From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon Author(s): Julie Peteet Source: Middle East Report, No.

200, Minorities in the Middle East: Power and the Politics of Difference (Jul. - Sep., 1996), pp. 27-30 Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013265 . Accessed: 23/09/2011 11:29
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From

Refugees

to

Minority

Palestinians Julie Peteet

in

Post-War

Lebanon

By seeking

to define themselves

as a minority, Palestinians

are attempting

both to accommodate

their isolation

from the larger Palestinian

context and protest their powerlessness

and restricted daily lives in the local Lebanese desperate situation.

context. Rather than a celebration

of difference, this is a strategy for survival in an otherwise

s Lebanon's elite strategizes post-war reconstruction and national reconciliation, the future of the Pales? tinian community in the country hinges on the outcome of the Arab-Israeli peace talks, particularly the multilat? eral talks on refugees.1 Popular sentiment holds that "peace" will not produce the conditions for return or com? pensation. In the meantime, Palestinians living in camps in Lebanon face insurmountable odds, including poverty, unemployment and political disenfranchisement. Palestinian identity is increasingly fragmented and highly nuanced around differences in geography, experi? ence and legal status. Abandoned by the peace process, Palestinians in Lebanon are rethinking their place in both the Lebanese and Palestinian national orders. In Leba? non, the Palestinian community is contending with its by seeking to redefine itself as a legal marginalization The process is simultaneously one of accommo? minority. dation in seeking a minority status for a distinctly Palestinian presence in Lebanon and a form of resistance against further displacement to other countries and in? from Lebanese tensified exclusion public life. Thus minority status emerges not from isolation but from the very specificity of interaction with the broader economic, social and political environment. In this context, marginalization takes a number of forms and is often linked to exclusion and violence. There is the spatial dimension: confinement to well-demarcated, bounded and surveilled Institutional camps. includes exclusion from public institu? marginalization tions of social life and from the legal rights and protections the state affords its citizens. Economic marginalization is accomplished by extremely restrictive options for em? ployment and the near-total absence of social welfare provisions, the latter problem compounded by cuts in UNRWA resources and services. There is also an experi? ential dimension marked by negativeness, fear and apprehension and a generalized awareness of self and com? munity as the object of scorn and hostility. Finally, there is a discursive dimension in which the generic Palestin-

ian is cast as trouble-maker and the cause of Lebanon's post-war woes. What is the relationship between minority status and Because no national census has been marginalization? conducted in Lebanon since 1932, officially recognized population categories and estimates are non-existent. Be? ing a minority is a contingent rather than a stable status, constituted by a setting apart and defining of self and oth? community vis-a-vis an other. Initially, Palestinian erness in Lebanon was a national phenomenon related to its destruction as "home." The refu? place of origin?and did not include the usual minority gee experience attributes of difference in language, religion and culture. Palestinian marginality is contingent, to some extent, on the concept of a Lebanese nation and society, however problematic, that excludes them. In the post-civil war period, a Palestinian presence has lent Lebanese national identity some cohesion. With few exceptions, there is a Lebanese political consensus on the need to monitor Palestinians in the short-term, and a re? fusal to grant them permanent right to settle in the country. Religious, or sectarian, differences in Lebanon complicate these assertions, which are premised on the notion of national difference. Palestinian otherness is jux? not to a homogenous, taposed singular category of Lebanese, but to a shifting set of sectarian groups and alliances, each with particular interests and fears. The Palestinian presence, perceived as a problem, can and does serve as a common denominator in unifying often dispar? ate elements of the Lebanese polity. By seeking to define themselves as a minority, Palestin? ians are attempting both to accommodate their isolation from the larger Palestinian context and protest their pow? erlessness and restricted daily lives in the local Lebanese context. While they do have rights of residence as foreign refugees, they are seeking additional civil rights, a sort of well-defined minority position, that should be forthcoming according to international law, such as the right to employ? ment, social security, access to health services and education. Rather than a celebration of difference, this is a Julie Peteet is associateprofessor anthropology the University at of of KY in and the Palestinian strategy for survival in an otherwise desperate situation. Louisville, and author Gender Crisis:Women of Resistance Movement (Columbia Press,1991). University Middle East Report ? July-September 1996

