CALIMUTAN vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006 Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

: FACTS: Victim Cantre crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao.Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as theculprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantres house on a previous night. Thus,upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ranaway, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the back of victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the leftside of his back.Victim Cantre complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable toeat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He wassweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died. Victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massiveaccumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. Thelaceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to deathby petitioner Calimutan. IssueWhether or not petitioner should be convicted of Homicide? HeldIt should be remembered that the meeting was a chance encounter. While a runninggrudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, there was none between thevictim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victimCantre with the specific intent of killing. What is obvious was petitioners intention toprotect his helper Bulalacao who was, much younger and smaller in built than the victimCantre.In the absence of such intent, petitioner Calimutan is only guilty of recklessimprudence resulting in homicide EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 Ponente: CALLEJO, J.: FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law. HELD: 1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner. 2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.

US vs AH CHONG March 19, 1910 Ponente: Carson, J. Facts: Ah Chong, defendant, was employed as cook and deceased Pascual Gualberto as house boy at Officers quarters No. 27. Ah Chong and Pascual share the same room (Officers quarter No. 27), which is situated some 40 meters away from the nearest building. No one slept there except the two of them. One night, at about 10pm, the defendant was awakened by someone trying to force the door open. He asked who it was but the other didnt answer. Fearing that the other person was a robber, Ah Chong threatened him that if he enters the room, he will kill him. He was struck above the knee by the edge of the chair that has been placed against the door. Convinced that the other person, whom he thought was a burglar, was still forcing his way in, he struck the intruder with a kitchen knife he was keeping under his pillow. Recognizing his roommate, who he has friendly relations with, he called for help to his employers at the next building. He also got bandages to bind up Pascuals wounds. He kept a knife to defend himself. There had been several robberies around the area not long prior to the date of the event. Ah Chong and Pascual had an agreement that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint the other with his identity. Pascual went out for a walk with his two other friends that night. They returned at about 10pm and assisted the victim when they heard cries for help. The defendant admitted of stabbing his roommate, but said he did it under the impression that the other was a thief. Defendant claimed that the act was done in self-defense. Defendant was arrested and trial court found him guilty of simple homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant can be acquitted on the ground of self-defense.

HELD: No. Defendant is acquitted. The general rule is intent/malice is an essential element in a crime. In the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule (i.e., negligence), an act without malice is not punishable. Whenever a man takes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If he defends himself according to what he supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though the facts that the person believes to be true are otherwise. PEOPLE vs. OANIS G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 FACTS: As a group taking the route to Rizal street, Chief of Police Antonio Z. Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Alberto Galanta were under instructions to arrest Anselmo Balagtas, anotorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man sleepingwith his back towards the door, simultaneously fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliberrevolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turnedout to be a peaceful and innocent citizen, Serapio Tecson who upon autopsy, multiplegunshot wounds were found on his body which caused his death.The defendants alleged and appealed that in the honest performance of their official duties,they acted in innocent mistake of fact. ISSUE:Whether or not Chief of Police Oanis and Corporal Galanta were guilty of murder. HELD: Yes, both are guilty of murder. No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not besubject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. As the deceased waskilled while asleep, the crime committed by both was murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is onlywhen the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of the law who are tryingto capture him that killing him would be justified. PEOPLE vs. FERNANDO G.R. No. L-24978 March 27, 1926 FACTS: This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, in which he was held guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty years cadena temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Buenventura Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the said crime. Before the day of the crime several Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the presence of three suspicious looking persons who were prowling around the place. The accused Fernando de Fernando who, at that time, was a municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter's daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that three unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue, prowling around his house. The accused remained in the said house talking with Paciencia Delgado, both being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at about 7 o'clock at night, there appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong Miong." At the time the accused nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused inquired what he wanted but instead of answering he continued advancing with bolo in hand. Upon seeing this Fernando de Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown continued to ascend the staircase he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a neighbor Leon Torres, where, after

placing upon a table the bolos that he carried, he fell on the floor and expired. Remigio Delgado, who was in the kitchen and had recognized the voice of the unknown, on hearing the shots ran into the parlor, took hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he had fired at Buenventura Paulino. Fernando de Fernando only said "Let me go, that is a cross eyed person" and immediately repaired to the house of the teniente of the barrio, Santiago Torres, from where he telephoned to the chief of police advising him of what had happened. When the body was examined it was found that a bullet had penetrated the base of the neck at the right, imbedding itself in the left side under the skin. The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact he called "Nong Miong," which indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action. ISSUE: WON the acts committed by the accused constituted the crime for murder? And WON the accused was exempt from criminal liability and in not acquitting him? HELD: Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious intent, because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he though him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence. The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence defined and punished in article 568, in relation with article 404, of the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by law arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correcional in its minimum degree. In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is held guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and he is sentenced to suffer one year prision correcional, to pay the amount of P500 to the heirs of the deceased as an indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the costs and with credit of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already suffered.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 FACTS :Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses

that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and itabolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Codesaying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses.Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law usingthe facial challenge. HELD: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. Thepetitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand whatconduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation thatis utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot beinvoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free fromambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statuteto be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not beachieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statuteand to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of freespeech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfullysince the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in freespeech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly itmight also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its applicationmight be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them downentirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activitiesare constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore imagined than real.The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congressdecision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. PEOPLE vs. GO SHIU LING G.R. No. 115156 December 14, 1995 FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finds accused-appellant AntonioComia guilty of conspiring with four others to import regulated drugs in violationof Art. III, Section 14 in relation to Article IV, Section 21 of the Dangerous DrugsAct (Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended). ISSUE: Whether or not a crime for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act is a crimemalum prohibitum? HELD: Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot escape criminalresponsibility. The crime with which he is charged is malum prohibitum. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. As held in People vs. Lo Ho Wing :Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a" malum prohibitum" because it is punished as an offenseunder a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited bylaw. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot beconsidered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of saidact is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices tovalidly charge and convict an individual caught committingthe act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.Likewise, in

People v. Bayona, it was held:The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminalintent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if theprohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must beexercised in distinguishing the difference between the intentto commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate to act." PEOPLE vs. ORTEGA GR. 151085 August 20, 2008 Facts:Petitioner was 13 years old when he rapeda 6 year old girl This act was committed sometimein 1996. The lower courts convicted him of rapewith criminal and civil liability imposed. During thependency of appeal in the Supreme Court, RA 9344was passed which provided that at the time of thecommission of the crime, a child whose age was 15years old and below will be exempted fromcriminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether criminal liability attachesalthough there were already convictions in thelower court. Stated otherwise, whether theretroactive effect of the law is not applicable in thecase at bar. HELD: NO. Although there is a crime committed,no criminal liability attaches. Sec. 15 of RA 9344 exempts a child below fifteen from criminalliability if at the time of the commission of thecrime he is below fifteen (15) years of age. Uponassessment, the offender will be released to thecustody of his parents or be referred to preventionprograms. It is given a retroactive since penal lawswhich are favourable to the accused are giveretroactive effect(Art 22 of the Revised Penal code)Even if the crime committed is heinous asin this case rape- criminal liability does not attach.The flaw in the logic of the law should beaddressed in Congress and not in courts. This is to give life to the full intent of the law. PEOPLE,vs . PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN FACTS: The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. After that the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the driver got suspicious and reported the matter to two barangay tanods. thetanods went after the two, Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him. At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan.4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian. Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon. ISSUE: 1) whether or not the act constitutes a crime of kidnapping under art 267 2) whether or not the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime HELD:

1) YES. Kidnapping may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty 2) NO. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. Moreover the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective. The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help. The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release. INTOD vs. CA 215 SCRA 52 FACTS: Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandayas house to ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangans house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that xxx. The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. ISSUE: Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime? HELD: [i]Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: 1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket of another with the intention to steal the latters wallet and finds the pocket empty. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs .RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA FACTS: Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the following information filed against him in the Court of First Instance of Manila: The accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly by overt acts, to wit; by then and there tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which is a prizewinning number. He presented the falsified ticket. exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said number has won, fraudulently pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket the said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the crime of estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some causes other than this spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended and arrested the said accused right then and there. ISSUE: whether or not said act constitutes an impossible crime HELD: NO. It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not exercised due care. This being a complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or security of the Philippines,.Taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. Thus, RTC was correct. VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE Summary: The accused was indicted for parricide under art 246 of the RPC for the killing of his wife. HELD: The accused is guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetu a. Parricide is committed when 1) a person is killed; 2)the deceased is killed by the accused; 3)the deceased is theor the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element is the relation of the offender to the victim. In case of a marital relationship the best evidence is the marriage certificate. The own testimony of the accused

as married to the victim may also be taken as an admission against penal interest. The case was proved through circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishing the malefactor, destroying the presumption of innocence, and fulfilling the standard of moral certainty. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted in the absence of eyewitnesses and is sufficient for conviction if, a)there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which that inferences were derived are proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Further, a conviction based on such can be upheld if the circumstances established would lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. PEOPLE vs. PALAGANAS FACTS: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas (nephew) and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime Palaganas got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by Melton Ferrer, that caused him to went to the Ferrers table and uttered statements which began the fight. Ferdinand sought help to Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the Bar and upon seeing the Ferrers outside, Ferdinand pointing at the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder. ISSUE: Whether or not the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which should be appreciated by the court at the case at bar? HELD: Yes. It has been held by the Supreme Court from the precedents before the case that the use of unlicensed firearm is now considered as a special aggravating circumstance. The Court states that: Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,63 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,64 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, the decision was affirmed with certain modifications appreciating the special aggravating circumstance in the case at bar. People vs. Genosa FACTS: Marivic and Ben Genosa, who knew each other since elementary and were 3rd cousins, were married inNovember 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Their marriage, save for the first year where, according to Marivic, she livedhappily with Ben, had been tumultuous and unhappy because of the many and frequent quarrels of the couple whichusually resulted in the cruel treatment of Marivic by Ben. This went on for about 10 or 11 years, occurring aroundthrice a week when everytime the latter got drunk.On the evening of November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas, his co-worker, after having collected their salary,went to the cockfighting place of ISCO where they stayed for 3 hours and drank 2 bottles of beer, each. They thenwent to the Genosa residence but Marivic was not there because, as she explained, she was out with her cousinlooking for Ben, knowing that it was a payday and that he was probably out to gamble again. Upon arriving later at the Genosa residence and finding Ben drunk because of his staggering walking, Marivic asked Ecel to sleep in the house because she was scared that Ben might again beat her, but Ecel declined for fear of a repetition of an incidenta year ago.Ben was in his usual unruly behavior, nagging and yelling at Marivic, even cutting the antenna wire with a bolo tokeep her from watching TV. There were basically 2 incidents of attack made by Ben: 1) he whirled Marivic, causing her to fall on the bedside, and two hours later when 2) he dragged her out of the room towards the drawer, holdingher neck. He tried opening the drawer, failed, so reached for a blade instead in his wallet. At this point, she wasaware

that he was going to kill her so she smashed his arm, causing the wallet and blade to fall. She also subsequently smashed him with a metal pipe before running to the childrens room, where s he felt overwhelming self-pity and felt nauseous. Marivic admitted killing her husband, however, by shooting him later on. She had distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot him. The RTC charged Genosa with parricide, giving her the death penalty. ISSUES: 1) WON Marivic acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus (invoking BWS)2) WON there was treachery in the killing of Ben Genosa HELD: 1) No, but with 2 mitigating circumstances2) None RATIO: 1) Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed that killing him would save herlife. Here, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.The reality or even imminent danger he posed ended altogether the moment he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed, notwithstanding the Courts recognition of this special case that requiring the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment and that threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Aggression, if notcontinuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense complete or incomplete on the part of the victim.

PEOPLE vs. RICOHERMOSO Facts: On the morning of January 30, 1965, Geminiano met Pio and asked him if he could have his share of the palay that Pio harvested from tilling Geminianos land. Pio told him to drop by his house anytime to get it so Geminiano said he will drop by in the afternoon with his son Marianito. That afternoon, Geminiano sat outside Pios house to wait for the promised palay. Pio was standing by the door of his house with Severo also standing by. Marianito was standing a few feet behind his father with a gun slung in his shoulder. Hostile, Pio told Geminiano that he was not going to give him palay thus Geminiano remonstrated. Pio then unsheathed his bolo and approached Geminiano from the left. Severo took an axe and approached from the right. At this, Geminiano held up his hands and told Severo not to fight. Pio then stabbed Geminianos neck with the bolo. With Geminiano faced down on the ground, Severo hacked his back with the axe. While this was going on, Juan suddenly embraced Marianito from behind. They grappled and rolled downhill where Marianito passed out. When he came to, he saw his mortally wounded father and carried him a short distance. Geminiano died at approximately 2pm. Pio is a fugitive from justice in this case. Severo and Juan were convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The two were also convicted of lesions leves (for Marianito). Other three were acquitted. Severo and Juan appealed for the murder conviction. They contend that Geminiano unsheathed his bolo first so Pio met him and struck. As Geminiano turned to flee, Pio struck again on the left side and thus Geminiano fell to the ground and died due to the bleeding. Marianito was embraced by Juan because he allegedly reached for his gun and tried to shoot Pio. With this argument, they shift the responsibility of the killing to Pio (who was not there and not trieda fugitive) and that Pio was only acting in self-defense. Juan contends he was just protecting Pio and Severo when he prevented Mariano from firing his gun. A few days after filing this appeal however, Severo withdrew and in effect accepted prosecutions version. So, this appeal concerns Juan only. Issue: WON Juan conspired with Pio and Severe in the killing of Geminiano and is he deserving of reclusion perpetua?

Held: Yes, judgment affirmed. Considering the trios orchestrated behavior and Juans close relationship to Pio and Severo, conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy with them, planning the whole thing, from the time after Pio met Geminiano in the morning to the event in the afternoon. He cannot invoke Article 11, par 4 (justifying circumstances) in explaining his act of preventing Marianito from shooting Pio and Severo as evidence shows he did this to ensure that the killing of Geminiano happened without any risk to Pio and Severo. His malicious intention was not to avoid any evil from Marianito but to forestall any interference in the assault done by Pio and Severo. Even though he did not take direct part in the killing, his conspiracy with the others made him a principal too. Moreover, treachery was involved. Juan weakened the victims defense by disabling Marianito and ensured the killing without any risk to themselves. Thus, the act of one is the act of all, and Juan is also guilty of murder. PEOPLE vs. BERONILLA Facts: Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at the outbreak of war and continued to serve as mayor during the Japanese occupation. Dec 19, 1944 accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col Arnold. Simultaneously, he received a memorandum issued by Arnold authorizing them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage or aiding the enemy. He also received a list of all puppet government officials of Abra, with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions placed Borjal under custody and asked residents of La Paz to file case against him. He also appointed a 12-man jury composed of Labuguen as chairman and others, plus Alverne and Balmaceda were prosecutors; Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Inovermo as counsel for the accused, later Atty. Barreras voluntarily appeared as counsel for Borjal. The jury found Borjal guilty on all counts and imposed death penalty. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to Headquarters of Infantry for review. Records were returned on April 18, 1945 with approval of Arnold. On the same day, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the execution to Arnold, the latter complementing Beronilla. Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others involved in the Borjal case were indicted by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized, under RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. All the accused (except Labuguen who filed and granted amnesty by the AFP), filed their application to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission, which denied their application on the ground that they were inspired by purely personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for trial on merits. On July 10, 1950 Beronillo, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico were convicted as conspirator and co-principals of crime murder. They appealed. Issue: WON accused appellants are guilty of murder; and WON they should be granted amnesty. Held: The records are ample to show that Beronilla acted pursuant to the orders of the Infantry Headquarters. Although it was alleged by the state that there was a radiogram from certain Col. Volkmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, on the illegality of Borjals execution, there are no sufficient evidence to show that it was known to Beronilla. Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold approving the decisions of Beronilla prove otherwise. The testimony of Rafael Balmaceda, relative of Borjal was also unreliable. The state claims that the appellants held grudges against late Borjal, but court said that the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that they were impelled by malice. In fact, prior to the execution, Beronilla sent the decision for review. The lower court also found that Borjal was really guilty of treasonable acts. The court held that the accused-appellants just acted upon the orders of superiors and criminal intent was not established. Even assuming the accused-appellant are guilty of murder, they should not be denied of the amnesty on the ground that the slaying took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control. The court

