BALANCED ASPIRATIONS WITH UNSTABLE RESULTS THE EFFECTS OF CONSCRIPTION ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN LEBANON

Dissertation supervisor: Philip Sabin MA War Studies Fernande van Tets Candidate Number N10582 August 2011 Words: 14.902

Acknowledgements
The Dutch Embassy in Beirut has been instrumental in allowing this research to take place. My internship there provided me with access to insights and individuals I had little hope of reaching on my own. Ambassador Hero de Boer has been kind enough to allow me to accompany him on official visits. I am grateful to HP van der Woude for his advice, and promoting me to attend Army Day; a great insight into how the Lebanese military perceives itself. I have Sana to thank for her skill in extracting mobile phone numbers from secretaries, as well as the endless manouche. Gratitude must be extended to all those who were willing to be interviewed for this paper; General Hanna, Hilal Khashan, Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Taylor, Jeremy Chivers and others who have preferred to remain anonymous. Their insights have proved invaluable. I am grateful to my dissertation advisor and tutor Philip Sabin for his guidance throughout the year. Words cannot express my gratitude towards my parents, Elsbeth and Rijnhard, and my twin sister Victoria, who have been so supportive of my lengthy academic endeavours. I am grateful to Sarah Clark for introducing me to Beirut and George Asseily for his introductions and hospitality. Lastly I would like to thank Ernst for his patience and advice and, notwithstanding that any errors are my own, Jan for setting me straight on my language.

Contents
Acknowledgements.....................................................................................................................2 Introduction ................................................................................................................................5 Literature review and concepts ....................................................................................................7 Civil-Military relations ............................................................................................................7 Concordance theory.................................................................................................................9 Conscription ..........................................................................................................................10 Methodology .........................................................................................................................11 History of the Lebanese Armed Forces......................................................................................12 Founding of the state of Lebanon...........................................................................................12 Early history: a weak institution.............................................................................................13 The Civil War 1975-1991: Desertion and disintegration ........................................................14 Political decision making process..............................................................................................16 Legal framework for civil-military relations in Lebanon ........................................................16 Budget...................................................................................................................................17 Political military relationships ...............................................................................................18 The Armys military role .......................................................................................................18 External actors.......................................................................................................................20 The elephant in the room: Hezbollah...................................................................................21 Military style.............................................................................................................................23 Social composition of the officer corps......................................................................................25 Promotions ............................................................................................................................26 Recruitment ..............................................................................................................................28 Involuntary enlistment: conscription......................................................................................29 Goals of conscription.............................................................................................................30 Effects of conscription...........................................................................................................31 Effective fighting force ......................................................................................................32 Politically unifying effects .................................................................................................34 Termination of conscription...................................................................................................34 Inadequate resources ..........................................................................................................35 Lack of persuasion .............................................................................................................36
3

Ideological failure ..............................................................................................................37 Lack of strategy .................................................................................................................38 Effects of ending conscription ...............................................................................................38 Military effects...................................................................................................................39 Unity..................................................................................................................................41 Neutrality...........................................................................................................................42 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................45 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................47

List of Tables Table 1: Size of the Lebanese Armed Forces 1990-2011..32 Table 2: Confidence in State and Army ....41 Table 3: Relationship religious background and sectarianism in LAF..42

A note on transcription The Latin spelling of Arabic geographical and personal names is based on the most common Latin spelling in Lebanon itself. These forms will be more familiar to the average reader than ones in scientific transliteration.

Used Abbreviations LAF CAF ISF IDF Lebanese Armed Forces Commander of the Armed Forces Internal Security Forces Israeli Defence Forces

Introduction
After the Civil War of 1975-1989, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) found itself under a unique set of circumstances. Not only did it have little legitimacy following mass desertion and disintegration, but there were three rival military powers operating within its territory. The South was still occupied by Israel following its invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Even though the Taif Accords of 1989, which officially ended the Civil War, called for the disbanding of all militias, the Israeli presence had been seized upon by Hezbollah to legitimise its continued armed presence in order to resist this occupation. The same Taif Accords had also awarded Syria a special role in Lebanons affairs which amounted to a de facto occupation, giving them a large role in Lebanese foreign, economic and defence policy, and a right to post a significant amount of troops on Lebanese territory. In addition to the government being unable to exercise a monopoly on violence, according to Weber the ultimate characteristic of the state,1 it is also weak and fractured due to its political system based on confessionalism. This quasi-democratic construction awards each of Lebanons 18 different religious confessions power according to their demographic strength, with the Christians allocated an advantage.2 This practice also extends to the military, with administrative posts being divided along confessional lines. Lebanons various confessions operate like states in a system of anarchy, constantly struggling to maintain the security of their own religious sect and preserve their respective identity.3 Despite these less than ideal circumstances, the LAF managed to regain a large degree of popular support and play an exemplary role in the rebuilding of Lebanon, becoming a symbol for Lebanons unity, the so-called heart of the nation. Two post-war Commanders of the Armed Forces (CAF) have been elected President. In order to keep order in a divided society, the Army has strived to create a unity, both within in its forces, and externally through influencing public perception. In the process of this balancing act, it has refused orders from its legal civilian

1 2

Weber (1985) 822 These are Maronite, Greek-Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Sunni, Twelver Shi`a, Druze, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Assyrians, Chaldean, Copts, Roman Catholic, Protestants, Alawi, Isma`ili and Israelite (Jewish). The first six groups are the largest and divide most of the power in the sectarian system between them. 3 Yacoub (2008) 20-27

master, previously the President, currently the Cabinet, on a number of occasions. Despite this large and unusual role, the LAF is severely understudied. This paper considers Lebanese civil-military relations; who decides what the military should do and how this should be achieved? A theoretical model which allows for Lebanons unique set of circumstances is Schiffs theory of concordance, which aims to look beyond a more traditional separation of the civilian and military sphere towards concordance between three actors; the political elite, the military and the citizenry. This partnership is based on four indicators; recruitment, social composition of the officer corps, military style and political decision making. The model advocates agreement between the people, military and state on the militarys composition, what image it projects, as well as the structures that govern it, as a vehicle for understanding civil-military relations and the absence of domestic military intervention. Through the model of concordance this paper will aim to answer a number of questions. Firstly, is the LAF able to create the unity necessary for guarding internal security? Is it capable of performing its official external role of protecting Lebanons borders? The introduction of universal conscription following the Civil War in 1991 was supposed to contribute to both these goals. There will thus be a large focus on the recruitment indicator, in order to find out how conscription contributed to the achievement of these two goals.

Literature review and concepts

In the West, the subordination of the military to its civilian commanders has been institutionalised legally as well as practically for decades now. In other parts of the world however, the distinction is less clear. Many developing nations, especially in the Arab world, have a recent history where the military is particularly present as an independent political actor. Despite this there is a severe lack of research into Arab militaries, particularly in smaller states such as Lebanon.4 Their large role in the region warrants the study of Arab militaries and could prevent policy pitfalls. One such pitfall was the US decision to disband the Iraqi Army, which could have been prevented by recognising the potential of the Army in helping to rebuild the country.5 The studies of the past decades have confined themselves to the size, equipment and technical capabilities of Arab armies, rather than analysing the relationship of these institutions with the state, politics and society.6 Civil-Military relations Civil-military relations describe the interplay between the civil society and the military organisations designed to protect it. Topics include the legal framework set out to govern the relationship between the military and civilian sphere, as well as the informal connections between acting and retired security personnel and politicians. As Barak and Assaf point out, these informal interactions, which are very common in the non-Western regions, defy the separation into distinct civilian and security sphere that is found in the established states of North America and Western Europe.7 This separation into distinct civilian and security spheres was first advocated by Huntington in the 50s, based upon the experience of the US military. In Huntingtons standard work The soldier and the state, the concept of professionalism is key. A professional military, whose profession is a special type of vocation based on expertise, similar to a lawyer, a responsibility to society and a feeling of distinction Huntington brands corporateness, will be detached from political ambitions. It will restrict itself to an advisory position to the laymen civilians, and not be involved in decision making. Its main responsibility is to defend the nation, and in answering

4 5

Barak and Assaf (2010) 807-11 Ibid. 804-5 6 Ibid. 807 7 Ibid. 813

to that call when necessary the professional Army carries out its responsibility. 8 However, this is a two sided coin, because in return the statesman respects the integrity of the profession and its subject matter and exerts political guidance in the form of setting the goals the military is to accomplish, as well as allocating the necessary resources to achieve that goal. 9 However, this model cannot apply to Lebanon for two reasons. First of all, it pre-supposes two strong institutions, similarly to the United States. This model is not always applicable to countries with weaker, less centralised political institutions, such as Lebanons confessionalm. For these sorts of society, professionalisation of the Army is not always the answer to attaining a separation between the civil and military sphere. Picard has even claimed that [a]s far as Arab armies are concerned; there is no evidence of any link between increase in professional skill and de-politicisation.10 Secondly, Huntingtons theory assumes that politicians are able to formulate a coherent end policy to pursue. As we will see, in the case of Lebanon this is anything but the case; there is no national defence policy and the role given to the Armys role on paper; external security, is not in line with its capabilities, and hence different to its actual modus operandi; internal security. Other literature on civil-military relations recognises the large role played by Arab militaries, but still largely focuses on military coups or degrees of military intervention during a coup.11 Such models, however, do not allow for states in which the government does not exercise a monopoly on violence.12 Similarly, more recent Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature, which has endeavoured to expand good governance in the military beyond civilian oversight, also presumes that the military is part of a centralised power structure that regulates society, thereby ignoring the challenges to SSR in divided societies with weak state institutions and strong neo-patrimonial networks.13 Seyigh has pointed out the problems the SSR framework faces in Lebanon, where the sectarian and political struggle for control over the security sector is compounded by the presence of dual military forces in Lebanon, namely the presence of Hezbollah.14

