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Collector of Internal Revenue, petitioner vs Douglas Fisher and Bettina Fisher, and The Court of Tax Appeals, respondents.

28 January 1961 Facts Walter Stevenson (born in Phils, of British parents, married in Mnla in 1909 to British subject Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson) died on Feb1951 in Sn Francisco, Cali., in permanent residence established with wife. He instituted his wife, who later assigned all her rights and interests to Fisher spouses in Dec 1952, as sole heiress to real & personal properties acquired by them while residing in Phil. Total gross of assets was P130,792.83. Ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of 1st Instance of Mnla were instituted to settle the estate in the Philippines. Ian Murray Scott was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate. He filed a preliminary inheritance and tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared finally appraised at values 6mos. after the death of Stevenson. On Sept 1952, estate and inheritance tax return was amended to avail of the right granted by section 91 of NIR Code. There was a change in price per share of stock, the ancillary administrator based it on the quotation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco Stock Exchange. He also made claim to deductions for funeral expenses, judicial expenses and others. On Sept 1953, he filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return. It contained new claims for additional exemptions and deductions: 4,000 deduction from gross estate of decedent provided by Sec.861, no.4, US Fedl Internl Rev. Code, made allowable by way of reciprocity granted by Sec.122, NIR Code); other exemptions granted by reciprocity proviso. Refund of amount of 15, 259.83 allegedly overpaid was requested by the estate and denied by the Collector. Pursuant to Act No.1125, action commenced in Court of 1st Instance was forwarded to Court of Tax Appeals. Issues 1. WON, one-half of the net estate should be deducted in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent as Beatrice Mauricias share in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and section 89 of the NIR Code 2. WON estate can avail of inheritance and estate taxes on shares of stock in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., granted by reciprocity proviso in sec122, NIR 3. WON estate is entitled to 4,000 deduction allowed by sec861, US FIRC, in relation to sec122, NIR 4. WON real estate properties of decedent and shares of stock were correctly appraised 5. WON estate is entitled to deductions for judicial, administration, funeral expenses and real estate taxes and amount representing indebtedness incurred by decedent during his lifetimes 6. WON estate is entitled to payment of interest of amt. it claims to have overpaid the govt and to be refundable to it. Held Decision affirmed with modifications. 1. Yes. In the absence of ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. Since the marriage took place in 1909, Article 1325( not Art.124 of NCC which became effective only in 1950), adhering to the nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one is a foreigner and there are no prior arrangements is the applicable law. However, in the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. Therefore, The law determining the Stevenson property relation is the English law, which must be presumed to be the same as our law since there is an absence of proof otherwise (processual presumption, p699). More importantly, property relations of spouses as distinguished from successional rights of spouses is governed differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of NCC. No. There is no total reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance. Amount under the Fedl Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction, not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cant be claimed under sec122, NIR.


No. Respondents contend that the fair market value should be the assessed values appearing in the tax rolls 6months after death of Stevenson, pursuant to sec91, NIR. However, properties are required to be appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as their fair market value only when evidence to the contrary hasnt been shown.The situs of the shares of the stock for purposes of taxation, being located in the Phils and sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our govts taxing authority, their fair market value should be fixed on the basis of the price prevailing on our country. However, since the said shares of stock commanded a lesser value at Manila Stock Exchange six months after death of Stevenson, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs contributed to the SCs reversal of Tax Court and holding the value of a share in said mining company in the Phil market as P.325 as claimed by respondents. Yes. These have been considered deductible by the Tax Court. p706-707 No, deduction has to be allowed only insofar as the Philippine probate court has not approved this particular indebtedness of the decedent, such approval is necessary. There is a regular administration under control of the court where claims must be presented and approved and expenses of administration allowed before deductions from the estate can be authorized. Another reason: According to sec89, letter d of NIR, allowable deduction is only to the extent of the PORTION of the indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated. Since there is no statement of the value of the estate situated outside the Phils, or that there exists no such properties outside the Phils, no part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted. Jorge Domalagan v. Carlos Bolifer (1916) Appeal from a judgment of CFI Misamis




Nov. 1909: Domalagan & Bolifer entered into a verbal contract wherein the former was to pay defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of the son Cipriano Domalagan w/ the defendants daughter, Bonifacia. Aug 1910: Dad Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus P16 as hansel or token of future marriage. However, Bonifacia married one Laureano Sisi. (read: new name Bonifacia Sisi puhlease!!) Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded return of the said sum of P516 plus interest and damages arising from the fact that he was obliged to sell his real property in Bohol to come up with the sum. Defendant denied complaint and alleged that it did not constitute a cause of action. RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered any addtl damages. Ruled in favor of plaintiff for the return of P516 plus 6% interest from Dec 17, 1910 plus costs.

ISSUE: WON verbal contract of the parties was valid and effective to render delivery of the money by reason of a prospective marriage HELD: Judgment affirmed. RATIO: Why, yes, of course! Sec 335 Par 3 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions: In the ff cases an agreement made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing (3) An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry. Said section does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. It simply provides the method by w/c the contracts mentioned can be proved. The form required is for evidential purposes only. A contract may be perfectly valid even though it is not clothed w/ the necessary form. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the case, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing. ESTANISLAO SERRANO vs. MELCHOR SOLOMON [June 29, 1959]

2. 3.

Appeal from CFI Ilocos Sur decision Alejandria Feliciano father is in Hawaii; entrusted to fathers friend, Estanislao Serrano who took care of her & raised her from 12 until she got married June 21, 1948 Alejandria & Melchor Solomon were married. Before the ceremony, Solomon executed alleged Deed of Donation w/c stated among others that he was donating all of his exclusive properties to serve as capital for their conjugal life & for the maintenance & support of their offsprings. Their children will inherit such donation but in the absence of children, half of the properties will go to his brothers/sisters/their heirs if he dies before his wife or if his wife dies before him, half will go to those who raised his wife. March 2, 1949 Alejandria died.

Thus, article 1279 is not applicable because (1) it refers to contracts; (2) the donation in question requires the execution of an instrument in the form required to make it valid, whereas article 1279 refers to the execution of an instrument that is in the form required to make the obligation in the contract effective.

Few months after Estanislao instituted action to enforce & implement terms of alleged donation. Being the one who raised Alejandria, he believed he had the right to half of Melchors property. CFI: donation was not a donation propter nuptias because it was not made in consideration of marriage & it was not made to one or both parties of the marriage ISSUE: WON the donation made by Melchor can be considered as a donation propter nuptias. HELD: No alleged donation is null & void. CFI affirmed. Estanislao wont get anything. RATIO: Whether you apply Art. 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 of the new CC, the result would be the same, donations propter nuptias are only those bestowed (1)before the celebration of marriage, (2)in consideration of the same & (3)upon one or both of the spouses. Melchors donation violated conditions 2 & 3. It was not in consideration solely of the marriage, it had additional terms like the marriage had to be childless and one of the spouses had to die before the other. Also, it was not in favor of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her parents & those who raised her. Based on Manresas commentary, donations granted to persons other than the spouses even though founded on the marriage are excluded. Its not a donation inter vivos (during their lifetime) either, because donee never accepted it by same instrument of donation or in separate document as required by law. Its not a donation mortis causa (upon death) either. It has to be governed by provisions on the disposition execution of wills to be appreciated as such. Besides, donor is still alive. It will only be operational upon his death. SOLIS v. BARROSO 53 Phil. 912 Facts: On June 1919, spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propter nuptias of certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case one of the donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and demanded: (1) the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law, (2) transferring one-half of the donated property, and (3) to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits The lower court granted the plaintiffs prayer, basing its judgment on article 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. Issue: WON one-half of the donated lands should properly be awarded to her. Held: No. CFIs judgment reversed and defendants absolved from complaint. Ratio: Article 1279 used by lower court is not applicable to donation propter nuptias Article 1279 provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract to exist. In the case at bar, what is of concern is a donation propter nuptias. According to article 1328, CC, donation propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in articles 618 to 656 of the CC, on donations. Art. 633 provides that for a donation of a real property to be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. Exception to the rule: onerous and remuneratory contracts, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts (art. 622) Because the donation propter nuptias by the spouses were made in a private instrument, it is not valid and does not confer any rights.

The lower courts judgment that the present donation is onerous and pursuant to article 622 must be governed by the rules on contracts is not well-founded. Donations for valuable consideration (onerous donations), as may be inferred from article 619, are such as compensate services (1) which constitute debts which are recoverable from the donor, or (2) which impose a charge equal to the amount of the donation upon the donee Neither applies to the present donation, which was made only in consideration of marriage The lower courts assertion that, by the fact that this is a donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the marriage as a consideration, and must be considered onerous is also not well-founded. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. The marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation. ***sana ma-gets nyo..sobrang hirap ako maintindihan siya coz it presupposes that I understand what onerous donations are. Just as reference, onerous means having legal obligations that outweigh the advantages. Sorry talaga..its all I could come up with.. Mateo vs. Lagua [October 30, 1969] Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Cipriano Lagua was the original order of 3 lots (998, 6541, 5106). In 1917 he donated lot 998 and 6541 to Alejandro Lagua in consideration of the marriage of his son. The Certificate of Titles remained in the donors name. 1923 Alejandro Lagua died and his wife and infant daughter stayed with Cipriano. Cipriano undertook the farming of the donated lots and initially he was giving the to Bonifacia (wife of Alejandro) the owners share of the harvest of the land. However in 1926 Cipriano refused to deliver the share of Bonifacio and as such Bonifacio resorted to the Court wherein she obtained a judgement award to her possession of the two lots plus damages. July 31, 1941 Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the two parcels of land in favour of his other son, Gervasio. Even with the sale Bonifacia continued to receive her owners share of the harvest until 1956. Bonifacia discovered the sale only in 1956 when the remittance of her share has stopped. She also discovered that in September 22, 1955 TCT Nos. 19152 and 19153 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan were issued to Gervasio. She went to court to seek for the annulment of the deed of sale in favour of Gervasio and for recovery of the possession of the properties. The court ruled in her favour. August 18, 1957 Gervasio and his wife filed an action against Bonifacia for reimbursement of the improvements allegedly made by them in lots 998 and 6541 plus damages. This case was dismissed but Gervasio appealed the decision. At about the same time Cipriano and Gervasio filed for the annulment of the donation of the two lots insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned. They were claiming that in donating the two lots, which allegedly were all that plaintiff Cipriano owned, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something for his own support but also prejudices the legitime of his forced heir, Gervasio. On November 22, 1958 Cipriano died. (the cases were still pending in court) Lower Court dismissed both cases. CA affirmed the decision of the lower court with regards to the damages claim but with respect to the annulment case it ruled that the donation to Alejangro of the 2 lots with the combined area of 11,888 square meters exceeded by 494.75 square meters his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will and as a result it prejudiced Gervasio. The Defendants were ordered to reconvey to Plaintiff Gervasio a portio of 494.75 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the lots. Bonifacia appealed the decision raising the following errors: o Validity of the donation propter nuptias have been determined in a previous case o Action to annul the donation has already prescribed since the case was filed 41 years after the donation o Donation propter nuptias is revocable only for any grounds enumerated in Art. 132 of the new civil code

Determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers in the hereditary estate of Cipriano the CA should have applied the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 and not Article 888 of the New Civil Code.

his wife by the wifes previous marriage. The donation falls under the prohibition in Art.1335, CC. Neither has the plaintiff acquired the land by prescription for there is no evidence that he ever possessed it or claimed it against his grandfather (as evident in deed in favor of Ariola, signed by Nazareno as witness). Judgement afformed. SUMBAD v. CA 308 SCRA 75 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of decision of CA Facts: Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a commonlaw marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of the private respondents who purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the property in question. In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are the children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim that after the death of their mother, their father sold the Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at property to private respondents without their knowledge and consent. They further alleged that although the private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria they still purchased the lots from Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at property so the deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private respondents. During the trial, petitioners and defense presented several witnesses. Issues: 1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to the forgery of the deed of donation should be given credence. No. The court agreed with the trial and appellate courts decision that Eillengers testimony is vague and incredible and incapable of impugning the validity of the public document. Forgery should be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillengers testimony difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she anticipated the questions of petitioners counsel. Petitioners should have presented handwriting experts to support their claim that Georges signature on the deed of donation was indeed a forgery. 2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art. 749 of the Civil Code, which requires a public instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property. No. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However, the acknowledgment clause states that the person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted for and in the absence of the clerk of court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In accordance with the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the deputy clerk of court who notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC No. Art 133 provides that every donation between spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. This prohibition extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v. Cervantes). In fact, Art 87, FC provides that every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. However, this point is being raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George was married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not married to George,

Issues: 1.