held that any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the amnesty proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused. Ty vs People G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004 Facts:This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The said accused drew and issue toManila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L.Vecino several post-dated checks. The said accused well knowing that atthe time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with thedrawee bank for payment of such checks in full upon its presentment,which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from thedate hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, saidaccused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of thechecks or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)banking days after receiving said notice.Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She claims that she was forced to issue the checks toobtain release of her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshlytreated, and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.The trial court rendered judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appealwith the CA and reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of thetrial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos P60,000.00equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable towarrant her exemption from criminal liability? HELD: No. The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims thatshe was compelled to issue the checks, a condition the hospital allegedlydemanded of her before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This isspeculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. For this exempting circumstance to be invokedsuccessfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of anuncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) thefear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicableIt must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of suchgravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not bespeculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to amere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. Itmust be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. PEOPLE vs. BULAN (GR 143404, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 550) FACTS: On the night of June 6, 1994, a dance was taking place at Brgy Datag. Alberto Mariano, a barangay tanod in said barangay was assigned the task of seeing to it that anybody who entered the gate to the dance

hall at the plaza must have a ribbon. Appellant Allan Bulan came to the dance and entered the gate without the required ribbon. Alberto Mariano followed appellant Allan Bulan into the dance hall and asked him why he entered the gate without a ribbon. Instead of answering Albertos question, Allan boxed him on the head. Accused Estemson Bulan, Allans brother, who had entered the dance hall, likewise, boxed Alberto. Estemson then held Alberto, while Allan boxed the latter on the chest. Perlita Mariano, Albertos sister, who was present at the dance, embraced her brother as Allan and Estemson unceasingly pummeled him. The other barangay tanods Ceferino Ceballo and Juan Boribor, and a barangay kagawad, Dante Ereso, stopped Allan and Estemson from further beating Alberto. After being pacified by the barangay officials, Allan and Estemson left the dance hall. Alberto, on the other hand, went back to where he originally stood to resume his duty. His sister Perlita stood beside him. One Edwin Solo, a policeman, suddenly came into the dance hall and dragged Alberto into the street just outside the entrance. Perlita embraced Alberto as he was dragged outside the barangay plaza. Appellants Jose Bulan and Allan Bulan were waiting for Alberto and immediately held the latter by his shoulders. Jose held Albertos right shoulder while Allan held his left shoulder. Perlita was still embracing her brother but she was pulled away from. Accused Estemson Bulan suddenly appeared behind Alberto and stabbed him twice in the back with a small bolo. Perlita screamed for help. However, despite the fact that there were people at the entrance gate, nobody came to help Alberto and Perlita. After stabbing Alberto, Estemson immediately escaped, while Jose and Allan dragged the fatally wounded Alberto away from the barangay plaza to the store of Valentin Talion, which was forty meters away from the scene of the stabbing. They dropped Alberto face down on the ground in front of Valentins store and then left, running towards the direction of [the] barangay plaza. Perlita, who followed Jose and Allan as they dragged her brother, kept on shouting for help but nobody came to help them. After Jose and Allan left, Perlita returned to the barangay plaza and sought help from her relatives who were at the dance. She, likewise, sought the help of the barangay officials present and informed them that Alberto was already dead. Minutes later, Nelson Rubio, a policeman, went to the place where Alberto lay. When the policeman tried to lift Alberto, the small bolo which was used in stabbing Alberto and which remained embedded in his back, fell to the ground. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of the crime charged as principals by direct participation as ruled by the CA, or, as ruled by the RTC, mere accomplices to the crime of murder. RULING: Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be established by acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be logically inferred the existence of a common purpose to commit the same. The prosecution must prove conspiracy by the same quantum of evidence as the felony charged itself. Indeed, proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to commit the crime is not essential to prove conspiracy. It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is primordial is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to bring out the victims death. Once conspiracy is established, it is unnecessary to prove who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal injury. If conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the crime charged and proved. The act of one is the act of all. In this case, the appellants were waiting outside the dance hall near the gate when Edwin Solo brought the victim towards them, onto the street. Jose held the victim by the right shoulder, while Allan held him by the left. Estemson suddenly appeared from behind the victim and stabbed the latter at the back with a small bolo. The appellants continued holding the victim as Estemson stabbed him yet again. Even as Estemson fled, the appellants dragged the victim from the gate, towards the store, where they dropped the victims body and fled from the scene. Allan then left Catanduanes and hid in Pasay City where he was arrested by the NBI on August 7, 1994. Considering the foregoing, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that the appellants are guilty as principals by direct participation in the killing of Alberto Mariano. PEOPLE vs. COMADRE, GR 153559, June 8, 2004 431 SCRA 366 At around 7:00 pm, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree. They noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed a grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy

Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital. RULING: Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that their presence provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of conspiracy. Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime. Under the Article 48 (complex crimes), when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty. Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo Lozano are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for another cause. PEOPLE vs. QUIROL GR 149259, October 2005, 473 SCRA 509 In celebration of a fiesta in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a benefit disco dance was held. Appellants, Juanito and Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo, attended. Policeman PO3 Jed Daloso, a third accused who remains at large, was also there. At the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were together and drank all through the night with some friends. Jed was later seen in a drunken state chasing people around while Juanito was seen toying with a Batangas knife. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and prosecution principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that it was about that time when he was asked by Benjamin and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home. Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would just follow. Wilson was behind them at a distance of 7 to 10 fathoms when the group passed by the house of Jed. From his vantage point, Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims in front of his house and frisk them. The ladies, perhaps not wanting to be delayed, went ahead. Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and Roel together with a pair of handcuffs and lead them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug, Cebu City. There, the three were met by Juanito and Mario and together they proceeded to the airport runway. Wilson, hidden behind a bush, could hear Benjamin plead for his life. Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged down to his knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held Roel while Juanito started stabbing him using a Batangas knife. Jed finished it by shooting Roel. At around 7 a.m. that same morning, Juanito went to collect his wages at the house of Galileo Banate, a construction foreman for whom the former was working. Galileo observed Juanito to be somewhat in an inebriated state, and so when Juanito asked permission to sleep on the floor, Galileo acceded. Juanito was so sleepy that he unconsciously dropped his Batangas knife. Galileo later saw it beside him on the floor, picked it up and kept it as there were children around who could play with it. When he later gave Juanito his wages, he forgot to return the knife. Four days later, at the construction site, Mario arrived with a policeman and picked up Juanito. Before leaving the construction site, Juanito asked his knife back from Galileo. Galileo retrieved the knife from his house and turned it over to the policeman. A subsequent examination on the knife revealed that it had human bloodstains on it.

RULING: We sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Neither is its necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design. The conspiracy in the instant case was sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the old airport tower and walking together with them towards the runway where appellants and Jed performed acts in unison with each other as to unmistakably reveal a common purpose and design. PEOPLE vs. PUGAY FACTS: The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused? HELD: JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS. There is no: CONSPIRACY- determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed. Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda. Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him. **Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim. Criminal Responsibilities: PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED

to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE PEOPLE vs. VALLEDOR FACTS: This case is about Enrico Valledors appeal of his conviction for the crime of consummated, frustrated and attempted murder. Last 06 March 1991, the appellant attacked Roger Cabiguen (stabbed on the forearm), Elza Rodriguez (stabbed on the chest), Ricardo Maglalang (was inflicted w/ physical injuries on different parts of the body) There were two other people inside the room (they were not harmed by the appellant). Roger and Ricardo were both wounded, while Elza died from the stab wound. After his arrest, accusedappellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial. This time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity. The appellants plea of insanity was anchored on the following instances: 1.) On January 1990 the Mother of the appellant noticed that he is behaving abnormally. The mother then brought the appellant to Dr. de Guzman, a medical practitioner. She then disclosed to the doctor that insanity runs in the family 2.) Dr. de Guzman then diagnosed the appellant as suffering from psychosis w/ schizophrenia and prescribed the appellant w/ an anti-depressant known as thoracin which kept the appellant sane for a period of 2 months 3.) On 04 March 1991, the appellants mother noticed that he is acting strangely, so she left to buy Thoracin, but when she returned the appellant is nowhere to be found. 4.) On 06 March 1991 (date of commission of crime) he was seen swimming across the river Barangay Captain and Councilman took the appellant out of the water inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that appellant was mentally ill, the Barangay Captain, asked the Councilman to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with appellant, while on the jeepney the appellant then jumped off the jeepney and boarded a tricycle. 5.) On 11 March 1991 he was interviewed by the City Health Officer I and was recommended to be committed to the NATIONAL MENTAL HOSPITAL 6.) While under the care of the hospital the medical findings for the appellant was that he was suffering from: Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia ISSUES: Can Insanity as an exempting circumstance be granted to the accused? HELD: THE COURT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY WITH MODIFICATIONS: HE IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR THE KILLING OF ELZA RODRIGUEZ, AND ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR BOTH ROGER CABIGUEN AND ROGELIO MAGLALANG (FROM FRUSTRATED MURDER FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO MAGLALANG IT WAS REDUCED TO ATTEMPTED MURDER) No it cannot be granted because in considering insanity as a defense, it presumed that all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously The acts made by the appellant shows that he does not have complete absence of the power to discern as shown by his stabbing of the two victims (roger and elza) while leaving the other two people in the room unharmed, also his action of fleeing from the scene after the incident indicated that he was aware of

the wrong he committed. The actions performed by the appellant does not sufficiently prove his insanity at the time of commission of the crime: "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."

Although it can be argued that the appellant is suffering from mental illness what is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts. TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: In a Presidential Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated Jan. 6, 1986, President Marcos allegedly commanded petitioner Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office of the President), the sum P55M in cash as partial payment of MIAAs account with said company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this Office dated Jan. 7,1985 Tabuena withdrew the sum of 55M on three separate occasions (25M, 25M, 5M with Adolfo Peralta) and delivered them to Gimenez, Marcoss private secretary. It is without dispute that Tabuena did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and delivery of the money (no disbursement slips and paid in cold cash).Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the third delivery and it did not mention anything about the purpose of the receipt or the money being used to pay PNCC, but merely acknowledged that Gimenez had received the sum of 55M from Tabuena on three occasions. Furthermore, there was no receipt from the PNCC recognizing payment of debt. Prosecution: there were no standing obligations in favor of the PNCC at the time of disbursement of 55M. PNCC said themselves that they didnt receive the P55M. Tabuena claimed that he was only complying with the direct order of Marcos (plus the Marcos memorandum which contained same order) to immediately forward to the office of the President, 55M in cash, as partial payment of MIAAs obligations to PNCC and that he believed that MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC. In short, that Tabuena acted in good faith. Sandiganbayan rejected Tabuenas claim of good faith and found him guilty of malversation by negligence, hence this case. ISSUE: WON Tabuena, in following the orders of his superior, was guilty of malversation (or if because of the justifying circumstance of following the orders of his superior, in good faith, he would not be criminally liable, but merely civilly liable)? HELD: Tabuena is merely civilly liable. The very fact that he was merely following the orders of his superior is a justifying circumstance. RATIO:

1. On the point raised by Tabuena that he cannot be charged with intentional malversation and be convicted by malversation by negligence, the Court ruled that the dolo and culpa of the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. The same felony is still there and conviction thereof is proper. 2. On the defense of good faith: it is a valid defense against malversation because it would negate criminal intent. To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimesbe accompanied by criminal intent or such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as is equivalent to criminal intent The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not commited if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent (malversation cases: US v. Catolico, US v. Elvina). 3.The Court, based on the evidence presented, found that Tabuena had no other choice but to actually follow the order stated in the Marcos Memorandum, because, as president of the Philippines, indubitably the head of governmental agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC, Marcos is undeniably the superior of Tabuena. 4.Tabuena entitled to the justifying circumstance of any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose because he is only acting in good faith, faithfully and efficiently carrying out orders from the highest official in the land. Moreover, there was nothing in the Marcos Memorandum that may invite suspicion there was no question about the lawfulness of the order contained in such a memorandum. Tabuena had reason to believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due and demandable debt, a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC (existence of such debts determined from testimonies). So even if the order was illegal and Tabuena was not aware of the illegality, he would not be liable because there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. 5.Tabuena followed the memorandum to the letter, paying immediately the PNCC, through this office (office of the president) the sum of 55M. Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the money because as Chief Executive, Marcos exercised supervision and control over governmental agencies (good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation). 6. While even Tabuena admitted that procedures were ignored and that the disbursement was unusual, he is found to be excused from such because the Marcos Memorandum enjoined his IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE. On the other hand, while this allows for the negation of criminal intent, as Tabuena acted in good faith, he would still be civilly liable (but hes not criminally liable anymore, escaping the harsher penalties) 7. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do with the creation of the Marcos Memorandum that even if the real purpose behind the memorandum was to get 55M from public funds, it is clear that he did and would not profit from such and that he did not have anything to do with the creation of the memorandum. 8. Tabuena case is a case concerning obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. The order/memorandum came from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the president himself, in effect allowing for the presumption that such order was regularly issued and patently legal. Furthermore, the wording of the memorandum expressed a certain urgency to its executionObedienta est legis essential (act swiftly without question). Voting: Four concurred (Narvasa, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza) Six dissented (Padilla, Davide, Romero, Puno, Melo, Panganiban)

Justice Hermosisima took no part as he was a signatory to the SB decision Regalaso, Bellosillo and Torres, Jr, Pro hac vice (meaning they join the majority opinion but they reserve their right to change their vote should a similar case with the same facts arise.) Implication of pro hac vice: Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan is not precedent for the proposition that any public official who blindly follows orders of their superior. Thus, this case is not authoritative on Art. 11(6). Tabuena and Peralta ACQUITTED. BAXINELA vs. PEOPLE Facts: On October 19, 1996, Baxinela and Regimen was in Playboy Disco Pub located at the 2nd flr. Of Kingsmen bldg. they saw someone with a handgun visibly tucked at the back of his waist. The man started walking at the door even before Regimen could come to him. As the man passed by their table, Baxinela from behind holds the mans arm and ask why he did have a gun with him. Upon suspicion that the man istaking out his gun, he shoot the man. The security guards pick up the man who appeared to be Sgt. Lajo, while Baxinela reported the event to SPO4 Advincula. Issue: Whether or not Baxinela is guilty of Homicide? Decision of S.C.: The crime of Homicide was affirmed with modification. Ruling: For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a person or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The attack must be real, or at least imminent. Mere belief by a person of an impending attack would not be sufficient. As the evidence shows, there was no imminent threat that necessitated shooting Lajo at that moment. Just before Baxinela shot Lajo, the former was safely behind the victim and holding his arm. It was Lajo who was at a disadvantage. In fact, it was Baxinela who was the aggressor when he grabbed Lajos shoulder and started questioning him. And when Lajo was shot, it appears that he was just turning around to face Baxinela and, quite possibly,reaching for his wallet. None of these acts could conceivably be deemed as unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo.The defense of fulfillment of a duty. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinelas duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub. Essentially, Baxinela is trying to convince the Court that he should be absolved of criminal liability by reason of a mistake of fact, a doctrine first enunciated in United States v. Ah Chong. It was held in that case that a mistake of fact will exempt a person from criminal liability so

long as the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In examining the circumstances attendant in the present case, the Court finds that there was negligence on the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was shot, was simply turning around to see who was accosting him. Moreover, he identified himself saying "I am MIG." These circumstances alone would not lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that Baxinelas life was in peril. Thus, his act of shooting Lajo, to the mind of this Court, constitutes clear negligence. The the use of unnecessary force or wanton violence is not justified when the fulfillment of their duty as law enforcers can be effected otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" attitude can never be countenanced in a civilized society.