8 9

Huntington (1957) 7-11 Ibid. 72 10 Picard (1990) 94 11 Norton and Alfoneh (2008) 8 12 Ibid. 13 13 Nerguizan (2010) 4 14 Seyigh (2009) 8

Concordance theory A different framework, which takes into account institutional weakness, is offered by Schiff through the concordance model. This model advocates an alternative to the separation between the civil and military spheres, namely a system of concordance in which the military, the political elite and the citizenry should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation [of the civil and military sphere] but does not require it.15 The model overcomes the limitations of mere institutional analysis by incorporating particular historical and cultural experience. Granting that such concepts are vague, and often difficult to operationalize, Schiff identifies four indicators which the three actors should agree on in order to prevent military intervention from occurring: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method and military style. The composition of the officer corps is self-explanatory; due to the role of the officer corps as the leaders of the Army it forms a critical link not only between the citizenry and the military but also between the citizenry and the government. The political decision-making process involves the institutional organs of society that determine the militarys budget, materials, size and structure. All these aspects of the military depend on the goals of the Army and what role it should fulfil in society. Although Schiffs definition does not include who is technically in control of the military, this should also be included as who can decide what to do with the above capacity surely is part of the political decision-making process too. Recruitment refers to the method of enlistment, specifically whether it is coercive; forced cooperation against a citizens will, or persuasive; citizens recognize the need for members of society to voluntarily or involuntarily enlist.16 This factor will be most important in this study, as Lebanon saw a shift in recruitment method; from voluntary to involuntary persuasive enlistment following the civil war, and then the return to voluntary enlistment in 2007. Military style refers to the external manifestation of the military and the inner mental constructions associated with it: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it? 17

15 16

Schiff (1995) 7 Ibid. 15 17 Ibid.

The novelty in this approach is that it is that it introduces context through the consideration of cultural issues, such as historical development and the structure of society. 18 In this it is

constructivist in nature. The model has successfully been used to analyse other militaries where the institutional balance is less equal than under Huntingtons model, for example in exploring civil-military relations in Turkey. 19 The concordance model does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making process.20 Therefore it is suitable for Lebanon, which cannot exercise a monopoly on violence, due to the presence of a competing armed militia, Hezbollah, and whose state institutions have been hollowed out by the system of confessionalism. The divided nature of Lebanese society makes it difficult to qualify citizenry, as different groups have different interests. Support by the citizenry will thus be based on research which has found agreement across confessional differences. Conscription Conscription has dual aims; nation building and the creation of an effective fighting force. Nation building aims to create a common national identity and idea of citizenship among the population. 21 An effective military fighting force is capable of protecting its territorys external borders. These goals, however, are not necessarily compatible. The political goals of establishing a national identity might contribute to the creation of an effective fighting force through strengthening morale, but the two goals only come together during the state of war. As Clausewitz pointed out, passion is a vital ingredient in ensuring victory in warfare, and nationalism and patriotism are one form of this. 22 But due to the diverging nature of these goals, the success of conscription must be measured for both aims as one might be more successfully achieved than the other.

18 19

Schiff (1996) 282 Narli (2011) 20 Schiff (1995) 2 21 Barak and Assaf (2010) 812 22 Clausewitz (1932) 32

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Methodology The Army, with up to 70,000 forces, will be the primary focus as the Navy and Air force are insignificant because of their small number of recruits.23 There are three ways I have gone about collecting my data. The first is qualitative literature research, focusing on Lebanons post- civil war period. The second is the consideration of statistical data on the militarys composition and the publics perception of it. To supplement these two sources, I have also conducted interviews with a variety of (former) senior military figures, European defence attaches, academics, politicians and journalists in Lebanon. The lack of accessible resources, as well as the discrepancy between the written laws and practice has made these contributions invaluable. I was hoping to talk to those currently at military headquarters, but my requests for access were not granted.

23

IISS Military Balance, various editions 1990-2011

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History of the Lebanese Armed Forces

Founding of the state of Lebanon The country of Lebanon, as it is known today, was established as a UN Mandate under France in 1920. Prior to this, the area now known as Lebanon was part of the Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire. The state of Greater Lebanon suffers from a paradox of origin, due to the conflicting three principles on which it was based; Maronite dominance, geo-strategic viability and confessionalism. Maronite dominance was ensured, in order to allay Christian fears of Muslim hegemony and Syrian dominance. The borders signified the desire to create an artificial, enlarged geographic space to ensure the economic, demographic and strategic viability of the new state. This territory was to be ruled by the quasi-democratic system of confessionalism, through which power, and eventually the state itself, was divided amongst Lebanons numerous sects.24 Despite supposedly being temporary in nature, the 1932 census which this division was based on remains the last official census to this day. Based on these three principles, in November 1943, Lebanon gained its independence. Its first two political leaders, President Bechara al-Khoury and prime-minister Riad Solh, created an understanding; a number of mutual renunciations and guarantees, a compromise formulation on the identity of the country and on power-sharing between the religious communities.25 This socalled National Pact, which was never written but has been institutionalised over time, saw the Christians renouncing Western protection and accept Lebanon as an Arab affiliated country, and the Muslims in turn renouncing possible unity with Syria or any pan-Arab state. The agreement stipulated the power-sharing mechanism, with the President always being a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni and the President of the National Parliament a Shia. Parliamentary seats, as well as all other administrative posts, were to be divided on a 6:5 ratio in favour of the Christians.26 In terms of civil-military relations, this inhibited military intervention by having political parties accept the authority of the state, and creating a moral barrier by legitimising civilian institutions in the eyes of the general public.27

24 25

Yacoub (2008) 9 Hanf (1973) 72 26 Binder (1966) 276 27 Beshara (2005) 78-79

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Early history: a weak institution The Troupes Spciales du Levant (Levantine Special Forces) were established by the French in 1920. Following growing pressure by the Lebanese to command their own forces, the French turned the 3000 strong force, which was to become the core of the Lebanese Army, over in June 1943. The political nature of Lebanon prevented the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from growing. Both Muslims and Christians were wary of strengthening the institution, fearing that the other side would use the LAFs military might to strengthen its own political position. The Muslims felt that the LAF should be strong enough to play a significant role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, while the Christians were keen to avoid such embroilment. Due to this lack of political consensus, the LAF was awarded neither the funds nor the manpower throughout its early history to play a significant role in external security; during the 1950s and 60s Lebanons military spending never exceeded 4 per cent of GDP.28 The individual who was most influential during the early history of the LAF was its first Commander; Fuad Chehab, who fulfilled the post from 1945 until the end of the first civil war of 1958. Under Chehab, the Army, while kept too weak to play a role in external conflicts with Israel, played an important role in the domestic arena. It provided humanitarian assistance after natural disasters but also managed conflicts in the periphery, particularly in the tribal areas of the north and the Bekaa valley. 29 When a civil war broke out in 1958, however, the Army remained neutral. Chehab refused an order from President Chamoun, responsible for the LAF at the time, to fight anti-Chamoun forces. Chehab felt the crisis was a contest over the personality of the president rather than the challenge to the state and feared that the Armys involvement would threaten its cohesion. 30 He was consequently elected president and oversaw a militarisation of society, which led to increased prosperity as well as an intensive, and disputed, role for the deuxime bureau (the military intelligence services).31 This trend of heavy military involvement in politics would continue under his successor Charles Helou (1964-1970), and during these twelve years some have even claimed that the Army was the behind the scenes ruler of Lebanon.32

28 29

Collelo (1989) 240, Barak (2009) 21-22 Barak (2001) 69 30 Kechechian (1985) 16 31 Barak (2006) 78 32 Ibid.

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The Civil War 1975-1991: Desertion and disintegration The Civil War proved that, despite its prominent role in the 60s, the institution still had the same trouble with its internal cohesion as in 1958. When in 1975 a civil war broke out again, the Army had little legitimacy and long standing concerns that the Army would disintegrate if it were called into action were vindicated when intense fighting broke out between Maronite and Muslim Army recruits. 33 Bereft of a commander as charismatic or commanding as Chehab, the Army almost immediately disintegrated; only ten per cent remained in their positions, fifteen per cent defected and joined various militias while the rest returned to their homes in anticipation of the end of the conflict.34 In 1982 president Amin Gemayel attempted to bolster the LAF, announcing plans to create a 60,000 strong and unified Army to rebuild the nation, trained under auspices of the Unites States through the so called Lebanese Army Modernization Program. However, despite the initial successes in bolstering national morale, the homogenous nature of the brigades proved to be a problem. An attack on the Druze area in the Chouf Mountains was the start of the first cracks, with 800 Druze deserting in September 1983. 35 A 1984 attack on the (Shia) Southern Beirut suburbs proved too much. The Shia sixth brigade refused their orders and the Shia Fourth brigade defected to the opposition. Thus the Army was facing mass defections, with as much as 40 percent of the Armys 27000 active fighting men refusing to fight their co-religionists, or having joined the Muslim militias. 36 By 1987, the Lebanese Armed Forces were only the sixth or seventh most powerful military organisation in the nation.37 Ever since 1984 the Army had been split into two units. General Michel Aoun, Commander of the Armed Forces (CAF), politicised a number of these units through promotion of junior officers and creation of an elite unit loyal to him. Following an impasse over the presidential elections of 1988, Aoun assumed the prime-minster ship over the Christian enclave while Salim al-Hoss was accepted by all factions outside of East-Beirut.38 The final blow to the LAFs cohesion came at the end of the Civil War after the Taif Accords, officially ending the war, had
33 34

Collelo (1989) 247 Barak (2001) 72 35 Kechechian (1985) 31 36 Civilians Leaving: Shiite and druse Leaders Call for a Cease-Fire Marine Wounded, New York Times, February 8, 1984 37 Collelo (1989) 178 38 McLaurin (1991) 549-550

14

been signed by various political leaders. Aoun refused to accept the Accords, through which the Christians would lose significant powers formerly given to the Presidency. This forced CAF Emile Lahoud, a fellow Maronite who was appointed by the government run by al-Hoss, to fight and defeat Aoun, which he managed with significant help from the Syrians. Following this last episode the Army not only had to rebuild its forces, but also reintegrate the majority of Aouns Army, who formed the majority of the LAFs best fighters as well as the greater part of its Christian component, in order to ensure a rebalancing of ethnic groups.39 The LAF has been kept weak from its inception due to the nature of sectarian politics. The system of confessionalism was institutionalised, albeit at an adjusted ratio of 50-50 Christian and Muslim quotas, by the Taif accords. This confessional nature, which as we shall see also seeped into the Army, has ensured the Army was kept weak in terms of resources as well as internal structure. Despite a period of significant military influence in the 60s, the LAF emerged out of the civil war neutral, but severely weakened through desertion and splits.