WON the Civil Code of 1889 should govern the case. NO Cause of action to enforce Gervasios legitime have accrued only upon the death of his father on November 12, 1958 then it should be governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code; and that a donation propter nuptias property may be reduced for being inofficious. Donation propter nuptias liberalities and as such it is subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donors death, if they should infringe on the legitime of a forced heir. WON the CA acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious, and in ordering the petitioners to reconvey to Gervasio an unidentified 494.75 square meter portion of donated lots. NO Court of Appeals acted on several unsupported assumptions o 3 lots were the only properties composing the net hereditary estate of Cipriano o There are only 2 legal heirs o Cipriano left no unpaid debt, charges, taxes etc. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deduction all payable obligations and charges at the time of his death; then all donations subject to collation would be added to it. It is only thereafter can it be ascertained WON a donation has prejudiced the legitimes. With the evidence before the CA it can hardly rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved and to order the reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondent.


Note: Donations propter nuptias are without onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or the motive for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donors death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir. Bonifacio Nazareno, plaintiff-appellant vs Francisco Birog and Apoloniano Ariola, defendants-appellee Andrea Rodriguez and Juan Aben were married and had a daughter named Alberta Aben. Their daughter Alberta later got married to Mariano Meleno Nazareno and had a child named Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff). When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had no offspring. In March 1917, Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to his then six-year old step-grandson Bonifacio. The donation was accepted in the same deed by Alberta and Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the land. Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land: 1930 71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for 1, 100 (paid) 1933 2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially with remaining balance of 300, later paid 275, wrote promissory note for 25) 1934 1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600 (balance of 600, promissory note for that sum payable at end of Feb or March 1935) These two buyers immediately took possession of the land and cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff wrote him a letter demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected balance of 25 from Birog in March 1935).



plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title and possession of a parcel of land described here?

No. Not only did he lose ownership of the two portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas possess, he signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the third and last portion; therefore, he is estopped from claiming the land. More importantly, appeal must be dismissed since plaintiff has no cause of action. The deed of donation upon which he bases his claim to land is null and void since it is made by the donor to a grandchild of

evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, George and Maria were still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice taits (one of the witnesses presented) testimone is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George and Maria continuously maintained common-law relations until the date when the donation was made (April 2, 1974) 4. WON the petitioners claim that they only learned of the sales to the private respondents in 1988 when they visited Maria because she was seriously ill is admissible No. Petitioners waited for twelve years before claiming their inheritance and are thus guilty of laches which precludes them from assailing the donation made by their father in favor of Maria. Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exerting due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. WON Lanoy Takayengs testimony that Georde gave Fani-is money to purchase the Sum-at property means that the money came from the proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property. No. Lanoy could not state with certainty when the alleged meeting took place, the amount of money given by George to Fani-is and when the purchase took place or if the sale was consummated in accordance with Georges instructions. Held: Petitioners have not sufficiently shown the nullity of private respondents title to the lots purchased by them. Decision of CA affirmed. Onas v Javillo [March 20, 1934] Ponente: Goddard Facts: Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis & they had 5 children. After Ramonas death, he married Rosario Onas & they had 4 children. During his first marriage 11 parcels of land were acquired; while in his 2 nd marriage 20 parcels of land were acquired. Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were products of the first marriage. Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was made by the administrator of the estate of her husband. She alleges the following errors: o All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the properties of the first marriage. o The trial court erred in approving the partition dated September 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the same did not include all properties of the deceased. Issues: 1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased husband or wife. NO When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought about the community ceases, for the principles of an ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is governed by special rules. Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any effect for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a recompense for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death of one of the partners. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as the spouses are united. 2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the properties of the first marriage. NO Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share. 3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid. NO

Was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second marriage were produced by the properties of the first marriage. Vda. de Delizo v Delizo [January 30, 1976] Ponente: Antonio Facts: This is about 2 cases involving the partition of the conjugal properties 2 marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. He first married Rosa Villasfer w/c lasted 18 yrs (1891-1909) & they had 3 children. He then married Dorotea de Ocampo w/c lasted 46 yrs (1911-1957) & they had 9 children. In 1957 Nicolas died (90 yrs old). The court originally adjudicated of the land to the 3 children from the 1 st marriage, to the surviving spouse & in equal shares to the children of both marriages. This was modified in consideration of the fact that, only the Caanawan property (67 hectares) was shown to be acquired during the 1st marriage & only 20 hectares of w/c was made productive during this time. However, it is from the fruits of this property that enabled the spouses in the 2nd marriage to acquire all other future property. 1. Caanawan property & house on P.Campa 8/39 (1/6 + 1/26) to each of the children from the 1st marriage; 1/26 to each of the children of the 2nd marriage 2. All other properties acquired during the 2nd marriage 19/195 to each children of the 1st marriage; 2/65 to each children of the 2nd marriage; 28/65 to the surviving spouse Issue: Held: Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined w/ mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided btwn the 2 conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership 1. 1st conjugal partnership entitled to 18/64 of the whole estate (18 yrs) 2. 2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of the whole estate (46 yrs) 3. the share of Nicolas Delizo is of the net remainder of CPG of both marriages or 32/64, divided into equal shares among all his heirs (all 13 of the kids) Thus the final sharing scheme is 1. Rosas share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be divided among their 3 kids (142/1664 each) 2. Doroteas share: 23/64 of the whole estate + her share in Nicolas estate (662/1664) 3. Nicolas share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be divided into 13 equal parts (64/1664 each) MOISES JOCSON, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents Petition for Certiorari to review CA decision [February 16, 1989] Facts: Spouses Emilio Jocson & Alejandra Poblete had 2 children: Moises Jocson & Agustina JocsonVasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. Alejandra died intestate. April 1, 1972 Emilio died intestate.


June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null & void and that the properties involved be partitioned bet him & his sister: 1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilios manifestation that the lands was sold at a low price because it was his loving, helpful & thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says his son possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did not violate any law & that he did not touch his wifes properties. He acknowledged receipt of payment.


Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills & a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too. 3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition & Adjudication w/Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio & Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio sold his share to Agustina. All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 & 2 were registered w/the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled & new certificates issued in the name of Agustina. Moises allegations: 1. #1 is null & void because his fathers consent was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure, influence & other illegal machinations. He also alleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that his sister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is fictitious, simulated & fabricated. 2. Same allegations re #2 & #3 with additional allegation that he was deliberately excluded & they intended to defraud him of his legitimate share. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents business & they must have used business earnings or simulated consideration in order to purchase the properties. 3. No real sale between dad & daughter living under same roof. 4. Dad didnt need money since sold properties were all income-producitng. 5. #1 & #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio cant validly sell. 6. #3: he only questions sale of dads share to sister but not extrajudicial partition. RTC: decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated & fictitious because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices were grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises. Declared #1 & #2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers w/c declared: Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. Ordered registration of prop to 2 children. CA: reversed. Nos. 1 & 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contract based on fraud must be filed 4 yrs from discovery of such w/c begins on the date of the registration w/the Register of Deeds. All documents actually & intended to be binding & effective against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition w/sale in #3 is valid since it was done in accordance w/New CC Art. 996 on intestate succession & Moises 1/3 has not been prejudiced. ISSUES & RATIO: 1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consents obtained by fraud is voidable (CC Art. 1330) & action for annulment must be filed w/in 4 yrs from time of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the time when contract was registered w/Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman). If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he further assailed that sale was w/o consideration since amount paid were merely simulated. Contracts w/o cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC Art. 1352). A sale w/simulated price is void (CC Art. 1471 & 1409[3]) and action for declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (CC Art. 1410). 2. WON sales were w/o consideration. NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations, especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of price & they are notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcome the presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his own witness contradicted his claim that his sister & her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina & Ernesto were into buy & sell of palay & rice. Even he himself said that he didnt know if his sister had other businesses. Agustina testified that she was into buy & sell even prior to her marriage. 3. WON prices were simulated NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher than assessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs. P24,840.00). Besides difference bet market value & purchase price is understandable considering fathers filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of defective consent. 4. WON sale is improbable. NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not relevant considering that all essential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object & cause.

5. WON properties in #1 & #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio & wife. NO. CC Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CP unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage (Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in question were indeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can invoke the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Doesnt say when properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different from registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor & only registered such after marriage.

Married to phrase is a mere description of Emilios civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner, property registered in his name alone & that he is married. Consistent w/principle that registration of property in name of only one spouse doesnt negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy vs. Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear & convincing proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have presented sufficient proof to show that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus, properties are considered exclusive to Emilio. HOLDING: Petition dismissed. CA affirmed. FRANCISCO v. CA 299 SCRA 188 (1998) Facts: Teresita (petitioner), is Eusebios (private respondent) legal wife second marriage. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private respondents) are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Teresitas allegations: o Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, theyve acquired properties in Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. o These properties were administered by Eusebio til he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them. o Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal. Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thus enjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute. RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show that said properties were acquired during the second marriage, or that they pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that: o CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has already been repealed by art. 253, FC o It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC However, issue in Teresitas reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4 Issue: WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. Held and Ratio: Yes. Petition denied. Arts. 158 and 160, New CC have been repealed by the FC, specifically by Art. 254, FC (not Art. 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art. 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158&160 doesnt operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued and vested while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be resolved based on provisions of New CC. Art. 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.