27

Refugees/Revolutionaries/Refugees Since their arrival in Lebanon nearly 50 years ago, Pales? tinians have taken up a succession of publicly circulated collective identities. The transformation from refugees to revolutionaries and now to a minority illustrates their per? ceptions of self and community within a continually shifting in of power in Lebanon and elsewhere spectrum the region. In the pre-1968 era, when Palestinians were politically unorganized and highly dependent on the United Nations refugee apparatus, the term "refugee" often bore the weight of an insult and humiliation. One man I spoke with re? called with amusement his physical education classes at UNRWA schools in the 1950s and early 1960s. The chil? dren exercised to the chant of A-W-D-A (return) and camp residents often insisted on calling each other "returners" rather than refugees. In 1969, an agreement between the Lebanese authori? ties and the PLO, known as the Cairo Accords, redefined the regulations governing refugees in Lebanon. The Cairo Accords gave Palestinians the right to employment, to form local committees in the camps and to engage in armed struggle, among other things. Lebanon was transformed for them from a refuge into a site of revolt against displacement. Times have changed. "Refugee" status has now become an asset in the battle to survive. Palestinians' status as refugees is an international matter by definition and has clear legal implications. Being refugees assures them, at minimum, to residency rights and to scarce UNRWA medi? cal and education resources, however paltry. The term "refugee" doesn't arouse the negative reaction it once did, but even during the height of resistance Palestinians wouldn't give up the legal status of "refugee" because it legitimized their right of return to Palestine. Discourses and categories of identity are not simply fluid; they can be re-configured in new contexts for quite different purposes. Marginalization After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO's evacu? ation from Beirut, and the PLO-Amal wars of the late 1980s, the political and practical geography of the camps changed dramatically. To the Lebanese, the camps have become spaces to contain Palestinians until the peace talks produce some final resolution. Rumors abound that they are soon to be demolished and the refugees transferred to other Arab states (Iraq or Syria) or to more remote parts of Lebanon. Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a man? ner reminiscent of turn-of-the-century American hyperbole that immigrants carried tuberculosis, and more recent fears of immigrants as carriers of the AIDS virus. Pathology de? mands quarantine: segregating Palestinians would facilitate the "normalization" of Lebanon in the post-war era with national health restored through the isolation of an infec? tious presence.

There are several problems in distinguishing Palestin? ians from Lebanese and confining them to homogeneous enclaves. Palestinian refugees who came to Lebanon in 1948 share language and culture with their Lebanese hosts. The two communities have a long history of inter-marriage and economic trade. That most Palestinians are Sunni Muslims has been a thorny issue for Lebanon's Christians, who have long feared a shift in sectarian demography. Spatial con? tainment was an attempt to produce and sharpen communal distinctions. However, urban camps, such as Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh in Beirut and Ain al-Hilwah in Saida, had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas. During the war and the current reconstruction process, once fairly in? distinct borders once again have become strikingly demarcated. In fixing a relationship between nationality and place, Lebanese authorities and militias have crafted and imposed boundaries where a fluidity of space and so? cial relations once prevailed. Refugees describe their lives in terms of abnormality. Narratives of the homeland are less focused on nostalgia and more on an image of well-being and security. Aside from shortages of shelter, food, safety and access to medi? cal care and education, there are constant doubts about the security of residence. The nearly 50-year period of ex? ile has been marked by continual displacement. The sense of crisis is commonly expressed through the notion of era? sure. Not only were Palestinians out of landscaped Palestine, but the erasure continues in exile. A Palestinian " lawyer, echoing popular sentiment, has written that there are those who believe that the group known as Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will stop existing within a few years."2 Recasting Palestinian Identity

How has Palestinian identity been legally recast over time and especially in the post-civil war era? Contrary to inter? national law governing the treatment of refugees, the state has implemented laws to restrict Palestinians in a variety of ways. Since 1962, legislation placed Palestinians on par with foreigners so that employment required a work per? mit. Palestinians circumvented this requirement for nearly two decades because demands for labor made enforcement nearly non-existent, and later, there was little interest in aggravating a now militant and empowered Palestinian community. Since 1982, however, these laws have been enforced. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs issued a decision on December 18,1982, setting out the areas of employment? to foreigners. ranging from banking to barbering?closed The Ministry also issued a circular detailing the areas of work open to foreigners with work permits. These include construction and its ancillary tasks (except on electrical and sanitation, agriculture, tanning and installations) leather works, excavation, textile and carpet works, smeltering, domestic labor, nursing, and automotive re? to pair and cleaning.3 This range of options available is limited to the most menial and low-paid Palestinians

