•

HAVE DOUGHNUT-TACTICAL VOLUME II (U) FTD-CR-20-l3-69-INT, VOL II DIA TASK NO. T65-20-2 1 August 1969

This report is classified because it contains intelligence information collected on a foreign aircraft and presents tactical performance comparisons of the foreign aircraft to USAF and USN aircraft.

WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANlNG OF THE ESPIONAGE .LAWS , TITLE 18 U.S. C. SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. This is a Department of Defense Foreign Materiel Report prepared by the Foreign Technology Di'Vision, Air Force Systems Command, with contributions from TAC, .ADC and the NaVY,forthe Defense Intelligence Agency.

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

(This page is unclassified)

GROUP.1 E.. c1ud.d frOlTlavtomatle dowl'I;radlnp andd.ela .. l.fleatlon.

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MIG-21-Fl3 .THE HAVE DOUGHNUT AIRCRA}iWI'

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ABSTRACT S!NFD) This report presents the results ofataotioal evaluation ofa Soviet FISHBED E (MIG-2l'-l3) aioraft performed under the management of .the Foreign TeohnologyDivision, Wright PattersonAFB, Ohio. The evaluation oonsisted of oomparat1veand tactical flights against both USN and USAF first·line fighter aircraft. Results of theperformance and flight test evaluation, system and subsystem charaoteristios, design features and technologioal information acquired from the exploitation are presented in FTD Document CR-2O-13-69 INT Volume I Teohnioal. :Basic agreement between published estimates and the exploitation results was round and the ourrent praotioed taotioal maneuvers against the lI'ISRBEDE were oonfirmedand revalidated.

69TDA-7363

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SUMMARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No.

• • • • • • • • • • •• • • • •• • • •• • • • • • • • v
xi

•• ••• •• •• ••• • • • • •• • ••• • •• • • •• •

SUPPLEMENTS 1 - 3 1. TACTICAL AIR COMMA.ND EVALUATION Glossary • • • • • • • • • • • •• Introduotion • • • • • • • • • • •• 3..-1 to 1-132

• • • • • • • • • • • 1-1 to 1-2 ••• •

•• 1-3 1-3 1-3

• • • • • ••• •••••••• •• •• Desoription of Test Item • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Objeotives. • • • •••• ••• • ••• • Soope of the Test • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

. ... . .

••

•• ••

• • 1-3 to 1-7

Defioienoies and Limitations.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-7 to 1-8
1-16 to 1-19

Conolusions

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-8 to 1-16 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

Beoommendations

Test Environment and Prooedures Test Results and Disoussion Annex A Annex B TactioalMission

• • • • • • • • • • • • 1-19 to 1-24

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-24 to 1-47 Summaries • • • • • • • • 1-48

tCl

1-110

~,:aintenanoeSummaries • • • • • • • • • • • 1-111 to 1-122 Test Airoraft • • • • • • • • • • • 1-112 to 1-113 F-4D (Airoraft #1) F-4D (Airoraft~) F-I05D F-105F
•

Attaohment 1 Attachment 2 Attaohment 3 Attaohment 4 Attachment 5 Annex C Annex D

• • • • • • • • 1-114 • • • • • • • • 1-115 to 1-117

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-118 to 1-119

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-120 to 1-122 • • • • • • • 1-123 to 1-126 1-127 to 1-132

,Cockpit EvaluationSummaries 71'eapon~ffects

• • • • • • • • • • • • ••

2.

U.s. NAVY EVALUATI01i •• References

•

• • • ••

• • • • • • • • • • • 2-1 to 2-131

••

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2--2 to 2--4
•
~

Previously Known Data

....

'.-.-.
vii

• • • • • • • • • • • • 2-4 to 2--5 69TDli.7363

TA~LE OF CONTENTS (Cont) Acronyms and Abbreviations Desoription of Material Pur?ose of the Test Conduct of the Test Page ~TQ. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-6 to 2-9 ••••••• ••• • •••••• 2-10 to 2-17 2-18

• • • • • • • • • • • • • ••••••
•

•••••••••••

· . .'. . . • 2-18 to 2-20

• • • • 2-4f1 to 2-60

Results and Df scuss i.on • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-20 Operational Applications Conolusions •• • • • • • • • • • ••

• •• ••

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-61 to 2-62

Recommendations Basic Conolusions

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-63 to 2-64
• • • ••
•

• • • • • • • • • • • •••

2-65

Daily Maintenance and Projeot Flight Summary. Mission Summaries

• • • • • • 2-66 to 2-73

•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-74 to 2-1')1
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 3-1 to 3-24 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3-1

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND EVALUATION. In troduo tion • • • •• Objeotives Results

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3-1

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3-2 to 3-24

LIST OF ILLU$TRATIONS Figure

1-1

FISHBED E

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-5

1-2 1-3

Seat Flaps • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-9 Cockpit Area •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-9

~.
viii

69TDA-7363

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONSCont) ( Figur~ 1-4 1-5 tITG-21 Pilot Ejection Positioning • •• •••• Page No.

••

• • • • • • • • • 1-44

Sequence

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-45
• • 1-129 1-130

1-6
1-7

Weapon Effects Weapon Effects Weapon Effeots Weapon Effects

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
• • •••• ••• •••••• •• •

• • •••

1-8
1-9 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-131 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-132 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••••

Position •• 2-10 • 2-22 Seating

FISEBEDE Plan Form rrrC~21 Pilot

• •••••••• •••
•••

Instroament Panel Throttle ~jection Protective 0uadrant Sequence

• •• ••• •• •••••

• • ••• • ••••• ••

• • • 2-24 • •• 2-2_6 • 2-27

• • •• •• • •

2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 2-11 2-12 2-13 2-14 2-15 2-16 2-17

• •• • ••

•••••• •••

•••••

Armor ••

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-2A

Smoke Emission MIG-21 Vn Diagram

•••••••••• ••••• ••• •

••

• • • • • 2-30 • 2-30

• • •• •

••

••

••

• •• ••

MIG-21 Vulnerability

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-33
• • • • •••••••• ••

MIG-21 and F-4 in Flight ~crG-21 and F-4 Vn Diagram

· . • • 2-33
2-39

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-34

1"-4 Compressor Modulation

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

1UG-21 and F-4 Compressor Modulations F-8 Target

• • • • • • • • • • • 2-39 • • • • • • 2-40

Blip and MIG-21 Compressor Modulation

1.1IG-21Comnressor ~:!odulation - Exnended •••••••••• Veloci tyDisplay and Real 1..'IG-21· elocity Target V !-~G-21 and F-8 in Fli.ght 1aG-21 and F-.8 Vn Diagram

• • • • • 2--40

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2--41

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-43

69?DA-7363

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Tn.ble

1-1 1-2

(Cont)
Page IrQ...

World Wide FISHBED AOB • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-4 FISHBED E General Characteristics Project MissinnSummary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-6 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1-25 to 1-30

1-3
2-1 2-2

Summary of Sohedu1ed and Cancelled Flights • • • • • • • • • • 2-19 Detection Ranges • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2-36

69TDA-7363

(S/D))) The purpose ot this report is to present the results of a taotioal evaluation ofaFISRBED E (MIG-21¥-13) airoraft. The report is intended tOI (1) Present to Commanders and oombat members an evaluation of the effeotiveness of existing tactioal maneuvers by USAF and USN oombat airoraft and assooiated weapons systems against the MIG-21, (2) To exploit the tactical capabilities of the If.rQ-21in an air-to-air environment, as necessary and limitations

(3) To optimize existing tactic.s and develop new taotios to deteat the MIG-21, and operational

(4) To evaluate the design, performance charaoteristics ot the MIG-21. BACKGROUND

(S/NFD) The missionottheFore.ign Technology Division inoludes the acquisition and evaluation otforeign materiel to provide information ofscient1fio and teohnioal 'Value to ournat1onalintell1gence oommunity 1.8 well.as Air Force and Navy.researohand development organizations, thus enabling our oombat orews to best perform their assigned missions. This report oonoerns a project to obtain such information designated ProjeotRave Doughnut. (S/NFD) The exploitation of the MIG-2lairoratt was assigned.a high priority sinoe it has been widely exported and deployed to most nations within theoommunist sphere ofinfluenoe and is in combat. in SEA. (S/NFl') Comprehensive data on the YIG-21 aircraft is contained in System, ST-CS-09~27-69, dated 23 Sep1969,classified Seoret and Rave Doughnut Volume I - Teohnic~ FTD-CR-2~13-69 INT, olassified Secret Bo Foreign Dissemination. TheBaveDoughnutprojeot was initiated to provide substantiating and supplement .. information l to that published in th.FTD/DIA~tudy as well as to validate. current tactical maneuvers used by USAF and USN oombat aircrews againstthe.MIG-21 aircraft.
(U) Fishbed Weapon

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SUPPLEMENT 1

PROJECT HAVE DOUGHNUT REPORT OFT1CTICAL EVALUATION OF PROJECT AlRCRArT

ASDETElWINEDBY THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

(Thi

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69TDA-7363

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GLOSSARY 1. Adverse Yawl The tendenoy of an airoraft to yaw away from the applied aileron. Induoed by rolling motion and ailerondefleotion, usually greatest at high angle of attack and full aileron defleotion. 2. ~imum Rate Turn: That turn at whioh the maximum number of degrees per seoond is aohieved.

3. Maneuverability,

The ability toohange of thevelooity. veotor.

direotion and/or magnitud~

4. 1¥qimum Performance! airoraft limitations.

Th~ best

possible performanoe without exoeeding

5. Energy Maneuverability; A oonoept used to determine total inflight performanoe by measuring instantaneous and sustained maneuverability of an airoraft through its envelope.
6. Maneuvering Energy! energy possessed. The ability to perform maneuvers as a.result of

••

7. Energy Level (Es), Total energy state possessed for a given oombination
of altitude and airspeed (Maoh)•

8. Energy Rate (Pi), A measure of the ability to gain or lose energy

in terms of altitude and airspeed or oombinations thereof. 9. V-N DiaS!ram! A plot of load faotor versus velooity used to provide a measure of instantaneous maneuverability. 10. Lethal Envelope: aircraft. The vulnerable envelope emanating frolI) the target

11. Defensive Turn: The basio defensive maneuver designed to prevent an attaoker from aohieving a launohor firing position. 12. Hard Turn (Single DireotionTqrn), A planned defensive turn in whioh the ihtensi tyof the turn is governed by the angle-off, range and olosure of theattaokingairoraft. 13. Break: A maximumperformanoe defensive turn into the attaoker to instantly destroy an attaoker's traoking solution. 14. TCA - Angle-Off (Aspeot Angle ), The angle between the defender's line of flight and the attaoker's line of sight measured in degrees (Traok Crossing Angle).

15. Separation' Distanoe between an attaoker and defender. lateral or longi~~dinal •

1-1

Can be either

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16. Soissors, A defensive maneuver in whioh a series of turn reversals are exeouted in an attempt to aohieve the offensive after an overshoot by the attaoker. 17. Ji~ing MAneUver, A series of rapid turn reversals or abrupt ohanges of rol~pitoh angle at random intervals, to prevent an attacker from aohieving a traoking solution. Usually employed with little load faotor while gaining lateral separation. 18. Diving Spiral. A near vertioal aooelerating dive using Gand roll rate to destroy an attacker's tracking solution and gain lateral separation. 19. High Speed Yo-Yo, An offensive maneuver performed to maintain nose-tail separation and prevent the possibility of beooming engaged in a SCissors maneuver. 20. Lufbery, A oiroular tail chase.

21. Low Speed Yo-YO! A maneuver employed to faoilitate olosure and at the same time allow an attaoker to remain inside an opponent's turn radius. 22. Closure (Relatiye VeloOitY)! The time rate of ohange of distanoe along the line of sight between airoraft. 23. Element. The basio fighting unit (two airoraft).

24. Fluid Element. 25.

26.

The seoond or supporting element in fluid tour formation, flying in a high or low element position.

,eM,

Air oombat maneuvers.

DCM, Defensive oombat maneuvering.

27. Maximum Performlnoe MAneuyering Envelope, A maneuvering region for the wingman in whioh optimum visual ooverage and mutual support may be aohieved in maximum performanoe maneuvers. 28. Defensiye Split! A oontrolled separation of a defensive element in different planes used in an attempt to for~e the attaokers to oommit themselves to one of the defenders.

39. In-Trail!
30.
In-Train
I

Individual airoraft, one behind the other. Elements or flights, one behind the other.

1-2

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••

1.

INTRODUCTION

(S/NFD)Taotioal Air Command, in joint participation with United States Navy and other government agencies, conduotedananalysis of the MIG-21~13 (FISHBED E) day fighter weapons system. The FISHBED is deployed widely throughout the world (Table 1-1) and represents a formidable threat to US taotical foroes. TAC pilots evaluated FISHBED E as a total weapons system in a taotioal environment and oompared it, operationlly, with seleoted USAF aircraft. 2. DESCRIPTION OF TEST ITEM;

A. (S) The MIG-2lF'-13, designated .FISHBED E, is a single-plaoe, olear airmass, high altitude, pointinteroeptor, weapons system. The airoraft is oapable of performing a seoondary role of ground attaok and incorporatesair-to-ground armament systems. Initial mG-2l prototype design was started in 1952 and design modifioation for the FISHBED E was initiated in 1959. This variant provided improved stability. (See Fig 1-1) A resume 'of general performanoe oharaoteristios is shown in Table 1-2.

B. (S) The mG-2l is 'being used. in the Southeast .Asia.environment primarily as a medium and low altitude interoeptDrand day fighter. United States strike foro.e fighter bombers are interoepted . by the MIG-2lwhich is initially GCI veetored into the rear hemi~phere for a highspeed, single-pass attack. Prolonged engagements have oocurred, foroing the MIG-2l to operate as a day fighter at medium and row a1 titudes. 0nJ.y limited use has been made of the KIG-2lin the high altitude, point interoept role, due to tactics of 1SAFaircraft. C. (U) Detailed description of the FISRBEDE weapons system is available in ST':'CS-09 ...27-69 technical study, and other FTD publications. 3. OBJECTIVES

(S/NFD) To determine the taotical oapabilityof the complete FISHBED E (MIG-21F-13) weapons system. The airoraft will be evaluated in a taotioal environment as a day fighter, clear air mass interceptor, and as anair-to-groundattaok aircraft. Comparative operational analysis withseleotedUS operational airoraft will validate or formulate optimum US air oomba.t maneuveringtechniquee and will define the taotio.al capabilities, limitations, and defioiencies of the FISHBEDE.

4.

SCOPE OF THE TEST (S/NFD) The soope of this test inoluded, but was not limited tOI

A. Defining the offensive and defensive taotioal oapability of the FISHBED E total weapons system in an air-to-air environment. Comparative taotioal analysis will be aooomplished with the 1ITG-2l and the following airoraft.

1-3

\-

TABLE 1-1 WORLI WIDE FISHEED AOB

(S-Gp-l)

•
D/F 14 76 141 30 16 TOTAL 36 134

NATIONAL AIR FORCES :Bulgaria Czechoslovakia E Germany Hungary Poland Rumania Yugoslavia Russia Communist China North Korea North Vietnam Indonesia Cuba Syria Iraq India United Arab Republic Afganistan

CIE 22 42 76 60 43 42 36 33
1

MODEL

68

217 90
111

717

10 20

52

10

13

717

56

17
33
1

11 6

46 22 6

27 13
36
~

17
60

11

64

72

.sa,
1793

24 64 108

417

1162

214

Soviet Air Forces in European Communist Countries E Germany Hungary Poland 284

....m.
506 - WORLD WIDE

111

284 111 ill

506

TOTAL FISHBED

2299

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Fig 1-1 FISHBED E
(S-Gp-3)

TABLE

1-2

FISHEED EGElrERAL CHARACTERISTICS

(S-Gp-l)

Configuration: .lliJ!s : i on

Clipped delta wing planform with swept tail surfaces •

Primary - Clear air mass, high altitude point interceptor Seoondary - Ground attack and tactical reconnaissance Propulsion: One type, R-37Faxia1f1ow turbojet with afterbu:rner ·thrust 12,650 pounds (max afterburner), 8,640 pounds (maximum dry) Armame;ni: Gun - One 30mm cannon with 60 :roundcapaoity Uissiles - Two ATOLLS Rookets - Thirt;y-tw'o57 rom FFARs (two pods ) Bombs - Total bomb load. on all three .stations, D;men§ions: '.VineSpan - 23.47 feet Length - (Without pitot boom) 44.2 feet Height - 13.5 feet Weight - Empty: 11,017 pounds Truceoff: 17,286 pounds !.!a:x::imurn: 18 ,072 pounds Performance: Maximum 1o:B.ch 2.05 Service Ceiling - 57,500 ft. Strike Radius - 370 NoM with external fuel St:r-uc;turalimit§: L 1.1aximumLoad Fa.otor !.!a.ximum Indicated Airspeed r!a.ximumIndioa.ted Maoh T.:s.ximum TIynamic Pressure Fuel Lorul: Internal - 4,600 lb Genterline Tank - 880 Ib w/o External.Stores 8G w/External 6G
kt

3,300 pounds

•
Stores
kt

595*

2.05 2 1200 Ib/ft

1200 'lb/tt2

1.8

595*

~elaw 15000 ft, above 15000ft

640 kt

1-6

(1)F-4C/D/E
(2) F-I05D/F

(3) F-IIIA (4) F-IOOD

(5) F-I04D

(6)

F-5N

(7) RF-IOl (Defensive Only) (8) RF-4C

(9) B-66

(Defensive Only)

'B. Identifying the operational limitations and deficiencies of the FIS~ED Esystemsand subsystems, to include: (1) Aircraft performance

(2) Airoraft stability and oontrol system. (3) Armament, lead oomputing gun sight, and radar ranging (4) Cookpit environment C. Defining optimum air combat maneuvers (ACM) to be employed by US taotioal airoraft in defensive or offensive situations to defeat the PISH'BEDE. D. Validating recommendedACM manuals and publicat±ons •• presoribed in ourrent tactical

E. Determining the air-to-ground attack oapability, deficiencies andlimitatlons of the FISHBED E weapons system. F. Iden~ifying those desirable design features of taotical signifioance inoorporated in theMIG-21F-l3 aircraft.

5. DEFICIENCIES AND LIMITATIONS:

(s/nFD) Tactical limitations and deficiencies of the FISHBED ~ are: A. Poor Forward and Rearward Visibility. Forward visibility through the sight combining glas.s,bulletproof glass slab, and forward winds oreen limits visual target deteotion. F-4 and F-105 ~ype targets normally are aoquired at three to five miles range.