As regard land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebios testimony that he inherited the same from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the property should be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant to Art. 148, New CC. Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title." As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as her documents all described Eusebio as the owner of the structures (Art. 1431, New CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence). Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (Art. 158(2), New CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on the source of funding (Art. 160, New CC) cannot be invoked because there is also lack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage. Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title already existing and phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio. Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as to incapacitate him to administer property. Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. [January 8, 1973] Motion for Reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme Court

1) WON the amount of damages is excessive. NO They had a contract of carriage w/c binds PANAM since a substantial monetary consideration was paid by the Zuluetas to transport them. PANAM failed to comply w/ its obligation & they acted in a manner to humiliate Mr. Zulueta & cause him inconvenience by leaving him on the island. 2) WON Mr. Zulueta has the right to recover moral & exemplary damages. YES Exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-delicts except when the defendants has acted w/ gross negligence. Here, the agent of PANAM acted w/ malice & bad faith. Thus, if exemplary damages are awarded for gross negligence, more so if the act is deliberate, malicious & tainted w/ bad faith. 3) WON the non-enforcement of the compromise agreement btwn PANAM & Mrs. Zulueta was valid. NO The payment to her is effective insofar as it is deductible from the award & because it is due from PANAM w/ or w/o the compromise agreement. It is ineffective insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. She is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership before its dissolution. The law doesnt favor a settlement w/ one of the spouses, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize the solidarity w/ the family. Efren Mendoza, Inocencia Mendoza vs Ponciano S. Reyes 1983 FACTS: Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes who executed a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements in favor of (petitioners) spouses Mendoza. The land in question was bought on installment basis from JM Tuazon & Co. represented by G. Araneta. Since the spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the said land because of lack of money, they had to borrow from RFC (Rehabn Finance Corpn). Thus, they loaned money for purposes of completing the construction of a one-storey building and paying balance of price of lot. A corresponding deed of absolute sale, in which Julia Reyes was named as vendee and her husband signed under the phrase, with my marital consent, was executed by Araneta on Nov 1948. From thereon, the sps secured another loan for the payment of balance of lot and additional security, for the defrayment of the expenses incurred in the repairs, etc. As a result the transfer certificates of said lots issued by Registry of Deeds was in the name of Julia Reyes married to Ponciano Reyes. The mortgage contracts executed by sps in favor of RFC were duly registered as well. SPS put up a school and a camarin in the lots. When the school was transferred someplace else, the camarin was leased to Mendoza sps in 1952 for ten years. The contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor with marital consent of Ponciano. Because of failure to pay their obligations to RFC, sps asked for extension on their obligation and was granted such. On March 1961, while they were separated in fact and her husband was in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots to the Mendoza sps without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. Thus, he filed a case for the annulment of the deed of sale, stating that the properties were conjugal properties & that she sold them w/o his knowledge or consent. ISSUES: 1) WON the deed of sale was null and void on grounds that the property is conjugal property, which means Julia is prohibited from selling such without consent of spouse. YES 2) WON issue of estoppel can be raised against Ponciano. NO RATIO: 1. Property is conjugal following the presumption found in A160, CC, which states that all property of the M must be presumed to belong to the CP unless it be proved that it pertains to exclusive property of sps. This presumption is strong as stated in A153, CC, which provides that such presumption must be overcome by one who contends otherwise. The only character that they could come up with to rebut the presumption is Julias testimony, w/c is contrary to Aranetas records as well as info on mortgage contracts (which are favorable to her H). Precedent states that it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the M in order that the same may be deemd conjugal property. And that proof of acquisition of property in dispute during the M suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. Thus, the property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The records show that the funds used to buy the lot & build the improvements came from loans obtained by the spouses. And A. 161 states that all debts & obligations contracted by the husband & wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. Thus, the lands are conjugal properties of both spouses. 2. The principle of estoppel rests on rule that whenever a party has intentionally

Facts: Mr. Zulueta, Mrs. Zulueta and Ms. Zulueta were passengers of Pan Am. Mr. Zulueta left the terminal and went to the beach in search for a place where he could relieve himself (where it would not be visible for the people in the plane and in the terminal). He came to a place abound 400 yards away from the terminal. He was gone for almost one hour (but before the plain left) and Pan Am was contending that it could have not taken him that long relieve himself and that there were 8 commodes at the terminal toilet for men. Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been off-loaded due to drinking and belligerent attitude but according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to off-load all Zuluetas, their luggage and overcoats and other effects handcarried by them came as a result of the altercation that happened between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner. After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the intention of keeping him stranded for a minimum period of one week at a cost of $13.30 per day. In an action for damages against PANAM, the Zuletas were awarded moral & exemplary damages, as well as attorney fees. This was based on a breach of contract of carriage coupled w/ a quasi-delict. Pending appeal, the spouses separated & Mrs. Zulute entered into a compromise agreement w/ PANAM, wherein she settled for 50k. She filed for the dismissal of the case w/c was denied since a wife cannot bind conjugal partnership w/o the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law. ISSUE: WON the damages involved are among those forming part of the conjugal partnership. YES RATIO: The damages arose from a breach of the Zuluetas contract of carriage w/ PANAM, fro w/c they paid their fare w/ funds presumable belonging to the conjugal property. The damages therefore, fall under A. 153 CC, the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The damages dont fall under A. 148 NCC as exclusive property of each spouse. Further, that w/c is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange w/ other property belong to only one of the spouses & that w/c is purchased w/ exclusive money of the wife or husband belong exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that what is acquired w/ money of the conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. ** other issues:

led the other to believe a particular thing true to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising from his act, declaration or omission, falsify it. It can be invoked only between persons making the misrepresentation and person to whom such misrepresentation is addressed. There is no showing that Ponciano led the Mendozas to believe that the land wasnt conjugal Cant be considered to have acted in good faith because the RFC mortgages were already registered in Registry of Deeds by the time the contract of lease was registered. Moreover, they initially demanded Poncianos consent when they leased the property but dismissed it upon sale. Consolacion Villanueva v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, sps Jesus Bernas & Remedios Bernas (1990) FACTS: Sps Graciano Aranas & Nicolasa Bunsa were owners in fee simple of Lot 13. Upon their death, their children, Modesto & Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. N portion belonged to Federico, and S portion, described as Lot 13-C under Torrens title in Modestos name. Modestos W Victoria died in July 71. Modesto himself died in April 73. They had no children. However, it appeared that Modesto was survived by 2 illegitimate children named Dorothea Aranas Ado & Teodoro Aranas. The 2 borrowed PhP18K from respondent Jesus Bernas In the loan, as security, they, as absolute co-owners, mortgaged to Bernas Lot 13-C. Raymundo Aranas, a relative was there as witness. The siblings failed to pay the loan. Bernas then acquired ownership over the land, cancelled the siblings title and issued another in his name. About a month later, witness Raymundo Aranas & his sp Consolacion Villanueva filed a complaint w/ RTC of Roxas City asking that they be declared co-owners of the land and title of Jesus Bernas over Lot 13-C be cancelled on the ground of their alleged discovery of 2 wills. Modestos will: bequeathed to his illegit children all his own capital property & all interest in his conjugal partnership w/ W Victoria . Victorias will: bequeathed to sps Aranas & Villanueva, and to the illegit children of her H all of her interests, rights and properties, real&personal, as her net share from conjugal partnership w/ H.

1) 2) 3)

1st installment was paid by Macaria w/ her exclusive money 2nd installment paid w/ proceeds from a loan from Dr. Jacinto, to who the fishpond was mortgaged by both spouses 3rd installment was paid from a load secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria

ISSUE: WON the 2nd & 3rd installments were paid with conjugal funds. YES RATIO: Under the Spanish CC, the law applicable here, the property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition, irrespective of in whose name the property was acquired. The initial 1k payment was paid exclusively w/ money belonging to Macaria. But the 2 other payments were paid by conjugal funds. The deeds show that the loans used to pay both installments were made out to both spouses as joint borrowers. Loans thus become obligations of CPG & money loaned is conjugal property. While the mortgage is on Macarias paraphernal property, the mortgage to secure the loan is a purely accessory obligation that the lenders could waive if they so chose, w/o affecting the principal debt w/c was owned by the conjugal partnership, & w/c the creditors can enforce exclusively against the conjugal property if they so desired. Since the fishpond was purchased partly w/ conjugal & partly w/ separate funds, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price. An undivided 1/6 is paraphernal & the remaining 5/6 is conjugal. Payment by the widow of the mortgage debt after Marcelos death doesnt result in an increase in her share in the property but merely creates a lien in her favor. Since the fishpond is undivided property of Macaria & the conjugal partnership w/ Marcelo, his heirs are entitled to ask for its partition & liquidation. The ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into acoount: a) Macarias 1/6 direct share b) Her half of the community property c) Her successional rights to a part of Marcelos share pursuant to the governing law of succession when he died d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount advance by her in paying the mortgage debt. Lorenzo v Nicolas PONENTE: Padilla FACTS: On Jan 16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente & Manuel Lorenzo contracted marriage. Manuel died on Jan 7, 1929 & Magdalena died on Jan 31, 1934. During their marriage, they had no children. However, they had children in their previous marriages. Plaintiffs are Manuels kids from his 1st marriage, while the defendants are Magdalenas grandchildren from her 1st marriage. Subject of the petition is 2 parcels of land, the sale of w/c (to respondents) the petitioner prays to be declared null & void since they are part of CPG. These lots were friar land w/c Magdalena bought on an installment basis:


1) 2)

WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C and improvements thereon by virtue of Victorias will. NO WON improvements on said lot was conjugal. NO

HELD: Judgment affirmed. Jesus Bernas deemed to have acquired indefeasible & clear title to Lot 13-C him having acquired it by a regular, untainted mortgage sale. RATIO: 1) No, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her H. She never inherited any part of Lot 13-C w/c she could bequeath by will to anybody. Moreover, even if Modestos acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place during the marriage, the lot would still be regarded as his own exclusive, private property because it was acquired during the marriage by lucrative title. 2) If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal, Villanueva may have acquired a right over them by succession. However, proof as regards when the improvements were made on the exclusive property and the source of funds used were not presented. Therefore, the presumption that it belongs exclusively to the H stands. Castillo v Pasco PONENTE: Reyes FACTS: In Oct 1931, Marcelo Castillo Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived 2 previous husbands. In Dec 1932, the Gonzales couple, as co-owners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said property to spouses Marcelo Castillo & Macaria Pasco for 6k w/c was payable in 3 installments: 1k upon execution of the deed, 2k w/in 1 month w/o interest & 3k after 1yr w/ 11% interest. In April 1933, Marcelo died & his widow married her 4 th husband, Luis San Juan in June 1934. The petitioners, children & grandchildren of Marcelo by his previous marriage, a filed a complaint for partition & accounting of the fishpond in CFI of Bulacan. The LC declared the fishpond as paraphernal property, since even before the marriage, Macaria was a woman of means while Marcelo had a salary of only P80 a month. CA affirmed the CFI decision. Installments were paid in the ff manner:

a) b)

Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage to Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in installment P25.32 on the 1st yr & P42 each yr after. Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage w/ Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable by installment of P52.32 on the 1st yr & P42 on each succeeding yr.

The receipts of the subsequent payment were made in the name of Magdalena only. The CA found them to be her paraphernal property. ISSUE: WON Lots 5 & 6 are conjugal property. NO RATIO: They are her paraphernal property, thus petitioners are not entitled to the land.