28

Middle East Report ? July-September 1996

sectors. Furthermore, Syrian or non-Ar ab labor, cheaper and more transient, is preferred, which has exacerbated problems of unemployment and poverty. Economic hard? by a decline in ship has been further compounded remittances after the Gulf War and the PLO's inability to pay indemnities to families of martyrs. Rebuilding in the camps has been restricted and legally regulated. Surveillance continues to intimidate Palestin? ians, making them extremely cautious in their movements outside the camps' perimeters. Outside those boundaries, fear of harassment, insult and physical violence plague Pal? estinians. The right to organize politically and culturally has also been denied. Travel restrictions further hinder Palestinian daily life and livelihood. Those traveling abroad on Palestinian travel documents have not always been guaranteed re-entry. In 1995, Libya expelled 30,000 Palestinian workers, 10-15,000 of whom were from Lebanon. On September 22,1995, the Lebanese Interior Ministry issued a decree requiring en? try visas for those holding Palestinian laissez-passer documents.4 Palestinians holding Lebanese travel docu? ments were refused visas, forcing them into a nightmarish shuttle from place to unwelcoming place. The new, post-civil war focus on obtaining civil rights as a minority is not a call for complete integration; rather, it seeks to mitigate the debilitating marginalization and destitution and to alleviate many daily problems. One former leader explained the desire for civil rights: It touches directlyon everyone'sdaily life.You cannot imagine what it is like. A Palestinian cannot work!For the example,ifhe graduates from AmericanUniversity ofBeirut medical school,he is forbidden workor open to a clinic,while a Lebanese graduate can finda post in a hospital or open a clinic.If he is educated and wants to which means work,he will have to leave the country, that familyrelations are strained. This is a huge chal? of lenge to the continuity ordinarylife. With the reestablishment of government sovereignty in Lebanon (except forthe Israeli-occupied south), the remain? 10 factions ing Palestinian leadership (encompassing to Arafat and the peace plan) put forth a plan in opposed 1992 calling for civil rights. A Palestinian involved in the plan described the situation: The Lebanese authoritiesagreed to forma ministerial delegationto talk withthe Palestinians about civilrights and to conducta studyon theirsituation.It was a seri? ous move because the government assigned two ministersto the delegation,one Christianand one Mus? lim. They received a unified delegation?there was a representativefromeveryPalestinian factionin Leba? non. It was a rare moment of Palestinian unity in Lebanon. They presented one unifiedmemo explicitly calling for civil rights. The Lebanese took the memo and promisedto answer in 15 days... days and now years have passed. In April 1994, the Palestinian organizations in Leba? non presented another memorandum to Prime Minister

Rafiq al-Hariri, asking for such civil rights as the right to employment, to reconstruct the camps and to open Pales? tinian cultural and humanitarian organizations. Again, there has been no response. The popular civil rights option is desirable since Pales? tinians are wary of diluting their national identity or sacrificing the principle of the right of return. What they want is to live in security and pursue a livelihood. Civil rights and secure permanent residency would go a long way to? wards solving this problem. Does this demand for civil rights without citizenship sig? nal a shift in Palestinian thinking toward the pragmatics of a minority position? Palestinians cannot understand or accept that they are classified as 'Yoreigners" along with Sri Lankans, Thais, Filipinos, Kurds and Syrians, who together constitute Lebanon's imported working class. They may be re-thinking themselves and their community as a minority whose citi? zenship and nationality will not coincide. The question of permanent Palestinian settlement in Lebanon is the subject of contentious debate among Leba? nese, ranging from statements calling for their wholesale removal to more measured and accommodating suggestions that they be granted civil rights and a more secure form of residency. Although the Palestinian community is not ask? ing for citizenship, those who can acquire it do so, which causes much resentment in the Palestinian community be? cause a legal fracture of the group can have negative consequences for the majority. In the past several years, around 60,000 Palestinians have been naturalized in Lebanon. In the first round in 1994, most were Shi'a from border villages who had Palestinian refugee status; the rest were Sunnis who, for reasons not made public, were naturalized in 1995, perhaps to balance out the Shi'a naturalization. Maronite protest ensured that the few remaining Palestinian Christians without Lebanese citizenship were then naturalized. Demographic and sectarian factors were at play here. The bulk of the refugees in the south are Sunni Muslims. Out? side of Saida, few Lebanese in the south are Sunnis. Rumor had it that the Lebanese Sunni leadership might have been attempting to build a Sunni demographic and voting bloc in the south. The gradual and quiet way it is being done may be intended to prevent a noisy and potentially explosive Lebanese reaction to Palestinian naturalization, including its sectarian implications. Palestinians who have acquired citizenship face resent? ment from those who have not. Naturalization is publicly cast as a betrayal of sorts. Yet, if offered the option, most Palestinians would not reject it for the simple reason that it would alleviate many of their problems. They would be em? ployable and their children would have some security in the future. Palestinian leaders publicly oppose the idea of natu? ralization some have quietly accepted it), (although presenting it as a threat to Palestinian national identity and a negation of their right of return.5 The issue is dis? cussed in a thoughtful and provocative way by ordinary people. In the summer of 1994,1 asked Sarnia, a resident of

Middle East Report ? July-September 1996

29

Shatila camp, if she would take Lebanese citizenship if it were offered. She paused for a few seconds to ponder and then said in a very precise way, her words carefully chosen: "If it were offered, I would take it, but only if I didn't have to give up being a Palestinian and the future possibility of Pal? estinian citizenship." She was making a clear distinction between nationality and citizenship. Even if there was a Palestinian state, many Palestinians who are not from the West Bank or Gaza Strip would not go: "It's not our land. We want our land." These refugees still insist on a long-term as? piration forconvergence of place, nationality and citizenship. The citizenship issue resonates with the contradictions of Lebanese policy and indicates the dilemmas they will face in the eventual peace negotiations. The US and Israel may force Lebanon to naturalize the refugees as part of a peace settlement that would then reward Lebanon with reconstruc? tion funds and a lifting of the US travel ban. Palestinians desire a host country that is cosmopolitan and open to foreigners?the idyllic reminiscence of pre-war Leba? non. They envision a radically different notion of spatiality where difference is related to place of origin rather than to forms oflegality relegating them to the margins, literally and figuratively. Their exacerbated marginalization stems from the re-emergent semblance ofsovereign Lebanese state power. Areconstructive ethos promoting "Lebanon forthe Lebanese" coexists with the continued entrenchment of sectarian poli? tics and identities. For now, aspirations fora legally constituted minority status may be the only possible vision allowing for the retention of a Palestinian identity in Lebanon and a ? continued residency.

Endnotes 1The inLebanon expelledleft homes northern Palestinian were or their in Palestine refugees the war have denied right return. number Arab-Israeliand been the to The of dialing 1948-49 inLebanon Palestinians issubjectdispute. current to The of UNRWAfigure registered 346,000 iscontested such Lebanese refugees by figures as 189,000 by proposeda leading newspaper, Al-Safir. 2 Souheil "The of Palestinian Status the inLebanon," in in Alnatour, Legal Refugees Refugees the Middle Nordic Seminar, March 1993 NGO East, Oslo, 26-27, (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, p.41. 1993), 3/6id.,p.44. 4 For text the the of decree JournalPalestine see Studies (1996), 145-46. 25/2 of pp. 5 See"The inLebanon: Interview Salah Palestinians with Salah, The August 29,1994," Beirut Review(Fall 8 1994), 161-62. pp. Continued from Makdisi, page 26. 12Farid The Pact National Identities:Making Politicsthe The and el-Khazen, Communal of of 1943 National Papers Lebanon 12(Oxford: for on No. Centre Lebanese Pact, Studies, p.5. 1991), amount work been on persistence of "feudalism" in Lebanon. Asignificant of has done the post-1943 in Set forthMichael The (NY: Hudson, Precarious House, the has Republic Random 1968), topic continued togenerate interestscholars as Samir such Lebanon's Predicament (NY: Khalaf, by Columbia Over The (NY: Press, and Petran, Struggle Lebanon Monthly University 1987) Tabitha in Review 1987). most contribution isMichael tothis Gilsenan's of Press, The recent studypower northern Lords the Marches: Violence Narrative and inan Lebanon, of Lebanes twentieth-century Arab I.B. (London: Tauris, 1996). Society 13 has Ahmed anexcellent on subject creation manipulation book the of the and Beydoun written of inmodern historical narratives LeLiban, histoire une identite dans Lebanon, disputee: et temps libanese delTJniversite 1984). (Beirut: Libanaise, I'historographie contemporaine Publications 14Gilsenen's of Lebanese Lords the Marches: inan Violence Narrative Arab and Society cit., op. exhibitscontours the of sectarianism and local who vividly patronage by landlords subvert politics state institutionsatthe time for and appointed while same run office are in ministers Lebanese the Seealso The over government. Petran Struggle Lebanon,cit., 35-37. op. pp. 15Hashim has Sarkis discussed"territorialization" during war pointing the of identities the by out that violence the new to redefine that after provided "spatial opportunities" identitiesemerged and of onset physical of destruction. becausethe SeeHasim "Territorial Architecture Claims: Sarkis, Attitudes the and Post-War Toward Built inSamir and S. Environment," Khalaf Philip Khoury Beirut: Design Post-War and Reconstruction E.J. (Leiden: Brill, (eds.), Recovering Urban 1993), pp.100-27. 16"Lebanese National for UNSummitSocial on March Report the Development," Copenhagen, 1995. in 17QuotedTime International, 15,1996. January

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