitedStates.40For sia for(illegal) immigration Western when their moneyrunsout in the often many,crimeis theironlyoption notes: "Without As one Russiannewspaper wait fordocuments. lengthy to are forced undertake illegalactivity, meansforsurvival, many[Chinese] of the often becoming victims [or] drugtrafficking, prostitution, themselves and Russiangangs(some of whichdeal especially crime."4' Thus,Chinese are that knowing they and in illegalpassports visas) preyon illegalChinese, to themselves theauthorities. for crimes fearof exposing to report unlikely
June 1994,p. 35. 29, 28, 38. ITAR-TASS,June 1994; FBIS, DR/SOV, c nashiotnosheniya Kitaem," vzorvat' spor "Pogranichniy mozhet Platovskiy, 39. Aleksandr 22, February 1995,p. 3. KrasnoeZnamya, KrasnoeZnamya, v 22, February 1994,p. "CherezKhanku Italiu," 40. VasiliySomotokhin, i mafiosi ikhrusskie'kolkitayskie vosstanavlivaut listed]"Rabstvov Shtatakh 4; [no author 3, daily),August 1994,p. 3. (Vladivostok legi'," Novosti 41. Aleksandr Mukomolov, "Iz Dos'e Spetssluzhb: Pod kolnakom 'Interpola' ne Gazeta,May 21, 1994,p. 8. Rossiyskaya porezvish'sya,"

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Other, Chinese legal visitors frequently complain rough of treatment-including interrogations, beatings, theft-suffered hands Russian and atthe of border guards customs and officials. Unlike Chinese the customs service, which a branch the is of People's Liberation Army-and subject milithus to tary discipline-Russian border guards a branch theMinistry Inteare of of rior. One sympathetic Russianaccountcites numerous incidents of "harassment brutality" and against Chinese citizens theSuifenhe at crossBy contrast, Russians a much difficult entering face less time China.A Russian in journalist traveling 1994from Vladivostok Harbin to complained mostly long of delays waiting train tobe detached reattached for cars at and various points. theborder At crossing, however, andpersonal bags belongings were checked. customs not The officials, reported, only she "were interin ested ourpassports AIDS certificates."43 and Indeed, despite wealth problems the of blamed Chinese, on certain reports from region portraymore the do a positive oftheRusso-Chinese side relaA in newspaper tionship. recent article the Tikhookeanskiy describes Kur'er a number the of positive of features theChinese The recharacter.44 author to counts visits nearby his Chinese border and the towns extols diligence, of Chinese friendliness, courtesy the and people.He compares Chinese businessetiquette with in Russian East. His conclusion favorably that the Far is that is Russian it of customs rudeness, and behavior laziness, bureaucratic that need reform.45 information localresidents Other from that suggests Chiwho nesemen, aregenerally as and perceived hard-working, oriented, family to as sober, Russian compare favorably potential marriage partners their who often These counterparts, aremore untrustworthy, anddrunk.46 violent,
42. See G. Christoffersen, Greater "The Vladivostok Project: Transnational Linkagesin RegionalEconomicPlanning" (unpublished paperof theProgram International on Economics and Politics, East-West Center, University Hawaii),January of 1994,p. 10. 43. Angelika Batueva, "Kuritsa-ne ptitsa, Kitay-ne zagranitsa," Novosti, May 14, 1994,p. 5. 44. Aleksandr Slepkin, "Nemnogo kitayskom o kharaktere," Tikhookeanskiy Kur'er (Vladivostokweekly), February 3-9, 1994,p. 5. 45. The author he recounts two particularly revealing incidents.In the first, watchedas a in his ChineserestaurateurSuifenhe racedoutto themarket bought for and eggsto satisfy order an omelet with onions(at a time whentherestaurant runoutofeggs). The author comments had with hint irony, of the out a "You can imagine director a Russianrestaurant running . . . in of ... searchof eggsbecausea client wanted omelet."In thesecondincident, author an the couldnot find passport, was putup in a hotelanyway his yet until finally he locatedit. The clerkat this Chinesehotelsmiledand behavedcourteously patiently and throughout (forthe author) this potential ordeal. This led theauthor ask, "Whenhave you everseen an administrator a to in Vladivostok hotelsmile?" Ibid. 46. Author'sinterview witha visiting Vladivostok academic(Monterey, Calif.,December 1994).

ing.42

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whilepublicdebatein theRussianpressand in political examples showthat of of implications theopening the to circleshas tended drawoutthenegative of is there at least a minority Russianswho do not border, Russo-Chinese subscribeto the beliefthatChina is the root of the Russian Far East's problems.

thosein Moscow who view theRusso-Chigap Thereis a growing between who view it withfear and favorably thosein theregion nese rapprochement ultranathanlapse intoself-defeating, resentment. Rather and,increasingly, Russian Far Easternleaders mightbe better tionalist policies, however, of of understanding thenature theChia servedby acquiring morerealistic plot organized to seize Russianterriof nese "invasion."Instead a centrally as described of the tory, influx Chinese(as shownabove) is moreaccurately ecoto their Chinesepeasantslooking improve an exodusby opportunistic Chineseeconomy. and in nomicconditions an overheating inflation-ravaged may governments provincial strapped in that, somecases,financially The fact from orders are that theseefforts suggests they notfollowing have supported population China's surging to Beijing. Indeed,as Beijing's ability control in threat theFar East is that Russia's primary it weakensovertime, appears Chineseregional should isolation, takeover, ofeconomic but notofa political in their Thisdoes notmakethe northern neighbor. lose entrepreneurs interest but Chinesein Russiaanyless of a concern, it does of reality undocumented mayneed to be refocused. meansfordealingwiththem that the suggest comthe amidst RussianFar East's current A pointfrequently obscured of in terms itstechdeveloped-both is plaints thatit is moreeconomically of regions China. level-than neighboring nological base and itseducational of in thedevelopment capitalist businesstechniques, Whereit has laggedis of sincethelate 1970s. Recentproblems whichChinahas been developing this from gap. Rusof Russiansstemlargely allegedChinese"exploitation" the including rangeof conbusinessinfrastructure, sia's lack of a modern thatmightguardlocal consumers laws and regulations sumerprotection to allowedChinese businessmen get business practices, foreign shady against Russianconsumers The factthat low products. away withdumping quality that in products had had little experience thisarea and lackedmanyessential the the from Russianmarket onlycompounded problem.While disappeared in in 1994haveresulted a shortinstituted January regulations thenewborder could-if regional Russo-Chinese politin they trade, term reduction overall for ical tensionscan be kept in check-lay a bettergroundwork more economic relations. favorable long-term Russian regionalleaders are edging The problemis thatconservative in often isolationist by closertoward supported nationalists theRuspolicies,

Conclusion

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sianParliament. seem prefertraditional ofseeking They to a policy subsidies overthemore risky-but ultimately forward-looking-option more of engaging regional Chinese inmore governments effective cooperative arrangements. The latter strategy, however, wouldallowtheRussian Eastto Far implement greater controls against illegal Chinese activities atthe while same time benefitting increased from customs duties from Chinese traders. These funds couldthen usedtofinance be Russian regional development. part As of thebargain, Russian officials would haveto increase protection the for Chinese against racist harassment persecution, arewidely and which tolerated (andevenencouraged) Russian by regional authorities today.It would also require Russian new policies allowlegalChinese to immigration this into labor-scarce region thebenefit both for of sides. To date, Moscow resolutely has pursued normalizationrelations of with China, despite opposition regional from authorities. with both Russian But parliamentarypresidential and elections scheduled 1996, policy for this could come under nationalist trends increasing pressure. Continued anti-Chinese in regional politics couldstrengthen conservative movements thenational at level, with ultimately harmful effects foreign on policy. In theend,theRussian Eastcannot Far that its ignore China-with dynamic economy population-is and going play major inthe to a role region's Whether willbe a positive this Russia'secoinfluence future. (promoting inthe nomic integration Pacific anditsacceptance increasing Rim ethnic of to pluralism) a negative or influence (leading Russian isolation a chanand in of neling Chinese investment elsewhere) be largely toRussians the will up to region decide.