Lot6 was purchased in her own name & for her own exclusive benefit before her marriage to Manuel. She paid the initial installment before the marriage & the balance was paid during the marriage. All the receipts for the installments paid, even during Manuels lifetime, were issued in Magdalenas name & the deed of sale of lot6 was made in her name despite the fact that Manuel was still alive. The acquisition of lot5 was the same as lot6. Under Act No. 1120 of the alienation of Friar Lands, the certificate is only an agreement to sell & doesnt vest ownership of the land. Since the receipts for the installments paid were issued in her name & the deed of sale in her name, this shows that the property belonged to her; ownership had vested on the buyer-spouse BEFORE the marriage. Since the installments paid during the marriage are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to Magdalena, such amounts should be reimbursed to the CPG. Calimlim-Canullas v Fortun PONENTE: Melencio-Hererra FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas & Fernando Canullas were married on Dec 19, 1962. They had 5 kids. They lived in a small house on a residential land in question w/ an area of approximately 891 square meters, located at Bacabac, Pangasinan. After Fernandos dad died in 1965, Fernando inherited the land. In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family & was living w/ private respondent, Corazon Daguines. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on Oct 21, 1981 by the then CFI of Pangasinan w/c judgment has become final. On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the property w/ the house on it to Daquines, for 2k. In the document of sale, Fernando described the house as also inherited by me from my deceased parents. Unable to take possession of the lot & house, Daguines initiated a complaint on June 18, 1980 for quieting of title & damages against Mercedes. The latter resisted & claimed that the house where she & her kids lived, including the coconut trees on the land, were built & planted w/ conjugal funds & through her industry; that the sale of the land together w/ the house & improvements to Daguines was null & void because they are conjugal properties & she had not given her consent to the sale. ISSUE:

debtor Osmena. The sheriff despite the protests of Petrona sold off the two parcels (separate property of Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmena was the successful bidder. Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to recover her property. The defendant Osmena contended that even though land was separate property of Petrona, the usurfructuary right belonhgs to the CP since it was purchased using CP dunds. Defendant prayed that the revenues from both properties, being CP, should be made liable for the debt. ISSUE: WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue of the parcels of land which belong to wife exclusively. YES RATIO: A. 141 OCC says the fruits, revenues or interest collected or accrued during the marriage relation, coming from the conjugal properties or from that w/c belongs to one of the spouses, are community property. A.1358 OCC states that the fruits of paraphernal properties form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership & are liable for the payment of the expenses of the married couple. The conjugal properties shall be liable for all debts & obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband for the support of the family. The husbands creditor may bring his action not, as a general rule, against the paraphernal properties, but against the fruits & income of such property of the wife. Since the fruits of exclusive property belong to the CP. The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage, for & in the exercise of an industry or profession by w/c he contributes toward the support of the family are not his personal & private debts & the products or income from the wifes own property, w/c, like those of her husbands are liable for the payment of the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the payment of such debts. As to whether the defendants prayer for an appointment of a receiver is to be granted, A1984 says that the wife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and (A1412) says that the husband is the administrator of the CCP. Thus, appointment of a receiver shall deprive the spouses of these rights; moreover, there is no need for it. PEREZ V LANTIN FACTS: For an indebtedness contracted in connection w/ Damaso Perezs business, a money judgment was obtained by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso. Wherein Damaso owed him P17,309.44 for unpaid purchases of leather materials used in his shoe manufacturing business. A writ of execution was issued & shares of stocks registered in Damasos name were levied. 1st notice: Sept 1961, respondent Sheriff of Mla scheduled auction sale of levied 3,573 shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso Perez w/ Republic Bank. Judge suspended such sale on the ground that it was highly excessive & unjust, debt was only PhP17,309.44 while value of shares was PhP357,300. 2nd notice: Oct 1961, cancelled by CA pending hearing of Perez motion for mandamus & certiorari w/ preliminary injunction 3rd notice: Jan 1963, sale was lowered to 210 shares of stock. But was later enjoined by the ff complaint. In the same month, petitioner Mercedes Perez filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the levied shares are conjugal assets w/c are not answerable for the judgment debt of her husband Damaso, since it was a personal obligation contracted not for the benefit or interest of their conjugal partnership. 4th notice: Oct 1963, auction sale of 220 shares of stock scheduled by Sheriff but was suspended due to Mrs Cobb-Perez filing a 3rd party claim over the shares of stocks. 5th notice: Nov 63 but was later suspended by Mr Perezs offer of his alleged cash dividends in same bank worth PhP19,985. His motion/offer denied. 6th notice: Jan 65: auction sale of 240 shares of stock. Sheriff enjoined for petitioners posted a bond of PhP10,000 for writ of preliminary injunction prayed ISSUE: WON judgment debt is Damasos exclusive & private debt. NO RATIO: Petitioners failed to support their claim that the levied shares are conjugal assets & that the judgment debt is a personal obligation of Damaso. All properties of the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved otherwise. The party who invokes this presumption must 1st prove that the hproperty was acquired during the marriage. Hence, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption (A.160

1) 2)

WON the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of a conjugal property. YES WON the sale of the land together w/ the house & improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction. NO

Under A. 158 CC, the land & building belong to the CPG but CPG is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor to the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, w/c value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Conversion of land from exclusive to conjugal property should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon; thus, the land & house are conjugal property & could not have been sold to Daguines w/o Mercedes consent. 2) The contract of sale is null & void for being contrary to morals & public policy. Under the law, spouses are prohibited from selling property to each other, subject to certain exceptions. This prohibition alos applies to common-law relationships. JAVIER v OSMENA FACTS: Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona Javier who inherited from her parents 2 parcels of land. To perfect her ownership, she acquiored from her fathers second wife the usufructuary right on properties for 3thou. Florentino, who succeeded Petronas father as a commission merchant in their family business in Manila, acquired the debt of Petronas father and became indebted to Tomas Osmena (one of the chief clients) in sum of four or five thou. Unable to pay, judgement was rendered in favor of

CC). Since there was no evidence as to when the shares of stocks were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of Damaso alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to him. Conceding that the shares are conjugal assets, petitioners still failed to prove that their ganancial partnership is not liable for the payment of the judgment debt. The obligation was contracted in the purchase of materials used in the manufacturing business of Damaso. And debts contracted by the husband for & in the excersice of the industry or profession by w/c he contributes to the support of the family, cant be deemed to be his exclusive & private debts. NOTES: In the case, the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain motion to quash the writ of execution for none of the ff grounds were present. It can only do so when: (1) writ has been improvidently issued, (2) it has been issued against the wrong party, (3) it is defective in substance, (4) judgment debt has been paid, (5) writ has been issued w/o authority, (6) there has been a change in the situation of the parties w/c makes execution inequitable, or (7) controversy has never been submitted to court and therefore no judgment has been rendered. DBP v ADIL FACTS: On Feb. 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor & Jovita VIllafuerte obtained an agricultural loan of 2k from Agricultural & Industrial Bank (AIB w/c is now DBP), w/c is evidenced by a promissory note payable in 10 equal yearly amortizations. After 10 years, they were still unable to pay the loan. Thus, Confesor, who was a member of Congress, issued a 2nd promissory note acknowledging the loan & promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961. He further agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage if & when he fails to pay. Another stipulation is that if he secures a certificate of indebtedness from the govt for his back pay, hell be allowed to pay amount out of it. The amount remained unpaid on the specified date. Thus DBP filed a compliant against he spouses on Sept. 11, 1970. The City Court of Iloilo decided in favor of DBP & ordered the spouses to pay the debt w/ interest. CFI of Iloilo reversed this decision & dismissed the complaint against the spouses. ISSUES: 1) WON the right of prescription may be waived or renounced. YES 2) WON the 2nd promissory note it binding on the conjugal partnership. YES RATIO: 1) CC Art. 1112 right to prescription may be tacitly renounced resulting from acts w/c imply abandonment of such right. The prescription w/ regard to the 1st promissory note had set it. However, the 2nd promissory note acknowledged the debt & even promised to pay the same thus, the right to prescription was effectively & expressly renounced. In Villaroel vs. Estrada the debt barred by prescription cant be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing & assuming the prescribed debt would be valid & enforceable. Prescription only bars the remedy, w/c is the payment of the debt, but it doesnt bar the debt itself. The new promise made by Confesor constitutes a new cause of action.

Romeo contends that his salaries as conjugal partnership property cannot be made liable for the personal obligation of the spouses, & therefore cannot be garnished to satisfy his obligation. ISSUES:

1) 2) 3)

WON his salary is exempt from execution. NO WON the LC acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the garnishee (Mapua) to deduct from Romeos monthly salary to pay his debt. NO WON the garnishment on Romeos salary was proper, considering that the salaries of the spouses are conjugal partnership property, & further that the conjugal partnership cannot be made liable for the personal obligations of one of the spouses. NO

RATIO: 1) Romeo was obviously misleading the court as to his testimonies regarding his salaries and expenditures. The truth was his total monthly expenses amount to P507.82 and his monthly income totals P680.80 and thus the earnings exceed the sum necessary for the support of the family by P172.98. Consequently, he is not exempt. 2) The relevant provision in such a case is Rule 39(38) of the ROC which provides that if, upon investigation of his current income and expenses, it appears that the earning of the judgment debtor are more than what is necessary for the support of his family, the judge may order him to pay the judgment debt in fixed monthly installments, as how the judge in the CFI had ordered. 3) Salaries of the spouses constitute part of the CP, under A. 153 (2), w/c may answer only for the liabilities enumerated in A.161, NCC. Under A.161, in order to make the CP liable for the personal obligation of the spouses, it must be shown that the debt was contracted during the marriage by the husband for the benefit of the CP. Under the NCC, there is no presumption that debts & obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband are conjugal. In the case at bar, it appears that the promissory note was executed and signed by Romeo alone. Furthermore, the promissory note does not in any way divulge whether or not the loan secured by the promissory note was for the benefit of the family. Since Romeo has not proved that the loan was for the benefit of said conjugal partnership, the inevitable conclusion is that the loan was his exclusive personal indebtedness for w/c the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable. On the contention that since the indebtedness was contracted during the marriage with his present wife, the law presumes that the loan was contracted for the benefit of his family. This is not tenable. Given the ruling in De la Cruz v. De Gula, before granting a loan to the husband, one should first make inquiry & satisfy himself that the loan applied for will be for the benefit of the CP & if such purpose is not stated in detail in the document of loan w/c should be signed, preferably by both spouses, the loan may be a personal obligation of the husband, for w/c the conjugal property is not answerable, except in case it redounded to the benefit of the family. On the other contention, that of the CP belongs to the husband, thus it can be validly levied upon to satisfy the money judgment. of the conjugal properties doesnt belong to the husband as to be validly levied upon, for as long as the conjugal partnership subsists, there can be no 1.2 share of the husband or wife. Only when the CP dissolved & liquidated & there is a net remainder, may the same be divided between the spouses. In the meantime, the interest of each in the conjugal partnership property is inchoate & is a mere expectancy. Thus, any levy on the conjugal partnership property o satisfy the money judgment against the husband is null & void. Held: Romeos liability is his personal responsibility and the conjugal partnership cannot therefore be held liable. Consequently, the garnishment on his salary is null and void. LUZON SURETY V DE GARCIA FACTS: Ladislao Chavez ( as principal) and petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (as surety) executed a surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any & all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges & expenses of whatsoever kind & nature w/c it may incur. On April 27, 1956 PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees, and costs of the suit. On August 8, 1957 a 3rd party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by Luzon Surety. July 30, 1960 a writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum of P8,839.97. August 9, 1960 a wit of garnishment was issued levying and