39

Gaub (2007) 7

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Political decision making process

Following the destruction of the Civil War, the Army needed to be restructured and rebuild, and this was recognised in the Taif Accords which ended the war in 1989. The restructuring of sectarian relations also affected the relationship between politicians and the Army. This section will first compare which institutionalised mechanisms exist on paper; who is in charge, how the LAFs budget is decided and what its role is, with its actual modus operandi. As we shall see, there is no concordance on these issues. External actors, and their proxies such as Hezbollah, exerting pressure on the already fractionalised political system complicates the situation even further. Legal framework for civil-military relations in Lebanon Both the Constitution (1926) and the Taif Accords (1989) enshrine that the President is the Supreme Commander of the LAF. 40 He also presides over the Supreme Defence Council, which also includes the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, interior and finance and is responsible for adopting stipulations and measures necessary to carry out defence and security policy.41 However both documents also stipulate that the armed forces fall under the authority of the Council of Ministers.42 Initially the President had large executive power over the LAF, 43 since the Taif Accords the authority over the LAF rests with the Council of Ministers, who are to define defence policy; including the goals to be attained and determination of the general goals of the army.44 All power for implementing the military aspect of defence policy however, is invested in the Minister of Defence. He is responsible for preparing the army for combat by mobilizing, training and equipping it and supervising execution.45 The budget for this is approved by parliament. The official distinction between the government and military which exists on paper is different to its modus operandi. The minister of defence is a political appointment with little power or autonomy. His job is confined to meeting foreign diplomats, rather than actually deciding on military affairs. Part of the reason is that those occupying the post often possess little to no
40 41

Constitution (1926) Article 49, Taif Accords (1989) Article II.B and II. B.2 and II.D.3 New Defence Law (1978) Article 6 and 7 42 Constitution (1926) Article 65, Taif Accords (1989) Articles II.D.3 43 Decree No 66 of April 1953 states that the Armed Forces are at the disposal of the President of the Republic. 44 New Defence Law (1978) Article 5 45 New Defence Law (1978) Article 17

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knowledge of military affairs, and this is the way the military prefers it.46 The person in control is the Commander of the Armed Forces (CAF), who some say enjoys more power even than the other top Maronite post, the President.47 The Ministerial Council headed by the Prime Minister, who de jure has authority over the LAF, has been overruled in the past by the CAF. Recently this was the case in 2005, when an order to act against anti-Syrian protestors was refused. A symbol of the weakness of the ministry of defence vis--vis the Army can be found in its presence online; it is non-existent. Instead, one is referred to the website of the LAF. Budget Although the parliament is constitutionally authorised to study and approve the military budget, in reality it plays a minor role in determining how money is spent.48 All decisions concerning salaries, arms procurement and so forth are made at the military headquarters in Yarze. While the Armys budget increased 1,534 % between 1990 and 2010, in comparison to what others spend in the region it is very low. Regionally it lags behind its neighbours, with Jordan spending 8.6% of its GDP on defence and Syria 5.9% in 2005, in comparison to Lebanons 3.1%. This, in combination with the high cost of salaries and perks awarded to the large amount of high ranking officers in Lebanon, has led to a severe lack of arms procurement. The situation is so dire that the Minister for Defence even seriously suggested opening a Central Bank account to which citizens could voluntarily contribute funds for arms procurement.49 The fact that such an account can legally only be opened by the Cabinet, who the minister failed to consult, betrays the lack of knowledge on Lebanons legal framework, as well as a failure to grasp basic principles of defence expenditure. Due to the lack of a clear framework of relations between the two and the large influence the military exerts over the ministry of defence, concordance is more in acceptance of the status quo. Politicians are worried about sacrificing power to state institutions, or strengthening them in case they are utilised by a rival sect. Therefore there is no political desire to address the structural fallacies of the LAF and its budget.

46 47

All those interviewed agreed on the weakness of the Minister of Defence. Interview European Defence Attach, interview Elias Hanna 48 Baaklini et al. quoted in Luethold (2004) 13 49 Hasbani (2010)

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Political military relationships The political decision making process is also affected by the myriad of informal ties which exist between the military and the political elites, in the form of marital ties and personal interests intertwining. 50 Most political leaders have inherited the mantle from their father and in the Army there is a similar trend. Emile Lahoud and Fuad Chehab, both Commanders of the Armed Forces and later Presidents, had ancestors who were the first officers in the LAF.51 However, on the issue of ties between military and political actors, there is concordance between all three actors. This is no more present than in the acceptance of the military fielding candidates for the Presidential Elections, which are decided in Lebanons Parliament. Former Commander of the Armed Forces Emile Lahoud became President in 1998, with legislators amending the law to allow him first, to extend his term as Commander and later to run for President despite a constitutional ban on senior military officers ascending to the presidency within two years of their leaving their military offices. The ascent of a former Army commander to the presidency obviously resulted in a larger political role for the military, with the Army establishing a network of political relations in the state council, the bank of Lebanon and parliament.52 Although Lahouds candidacy was heavily supported by the Syrians, even more so upon his re-election in 2004, after Syrias departure in 2005, the Lebanese again have a president who is a former CAF; Michel Suleiman was elected in 2008. Word is that the current Commander, Jean Kahwaji, is lining himself up for the post. The Armys military role Apart from a lack of clarity over who exercises power over the armed forces, the formulation of the Armys military role is a constant struggle. Officially determined by the Council of Ministers, there is a lack of agreement on the fundamentals, such as the Armys role in society. Thus he military in practice is allowed to run its own affairs. Officially, the role allocated to the LAF by the Taif accords was to protect Lebanon from external foes, stipulating that the fundamental task of the armed forces it to defend the homeland and should be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression. In reality it confines itself to what was supposed to be a

50 51

For example Elias Murr, the Defence Minister, was married to Emile Lahouds daughter during his tenure as CAF Barak (2006) 83 52 Habib (2002) quoted in Koekenbier (2005) 109

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secondary role; supporting the Internal Security Forces (ISF) until they are ready to assume security tasks. 53 The Army itself formulates its mission as: Facing the Israeli occupation and its perpetual aggression in South Lebanon and West Bekaa and supporting the steadfastness of Lebanese citizens to ensure the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces to internationally recognized borders as well as defending the country, its citizens and its vital interests against all threats. The legal basis for this protection of vital interests is Law 102/1983 (the National Defence Act), which provides that, if the State of Lebanon is threatened in one or more of its regions by acts which may be harmful to its security or its interests, the Army is entrusted with maintaining order.54 As to the protection of vital interests of Lebanon, it is unclear when the vital interests are being threatened, thereby providing the military free reign in determining when they choose to overrule the politicians formally in charge. The Army also counts internal security among its responsibilities, as well as social, development and humanitarian operations according to national interests.55 However, the external role stipulated by Taif immediately failed to materialise due to Hezbollahs control of the South. The only external task which in practice firmly falls in the realm of the military is that of the Palestinians, who are perceived by the government as an external security threat and therefore the responsibility of the Army. 56 Thus the Army returned to its traditional role of providing internal security, including the provision of humanitarian assistance and helping in development projects.

Politicians, the military and citizenry agree on the necessity of this internal role. The ISF lack legitimacy, and even though the population is aware of the expected roles of the two institutions, a vast majority do not think this theoretical distribution of powers and duties is feasible in Lebanon.57 The lack of the clear definition of the Armys external role is an obstacle which the Army encounters time and again. The lack of concordance between political sectarian actors on

53 54

Taif Accords (1989) section III.C.1-4 UN covenant on political and civil rights (1996), Article 4 55 Mission of the LAF - http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/Mission.asp. 56 Long & Hanafi (2010) 7 57 Harris et al. (2010) 15

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what it would like the Army to do, and consequently attribute the necessary resources for this, is a troubling feature of Lebanese civil-military relations. External actors Throughout Lebanons history external actors have used Lebanon as a battle ground. During the Cold War, the US aligned itself with various presidents, and interfered on behalf of Chamoun in 1958. Later it played a role through the establishment of the Lebanese Army Modernisation Programme in 1983. Furthermore other contributors to the multi-national force established to patrol the border between Israel and Lebanon since the 80s have also tried to help the Lebanese state assert sovereignty over its territory. Syria has always had a heavy presence in Lebanese relations, due to its belief that the larger part of Lebanon should be part of Syria, as it was during Ottoman times, excluding the province of Mount Lebanon. Syria interfered at multiple times during the Civil War, allying itself with Christians and Shia factions depending on strategic convenience. The civil war only ended due to heavy Syrian pressure, a result of which the special relationship between the two was mentioned in the Taif Accords and solidified through the Agreement on Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination signed in 1991. Syria had a heavy presence in all forms of policy until its exit in 2005, and was responsible for a large part of restructuring the Army and training many of its officers. All appointments to leadership-level posts in Lebanese state institutions, including the LAF, were influenced by the Syrians between 1990 and 2005.58 Thus it managed to promote figures which were friendly towards Syrian policy, as well as towards the proxy it simultaneously supported: Hezbollah. 59. Consequently any concordance between the three actors would need Syrian approval during the period of conscription; 1991-2005. Syria acted as a de facto national arbiter, and there was no need for a national defence policy as Syria provided this. The effects of the ending of conscription must therefore also be placed in the larger context of the decline of Syrian influence. Iran has also given ideological and financial guidance to Hezbollah since its creation, thereby severely undermining Lebanese sovereignty