1-7

Rearward visibility is restricted by the seat flap (Figure 1-2 and 1-3), narrow canopy, and aircraft structure to an area outside a 50-degree tail cone. B. Low Q Limit. Below 15,000 feet, the aircraft is limiteq to .98 IMN, or 595 KlAS. Airframe buffet is severe at and above these airspeeds and the aircraft is unuseable as a weapons system. C. Weapons System. The 30rnmcannon 'capacity is limited to 60 rounds, and severe pipper jitter precludes tracking corrections during cannon firing. The optical, lead oomputing, gyroscopio sight precesses exoessively, and target tracking is impossible over 3 Gs. The Range-Only Radar is susoeptible to ohaff and eleotronio jamming. D. High Longitudinal Control Foroes. Above approximately 510 KIAS, below 15,000 feet, the pilot experiences high stabilator control forces and cannot command a high pitch rate. E. Airspeed Bleed-off. At high G loads. the MIG-21 airspeed bleed-off is excessive. This does, however, improve the turn radius. F. Engine Response. Engine acceleration in response to throttle movement is extremely poor. During ground operation,14 seconds are required to inorease the engine speed from idle to.full military power. Formation flight is difficult, requiring oombined use of speed brakes and throttle movement. G. Afterburner Puff. At altitudes above 15,000 feet, the engine of the FISHBED E produoes a white puff of unburned fuel as afterburner power is engaged and disengaged.

H. Directional Stability. Direotional stability is poor. During air-to-ground attacks,if turbulent flight oonditions exist, excessive pilot effort is required for precise target tracking. 6. CONCLUSION§,
(S/NFD) The FISHBED E has an exoellent operational oapability in all flight regimes. However, performanoe is limited below 15,000 feet, due to severe airframe buffeting whioh ooours above .98 IMN, or 595 KlAS. Heavy longitudinal oontrol forces are enoountered at 510 KlASand above, making high pitch rates diffioult or impossible to aohieve. Forward visibility through the oombining glass, bulletproof slab, and windsoreen is severely degraded and the rear seat flap (Figure 1-3), narrow oanopy, and airoraft struoture reduoe rearward visibility. Armament is adequate, however, the 30mm oannon is limited to 60 rounds total oapaoity and oonsiderable pipper jitter ocours during firing. The traoking index drifts off the bottom of thewindsoreen when traoking targets in exoess of. 3 Gs. Airspeed bleed-off during high G turns is exoessive and engine
1-8

Fig l-2 Seat Flap (S-Gp-l)

j:;'1 ~~ -:g i.-: Co:kp.::_t (S-Gp-l)

A-:,ea

response A.

is noor. Comparative Taotioal Ana.Lvsi s

(1) F-4 and ?ISH3ZD E: (a) The F-4 has the capability to control an engagement below 15,000 feet by exploiting the M'IG-2l airspeed limitation and airspeed ble~d-off oharacteristio at high G. By orienting an a-:taok towards the FISHBED CIS bli.nd cone in lag pursui.t type maneuvering, and by ()perat-ingin t he vertioal during ACM, the F-4 can defeat the liIG-2l. (b) Aoce1eration Comparison. Aooeleration performanoe 'jf the 'F'-4 superior in military and afterburner power up to is 30,000 feet. A signifioant advantage is apparent in military power and a slight advantage wa~ demonstrated in afterburner power. Below 15,000 feet, the F-4 oan easily acoelerate to above the usable airspeed (595 KIAS, or •98 n~N) of the FI3HB3D E. (c) Zoom Comparison. The P-4 has a signifioant advantage power zoom performance fr"lm low altitude up to 30,000 feet. It has a slight advantage over the MIG-2l in afterburner pow~r zoorn capabili t~r, up to 20,000 feet.
in military

(d) Turn Comparison. The MIG-2l has more instantaneous available than the F-4 at any given airspeed up to the limit load faotor of the airoraft. ~he MIG-2l loses airspeed more ra~idly during high G maneuvering than the ~4, and the subsonic, thrustlimited, turninc performanoe of the MIG-21 was about one-fourth G less than shown on current energy maneuverabili t v char t.s , (2) F-l05 and FISRB~D E: (a) ~he F-l05 should nress an offensive attaok only if an initial rear hemisphere advantage exists. Prolonged maneuverinG en,;-agements should be avoided. The airspeed limit of theMIG-2l below 15,000 feet can be easily exceeded by the F-I05. if defensive separation is required. Lag pursuit offensive maneuvering to the ~tIG-21's blind oone, mu.tual flight support, and hit-and-run taotics should be e mnl.oyed b v the F-105. (b) Aocelera.tion Comparison. The F-105, in military and afterburner power, olosely ma.tohes the MIG-2l in aoceleration nerforman~e u~ to 15,000 feet altitude from subsonic airspeed to 1.05 TI.:J:T. The F·I05 can easily accelerate to above .98 IMN, or 595 Y.TE, below 15,000 feet and exoeed the airspeed limit of
the ?IE33D S.

(c) 1'urn Comparison. Thf'! :.1IG-2lhas a distinot advantage in turn oapability at all airspeeds and altitudes. The F-l05, 1-10

therefore, should utilize hit-and-run turning eneagements with the MIG-2l.

tactics,

and avoid prolonged

(d) Fire Control and Armament. The F-I05's air-te-air missile firing capability is equal to that of the UIG-2l. RovV'ever, the F-I05 has a superior eun system with its higher cyclic rate and better eunsight system. (e) APR-25 RHAW. The APR-25 RHA7 equipment will not provide sufficient warning for the F-I05 pilot to negate a missile attack by the FISH'BED E. (3) F-IIIA and FISH3EDE (a) The F-lll should avoid maneuverinc ene;agements with the !HG-21. since energy loss during prolonged maximum performance man.euvering is prohibitive and Dcr.~potential is lost. (b) Acceleration Comparison. The MIG-21 has su.perior aoceleration performance from subsonic speed to the maximumQlimit at altitudes below 15,000 feet. The F-lll has a definite advantage above the .98 nm , or 595 KIAS.

••

(c) Turn !Jomparison. The ~.~IG-2lhas superior turnoapabilitv at all altitudes and airspeeds and the F-lll should not attempt to engage in a. turning fight with the I~IG-.2l at any altitude • (4) F-IOOD and FISRBED E: (a) The F-IOO should avoid maneuvering engagements with the 1tIG-21. Effeoti ve DC1.~ poas i ble by aooelera ting beyond the .98 is n.1J.~, 595 KIAS, limit of the !HG-21 below 15,000 feet. Hit-and-run attaoks can be acoompljshed and lag pursuit maneuvering to the blind area is most effeotive. Visual scan and mutual Bupp.ort are essential.

(b) Acceleration Performanoe. Phe 1.:IG-21has a significant advantage over the F-IOO in both military and afterburner aooeleration in all flight regimes.

(0) Turn Comparison. The UIG-2l hasasignifioant advantage in turn oapability at all airspeeds and altitudes. Therefore, the F-IOO should not attempt todefe.!l.t the !.!IG-2l in a prolonged turning engagement. HH-and-r-,m tactics are effective, providing the ?-olOO airspeed is kept well above 450 KlAS. (d) Fire Control and Armament. The F-IOO missile capac i::'it::r is appro.x:imate::':r eC!ual :0 the~IG-21' 8, although the A:m-9 capac ; ty is greater. Radar ranging. of tbe~HG-2lin missile. mode, co:nbined

1.-.11

with the enunciator lights for "In Range" and "Over Gil equalize this missile capacity difference. The four 1~39, 20mm cannons and the optioal sight system of the F-100 are superior to the MIG-21's gun system. (5) F-I04D and FISHBED E: (a) The P-I04 should employ high-speed, hit-and-run tactios during offensive aotion and avoid prolonged maneuvering engagements wi th the MIG-21. If the offensive situation deteriorates, the P-I04 should separate by acoelerating to above .98 nm below 15,000fe.et. (b) Acceleration Comparison. The F-I04 has a slight advantage over the MIG-21 in military and afterburner power accelerations up to 30,000 feet. (c) Turn Comparison. The MIG-21 has a sup.erior turn capebility at all altitudes and airspeeds when compared to the F-I04, and the F-I04 should never engage in a prolonged, turning fight with the MIG-21. (d) Zoom Capability. The P-I04 demonstrated a better zoom capabi1i ty than the ~HG-21; however, if the zoom maneuver terminates at low airspeed, the 1"-104 is at a tactioal disadvantage and vulnerable to follow-up MIG-21 attacks. (e) Fire Control and Armament. The.F-I04 fir: control system is slightly superior to that of the MIG-21. The two aircraft have equal IR missile oap"\bility; however, that of the F-104, with the M61 oannon, has a slight advantage, because of the cannon cyolic ;rate and aoouracy of the sight system. The F-I04 ASG-14 radar system is superior to the Range-Only Radar system in the MIG-21. (6) P-5N and FISRBED E: (a) ~ithin the performance limits of the airoraft, the 1"-5 has considerable potential for engaging the HIG-2l in a taotioal situation. At altitudes below 15,000 feet, the F-5 has a performance advantage. The tactioal engagement can be oontrolled effectively by the 1"-5 and if defensive separation is necessary, it oan exceed the MIG-21's airspeed envelope below 15,000 feet. The F-5 oan olosely simulate the ~rrG-2l up to Ma.oh 1.2 for oombat orew training in ACM, dissimilar aircraft engagements. (b) Acceleration Comparison. The 11IG-21 has a slight advantage in afterburner acceleration, and an equal acceleration capacity in military power. The F-5 is limited to ~,~ach 1.25, and the !ITG-21 has a distinct performance advan'tage at highe7:' ;.~ach numbers.

1-12

The ~5 has an advantage when operating below 15,000 feet above the .98IMN, Q Limit of the MIG-21. (0) Turn Comparison. The MIG-21 has a slightly better instantaneous G oapability; however, overall turn oomparison appears about equal to that of the F-5. (d) Fire Control Comparison. lcrO-21 in fire oontrol oapability.
(7) RF-IOI andFISHBEDEs

The F-5 is oomparable to the

(a) The most effeotive defensive maneuver for the RF-IOI is an unloaded, maximum power aooeleration to above .98 IMN (595 KIAS) below 15,000 feet altitude. A steep desoent, 45 degrees or greater, when possible, will provide baokground IR olutter, inorease the aooeleration rate,and foroethe attaoking MIG-21 to enter the flight regime where high longitudinaloontrol forces are encountered. (b) AooelerationCompari80n. 'rhe.MIG-21 has a slight advantage over theRP'-lOl in afterburner aooeleration up .toll!aoh 1.2 at 16,000 feet. The RP'-lOl is oomparable to the mG-21 in military power aooeleration from 300 KIAS to .98 rwl at 15,000 feet. (0) Turn Comparison. The 1.~G-21 has a superior turn oapability in all flight regimes. (8) B-66and FISHBED Es

(a) The :B-66 is vulnerable toattaok by the HIG-21. Escort proteotion is mandatory during operation in a higb lITG threat area, an~ B-66 survivability depends upon the escort effectiveness and teaIl1'Nork. (b) A 3 0 defensive spiral,considered maximum.performance for the J3-66,will not negate aMIG-2l missile or gun attack. However, the de acendd.ng: spiral will assist the esoort inoffensively positioning on the attacker and may provide the time required for the escort to perform a diversionary missile launch or obtain a kill. (9) RF-4C and FISHBED E.: (a) The RF-4C,equipped witb a QRC-353A chaff dispenser, can effeoti vely deny radar ranging information for theFISHBED E. As 1~IG radar look-on is obtained and QRC-353A is activated ,radar lock-on is transferred· from the RF-4C to the emitted ohaff. The MIG-21, however, can estimate range visually fora missile attack or use the optioalsight manual ranging mode for gun firing •
1-13

"

.. .-

F-4C/D/E. B.

(b) Effective DCM for the RF-4C is the same as for the

Operational Limitations of the FISRBED EI (1) Aircraft Performance

(a) Airspeed limit of 595 KIAS, .98 IMN, below 15,000 feet altitude. (b) High longitudinal control forces below 15,000 feet altitude over 510 KlAS. (c) Slow engine acceleration. (d) Excessive airspeed bleed-off during high 0 maneuvering. 15,000 feet. (e) Afterburner puff when engaging or disengaging above (f) Limited range and flight duration in combat oonditions. (2) Stability and Control (a) Poor directional stability in turbulent flight oonditions. (b) High longitudinal oontrol foroes above 510 KIAS, below 15,000 feet altitude. maneuvering. (3) (c) Adverse yaw and rudder sensitivity during low speed ' Fire Control and Armament (a) Cannon capacity is limited to 60 rounds (b) Ounsight is not useful when tracking in excess of 3 Os. (c) Excessive pipper jitter when firing the oannon. (d) Electrioal cage button for sight is difficult to actuate while preparing to pull the stick grip mounted trigger. (e) Range Only, X-band, radar is susceptible to chaff and electronic jamming. (f) Maximum usable sight reticle depression is 95 mils. (4) Cockpit Environmentl (a) Functional switch and instrument grouping is poor. 1-14

•
to operate.

(b) Over-the-nose visibility is limited. (0) Poor visibility through the forward windsoreen area. (d) Restriotedrearward visibility.

(e) Cookpit warning lights are looated poorly and are diffioult to monitor and interpret. (f) Throttle quadrant controls require conoentrated effort

C. Optimum ACM for defeating the MIG-2linvolved orienting an attack toward.s the 50 degree blind oone in a lag pursuitteohnique, then convertingtbe attaok to pure or lead pursuit for the missile/gun kill. Vertioal maneuvering,potential of theMIG-21 was not as good as indioated in current EM plots and ACM, in some instanoes, oan exploit this by vertical maneuvering. The 595 knot airspeed limit of the MIG-21 below 15,000 feet oan be effectively exploited during POM to effeot separation. D. ACM, as desoribed and recommended in An~3-1 andTACM 51-6, are valid and effeotive if exeoutedoorreotly in the <proper tactioal si tuation. • E. The MIG-2l has a limited oapabili ty in the ground attack role. The 30mm oannon is highly effeotive against heavy ground equipment (Annex E), however, the 6O-round oapao! ty isa limiting faotor. Pipper jitter preoludes traoking oorrections during gun firing and airoraft direotional stability is marginal in turbulent firing oonditions. The 95·mil pipper depression limit prevents low angle releases !)fbombs/ rookets •. F. Desirable features of the MlO-2linolude: (1) Simplioity of design and operation (2) Small size, lightweight ,and maneuverability (3) Pilot restraint adjustment (4) Three wheel brake seleotion with anti-skid proteotion (5) Absenoe of engine exhaust smoke (6) Laoquer finish that effeotively eliminates skin oorrosion. (7) Longitudinal stability without utifioial damping

(8) Stabilator automati~ positioning, matohed with aircraft speed stabili ty• 1-15

G. This test was very successful in obtaining a vast amount of invaluable data of an operational nature. r~echnical publications and intelligence reports could never substitute for the knowledge gained through this test. Obtaining other foreif,n aircraft, from friendly countries as well as Soviet 3loc countires, and conducting tests such as "RAVS rxmomru,:," would be of great benefi t to the USAF.

A. (S/UFD) Formation Tactios and J:a.neuvers. Overall evaluation of the test as conducted against the 11IG-21 and the complete list of USAF fighter aircraft has validated the tactics and maneuvers that are presently outlined in Arr 3-1. Speoific tactics for all tactioal situations could not be obtained from this limited test. Air oombat maneuvers exploiting the limi tations and weaknesses of the r.~IG-21 are summarized for each fighter airoraft as fellows:

(1) F-4
(a) Force the engagement to low altitude high airspeed. Fight below 15,000 feet and maintain KCAS. (b) Retain a high energy level. flight condi tior. when ne ce s sar-y, and maintain at least 450 in an unloaded

Acoelerate

(c) Establish maximum angle off during DCM with the MIG-21. Establish this high TCA at initial sighting and maintain it with the minimum 0 required to avoid airspeed bleed-off. (d) :.;aneuver in a vertical plane below 15,000 feet and avoid slow-speed reversals. Avoid prolonged, turning, olose-in engagements wi th the !.~G-21 and, if necessary, oompletely disengage to retain a higher energy level for possible reattack. (e) Exploit (50 degree blind cone). oone, using lag pursuit the turn. the rear hemisphere blind cone of the hlIG-2l '%enever possible, maneuver toward this blind or rolling maneuvers tmvard the outside of

(f) The iHG-2l is extremely difficult to deteot visually. Visual scan nrooedures should be continuously emphasized when in the !::!IO high-thr~at area. Pilots of the #2 and #4 aircraft in the four-ship flights should direot their prirnaryeffort to visual scanning during an eneagement. (g) l.~utualsupport and teamwork are vital. '~lhenmutual suppor-t is lost, immediately disengage at high speed (above .98 nm. or 595 KIA3, below 15,000 feet). (h) At high airspeeds (595 KCAS) below 15,000 feet, the !~IG-2l is ineffective because of pronounced airframe buffet. If the

1-16

••

MIG-21 gains an offensive advantage below 15,000 feet, the F-4 should aooelerate to above .98 IMN in a slight turn, inorease TCA while maintaining visual oontaot with the attaoker, obtain separation, then position for a head-on attaok if all oonditions are favorable. If oonditions do not permit suffioient separation for a head-on attack, a oomplete disengagement should be acoomplished. (2) F-l05 (a) Maintain maximum airspeed (above 450 ICIAS) below 15,000 feet when operating in ~ high MIG threat area. (b) Avoid prolonged maneuvering engagements wi th the MIG-21 at any altitude. Do not allow airspeed to disfdpate below 450 KCAS during ACM. (0) Do not rely on the APR-25 equipment to provide adequate warning of MIG-2l missile attack. (d) TheMIG-2l is extremely diffioult to deteot visually, and visual soan procedures should be oontinuouslyemphasized when in the MIG high threat area.

(e) MUtual support and teamwork should.be centinually emphasized. Whenever mutual support is lost, immediately disengage and separate(~bove.98 IMN, 595 KCAS, below 15,000 feet) • (f) If an offensive advantage has been obtained on the r.rrG-21, maintain at least a 50-knot closure rate and press the attack through the lethal missile envelope to lethal gun range. If a kill oannot be obtained as minimum lethal gun range is reaohed, separate by performing a desoending aooelera tion (above •98IMN , or 595 ICIAS, below 15,000 feet). (g) Exploit the 50 degree blind oone in the rear hemisphere of the MIG-21. Whenever possible, maneuver toward thi$ blind cone, utilizing lag pursuit or rolling maneuvers toward the outside of the turn. (3) theMIG-2l.

r-rn
(a) The F-lll should avoid maneuvering engagements wi th

(b) At the first. indioation thatanattaok by a MI.G-21 is imminent or in progress, the ~11l should aooelerate to above .98 IMN, or 595 KCAS, below 15,000 feet, and separate.

(.0) Very high speed, hit-and-run attaoks should be performed by the ~lllagainst the MIG-21 only it an initially favorable offensive position eXists • 1-17

(4) F-lOO (a) The P-lOO should avoid maneuvering the MIG-2l. engagements with

(b) If an attaok by a MIG-2l is imminent or in progress, the P-lOO should maintain mutual support, aooelerate to above .98 IMN, or 59'>KlAS. (5) P-l04 (a) The P-l04 sh?uld avoid prolonged maneuvering engagements with the MIG-2l. fb) The P-l04 should use only hit-and-run, high-speed attaoks on the MIG-2l.

(0) If a distinot advantagw oannot be maintained in an aerial engagement against the MIG-2l, the ~104 should disengage byaooelerating to above .98 IMN, or 595 KIAS, below 15,000 feet.
(6) BF-10l andBF-4CI- When an attaok by a MIG-2l is imminent or in progress against the RF-10l and ~4C, an immediate aooeleration above .98 IMN, or 595 KIAS, below 15,000 feet should beaooomplished to effeot separation. Only mild "jinlcing"or turning should be performed to retain visual oon~aot with theMIG-2l until outside of missile range. (1) :&-661 If the :S-66 operates in a high MIG threat area, an escort of tactical fighters should be provided. When attaoked by a MIG-2l, the :&-66 should attempt separation is a desoending maximum G spiral.

:B. Aircraft Modifioations

(1) Reoommend the automatio acquisition mode of the P-4E APQ-120 radar s;rstem be modified to allow automatio aoquisition ranges up to five liM. (2) Recommend equipment capable of positively identifying hostile aircraft be incorporated in taotioal weapons systems as soon as possible. C. Training

An aggressive ACM program should be a required part of combat orew training, replaoement training units, and operational oontinuation training. Di8simi~ar airoraft should be used for training whenever pos.ible and the ~5N airoraft should be used for simulating the MIG-21 in ACM.

1-18

D. Future Exploitation. Reoommendthe Foreign Teohnology Division be authorized to aggressively pursue obtaining other foreign airoraft for exploitation in programs s1milarto HAVE DOUGHNUT. These ai·rora.:f't should inolude those from our Allied oountries as well as Soviet designed airoraft. Major US airoraft oorporations should be. allowed to partioipate in the exploitations if security permits. This would allow our airoraft manufaoturers the benefit of seeing the results of foreign teohnology first hand and give them a better understanding of the oompetition that we must meet and beat. 8.
TESTEKVIRON}1ENT AN!) PROCEjDgRES

A. (S-NFD) Offensive and defensive taotioal oapabilities of the MIG-21 were assessed during air oombat maneuvering with seleoted taotioal airoraft. Basio fighter maneuvers used during this evaluation are desoribed in AFM 3-1. (1) Offensive Ca~apility.Flight oonditions were established for theMJG-21 (attaoker) and partioipating airoraft (defender) .which defined a particular attack geometry,airspeed regime,and maneuvering sequence. Attaok oonditions initially simulated those being employed in SEA environment, however, the attacks were not limited to the high-speed, rear-hemisphere, single-pass type. (2) Defensive Capability. The MIG-2lestablished defined. f1igh"'; oonditions in a defensive posture and simulated attaoks by selected airoraft were aooomplished. Defensive maneuvering of theMIG-21 was evaluated byoonstraining -themaneuvering toa definite sequence within defined flight parameters. B. Operational defioienoies and limitations of the FISH3ED E were identified by evaluating system performanoe in an operational environment. (1) Comparative performance with seleoted US tactioal aircraft was investigated by: (a) Acoeleration Checks. Level. flightaooeleration checks with selected taotical airoraftwere aocomplished. IDaoha.iroraft stabilized co-altitude in a line-abreast pOSition with the tITG-21. Power was advanced to military/maximum simultaneously. Results of the qualitative aoceleration performanoe were recorded by eaohparticipating pilot, safety chase, and.observer. (b) Zoom Performance. Frotllstabilized flight conda ti.ons in a line-abreast formation, power was applied simultaneously and .a smooth 'Oi ch .rate was established to achieve the desired flight path t attitud~. During the zoom, each airoraft maintained the desiJ:'edclimb angle if separation occurred. Zooms were terminated as theMIG-21 reached a 'Ore-determined minimum airs'Oeed. Relative positioning.of each aircraft was recorded on oOOkpit- voice tape during eaCh maneuver •

1-19

.... I·~
:

(2) Stability and control characteristics of the MIG-2l were assessed qualitatively as the aircraft performed air combat maneuvers, including offensive tracking, air-to-ground attack, high speed pursuits, low speed reversals and high G rolls. MIG-2l stability and control investigation during ACM was limited to the normal operational flight regime of the aircraft. Maximum performance maneuvering during certain flight conditions was also evaluated. (3) The aircraft armament system was analyzed during live cannon firings in an air-to-ground environment. Pipper jitter, tracking characteristics, muzzle flash, and weapons effects were documented. Thirty millimeter high explosive, inoendiary cannon shells were used in lO-round links. Prior to cannon firing, the system was dry borf:,ighted at 1,000 feet range. Characteristics of the traoking index were assessed during ACM and documented under high .G flight oonditions. Radar capability in oannon and missile mode was investigated during offensive positioning on various target aircraft. RHAW indications during MIG-21 sight radar look·on were investigated by offensive maneuvering with P-105 aircraft using APR-25 equipment. (4) Cockpit environment of the rISHBED E was assessed by the TAC aircrew participants. Cockpit questionnaires were completed during static ground analysis and immediately after ACM missions. Cockpit qualitative assessment was completed by pilots with minimal aircraft experience and again after oonsiderable exposure to actual cockpit operation. C. Optimum combat maneuvers to be performed by US tactioal aircraft to defeat an attaoking MIG-2l were defined during simulated oombat engagements. (1) Initial investigation of DaM was limited to a l-on-l situation with maneuvering constrained to a preplanned s.equence. Defensive maneuvering progressed to a 1-on-2, and 1-on-4 situation to evaluate element and flight DOM and tactics. (2) Basic DCM described in AF.M 3-1 were performed and their effectiveness assessed. Combinations and variations of these maneuvers were accomplished and the results documented. D. Air combat maneuvers described in AFM 3-1, TAC publications, and Fighter Weapons Wing lesson plans were performed and the results of each maneuver were assessed. In this manner, a valid analysiS of maneuver effectiveness was accomplished. E. Air-to-ground attacks were performed using the NR-30 30mm oannon. Cannon system, tracking index, and aircraft handling qualities were analyzed and weapon effects were documented. F. Design features of the MIG-2l were assessed qualitatively by
1-20

TAC crews to evaluate the cockpit environment features. G. Safety:

(1) Mission planning procedures and evaluation flights reflected maximum consideration for flying safety. (a) Evaluation missions progressed from investigation of MIG-21 weapons 'system avionics and aircraft handling qualities involving mild maneuvering, to an offensive l-on-lsituation with moderate ACM, to 1-on-2/4with maximum performance maneuvering in defensi·'\1'e offens.i modes. and ve (b) Brea.k-offminimums, as prescribed in AF'M 51-6, were considered inviolable. (c) Safety chase aircraft was required on every test mission. ThA chase pilot was familiar wi th all details of the flight, MIG-.21 operation, and emergency procedures.

condi tions.

(d) All test missions were conducted in day, VFR flight

(e) A mobile control officer, familiar withMIG-21operation and procedures, was required to be on duty during all flight operations. MIO-21. (f) Aircraft drag chute was used on all landings with the

(g) mG-21 ground taxiing was reduced to a.minimum by towing the aircraft toa position adjacent to the runwt;l.y each mission. for After each landing, the MIG-21was shut down immediately after clearing the runway and towed to the hangar area. H. Mission P1anningl

(1) The po.ssibili that the MIG-2lwould permanently go out ty of commission at any time, and that each. test flight would be the last, dictated that the following priority be established for the required data: (a) Air combat maneuvering and comparative performance low and medium altitudes with: at

1. F-4D,/E 2. F-105D/F

(b) Quanti tativa flight testing for performance, stabili "\;y

1-21

and control, and energy maneuverability data. (c) Continued ACM and comparative performanoe with selected taotical aircraft. (2) Prior to each mission involving ACM or comparative maneuvering, all participating aircrews were briefed in detail on each aspeot of the mission so that maximum data could be obtained from eaoh flight. Briefing guides as established in TACM 51-4 were followed. The pre-mission briefing was conducted by the projeot offioer or assistant project officer, who also participated in eaoh evaluation mission. ACM engagements were terminated by radio call when the following ocourredt (a) Flight conditions were becoming unsafe. (b) A neutral, or stand-off, situation was apparent. (c) A decisive advantage was gained by either partioipant. (d) Maneuvering produced the required data. (3) All participating airorews were selected on the basis of their demonstrated ability and knowledge of ACU and SEA oombat experienoe. This seleotivity providedt (a) Most qualified airorews and more meaningful data.

(b) Maximum amount of usable data per taotioal sortie. (0) Maximum degree of safety during taotioal analysis •

(4) Evaluation missions were oonduoted initially with the lITG-2l in an offensive posture to define the attaok and oomparative performance capability. Defensive oombat maneuvering was employed by US tactical aircraft to negate a simulated missile/gun attack and then attempt to achieve an offensive position. All available teohnical material on the FISRBED E was reviewed to identify suspeoted deficiencies and limitations of the weapons system. Performance data and energy maneuverability estimates were analyzed to determine the general urc-zi performanoe capability. TAC reoommended ACM and FISHBED E tactioal oapability estimates were oompared to provide a basis for flight planning.
(5) Mission debriefings were oonducted as soon as practical after completion of eaoh mission to provide more valid flight analysis and mission data. The projeot/assistant projeot offioer partioipated in each debriefing to insure oomplete understanding of mission results and data aoquired. Simulated ''kills''hioh oocurred during ACM reflect w mutual agreement by all partioipants ooncerned.

•..
;~

1-22

A;,,;;"""

(6) To reduce the possibility of a ground mishap, the MIG-21 was towed to and from the active runway. This procedure also prevented unnecessary brake and tire wear associated with taxiing, a primary consideration since spares were not available. I. Data Acquisition:

(1) Photographic. :r·,\'aximum photographic documentation was acquired by providing the safety chase aircraft, participating airoraft, and ground monitor with 16mm Canon Scopic motion picture cameras. Gun camera and external pod-mounted cameras were used when possible on selected missions. Cockpit, over-the-shoulder cameras were installed in the UIG-21 to record cockpit conditions during each flight. (2) Tape Recording. Voice tape recorders were used by the tITG-2l, safety chase, and participating airerews to document each tactical air situation. and development. Ground monitors were used to record the UHF communication during comparative flight evaluations. Briefings and debriefings were recorded. and summarized daily.

(3) Data Cards. Mission data cards were completed b~r all participating aircrews during or immediately after each mission. Significant events and pilot qualitative comments were .noted.
(4) Cockpit Evaluations. Cockpit questionnaires were completed by partiCipating TAC aircrews. Continued analysis was accomplished as cockpit exposure and familiarization of pilots were gained. J. Aircraft Modifications for Tac-eicalEvaluation. Da to.: l~odifications to the MIG-21 were only those required for valid data acqUisition. (1) tmF communications system was installed and the standard VHF equipment was removed. A UHF blade antenna was added. (2) Representative combat configuration was achieved by fabricating two wooden wing pylons and attaching a LAU-7A missile launcher to each. One ADJ-9Btraining missile was then attaohedto each launcher. console headset

(3) A voice tape recorder was placed on the right rear cockpit and a communications lead was connected to the pilot's and microphone for providingneoessary inputs. (4) Other modifications
for quantitative flight test data

inoluded:

(a) Oscillograph - 10 channel (b) Over-the-shoulder cameras (2) (c) Photo panel (d) X band beacon (e) Stopwatch (5 ) Standard US in!:!truments were installed: (a) Airspeed indicator (b) Calibrated Machmeter (c) Altimeter

9. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.

(S-NFD) One hundred and. two total sorties were aocumulated on the ?JIG-21 by all participating agencies. Table 1-3 summarizes these sorties by mission, participating aircraft, and flight duration. USAF tactical evaluation of the FISHBED E was accomplished on 35 sorties. Annex A summarizes the results of each tactioal mission. A. Offensive and defensive tactioal capability of the FISRBED.E was analyzed and oomparative performance with seleoted taotioal aircraft was evaluated.

(a) Aoceleration. Comparative acoeleration cheoks with the F-4 and MIG-2l were acoomplished on missions 1, 2, 13 and 53. Average fuel load for the F-4 aircraft during the acceleration performance evaluations was 8,500 pounds and the FISRBED E averaged approximately 3,800 pounds. 1. Qualitative aooeleration performance obtained during mission 1 with both airoraft (F-4D and MIG-2l) in a clean configuration indicated that the ~4 oould maintain a close wing position as the tfiG-2l accelerated at 10,000 feet in military power from 300 KIAS to 400 KIAS. Excess power would enable the F-4 to aooelerate ahead of the FISHBED E at any time. During afterburner aooelerations at 10,000 feet from 300 KIAS to 550 KIAS, the F-4D oould maintain close formation with the MIG-21 and excess power was available which would permi t the ~4 to accelerate ahead. As 550 KIAS was obtained at 10,000 feet, airframe buffeting of the MIG-2l became severe. Speed brake effectiveness of the U}G-2l and F-4 was about equal and during deceleration at 10,000 feet

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on mission 1, both airoraft remained in the same relative position after opening speed brakes simultaneously. Idle poweroomparison resulted inmuoh greater F-4D deoeleration. 2. WJ.litary and afterburner power acoelerations were accomplished at 30,000 feet on mission 2. Close formation was maintained by the F-4 with 95 peroent power during the military power acoeleration. 'Nhenafterburner was used by tbe MIG-21, the F-4D maintainedolose formation with less than full afterburner power. Excess power was availa.ble for theF-4 to separate. 3. Aooeleratlonperformanoe was again evaluated on mission 13. Armament pylons were installed on stations 2 and 8 of the F-4D. At 10,000 feet, in military p~wer, the F-4 was superior in aoceleration performanoe, requiring 38 seoonds to reaoh 450 KCAS as compared to 51 seoonds for the MIG-21. Both airoraftinitially were sta.bilized line abreast at 300KIAS. At. 40 ,000 feet, aooelerating from 260.KIAS line abreast in a desoendingfullafterburnermaneuver, the F-4D gained the lead position starting at 1.1 lUN. At 1.2 urn, the F-4D was 300 feet ahead of the MIG--2l. 4. With both aircraft in a oombat oonfiguration during ohecks on mission 53, the F-4 aooelerated better in military and afterburner power at 20,000 feet. Afterburner aoceleration performanoe at 25,000 feet demonstrated F-4 superiority up to 1.1 1MN • Combat configuration for the MIG-2l inoluded two AINr-9B missiles and centerline pylon. The F-4D was configured wi th armament pylons, stations 2 and 8, four AIM·9B missiles and a oenterline camera pod.

5. Below 15,000 feet, the MIG·21 enoounters pronounced airframe buffet at .92-.98 IMN. As this flight regime is entered, airframe buffeting begins translating through the oookpit rudder bars and is evidenoed by a rudder buZZ. As airspeed is increased, the buffeting beoomessevere and causes instrument panel vibration to the point that oookpit instruments are unreadable. The aircraft, at this point, is unusable as a weapons system. Manually opening the intake shutter doors does not. produoe a significant change in the buffet onset. The only recourse available to .the pilot for eliminating the ·butfet 1s.1;0 reduce speed until the buffet stops.
(b) Zoom Comparisons 1. The F-4, oleanoonfiguration witb 8,500 pounds of fuel, versus the MIG-21, olean, 1,900 liters (3365 Ibs) of fuel. Starting at .80 IMN, 15,000 feet MSt, and zooming at 30 degree flight path angle, the F-4 demonstratedsignlficantly superior performance i!1 military power (mission 13, Annex A). Under these same. cono.i:ions, in an afterb.urner zoom, the p-4. gained 4,000 feet more a1 ti tude and terminated wi th20 to 30 KCASairspeed .advantage over the !>~1G-21. 1-31

2. The F-4, with four AIM-9B missiles and B ,500 pounds of fuel, versus the MIG-2l, olean, starting at .9· IMN, 10,000 feet MSL, in afterburner power, again demonstr.ated superior performanoe and gained 1,500 to 2,000 feet, terminating with 30 KIAS advantage over the MIG-21 (refer to mission 40, Annex A). 3. An afterburner zoom was conducted with the F-4 oonfigured with four AIM-9B's and a oame ra podoenterline, totaling 17 uni ts of drag (this oompares to the MIG CAP oonfiguration used in SEA), refer to mission 56, Annex A. The MIG-2l was oonfigured with two AlM-9B missiles simulating ATOLL missiles. Conditions were 20,000 feet MSL, .90 nm, full a:tterburner power, 40 degree pitoh attitude established. The 11'-4 terminated the maneuver with a slight advantage (1,000 feet and 20 KUS). . 4. Teohnioal and performance data available supports a oonolusion t.hAt the MIG-2l has a superior zoom oapability, especially from 20,000 feet up. ~atitative tests results indioated that this was not the oase and the P-4, with oomparable oonfigurations, was found to be superior to the MIG-2l in zoom oapability at subsonio speeds terminating at altitudes up to 35,000 feet.

(0) Turn
1.

Comparison.

Refer to Supplement 2 of HAVEDOUGHNlJ'l' Vol I for the quantitative data on the MI~21 performance from AFFTC flights conducted concurrently with the Phase II tactical evaluation. . 2. The -VI oharts for the MIG-2l appear to be valid and at any airspe.d the MIG-2l oan generate more instantaneous G than the F-4, up t~ the -point of struotural limitations. Qualitative data shows that the MIG-2l loses airspeed more raptdly in a high. G, full afterburner or military power turn than the F-4. For example, with oomparable oonfigurations, ruel load, altitude, airspeed and G, the F-4 oonsistently completes lBO-degree turns with an average of 70 KIAS speed advantage; This oocurs up to and including 35,000 feet MSL/l.35 IMN. It was demonstrated that prolonged, maneuvering engagements should not be attampted by an P-4 against the MIG-2l. Despite the fact that theMIG-2l lo.es airapeedmore rapidly than the F-4 in a turn, the MIG-21 oan generate more G at a lower airspeed than the F-4. (d) .tOM.-

1. The 11'-4 must oapitalize on those performanoe areas where an advantage exists and maintain a high airspeed (450 KCAS or .9 nm minimum), :play the vertioal (zooms and dives, get very high airspeed in the div.), foroe the fight to below 15,000 feet, and press a close-in attaok only when a distinet advantage is held. Below 15,000 feet, at airspeeds above 510 KIiS, the MIG-2l enoounters heavy longitudinal oontrol foroes. This limit is partioularly signifioant below 10,000

feet above 540 KIAS, where maximum Q available the longitudinal flight control limit.

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2. On four occasions (lI!issions43,46,47 and 48), the test aircraft was set up with an overtake speed between 50 and 100 KIAS inside a 60-degree tail cone of the F-4, ata range of 6,000 to 12,000 feet. The F-4 entered a 6 G, descending spiral, maintaining 450 KCAS, and denied the MIG-2l the capability to achieve a ''kill ", In all cases, if mutual support had been available, the MIG-2l would have had to disengage immediately or be vulnerable to a ki.ll from the supportingF-4. If the FISH3ED E chose to fOllow theF-4 below 15,000 feet in this spiral maneuver, it was unable to mat.chthe turn performance of theF-4 and maintain a high airspeed. Therefore, theF-4 was sucoessful in DCM by: above .96 IMN, separation, missiles. a. Performing an unloaded acceleration below 15,000 feet, for a complete disengagement. to

b. If re-engagement was desirable after reverse after separating 2 to 3 NM and employ all-aspAct

1. A total of 24 radar intercept sorties was accomplished by the F-4 to evaluate the MIG-2l radar signature characteristicR. The smallest radar cross section occurred from the head-on aspect, and average detection range was 20 IDJ. Lock-on averaged 15 ID.! from the head+on aspect. . From a tail-on aspect ,ranges increased to 25 lIM and 17 NM, res:oectively. From abeam, or 90-degree aspect,the range for ·acquisition and lock-on increased to 35 and 28 NM, respectively. Target altitude was determined to be a consideration only because ground clutter at lower altitude complioated the radar target recognition problem. 2. Comparison of APQ-l09 (~4D) radar detection ranges and those of the APQ-120 (F-4E) revealed that the APQ-l09 acquired the MIG-21 at 5-10 percent greater range. The sour-ce of such a small deviation over a limit.edsampling is difficult to define. It should be reoognized, however, that the increased beam width of the APQ-120, necessitated by a redesigned radarrefleotor to be oompatible with the internal gun of theF-4E, decreases the amount of power that can be oonoentrated on target. Therefore, a slight degradation in range performanoe is to be expeoted. 3. Neither the F-4D nor F-4E is currently equipped with a suitable low altitude or look down capability against airborne targets. It, therefore, beoomes evident that both airoraft ( and the F'-4Cas well) are vulnerable, from a radar detection standpoint, to low front quarter and head-on attacks. Beoause of this limitation,

1-33

visual look-out remains the primary threat deteotion sensor. The automatio aoquisition mode of the APQ-120 radar, while definitely easing the radar deteotion and look-on problem, is virtually useless to the orew in the situation under disoussion beoause the range gate in the automatio aoquisition mode sweeps out to a range of only 12,500 feet maximum. By the time a front seat aoquisition oan be made on a visual target, it is very probable that insuffioient range will remain to permit offensive aotion in the form of an AIM-9 missile launoh. Further, in a turning engagement following visual identifioation of the threat airoraft, ranges in exoess of 12,500 feet will frequently be enoountered. Automatio aoquisition, oonsidered in a sterile environment, oan be oonsidered a signifioant advantage to the airorew. However, the foregoing oiroumstanoes indioate that under realistio oonditions the oapability for auto aoquisition aotually inoreases, rather than deoreases, the requirement for olose orew ooordination. A modifioation of the !existing APQ-120 automatio aoquisition oapability to provide seleotion of a maximum range of' 30,000 feet is desirable. (f) Radar Teohnique and Disoussion. In the ~4D, use of the MAP B mode for radar searoh will provide slightly inoreased deteotion ranges over RDR, 1 Bar. However, it is likely that due to the tightly fooused radar beam in MAP B mode, a slightly deoreased detection probability exists. RDR, 3 Bar, will probably prove ineffeotive, due to the infrequent illumination of the target. The transmitter beam width of the APQ-120 in the RDR mode is 6.7 degrees, as compared to 4.7 degrees in the APQ-I09. Acoordingly, the signal applied to the B-sweep of the APQ-120 during acquisition and look-on widens the sweep to 6.7 degrees. A target at long range oooupies a very small portion of that 6.7 degree beam and sweep. It is subsequently badly distorted and broken up in the B sweep until a relatively strong target signal is available for display. The result is that when searohing for an airborne target with the APQ-120 in the RDR mode, the target, although displayed on the soope, is easily mistaken for reoeiver noise when initially displayed. Therefore, the best results oan be obtained in the MAP mode of the APQ-120. (2) F-105 (a) Acoeleration. On missions 3 and 8, acceleration in both military and afterburner in one G flight show the P-l05 to be oomparable to the MIG-.2l, up to 1.05 IMN and altitudes of 15,000 feet. The MIG-2l configuration was clean and the F-l05 was olean with 10,000 pounds of fuel remaining. The MIG-21 gained a position 200 feet ahead of the F-I05 in military aooeleration from 350 to 500 KlAS. ~he MIG-21 gained a position 500 to 1,000 feet ahead of the F-l05 in the afterburner aooelerations from 400 KIAS to 1.05 11ThT at 15,000 feet MSL. Therefore, the two aircraft are about equal in acceleration performanoe under the stated oonditions.

(b) Turn Comparison. The MIG-21 has a better turn oapability than the F'-105 at all airspeeds. This holds true at all altitudes e:c:oept below 10,000 feet and airspeeds above 540 1(IAS,where the MIG-2loannot obtain ma:c:iinumperformanoedue to stabilator limitations. The MIG-2l has a better instantaneous a capability, better sustained a oapability, and approximately the same airspeed bleed off rate at high a loads. (c) It was shown during ACM (missions 8,9, 50 and 72) that the P-I05 should not pursue a maneuvering engagement with the MIa-21. If the F-I05 has an initial offensive position, he can continue to maneuver for a ''kill"provided he maintains at least 450 KCAS. Once the initiative is lost by the F-I05 in an engagement, an immediate separation should be aooomplished by acoelerating to above 595 KOAS below 15,000 feet. (d) RItAW. On missions 50 and 72, the APR-25 Radar Homing and Warning gear was evaluated wi th the MIG-21 Range Only Radar. During this limited evaluation, the APR-25 was unable to deteot lock-on by the MIG-2l radar outside of five kilometers. The average deteotion range indioated by-the APR-25 was 3-1/2 kilometers or 11,484 feet, whioh oan be inside the ma:c:imumfiring range of the ATOLL missile system, depending on altitude. On more than oneoocasion, radar passes by the MIG-21 were undeteoted by the APR-25 until well within the optimum miss1le firing range. It is apparent that the APR-25 is an aid far deteoting MIG-2l radar look-on, however, it should not be relied upon as a primary deteotion devioe. Visual lookaround and soan prooedures oontinue to be the most reliable means for detecting an attaok.

(a) Mission 27 was accomplished wi th the F'-lll to determine the optimum F'-111 DOM. An immediate turn by tha F'-lll at maximum UIa dettlction range, followed by a low magnitude "jinking" aoceleration to minimum altitude and maximum Mach was the only effec tive defensive maneuver. (b) APS-I09. The APS-I0gequipmentwas evaluated during mission 99 wi th the F'-lll and the MIG-21 Range Only Radar. The APS-I09pr.oduoed olear audio and strobe indioations when the !.:IG-2l radar looked on theF'-lll airoraft. During this limited evaluation of theAPS~109 system, it was noted that the maximum detection range for 1.:10-21 radar lock-on was five kilometers, and the average range detection was 3-1/2 kilometers. This equates to 11,484 feet,which is inside the maximum range capability of the A'I'OLL missile system. Therefore, while the APS-·l09 system is an aid for detecting the tITG-21 Range-Only Radar lock-on, it should not be utilized as the primary means of detection. Visual look-around and scan procedures remain the.best means of detecting an attack •

1-35

(4) 1"-100 (a) The 1"-100was evaluated with the MIG-21 on mission 25. The 1"-100was able to force overshoot and negate close-in, gun-tracking attacks b~r the MIG-21 through DCt! involving high G rolls, nose-high, maximum-performance reversals, and hard turns to a break. This type of maneuvering is "last-ditch" type for the 1"-100, and a followup attack by the MIG-21 would have been successful. The limited Mach of the MIG-21 below 15,000 feet (0.98 Mach, 595 IClAS), dictates that the 1"-100 use 595 KIAS as minimum separation speed. (b) Flight integrity and teamwork represent the best !lossi'Dle tactics for engagin~ the MIG-21 in offensive action. The need for an excellent visual scan/look-out patterncannot.be over-emphasized. If the F-IOO is in an offensive position on the MIG-21 at low altitude, a kill probably can be obtained by maneuvering toward the 1~IG-21's blind cone. However, without a speed advantage, vertical or high G maneuvering would rapidly change the F-IOO's offensive position to one of defense. Results of !.!ission indicate that the F-IOO should avoid 25 air-to-air engagements with MIG-21 aircraft when the initial conditions are not optimum. Defensive separation, when required, should be performed at low altitude, above 595 KlAS. (c) Turn Comparison. The tITG-21 has a slight advantage in turn capability at all airspeeds and altitudes tested. The sustained G capabilities of the MIG-21 are significantly better. (5) 1"-5N. The 1"-5Nwas evaluated with theMlG-21 on mission 87.

(a) Acceleration. The 1"-5demonstrated superior acceleration capabilities in military and afterburner power at low altitude (15 ,000 feet) up to the Q limi tof the MIG-21. The MlG-21 had a superior unloaded acoeleration oapability to 1.2 IMN, the maximum obtainable Mach of the 1"-5 • . (b) Zoom Comparison. Starting from 10,000 feet, 0.9 Mach using full afterburner in a 3O-degrees pitch zoom, the tITG-21 had slightly better performance. (c) Turn Comparison. The F-5N and MIG-21 are closely matched in turn capability between .9 and 1.2 IUN. The MIG-21 has more instantaneous G available below.9 IMN; however, the F-5N has a slightly better sustained G capability. Therefore, the two aircraft have comparable turn capability. (d) General. During ACM, the F-5 and MIG-21 performed the same maneuvers during the engagement on mission 87. Because of the small size of both aircraft, visua.l acquisition was difficult. The restrictions to visibility in the lflG-2l caused loss of visual contact and a resultant ''kill'' osition was obtained by the F-5. The turn, p 1-36

zoom,andaooeleration oapabilities were olosely matohed and the results of the ACMwere determined by pilottaotioal profioienoy rather than superior airoraft performanoe. Radar returns of the MIG-2l and P-5 are nearly equal. The P-5 oan exoeed the low altitude Q limit of the 1ITG-21 and has a better oookpi t visibility. The p-.5' s slow speed maneuverability and fuelspeoifios are oomparable to the MIG-2l. (e) Training. The P-5 performanoe envelope makes it an exoellent training vehiole for simulating theMIG-21airoraft. Its small silhouette, aooeleration, zoom,and turn performanoe olosely approximate the MIG-2l. Exposure of oombat orews to air oombat training against the P-5N would signifioant1y aid airorews in aotua1 oombat with the lITG-2l airoraft. (6) RP-101. mission 68. The RF-IOI was evaluated with the MIG-21 on

(a) Aooeleration. Aooeleration showed the RP-l01 to be equal to the MIG-21 in subsonio militaryaooeleration at or below 15,000 feet. With the same initial oonditions, the MIG-?l was slightly superior when performing an afterburner aooeleration froln 350 KIAS to 1.1 DiIN. The 1111'-101 oapable of aooelerating above the Q limi t of is the MIO-21 below 15,000 feet. (b) Turn Comparison. The MIG-21 has a superior turn oapability when oompared to the RP-101, whioh was demonstrated on all enoounters flown during the one evaluation flight. Results show the RF·10l, when under attaok by a MIG-2l, should aooe1erate immediately to above .981l{N, 595 ICIAS, ina steep dive, below 15,000 feet, and separate from the attaoker.

78.

(7) B-66.

B-66 defensive maneuvering was evaluated on mission

(a) Aooeleration. The l.1I'lG-21 far superior in aocelerais tion at all al t"iudes and the 13-66lI'.ach tation is well below the Q t 11mi limit of the MIG-21 below 15,000 feet. (b) Turn. The last-ditch maneuver of·ahigh 0, descending spiral performed by the 13-66 failed to negate anattaok by the MIG-21. This still appears to be the best possible maneuver for the B-66 to aooomplish when under attaok of a MIG-2l. If the 13-66 operates in a 1rra-2l high threat area, olose fighter esoort should be provided so the high o spiral DOM would permi t the esoortingalroraft to aohieve a ''kill'' position on theMIOattaoker. (8) RF-4C. The QRC-353A was evaluated on mission 98 utilizing anRF-4C. During this limited evaluation, it was determined that the QRC-353A is effeotive in denying radar range informAtion to the ~qG-21

1-37

during an attaok. Eaoh time the MIG-21 Range-Only Radar looked on to the RP-4C and the QRC-353A ohaff dispenser was aotivated, radar look-on was transferred to the chaff, thus denying range information to the MIG-2l radar system. Even though radar range was denied the MIG-21 radar system, the MIG-2l pilot oould still perform an effeotive ATOLL missile attaok and follow-up gun attack on the RF-4C, using visual range estimation or manual sight ranging. B. MIG-21 Cockpit Evaluation (1) General. The ?l.rG-21F-13 cockpit ref1eots the Soviet philosophy of engineering simplicity. Functional grouping of switches, controls, instruments, and warning lights is poor and gives the cockpit a cluttered appearance. Results of cockpit evaluation by TAC project personnel are summarized in Annex D. The poor grouping of switohes and controlsoauses the neoessity for olose pilot attention when some cookpit aotion is required. However, the overall design simplioity of airoraft systems generally requires little pilot monitoring or oontrol. (2) Support Requirements. Ground-handling equipment is minimal and inoludes that required for over-the-wing refueling and reservioing of gasoline, lubricants, gaseous oxygen, and high pressure air. Filler ports and aooess panels are readily aooessibleand airoraft turn-round time frequently was 30 minutes. Battery starts are possible, however, an external power souroe was normally used during this evaluation. (3) Cookpit Entry and Pilot Seat. A ladder is neoessary to enter the cookpit. The pilot steps onto the seat, whioh contains the seat-type paraohute, and must suppor~ himself on the oanopy rails as he carefully positions his feet on the rudder bars. He then lowers himself into the·seat. Great oare must be taken as the pilot pOSitions his feet on the rudder bars because the limited space between the leg restraint mechanism, the center pedestal, and the lower instrument panel. Rudder bars are manually adjusted by maintenanoe personnel before the pilot enters. Seat oomfort is marginal beoause of the parachute harness back strap arrangement. This was alleviated somewhat on some missions by putting a foam rubber oushion between the harness and the pilot's baok. Seat positioning optimizes pilot body posture so that high G loads are more easily tolerated by the pilot. The legs and buttocks are positioned on the same level, which reduoes the tendency for blood to pool in the lower body areasasG forces are applied. Seat adjustment is aooomplished by an eleotrio aotuator whioh moves the seat up and down. Visibility during taxi operation is poor beoause of limited over-the-nose visibility and reduoed visual aouity through the sight oombining glass, the bulletproof glass slab, and the forNard windscreen. Canopy/head olearance oauses head movement restriotions. Ejection triggers on eaoh armrest are easy to operate and are readily acoessib1e. Donning the parachute and integral seat restraint harness takes one to two minutes. Eaoh leg strap on the seat-type paraohute must be positioned over the leg and threaded through a harness loop and 1-32

seat pan slot at the rear of the seat, then into a oentral harness connector. Finally, the pilot snaps the right shoulder strap into the connector and attaches the oxygen, G-suit, and oommunications leads. The personnel lead group, although bulky, does not restrict pilot movement or cause discomfort, once attached. A ratohet handle located on ~he right side of the seat allows the pilot to tighten the harness and restraint mechanism to a high tension. Shoulder harness slack may be adjusted by a release/locking lever located on the left side of the pilot's seat.

(4) Canopy and Controlsl

(a) • The oanopy is pneumatically opera ted by con trol s within the cockpit and externally accessible from the left forward nnse section. The pilot positions two levers in the. cockpit to close and lock the canopy. There is no warning light to indicate a canopy~ unlocked condition. Care must be taken when opening the canopy so as not to apply penumatic pressure to the actuator before the locking mechanism has fully released. Improper openi~g technique on one occasion caused the canopy to snap open forcefully and become disengaged at the forward hinge point.

(b). The oanopy is designed to semi-encapsulate the pilot during normal ejection sequence. Alternate controls allow for separate jettison of the canopy •

(5) Switchology
(a) General. With slight slack. in the shoulder harness, all switches and controls can be a.otuated by the pilot. If. the.sho'-llder harness is locked in the fully-retracted position, the pilot has some difficulty reaching the forward left and right extremities, i.e., the landing gear panel indicator light dimmer control. Placards for switches looated on the right vertical console are positioned above each respective switch, while placards on the left are positioned be 1 0',': each. swi tch. T:his inconsistency is confusing to an inexperienced MlG-21 pilot and causes identification difficulty. Guards and covers for switches and buttons are good. (b) Armament Switches. Contrals,svTi tohes, and moni taring lights for bombs, rockets, oannon, and missiles are located randomly thrr"\ughoutthe cockpit~ Despite this soatteredswitch arra.ngement, very little pilot action is required to set up the desired armament. '.7henconverting from missile to gun attack, the pilot must reposi tion the following:

1. Missile - Cannon switch to cannon.

accomplished

2. Sight cage leve:f - Uncage (this can be by alternate use of the electrical cage function) •

1-39 .

(6) Instrument Panel (a). Grouping of flight instruments is poor, as pilot crosscheok requires total panel soan instead of looalized soanning. Maoh meter, vertioal speed, and turn indioator are positioned on the right half of the instrument panel, and attitude indioator, airspeed, altimeter, and oompass are on the left. Engine instrument grouping is good. The engine monitoring gages (taohometer, EGT, oil pressure and fuel totalizer) are looated on the right lower·ha.lf of the instrument panel. Readability and interpretation of these instruments is good. (b). Warning lights are poorly looated and diffioult to interpret. The gear warning light is positioned on the lower left panel; the marker beaoon, nose oone, stabilizer ratio, and trim warning plaoards are in the oenter panel; fire warning and other lights are in the upper right portion of the panel. Dimness of the warning lights, even at full intensity, oauses interpretation diffioulty. Color ooding is inoonsistent throughout the warning/monitor indioations and a red colored telelite mayor may not indicate a normal condition. The moni toring and warning light system is adequate for providing vital information to the pilot.
(7) Console and Pedestal. Controls and switches located on left and right consoles and center pedestal were generally rated good to fair. Identification and aocessibility of switches on the oenter pedestal was marginal beoause of the control stick position which blocked the pilot's view. Left console switches were provided with a gang bar to facilitate pilot actuation. Switches are arranged so that the 011position is either a forward or upward movement of the switch control. Pressure gages on the vertical side panels and forward vertical instrument subpanels were difficult to interpret. (8) Emergency Controls. Manual control of 'nose cone, stabilator ratio and intake shutters provides pilot override capability for these normally automatic systems. Emergency airstartand landing gear controls are adequate, but require oonoentrated effort to actuate. An emergenoy hydrauliC pumping unit is incorporated for limited stabilator oontrol after loss of primary and boost system. This system is manually selected by the pilot. Aileron control can be effected by manual aotion if the boost system is lost.

(9) Stiok Grip. Speed brake, gunsight electrical cage, and trim armament fire buttons are looated on the oontrol stiok grip. Aotuation of eleotrioal oage when pressing the trigger is somewhat awkward but does not neoessarily limit the pilot's ability to operate the systems. The brake handle arrangement is poor and represents antiquated design.
(10) Tb.xottle Quadrant. Throttle oontrols were rated good to fair. The positive look lever for idle is good as inadvertent stoplocking levers cause diffioulty for the pilot because of the determined effort required to engage and disengage afterburner power. 1-40

C.

FISREED E Armament and Fire Control Systems

(1) General. Poor forward visibility degrades the overall effectiveness of the FISHBED Eweapons system. The tracking index, fire control systems, and armament can be. effectively employed only when the pilot r"ltai.ns visual contact of the.target. Targetswere frequently unobserved, or could not bevisuall"y. spotted, caused by the sight combining glass, the bulletproof glass slab, and the forward windscreen. (2) Switchology. The overall cockpit switchology evaluation, including armament and avionics controls, is presented in section 9b. Duringair-to-ground attack mission , the pilot generally has enough time. to position swi.tches as requred. The air-to-air switcbologyrequirementstoinitally set up the systems are more.difficult and pilot actions are excessive. It is possible, however, to convert from a missile attack to a gun attack with one SWitching movement. (3) Gun. The NR-30, 30mm cannon is limited to a capaCity of 60 rounds. Gun rate of fire was not established; however, published estimates are 850 rounds/minute, whioh provides for a total firing of 4.2 seoonds. Estimated muzzle velooity is about 2,560 feet/seoond. During gun fire, pipper jitter is exoessive, about 20mils,and tracking correction during gunfire is not possible. Muzzle flash can be seen during daytime oonditions from a range of 3 miles. Results of air-to-ground attack on a bulldozer are depicted in Annex D. It is estimated that 2 rounds of REI impacted the vehicle .and rendered it irrepairable. The bulldozer was in operational condition before this attack, although the blade had been removed. No cannon-malfunotions were encountered during the oannon firing missions. (4) Gunsights (a) Manual ranging of the gunsight oannot be smoothly and precisely performed. System hysteresis -and friction make it virtually impos.sible to prevent overcontrol of the sight reticle diameter size with the throttle twist grip. 20 mils. (b) Pipper jitter during cannon firing is in excess of

(c) Gyro drift when tracking air targets is excessive. Gloads greater than 2~5cause the sight reticle to drift to a point near the bottom of the sight oombining glass. At very high 0 loads, the sight reticle disappears entirely. (d) Sight eleotrical oaged funotion is sluggish and slow to respond. During air-to-air tracking, it is neoessaryto bold the elec.trical.oage button (on the stiok grip) until radar lock-on oocurs. The eleotrical oage button is poorly positioned and difficult to actuate when preparing· to .fire the gun.

,~.

1-41

(e) Sight Depression Limit. FISHBED E over-the-nose visibilityrestriotions limit the useful mil depression to 94 mils. Large lead angles during air-to-ground attacks with bombs, gun, or rookets are not available. It is not possible to depress the gunsight in the gun mode of operation as may be required for ground attaok at long slant ranges. D. FISHBED

cIE

Desirable Charaoteristics Incorporated in the MIO-21~l3 Weapon Systeml

(1) General. The MIG-2lF-l3 olear-air-mass, day fighter/ interoeptor was introduced into operational Soviet units in 1960. This weapons system inoorporatesseveral exoe11ent design features whioh are summarized in the following disoussion. As future US taotioal fighter airoraft requirements are formulated, consideration should be given to these desirable features and qualities of Soviet teohnology. Extrapolation of Soviet 1960 state-of-the-art projeoted to the 1970 time period has signifioant impaot on future US taotioal fighter requirements and desired oapabilities. (2) Simplioity. Maintenance reqUirements are minimized by system design Simplicity. Ground-handling equipment inoludes only that required for servioing fuel, lubricant, oxygen, and high pressure air. Filler ports are easily aooessible and reservicing time is minimal. Aooess hatohes to faoilitate maintenance are numerous and specialized heavy equipment is not required for routine support and maintenanoe of the !!IG-21~13. Attachment 1, Annex B, summarizes the maintenanoe disorepanoies that developed during this 102-sortie evaluation. Foroomparative analyses, Attaohments 2 and 3, Annex B, summarize those noted for partioipating ~4D project aircraft. Pilot oookpit tasks are minimized by engineering simp1ioity of airoraft systems. The pilot is not required to devote exoessive time and attention to monitoring airoraft systems. He then is afforded the luxury of devoting maximum attention outside the oookpit to evaluate a developing air situation. Ease of system operation, simple oookpit prooedures, and minimum system monitoring enhanoe pilot performanoe during a taotioal engagement. (3) Size. The s.. ll frontal area provides a low probability of visual or radar deteotion of the MIG-2l in a head/tail-on aspeot. The ~rrO-2l pilot oan use the quality to his advantage for reduoed detection during patrol or attaok. After initial visual deteotion of the m:G-2l, it is neoessary to "padlock" or remain visually fixed on the airc~a~t to prevent losing contact. US taotica1 airoraft of oomparable size are the F-I04 and F-5. (4) Light Weight. Operational weight of the FISHBED clE, co:::~.:..:-.:~si60 r-ounds of 30mm ammunition and two ATOLL missiles, '1":" th is lot:25C ;'0·..:.!':.i~. Although not demonstrated, it is possible to operate 1-42

""'"
,

......

the 1crG-21 weapon system from soft runways, i.e., snow, dirt, sod, etc. Tire oonsumption rate is oomparatively low and 50 landings are normally available from main gear tires. During this evaluation, one set of tires acoumulated 53 landings and could probably have been extended to 60. (5) Cookpit Environment. (a) Seat. Airorew seat positioning oftheUIG-2l enhanoes the pilotts ability to sustain high G loads. Beoause of the semi-reolining pilot posture, with legs slightly elevated, . blood pooling in the lower body extremities is reduoed. This results in pilot ability to funotion more adequately under high G conditions. Figure 1-4 depicts!.~IG-21 airorew position as oompared to that in theP-4, P-I04, and P-I05. (b) Seat Restraint. A ratohet.assembly adjaoent to the seat armrest provides the pilot with a means of tightening the restrain-: harness to a high tension. This tightening prooess oan beaooomplished quioklywith one hand, a feature not inoorporated in anypresel'l.ttaotioal fighterairoraft.
(0) Ejeotion System. By semi-enoapsulating the.~ilo7, with the oanopy during ejeotion, high ~peed bailouts are possible without serious ,ilot injury. The sy~tem is designed to operate at speeds up to 595 knots at sea level and up to Mach 2.05 at altitude. From all indications,this ejeotionsystem is extremaly effeotive and reliable. Figure l-5illustrates theejeotion system sequenoe.

(d) Armor. as indioated below.

The MIG-21 pilot is proteoted by armor plating .68 inohes thiok .63 inohes thiok .4 inohes thick

Headrest Rear plate Front plate Glass shield

2.5 inohes thiok

Review of all available gun camera film indicates that, a.lthoughthe MIG-2l has a tendency to explode when hit by cannon/missile tire, the.pilot ejects successfully in most cases. Etfectiveness of this armor plating contributes to the high pilot survivability-rate. (e) Armament (Cannon). The lethality of the 30mm cannon was demonstrated during a simulated ground attaok mission. The target for the strafing attaok was a standard, US manufactured bulldozer. ~he bulldozer \Vas rendered inoperative and irreparable after being hit with two round of 30mm HElammunition. The 20mm oannon used by U.S. tactical fighters would not have oauseda comparable degree of damage •

1-43

1-44

•
1. THE PILOT SQUEEZEs THE ARMREST TRIGGERS. ACTU.
ATI~G THE FIRING MEC+iANISM FOR THE .SHOULDER HARNESS AND THE SEAT EJECTION.

:a.

AFTER SEAT MOVES 1.5 INCH. THE DROGUE CHUTE FIRING MECHANISM IS ENGAGED. DRIVES OUT THE CANOPY PLUG AND PUSHES OUT THE CHUTE.

3. THE SEAT ENGAGES THE CANOPY COVERING THE PILOT. THE TIMING MECHANISMST ARTS •

•• THE DRQGUE TURN$ THE SEAT FOR DECELERATION FORCES. S. THE MAST WITH THE DROGUE CHUTE IS DISENGAGED AND .THE FRONT CANOPy LOCKS RELEASE • 6. THE CANOPy IS TURNED UP AND DISENGAGED FROM THE SEAT. PILOT RESTRAINT LOCKS ARE RELEASED.

<D

7. PILOT'S CHUTE OPENS AUTOMATICALLY 13,100 PEET (<<Il10 METERS). '

AT

FIGURE 1-5
EJECTION SEQtmNCE (S-Gp-3)

-...
1-45

(f) Head Up Display. '"!:'he follcming information is presented to the :.:IG-2l:Jilot in the form of a haad up display: target radar lock "on, target in ranee, over-G condition for rm ssa Le launch and tareet breakaway (minimum ranee). Althoueh lackinp, in !'1o!lhi~tica-:ion,he pre!1entation provides the r:IG-2l pilot '.':ith t required informatinn in a manner which is simple and p-ffective. (g) ',TheelBrakes. A three-wheel braking system has been inoorporated in the 1.!IG-2ldesign. The nose wheel can be selected at the pilot's option. This increases the total !'l~rstembraking ener~J by 23~'~. After landing gear retraction, an automatic feature applies the wheel brakes to prevent rotation while in the wheel wells. (h) Navigation Lights. Individual navigation light bulbs are cooled by bleed-off airflovt. This cooling procedure has the effect of prolonging the life of a bulb and reduces failure. (i) Engine: 1. Smoke Trail. At the start of this evaluation, the ~.'rIG-21roduced no tell-tale blaok smoke trail from the engine at p any power setting. This quality was extremely notioeable during the eva lua tion, as in many instanoes ,visual detection of the ~nG-2l was possible only by aoquiring the smoke trail of the TTS ohase airoraft in olose proximity, then by restrioting visual searoh to the immediate area. A vivid contrast of comparative engine burning qualities was apparent as the F-4 and MIG-2l aircraft operated in close formation. The dense blaoksmoke trail produced by most US engines is an operational handicap; Soviet teohnology has eliminated this serious problem. 2. Airstart. ~h~ airstart system incorporate!'l an autonomous oxygen supply and is designed to be capable of restarts up to 39,000 feet. 3nough oxygen is a,~ilable for four to five airs tarts at 30-seconds duration each. During the starting cvc l.e , aviation gasoline is supplied from a special tank. A significant increase in relight capability has b~en gained with little weieht gain or complexity.

(j) Aircraft Finish. A protective finish, which has the appearance of a lacquer coating on 'the aircraft skin, prevents corrosion as well as greatly lowering the manhours required to keep the aircraft clean.
(k) Stability and Control:

1. Aircraft speed stability requires little control stick force or movement as aircraft speed is. increased throughout tbe operational speed range. Very little stabilator trim is required as airspeed changes throughout the operational range of the aircraft. This requirement for minimum trimming is advantageous to the pilot, as it

1-46

simplifies preoise traoking during airspeed ohanges ,i.e., runs, air-to--ground oannon attaok, eto.

dive bomb

2. Statio and dynamio l~ngitudinal stability is positive throughout the airoraft subsonic speed range. There is no tendenoy for the MIG-2l to.porpoise or overshoot an ini tial trim oondition when disturbed in the longitudinal mode, and stability oan be desoribed as "deadbeat." This quality is apparent throu,ghoutthe subsoniospeed and altitude range of the airoraftand is achieved without the aid of an artifioial pitoh damping subsystem, i.e., rate gyros,visoous damper, eto.

3. Exoellent performanoe of the MIG-2l has been gained by effeotively optimizing the airframe and engine oombination •

1-47

ANNEX A
TJ.CTICAL KISSIOI (S-N.lI'D) llO'1'l. SUJBWtIES (tJ)

.l1roratt."

Ir1 th1 • .Azulex,the KIG-21P'-13

18 reterred

tO&S

the "Test

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CONFIGURATIONS (S-NFD)
TeB t

Mis§ion Nrs 1 Date.1. 8 Feb 1968 FlightDuration~ 0:30

Airoraft Primary Chase

I I

Cxean with empty oenterline pylon P-4D, with.MA~l2,pylone, stations 2,8

EVENTSs

(0) Ground evaluation, start, taxi, takeoff, climb to 10,000 feet, acoeleration comparison, afterburner and engine response,aircraft maneuvering qualities, slow speed handling characteristics, avionios and sight system analysis, low approach, full stop landing.
}.gSSI0I1 SmmWlY/OOW1ENTS
I

(C) ~ngine response is poor during taxiing and engine checks. Wheel brakes are fair and steering is difficult with differential braking. Wheel brakes would not hold during run-up at full power. Aoceleration on takeoff and stabilator effectiveness on rotation was good. Landing gear would not retract until the third recycle attempt. Trim chanee during gear retraction is slight. Aircraft has a slight sink during flap retraction. Speed brakes are poor and fairly ineffeotive and aileronoontrol is very sensitive at low speed. Adverse yaw is very pronounoed during low speed maneuvering. 'line afterburner will not ignite until engine speed reaches 100%. Airframe buffeting is encountered about 550 KIAS and as power is r.educed the buffeting stops with decelera t i.on, (3) During maneuvering flight, a nose lightening and slight di~in occurred at about 5.5 Gs, accompanied by high airspeed bleed off. Stick forces are. medium to heavy. Stall approaoh is accompanied by mild buffeting and wing rock. At 140 KIAS, reoovery was effeoted as the left wing dropped. During aooeleration from low speed,the intake suck-in doors close with a notioeablebang. Below 200 ICIAS in the traffic pattern, the aircraft feels sensitive to controls. (S-NFD) During ac~eleration ohecksat 10,000 feet with the F-4D ohaseaircraft, the F'-4had SUperior performance throughout (300 to 400 KOAS) in military power. Afterburner acoeleratio~ .checks from 300 to 550 .KCAS demonstrated that the F'-4D COUld .. maintain a wing formation position and had excess power available to separate from the test aircraft. As 550 KCAS was reaohed,the test aircraft terminated the acceleration because of severe buffeting.

(S-UFD) Level flight deceleration with speed brakes is equal to F-4 speed brSkedeoeleration, however, when idle power is used, the F-4 decelerates more rapidly •

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Men Nr 1 (0) Slow speed maneuvering requires good piloting teohnique beoause of wing rolloff and adverse yaw oharacteristios. Visibility through the forward windscreen is poor and targets generally are aoquired at 3 to 5 NM range. (0) If afterburner is selected by throttle being moved into afterburner range from any position less than full military RPM, ignition is delayed until the engine accelerates to 10~. No afterburner puff was apparent during AE operation at 10,000 feet and below, and engine smoke was not apparent at any time. (0) Rearward visibility is restricted by canopy so that the pilot can see only about one foot of eaoh wing tip.

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CmtFlOUJ1AT.ON •
(S-NFD)

Miss~on 1Il:' 2 Da~l 11 !i'eb 1968 ~lieht~raiiou: 0:35

Test Airoraft. Primary Chase.

Clean with empty oenterline pylon F'-4D, with UA1J-12 'Pylons, stations

2,8

(s) Ground evaluation, start, taxi, run-up, military power takeoff, olimb to 5,000 feet ,stabilize on .88 IMN and s.tart check climb to 30,000 feet holding .88 Itm, level acceleration check in military power from .8 to .96 I'm, afterburner aooeleration check at 30,000 feet from .8 :0 1.2 IMH, supersonic handling quali ti tes, avionics investigation ,offensive maneuver on ohase F'-4 at 15,000 feet and 450 knots, letdown, land.
:MISSION SUMMARY/COMMENTS.

(S )Visl bili ty during taxiing is fair and idle power will maintain a good taxi speed onoe aircraft is moving. Some intermittent braking is required to hold a comfortable taxi speed. Wheel brakes are still marginal and steering isdifficul t , Brakes will not hold during run-up at IOOc~ power. Best teohnique on line-up before takeoff is to engage nose wheel brake after turning onto the runway, then apply brakes firmly after obtaining the desired heading. Rudder waseffeotive about 450 KIAS and gear retraction was normal. Li ~tle pi :;ch change with gear retraction and slight sink is notioeable with flap retraction. (SiTF'D) IJevel-off was acoomplished at 5,000 feet and .88 rrm and 275 liters of fuel had been used since starting the takeoff roll. Climb was initiated at .88 um at 5,000 feet with 1,975 liters of fuel and 3.4 minutes later, level-off was made a"; 30,000 feet 11S1. fuel usedduri:1e the mili tary power climb was 100 11ters.. Control response during climb was good and. very 11ttle trim action was required to hold the.B8 I;.~~ olimb sohedule. Over-the-nose visibility was fair andolimbatti tude was about 10 degrees. Speed brakes are not very effective for deoelera.:ing. During military power acceleration from .86 n.mtoVmax, 140 liters of fuel were used in 1.9 minutes. Final .Mach number stabilized at.95 indioated and 370 KIA3 at 29,300 feet indicated altitude. Afterburner acceleration from .8 to 1.2 IMN at 30,000 feet wasacoomplishedin 1.2 minutes and with 300 liters of fuel. Supersonic handling qualities were good and adequate roll and pitch is available. Gunsight .radar would not lndioa te look-on although amber power light was illuminated. During high side attack on the chase F-4D, sight pipper was loose and traokingwae very diffioult. A very pronounoed engine harmonic zone was apparent during letdown with 78-80% power. Speed brakes should be

1-51

Man Nr 2 used in the traffio pattern to allow use of higher engine rpm so the power delay effect is minimized. It is difficult to reaoh the switohes in the forward corners with a lock~d shoulder harness. (S-NFD) The F-4D chase airoraft had no difficulty maintaining close chase position with the test aircraft during the military power climb to 30,000 feet. The ~4n used 400 pounds of fuel during the olimb.Exoess power was available and the F-4D could accelerate away at any point during the climb. During the military power level acceleration check at 30,000 feet, the F-4D maintained olose formation with 95~ power. Less than full afterburner was required to maintain position during the afterburner power acoeleration from .8 to 1~2 I~N. ~he test aircraft produoed a notioeable white puff as afterburner was ignited and terminated. (S-NFD) The F-4D executed a hard turn during the test airoraft's simulated attaok. Angle-off was about 20 degrees and closure rate was 100 knot~ and it was possible to maintain a position inside the FA's turn. Visualdeteotion of the test airoraft is extremely diffioult.

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Co.m QYR.A TIo.N.

Mj. §.§.ion I 3 Nr Dat~t 12 Feb 1968 F1ight __urati~u.! 0.:40. D

(S-NFD) Test !iroraftl Clean with empty oenterline pylon Chase F4D. MAU-l2 pylons, stations 2, 8 Flo.5DI Clean

(S-NFD) Ground evaluation, start, taxi, takeoff in A/B power, rendez.vous with F-4D for zoom comparison, zoom dn military power at 30.degrees flight path angle to 30.0. IAS, rendezvous with F-lo.5Dfor K aooeleration oomparison at 15,0.0.0. feet, military power aooeleration 30.0.-450. KIAS, A/B aooeleration 450-550. KIAS, high speed, high Side ..attack on F-105 at 15,000 feet, tracking capability, avionics c.heck, maintaining offensive position, let·down, f'ull stop landing.

Mli2IQ]L§ID&1A!ULgQWEU':'~ I
(S-NFD) Start ,taxi, and takeoff were normal, .al hough the gear had t to be recyoled before it retraoted. Zoom maneuver started with 528 KIA3, 10.,0.0.0. feet, and 1,890. liters of fuel, and terminated at 25,0.0.0. feet, 250.KIAS, and 1,80.0.· liters of fuel. During the zoom the F-4D was able to stay in formation with 9~ power. (~-NFD) Rendezvous with F-lo.5D at 15,0.0.0. feet wasaooomplished and military nower aooeleration oheck was made from 3o.o.-450.KIAS. Fuel used during the .acceleration was 50. 11 ters and elapsed time was 1. 3 minutes. Afterburner accelerationcheok was aooomplished from 450. KIAS to 530.KlAS ". An offensive attaok on the F-l0.5D was set-up by posi t iorri > n the test aircraft on a perch at 25,0.0.0. feet. Descending attack was mad~, accele~ating to about 1.1 in minimum afterburner and cycling A/B as necessary to stay below the buffe.t speed. OffenSive position was maintained through F-lo.5 defenSive maneuvering and the attaok was broken off for another set-up. A high side attaok was again initiated from 25,0.0.0. feet with the F-l0.5at 15,0.0.0. feet and. 450. KlAS. The test airoraft remained in an offensive. position again throughout the F'-lo.5D defen~ive maneuvering. It is diffioult to retain visual oontaotwith the target at less than 3 miles range and exoessiveconcentration is required. The test airoraft fe·els good and solid when tracking at 6 Gs, Thegunsight radar did not indioate a look-on during either attack so tracking was inoagedsight mode.

(S-NFD) The F-l0.5pilot indioated that visual deteotion of t he test airoraft was extremely difficult, head/tail-on. Aooeleration check

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Man Nr 3 in military power indioated little performanoe differenoe in the two airoraft. Due to AlE ignition delay on the afterburner' aooeleration, the F-I05 initially started to separate. After the testairoraft obtained afterburner light·off, the aooeleration performanoe appeared equal to the F-l05D. During defensive maneuvering, the F-l05 pilot had a tendenoy to overestimate the range .to the test aircraft beoause of its very small size. A 4'0 level turn by the F-l05 into the attaoker did not produoe an overshoot and a level break turn in afterburner power only resulted in excessive airspeed bleed-off for the F-l05. (S-NFD) The seoond attack by the test airoraft was initiated at 25,000 feet. The F-l05accelerated to .9 IMN at 15,000 feet and started a desoending hard turn as the attacker called missile launch, terminated AlB and continued a high 0 roll underneath. Visual oontaot was lost during this roll and effeoti veness of the maneuver was compromised. The test airoraft remained in an offensive, traoking position throughout the F-l05 defensive maneuvering. During the attack, the test aircraft attained 7 Os while remaining in the offenSive posture. The test airoraft produoed a very notioeable afterburner puff at altitudes above 15,000 feet when engaging and disengaging the afterburner.

•
CONFIGURATION
I

Mission Nrl 5 Date. 18 Feb 1968 Flight Duration 10 145

(S)Test Aircraft. Clean with empty centerline pylon F'-4DParticipant IMAU-12pylons ,stations 2,8 F-4D Chase. MAU-12pylons, stations 2,8 EVENTS. (8) Ground oheoks, start, taxi, af~erburner power takeoff, military power olimb to 20 ,000 feet at •9 urn, level defensive maneuvering against high speed, high side attack by F'-4D, defensive maneuvering and wings level afterburner powerzoom,offensivemanauvering for photo analysis, simulated flameout approach to landing, full stop landing Ml§_SION SUMMARY I9.QMMENTS.

(s) Taxi and takeoff were normal although several recyoles were necessary before the gear would retract. Military power olimb to 20,000 feet at .9 IMN was made and rendezvous waseffeotedwith F-4D for defensive combat maneuvering. (s) The testairoraft stabilized, at 20,000 feet, .9 IMN, for the first attaok. The F·4D initiated the attaok from 25,000 feet.and aQcelerated to 1.2 IM}l with an initial TCA of 30 degrees. 1lissile er:velopewas achieved by the F AD and simulated missile Launch was oalled. The teet airoraft turned into the F~4 and oontinued attempting ~o negate the attaok. The F-4D closed into gun envolope, traokedth~ test airoraft with 6.8 G,and was notforoed to overshoot.

(S) The second maneuver's initial oonditions were established similar to the first. The F-4D attackeracoelerated to 1.2 nm during the initial situation at 30 degrees TCA. Reversal was made as missile envelope was reaohed andTCA deoreased to about 10 degrees. Traoking required 7 Os and the test.aircraft generated a hard turn into the attaok and oaused an oveshoot. As the F'-4 overshot high and outside the test airoraft, visual oontact with. the F'-4Dwas lost and the third maneuver was set-up.
(s) Init1al oonditions for the third maneuver were the same,as previous attaoks. At ,missile launohrange, the test aircraft started a level 3 G turn into the attaokerand inoreased to 5.5 Gs. The atta.cking F-4D was foroed to overshoot and both airoraft exeou~ed a winge~level zoom •

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t;'...'.~
"f

Msn Nr 5
(s) Conditions for the fourth maneuver were established with the test aircraft initiating an attack on the ~4. The ~4D defender was stabilized at 15,000 feet and Mach .9. The attack:was started by the test aircraft at 25,000 feet and 450 KlAS from a high perch position. A simulated missile launch was called .at 1.5 miles range and the ~4 executed a hard turn at 3 Gs increasing to 7 Gs. An overshoot resulted and the test aircraft was forced outside the turn and pulled high. The test aircraft attempted to pull back down and inside the ~4 to continue offensive maneuvering, however, the F-4D reversed as the overshoot ooourred and set up a scissors type maneuver. Maneuvering was terminated before the engagement progressed to low speed soissors. (u) The test aircraft returned for .simulated forced landing pattern and full stop landing.

(S) By using afterburner modulation, speed brakes, and G load for airspeed oontrol, the F-4D sucessfully maintained an offensive posture during the first attaok. With similar initial conditions on the seoond offensive engagement, the ~4 did not reduce power during the attack and was forced to overshoot high .and to the outside of the test airoraft. Poor rearward visibility from the test aircraft caused loss of visual oontaot with the attacker and subsequent maneuvering for an offensive position was not possible. (S) As an overshoot was generated on the third engagement, the ~4 pilot called for a wings-level zoom to be exeouted. With about equal flight oonditions at entry into the zoom maneuver, both airoraft performed a maximum performanoe zoom in afterburner power. It was determined that the ~4 attained 2,000 - 3,000 feet more altitude than the test airoraftand could have maintained an offensive posture. (S) Defensive maneuvering by the F-4 during the last engagement caused the test aircraft to overshoot. A 7 G, nose high reversal by the F-4D permitted attainment of an offensive posture. Radar lock-on indications wer.e not obtained by the test aircraft during this attack.

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C01JFI GTIIi4TI ON a

Uission lh-,

~,

Flight

19 Feb 1968
Duration:

0:30

(S)~est Aircraft: Clean, with empty centerline pylon Participants I F-4D Ur 1, MATT-12 pylons, stations 2 and 8, missile launcher AHD An~-4D 'I'm: F-4D :~r 2, ~"ATJ-12ylons ,sta :ions 2 and 8, LAU-7/Amissile p launchers and 4/AIM-9BI!1issiles.

(s) Grou~d check~, start, taxi, afterburner power takeoff, mili~ary power climb to 15,000 feet, offensive maneuvering with two F-4D aircraft at 15,000 feet, IR ~ignature documentation, reversalcharact~rir:;tics, straight-in simulated flameout landing approach, full stop landing.

(?l) Start, taxi and ground checks were p(")rr'lal; however, i~, was nece s sar-v to rec~rcle the gear handle before gear retraction occur-ned; The first attack was head-on at co+a'Lti tude with the F-4D's at 16,000 feet, .9 Hm. The F -4 forma tif'ln WlMS spread, simulating two elements. As visual contact was obtained, the test airoraft initiated a level turn toward the F-4'sand p.J.~led to about 7 Gs, attempting to achieve a rear hemisphere position on the 1~r2 F-4 who was low. Both F-4' s started turning toward the test aircraft, using maximum powe.r Nr 2 , F . execu te.d a climbing turn and Nr 1 F-4 turned down (!?plit plane maueuvez-Lng}, As the test airoraft attempted to achieve a kill posi tion on the !,Tr2 F-4, lead F-4 rolled high, executed a ";,'o-;,ro" and closed to gun kill position while trackine the test aircraft. '?~p. lest aircraft was unable to track lIr 2 F-4 at any time during the engagement.
(3) The second engagement was initiated \vith the test aircraf"" in offensi ve pos ture and the .Fl-4's in fighting wing formation, a t 16,000 feet and.9 J!.!N. During the high side. attack , the test aircraftselected the wingman (~Jr 2 F'-4) and pressed the attack. F-4 lead called for a spli t and started a climbing turn as)rr 2 F-4D turned down in a high G, full power spiral. The attaoker was able to track initially, but could not match the F-4's performance thr0ugh the spiral, and becauRe of enarg lost could not track. Lead F-4 turned. in behind the test aircraf:, clcsed to 1,000 feet while tracking, and achieved a kill.
o ,

(3) ."'he third engagement started \viththetest aircraf"':. initia:inf a hiCh side attack, once again with the two F-4' 9 a -: 16,000 feet, .9 r:::, in element formation. The attacker closed from 4 o'clock to 4,000 feet

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Man Nr 7 range as tae 11"4element maneuvered into a hard right turn. The attaoker was traoking in a lead pursuit ourve with 3.5 '0* .as F-4 Nr 1 initiated a defensive split. As the split ooourred with F-4 Nr 2 desoending, the test airoraft ohanged his attaok to F-4 Nr 1. As the range deoreased to about 2,000 feet, F-4 Nr 1 performed a hith G roll underneath and oaused the attaoker to overshoot. Lead F-4 (Nr 1) then reversed and beoame offensive as the test airoraft was foroed into the forward hemisphere. (S) As the test airoraft returned for a simulated flameout approaoh, IR tone signatures were reoorded by AI~4D and AIt~9B missiles. A.malfunotion in the AI~4D prevented disoernible tone shift at oooling. The A1~9B tone was good on the test airoraft and there was no appreoiab1e tone differenoe in the test airoraft a.nd the F-4D ohase airoraft. (0) A straight-in, simulated flameout pattern was performed by the test airoraft, followed by a full stop landing.

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CmTFIGTJRATIOU; EVENTS;
1':'I8~IO~T 8nMMA.RtLcm.MJH~§:

Mi ssion lrr; 8 ~; 19 Feb 1968 Flight Duration; 0;35

(s) Test Aircraft a Clean with empty centerline pylon 2!F-105D; Clean

(S) Grouhd evaluation, start, taxi, takeoff, military power climb to.10,000 feet, acce1erationOhecks.i.n military and afterburner power with F-105D defensive maneuvering at 16,000 feet, offensive maneuvering defensive vertical maneuvering, photo documentation, simulated flameout approach, go-arcund, full stop landing.

(s) The acceleration check was performed at 10,000 feet in military power from 400 to 500 ICIAS. As the test aircraft reached 500KlAS, the F-105D was indica~ing 494 knots and wasabcut 300 feet behind. Speed brakes were e:xtendedto oompare deoele:ration performance and it was immediately obvious that the ~l05 wassupe:rior. Afterburner acceleration check was started at 400 knots and terminated about 500 KlAS. Again, the acceleration performance of the two aircraft was very close, with a slight margin in favor of the test aircraft. This check was performed with a fuel wieght of 5,500 pounds for the F·l05, and 2100 liters (3723 lb) in the test aircraft. (s) E...,gagement numbezr I for the mission was set-up with the test ai~ craft in a defensive· posture at 16,000 feet and .9.I!.m. The element of F'-105D's initiated a high speed attack from 6 o'clock. A simula.ted missle launch was called at 6,000 feet range and the test aircraft entered a 4 0 turn. The attackers continued closing for a gun attack to 2,000 feet range. All aircraft were operating in afterburner power and the test aircraft increased the turn rate to 5 Oa. The attackers were forced into a slight overshoot and elected to disengage by performing an unloa.ded acceleration. The F'-105's reverEIf~d, unloaded, andaccelerat.ed away as the test aircraft attempted a high Grevereal. Visual contact with the attackers was lost and .theirseparation wassuccesstu1. (3) Theseoond engagement waeinitiated with the test airoraft in an offensive mode. The two ~105D aircraft were in formation, simulati!'1b' a strike foroe element, at 15,000 feet, 450 KCAS. The at~aoker closed on the F-105 element from 5 o'clock with about a 100 knotolosurera:e. As the test airorafto10sed to missile range, the ~105's started a hard right turn and split,with the wingman desoendin~andthe lead climbing. The attacker pressed for.the lowairoraft (number 2), who

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,:.,
Man Nr 8 engaged afterburner and inoreased the a load to maximum. The attaoker maintained a 6 o'olook position on ~105 number 2, but oould not traok smoothly. The lead '-105, through split plane maneuvering, was able to effeot a "yo-yo" and attain a lethal gun position on the test airoraft and maintained the offensive posture for an effeotive kill. (s) The last engagement was performed with the test airoraft in defensive posture at 16,000 feet and .9 IMN. P-I05 element was positioned direotly astern at 6,000 feet r.ange for a simulated missile launoh. As this launoh was called, the test airoraft entered a full power, 3.5 a, olimbing spiral. The F-l05 element oould not matoh the turn-olimb performanoe and would have dissipated energy to an unaooeptable level. The engagement was terminated. (3) Photo dooumentationwas aooomplished as the test airoraft positioned for a simulated flameout approach. The approaoh was performed at 250XIAS, then 350 KIAS, as a steeper desoent to a point 1.5 miles short of the landing runway was established. Flare was started at about 1,000 feet for the low approaoh. (U) A gO-around was exeouted, followed by a full stop landing. (S) This mission demonstrated that the P-l05, using a lag pursuit attaok, oould press for a suooessful kill if an initial offensive advantage existed. The ~105's could separate suooessfully and could use the high a break turn to negate an attaok. F-I05 level acoeleration performanoe at 10,000 feet in military and afterburner power was oomparable to the test airoraft.

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CONFIGURATION. EVENTS,

Mission hi 9 Date. 20 Feb 1968 Flight Duration. 0'45

(S) Test Aircraft. Clean,withempty centerline pylon P-I05D. AIM-9B, outboard stations

(S) Ground evaluation, taxi, m:l..n~mwn afterburner, takeoff, military power climb to 15.,000 feet., set-up head-on flight oODdi tions for air combat maneuvering with F'-105D, high speed.attackon F'-l05 during dive bomb run·and attempt gun kill, attack F-I05 at 15,000 feet from astern !lo.sition, record IRsignature,!lerform simulated flameout approach to landing,go-around, and full stop landing.

MISSION SUMMARY/COMMENTS,

(S) The first engagement was initiated with the test aircraft and F-I05 maintaining head-on track from long range (20 NM). Both aircraft were established at 15,000 feet, .9 um. As 'both aircraft passed line abreast wi thabout .5 miles separation ,each started a turn toward the other,attempting to secure an offensive kill position. The F'-105 accelerated to 1.02 in afterburner on the initial turn-in. After 180 degrees of turn had been completed, the test airc~aft andF'-105 were still essentially in a head-on standoff. As the maneuvering progressed, the teet aircraft pilot momentarily lost sight of the F'-105and reacquired the chase F-4 aircraft mist~:enly, and oriented his ACM on the F-4 chase. As this ooourred, the F'-105 attained a kill position on the test .aircraft. (S) The second engagement was started with the test aircraft attacking the F'-105while it was on a simulated dive bomb attack. As the F'-105 pulled out of the 45 degrees dive bomb run at 580 KIAS, the .test aircraft acquired about 550 IaAS attempting to close to a lethal range. Hard "jinking" action by the F'-105 allowed the test aircraft to olose to gun range and track momentarily. (s) The test aircraft was positioned astern theF'-105 for a high speed attack at 15,000 feet. As "missile away" was. called, the Fl-l05 initiated a 3 G turn to defeat the missile. The test aireraft continued closing to gun range and tracked the F'-105briefly. The tes~ aircraft then rolled out of the tracking turn and attempted a level separation in afterburner power. The F'-105 reversed his defensive turn and had the c~ability to launch a missile at the separating aircraft •

1-61

Man Nr

(s) IR signatures were documented by the AIif:-9B equipped F-l05. Missile tone inoreases in pitoh and intensity as the test aircraft engages afterburner. (U) A random simulated flameout pattern and low approach was aocomplished by the test airoraft and .a full stop, normal landing was made. (S) High longitudinal stick foroes reduoe the test airoraft's maneuvering potential at airspeed over 500 knots. If the F-l05 had elected to Reparate at an airspeed over 600 KIAS, it is felt tha: this maneuver would have been sucoessful, beoause of the maneuvering and structural limit of the test aircraf:. A straight-ahead acceleration without violent "jinking" aotion may be a more appropriate separation! defensive maneuver.

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CO~TFIGURATlm; : E'VENTS:

;:ission Nr: 13 Dater·18 Feb 1968

Flight DurationJ.

°:40

(S) Test Aircraft: Clean with empty centerline F4Dl tiAU-12 armament pylons, stations 2,8

pylon

(8) Ground checks, taxi, takeoff, military power climb to 10,000 feet rendezvous wi+.h F-4D, comparative military power acceleration from 300 to 450 KCAS, maximum power zoom comparison, unloaded maximum power acoelera ti on performanoe comparison, tl1rn performance comparison with F-4 at 35,000 feet and 20,000 feet, military power zoom comparison Dm.!with 1"-4 at 20,000 feet, 400 ICIAS, Am.~withdefensive F'-4Dat 10,000 feet, 400 KCAS, letdown, full stop landing.
1."ISSI ONsm.mARYlCOtn&:N·T~:

(8) Aooeleration performanoe of the test aircraft compared with the ?-4D was investigated at 10,000 feet. Both aircraft stabilized line abreast at 300 Y.1AS and applied ~,ll military power while maintaining 19vel flieht. ~he F-4D reached 450 KCASafter 38 seconds elapsed time and the test aircraft reqUired 51 seconds to accelerate to 450 KlAS.
(,,) Zoom comparison was initiated at 15,000 feet, .8 I::;~, in afterburn~r ~ower with both aircraft line abreast. A standard pitch rate wa~ p~rformed to achieve a 30 degree flight path anele climb. A~ the zoom wal'!terminated bv the tes: aircraft at 28,000 feet, 270 KIA3, the ~·4 had attained 32,000 feet and indicated 300 KeAS. (3) From 40,000 feet at 260 KIAS, both aircraft in line abreast position star:e'd a maximum power, descending acceleration. At 1.1 IMN, the P·4Daocelerated ahead of the test airoraftand was 300 feet i'1 front at 1.2 n?-T. A wind-up maximum performance turn at 35,000 feet was initiated by both airoraft, whiohresulted in the test aircraft's attaining about 5.60 and rolling out .after 360 degrees of turn wi th 230KIAS. The F-4 attained 6 G's initially and rolled out after 3600 of turn with 300 KCAS •.

(5) '.Thiledescending to 20,000 feet at .9nm, ano t hez-wind-up maximum performanoe turn was aocomplished. The test aircraft reaohed 6 G's initially, whioh dissipatedto3 G's·as the airspeed bled off. TheF-4 attained 6.5 G's initially and bled off to 4 G'.sas the turn progressed. Both aircraft rolled out of the turn simultaneously and thep..4 had 80 KCAS more than the test aircraft •

1-63

Men Nr 13

(s) A military power comparative zoom climb was performei starting at 10,000 feet, .9n~;. A ~tandard 2.5 G pitch rate to 30 degrees flight path angle was acoomplished with both a~rcraft line abreast. At simultaneous zoom termination, the test aircraft at 19,500 feet had 300 KIAS; the F-4D at 21,500 feet had 320 KCAS.
(8) ACl~ was ini t i.a ted wi th the F·4D offensive. A high side pass at 1.1 was started by the F-4 at 25,000 fee~. The test aircraft was established at 20,000 feet, 400 KlAS. As the attack progressed to missile range, the defender rolled into a 6 G, afterburner power turn. By modulating speed brakes and afterburner, the F·4 attacker maintained a pursuit curve without being forced into an overshoot.

(s) The second engagement was performed \'{i the F-4D in a defensive th pos tur-e at 10,000 feet, 400 KCAS. A high side attack was started bv the test aircraft accelerating in afterburner -:0 about 500 KIA3. '!'he F-4 initiated a 3 G turn at missile launch, increased to 7 G'g as the attacker decreased range. The test aircraft was forced to -:he outside of the turn and the F-4 rolled wings level and performed a vertical zoom. As the zoom ~aneuver was started, the test aircraft attempted to follow, but because of low airspeed, could not maintain a tracking position behind the F-4. The engagement was terminated.
(11)The test aircraft returned to base, performed with speed brakes extended, normal full stop landing. an idle letdown

:-61.:..

~.:i §.ion Nr ~

I 22 Dat~1 24 ,Feb 1968 Flight Durgti9n! 0135

CONFIGURATION: (S) Test Airoraft& 4/~4D Clean with oenter1ine pylon

EVENTS:
(S) Ground ohecks , taxi ,takeoffin mi nrmum afterburner power, olimb to 23,000 feet while ~8 obtains IR documentation, establish traok for head-on engagement at .9 I1nr, repeat set-up for similar engagement, attaok four F-4's from rear hemisphere at 20,000 feet, maximum lAS, photo data, letdown to initial approaoh, full stop landing.

":IT;:)8 I Q!L~.1mM.AR y ICOUMSIIT§.t

(S) The first engagement was set-up with the flight traok established by the test airoraftat 23,000 feet, .9 IMH. The flight of F-4's did not deteot the test aircraft on radar dUring about 30 miles of head-on oonvergenoe. The test airoraft visually acquired theF'-4's, oonverted to a rear hemisphere attack and oompleted a gun attack on F-4 number 2, who had performed a hard turn at 5 G. After tracking for several seconds, the testairoraft switched his attaok to F-4 number 1, who had inoreased the hard turn to about 6.5 G's. Tracking of ,F-4 number 1 was aooomplished by the test aircra.ft at about 6.8 G'smaximum. Airframe buffetlngwas experienoedby the test airoraft at 15,000 feet, 520 lCIAS, however,power reduction eliminated the buffet. Turn reversals were aooomplsihed effeotively at 170 KIAS by the test aircraft. As F-4 element (numbers 3 and 4) obtained a rear hemisphere position on the test aircraft, this engagement was terminated.
(S) Similar initial oonditionswere set-up on engasement2 and the~4' s aoq'.liredthe test airoraftsimul taneously on radar and visually at 2-3 miles. ~4 numbers 1 and 2 maneuvered. vertioally to the rear hemisphere of the testa.iroraftwho had not acquired the 1I'-4's visually. This engagement was terlilinatedas the 1I'-4's closed to lethal gun range beoause of the inability of the test aircraft to visually acquire the attackers. (S) Initial conditions for the third engagement were established by the F-4'e in pod (ECM) ,formation at 20,000 feet, 450 KIAS. The test a.iroraft, exeoutingasimulated GCl high-speed attack from the rear of ,the ~4 flight ~ closed to gun range on F-4 ~umber 4. Duri~g thisolosure, the test aircrat'te:x;perienced light buffeting at 18,000 feet, 500 KIAS, and abtainedvisual acquisitio:: O~ the F-4.'s at about 8 miles. F-4's performed a 70 desoe:ldingtrn/break and. the =--65

Man Nr 22 airoraft maneuvered into the vertioal, rolled off, and baok down on F-4 number 4 for a gun kill. F-4'e number I and 2 were able to effect a sandwioh maneuver and beoome offensive as the engagement terminated.
(s) Radar and visual searoh natterns proved to be inadequate during this mission and further analysis is required. Vertioal maneuvering by the F'4's with superior zoom, and sustained G made it possible to gain an advantage on the test airoraft. Onoe the test airoraft is in a lethal rear hemisphere position, a maximum performanoe break appears to be neoessaryto negate the immediate attaok. Support of second element or wingman is neoessary to insure survival against re-attaoks, sinoe a low energy state exists after the maximum-performanoe, last-ditoh, break maneuver. (c) Limited visibility rearward from the test airoraft is a severe restriotion that shouldbeoapitalized upon.

:-66

••
CONFIGURATION: (S) Test Aircraft. F'-lOOD. Clean
EVENTS.

Mission Hr. 25 Date. 25 Feb 1968 Flight Duration. 0'35

Clean with-empty centerline pylon

(S) Ground checks, taxi, takeoff in mrnamum afterburner ,mili tary power climb to 15,000 feet, head-on engagement with F'-100, .9IMN, rear hemisphere attack on the F-I00 at 15,000 feet, line abreast position for ACM, letdown, full stop landing.
m,SSION SUMMARY

lcoNJ.tm.!lrs:

••

(s) After military climb to 15,000 feet, conditions for the first engagement were established at .9IMN. A head-on .flight path was set-up and after visual acquisition at3 miles, eaoh aircraft entered a maximum performance turn. After 180 degrees, the .testaircraft appeared to have turned about 20 degrees more than the F-IOO. At the end of 360 degrees of F-IOO turning, the test airoraft had g$ined a significant advantage. Both aircraft were operating in afterburner power and after the ma.ximwn'.~performanceurn had lost oonsiderable enel"gy. A t slow speed, turning situation was apparent and this engagement was terminated. The test aircraft assumed the offensive mode for the seoond engagement and initiated a high speed attack from the F'-IOO's rear hemisphere. Range was decl"eased through.missile range and into gun range as traokingwas acoomplished. TheF-IOO performed a hard turn to negate the missile and maximum performance break to thwart the gun .attack. The test aircraft was forced to overshoot and theF'-lOO reversed as it ·occurred. A "Y-frYo"was executed by the test aircraft into the vertical and the engagement was terminated during this temporaryst~lemate.
(S) Initial oonditionsforthe third engagement were set-up with the F-I00in an offensive posture and test aircraft at 15,000 feet, 450 KlAS. An attack was initiated by the F'-lOOfrom 6 o'clock with about 75 knots.1iHosure rate. Although the test airoraft performed a hard tUrn in military power at missilelaunoh,the F'-100 continued to maintain a stead;)' olosure while tracking. A "yo-yo" into the .vertical was exeouted by the F-IOO to prevent an overshoot, which was followed by a roll-off and further offensive pOSitioning. The test aircraft lost visualoontact with the F'-100&tsimulated missilelaunch.

(S) The:fourth engagement vIas initiated with the aircraft in line abre$st posi tion at 1.5 miles range. Vertioal maneuvering was sinr.lltaneouslyinitiated as each airoraftattempted to.gain an'offensive 2..-67

Msn Nr 25 ~osture as the test aircraft executed an unloaded aoceleration and vertical zoom.
(s) The F-I00, with an initial position advantage (rear hemisphere) is capable of completing a successful attack on the test aircraft. However, it is not capable of out-performing the test aircraft in a sustained maneuvering engagement. An overshoot by the test aircraft can be obtained by the F·lOO·s performing a maximum performance break turn. Rear visibility restriotion in the test aircraft is a significant tactical disadvantage that should be exploited.

.L-Cc

"

~------------------------------------------------------------------

•
QQlitlqtJR~TI.Q~!
(S) Test Airoraftl
F-lllAa
EVE~r:'S :

1.1issionNrl 27 Date: 26 Feb 1968 Flight Duration: 0:40

Clean

Clean with empty centerline

pylon

(8) Ground ohecks, taxi, minimum afterburner takeoff, mili:arypower olimb to 15,000 feet, rendezvous with 1"-111 and initiate a high side a-+;tack,attaok 1"-111 from abeam position at 15,000 feet, defensive maneuvering with F-lll at 15,000 feet and attempt to become offensive, letdown, full stop landing.
HISSI

mr

Sl:J!~.A.l1Y ICm~!ENTS

(3) Rendezvous was aocomplished \vi the F'-lll at 15,000 feet and th the test aircraft established conditions for a hieh side attack. The test aircraft started the attack from the 7 o'clock position of the F-lll and accelerated to 525 KIAS. Simulated missile launch was called at 1 to 1-1/2 miles and the F-l11 started a moderate, descendine left turn at 3-1/2 G's. Afterburner was engaged by theF-lll and after abou t 270. de £'I'ee of turn , the wings were swept t.oattempt high !.Tach s separation. Visual contact with the attacker was lost. The test aircraft maintained a gun traoking position on the F-lll for about 30 seconds, and the F-lll's separation maneuver 'was not effective until reaching an airspeed above 560 KCAS. At this point, it was apparent that the test aircraft could no longer maintain pOSition, due to. the airframe buffet at high indicated airspeed.

(::0;) For the second engagement, the F-lll maintain9d450 K:'A3 at 15,000 feet and the te~ta.ircraft set-up an attack from the 3 o'clock nosition. The attackerS3lectedafterburner power and accelerated to 525 KIA::!during the initial pursuit. Since the attaok Vlasoriented from the right side of the F-lll, the right seat pilot comma.nded the airplane. He started a hard right turn and called for 16 degrees wing sweep. Due to cockpit confusion, the F-lll left seat pilot aircraft commander interpreted the call as 60 degressand selected the full aft position on .the wings. The test aircraft overshot .due t.O the 70 degrees TeA and pulled into the vertical for a high "yo-yo" maneuver. The F'-lll reversed the turn as the overshoot occurred in an a.ttempt tosoissorsthe test aircraft. Cloud conditions prevented further maneuvering dur~ng this engagement.

(S) Test aircraft flight conditions for the third engagement were established at 15,000 feet, 450KIAS.. The F-lll initiated the a.ttack

1-69

Men lrr 27 4 o'clock position, co-altitude, and accelerated to 1.1. n'::J prior to reaohing missile range. A olimbing, hard right turn in afterburner was performed by the test airoraft and the P-lll olosed to gun range, seleoted 26 degrees wing sweep and momentarily tracked the test aircraft at maximum gun range (3,000 feet). As the zoom maneuver progressed, the test airoraft aohieved separation and the engagement was termina ted. l!.inimum fuel was reaohed and the test airoraft returned to base for full stop landing. (8) ~o generate an over shoot, the F-lll must initiate a maxi~~ performanoe turn while the attacker is out of gun range and immediately effect separation by an unloaded acceleration at full power. At a low enere:r statein a maneuvering engagement with the test airoraft, ~the F·lll is extremely vulnerable. Poor rearward visibility and side-by-side seating further degrade the F-ill's air-to-air capability. If initially in an offensive rear hemisphere position, the F-lll can effect a missile a tt ack and probably convert to a gun attack. As the test aircraft maneuvers vertically, the F-lll should attempt to separate.

1-70

•
CONn GTffiATI 1 on (s) ':"estAircraft: F-4E: Clean
EVENTS:

!.~issionNr, 30 ~ate: 27.Feb 1968 FlightINrationl 0130

Clean wi th empty centerline

pylon.

(s) Ground checks, taxi, takeoff in m~n~mum afterburner power, mili tar;r power climb to 30,000 feet, establish track at 1. 2 nrn for head-on ACt! with F-4E, repeat first engagemen-t at 15,000 feet, 550 KIAS, scissors comparison at 20,000. feet, letdown, full stop landing.
nSSI0_N StTr~,:ARy/CO!.!lreNTS:

••

(s) The first engagement was initiated with the F'4B and test aircraft on opposing tracks at 30,000 feet, 1.2 urn. Visual detection for both aircraft occurred at about 4 miles range and simultaneous turns were started toward each other. Initial lateral separation was two miles and as the aircraft turned towards each other, the test aircraft crossed the F-4 track at 110 degrees. Continued hard maneuvering through a series of zooms, turns,and "yo-yo" resulted in the F-4E's becoming defensive and the test aircraft in a position fora gun kill. (S) Initial oonditons for the seoond engagement were established with eaohairoraf't at 15,000 feet, 550 ICIAS, on opposing flight traoks. 'Visual detection was not· obtained and each aircraft performed a 18O-degree turn-around. During the turn, visual acquisition by the F-4E was established and the F-4nyo-yoed~ high, turning toward the 6 o'clock posi tionof the- test aircraft. The test aircraft did not aoquire. the attacking F-4E d~e to the limited rearward visibility, and the engagement was terminated with the~4Ein gun tracking range and position. (8) A scissors comparison was accomplished on the third engagement and both airoraft were initially established line abreast, co-speed, 20,000 feet. On the first turn in, the F-4E established a higher climb angle than the test aircra.ft and gained an al titude advantage as .TCA was 90 degrees. Two more reversals were executed and the F-4E, maintaining an- offensivepost"re, attempted to track the test aircraft for a gun kill. Energy dissination during the tracking attempt by the F-4, and a nose-high rolling maneuver. by the test aircraft resulted in the test aircraft's achieving an offensive position in the rear hemisphere of the F-4E. The F-4 fue.I was 2,000 pounds, significant17 below tha~ required in a normal combat situation. Flaps were not used, although afterburner was used intermittently. "Bingo" fuel was called and allaireraft returned to base •

1-71

Men Nr 30

(s) The test aircraft demonstrated superior performance in the high altitude engagement. It would have been to the F-4E's advantage to force the flight ~o low altitude. Rear visibility limitation of the test airoraft again was apparent as visual deteotion of the F-4 attacker in the rear hemisphere is diffioult. A slow speed soissors with the test airoraft should be avoided.

1-72

•
CONFIGURATIOU: (S) Test Airorafts F4Es Clean .EVENTS.
ll!ISSION SUMMARY/COMMENTS:

Mission Nr: 37 Date: 29 Feb 1968

FlIght Duration: 0:35

Clean with empty oenterline pylon

(S) Ground checks , taxi, takeoff in m~nJ.rnum afterburner power, military power olimb to 20,000 feet for head-on ACM with P-4B, ACM at 15 ,000 feet with F-4E on head-on set-up, defensive maneuvering with F-4E attaoking from 4 o'olook a't15,000 feet, letdown, full stop landing.

(S) An OPPOSing traok with the ~4E was established at 20,000 feet, 1.2 Dm. Visual deteotion. was obtained (no radar ) as both airoraft passed abeam at two miles range. Eaoh a.iroraft maneuvered into the vertioaland turned in towards eaoh other. The F-4E achieved about 300 flight path angle, then turned down inside the test airoraft, whioh pulled up to about 500• As the test airoraft topped the zoom maneuver at a higher altitude, the F-4 oontinued turning toward the adversary and pulled up again into the vertical as the test airoraft unloaded and turned down into the F-4. Tracko.:EtDSsingangle was 1800• Two more zooms in the vertical were performed by the test airoraft and eaoh time, theF-4E maneuvered to aohieve 1800 of TCA.The engagement was terminated with neitherairoraft gaining an advantage. (S) Bead-on oonditions were established at 15,000 feet, .95 IMU, for the seoond .engagement. Maneuvering started. as eaoh airoraft passed line abreast at 1 mile. The P-4E and test airoraft pulled into the vertioal and aohieved about a 700 flight path angle. Floating over the top of this zoom at 100 ICIAS, the test airoraft lost visual contact with the P-4 and t.urned in a directionwhioh allowed the P-4 to roll into the rear hemisphere and assume a kill posture. The engagement was terminated. (S) The P-4E initiated a high side attaok on the test airoraft at 15,000 feet, 450DAS, for. the third engagement. The F-4 accelerated in afterburner power to 1.2 I'MNand. at 3-4 miles range with 700 TCA,at~empted .abarrel roll attaok whioh turned into a high "yo-yo" and a rolloff. A turn into the attaoker was initiated by the test airoraft and the F-4 lost visual oontaot during the high rolloff. An unloaded aoceleration was accomplished by the P-4 to separate. As 1.2 nm was obtai11ed, the P-4E pulled up for a vertical zoom at 800 flight :path angie • 1-73

Msn Nr 3"7 The test aircraft in the rear hemi~phere outside of g~n range could not match the F-4's zoom performance. A slow reversal by the F-4 at the apex of the zoom set-up a rolloff -:0 the blind cone of the test aircraft. The engagement was terminated with the F-4S in a lethal missile envelope. "Bingo" fuel was called and each aircraft returned to base fer landing. by the F-4 must approach 900 to be effective. Determined maneuvering toward the test aircraft's blind cone instead of pressing for lead or pure pursuit appears to be advantageous and should be investigated further.

(s) Vertical maneuvering

1-74

•
CONFIGURATION
I

Mission Nr: 39 Date: 1 March 1968 Flight Duratiol.: 0:35

(s) Test Aircraft,

F-4E1 MAU-12

Clean with empty oenterline pylon armament pylons, stations 2 and 8, 2/A~9B

missiles

EVENTS

(S) Ground ohecks, taxi, takeoff in m~n~mum afterburner, military power olimb to 20 ,000 feet, defensive oomba t maneuvering with 14'- 4E initiating high side attack at 1.2 IMN, head-on e.ngagement at 15,000 feet,. 450 KIAS, defensive maneuvering at 15,000 feet, 450 KIAS, repeat ~reviousengagement, letdown, land. lITSSION SUMMARY/COMMENTS.

(s) For the first engagement, the F-4E with two AI1~9Bmissiles (inert) initiated a high side attack at 20,000 feet, 1.2 IMN. The test aircraft mQintained 450 KIAS until oal1ed clear to maneuver as the 14'-4E reaohed missile range. At 3 miles range, the test aircraft initiated a turn toward the attacking F'-4. The 14'-4 performed a high, vertioalbarrel roll inside the test airoraft and oriented the .lCM toward the blind cone of the test airoraft. The 14'-4 maintained an offensive position throughout the engagement and was able to simulate a missile and gun kill.
(S) The second engagement was a he~d-on, co-altitude set-up lEt 15,000 feet, 450 lIAS. 1~neuvering was st.arted as eaoh airoraft passed line abreast. The test airoraft initiated a olimbing turn and the 14'-4 performed a desoending .turn. A head-on missilelaunoh was possible by the F-4 after 1800 of turn in two instano.es. The engagement was terminated after the tes.t airoraft lost visualoontactwith the F... 4E. (3) Initial conditions for the third engagement were established at 15,000 feet, 450 ICIAS, with.the F-4E on a high p('!rchfor an attack. A dGscending turn toward the test aircraft was accom?lished in maximum power, accelerating to 1.2 E:?T. The attack was pressed to the rear blind area of the test aircraft in a lag pursuit technique. The test aircraft turned into the F-4 attacker and theF-4 executed a barrel-type maneuver, remaJ.nJ.ng on the inside of the turn generated by the test aircraft. The 14'-4 was successful in clOSing to mis~ile. range and subsequently to gun range for a tracking, simulated gun kill.

(s) The F~4E was again in the offensive mode for-the fourth engasement and the test aircraft was established at 15,000 feet, 450 KIAS. The F-4Eaccelerated to 1.2 IMN and rolled tcmard the target, establishing a 600 TCA. The test aircraft was cleared to maneU'V"9rand
1-75

Msn Nr 39 performed a hard level turn into the attacker. To prevent an oV'ershoot, the F-4 pulled into ~he vertical and executed a barrel roll ~o the outside, attempting to enter the test aircraft's blind area. Two re~~rsal~ occurred and during each, the ~4 directed the maneuvering toward the test aircraft's rear blind cone. An offensive position was maintained by the F-4 and a gun kill could have been achieved. (U) "Bingo" fuel was called, and all aircraft returned to base. (S) The barrel roll attaok appears to be successful if exeouted toward the inside of the test aircraft. Lag pursuit,or orienting the maneuvering t:c:mard the test aircraft's rear blind cone, produced desirable results.

1-76

•
CONFIGURATIOn,

MissionNz:' 40 Dates 1 Mar 1968 Flight Duration, 0'35

(s) Test Airoraft,

Clean with empty oenterline pylon F"'4E, ~.!.AU-12rmament pylons, s"tations 2,8 and 4/.4.Dit""'9B a missiles

(s) Ground ohecks, taxi, minimum afterburn~r takeoff, military power olimb to 10,000 feet, rendezvous with F-43 for zoom oomparison, defensive maneuvering with F·4E at 20,000 feet, repeat at 15,000 feet, 450 KIAS, head-on engagement and ACM at 15 ,000 feet , letdoi7n, landing.
b1.SSIOn·· StP..'::ARYICO?~I.CnTS: (S) Comparative zoom performance wasevaluated.starting at 10,000 feet, .9 I!':: ,USing full afterburner power. Both aircraft were positioned line abreast and established an equal pitch rate to achieve 400 flight path angle. The test aircraft initiated zoom termination at 250 KlAS. At the termination call, the ~4 had 2,000 feet higher altitude and 280 KIAS.

(s) lni:ial oonditions for the first engagement were established with the 1"-4 offensive and the testairoraft defensive at 20,000 feet, 450 KlAS. An attaokwas started with the ~4 aooelerating to 1.25 nn~ and rolling out toward the target with 500 TCA. U~neuverine by the test airoraft was started as the attaoker entered the rear blind oone. A high G pull into the vertioal, turning toward the direotion of the attaoker, was performed by the test airoraft. The ~4Ewas foroed to overshoot and oontinued turning toward the test airoraft's rear hemisphere. A TCA of 1000 resulted as the test airoraftturneddawn and into the att.aoker. A reversal and oontinued maneuvering by the F'-4 toward ~hetarget' s blind oone resulted inthe~4' s maintaining a rear hemisphere position; however, a missile or gun a.ttaok was not possible beoause of the exoessive TCA. The ACUwas terminated. (s) Conditions for the seoond engagement were aircraft at 15,000 feet, 450 KIAS, defensive, ~4E initiating a lag pursuit attaok from 8 o'olook. The F'-4 oriented the attaok toward a point 3,000-4,000 feet behind the test airoraft as a hard defensive turn was performed into the attack. The F-4 exeouted a pull-Up into the vertical and a barrel ron to the outside of the target's turn. As the test aircraft pulled upvertioal:y and turned toward th~ attaoker, .visualcontact was lost with the :;<-4. 'Visual re-aoquisition was obtained on the

1-77

Men Nr 40 F-4 ohase aircraft instead of the termina ted.

F-4E

attaoker and the engagement was

(S) Head-on oondi tions were established for the third engagement at 15,000 feet, 450 KlAS. Radar oontaot was obtained by the F-4£ at a range of 7 miles and visual aoquisition was obtained at 3 miles. Maneuvering started as the test airoraft passed a.beameaoh other and the test airora.ft pulled up to about 800 flight path angle, turning toward the ~4E, and then desoending. After 1800 of turn by the test aircraft, the ~4 had progressed through only 1500 and the test airoraft gained a slight advantage. Energy in the 6.5 turn resulted in airspeed bleed-off to '310KIASfor the test airoraft. The ~4, With 450 KCAS, pulled vertioal into a zoom maneuver. Unable to oatoh the zoom, the test aircraft was foroed to reoover at a lower altitude than the F-4. A roll-off by the ~4 resulted in an offensive rear hemisphere position with 300 TCA at 1.5 miles. (Tn "Bingo" fuel was reaohed and all aircraft returned to base.
(s) The barrel roll attack produoed desirable results and the lag pursuit technique appears valid. Zoom performanoe of the F-4E and olean test airoraft demonstrated superior ~4 capability.

1-78

•
CONFIcroR.ATIONI

Mission Nr; 42 Date: 2 Mar 1968 F1ightnurationl 0:35

(S) Test Aircraft: Clean with empty oenterline pylon F-4D: MAU-12 armament pylons, stations 2 and 8, with 4/LATJ-7 missile launchers, S~16 gun pod station 5. EVENTS: (S) Ground cheoks, taxi, ma.namum afte.rburner takeoff, military power olimb to 10,000 feet, rendezvous withF-4D, zoom oomparison, head-onACMwi th F-4 at 15,000 feet, offensive maneuvering with F-4 at 15,000 feet, letdown, reoovery.
MISSION STTMMARY/COW@NTSI

(s) A normal takeoff and olimb to 10,000 feet wasaooomplished and rendezvous with the F-4D was made. The zoom oomparison wa.s initiated at 10,000 feet, .9 nm,bothairo:raft line abreast in afte·rburnerpower. A pull-up to 400 flight path angle was aocomplished and with full power the relative position remained the same throughout the zoom. (s) Engagement number 1 was set up with each aircraft in an opposing flight path at 15,000 feet, 450 ICIAS. Maneuvering was started as the airoraft passed abeam at 1.5 miles. Each airoraft performed a desoending turn in maximum power whioh resulted in the F-4's gaining about 200 after 1800 of turn. The test airoraft experienoed airframe buffeting in the transonio regime, was foroed to'reduoepower Slightly, and after 3600 of turn, the F-4 maintained a slight advantage. The engagement was terminated. (s) Engagement number. 2 conditions were established with the F-4 defensive at 15,000 feet, 450 KCAS, and the test aircraft initiating an attaok at 1.05 IMN with 300 TCA. Simulated missile 1aunoh was oa11ed at 2 miles range and the F-4 performed a climbing turn in afterburner power. 'rhe test aircraft olosed to about 1/2 miles and traoked the F-4 during the olimbing turn. G load waeincreased to the maximum by the F-4 at a 200 KCAS apex and the test airoraftovershot,to a position higher than the F-4. As the overshoot occurred, the F-4 unloaded and aooe1erated momentarily, then pulled into a climbing turn toward the attaoker, generating a 90° TCA. Continued maneuvering toward the test aircraft blind oone resulted in the F-4 attaining an offensive position in the rear hemisphere of the test airoraft. MiSSile/gun kill was not obtained as the engagement terminated.

(U)''Eingo" fuel wasrea~='.9d was effeoted.

b:.- tte

test ai:-cra.i'tand

reco"\rery

!.:sn :rr 42

(s) Airspeed bleed-off engagement was due to pilot to defensive. 1"-4 airspeed Vertical maneuvering by the of the test aircraft proved

by the }l\-4 to a low energy level on the first misjudgment and the situation deteriorated during ACM should not fall below 450 KCAS. 1"-4 followed by roll-offs to the blind cone to be very effective.

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•
CONFIGURATIONs EVENTS. MISSION SU¥MARY/COMMENTS.

Miasion·Nr. 43 Date. 2 Mar 1968 ii'i'iiht Duration. 0.40

(S) Teat Airoratt - Clean, with empty oenterline pylon. 2/F-4EMA.O-12armament pylons, stations 2 and 8; 4/AIM-9Bmiasiles.

(S) Ground oheoks, taxi, takeott in minimum afterburner, military power climb to 15,000 ft, converging track for enga~ement with F-4's at 450 kt, head-on set-up at 25,000 tt, .9 IMN, otfensiveposture for high sid.e attack on F-4's, letdown, landing.

(U) Normal takeotf in minimum afterburner and military power climb to 15,000 tt was aooomplished.

(S) Initial oonditions for the first head-on engagement were esta~ lishedat 15,000 tt, 450 KCAS. No radar contact was obtained by the F-4's throughout the 40 mile converging track. Visualoontact was not established and a 1800 level turn was exeouted by the F-4's and the test airoraft. During this turn-around, the test aircraft sighted the.F-4's and initiated an attack, closed to missile range on F-4 Nr. 2, .overshotand ~itched the attack to F-4 Nr. 1. The F-4's were unable to visually acquire the teet aircraft until missile launch was oalled. F-4 lead then called for a hard turn reversal as the test aircratt overshot F-4 Nr. 2. After a series of vertical maneuvers, the test aircraft remained in an offensive posture and the engagement was terminated. (s) A converging flight traok was set up for.the second engagement with the teat aircraft at 25,000 ft, .9IMN, and thetwoF-4E's at 15,000 and 20,000 simulating two elements in fluid four formation. F-4 Nr. 1 achieved a ~adar lock on the test aircraft at 15 miles and turned toward the target. A climbing attack into the test aircraft was performed by both F-4's and after several oyclesof vertical "yoyo's", both F-4E aircraft were in the rear hemisphere of the test airoraft. Nr. IF-4 obtai.ned an auto radar aoquisition at 3,500 ft and closed to gun range. (S) The third engagement was initiated at 15,000 ft with the test airoraft in the off'ensiveandinitiating the attaok from an abeam position of the F-4 element. At 3 miles range, TOA of 600, the F-4's turned into the attacker. A defensive split .was performed by the F-4'eas the attacker closed to 3-4,000 ft range. F-4 Nr. 2 started a high G descending spiral and F-4 Nr. 1 pulled into a climb while waiting for the attacker to become committed to one target. Test a.ircraft elected to

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Msn Nr. 43 pu.:.·sue d.escending 1-4 Nr.2 and F-~ Nr. 1 reversed down and effected. the a sandwioh ~th the attacker. After 360~ of turn, the test aircraft and. F-4 Nr. 2 maintained a 1800 TOA and 1-4 Nr. 1 was able to sandwich and achieve a missile and gun kill position o~ the test aircraft. (0) ":Bingo" fuel level was called by the test airoraft and it returned. to base for a normal landing. (5) Radar deteotion was sucoessful in the second engagement as the test airoraft was 5000 ft higher than the F-4's providing a look-up aspect. The defensive split was suocessful as the subsequent sandwich achieved a kill. During the high 0 defensive spiral byF-4 Nr. 2 in the split, the test airoraft was unable to achieve a traoking solution. The auto radar acquisition was used with success; however, to be more Useful, the effective range oapability of this mode should be expanded to 5 miles.

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•
CONFIGURJ.TION.
EVENTS.

MissionNr. 44 Date 1 3 Mar 1968 FitKht Durationl

0150

(S) Test Airoraft - Clean, with empty oenterline pylon. 4/F-4D-MlO-12 armament pylons, stations 2 and 8, 4/AIM-9B mi ••ilea.

(S) Groundohecks, taxi,.minimum afterburner takeoff, military power climb to 25,000 ft for head-on set-up with 1I'-4's, repeat head-on setup at 20,000 ft and ACM, high side attack on1l'-4's and AOM, letdown, landing.

MISSION SUMMARY/COMMENTS.
(9) After & normal takeoff and cl:r..Q 25,000 ft, the teat aircraft to set-up an opposing f'lighttraok wi ththe F-4' s._ Lead 11'-4 element was established at 15,000 f'tand F-4's Nr. 3 and 4 were positioned in fluid four formation at 18,000 ft, .9 IMN. During the 30-mile oonvergenoe, radar oontact waa not obtained by the 1"-4's (3 radar sets were operable). (S) All airoraft reversed their flight path and another converging situation was established. The test aircraft desoended to 20,000 ft. Radar oontaotwas established at 12 miles by F-4 ..r. 3. F-4Nr. 1 then N aoquired radar look-on at 9 miles,as Nr. 3 initiated an aooeleration for visual identifioation. F-4 lead performed a slight "jink" turn for additional separation, and turned toward the target as the ID was aooomplished by F-4 Hr. 3. Loss of radar oontaot by F-4Nr. 1 prevented a missil.attack, and a close-in visual engagement developed. The test airoraft attempted to aohieve an otfensive position on the high element (F-4's Hr. 1 and 2); however, when it beoame app~ent that it was going~ require maneuvering .into the vertical to a very low airspeed, the test airoratt attempted to disengage by an unloaded acoeleration to maximum airspeed. The engagement was terminated. (S) The next engagement was initiated by the test aircratt at 25,000 ft,attaoking the flight of F-4's at 15,000 ft in fluid four formation. Rolling in from 8 o'clock to the 11'-4'8, the test aircraft desoended, orienting the attaok on the high F-4 element (Nr. J and 4). Afterburner was engaged by the F-4' s as they performed a hard turn toward the attaoker. An overshoot oaused by the testairoraft being unable to matoh the F-4's turn rate oocurred, and the 1I'-4's reversed appropriately. The test aircraft then pulled up into a vertioal .zoom attempting topoe1tion on F-4's Nr. 3 and 4.. This zoom resulted in the test aircraft .dissipatingairspeed, and at a very low energy level, maneuvering ability wa.s marginal. F-4's Nr. 3 and 4 were able toaohieve an offensive position during the roll-off. The engagement was termina.ted with all four of the F-4D's in the rear hemisphere of the test aircraft •
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Msn Wr 44 The search pattern used on this particular engagement was briefed aSI Hr. I and Hr. 3 radar operator search from slightly below the horizon to above the hori~on in map B mode. Nr. 2 and Nr. 4 radar operators in ra.da.r mode were to overlap their search areaSJ however, their primary responsibility was visual scan. The visual coverage was to be standard as published in current tactical manuals. The visual coverage proved successful on the second engagement. Visual contact was aoquired at the initiation of the attaok and was never lost throughout the engagement. The ~4 elements did not maneuver in the same relative plane after the ACM was started. One element olimbed and one element desoended and through a aeries of high speed or anergy-maintaining turns (at least 450 KIAS), the entire flight of four was able tc position to the rear hemisphere of the test airoraft and obtained missile shots and gun traoking solutions. During the engagement the opportunit:r developed for the ~4's to dive toward the blind area of tbe test airoraft. This resulted in offensive positioning by the F-4's. All aircraft returned to base for reoovery. (s)

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