CFI claims the 2nd promissory note not binding pursuant to new CC Art. 166: unless wife is spendthrift, serving civil interdiction or confined in leprosarium, the husband cant alienate or encumber real property of the CP w/o her consent. Thus, the CFI held that in signing the new promissory note alone, Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife. HOWEVER, A. 165 CC states that the husband is the administrator of CP. Thus, all debts & obligations w/c he contracts for the benefit of the CP are chargeable to the CP. He, Confesor, signed the 2nd promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable for obligation. CUATICO v. MORELOS FACTS: Romeo Morelos secured a loan from Lorenzo Cuatico by a promissory note. Romeo was unable to pay so Lorenzo instituted a complaint against Romeo and his wife Amada for the collection of the sum of P5K plus interest. The CFI of Manila declared Romeo in default (and Amada, who was also impleaded, was relieved as she didnt sign the promissory note) & ordered the garnishment of Romeos salary from the Mapua Institute of Technology, where Romeo worked. Romeo moved for the dissolution of the writ of garnishment w/c was denied. Hence, this appeal.

garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses, from their sugar plantation registered in their names. The Garcias filed a suit for injunction & the TC ruled in their favor. ISSUE: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, can be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3 rd party in favor of a surety agreement. NO RATIO: A CP under A.161 is liable only for such debts & obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CP. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal property however, only obligations incurred by the him that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. Thus, there must be the requisite showing then of some advantage w/c clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. And in this case there is none. Nor can there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a 3 rd party Ladislao Chaves. Acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement is not an act that would benefit the conjugal partnership While the husband, by signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem & to have earned the confidence of the business community, such benefit even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote & fanciful to come w/in the express terms of the provision. To make a CP respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat & frustrate the avowed objective of the NCC w/c is to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. Reyes, concurring: A.161 par1, doesnt require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the CP from the husbands transaction but that it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the ratio in Javier v Osmena that obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his profession are collectible from the CP. AYALA INVESTMENT V CHING FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan of P50,300,000 from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Alfredo Ching, the Executive Vice-Pres of PBM signed a surety to the loan, making himself liable w/ PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. Upon PBMs failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of money from PBM and Ching. A writ of execution was issued wherein the properties of Ching were to be levied & scheduled for auction. The 3 properties involved were conjugal properties of Ching & his wife; thus, Ching asked that the auction sale upon said properties be enjoined because such are part of the CPG & couldnt be held liable to answer for a loan that didnt redound to the benefit of his family. The auction still took place & AIDC being the only bidder acquired the properties. As such, Ching instituted an action in the court to declare the sale null & void. The LC and CA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no legal effect. ISSUE:

CARLOS V ABELARDO FACTS: Oct 1989: resp & his W Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance USD 25K for the purchase of h&lot in Paraaque. Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount to the seller of the property to enable and assist the sps conduct their married life independently and on their own July 1991: petitioner inquired about the status of the loan. The sps acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet ready to settle it. Respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries by making various threats against the petitioner. Aug 94: formal demand was made by Carlos but sps failed yet again to comply Oct 94: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the sum & damages against sps in RTC of Valenzuela Sps, having been separated in fact for more than a yr prior to filing of complaint, submitted separate answers. W admitted securing a loan together w/ H but claimed that loan was payable on a staggered basis. H claimed that sum was not a loan but his share of income on contracts in reviving the petitioners construction business RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos CA reversed decision and dismissed the complain for insufficiency of evidence ISSUES:

1) 2)

WON USD25K or its equivalent PhP625K was in the nature of a loan. YES If so, WON loan is liability of both spouses. YES

RATIO: 1) The petitioner was able to prove it as a loan by a preponderance of evidence in providing the check he issued, the acknowledgement of the wife of their accountability, and the petitioners demand letter sent and received by respondent. Husbands claim that it is his rightful share as income, profit or salary is untenable because there is no showing that he is a stockholder, an employee or an agent of the corporation. 2) The acknowledgement of the loan made by the wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the h&lot w/c became their conjugal home. Pursuant to Art 121 No. 2&3, even w/ the alleged lack of consent of respondent-H, defendant-H & W are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. FELIPE v HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON FACTS: Maximo Aldon & Gimena Almosara were married in 1936 & they bough several parcels of land. These land were divided into 3. In 1951, Gimena, sold an unregistered 16-hectare conjugal land in San Jacinto, Masbate w/o the consent of her husband, Maximo (died in 1959), to Eduardo & Hermogena Felipe. Maximos heirs filed an action for annulment in 1976, claiming they were the rightful owners of the properties. They claim that they orally mortgaged the lands to the spouses & an offer to redeem the mortgage was refused by the Felipes. The Felipes contend that they purchased the land & it was delivered to them. The TC while the declared the Felipes as the lawful owners & the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA reversed the TC decision & declared the sale as invalid & ordered an accounting of the produce of the land since 1951 & payment of the net monetary value of the profits after deducting P1800. 1. 2. 3. 4. CA ratio: if transfer was through an oral contract of mortgage: redemption allowed anytime upon repayment of P1,800.00 if it was done through sale: redemption is improper what really transpired: Deed of Purchase & Sale executed by Gimena in favor of the Felipe spouses sale wasnt forged but invalid since deed was executed w/o the consent of Maximo since the lots were conjugal (presumed as such because were purchased during marriage). This was properly raised in the pleading considering the fact that complaint alleges that lands were purchased from Gimena & Maximo.

1) 2)

WON the CP is liable for a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer? NO Was act of the husband, in securing the loan, part of his industry, business or career from which he supports his family. NO

RATIO: 1) The execution of the surety agreement did not redound to the benefit of the family since it was a corporate loan extended & used by PBM. A161(1), CC and A121 (2) FC are clear in requiring that the loan obtained should be for the benefit of the partnership or should redound to the benefit of the CP in order for the CPG to be held liable. Burden of proof of showing that it does lies in creditor-party litigant and the AIDC presented no such proof. Moreover, actual benefits must redound to CPG & its not enough that the transaction be one that would normally produce benefit for the partnership. It must do so, in fact where such benefits directly result from the loan; such are what is contemplated by the law. 2) Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or profession of Ching. Neither is it an embarking in a business or an act of administration for the benefit of the family.

Felipes claim: since deed is not a forgery, it authenticity & due execution is beyond question. This is a question of fact that SC cant consider. Theyre only concerned w/questions of law. ISSUES:

4. WON the right of action of Sofia & Salvador Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations. NO Their right of action accrued from death of dad in 1959 & they are given 30 yrs to institute it (CC Art. 1141). Action filed in 1976, thus still w/in allowed time. Held: CA modified. Sofia & Salvador awarded their shares of lands. The Felipe spouses are possessors in bad faith ordered to make an accounting of the fruits corresponding to childrens shares from 1959 & solidarily pay value to them. TINITIGAN V TINITIGAN FACTS: Severino Tinitigan Sr, on Sept. 17, 1975 filed a motion in a pending case seeking judicial approval of the sale of a 2-storey residential house & lot w/c are conjugal properties located at Pasay City. Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the property for 300k to Quintin Lim, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue in the amount of P256,137.79 & to forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal properties. On Sept 29,1975 the CFI of Rizal, issued an order granting Tinitigan authority to sell the house & lot in Pasay City, in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for 300k. On June 1, 1976 the CA gave its decision upholding the orders of respondent Judge, particularly, the orders of Sept 29, approving the sale of the conjugal property. ISSUE: WON the order of Sept 29, rendered by Judge Navarro, is valid. RATIO: Petitioners Teofista Tinitigan, et al, argue that the order authorizing Severino to sell the property is void, because he had no authority to sell it, they being under the administration of his wife Teofista. This has no legal basis. A. 165 NCC states: the husband is the administrator of the CP, w/c is the general rule. Though A.1658 states that the wife may be express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property. Other provisions in the Code also speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a judicial decree. However, such provisions are not applicable in this case. The judicial decree on Oct 29, 1975, appointing Teofista as administratrix of the CP cannot be treated as an exception because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal granted Severino the authority to sell the property. Besides, her appointment was not absolute since it was subject to certain conditions that were agreed upon. Thus, the conclusion is that Severino did not ceased being the administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the motion for judicial approval of the sale was granted. Being the administrator, however, doesnt give him the outright authority to alienate or encumber assets. This would require the express or implied consent of Teofista subject to certain exceptions. A. 166 NCC states that unless the wife has been declared incapacitated, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any property of the CP w/o her consent wherein the court may compel her to grant it if she unreasonably refuses to give consent. This is why Severino sought judicial approval. The sale was necessary to answer for a big, conjugal liability w/c might endanger the familys economic standing. The case at hand actually is one wherein the wifes consent is not required & impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary. According to A. 171 NCC, the husband may dispose of the CP for the purposes specified in A. 161 & 162. In general, these articles deal w/ the obligations of the CP. A. 161, par1 provides that the CP shall be liable for all debts & obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CP, & those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the case where she may legally bind the partnership. GUIANG V CA FACTS: Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz were married on December 24, 1968. They have 3 children Junie, Harriet and Jodie or Joji. February 14, 1983 they bought a piece of land from Manuel Callejo with Gilda Corpuz as the vendee. The consideration was payable in instalment and with the right of cancellation in favour of the vendor should the vendee fail to pay for 3 successive instalments April 22, 1988 the spouses sold of their Lot 9 Block 8 to the defendant spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. June 1989 Gilda Corpuz went to Manila (with the consent of the husband) to look for employment in the Middle East but she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter.

1) 2) 3) 4)

WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. NO WON Gimena & her kids can ask for an annulment of contract. NO WON petitioners have acquired the land by acquisitive prescription. NO WON the right of action of Sofia & Salvador Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations. NO

1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. NO Note the ff. elementary rules: 1. CC Art. 165: husband is administrator of CP 2. CC Art. 166: subject to certain exceptions, husband cant alienate/encumber any real prop of the CP w/o wifes consent 3. CC Art. 172: wife cant bind CP w/o husbands consent except in cases provided by law Since Gimena sold lands belonging to CP w/o husbands consent & such sale is not covered by instances except in cases provided by law, the sale is defective. Not invalid, as held by the CA, because that term is imprecise when used in relation to contracts because the CC uses specific names in desinating defective contracts. It can either be: 1. rescissible (art. 1380) when all essential elements are untainted (Gimenas consent was tainted) 2. voidable (art. 1390) 3. unenforceable (art. 1403) 4. void/inexistent (art. 1409) Deed of sale is a voidable contract. Under A.1390 CC, among the voidable contracts are those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract. Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale since the consent of both spouses is needed. This is further supported by CC Art. 173, w/c provides that contracts entered by husband w/o wifes consent when such is required, are annullable at her instance during marriage & w/in 10yrs from questioned transaction. The contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all the essential elements are untainted but Gimenas consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as unenforceable, since it doesnt fit any of those described in A.1403 CC. Finally, it cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of those in A.1409 CC. Thus, it must be a voidable contract. 2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for annulment of contract . NO GIMENA - Its only subject to annulment of husband during marriage because he was the victim who had interest in contract, whereas Gimena was partly responsible for defect. Gimena is barred from doing this during & even after the marriage. CHILDREN While marriage was still subsisting, they could NOT seek for its annulment since their right to the lands was merely inchoate/expectant. But upon death of Maximo, they acquired the right to question the defective contract in so far as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their dads share in lands. Maximos share is & theyre entitled to 2/3 of such; remaining 1/3 belongs to Gimena. 3. WON petitioners have acquired land by acquisitive prescription. NO They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff instances: a. Vicente, son of the Felipe spouses, attempted to have Gimena sign a ready-made document purporting to sell the disputed lands to the Felipes in Dec. 1970. They knew land didnt belong to them. b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining Gimenas consent to the construction of irrigation pumps on the lands. If they were the owners, why did they have to get her consent? c. Improvements were only being made in 1970 when sale was in 1951. d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974. e. No attempt to obtain Maximos signature despite fact that Gimena & Hermogena were close relatives. Given that they did possess the lands, possession in bad faith is covered by extraordinary prescription w/c lapses in 30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 & case filed in 1976, 30 yrs had not yet lapsed.