58 59

Nerguizan (2010) 8 Barak (2009) 179, Salloukh (2005) 19

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The elephant in the room: Hezbollah In addition to the pressures from external actors such as Syria, the formulation of any role for the Army in terms of national security is complicated by the existence, and acceptance, of Hezbollah. Although the Taif accords officially called for the dismantling of all militias, Hezbollah was allowed, under Syrian tutelage, to continue its presence in the South in order to combat the Israeli occupation. Subsequent to the ending of the Israeli occupation in 2000, it seized upon the continued occupation of the Shebaa farms, according to the UN part of Syrian territory, to justify its continued armed presence in the South. The fact that the state and the LAF do not exercise a monopoly on violence in Lebanon further complicates the civil-military relations. The LAF is, still today, structurally, militarily but most of all politically incapable of disarming Hezbollah. Hezbollah is better armed, and a highly skilled fighting force. But more importantly, 30% of the LAFs officer corps is Shia, and almost 40% of the Lebanese population.60 If the LAF was used against Hezbollah it's not only the Shias who would leave the army, 70 per cent of the Sunnis and half the Christians are with the resistance [Hezbollah] at the moment as well."61 Despite a lot of verbal bluster from politicians, there is concordance about the unwritten nature of the status quo; with the military performing a mostly internal security role and relying on Hezbollah to provide Lebanons external defence. The slogan of Hezbollah has become the strategy of Lebanon: the Resistance, the Army and the People. This bastardisation of Clausewitzs trinity of the Army, the People and the State,62 goes to show the weakness of the state in this formulation. In terms of national defence it is absent. The Army has accepted this, referring to Hezbollah as the hand of the Army.63 Official Army propaganda, such as bulletins and speeches incorporate Hezbollah victories as their own, thus blurring the line between the two.64 The Armys own mission statement accepts Hezbollahs presence, supporting the steadfastness of Lebanese citizens is a transparent reference to supporting Hezbollah.

60 61

CIA World Fact Book, Nerguizian (2009) Former general Hteit in Sending in the troops, Al-Ahram weekly, 17-23 August 2006 62 Clausewitz (1832) 24 63 Interview former LAF General 64 Recent statements underscoring this are a document published on the LAFs 60th anniversary http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/article.asp?cat=7&ln=en and folders distributed during Army Day 2011.

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This awkward co-existence between the Army and Hezbollah also affects civil-military relations. During Hezbollahs 2006 war with Israel the Army refused to challenge the loyalty that many Lebanese felt for Hezbollah. Furthermore, it deviated from government policy by verbally issuing direct support for Hezbollah, even calling them brothers.65 However, any formalisation of the duopoly of violence, through a long overdue national defence strategy, seems impossible. Such an agreement would constrain Hezbollah, and it would lose its autonomy to the LAF. But more importantly, it would sacrifice its denial ambiguity; Hezbollahs fluidity is what allows it to operate at times as the vanguard of Lebanon, successfully resisting and expelling the Israeli occupation while at other times protecting its own interests, as it did when it took over West-Beirut in 2008. This was a response to a perceived threat to its communications infrastructure by the governments replacement of a Hezbollah minister for telecommunications, as well as the replacement of the General in charge of the airport, perceived by the ruling coalition at the time to be a Hezbollah sympathiser.66

65 66

Henry (2007) 130-131 Hezbollah Pledges to Pull Its Forces Out of Beirut, Bloomberg News, 10 May 2008 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqf3zxx_..5I&refer=home

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Military style
The militarys style concerns how the LAF interacts with society; its ethos, the image it projects of itself and how this is received. The LAFs image is mostly centred on unity in the form of overcoming sectarian differences for the higher goal of the nation. This is strived for through outwards shows of unity, propaganda and displays of military might laced with valiant rhetoric, such as Army Day. The inclusion of military style allows for the definition of its ethos. Lebanon can be firmly categorised as what Khuri calls a tribally based model; the Army establishes a semblance of institutional cohesion; but fragments under crisis into sectarian or religious fragments.67 This has happened twice during the civil war, and a repeat is the LAFs greatest fear. The military style is still heavily influenced by its colonial past. The French character and its ethnic composition were two obstacles to overcome on the way to unity.68 Almost 70 years later neither has completely succeeded, as its structure is still European and, as we shall see later, it has still not established a balanced ethnic composition. The LAF structure is, like most postcolonial armies, similar to European armies. A large number of its officers have been trained, and still do train, in Europe and the US. The European character of the Army was echoed by its trainers in the 80s, and is again today; it basically is a European Army. 69 The European structure and appearance can also be attributed to the dependency on Western donors for a lot of its equipment and training. 70 For example, military uniforms are supplied by the US and are consequently a form of Woodland camouflage. The British train anti-terrorism units in the North of Lebanon. From its inception there been a large emphasis on creating a cohesive whole out of an Army of divided personnel. When President al-Khuri asked Fuad Chehab to command the Army he described it as not united by any national sentiment and told him: Make a genuine, strong and national Lebanese army out of this rabble.71 The LAF makes great effort to exalt its unity at every possible turn. This starts with its founding myth, the battle of Malikiyya, indeed the only
67 68

Khuri (1982) 13 Barak (2001) 65 69 Interview Giles Taylor 70 Owen (2004) 179 71 Riyashi (1961) quoted in Barak (2001) 63-4

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offensive battle ever fought by the LAF, and which is still propagated by the LAF today. 72 A contemporary journalist proudly remarked: These are the genuine Lebanese, moulded by the military in one melting pot and transformed by it into one community whose only purpose is the service of the homeland and the flag. Their sight elicited pride: strict obedience of order and love and loyalty for the commander of the Army (my italics). This quote not only showcases the perceived uniting nature of the battle, but also the role of the commander. Fuad Chehab is a figure of almost mythic proportions within the Army and the desire to unite the Army is known by his name as Chehabism. 73 Due to the divisive nature of society, with a lack of one uniting party or figure, the Army has always been very dependent on charismatic leaders. The ascendancy to the presidency of those who proved successful in improving the Armys image shows the strong desire, as well as lack of availability, in Lebanon of such figures. Through Army propaganda, this image is reinforced time and again among the military itself. Externally, the military makes similar gestures, through large scale parades, as well as articles in the press emphasising the unity of the institution and its role in protecting Lebanon. During the Civil War it continued to organise parades and press coverage was overwhelmingly positive.74 Throughout the 90s the Army conducted a propaganda campaign on TV and billboards emphasising the unity of the institution.75 This focus on creating an image of unity is largely determined by politics, which, in reality, keeps the institution weak. Furthermore, the basis for this unity is centred on the only external enemy everybody can agree on: Israel. Shows of strength, such as the biting the head of a snake a standard ritual during parades - stand in stark contrast to the Armys actual capabilities. A second basis for the unity of the LAF is its internal ethnic composition, which it has strived to balance throughout the years. It is to this process that we now turn.

72 73

Barak (2001) 73 Gaub (2007) 17 74 ibid, p. 72 75 Gaub (2011) 22

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Social composition of the officer corps

Ever since its creation, the LAF has struggled with the composition of its officers corps. When speaking of social composition in Lebanon, this regards sect as well as socio-economic background. The LAF has created a greater balance on both fronts, mostly through the introduction of an artificial quota stipulating a 50-50 division between Muslims and Christians throughout its officer corps. Due to their supremacy in the Troupes Spciales du Levant created by the French, when the LAF came into existence in 1943 the overwhelming majority of the officer corps was Christian.76 Even though up until 1958 recruitment was technically based on merit alone, a variety of socioeconomic and political factors ensured that the majority of those accepted into the military academy were Christian and from the higher echelons of society.77 Following Lebanons first civil war in 1958, part of President Chehabs efforts to strengthen the states institutions was to distribute all administrative posts, including the LAF (except for senior posts) equally among Christians and Muslims, rather than on the previous 6:5 ratio in favour of the Christians. Oren Baraks research in this area shows that this parity was only attained during Lebanons second civil war, after the first wave of retirements in 1977-8.78 Such retirements encouraged high level officers, especially Christian ones, to leave their positions in order to benefit a more balanced demographic composition of the officer corps. The restructuring of the Army after the Taif accords saw another wave of retirements, and subsequently an even greater effort was made to enforce the parity. Officially the quota is still in place, but attendance of Army Day of 2011, which coincides with the graduation ceremony of the military academy, revealed that the new officers corps is not as equally distributed as claimed. Based on a rough sample of names called out, which in Lebanon can often indicate ones religion,79 far less than half were Christian, perhaps closer to one third. When confronting a former Army general about this, he stated that this was readjustment for greater numbers of Muslims falling in battle or leaving the Army.80 However, other sources confirmed 30% Sunni,
76 77

McLaurin (1984) 83-84 Barak (2006) 80, McLaurin (1984) 83-4 78 Barak (2006) 86 79 Eg. Joseph and Anthony for Christians, Mohammed for Muslims 80 Interview with former LAF general

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30% Shia and 30% Christian was a more realistic estimate.81 Oren Barak puts the figure for the post-civil war period at 47.1% Christian, 27.2 Shia and only 16.1 Sunni, with the rest being Druze.82 This seems to be in line with demographic trends in Lebanon. The Shias, who had trouble passing tests to enter the military academy, seem to have benefitted from their increased socio-economic position. There is a low number of Sunni officers, but this can also be attributed to education; Sunnis are far better represented in the rank and file. Apart from a shift in the sectarian composition of the officer corps, the corps has also become more representative of various social levels. While initially almost three quarters hailed from favoured or elite, mostly Christian families, it has now become more middle-class. Officers are increasingly hailing form the, poorer, northern region and the Bekaa.83 The officer corps has become a vehicle for social mobility, especially for the Shia. When the quota was enforced in the 90s it was to encourage Christian recruits to apply, as they had a lesser desire to pursue a military career. However, instead of producing greater ethnic balance and unity, it is a source of frustration, as enthusiasm is greater among Muslims, yet the number of places remains the same. 84 The parity it enforces is artificial, and out of touch with demographics and demand. Furthermore, the quota seems to contradict the idea of unity it is meant to promote. Hence calls for its abolishment are frequent, especially among Muslims. 85 The quota also undermines the principle of merit, as can be seen from the promotions system. Promotions The highest positions of the military are governed by the National Pact. The Commander in Chief is traditionally a Maronite Christian. The New Defence Law of 1978 changed the command structure to include a chief of staff, traditionally a Druze, and four deputy chiefs of staff; a Sunni, Shia, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. Furthermore, within the division between Muslims and Christians there are also positions secured for all of Lebanons 18 recognised religious sects. These are divided through a complicated system ensuring representation of religious groups at a horizontal and vertical level like a Rubiks cube. For
81 82

Interviews with European Defence Attachs Barak (2006) 89 83 Ibid. 84 Gaub (2011) 12 85 Ibid.

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example, if a company is commanded by a Sunni, he must have a Christian deputy, a Greek Orthodox perhaps. The commander of the brigade then may not be a Christian of the same sect.86 The New Defence Law of 1978 stipulated that the Military Council, consisting of the head of all the different departments of the Defence Ministry, should advise on promotions. As a result promotions were very subjective, and mostly expressions of political favouritism. A series of exams was introduced in 1994 in order to ensure some form of meritocracy. 87 Although this ensures the best cadets securing positions within their sectarian quota, ultimately the sect still takes precedence over performance, with a majority of positions thus reserved for the dominant Maronite sect. Furthermore, this division of posts along sectarian rather than meritocratic lines leads to inflation in the officers corps. Estimates put the current number of generals around 400, as well as thousands of colonels, for an Army comprising 56,000 personnel. 88 In comparison, Britain has 46 officers of three star rank lieutenants general, vice admirals and air marshal for of a force of 109,500.89 Despite being inhibited by a lack of meritocracy in terms of military capabilities, the officers corps does have a sense of unity, instilled primarily during the three year training programme. Political issues are discussed, but smoothed over. For example, when questioned, cadets hardly acknowledge the effects of the split between the Lahoud and Aoun factions of the Army, stating that it has always been one.90 Officers perceive themselves as above sectarianism and able to act in the greater interest of Lebanon.91 Upon entering the military academy one signs an agreement foreswearing allegiance to any political party or militia, and declaring allegiance to Lebanon alone. 92 There seems to be an instalment of constitutive norms, resulting in officers constructing an artificial Lebanese identity which allows thinking in terms of what should a Lebanese officer do?93 How these norms are instilled and the organisational culture which accompanies this process would be an interesting topic for further research.

86 87

Ibid. 6 Koekenbier (2005) 108 88 Hasbani (2010), interviews with defence attachs and former generals 89 Generals and Admirals to be culled in defence cuts, The Daily Telegraph, 3 February 2010 90 Gaub (2007) 8 91 See several biographies of officers eg. Lahoud (1976), Lahad (2003) 92 New conditions for admission http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/CollegesMilitarySchoolMain.asp#condition1 93 Based on Farrell (1998) 411

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Recruitment
The composition of the LAF has been a problematic issue throughout its history, with accusation of it being a Christian Army levelled against it on a number of occasions. In order to combat this perception, not only the officer corps has changed in composition, but the rank-and-file has too. Over the years, Lebanons recruitment process has changed from voluntary enlistment, to conscription during and after the civil war. Recently, since 2007, enlistment is voluntary again. Following Lebanons independence, the sectarian imbalance in favour of the Christians and Shia among the foot soldiers deemed to be solved in line with the National Pact, thus establishing a 6:5 ratio favouring the Christians. This communal balance prerequisite, combined with the unpopularity of military service among the Christian population, made it difficult to fill quotas. By 1951 only 700 out of 4000 candidates were being accepted, despite a desire to recruit 800.94 Any initiative to change the status quo was hampered by the Christians, who were fearful of losing their dominance over the security sector. This fear was only aggravated by the growth of the Muslim population, which had made the 1932 census out dated. Nevertheless, by 1975, despite the image of the Army being Christian due to the high representation of Christians at officer level, 60% of the rank and file were, in fact, Shia.95 The sectarian composition, and especially allegiance is a problem which has plagued the military since its inception and military commanders have struggled to overcome. Even Fuad Chehab, who was an extremely uniting leader to his forces, did not dare use his forces in 1958, telling the US ambassador: I have a very brittle instrument in my hand. If I strike too hard, it will break.96 The large number of desertions and the disintegration of the Army during the civil war show that it was not, at that time, a unified force internally. The perception of the Army as a Christian one shows that that unity did not exist externally either. Changing the nature of recruitment to universal conscription would have the potential to deal with both this internal weakness and external perception of weakness.

94 95

Barak (2009) 19-20 Gaub (2011) 4 96 Barak (2009) 55

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Involuntary enlistment: conscription Although many Lebanese, including former generals, 97 are under the impression that conscription under the so-called Flag Service Law was introduced following the Civil War, the practice is much older. The idea of a mandatory draft was first proposed by a Sunni MP in 1974, but Christians opposed it, afraid of losing their dominance, and thereby strengthening the perception of the Army as a Christian institution in the wake of the civil war.98 Compulsory enlistment was introduced by the 1978 New Defence Law, stipulating a serving period of 2 years for every Lebanese male between the age of 18 and 22, with the opportunity to defer and specialist positions for those holding university degrees.99 The Flag Service Law (102/83) was implemented in 1983 by President Amin Gemayel, as part of a larger effort to re-balance the LAFs confessional composition, by expanding its forces to 60,000 and the forced retirement of 140 officers. 100 Despite the Army controlling little more than the area around Beirut, potential draftees flocked to the colors within the first months of its enactment. So great was the enthusiasm, even from areas controlled by the Syrian and Israeli armies, that it strained the Armys ability to process them.101 However, despite this initial interest, barely a year later the Army disintegrated under battle.102 During the rest of the civil war the policy was no longer implemented. Yet following the Taif accords the LAF underwent large scale re-organisation in order to create a greater sectarian balance. This was achieved by mixing brigades, integrating militias and expanding the LAF by introducing conscription.103 Outnumbered by militias during the Civil War at a ratio of 2:1, the Army urgently needed to be enlarged. Rather than relying on veterans, the Army leadership preferred enlisting new recruits.104 Thus law 97/91, re-establishing the Service of the Flag Law was approved on 21 September 1991.

97 98

A former general was unaware of its existence prior to 1993, despite joining the army in 1975. Barak (2009) 29 99 New Defence Law (1978) Articles 34, 37-43 100 Ignatius (1985) 1151 101 Dunn (1983) 18 102 Kechechian (1985) 28 103 For an in-depth look at the mixing of brigades and re-integration of militias, see Gaub (2007), Koekenbier (2005), Dupont (1999) 104 Barak (2009) 178

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Goals of conscription Following Taif, the government wanted the Army to be able to restore the states authority. In order to do this the Army needed to reunite its scattered remnants, restructure the religion-based brigades, increase its size, integrate former militias, get rid of the Christian image and impose itself as the one and only source of coercion105 A leitmotif through all these goals is establishing the Army as an institution of unity for all Lebanese, regardless of sect. Changing the nature of recruitment by introducing conscription would fulfil a number of these goals; increasing its size as well as eradicating its Christian image, both of which would allow for a greater presence on the ground, thereby eventually leading to the LAF fulfilling its goal of external defence.

The Taif Accords declared the abolishment of political sectarianism to be a fundamental national objective. A national council was to be formed which was to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism. In the interim the sectarian representation base in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions was to be abolished excluding the top-level jobswhich shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.106 The introduction of universal conscription was in line with this objective. Eradicating the confessional quota for its rank and file marked a fundamental change in the functioning of the Lebanese military. Recruitment was now based on Lebanese citizenship rather than religious sect, and should therefore prove far less divisive. Overcoming this obstacle to internal cohesion should allow for the projection of greater outwardly cohesion too. The Army intended to play a unifying role in Lebanon, and had started to re-organise its officer corps to be more representative as early as 1977.107 This desire is reflected in the way it perceived the goals of conscription. Even though the primary goal of conscription, as stated by the Army, is preparing conscripts to serve in the LAF, the next eleven all focus on instilling patriotism, citizenship and national pride and faith in the states institutions, cumulating in conscripts being preachers carrying a message to spread throughout their community following completion of the Flag Service.108 Thus the
105 106

Gaub (2007) 7 Taif, Articles II.G and II.G.a 107 Barak (2006) 90 108 The First Flag Service Center, LAF website, http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/english/collegesmilitaryservicemain.asp

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Army sees a large role for itself in nation building and the creation of a national identity. This is unsurprising, as the Lebanese Army has long viewed itself as a supra-sectarian institution, holding itself to a higher standard, and has created a number of myths to reinforce this image (see previous two sections). The Army bulletin Al-Jaysh [the Army] went to great lengths to underscore the potential of conscription as a melting pot of Lebanese youth. For example, the Flag Service Law vowed to help the youth, particularly in the post-war period, to escape the narrow partisanship and blind sectarianism into a broader loyalty to the homeland alone.109 As explained there is a dichotomy between the social and military goals of conscription. The majority of the goals of conscription in Lebanon are of a nation-building rather than military nature. In evaluating the effects of conscription, the military and social effects of the policy will be analysed before turning to its effects on civil-military relations. Effects of conscription Yet the initial drafting of the law and its political goals conflicted, as the pool of recruits was far too large, covering all men born between 1966 and 1973 (all 18-25 year olds), a group comprising over 260 000 individuals. 110 In contrast, in 1990, the LAF comprised a mere 21 000 soldiers, and thus the establishment would be completely overwhelmed, on a far bigger scale than in 1983 when it had already struggled with 3000 recruits. A solution was found in the possibility of paying a sum of 1,500 000 Lebanese pounds (around $1000) to evade the draft.111 While this provided the military with a tidy sum, it contradicted the Armys above goals of installing national sentiment and creating an integrated national military; the sentiment would only be instilled in the poor. Hence in 1993, law 245/93 decreed that military service was to be served for one year by all males attaining 18 years of age. This decreased the pool of recruits to a much more manageable 25, 000 recruits annually (see table 1).

109 110

Al-Jaysh 74 (june 1991) quoted in Barak (2009) 178 Taqi al-Din (1994) 213 111 Dupont (1999) 65

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Table 1: Size of the Lebanese Military (1990-2011)

1990 Total military size Army size Navy size Air force size Number of conscripts Percentage of conscripts 21,800112 21,000 0 800 1992 36,800 35,700 400 800 1994 44,300 43,000 500 800 25,000 58.1% 1996 48,900 47,500 600 800 1998 55,100 53,300 1,000 800 19992000 67,900 65,000 1,200 1,700 27,400 40.4% 2002 2003 72,100 70,000 1,100 1,000 22,600 31.3% 20042007 72,100 70,000 1,100 1,000 22,600 31.3% 20082009 56,000 53,900 1,000 1,100 0 0.0% 20102011 59,100 57,000 1,000 1,100 0 0.0%

Source: The Military Balance 1990-1991 / 1992-1993 / 1994-1995 / 1996-1997 / 1998-1999 / 1999-2000 / 2002-2003 / 2004-2005/2005-2006, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, Taqi al-Din (1994)

Effective fighting force The introduction of conscription led to a huge increase in troops, doubling its size within the first three years (see table 1). But this increase in troops did not allow for the Army to achieve what is traditionally an Armys primary goal, protection of external borders. What were the effects of this surge of troops on its fighting capabilities? Let us first consider the operations carried out by the LAF during the years of conscription.

As stipulated before the task of external security was mostly performed by Hezbollah. The LAF moved into some villages in the South following a retaliatory action against Hezbollah by Israel in 1993 (Operation Accountability), but remained passive during the fighting. The same was the case during Israels 1996 operation Grapes of Wrath.113 Much more significantly, in the wake of Israels withdrawal from the South after 2000, it took the LAF until 2006, and even then only under the auspices of the UN, to be deployed to the South. Even though the LAF is currently formally in control of the South, the area is by no means under the LAFs sole authority, and all brigades stationed there need to be cleared by Hezbollah.114

112 113

Combined Aoun and Lahoud forces Koekenbier (2005) 117 114 Interview European Defence Attach

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The two most significant actions against the Palestinians, in Sidon in July 1991 and in Nahr el Bared in 2007, both fall outside the realm of conscription, and are not relevant for this section. The clashes with Islamists in Denniye, outside Tripoli in 2000 were significant in that it was a first test of unity for the Army, as the fight was against Sunni Islamic militants. A large scale operation, with 1500 personnel was deployed to fight the 150 insurgents.115 However, the insurgents attacked the Army first and Sunni politicians immediately voiced their support for the Army. The operation was over within 8 days and was not controversial.

Apart from this most of the LAFs operations throughout the period of conscription concerned the guarding of elections, in 1992, 1996 and 2000, as well as other internal security matters such as the clearing of stockpiles of weapons. With increasing strength the Army also started to interfere more in internal situations. The first example of this was in July 1995, when the Army beat down trade union protests against rising prices, especially petrol. Then, in August 2001, the Army launched an operation against anti-Syrian protests organized by the supporters of the Christian leaders Michel Aoun and Samir Gaegea, in the wake of Maronite patriarch Sfeirs visit to the Chouf Mountains.

None of these actions by the military sincerely tested the loyalty of conscripts to the nation, rather than the sectarian allegiance, and so it is impossible to say whether the military created an effective fighting force in terms of idealistic cohesion. While the Islamist uprising in Denniye, in 2000, was a test in terms of Sunni soldiers fighting against other Sunnis, the encounter was too brief and the power balance too skewed for it to be considered a threat to the national survival of the Sunnis. 116 In 2005, when the Army would have seen a severe test of its soldiers' loyalty if deployed, the Army refused to play a role, with CAF Michel Suleiman refusing orders to act against the March 14 anti-Syrian protestors.117 This neutrality, although sold as solely preventing further bloodshed and preserving unity, 118 is closely linked to an intense fear of the Army splitting. The effects of the social aspect of conscription thus clearly were not as strong as intended in advancing internal cohesion. Nevertheless, the Army was effective in carrying out its
115 116

Sending in the troops, Al-Ahram weekly, 17-23 August 2006 Interview Jeremy Chivers 117 Kechechian (2008) 2, Nerguizian (2009) 9 118 Suleiman Profile, APS Diplomat News Service, 2 June 2008

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other internal duties, helping reconstruction, and managed to extend its sovereignty over Lebanon, albeit with help from the Syrian Army and excluding the South, and ensured the elections were peaceful. Politically unifying effects As for the aspirations for the Army being a melting pot of all sects, again it is difficult to draw clear conclusions. Two different 2002 studies into whether conscripts time in the service improved the image of the other come to opposing conclusions. Abla found that the initial three months of training did instil cohesion, but 90 per cent of draftees felt that there was no link between national identity and military service.119 Some recruits even felt they had become more sectarian due to the behaviour of their superiors, as generals cooperate more between them than with generals of other religions.120 By contrast, a study by Messara states that the draft fulfils its goals in every way; the service is a positive experience which instils discipline, and daily contact created bonds of friendship and patriotism among the recruits.121 The answer probably lies somewhere in the middle; while recruits no doubt were confronted with the other during their time in military service, it is unclear whether this contributed to a national identity as such. Many recruits would cluster along confessional lines. There was even one incident of a Muslim soldier shooting his fellow Christian recruits, though this was an anomaly. 122 The reasons for the lack of success of the policy will be discussed later.

Termination of conscription In 2005 conscription was terminated by law 664/2005, which amended the 1983 national defence law to reduce conscription to 6 months immediately, and abolish the practice completely after 2 years. Accordingly from 2007, recruitment into the LAF has been on a voluntary basis. The reasons for this change can be found in a lack of concordance between the three parties. Recruitment in Lebanon has always been of a persuasive, rather than coercive nature. Although at times it has been involuntary, enlistment is based on the recognition by the population that

119 120

Abla (2002) 46 note 26 Recruit quoted in Gaub (2007) 13. This sentiment was echoed by various European Defence Attaches and former generals this author spoke to. 121 Messara (2002), quoted in Gaub (2007) 12 122 Interview Hilal Khashan

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military service is worthwhile, for patriotic or security reasons.123 Despite still recognising the necessity of the Army, all actors no longer saw the need for conscription to staff it, as voluntary enlistment would suffice. There were two main reasons for abolishing conscription. Firstly, the Army did not have the resources, financially or structurally, to properly use the recruits according to their potential. As a result of this, the practice was unpopular among the population; it contributed to brain drain and was seen as a wasted year. Consequently in the end, parliament decided to abolish it, a decision which was difficult for then President Emile Lahoud, who had overseen the introduction of the policy as CAF, and saw great potential in it as a melting pot for all Lebanese. 124 Inadequate resources The last few years of the civil war had led to a complete collapse of the Lebanese economy, with militias usurping the states role and collecting taxes in their respective enclaves. 125 As a result the state had limited funds at its disposal and the allocated budget did not allow the Army to properly pay, train and equip its recruits. As a result of this, recruits were terribly paid, with Khishan even describing most recruits as working under conditions of slavery.126 Apart from the financial difficulties, the military did not possess adequate resources, structurally or administratively, to integrate such a large number of recruits each year. There was often a gap between conscripted recruits and regular soldiers in terms of education, with the recruits being better educated, but their intelligence not being properly utilised. 127 Conscripts were generally used as officers mess waiters, guards of buildings or chauffeurs to officers. Indeed, most conscripts were positive about their initial twelve week training, but felt useless during the rest of the nine months due to the lack of stimulation of such duties. 128 Many recruits perceived the experience to be a waste of time and one study found that as many as 80 per cent of recruits had an overall negative impression of the Army following completion of their Service of the Flag. 129

123 124

Based on Samuel Finer (1975), quoted in Schiff (1995) 15 Lebanese Army looks ahead to new challenges as conscription ends, Daily Star, 13 February 2007 125 Picard (2000) 292 126 Interview Hilal Khashan 127 Interview Elias Hanna 128 Gaub (2007) 13 129 Abla (2002) 46 note 26

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Lack of persuasion This negative perception by the conscripts themselves had a ripple effect on the popularity of conscription among the population. Apart from the unfulfilling nature of the Service of the Flag, many were also forced to postpone (often much better paying) jobs in order to fulfil their military obligation. Additionally, the Lebanese, traditionally weary of state interference in the private sphere, perceived it as government interference in their personal lives. 130 Lastly, it has been argued that conscription contributed to Lebanons brain drain. Exemption was granted to those living abroad for more than five years in 2001. The measure was introduced to reduce brain drain and encourage Lebanese to return to Lebanon. 131 However the measure had a reverse effect, promoting emigration by highly educated (mostly Christian) men for whom the Lebanese job market never had been the most appealing option.132 Furthermore, some men used their wasta (political influence) to gain exemption, thereby undermining the Services national character.133 These factors and the unpopularity of conscription thus diminished the Armys prestige rather than enlarging it. The political elite verbally threw its full weight behind rebuilding the Army through conscription, with the President stating that the Army carried the legitimate government on its shoulders and if the Army would fall it would bring the government down with it.134 But the concordance between the military and the citizenry on the issue of recruitment was declining.

Notwithstanding unpopularity, if there is still concordance on the necessity of conscription, militarily speaking or in terms of patriotism, as a means of recruitment the practice can continue. But due to the small role of the LAF in defending Lebanon against external foes (this being the de facto responsibility of Hezbollah) many Lebanese found it unnecessary for their sons to be in the Army. An exchange from a 2010 report into perceptions of the LAF proves illustrative. In response to a question what she thought about the ending of conscription a 33 year old mother from the South answered: Fulfilling your military service is unnecessary. They waste 1 year of their lives, and then they come back home. When confronted with her previous opinion that

130 131

Interview Hilal Khishan Lebanon relaxed conscription rules BBC News, 2 April 2001 132 Gaub (2007) 13 133 Army battles resistance to conscription, Daily Star, 20 March 1999 134 Barak (2009) 179

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Israel was a threat the woman answered: My son is in the Resistance, and has been receiving military training from Hezbollah since he was 16.135 Ideological failure This lack of an external role also proved problematic in crafting an effective identity. The only identity to be crafted was one of unity against Israel; it is disseminated in all of the Armys literature, such as its bulletins, as well as during speeches. Commemoration speeches during the annual Army day, for example, never fail to mention a long list of the armys achievements over Israel, but this is contradicted by the LAFs actions. A year proved too short to instil the values of national unity, and many recruits simply returned to their old sectarian beliefs after leaving the Army. 136 This is unsurprising due to several reasons. Firstly, there is no agreement in Lebanon on a common past, history, or identity. Although the Army has proved quite successful in installing a sense of unity into its officer corps, it discouraged its draftees from debating supersensitive sectarian divisions and banned all talk of religion in the barracks. 137 Furthermore, the ideological component of conscription, which was only discernable during the few months of training, was not embedded in a larger programme of national reconciliation. Even though the Taif accords called for a national effort and the establishment of a committee, the practical policy of de-confessionalisation largely remained confined to paper. Thus any lessons learned during their brief time in the Army were easily forgotten once draftees returned to the political anarchy of Lebanese society, where sects fought for their own interests as hard as ever. Within the Army itself, recruits even noticed that sectarianism was still rampant. Not only the deconfessional message took place in isolation, the idea of citizenship is also not present in civilian society. Lebanese politics do not encourage civic participation, as voting is done on a basis of clientelism and done in blocks of political alliances, mostly decided by religious leaders. The hollowing out of the state by different sects has led Lebanese to expect very little from the state, and consequently abhor taxes. The Lebanese are unwilling to bear the financial cost of statehood and the Army that goes with it.138 Therefore any kind of national citizen created by conscription is a product of only those few months. Despite Taif calling for
135 136

Harris et al. (2010) 16 Interviews with former LAF Generals 137 Kechechian (2008) 3 note 7 138 Yacoub (2008) 17 note 12

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the development of a national curriculum to strengthen national belonging, Lebanon has no national education system, as the state cannot agree on what to teach its children. The failure to produce a national modern history book for it schools bears witness to the multitude of narratives concerning Lebanons past. This decreased the likelihood of the educative aspects of conscription ever working in the long term. Lack of strategy Finally, the lack of a clearly defined goal for the LAF made it difficult to support keeping the policy in place. Without a clearly defined goal, and in the absence of national strategy envisioning how to train, equip and use a large standing Army (see section politics) to achieve that goal, the policy was let go. Some said that the ending of conscription was in order to professionalise the force as a smaller, adaptable Army would prove more useful and financially efficient.139 Lebanons primary foe, Israel, cannot be deterred by a large standing Army, as it will simply be no match in terms of equipment or manpower. To illustrate, the LAF had 70,000 soldiers at its disposal at the height of conscription, while Israel currently has 176,500 active members. 140 Furthermore, Israel outspends Lebanon on a factor of 16:1.141 Effects of ending conscription Although Law 95 abolishing conscription was passed in 2005, it only came into effect in 2007. That year the Army saw a drop of 16,500 in personnel. The law allowed for recruits to stay on for an additional five years, and initially over 10,000 did. 142 This explains the discrepancy between the actual drop and the number of conscripts (see Table 1). Through the introduction of universal conscription, it was to be expected that the Army would become a more realistic representation of Lebanese society. However, the abolishment of conscription and the opening up of the military profession to anybody who desired to serve risked skewing the balance in favour of certain groups. Though one would expect the Shia, the largest population group, to be well represented, in 2008 the total number of Shia soldiers was under 20%. In fact, the bulk of the LAF is composed of Sunni recruits, predominantly from the
139 140

Lebanese Army looks ahead to new challenges as conscription ends, Daily Star, 13 February 2007 IISS Military Balance (2010) 255 141 Defence budget gets additional NIS 260M, ynetnews, 4 April 2011 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4054947,00.html 142 Interviews with European Defence Attachs

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northern Akkar region (55-60%), followed by Shia (18-20%), Christians (15-18%) and Druze (3-5).143 The reason for this spread of demographic representation can be attributed to socio-economic factors. The northern region of Akkar is poor, with a lack of opportunities. The primary driver for this group is economic rather than patriotic, which is reflected by their choice of role in the Army; Sunnis are overly represented in the logistics department. Maronites, who often come from better education and backgrounds, opt for the infantry.144 This is in line with armies all over the world, for example in the US blacks are overrepresented in service and support functions 145 Another reason for the North being so well represented is family structure, with the military being the profession of choice for decades among many families. This especially used to be the case for the Christians from the North; however they currently aspire to better paying civilian careers, thereby forsaking their traditional military careers. 146 The lower level of education among the Sunnis makes this a less viable option for them. The decline of the Shia percentage can be attributed to opposite social factors. Historically the Shia are better represented in the military than the Sunnis, which can be attributed to them embracing the Lebanese state at an earlier stage as well as their rapid demographic growth. The Shia, on the other hand, have transformed from a disenfranchised class which saw the military as an opportunity for social mobility to a more established middle class, which seeks opportunities elsewhere. Also, Shias who are concerned about national security have the option of joining Hezbollah. In the South, many do while also practicing a civilian career.147 Military effects But what has demographic shift and loss of personnel meant for the military in terms of capability? Opinions are mixed. Although the move towards a smaller, more professional Army was welcomed by many, especially western donor countries, the execution was imperfect. There is no strategy complains one European Defence Attach. The LAF wants to keep all its equipment, even though a smaller professional Army might not need it and benefit from
143 144

Kehchechian (2008) 5. Giles Taylor confirmed these figures. Interview Giles Taylor 145 Clark (1988) 70 146 Interview Elias Hanna 147 Norton (2000) 26-27

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alternative purchases.148 In terms of numbers the Army still has large numbers of recruits that it can recall if it feels the necessity. In 2006 it did this, increasing its size from the usual 70,000 to 160,000.149 Internally, it can be argued that the Army is now stronger. Armies are most effective when participation is voluntary, especially in terms of troop morale. A voluntary Army is a better fighting force due to higher morale, increased experience due to a smaller turnover and hence more capability; is for these reasons that conscription was abolished in many countries. 150 The post-conscription Army was first tested during the offensive at the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared in 2007. The LAF fought a 3 month battle, ending victorious with the Islamic militants defeated, though at a high cost to the LAF in equipment and personnel; 169 LAF soldiers were martyred. Some warned that the ending of conscription could enlarge and deepen the Army operational problems as it has not been counter-balanced by enhanced equipment and material capabilities.151 Despite its success, Nahr el-Bared confirmed this assessment by revealing the Armys operational weakness; it disposed of too few resources to provide air support and thus had to improvise through use of its helicopters and months of shelling. Due to it running out of ammunition very soon into the fight, the US had to provide ammunition aid.152 Some hail Nahr el-Bared as a turning point for the internal cohesion of the LAF, as for the first time Sunni soldiers were fighting Sunni insurgents.153 However, the fact that the insurgents were Palestinian rather than Lebanese dilutes the argument; it was an extremist Sunnite faction that was viewed as a supra-sectarian target in the eyes of the various confessionalist factions in Lebanon.154 The post-conscription Army has so far avoided embroiling itself in situation where Lebanese fight Lebanese as it still is not sure that it can rely on its internal cohesion, even postconscription. This can be most clearly seen in the events of May 7-14 of 2008, when the LAF did nothing to stop Hezbollah from occupying West-Beirut. The Army played a non-military role in negotiating a deal advising the government to reverse its decision to fire the Hezbollah head of
148 149

Interview with European Defence Attach. IISS Military Balance (2007) 150 http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Conscription.html 151 Belloncle (2006) 5 152 Parrein (2009) 10-11 153 Interview Giles Taylor 154 Parrein (2009) 10-11

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the airport, and reverse its decision to declare Hezbollah private telephone network, vital in its operations, illegal. But it was not able to use its military capabilities for fear of a split. Unity Gaub predicted that it was unlikely that conscription would be abolished completely. Too much symbolism is attached to it, and too much of the Armys positive image depends on the draftees.155 In 2002 the population had a very high level of trust in the Army, especially compared to the state and other institutions (see table 2).

Table 2: Confidence in State and Army

Lebanese trust State and its Lebanese trust their Army institutions Druze 62.5% 75.1% Shia 43.7% 80.6% Sunni 53.1% 83.1% Catholic 46.9% 73.0% Maronite 15.5% 65.4% Orthodox 26.7% 75.1% Lebanese total 41.7 % 75.3% Source: Gaub (2007) based on Fabiola Azar and Etienne Mullet, Muslims and Christians in Lebanon: common Views on Political Issues, Journal of Peace Research 11 (2002)

The reasons for this are difficult to pin down. Gaub attributes the trust people have in the Army to its supra-religious image, and points to the positive effects conscription has had on this.

The sheer presence of draftees in the Army contributes to an important change in the institutions image. Because sons of all religious groups and of all regions are serving in it, Lebanese feel that the Army embodies the idea of Lebanon itself; it no longer has a Christian image, but symbolises the country, and by the same token the slowly growing Lebanese nation. 156

155 156

Gaub (2007) 14 Ibid.

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But a more recent study found that although 84% of the Lebanese expressed support for the Army as an institution, nearly half agreed or strongly agreed that sectarianism is a problem which plagues the LAF today (see table 3).157

Table 3: Relationship between religious background and agreement with the statement: Sectarianism is a problem which plagues the LAF today Sunni n=112 Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree Source: Harris et al. (2010) 27 43,8% 8.9% 12.5% 4.5% 30.4% Shia n=74 29.7% 9.5% 13.5% 10.8% 36.5% Christian n=158 29.1% 16.55 19.6% 4.4% 30.4%

Therefore this supra-religious explanation fails to account for the bigger picture, for an organisation which is perceived as sectarian cannot base its legitimacy on the absence of said sectarianism. The positive image can be attributed to the unity of the officer corps, which does act in line with what they perceive the public will see as Lebanons national interest, but posts at this level are still divided among sectarian lines, and thus attributions to the supra-sectarian nature of the Army are contradictory to reality (see previous section). Neutrality Rather than the demographic representation the reason for the Armys perceived unity is its neutrality, exercised through the LAFs refusal to shoot at Lebanese, overriding its civilian commanders if need be to prevent this.158 There are two possible reasons for this neutrality. The first is that this neutral role is enshrined firstly by the Armys allegiance to the constitution, and as the keeper of a balance of power between the sects. This can be traced back to the refusal of Chehab to follow orders in 1958. At several moments in Lebanese history, including the postTaif period, CAFs have chosen to disobey orders. A recent example of this was in 2005, when CAF Michel Suleiman refused to follow orders from the government of Prime Minister Omar
157 158

Harris et al. (2010) 2 All those interviewed mentioned neutrality as the LAFs greatest asset

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Karami to act against millions of anti-Syrian demonstrators.159 This inaction had the added benefit of restoring widespread Lebanese support to an institution which was starting to be viewed as pro-Syrian; the rejection by the public of the Army investigating the death of Rafik Hariri after his assassination in February 2005 also disputes the neutrality of the LAF. Kechechians assessment of this event; that the LAF redefined civil-military relations in Lebanon, which was new to Lebanese politicians who were aghast at the last commanders [Suleiman] audacity but remained speechless nonetheless160 is a bit of an overstatement. The military has always been on hand to defend what they perceive the interest of Lebanon (see officer section) and this has sometimes left the government out in the cold. Some attribute this neutrality to the presidential aspirations of the CAF (for both posts are reserved for Maronites), who do not wish to upset either side in order to avoid thwarting their presidential bid later in their careers.161. One can see this neutrality as a symbol of professionalism, and indeed this does contribute to the popular image of the Army. 162 However, another reason is fear for the cohesion of the LAF, and so far the LAF Command has been apprehensive of employing its military force in domestic disputes. The brittle nature of the Army which Chehab admitted to in 1958 seems to still plague the Army today. The LAFs hesitation to deploy in 2008, when it was clearly being challenged within territory over which is had been exercising complete sovereignty since the departure of the Syrians, is a clear example of this. Even though the public do not approve of the passiveness of the LAF, they are aware that taking sides poses risks to the unity of the Army. 163

The neutrality of the Army is thus the safest option. This argument extends to a lack of explicit domestic interference, rather than inaction. Action perceived to be on behalf of a particular sect would lead to an armed confrontation with a Lebanese actor, contradicting the LAFs mantra and possibly leading to disintegration. Rather than a danger of the Army deliberately interfering in domestic politics, the danger is of the Army splitting. The huge effort to create unity, both internally and externally, betrays this vulnerability.
159 160

Kechechian (2008) 2, Nerguizian (2009) 9 Kechechian (2008) 3 161 Interview Hilal Khashan, Interview Elias Hanna 162 Gaub (2011) 30 163 Harris et al. (2010) 20

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It is impossible to predict whether the ending of conscription, and the narrative of unity, have made the Army strong enough to survive an intervention such as was necessary in West-Beirut in 2008. Several top military commanders, from a variety of sects, wished to resign following the episode, questioning what the purpose of the Army was if it could not interfere in such situations.164 Indeed, recently, in February 2011, when faced with possible Hezbollah action, the LAF took the uncharacteristic step of presenting a counterplan, defending sectarian lines and government buildings. 165 This is a step in the right direction. Conscription was terminated after Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This has removed a third party national arbiter, and has returned Lebanon to the state of anarchy it was in before. No single sectarian actor has control over the LAF, or a monopoly on violence. This makes it useless in terms of political gain to support the Army. 166 Western military support, restarted after the departure of the Syrians in 2005, is currently in limbo following the formation of a cabinet which is more pro-Syria and Iran than pro-Western, and includes many Hezbollah members. 167 The absence of a larger defence strategy and a monopoly on violence, in combination with the sectarian nature of the state, make it unlikely that civil-military relations will change much in the short term. There is concordance amongst all three actors that the status quo works. In the media one will often hear cries for sovereignty, but the Lebanese public is unwilling to pay the costs associated with this, and the politicians are wary of relinquishing power and funds in order to strengthen a, perceived rivalling, state institution. This expresses itself in a lack of oversight and a lack of allocation of funds. Thus despite being ruled on paper by the politicians, the Army is likely to continue pursuing its independent acquisition policy through donations, ruled mostly by the fancy of its military commander, rather than the strategic interest of Lebanon. Recently, the current COF extended enthusiasm for the delivery of 10 MiGs donated by the Russians, regardless of the fact that by the time such vessels had taken off, they would have left Lebanese airspace.168

164 165

Interview Giles Taylor, interview Elias Hanna Interview Giles Taylor 166 Nerguizan (2010) 10 167 Kahwaji (2011) 168 Interview European Defence Attache

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Conclusion
There is concordance among all three actors concerning the necessity of the LAFs internal role, due to the lack of legitimacy of the Internal Security Forces (ISF). The internal unity to effectively execute this role is present in the officers corps, instilled through the military academy and through its representative composition. But the sectarian quota also hampers meritocracy and military performance. The unity conscription was supposed to install in the conscripts was less of a success. This is due to the difficulty of defining Lebanese identity, and that the creation of such an identity in the Army was an isolated process. There was no national re-integration programme, nor is citizenship installed through the education system. The LAF has, however, been successful at projecting an image of unity through its military style. The Army enjoy a high degree of trust and popular support, especially compared to other state institutions. Contrary to expectations, the introduction of conscription did not contribute to this; the policy was unpopular, led to a negative perception of the Army among recruits and failed to eradicate the idea of the Army being sectarian. The reason for the LAFs popularity is its perceived neutrality. This can be attributed to the professionalism of the officer corps, which acts to preserve Lebanons vital interests, or to the CAFs presidential ambitions. However, the Armys neutrality also betrays its inherent weakness in terms of cohesion. This neutrality bestows the legitimacy necessary to carry out several internal operations. Nevertheless, the successes of the LAF to date are confined to non-military intervention, or military offensives against groups which are considered supra-sectarian targets such as Islamist extremists and Palestinians. Any military confrontation which would see LAF fighting Lebanese factions is avoided. Conscription, as well as its abolishment, has failed to overcome this internal lack of cohesion, as can be discerned from the non-action by the LAF in 2005 and 2008. This neutrality also prohibits the LAF from fulfilling its external role. This situation is also aided by the political decision making process; the sectarian political actors are wary of allocating resources to a military which is non-aligned, and consequently will not bring any tangible political gain, as well as dreading the power such a strengthened institution could have.

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These circumstances have led to a tacit acceptance of a duopoly of violence, with Hezbollah in charge of defending Lebanons borders against Israel. All three actors are aware of the danger of challenging the status quo, and thus have, uneasily, embraced it. The strength of the Israeli Defence Forces in relation to the LAF means that all are painfully aware in terms of conventional force, the LAF is no match. The swelling of the LAFs forces through conscription has no impact on this imbalance of military power. This imbalance allows the absence of a monopoly on violence to exist, frustrating any attempts at creating a national defence strategy. In civil-military relations most are concerned with prohibiting military intervention. The lack of cohesion in the Army prohibits intervention beyond inaction and verbal interference; any more pronounced military action could lead to a sectarian clash which military, neither politics nor citizenry are sure it would survive. Rather Lebanon is in the unique situation that, if its politicians would ever reach consensus on the need for domestic or external military action, the LAF would be unable to provide it.

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Websites:

Mission of the LAF http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/Mission.asp Accessed 10 June, 2011 First Flag Service Center http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/CollegesMilitaryServiceMain.asp
Accessed 10 June, 2010 New conditions for admission http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/CollegesMilitarySchoolMain.asp#condition1 Accessed 10 June 2011

Documents: The Taef Accords (1989) available at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/PublicationDetail?lng=en&id=111825 New Defence Law (1978). The text of the NDL was published by Al-Safir, December 21, 22, 1978 and translated in Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS), no. 72769, February 6, 1979, pp. 58-90. The Lebanese Constitution (1926) available at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/PublicationDetail?lng=en&id=111825

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Interviews Hilal Khashan, Professor Political Science at American University Beirut Beirut, 28 July 2011 Anonymous European Defence Attach to Lebanon Beirut, 29 July 2011 Anonymous former LAF General Beirut, 2 August 2011 Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Taylor, British Defence Attach to Lebanon Beirut, 3 August 2011 Former LAF General Elias Hanna Beirut, 4 August 2011 Jeremy Chivers, Stabilisation Advisor British Embassy, Lebanon Beirut, 15 August 2011

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