January 1990 Harriet (daughter) informed her mother that her father intended to sell the remaining portion of the land including their house to the Guiangs. Gilda Corpuz objected to the sale. Harriet did not inform her father but instead she gave the letter of her mother to the Guiangs. Judie Corpuz pushed through with the sale of the remaining portion and a deed of transfer of rights was executed. March 1 (or15), 1990 to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuzs title over the lot transferred, Luzviminda Guiang executed another agreement over lot 9 block 8 with Manuela Callejo (widow of the original owner) {Manuel and Manuela} March 11, 1990 Gilda Corpuz returned home and together with her children they stayed at their home. At this time her husband is already living with another woman already. The Guiangs charged Gilda in the barangay for trespassing. March 16, 1990 the parties signed a document known as amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz asked for the annulment of the settlement. Court of Appeals ruled that the sale was void because it was done without the consent of the wife. The amicable settlement did not ratify the sale because Art. 1409 expressly bars the ratification of the contracts of those prohibited or declared void by law. ISSUES:

FACTS: Relucio seeks to have the CoA decision set aside, which denied a petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs order (that then denied her motion to dismiss the case against her inclusion as party defendant). Angelina Lopez is legally married to Alberto Lopez. In 1968, Alberto abandoned her and their four legitimate children. He also abrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of their CP. He spent and used the CP for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of Angelina and their four children. Since 1976, he also maintained an illicit relationship and cohabitated with Imelda Relucio. Since then, they amassed quite a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residentialjewelry, etc. These properties are in the names of (in CoA case, the defendant) Alberto and Imelda or jointly, or their dummies. They have been acquired mostly byactual contribution and industry of Alberto. He also, with intention to escape his obligations as a father and husband, placed some properties in the name of Relucio and even stashed away some. He has also alienated various properties that belong to the CP, spending the proceeds thereof for his benefit, Imeldas and their two illegitimate children. ISSUE: 1) WON Angelinas petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the CP against her husband established a cause of action against petitioner. NO 2) WON Imeldas inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for complete adjudication of the controversy. NO RATIO: 1) A cause of action is an act or omission of one party (the defendant) in violation of the legal right of the other. There are three elements: 1. right in favor of plaintiff 2. obligation on part of defendant to respect that right 3. act or omission on part of defendant in violation of that right Complaint of Angelina is that of an aggrieved wife against her husband. It doesnt seek relief from Imelda. References to her, are merely incidental to set forth facts and circumstances that prove cause of action against Alberto. All of Angelinas causes of action were against her husband:

1. 2.

WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed. NO

WON the CA erred in not declaring as voidable contract under Art. 1390 CC, the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution of the amicable settlement by the contending parties. NO

1. The deed of Transfer of Rights was a void contract. Petitioners contend that it is a valid contract and that Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed and that the absence of the consent of Mrs. Corpuz merely made the Deed voidable and under Art. 1390 provides that it is susceptible of ratification. Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. This article refers to contracts visited by vices of consent (consent was vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud) The consent of Mrs. Corpuz was totally inexistent or absent. Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) Disposition or encumbrance is void. The court compared the civil code with the family code. Under Art. 166 of the civil code the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made without the consent of the wife. Art 173 provided that the wife is 10 years during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance. This provision was not carried to the Family Code and as such any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband after August 3, 1988 without the consent of the wife would be considered as null and void. Fraud and intimidation was only present during the execution of the amicable settlement and not during the Deed of Transfer of Right. When is a contract null and void? Absence of any of the elements: cause, object & consent. 2. No The Deed of Transfer of Right cannot be ratified because an amicable settlement cannot validate an invalid act. Art. 1422 provides that: A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent. RELUCION V LOPEZ

2. 3. 4. 5.

as to judicial appointment as administratrix of the CP or ACP arising from her marriage to AlbertoImelda is a stranger to such cause of action since A128 of FC refers only to sps with regards to compliance with marital obligations, petitions for judicial separation or property or for appointment as administratrix as to accounting, which is an incident of marriage as to forfeiture of Albertos share in co-owned property acquired during illicit relationship with Imeldathe issue is whether there is basis in law for forfeiture of Albertos share as to seeking support, which cant be sought from stranger as to moral damages

2) Imelda isnt a real party-in-interest; there can be a final determination of action even without her inclusion. A judgment in favor of Angelina would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto. Moreover, complete relief will be granted to Angelina even without the inclusion of Imelda. See page 584. JADER-MANALO V CAMISA FACTS: April 1992: Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across respondent sps ad in Bulletin Today selling their 10-door apartment in Mkt and another property in Taytay, Rizal. Interested in both properties, petitioner negotiated for its purchase through the sps real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno.

After a visual inspection of the lots, petitioner met w/ both the sps and made a definite offer to buy the properties. After negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner agreed upon the purchase price of PhP1.5M for Taytay property & PhP2.1M for Mkt property. Agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. Purchase was on installment basis and downpayment through checks was made by petitioner. Ff day, Norma, the sps and the real estate broker met to incorporate notations and revise contracts to sell At yet another mtg, petitioner was surprised to learn that sps were backing out of the agreement because they needed spot cash for the purchase price. Norma Camaisa refused to sign contract to sell.


1) 2) 3)

WON sale of real properties of the spouses have already been perfected. NO WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property w/o his wifes written consent. NO WON Court may intervene to authorize the transaction. NO

Sec. 3, Rule 83, Rules of Court. They also claim that wards are no longer under guardianship & respondents misrepresented part re school materials & fees. Issue of insufficient funds was also raised. ISSUES: 1) WON private respondents are entitled to the allowance. YES 2) WON private respondents are entitled to allowance from the intestate estates of Pablos parents. NO 3) WON the motion was granted by the CFI w/o hearing. NO RATIO: 1. WON priv respondents are entitled to the allowance. - YES Pursuant to CC Arts. 188 & 290 and not Rules of Court, Rule 83, Sec. 3. CC is a substantive law that cant be impaired by a procedural rule like the ROC. CC Art. 188 makes no distinction w/regard to minor or incapacitated children unlike the ROC. Thus, even if some children have already reached majority or is married is immaterial. It is not a determining factor of their right to allowance under A. 188 Allowance will be considered as advances from their shares in inheritance from dad. Note that spouse contemplated in Art. 188 is only the legitimate spouse & not common-law spouses who are mom of children here. Thus, Anselma is NOT entitled to support. 2. WON priv respondents are entitled to allowance from intestate estates of Pablos parents - NO Theyre only entitled to estate of their dad, Pablo. New CC Art. 992 states that illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from legit children & relatives of dad/mom & vice-versa. Settled in Diaz vs. Felisa Pamuti-Jardin. 3. WON motion was granted by CFI w/o hearing - NO Notice of Hearing was issued & theres even proof that petitioners lawyers received such. Lawyer even filed an opposition. Besides, allowances have been granted for 8 yrs now. GARCIA v MANZANO FACTS: Gonzalo Garcia filed an action against his wife, Consolacion Manzano, for the declaration of the separation of their conjugal partnership property on the ground that they have been living separately since 1948 & that all attempts at reconciliation btwn them have failed. As a result of their joint efforts, they accumulated real & personal properties. And that since their separation, Consolacion assumed complete management & administration of the CPP. He alleges mismanagement of the CPG since she was exclusively enjoying the fruits of it, she refused to turn over to Gonzalo his rightful share or allow him participation in the partnership, she conducted ficticious transfers & alienation of prop to 3 rd persons & that she neglected to file income tax returns. Upon motion of Consolacion, the TC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to a judicial declaration of sep of prop. NO RATIO: His complaint doesnt establish a case for separation of properties. Consistent w/ its poicy of discouraging a regime of sep as not harmonious w/ the unity of the family & the mutual affection & help expected of the spouses, the OCC & NCC require that sep of properties shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in M settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the M; and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for the causes specified in A. 191, NCC. In the sys established by the NCC, the wife doesnt administer the conjugal prop unless w/ the consent of the husband, or by decree of the court & under its supervision w/ such limitations as the court may deem advisable. In the event of such maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the husband doesnt lie in a judicial separation of properties but in revoking the power granted to the wife & resume the administration of the communal property & the conduct of the affairs of the CP. He may enforce his right of possession & control of the conjugal prop against his wife, & seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or encumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, A. 167, 172 & 178 NCC contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife against the abuses of her husband bec normally, only the latter can commit such abuses. Therefore, he cannot claim that he should be entitled to the same remedies. PARTOSA-JO v CA FACTS:

RATIO: 1& 2) Accdg to Art 124 FC, the law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife. Otherwise, the disposition is void. Even though Norma was aware of and participated in the negotiations for the sale, mere awareness of a transaction is not consent and her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. 3) A. 124, FC also states that court authorization is only resorted to in cases where the sp who does not give consent is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such, court authorization cannot be sought. SANTERO v CFI OF CAVITE FACTS: Pablo Santero only legitimate son of Pascual Santero (died 1970) & Simona Pamuti vda de Santero (died 1976). He died in 1973.

Petitioners are children of late Pablo & Felixberta Pacursa, his 1st wife

Priv respondents (Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina & Miguel) are 4 of 7 children of Pablo & Anselma Diaz, his 2nd wife Pablo married neither Felixberta nor Anselma. Priv respondents filed a Motion for Allowance before CFI. CFI decided in their favor granting such motion. 1. Priv respondents claim that allowance is support for educational expenses, clothing & medical necessities. Anselma Diaz, guardian-movant of children, claimed that a similar motion was granted last year. 2. Petitioners/oppositors: Wards are no longer schooling & they have reached age of majority. Also, they claim that administrator doesnt have sufficient funds to cover said allowance because current funds are held in trust for benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of Kawit prop from w/c administrator derives income of Pablos intestate estate. 3. Anselma: some of her children are not in school precisely because they dont have funds to finance such. Theyll be enrolled as soon as they get the allowance. She cited: a. CC Art. 290: Support is for substance, dwelling, clothing & medical attendance accdg to social position of family. It also includes education until person entitled to support completes education/training even beyond age of majority. b. Sec. 3, Rule 83, Rules of Court: Widow & minor or incapacitated children of deceased are entitled to allowances upon settlement of estate as may be determined by court. CFI further ruled that Pablos estate is quite big & allowances would be insignificant & can be easily replaced from the gen funds. Children are granted P2k allowance each for tuition, clothing materials & subsistence. March 25, 1985: another Motion for Allowance was filed by priv respondents for inclusion of Juanita, Estelita, & Pedrito Santero (remaining 3 children of Pablo & Anselma) in grant of allowance. Granted by the CFI. Anselma explained that the 3, even if theyre of age already, are still entitled to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in inheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of New CC1. Petitioners opposed motion. CFI ordered estate administrator to get back the allowance of 3 additional children based on petitioners Urgent Motion to Direct Administrator to Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to Movants. Among petitioners contentions: children have attained majority, 2 are gainfully employed, 1 married thus no longer covered under

Art. 188, New CC Support shall be given to surviving spouse & children from common mass of prop upon liquidation of inventoried prop & until what belongs to him is delivered; but from this shall be deducted amt received for support w/c exceeds fruits/rents pertaining to them.

Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he fathered 15 children. The Petitioner in this case claims to be his legal wife (Prima) wherein they a daughter named Monina Jo. Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City it was their agreement that she was temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her. In 1980 Prima filed an action for judicial separation of conjugal property and this was consolidated with her earlier petition for support. In the disposition of the trial court it was held that Prima was legally married to Jose Jo and therefore entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and Jose Jo was ordered to give a monthly support of 500. There was no definite disposition as to the judicial separation of conjugal property. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Trial Court but the complaint for the judicial separation of conjugal properties was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Art. 178 of the CC. However, the penultimate paragraph of the decision provides: It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Art. 178, third paragraph of the CC, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein. ISSUE:

On July 22, 1958 she filed a complaint praying for the sep of prop, monthly support & payment of attorney fees & costs. In 1949, she claims that she already suspected that Severino was sleeping around. W/c was only confirmed by a note she found in his shirt in 1951. She confronted him about it & he promised her to forsake his mistress. W/c he didnt. Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling, but only paid short visits. She contends that he abandoned her & their children to live in Mla w/ his mistress, Nenita Hernandez. And that after 1955 until the time of the trial, he had never visited the conjugal abode & when he was in Bacolod, she was denied communication w/ him. RTC ordered separation & division of the conjugal assets (valued at 500, 000), directing the Severino to pay to Estrella 20k as attorneys fees, with legal interest form date of original complaint (July 22, 1958) until fully paid plus costs. ISSUE:

1) 2)

WON separation of husband from his wife constitutes abandonment in law that would justify the separation of conjugal partnership property. NO WON the husbands failure and/or refusal to inform his wife of the state of their business is an abuse of his powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets. NO

1) 2) 3)

WON a final judgment rendered by the LC may be modified if the dispositive portion did not contain the decision extensively discussed in the body of the decision. YES WON the separation of the parties was due to their agreement. NO WON Pirma is entitled to judicial separation of property. YES

RATIO: 1) In the case at bar, there was only mere physical separation & not real abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement, moral and FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was used in A.178 & in Gay v State in order for desertion of one spouses to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations & duties & rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to resume or claim ones rights or interests. Here, Severino didnt seem to have the intention to leave his family permanently since he continued to give support despite his absence w/c thus negates any intent not to return & resume his marital duties & rights. Since separation in fact between spouses doesnt affect the CP except if the husband abandons his wife w/o just cause, (A178, CC)...claims of the Estrella of concubinage on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her claim of abandonment w/c shall justify, under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets. There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates the existence of illicit relations btwn Nenita & Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he actually increased the value of their assets by over a million pesos. 2) For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts injurious to the partnership. There must be an act willfully performed & w/ utter disregard of the partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the wife, evidenced by the repetition of deliberate acts &/or omissions. COURT says theyre not condoning the husbands separation from his wife. What theyre saying is that there is an insufficiency or absence of cause of action. Remedies of A. 167 and 178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise restraint since theyre trying to preserve union of spouses: a judgment ordering a separation of assets where theres no real abandonment may eradicate the possibility of reconciliation. Alimony increased from 2000 to 3000. Attorneys fees must also be born by defendant since he left the conjugal abode and has given cause for plaintiff to seek redress in courts. IN RE: VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERNAS FACTS: Jose & Pilar Bernas were married in Dec 1932 & they had 2 kids. During the M they acquired 12 parcels of land & 2 bldgs. On May 31, 1962, they executed an Agreement for Dissolution of conjugal partnership & sep of prop believing that this will redound to their mutual advantage , benefit & gain, & preserve peace & harmony & prevent friction, dissension & confusion btwn their heirs since Jose had 2 sets of children. After the execution of this contract, they filed w/ the court the aforementioned petition. The LC denied the petition since under A. 192 CC, a CP can only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered, w/c can only happen upon civil interdiction, declaration of absence or abandonment (w/c is under A. 191CC).

1) The dispositive portion of the decision was incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision. The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court ruling should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. It was based upon the findings that Pirma & Jose were legally married & the properties mentioned were acquired during the M although they were registered in the name of a dummy. 2) The ruling of the CA that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Art. 221 of the CC and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Thus, the only remedy available was that of legal separation. However, the separation WAS due to abandonment. They merely agreed that she would live w/ her parents while she was pregnant, & when she returned, he refused to accept her. This clearly demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship; moreover, from 19681988 when the court finally decided to award support, Jose never gave financial support. 3) O the grounds of abandonment & also failure w/o just cause to comply w/ his obligations as husband & father; apart from refusing to admit Pirma, his lawful wife, to their conjugal home, She is entitled to a judicial separation of property. Court held that, abandonment is the departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for ones family although able to do so. And the FC states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation when there is: o Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause o Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse. The physical separation of the parties coupled with the refusal by Jose to give support sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. The FC allows judicial separation of property when the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Since the LC found that Jose is the real owner of the properties, these must be divided btwn them on the assumption that they were acquired during their M. DELA CRUZ v DELCA CRUZ FACTS: Estrella and Severino dela Cruz were married on Feb 1, 1938 & they had six children. They acquired seven parcels of land at Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay Cadastre. These are all registered in their names. They are also engaged in various business ventures.

The spouses claim that A. 191 allows voluntary judicial sep or prop during the marriage subject to judicial approval ISSUE: WON voluntary separation of prop during marriage is allowed by law. YES RATIO: The CP may be dissolved by agreement of the spouse if it has judicial approval. But even those Jose has kids by his 1st M, their names werent included in the agreement or approval of the petition whereas his kids by 2nd M & his 2nd wife are. Neither were the kids by 1st M notified of such. In fact, no notice appears to have been given to the kids by 2 nd M, although the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem remote. Also, the dissolution of the CPG of the 2nd M cannot take place w/o 1st dissolving the CPG of the 1st M wherein the kids (of that M) have an interest. And the agreement may affect the rights of the kids by 1st M since A.189 CC states that in case of doubt, the partnership prop shall be divided btwn the diff partnerships in proportion to the duration of each & to the prop belonging to the respective spouses. The kids by 1st M should be notified of the proceedings & their names & addresses, as well as the names & addresses of the kids by 2nd M,be furnished by them. LACSON v SAN JOSE FACTS: Alfonso Lacson & Carmen San-Jose Lacson were married on Feb 14, 1953 & they had 4 children. On Jan 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home & began living in Mla. She filed a complaint on March 12, 1963, in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court for custody of the kids & their support. An amicable settlement was however reached btwn the spouses w/ regard to custody of the kids (wherein the 2 older kids go to their dad & the 2younger ones to their mom), support & separation of prop. This was later approved by the CFI, stating that it was conformable to law. Later, Carmen filed a complaint praying for the custody of all the kids. This was granted by the CA who declared the agreement null & void insofar as the custody of the kids was concerned. ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement & the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are conformable to law. YES RATIO: It is valid w/ respect to the sep of prop btwn the spouses & the dissolution of the CP since this is allowed by law provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Such approval was obtained & it doesnt appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the arrangements. Further, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least 5 yrs & its but proper to sever their financial & proprietary interests. Court cant force them to live w/each other & render conjugal rts to the other (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo).However, in the approval of the regime & dissolution, the court doesnt accord recognition nor legalize de facto separation. Its abnormal & fraught w/grave danger to all concerned (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). Spouses are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect & fidelity & render mutual help & support (CC Art. 109). Theres virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples to abandon each other merely due to whims & caprices. Gen. happiness of married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, they become good spouses from necessity of remaining such. Necessity is a powerful master in teaching duties w/c it imposes. (Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo). W/ regard to the custody & support of the children: all the children, including the Enrique & Teresa, were below 7 then. A.353 CC specifically commands that no mother shall be separated from her child under 7 yrs of age unless court finds compelling reasons for such measure. Ratio for Art 353: avoid tragedy where mom has seen her baby torn away from her. Compelling reasons must be rare if moms heart is not to be unduly hurt. If mom has erred such as in adultery, imprisonment & divorce will be sufficient punishment. Her moral dereliction wont affect the baby who has yet to understand situation (Report of Code Commission). Provision is mandatory & the compromise judgment by separating 2 elder children who were below 7 from their mom was null & void for violating the provision. No compelling reason was given for taking away 2 children from Carmen. CFI decision on MFR re compromise judgment only presented a mere hint. Courts cant proceed on mere insinuations. Enrique & Maria are now above 7, thus issue regarding awarding their custody to their mom has become moot & academic. But, Court should still uphold their agreement regarding custody. A.356 CC provides that every child is entitled to: 1. parental care 2. receive at least elementary education 3. moral & civic training by parents/guardians 4. right to live in atmosphere conducive to his phys, moral & intellectual devt.

Childs welfare should not be subject to parents say-so or mutual agreement alone. Court should ascertain in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted by law. Evidence should be presented & court should not merely rely on compromise judgment in determining fitness of each parent to be custodian of children. Besides, Enrique (11), since hes now over 10, should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with (Sec. 6, Rule 99, Rules of Court). If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150 monthly support is insufficient considering that prices of commodities & services have increased & kids are now of school age. CFI may increase such amount accdg to need of each child. YAPTINCHAY v TORRES FACTS: Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the CFI to appoint her, first, as Special Administratrix & then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 alleging that: o Isidro had lived w/ her continuously, openly & publicly as husband & wife for 19 yrs o Isidro died w/o a will & left an estate in Philippines, HK & other places wi/ an estimated value of about P500K; o Isidro left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary & Asuncion o On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to Isidro together w/ others exclusively owned by Teresita. The CFI granted the appointment, while Josefina Yaptinchay , the alleged legitimate wife, & Ernesto Yaptinchay & other kids of the deceased opposed this stating that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latters estate, much less to procure appointment as administratirx thereof; & that having admittedly cohabited w/ the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia, as special administratrix & of Josefina, as regular administratrix. After the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix who subsequently submitted a preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate of the deceased which included a house in North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal. This time, Teresita filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the Rizal, CFI an action for replevin and preliminary injunction for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation w/ Isidro & for damages. Respondent judge Torres ordered issued a TRO that Virginia et. al. & their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering w/ Teresitas rights to, & possession over the house now standing at North Forbes Park. Virginia et al opposed, on the grounds that: o exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased was already vested in the Pasay City, CFI Branch o the present liquidation case was filed to oust said probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this 2nd case

Teresita was not entitled to the remedy of injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute.

Virginia et. al thus prayed that Teresita & all others in her behalf be made to cease & desist from disturbing Virginias possession of the North Forbes Park house & to order removal from the house of the employees employed by Teresita, to keep Teresita et. al. from entering the house & any other real property registered in Isidros name & from interfering w/ or from disturbing the exercise by of Virginias rights & powers of administration over the assets registered in the name of Isidro and/or in the latter's possession at the time of his death. The Court granted Virginias prayers considering the Forbes Park property is really under the responsibility of Virginia as the appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro. This was amended adding that Virginia et. al are enjoined from selling, disposing or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of this case, considering that present case treats principally with the liquidation of an alleged partnership between the Teresita and the deceased. Teresitas MFR was denied hence this petition ISSUE: 1) WON the preliminary injunction may be granted. NO 2)WON the fact of living together as common-law husband & wife is sufficient basis for a claim of the share of co-owned properties. NO RATIO:

1) Injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been clearly established. In the verified petition before this Court, Teresita avers that construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by her and deceased, Teresita even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor. But in her amended complaint she had said that she acquired through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as North Forbes Park house. Virginia et. al. dispute Teresitas claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house. Maintaining that construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased without Teresita's intervention and with his own personal funds. Note that it was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after the death of Isidro the Forbes Park house was among the properties of the deceased placed under Virginias administration that respondent judge issued the injunction order. Thus, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below. Furthermore, grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although Teresitas presented loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under construction as proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction work the evidence, on the contrary were indicative that the loans she obtained from the bank were for purposes other than the construction of the home. Thus, the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on Isidros lot (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix. 2) Stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relations envisaged in A. 144 NCC is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of w/c must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the claimant had, during the cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the prop involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, claimants interest in the prop in controversy cannot be considered the present right or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction for the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. JUANIZA v JOSE FACTS: Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting w/ defendantappelant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 yrs. Jose was the registered owner & operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision w/ a freight train resulting in the death of 7 & physical injuries to 5 of its passengers. In the resulting case for damages, the CFI rendered decision ordering Jose & Rosalia to jointly & severally pay. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia praying that she should not be liable to pay for damages since the decision was based on the erroneous theory that she was living together with Jose as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, are co-owners of the jeepney. The motion was denied. The court based their decision on Article 144 of the CC which provides that when a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership ISSUES: 1) WON A. 144 is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry. NO 2) WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages w/ the registered owner. NO RATIO: 1) It has been consistently ruled that the co-ownership contemplated in A. 144, requires that the man & woman living together must not be incapacitated to contract M. Since Jose is legally M to Socorro, there is an impediment forhism to contract M w/ Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cant be a co-owner of the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose & Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of & physical injuries suffered by the passengers. 2) Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation, bec only the registered owner is responsible. VDA. DE CONSUEGRA v GSIS FACTS:

Jose Consuguera, a shop foreman of the District Engineers Office in Surigao contracted 2 marriages. The 1st to Rosario Diaz where they had 2 kids. The 2 nd, w/c was contracted in good faith while the 1st was subsisting, to Basilia Berdin, bearing 7 kids. Later he died. As a member of GSIS, he had a retirement insurance policy & his life insurance policy. The life insurance proceeds were paid by GSIS to Berdin & her kids who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. The retirement policy didnt designate a beneficiary. As a result, Rosario filed a claim with GSIS asking that such should be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra. Berdin and her children also asserted that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits. GSIS resolved the conflict by ruling that the legal heir was his widow, Rosario Diaz, who is entitled to of the retirement benefits. One the other hand, his second wife Basilia as his widow should be entitled to the remaining . Basilia Berdin, filed an action in the CFI as she was unsatisfied with the GSIS ruling. CFI ruled that when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of out wedlock will be regarded as legitimate children and each family shall be entitled to of the estate (LAO vs DEE TIM). CFI ruled the same way GSIS did. Basilia & her kids appealed. ISSUE: WON retirement insurance benefits should be awarded to the 1st or 2nd wife. RATIO: The GSIS correctly acted in dividing equally the proceeds btwn the 2 marriages; & the LC didnt commit error when it confirmed the GSIS action, it being accepted as a fact that the 2 nd M was contracted in good faith. In Gomez v Lipana, in construing the rights of 2 women who were M to the same man, a situation more or less similar to this case, it was held that since the defendants 1 st M has not been dissolved or declared void, the CP established by that M has not ceased. Nor has the 1 st wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the CC, entitled to a share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as a conjugal partner in a still subsisting M or as such putative heir, she has an interest in the husbands share in the prop here in dispute. And w/ respect to the right of the 2 nd wife, this Court observed that although the 2 nd M can be presumed to be void ab initio, as it was celebrated while the 1st M was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity, the only just & equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the 2nd wife to her share of in the prop acquired by her & her husband, & consider the other half as pertaining to the CP of the 1st M. Consuegra became part of the GSIS system around 1943. When Consuegra designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance he could not have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only when Com Act 186 was amended by RA 660 on 1951. Life insurance and retirement insurance are two distinct benefits separately and distinctly offered by GSIS. Retirement is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee for his old age, incapacity, after rendering service in the govt for a required number of years. In cases like the one at bar, retirement benefits will accrue to the estate of the employer and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiaries are named. LAYSON v OLIQUINO FACTS: Cirila Layson de Tamboan and Emiliano Tambaoan have been married since Nov 1909. In 1941, H Emiliano left the conjugal dwelling and went to live w/ mistress, now defendant, Mercedes by whom he begot 2 children. They lived together until Dec 1946. Cause of conflict: In May 1941, the rights of one Laureano Ferrer, as purchaser on monthly installment of lot No 6, Blk No 49 in Sta Mesa Heights Subdv. were transferred to Mercedes. In the Deed of Transfer, Emiliano signed for the transferee Mercedes. Later on, they built a residential hse on the lot w/ contractor Franscisco del Rosario. After the payment of the last installment, Deed of Sale was executed by Gregorio Araneta, Inc in favor of Mercedes Oliquino, married to Emiliano Tambaoan. In Dec 1946, Emiliano having become paralytic and unable to support his mistress, the latter separated from him. She filed a petition w/ CFI to change the status in the above title from married to Emiliano Tambaoan to single. Emiliano opposed claiming to be the owner of the H&lot covered by the title. Court granted her petition. An action was instituted by legal W Cirila Layson v. mistress Mercedes and Emiliano seeking that the properties (i.e. H&lot) be adjudged conjugal property of her and H, and that defendant Mercedes be ordered to reconvey the same to the conjugal partnership. Lower court ruled in her favor. Defendant Mercedes brought this appeal.


1. 2.

WON subject property is owned by Mercedes. NO If owned by Emiliano, WON alienation as gift/present to Mercedes is legal. NO

RATIO: Mercedes claims that it was through her and her sisters earnings as dressmakers that they were able to buy a laundry business. And it is w/ this busis income of PhP50/mo that she was able to purchase the H&lot. The document of sale for the lot in question was stolen. She offers testimonies of her sister, Prima Oliquino, and one Pedro Guerrero, who paid the fees of the contractor and carpenter. Emiliano, for his part, claims that he purchased the lot directly from Laureano Ferrer who is his witness. He said that at that time, he was employed in the Hawaiian & Phils Assoc, a sugar corp, earning PhP1k/mo. He also had a transpo busi w/c he derived another PhP1k/mo. Contractor Del Rosario, as his witness, further states that indeed it was Emiliano who paid him the contract price and told him that he was buying the lot for his querida.

capacity of a party to contract marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Art. 147 has clarified Art. 144, CC and now expressly provides that: o Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in coownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and o In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation (Art. 147) or declaration of nullity of the marriage (Arts 43, 50, 51, FC). When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. NICDAO CARINO v LEE CARINO FACTS: Santiago Carino contracted two marriages the first was on June 20 1969 with Susan Nicdao with whom he had two children. The second was on November 10, 1992 with Susan Yee. November 23, 1992 he passed away under the care of Susan Yee. She paid for medical and burial expense. Yee and Nicdao both filed claims for monetary benefits and financial. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCIU, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig. Yee was able to collect P21,000 from GSIS Life, GSIS burial, SSS burial. December 14, 1993 Yee filed a case for collection of sum of money against Nicdao praying that the latter be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits. Nicdao failed to file her answer and the trial court declared her in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased i. She claims that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. ii. She contends that the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void an initio because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. The marriage certificate bears no marriage license number and she presented a certification dated Marc 9, 1994 from the Local Civil Registrar that states that no record of marriage license of the deceased and Nicdao. TC ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao filed an appeal with the CoA but the decision of the trial court was affirmed. ISSUES:

As between the 2 opposing versions supplied by oral evidence, the trial court gave more credence to Emilianos version for it is more consistent and natural. It was given by witnesses Ferrer & Del Rosario who have no motives to distort the truth and who were directly involved in the purchase and construction. It was not strange for a man like Emiliano, who had the means for it, to buy a lot and construct a house for his mistress w/ whom he was living under the same roof and by whom he begot 2 children. Mercedes and her sisters have no sufficient income and it is doubtful that Emiliano would let the appellant take the little earnings of her siblings to buy the H&lot where they would live. Hence, the H&lot are conjugal property. It is evident that it was granted by way of a gift or present. However, such alienation, being in violation of CC and in fraud of the wife, is illegal and shall not prejudice her and her heirs. The gift is held invalid insofar as it prejudices the W. Pursuant to Art 1412 & 1419 CC, its nullity cannot be determined until after liquidation of CP and it is found to encroach upon the Ws portion in the partnership. This alienation should be declared illegal and noted/recorded in the register & in the cert of title of the defendant and appellant. Judgment modified. VALDES v RTC

FACTS: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on Jan. 5, 1971. In 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage in the Quezon City RTC, pursuant to Art. 36, FC (mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations) which the trial court granted. Ex-spouses were directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147, FC, and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50-52, FC, within 30 days from notice of this decision. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the direction of compliance with Arts. 50-52 asserting that the FC contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Trial court thus clarified that considering that Art. 147 explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, ex-spouses will own their family home and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the ex-spouses, the provisions on ownership found in the CC shall apply. And on the issue of disposing the family dwelling, considering that this Court has already declared the marriage as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership and provisions of Arts. 102 and 129 of the FC finds no application. Petitioners MFR was denied and in his recourse to the SC, he submits that Art. 50-52 should be controlling ISSUE: WON provisions Arr. 50-52 are controlling. NO RATIO: TC correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by the provisions of Art. 147 (a remake of Art. 144, CC) or Art. 148, FC. The particular kind of co-ownership in Art. 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision refers to the legal

1. 2.

WON article 148 is applicable to the marriage of the deceased with Yee. YES WON article 147 is applicable to the marriage of the deceased with Nicdao. YES

Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. For purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.

Under the CC valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The marriage of Nicdao and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao was sufficiently overcome

Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. The nullity of the marriage of Nicdao with the deceased does not validate the marriage of Yee because their marriage was solemnized without a judicial decree declaring the 1st marriage void. Two marriages are void and as such the applicable property regime is governed by provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. Article 148 of the Family Code refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions Actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime Marriage of Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage and as such article 148 of the FC is applicable. The P146,000 are renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. It could not be said that Yee contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the monetary benefits Intestate succession the death benefits shall pass to his legal heirs. 2. Article 147 of the Family Code governs unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license Under Article 147 wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto ** diff of Vda. de Consuegra v GSIS to this: It was promulgated in 1971, under A. 144 CC, w/c provided that prop of a man & woman living together as husband & wife, but not married or whose M is void ab initio, shall be governed by rules on co-ownership. In the case, the SC awarded half the retirement benefits to each spouses as the 2 nd M was contracted in good faith & the CP formed by the 2nd M was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity.