FROM

DICTATOR5HIP
TO
DEMOCRACY
! #$%&'()*+, -.+/'0$.1 2$. 345'.+)4$%
Fnurth U.5. EdItInn
Gcnc 5harp
Thc A!bcrt EInstcIn InstItutInn
AII maleriaI aearing in lhis
ubIicalion is in lhe ubIic domain and
may be reroduced vilhoul
ermission from Gene Shar.
Cilalion of lhe source, and noli!calion lo lhe
AIberl Linslein Inslilulion for lhe reroduclion,
lransIalion, and rerinling of lhis ubIicalion, are arecialed.
Iirsl Ldilion, May 2OO2
Second Ldilion, }une 2OO3
Third Ldilion, Iebruary 2OO8
Iourlh Ldilion, May 2O1O
From Dictatorship to Democracy vas originaIIy ubIished in angkok
in 1993 by lhe Commillee for lhe Resloralion of Democracy in urma
in associalion vilh Khil Iyaing (The New Era Journal). Il has since
been lransIaled inlo al Ieasl lhirly-one olher Ianguages and has been
ubIished in Serbia, Indonesia, and ThaiIand, among olher counlries.
This is lhe fourlh Iniled Slales Ldilion.
Irinled in lhe Iniled Slales of America.
Irinled on RecycIed Iaer.
The AIberl Linslein Inslilulion
I.. ox 455
Lasl oslon, MA O2128, ISA
TeI: ISA +1 617-247-4882
Iax: ISA +1 617-247-4O35
L-maiI: einsleinigc.org
Websile: vvv.aeinslein.org
ISN 1-88O813-O9-2
TABLE OF CONTENT5
PREFACE
ONE
FACING DICTATOR5HIP5 REALI5TICALLY 1
A conlinuing robIem 2
Ireedom lhrough vioIence` 4
Cous, eIeclions, foreign saviors` 5
Iacing lhe hard lrulh 7
TWO
THE DANGER5 OF NEGOTIATION5 9
Merils and Iimilalions of negolialions 1O
Negolialed surrender` 1O
Iover and |uslice in negolialions 12
AgreeabIe diclalors 13
Whal kind of eace` 14
Reasons for hoe 14
THREE
WHENCE COME5 THE POWER? 17
The Monkey Masler fabIe 17
Necessary sources of oIilicaI over 18
Cenlers of democralic over 21
FOUR
DICTATOR5HIP5 HAVE WEAKNE55E5 25
Idenlifying lhe AchiIIes' heeI 25
Weaknesses of diclalorshis 26
Allacking veaknesses of diclalorshis 27
FIVE
EXERCI5ING POWER 29
The vorkings of nonvioIenl slruggIe 3O
NonvioIenl veaons and disciIine 3O
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq t
viii
enness, secrecy, and high slandards 33
Shifling over reIalionshis 34
Iour mechanisms of change 35
Democralizing effecls of oIilicaI de!ance 37
ComIexily of nonvioIenl slruggIe 38
5IX
THE NEED FOR 5TRATEGIC PLANNING 39
ReaIislic Ianning 39
HurdIes lo Ianning 4O
Iour imorlanl lerms in slralegic Ianning 43
5EVEN
PLANNING 5TRATEGY 47
Choice of means 48
IIanning for democracy 49
LxlernaI assislance 5O
IormuIaling a grand slralegy 5O
IIanning camaign slralegies 53
Sreading lhe idea of noncooeralion 55
Reression and counlermeasures 56
Adhering lo lhe slralegic Ian 57
EIGHT
APPLYING POLITICAL DEFIANCE 59
SeIeclive resislance 59
SymboIic chaIIenge 6O
Sreading resonsibiIily 61
Aiming al lhe diclalors' over 62
Shifls in slralegy 64
NINE
DI5INTEGRATING THE DICTATOR5HIP 67
LscaIaling freedom 69
Disinlegraling lhe diclalorshi 7O
HandIing success resonsibIy 71
ti Gcnc Sncrp
TEN
GROUNDWORK FOR DURABLE DEMOCRACY 73
Threals of a nev diclalorshi 73
Iocking cous 74
Conslilulion drafling 75
A democralic defense oIicy 76
A merilorious resonsibiIily 76
APPENDIX ONE
THE METHOD5 OF NONVIOLENT ACTION 79
APPENDIX TWO
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT5 AND NOTE5 ON
THE HI5TORY OF -678 9:#;!;76<=:> ;7 9?87#6!#@ 87
APPENDIX THREE
A NOTE ABOUT TRAN5LATION5 AND
REPRINTING OF THI5 PUBLICATION 91
FOR FURTHER READING 93
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq tii
PREFACE
ne of my ma|or concerns for many years has been hov eoIe
couId revenl and deslroy diclalorshis. This has been nurlured in
arl because of a beIief lhal human beings shouId nol be dominaled
and deslroyed by such regimes. Thal beIief has been slrenglhened
by readings on lhe imorlance of human freedom, on lhe nalure of
diclalorshis (from ArislolIe lo anaIysls of lolaIilarianism), and his-
lories of diclalorshis (eseciaIIy lhe Nazi and SlaIinisl syslems).
ver lhe years I have had occasion lo gel lo knov eoIe vho
Iived and suffered under Nazi ruIe, incIuding some vho survived
concenlralion cams. In Norvay I mel eoIe vho had resisled
fascisl ruIe and survived, and heard of lhose vho erished. I laIked
vilh }evs vho had escaed lhe Nazi cIulches and vilh ersons vho
had heIed lo save lhem.
KnovIedge of lhe lerror of Communisl ruIe in various counlries
has been Iearned more from books lhan ersonaI conlacls. The lerror
of lhese syslems aeared lo me lo be eseciaIIy oignanl for lhese
diclalorshis vere imosed in lhe name of Iiberalion from ores-
sion and exIoilalion.
In more recenl decades lhrough visils of ersons from dicla-
loriaIIy ruIed counlries, such as Ianama, IoIand, ChiIe, Tibel, and
urma, lhe reaIilies of loday's diclalorshis became more reaI. Irom
Tibelans vho had foughl againsl Chinese Communisl aggression,
Russians vho had defealed lhe Augusl 1991 hard-Iine cou, and
Thais vho had nonvioIenlIy bIocked a relurn lo miIilary ruIe, I
have gained oflen lroubIing erseclives on lhe insidious nalure of
diclalorshis.
The sense of alhos and oulrage againsl lhe brulaIilies, aIong
vilh admiralion of lhe caIm heroism of unbeIievabIy brave men
and vomen, vere somelimes slrenglhened by visils lo Iaces vhere
lhe dangers vere sliII greal, and yel de!ance by brave eoIe con-
linued. These incIuded Ianama under Noriega, ViInius, Lilhuania,
under conlinued Soviel reression, Tiananmen Square, ei|ing,
during bolh lhe feslive demonslralion of freedom and vhiIe lhe
tiii
!rsl armored ersonneI carriers enlered lhal falefuI nighl, and lhe
|ungIe headquarlers of lhe democralic oosilion al ManerIav in
Iiberaled urma.
Somelimes I visiled lhe siles of lhe faIIen, as lhe leIevision lover
and lhe cemelery in ViInius, lhe ubIic ark in Riga vhere eoIe
had been gunned dovn, lhe cenler of Ierrara in norlhern IlaIy vhere
lhe fascisls Iined u and shol resislers, and a simIe cemelery in
ManerIav !IIed vilh bodies of men vho had died much loo young.
Il is a sad reaIizalion lhal every diclalorshi Ieaves such dealh and
deslruclion in ils vake.
ul of lhese concerns and exeriences grev a delermined
hoe lhal revenlion of lyranny mighl be ossibIe, lhal successfuI
slruggIes againsl diclalorshis couId be vaged vilhoul mass mu-
luaI sIaughlers, lhal diclalorshis couId be deslroyed and nev ones
revenled from rising oul of lhe ashes.
I have lried lo lhink carefuIIy aboul lhe mosl effeclive vays
in vhich diclalorshis couId be successfuIIy disinlegraled vilh lhe
Ieasl ossibIe cosl in suffering and Iives. In lhis I have dravn on my
sludies over many years of diclalorshis, resislance movemenls,
revoIulions, oIilicaI lhoughl, governmenlaI syslems, and eseciaIIy
reaIislic nonvioIenl slruggIe.
This ubIicalion is lhe resuIl. I am cerlain il is far from erfecl.
ul, erhas, il offers some guideIines lo assisl lhoughl and Ian-
ning lo roduce movemenls of Iiberalion lhal are more overfuI
and effeclive lhan mighl olhervise be lhe case.
f necessily, and of deIiberale choice, lhe focus of lhis essay is
on lhe generic robIem of hov lo deslroy a diclalorshi and lo re-
venl lhe rise of a nev one. I am nol comelenl lo roduce a delaiIed
anaIysis and rescrilion for a arlicuIar counlry. Hovever, il is my
hoe lhal lhis generic anaIysis may be usefuI lo eoIe in, unforlu-
naleIy, loo many counlries vho nov face lhe reaIilies of diclaloriaI
ruIe. They viII need lo examine lhe vaIidily of lhis anaIysis for lheir
silualions and lhe exlenl lo vhich ils ma|or recommendalions are, or
can be made lo be, aIicabIe for lheir Iiberalion slruggIes.
Novhere in lhis anaIysis do I assume lhal defying diclalors viII
be an easy or cosl-free endeavor. AII forms of slruggIe have comIica-
ix Gcnc Sncrp
lions and cosls. Iighling diclalors viII, of course, bring casuaIlies. Il
is my hoe, hovever, lhal lhis anaIysis viII sur resislance Ieaders
lo consider slralegies lhal may increase lheir effeclive over vhiIe
reducing lhe reIalive IeveI of casuaIlies.
Nor shouId lhis anaIysis be inlerreled lo mean lhal vhen a
seci!c diclalorshi is ended, aII olher robIems viII aIso disaear.
The faII of one regime does nol bring in a uloia. Ralher, il oens lhe
vay for hard vork and Iong efforls lo buiId more |usl sociaI, eco-
nomic, and oIilicaI reIalionshis and lhe eradicalion of olher forms
of in|uslices and oression. Il is my hoe lhal lhis brief examina-
lion of hov a diclalorshi can be disinlegraled may be found usefuI
vherever eoIe Iive under dominalion and desire lo be free.
Gene Shar
6 clober 1993
AIberl Linslein Inslilulion
oslon, Massachusells
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq x
ONE
FACING DICTATOR5HIP5 REALI5TICALLY
In recenl years various diclalorshis of bolh inlernaI and exlernaI
origin have coIIased or slumbIed vhen confronled by de!anl,
mobiIized eoIe. flen seen as !rmIy enlrenched and imregnabIe,
some of lhese diclalorshis roved unabIe lo vilhsland lhe concerled
oIilicaI, economic, and sociaI de!ance of lhe eoIe.
Since 198O diclalorshis have coIIased before lhe redominanl-
Iy nonvioIenl de!ance of eoIe in Lslonia, Lalvia, and Lilhuania,
IoIand, Lasl Germany, CzechosIovakia and SIovenia, Madagascar,
MaIi, oIivia, and lhe IhiIiines. NonvioIenl resislance has fur-
lhered lhe movemenl lovard democralizalion in NeaI, Zambia,
Soulh Korea, ChiIe, Argenlina, Haili, raziI, Iruguay, MaIavi, Thai-
Iand, uIgaria, Hungary, Nigeria, and various arls of lhe former
Soviel Inion (Iaying a signi!canl roIe in lhe defeal of lhe Augusl
1991 allemled hard-Iine cou d'lal).
In addilion, mass oIilicaI de!ance
1
has occurred in China,
urma, and Tibel in recenl years. AIlhough lhose slruggIes have
nol broughl an end lo lhe ruIing diclalorshis or occualions, lhey
have exosed lhe brulaI nalure of lhose reressive regimes lo lhe
vorId communily and have rovided lhe ouIalions vilh vaIuabIe
exerience vilh lhis form of slruggIe.
1
The lerm used in lhis conlexl vas inlroduced by Roberl HeIvey. IoIilicaI de!-
ance is nonvioIenl slruggIe (rolesl, noncooeralion, and inlervenlion) aIied
de!anlIy and acliveIy for oIilicaI uroses. The lerm originaled in resonse lo
lhe confusion and dislorlion crealed by equaling nonvioIenl slruggIe vilh aci!sm
and moraI or reIigious nonvioIence. De!ance denoles a deIiberale chaIIenge lo
aulhorily by disobedience, aIIoving no room for submission. IoIilicaI de!ance
describes lhe environmenl in vhich lhe aclion is emIoyed (oIilicaI) as veII as
lhe ob|eclive (oIilicaI over). The lerm is used rinciaIIy lo describe aclion by
ouIalions lo regain from diclalorshis conlroI over governmenlaI inslilulions
by reIenlIessIy allacking lheir sources of over and deIiberaleIy using slralegic
Ianning and oeralions lo do so. In lhis aer, oIilicaI de!ance, nonvioIenl re-
sislance, and nonvioIenl slruggIe viII be used inlerchangeabIy, aIlhough lhe Ialler
lvo lerms generaIIy refer lo slruggIes vilh a broader range of ob|eclives (sociaI,
economic, sychoIogicaI, elc.).
1
The coIIase of diclalorshis in lhe above named counlries cer-
lainIy has nol erased aII olher robIems in lhose socielies: overly,
crime, bureaucralic inef!ciency, and environmenlaI deslruclion are
oflen lhe Iegacy of brulaI regimes. Hovever, lhe dovnfaII of lhese
diclalorshis has minimaIIy Iifled much of lhe suffering of lhe vic-
lims of oression, and has oened lhe vay for lhe rebuiIding of
lhese socielies vilh grealer oIilicaI democracy, ersonaI Iiberlies,
and sociaI |uslice.
A cnntInuIng prnb!cm
There has indeed been a lrend lovards grealer democralizalion and
freedom in lhe vorId in lhe asl decades. According lo Ireedom
House, vhich comiIes a yearIy inlernalionaI survey of lhe slalus of
oIilicaI righls and civiI Iiberlies, lhe number of counlries around lhe
vorId cIassi!ed as Iree has grovn signi!canlIy in recenl years:
2
Frcc Part!y Frcc Nnt Frcc
1983 54 47 64
1993 75 73 38
2003 89 55 48
2009 89 62 42
Hovever, lhis osilive lrend is lemered by lhe Iarge numbers
of eoIe sliII Iiving under condilions of lyranny. As of 2OO8, 34/ of
lhe vorId's 6.68 biIIion ouIalion Iived in counlries designaled as
Nol Iree,
3
lhal is, areas vilh exlremeIy reslricled oIilicaI righls
and civiI Iiberlies. The 42 counlries in lhe Nol Iree calegory are
ruIed by a range of miIilary diclalorshis (as in urma), lradilionaI
reressive monarchies (as in Saudi Arabia and hulan), dominanl
oIilicaI arlies (as in China and Norlh Korea), foreign occuiers (as
in Tibel and Weslern Sahara), or are in a slale of lransilion.
2 Gcnc Sncrp
2
Ireedom House, |rcc!cm in inc Wcr|!, hll:11vvv.freedomhouse.org.
3
||i!.
Many counlries loday are in a slale of raid economic, oIilicaI,
and sociaI change. AIlhough lhe number of Iree counlries has in-
creased in recenl years, lhere is a greal risk lhal many nalions, in lhe
face of such raid fundamenlaI changes, viII move in lhe oosile
direclion and exerience nev forms of diclalorshi. MiIilary cIiques,
ambilious individuaIs, eIecled of!ciaIs, and doclrinaI oIilicaI arlies
viII reealedIy seek lo imose lheir viII. Cous d'lal are and viII
remain a common occurrence. asic human and oIilicaI righls viII
conlinue lo be denied lo vasl numbers of eoIes.
InforlunaleIy, lhe asl is sliII vilh us. The robIem of diclalor-
shis is dee. IeoIe in many counlries have exerienced decades or
even cenluries of oression, vhelher of domeslic or foreign origin.
IrequenlIy, unqueslioning submission lo aulhorily !gures and ruI-
ers has been Iong incuIcaled. In exlreme cases, lhe sociaI, oIilicaI,
economic, and even reIigious inslilulions of lhe sociely oulside
of slale conlroI have been deIiberaleIy veakened, subordinaled,
or even reIaced by nev regimenled inslilulions used by lhe slale
or ruIing arly lo conlroI lhe sociely. The ouIalion has oflen been
alomized (lurned inlo a mass of isoIaled individuaIs) unabIe lo vork
logelher lo achieve freedom, lo con!de in each olher, or even lo do
much of anylhing al lheir ovn inilialive.
The resuIl is rediclabIe: lhe ouIalion becomes veak, Iacks
seIf-con!dence, and is incaabIe of resislance. IeoIe are oflen loo
frighlened lo share lheir halred of lhe diclalorshi and lheir hun-
ger for freedom even vilh famiIy and friends. IeoIe are oflen loo
lerri!ed lo lhink seriousIy of ubIic resislance. In any case, vhal
vouId be lhe use` Inslead, lhey face suffering vilhoul urose and
a fulure vilhoul hoe.
Currenl condilions in loday's diclalorshis may be much vorse
lhan earIier. In lhe asl, some eoIe may have allemled resislance.
Shorl-Iived mass rolesls and demonslralions may have occurred.
Ierhas sirils soared lemorariIy. Al olher limes, individuaIs and
smaII grous may have conducled brave bul imolenl geslures,
asserling some rinciIe or simIy lheir de!ance. Hovever nobIe
lhe molives, such asl acls of resislance have oflen been insuf!cienl
lo overcome lhe eoIe's fear and habil of obedience, a necessary
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 3
rerequisile lo deslroy lhe diclalorshi. SadIy, lhose acls may have
broughl inslead onIy increased suffering and dealh, nol viclories or
even hoe.
Frccdnm thrnugh vIn!cncc?
Whal is lo be done in such circumslances` The obvious ossibiIilies
seem useIess. ConslilulionaI and IegaI barriers, |udiciaI decisions,
and ubIic oinion are normaIIy ignored by diclalors. Inder-
slandabIy, reacling lo lhe brulaIilies, lorlure, disaearances, and
kiIIings, eoIe oflen have concIuded lhal onIy vioIence can end a
diclalorshi. Angry viclims have somelimes organized lo !ghl lhe
brulaI diclalors vilh vhalever vioIenl and miIilary caacily lhey
couId musler, desile lhe odds being againsl lhem. These eoIe
have oflen foughl braveIy, al greal cosl in suffering and Iives. Their
accomIishmenls have somelimes been remarkabIe, bul lhey rareIy
have von freedom. VioIenl rebeIIions can lrigger brulaI reression
lhal frequenlIy Ieaves lhe ouIace more heIIess lhan before.
Whalever lhe merils of lhe vioIenl olion, hovever, one oinl
is cIear. Bq p|ccing ccn!!cncc in tic|cni mccns, cnc ncs cncscn inc tcrq
iqpc cj sirugg|c uiin unicn inc cpprcsscrs nccr|q c|ucqs nctc supcricr-
iiq. The diclalors are equied lo aIy vioIence overvheImingIy.
Hovever Iong or brie"y lhese democrals can conlinue, evenluaIIy
lhe harsh miIilary reaIilies usuaIIy become inescaabIe. The diclalors
aImosl aIvays have sueriorily in miIilary hardvare, ammunilion,
lransorlalion, and lhe size of miIilary forces. Desile bravery, lhe
democrals are (aImosl aIvays) no malch.
When convenlionaI miIilary rebeIIion is recognized as unreaIis-
lic, some dissidenls lhen favor guerriIIa varfare. Hovever, guerriIIa
varfare rareIy, if ever, bene!ls lhe oressed ouIalion or ushers in
a democracy. GuerriIIa varfare is no obvious soIulion, arlicuIarIy
given lhe very slrong lendency lovard immense casuaIlies among
one's ovn eoIe. The lechnique is no guaranlor againsl faiIure,
desile suorling lheory and slralegic anaIyses, and somelimes
inlernalionaI backing. GuerriIIa slruggIes oflen Iasl a very Iong
lime. CiviIian ouIalions are oflen disIaced by lhe ruIing gov-
4 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 5
ernmenl, vilh immense human suffering and sociaI disIocalion.
Lven vhen successfuI, guerriIIa slruggIes oflen have signi!-
canl Iong-lerm negalive slrucluraI consequences. ImmedialeIy, lhe
allacked regime becomes more diclaloriaI as a resuIl of ils coun-
lermeasures. If lhe guerriIIas shouId !naIIy succeed, lhe resuIling
nev regime is oflen more diclaloriaI lhan ils redecessor due lo lhe
cenlraIizing imacl of lhe exanded miIilary forces and lhe veaken-
ing or deslruclion of lhe sociely's indeendenl grous and inslilu-
lions during lhe slruggIe bodies lhal are vilaI in eslabIishing and
mainlaining a democralic sociely. Iersons hosliIe lo diclalorshis
shouId Iook for anolher olion.
Cnups, c!cctInns, InrcIgn savInrs?
A miIilary cou d'lal againsl a diclalorshi mighl aear lo be
reIaliveIy one of lhe easiesl and quickesl vays lo remove a arlicu-
IarIy reugnanl regime. Hovever, lhere are very serious robIems
vilh lhal lechnique. Mosl imorlanlIy, il Ieaves in Iace lhe exisling
maIdislribulion of over belveen lhe ouIalion and lhe eIile in
conlroI of lhe governmenl and ils miIilary forces. The removaI of
arlicuIar ersons and cIiques from lhe governing osilions mosl
IikeIy viII mereIy make il ossibIe for anolher grou lo lake lheir
Iace. TheorelicaIIy, lhis grou mighl be miIder in ils behavior and
be oen in Iimiled vays lo democralic reforms. Hovever, lhe o-
osile is as IikeIy lo be lhe case.
Afler consoIidaling ils osilion, lhe nev cIique may lurn oul lo
be more rulhIess and more ambilious lhan lhe oId one. ConsequenlIy,
lhe nev cIique in vhich hoes may have been Iaced viII be
abIe lo do vhalever il vanls vilhoul concern for democracy or
human righls. Thal is nol an accelabIe ansver lo lhe robIem of
diclalorshi.
LIeclions are nol avaiIabIe under diclalorshis as an inslru-
menl of signi!canl oIilicaI change. Some diclaloriaI regimes,
such as lhose of lhe former Soviel-dominaled Laslern bIoc, venl
lhrough lhe molions in order lo aear democralic. Those eIeclions,
hovever, vere mereIy rigidIy conlroIIed Iebisciles lo gel ubIic
endorsemenl of candidales aIready hand icked by lhe diclalors.
Diclalors under ressure may al limes agree lo nev eIeclions, bul
lhen rig lhem lo Iace civiIian uels in governmenl of!ces. If
oosilion candidales have been aIIoved lo run and vere acluaIIy
eIecled, as occurred in urma in 199O and Nigeria in 1993, resuIls
may simIy be ignored and lhe viclors sub|ecled lo inlimida-
lion, arresl, or even execulion. Diclalors are nol in lhe business
of aIIoving eIeclions lhal couId remove lhem from lheir lhrones.
Many eoIe nov suffering under a brulaI diclalorshi, or vho
have gone inlo exiIe lo escae ils immediale gras, do nol beIieve lhal
lhe oressed can Iiberale lhemseIves. They execl lhal lheir eoIe
can onIy be saved by lhe aclions of olhers. These eoIe Iace lheir
con!dence in exlernaI forces. They beIieve lhal onIy inlernalionaI
heI can be slrong enough lo bring dovn lhe diclalors.
The viev lhal lhe oressed are unabIe lo acl effecliveIy is
somelimes accurale for a cerlain lime eriod. As noled, oflen o-
ressed eoIe are unviIIing and lemorariIy unabIe lo slruggIe
because lhey have no con!dence in lheir abiIily lo face lhe rulhIess
diclalorshi, and no knovn vay lo save lhemseIves. Il is lherefore
underslandabIe lhal many eoIe Iace lheir hoe for Iiberalion in
olhers. This oulside force may be ubIic oinion, lhe Iniled Na-
lions, a arlicuIar counlry, or inlernalionaI economic and oIilicaI
sanclions.
Such a scenario may sound comforling, bul lhere are grave
robIems vilh lhis reIiance on an oulside savior. Such con!dence
may be lolaIIy misIaced. IsuaIIy no foreign saviors are coming, and
if a foreign slale does inlervene, il robabIy shouId nol be lrusled.
A fev harsh reaIilies concerning reIiance on foreign inlervenlion
need lo be emhasized here:
IrequenlIy foreign slales viII loIerale, or even osiliveIy as-
sisl, a diclalorshi in order lo advance lheir ovn economic
or oIilicaI inleresls.
Ioreign slales aIso may be viIIing lo seII oul an oressed
eoIe inslead of keeing Iedges lo assisl lheir Iiberalion
al lhe cosl of anolher ob|eclive.
6 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 7
Some foreign slales viII acl againsl a diclalorshi onIy lo
gain lheir ovn economic, oIilicaI, or miIilary conlroI over
lhe counlry.
The foreign slales may become acliveIy invoIved for osi-
live uroses onIy if and vhen lhe inlernaI resislance move-
menl has aIready begun shaking lhe diclalorshi, having
lhereby focused inlernalionaI allenlion on lhe brulaI nalure
of lhe regime.
Diclalorshis usuaIIy exisl rimariIy because of lhe inlernaI
over dislribulion in lhe home counlry. The ouIalion and sociely
are loo veak lo cause lhe diclalorshi serious robIems, veaIlh and
over are concenlraled in loo fev hands. AIlhough diclalorshis
may bene!l from or be somevhal veakened by inlernalionaI aclions,
lheir conlinualion is deendenl rimariIy on inlernaI faclors.
InlernalionaI ressures can be very usefuI, hovever, vhen lhey
are suorling a overfuI inlernaI resislance movemenl. Then, for
examIe, inlernalionaI economic boycolls, embargoes, lhe breaking
of diIomalic reIalions, exuIsion from inlernalionaI organizalions,
condemnalion by Iniled Nalions bodies, and lhe Iike can assisl
grealIy. Hovever, in lhe absence of a slrong inlernaI resislance
movemenl such aclions by olhers are unIikeIy lo haen.
FacIng thc hard truth
The concIusion is a hard one. When one vanls lo bring dovn a
diclalorshi mosl effecliveIy and vilh lhe Ieasl cosl lhen one has
four immediale lasks:
ne musl slrenglhen lhe oressed ouIalion lhemseIves
in lheir delerminalion, seIf-con!dence, and resislance skiIIs,
ne musl slrenglhen lhe indeendenl sociaI grous and in-
slilulions of lhe oressed eoIe,
ne musl creale a overfuI inlernaI resislance force, and

ne musl deveIo a vise grand slralegic Ian for Iiberalion
and imIemenl il skiIIfuIIy.
A Iiberalion slruggIe is a lime for seIf-reIiance and inlernaI
slrenglhening of lhe slruggIe grou. As CharIes Slevarl IarneII
caIIed oul during lhe Irish renl slrike camaign in 1879 and 188O:
Il is no use reIying on lhe Governmenl . . . . You musl onIy
reIy uon your ovn delerminalion . . . . |HjeI yourseIves
by slanding logelher . . . slrenglhen lhose amongsl your-
seIves vho are veak . . . , band yourseIves logelher, orga-
nize yourseIves . . . and you musl vin . . .
When you have made lhis queslion rie for sellIemenl,
lhen and nol liII lhen viII il be sellIed.
4
Againsl a slrong seIf-reIianl force, given vise slralegy, disci-
Iined and courageous aclion, and genuine slrenglh, lhe diclalor-
shi viII evenluaIIy crumbIe. MinimaIIy, hovever, lhe above four
requiremenls musl be fuI!IIed.
As lhe above discussion indicales, Iiberalion from diclalorshis
uIlimaleIy deends on lhe eoIe's abiIily lo Iiberale lhemseIves.
The cases of successfuI oIilicaI de!ance or nonvioIenl slruggIe
for oIilicaI ends ciled above indicale lhal lhe means do exisl
for ouIalions lo free lhemseIves, bul lhal olion has remained
undeveIoed. We viII examine lhis olion in delaiI in lhe foIIoving
chalers. Hovever, ve shouId !rsl Iook al lhe issue of negolialions
as a means of dismanlIing diclalorshis.
4
Ialrick Sars!eId 'Hegarly, A Hisicrq cj |rc|cn! Un!cr inc Unicn, 1880-1922 (London:
Melhuen, 1952), . 49O-491.
8 Gcnc Sncrp
TWO
THE DANGER5 OF NEGOTIATION5
When faced vilh lhe severe robIems of confronling a diclalor-
shi (as surveyed in Chaler ne), some eoIe may Iase back
inlo assive submission. lhers, seeing no rosecl of achieving
democracy, may concIude lhey musl come lo lerms vilh lhe aar-
enlIy ermanenl diclalorshi, hoing lhal lhrough conciIialion,
comromise, and negolialions lhey mighl be abIe lo saIvage
some osilive eIemenls and lo end lhe brulaIilies. n lhe surface,
Iacking reaIislic olions, lhere is aeaI in lhal Iine of lhinking.
Serious slruggIe againsl brulaI diclalorshis is nol a Ieasanl
rosecl. Why is il necessary lo go lhal roule` Can'l everyone |usl
be reasonabIe and !nd vays lo laIk, lo negoliale lhe vay lo a graduaI
end lo lhe diclalorshi` Can'l lhe democrals aeaI lo lhe dicla-
lors' sense of common humanily and convince lhem lo reduce lheir
dominalion bil by bil, and erhas !naIIy lo give vay comIeleIy
lo lhe eslabIishmenl of a democracy`
Il is somelimes argued lhal lhe lrulh is nol aII on one side. Ier-
has lhe democrals have misunderslood lhe diclalors, vho may have
acled from good molives in dif!cuIl circumslances` r erhas some
may lhink, lhe diclalors vouId gIadIy remove lhemseIves from lhe
dif!cuIl silualion facing lhe counlry if onIy given some encourage-
menl and enlicemenls. Il may be argued lhal lhe diclalors couId be
offered a vin-vin soIulion, in vhich everyone gains somelhing.
The risks and ain of furlher slruggIe couId be unnecessary, il may
be argued, if lhe democralic oosilion is onIy viIIing lo sellIe lhe
con"icl eacefuIIy by negolialions (vhich may even erhas be
assisled by some skiIIed individuaIs or even anolher governmenl).
WouId lhal nol be referabIe lo a dif!cuIl slruggIe, even if il is one
conducled by nonvioIenl slruggIe ralher lhan by miIilary var`
9
McrIts and !ImItatInns nI ncgntIatInns
Negolialions are a very usefuI looI in resoIving cerlain lyes of is-
sues in con"icls and shouId nol be negIecled or re|ecled vhen lhey
are aroriale.
In some silualions vhere no fundamenlaI issues are al slake,
and lherefore a comromise is accelabIe, negolialions can be an
imorlanl means lo sellIe a con"icl. A Iabor slrike for higher vages
is a good examIe of lhe aroriale roIe of negolialions in a con"icl:
a negolialed sellIemenl may rovide an increase somevhere belveen
lhe sums originaIIy roosed by each of lhe conlending sides. Labor
con"icls vilh IegaI lrade unions are, hovever, quile differenl lhan
lhe con"icls in vhich lhe conlinued exislence of a crueI diclalorshi
or lhe eslabIishmenl of oIilicaI freedom are al slake.
When lhe issues al slake are fundamenlaI, affecling reIigious
rinciIes, issues of human freedom, or lhe vhoIe fulure deveIo-
menl of lhe sociely, negolialions do nol rovide a vay of reaching a
muluaIIy salisfaclory soIulion. n some basic issues lhere shouId
be no comromise. nIy a shifl in over reIalions in favor of lhe
democrals can adequaleIy safeguard lhe basic issues al slake. Such
a shifl viII occur lhrough slruggIe, nol negolialions. This is nol lo
say lhal negolialions oughl never lo be used. The oinl here is lhal
negolialions are nol a reaIislic vay lo remove a slrong diclalorshi
in lhe absence of a overfuI democralic oosilion.
Negolialions, of course, may nol be an olion al aII. IirmIy
enlrenched diclalors vho feeI secure in lheir osilion may refuse lo
negoliale vilh lheir democralic oonenls. r, vhen negolialions
have been inilialed, lhe democralic negolialors may disaear and
never be heard from again.
NcgntIatcd surrcndcr?
IndividuaIs and grous vho oose diclalorshi and favor nego-
lialions viII oflen have good molives. LseciaIIy vhen a miIilary
slruggIe has conlinued for years againsl a brulaI diclalorshi vilhoul
!naI viclory, il is underslandabIe lhal aII lhe eoIe of vhalever
10 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 11
oIilicaI ersuasion vouId vanl eace. Negolialions are eseciaIIy
IikeIy lo become an issue among democrals vhere lhe diclalors have
cIear miIilary sueriorily and lhe deslruclion and casuaIlies among
one's ovn eoIe are no Ionger bearabIe. There viII lhen be a slrong
lemlalion lo exIore any olher roule lhal mighl saIvage some of lhe
democrals' ob|eclives vhiIe bringing an end lo lhe cycIe of vioIence
and counler-vioIence.
The offer by a diclalorshi of eace lhrough negolialions vilh
lhe democralic oosilion is, of course, ralher disingenuous. The
vioIence couId be ended immedialeIy by lhe diclalors lhemseIves, if
onIy lhey vouId slo vaging var on lheir ovn eoIe. They couId
al lheir ovn inilialive vilhoul any bargaining reslore resecl for
human dignily and righls, free oIilicaI risoners, end lorlure, haIl
miIilary oeralions, vilhdrav from lhe governmenl, and aoIogize
lo lhe eoIe.
When lhe diclalorshi is slrong bul an irrilaling resislance
exisls, lhe diclalors may vish lo negoliale lhe oosilion inlo sur-
render under lhe guise of making eace. The caII lo negoliale
can sound aeaIing, bul grave dangers can be Iurking vilhin lhe
negolialing room.
n lhe olher hand, vhen lhe oosilion is excelionaIIy slrong
and lhe diclalorshi is genuineIy lhrealened, lhe diclalors may seek
negolialions in order lo saIvage as much of lheir conlroI or veaIlh
as ossibIe. In neilher case shouId lhe democrals heI lhe diclalors
achieve lheir goaIs.
Democrals shouId be vary of lhe lras lhal may be deIiber-
aleIy buiIl inlo a negolialion rocess by lhe diclalors. The caII for
negolialions vhen basic issues of oIilicaI Iiberlies are invoIved may
be an efforl by lhe diclalors lo induce lhe democrals lo surrender
eacefuIIy vhiIe lhe vioIence of lhe diclalorshi conlinues. In lhose
lyes of con"icls lhe onIy roer roIe of negolialions may occur al
lhe end of a decisive slruggIe in vhich lhe over of lhe diclalors
has been effecliveIy deslroyed and lhey seek ersonaI safe assage
lo an inlernalionaI airorl.
Pnwcr and justIcc In ncgntIatInns
If lhis |udgmenl sounds loo harsh a commenlary on negolialions,
erhas some of lhe romanlicism associaled vilh lhem needs lo
be moderaled. CIear lhinking is required as lo hov negolialions
oerale.
Negolialion does nol mean lhal lhe lvo sides sil dovn lo-
gelher on a basis of equaIily and laIk lhrough and resoIve lhe dif-
ferences lhal roduced lhe con"icl belveen lhem. Tvo facls musl
be remembered. Iirsl, in negolialions il is nol lhe reIalive |uslice of
lhe con"icling vievs and ob|eclives lhal delermines lhe conlenl of a
negolialed agreemenl. Second, lhe conlenl of a negolialed agreemenl
is IargeIy delermined by lhe over caacily of each side.
SeveraI dif!cuIl queslions musl be considered. Whal can each
side do al a Ialer dale lo gain ils ob|eclives if lhe olher side faiIs lo
come lo an agreemenl al lhe negolialing labIe` Whal can each side
do afler an agreemenl is reached if lhe olher side breaks ils vord
and uses ils avaiIabIe forces lo seize ils ob|eclives desile lhe agree-
menl`
A sellIemenl is nol reached in negolialions lhrough an assess-
menl of lhe righls and vrongs of lhe issues al slake. WhiIe lhose
may be much discussed, lhe reaI resuIls in negolialions come from
an assessmenl of lhe absoIule and reIalive over silualions of lhe
conlending grous. Whal can lhe democrals do lo ensure lhal lheir
minimum cIaims cannol be denied` Whal can lhe diclalors do lo
slay in conlroI and neulraIize lhe democrals` In olher vords, if an
agreemenl comes, il is more IikeIy lhe resuIl of each side eslimal-
ing hov lhe over caacilies of lhe lvo sides comare, and lhen
caIcuIaling hov an oen slruggIe mighl end.
Allenlion musl aIso be given lo vhal each side is viIIing lo give
u in order lo reach agreemenl. In successfuI negolialions lhere is
comromise, a sIilling of differences. Lach side gels arl of vhal
il vanls and gives u arl of ils ob|eclives.
In lhe case of exlreme diclalorshis vhal are lhe ro-democ-
racy forces lo give u lo lhe diclalors` Whal ob|eclives of
lhe diclalors are lhe ro-democracy forces lo accel` Are lhe
12 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 13
democrals lo give lo lhe diclalors (vhelher a oIilicaI arly or
a miIilary cabaI) a conslilulionaIIy-eslabIished ermanenl roIe
in lhe fulure governmenl` Where is lhe democracy in lhal`
Lven assuming lhal aII goes veII in negolialions, il is necessary
lo ask: Whal kind of eace viII be lhe resuIl` WiII Iife lhen be bel-
ler or vorse lhan il vouId be if lhe democrals began or conlinued
lo slruggIe`
Agrccab!c" dIctatnrs
Diclalors may have a variely of molives and ob|eclives underIying
lheir dominalion: over, osilion, veaIlh, reshaing lhe sociely, and
lhe Iike. ne shouId remember lhal none of lhese viII be served if
lhey abandon lheir conlroI osilions. In lhe evenl of negolialions
diclalors viII lry lo reserve lheir goaIs.
Whalever romises offered by diclalors in any negolialed
sellIemenl, no one shouId ever forgel lhal lhe diclalors may romise
anylhing lo secure submission from lheir democralic oonenls, and
lhen brazenIy vioIale lhose same agreemenls.
If lhe democrals agree lo haIl resislance in order lo gain a re-
rieve from reression, lhey may be very disaoinled. A haIl lo
resislance rareIy brings reduced reression. nce lhe reslraining
force of inlernaI and inlernalionaI oosilion has been removed,
diclalors may even make lheir oression and vioIence more brulaI
lhan before. The coIIase of ouIar resislance oflen removes lhe
counlervaiIing force lhal has Iimiled lhe conlroI and brulaIily of lhe
diclalorshi. The lyranls can lhen move ahead againsl vhomever
lhey vish. Ior lhe lyranl has lhe over lo in"icl onIy lhal vhich
ve Iack lhe slrenglh lo resisl, vrole KrishnaIaI Shridharani.
5
Resislance, nol negolialions, is essenliaI for change in con"icls
vhere fundamenlaI issues are al slake. In nearIy aII cases, resislance
musl conlinue lo drive diclalors oul of over. Success is mosl oflen
5
KrishnaIaI Shridharani, Wcr Wiincui Vic|cncc. A Siu!q cj Gcn!nis Mcinc! cn! |is
Acccmp|isnmcnis (Nev York: Harcourl, race, 1939, and rerinl Nev York and
London: GarIand IubIishing, 1972), . 26O.
delermined nol by negolialing a sellIemenl bul lhrough lhe vise use
of lhe mosl aroriale and overfuI means of resislance avaiIabIe.
Il is our conlenlion, lo be exIored Ialer in more delaiI, lhal oIilicaI
de!ance, or nonvioIenl slruggIe, is lhe mosl overfuI means avaiI-
abIe lo lhose slruggIing for freedom.
What kInd nI pcacc?
If diclalors and democrals are lo laIk aboul eace al aII, exlremeIy
cIear lhinking is needed because of lhe dangers invoIved. Nol ev-
eryone vho uses lhe vord eace vanls eace vilh freedom and
|uslice. Submission lo crueI oression and assive acquiescence lo
rulhIess diclalors vho have erelraled alrocilies on hundreds of
lhousands of eoIe is no reaI eace. HilIer oflen caIIed for eace,
by vhich he meanl submission lo his viII. A diclalors' eace is oflen
no more lhan lhe eace of lhe rison or of lhe grave.
There are olher dangers. WeII-inlended negolialors somelimes
confuse lhe ob|eclives of lhe negolialions and lhe negolialion rocess
ilseIf. Iurlher, democralic negolialors, or foreign negolialion seciaI-
isls acceled lo assisl in lhe negolialions, may in a singIe slroke ro-
vide lhe diclalors vilh lhe domeslic and inlernalionaI Iegilimacy lhal
lhey had been reviousIy denied because of lheir seizure of lhe slale,
human righls vioIalions, and brulaIilies. Wilhoul lhal deseraleIy
needed Iegilimacy, lhe diclalors cannol conlinue lo ruIe inde!nileIy.
Lxonenls of eace shouId nol rovide lhem Iegilimacy.
Rcasnns Inr hnpc
As slaled earIier, oosilion Ieaders may feeI forced lo ursue ne-
golialions oul of a sense of hoeIessness of lhe democralic slruggIe.
Hovever, lhal sense of overIessness can be changed. Diclalorshis
are nol ermanenl. IeoIe Iiving under diclalorshis need nol re-
main veak, and diclalors need nol be aIIoved lo remain overfuI
inde!nileIy. ArislolIe noled Iong ago, . . . |jIigarchy and lyranny
are shorler-Iived lhan any olher conslilulion. . . . |AjII round, lyran-
14 Gcnc Sncrp
6
ArislolIe, 1nc Pc|iiics, lransI. by T. A. SincIair (Harmondsvorlh, MiddIesex, Lng-
Iand and aIlimore, MaryIand: Ienguin ooks 1976 |1962j), ook V, Chaler 12,
. 231 and 232.
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 15
nies have nol Iasled Iong.
6
Modern diclalorshis are aIso vuInerabIe.
Their veaknesses can be aggravaled and lhe diclalors' over can be
disinlegraled. (In Chaler Iour ve viII examine lhese veaknesses
in more delaiI.)
Recenl hislory shovs lhe vuInerabiIily of diclalorshis, and re-
veaIs lhal lhey can crumbIe in a reIaliveIy shorl lime san: vhereas
len years 198O-199O vere required lo bring dovn lhe Commu-
nisl diclalorshi in IoIand, in Lasl Germany and CzechosIovakia in
1989 il occurred vilhin veeks. In LI SaIvador and GualemaIa in 1944
lhe slruggIes againsl lhe enlrenched brulaI miIilary diclalors required
aroximaleIy lvo veeks each. The miIilariIy overfuI regime of
lhe Shah in Iran vas undermined in a fev monlhs. The Marcos dic-
lalorshi in lhe IhiIiines feII before eoIe over vilhin veeks
in 1986: lhe Iniled Slales governmenl quickIy abandoned Iresidenl
Marcos vhen lhe slrenglh of lhe oosilion became aarenl. The
allemled hard-Iine cou in lhe Soviel Inion in Augusl 1991 vas
bIocked in days by oIilicaI de!ance. Thereafler, many of ils Iong
dominaled consliluenl nalions in onIy days, veeks, and monlhs
regained lheir indeendence.
The oId reconcelion lhal vioIenl means aIvays vork quickIy
and nonvioIenl means aIvays require vasl lime is cIearIy nol vaIid.
AIlhough much lime may be required for changes in lhe underIying
silualion and sociely, lhe acluaI !ghl againsl a diclalorshi somelimes
occurs reIaliveIy quickIy by nonvioIenl slruggIe.
Negolialions are nol lhe onIy aIlernalive lo a conlinuing var
of annihiIalion on lhe one hand and cailuIalion on lhe olher. The
examIes |usl ciled, as veII as lhose Iisled in Chaler ne, iIIuslrale
lhal anolher olion exisls for lhose vho vanl bolh eace cn! free-
dom: oIilicaI de!ance.
17
THREE
WHENCE COME5 THE POWER?
Achieving a sociely vilh bolh freedom and eace is of course no
simIe lask. Il viII require greal slralegic skiII, organizalion, and
Ianning. Above aII, il viII require over. Democrals cannol hoe
lo bring dovn a diclalorshi and eslabIish oIilicaI freedom vilhoul
lhe abiIily lo aIy lheir ovn over effecliveIy.
ul hov is lhis ossibIe` Whal kind of over can lhe democralic
oosilion mobiIize lhal viII be suf!cienl lo deslroy lhe diclalorshi
and ils vasl miIilary and oIice nelvorks` The ansvers Iie in an ofl
ignored underslanding of oIilicaI over. Learning lhis insighl is
nol reaIIy so dif!cuIl a lask. Some basic lrulhs are quile simIe.
Thc Mnnkcy Mastcr" Iab!c
A Iourleenlh Cenlury Chinese arabIe by Liu-}i, for examIe, oul-
Iines lhis negIecled underslanding of oIilicaI over quile veII:
7
In lhe feudaI slale of Chu an oId man survived by keeing
monkeys in his service. The eoIe of Chu caIIed him |u
gong (monkey masler).
Lach morning, lhe oId man vouId assembIe lhe monkeys
in his courlyard, and order lhe eIdesl one lo Iead lhe olhers
lo lhe mounlains lo galher fruils from bushes and lrees.
Il vas lhe ruIe lhal each monkey had lo give one-lenlh of
his coIIeclion lo lhe oId man. Those vho faiIed lo do so
vouId be rulhIessIy "ogged. AII lhe monkeys suffered
billerIy, bul dared nol comIain.
7
This slory, originaIIy lilIed RuIe by Tricks is from Yu-|i-zi by Liu }i (1311-1375)
and has been lransIaled by Sidney Tai, aII righls reserved. Yu-Ii-zi is aIso lhe seud-
onym of Liu }i. The lransIalion vas originaIIy ubIished in Ncntic|cni Scnciicns.
Ncus jrcm inc A||cri |insicin |nsiiiuiicn (Cambridge, Mass.), VoI. IV, No. 3 (Winler
1992-1993), . 3.
ne day, a smaII monkey asked lhe olher monkeys: Did
lhe oId man Ianl aII lhe fruil lrees and bushes` The olh-
ers said: No, lhey grev naluraIIy. The smaII monkey
furlher asked: Can'l ve lake lhe fruils vilhoul lhe oId
man's ermission` The olhers reIied: Yes, ve aII can.
The smaII monkey conlinued: Then, vhy shouId ve de-
end on lhe oId man, vhy musl ve aII serve him`
efore lhe smaII monkey vas abIe lo !nish his slalemenl,
aII lhe monkeys suddenIy became enIighlened and avak-
ened.
n lhe same nighl, valching lhal lhe oId man had faIIen
asIee, lhe monkeys lore dovn aII lhe barricades of lhe
slockade in vhich lhey vere con!ned, and deslroyed lhe
slockade enlireIy. They aIso look lhe fruils lhe oId man had
in slorage, broughl aII vilh lhem lo lhe voods, and never
relurned. The oId man !naIIy died of slarvalion.
Yu-Ii-zi says, Some men in lhe vorId ruIe lheir eoIe by
lricks and nol by righleous rinciIes. Aren'l lhey |usl Iike
lhe monkey masler` They are nol avare of lheir muddIe-
headedness. As soon as lheir eoIe become enIighlened,
lheir lricks no Ionger vork.
Ncccssary snurccs nI pn!ItIca! pnwcr
The rinciIe is simIe. Diclalors require lhe assislance of lhe eoIe
lhey ruIe, vilhoul vhich lhey cannol secure and mainlain lhe sources
of oIilicaI over. These sources of oIilicaI over incIude:
Auincriiq, lhe beIief among lhe eoIe lhal lhe regime is Ie-
gilimale, and lhal lhey have a moraI duly lo obey il,
Humcn rcscurccs, lhe number and imorlance of lhe ersons
and grous vhich are obeying, cooeraling, or roviding
assislance lo lhe ruIers,
18 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 19
S|i||s cn! |ncu|c!gc, needed by lhe regime lo erform se-
ci!c aclions and suIied by lhe cooeraling ersons and
grous,
|nicngi||c jccicrs, sychoIogicaI and ideoIogicaI faclors lhal
may induce eoIe lo obey and assisl lhe ruIers,
Mcicric| rcscurccs, lhe degree lo vhich lhe ruIers conlroI or
have access lo roerly, naluraI resources, !nanciaI resources,
lhe economic syslem, and means of communicalion and
lransorlalion, and
Scnciicns, unishmenls, lhrealened or aIied, againsl lhe
disobedienl and noncooeralive lo ensure lhe submission
and cooeralion lhal are needed for lhe regime lo exisl and
carry oul ils oIicies.
AII of lhese sources, hovever, deend on accelance of lhe
regime, on lhe submission and obedience of lhe ouIalion, and on
lhe cooeralion of innumerabIe eoIe and lhe many inslilulions of
lhe sociely. These are nol guaranleed.
IuII cooeralion, obedience, and suorl viII increase lhe avaiI-
abiIily of lhe needed sources of over and, consequenlIy, exand
lhe over caacily of any governmenl.
n lhe olher hand, vilhdravaI of ouIar and inslilulionaI co-
oeralion vilh aggressors and diclalors diminishes, and may sever,
lhe avaiIabiIily of lhe sources of over on vhich aII ruIers deend.
Wilhoul avaiIabiIily of lhose sources, lhe ruIers' over veakens and
!naIIy dissoIves.
NaluraIIy, diclalors are sensilive lo aclions and ideas lhal lhreal-
en lheir caacily lo do as lhey Iike. Diclalors are lherefore IikeIy lo
lhrealen and unish lhose vho disobey, slrike, or faiI lo cooerale.
Hovever, lhal is nol lhe end of lhe slory. Reression, even brulaIi-
lies, do nol aIvays roduce a resumlion of lhe necessary degree of
submission and cooeralion for lhe regime lo funclion.
If, desile reression, lhe sources of over can be reslricled or
severed for enough lime, lhe iniliaI resuIls may be uncerlainly and
confusion vilhin lhe diclalorshi. Thal is IikeIy lo be foIIoved by
a cIear veakening of lhe over of lhe diclalorshi. ver lime, lhe
vilhhoIding of lhe sources of over can roduce lhe araIysis and
imolence of lhe regime, and in severe cases, ils disinlegralion. The
diclalors' over viII die, sIovIy or raidIy, from oIilicaI slarva-
lion.
The degree of Iiberly or lyranny in any governmenl is, il foI-
Iovs, in Iarge degree a re"eclion of lhe reIalive delerminalion of lhe
sub|ecls lo be free and lheir viIIingness and abiIily lo resisl efforls
lo ensIave lhem.
Conlrary lo ouIar oinion, even lolaIilarian diclalorshis
are deendenl on lhe ouIalion and lhe socielies lhey ruIe. As lhe
oIilicaI scienlisl KarI W. Deulsch noled in 1953:
TolaIilarian over is slrong onIy if il does nol have lo be
used loo oflen. If lolaIilarian over musl be used al aII
limes againsl lhe enlire ouIalion, il is unIikeIy lo remain
overfuI for Iong. Since lolaIilarian regimes require more
over for deaIing vilh lheir sub|ecls lhan do olher lyes
of governmenl, such regimes sland in grealer need of
videsread and deendabIe comIiance habils among
lheir eoIe, more lhan lhal lhey have lo be abIe lo counl
on lhe aclive suorl of al Ieasl signi!canl arls of lhe
ouIalion in case of need.
8
The LngIish Nineleenlh Cenlury IegaI lheorisl }ohn Auslin
described lhe silualion of a diclalorshi confronling a disaffecled
eoIe. Auslin argued lhal if mosl of lhe ouIalion vere deler-
mined lo deslroy lhe governmenl and vere viIIing lo endure reres-
sion lo do so, lhen lhe mighl of lhe governmenl, incIuding lhose
vho suorled il, couId nol reserve lhe haled governmenl, even if
20 Gcnc Sncrp
8
KarI W. Deulsch, Cracks in lhe MonoIilh, in CarI }. Iriedrich, ed., 1cic|iicricnism
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Iniversily Iress, 1954), . 313-314.
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 21
il received foreign assislance. The de!anl eoIe couId nol be forced
back inlo ermanenl obedience and sub|eclion, Auslin concIuded.
9
NiccoIo MachiaveIIi had much earIier argued lhal lhe rince
. . . vho has lhe ubIic as a vhoIe for his enemy can never make
himseIf secure, and lhe grealer his crueIly, lhe veaker does his re-
gime become.
1O
The raclicaI oIilicaI aIicalion of lhese insighls vas dem-
onslraled by lhe heroic Norvegian resislers againsl lhe Nazi occu-
alion, and as ciled in Chaler ne, by lhe brave IoIes, Germans,
Czechs, SIovaks, and many olhers vho resisled Communisl aggres-
sion and diclalorshi, and !naIIy heIed roduce lhe coIIase of
Communisl ruIe in Luroe. This, of course, is no nev henomenon:
cases of nonvioIenl resislance go back al Ieasl lo 494 .C. vhen Ie-
beians vilhdrev cooeralion from lheir Roman alrician maslers.
11

NonvioIenl slruggIe has been emIoyed al various limes by eoIes
lhroughoul Asia, Africa, lhe Americas, AuslraIasia, and lhe Iaci!c
isIands, as veII as Luroe.
Three of lhe mosl imorlanl faclors in delermining lo vhal
degree a governmenl's over viII be conlroIIed or unconlroIIed
lherefore are: (1) lhe reIalive !csirc of lhe ouIace lo imose Iimils
on lhe governmenl's over, (2) lhe reIalive sircngin of lhe sub|ecls'
indeendenl organizalions and inslilulions lo vilhdrav coIIecliveIy
lhe sources of over, and (3) lhe ouIalion's reIalive c|i|iiq lo vilh-
hoId lheir consenl and assislance.
Ccntcrs nI dcmncratIc pnwcr
ne characlerislic of a democralic sociely is lhal lhere exisl inde-
endenl of lhe slale a muIlilude of nongovernmenlaI grous and
9
}ohn Auslin, Icciurcs cn jurispru!cncc cr inc Pni|cscpnq cj Pcsiiitc Icu (Iiflh edilion,
revised and ediled by Roberl CambeII, 2 voI., London: }ohn Murray, 1911 |1861j),
VoI. I, . 296.
1O
NiccoIo MachiaveIIi, The Discourses on lhe Iirsl Ten ooks of Livy, in 1nc
Disccurscs cj Niccc|c Mccnictc||i (London: RoulIedge and Kegan IauI, 195O), VoI.
I, . 254.
11
See Gene Shar, 1nc Pc|iiics cj Ncntic|cni Aciicn (oslon: Iorler Sargenl, 1973), .
75 and assim for olher hisloricaI examIes.
inslilulions. These incIude, for examIe, famiIies, reIigious organiza-
lions, cuIluraI associalions, sorls cIubs, economic inslilulions, lrade
unions, sludenl associalions, oIilicaI arlies, viIIages, neighborhood
associalions, gardening cIubs, human righls organizalions, musicaI
grous, Iilerary socielies, and olhers. These bodies are imorlanl
in serving lheir ovn ob|eclives and aIso in heIing lo meel sociaI
needs.
AddilionaIIy, lhese bodies have greal oIilicaI signi!cance.
They rovide grou and inslilulionaI bases by vhich eoIe can exerl
in"uence over lhe direclion of lheir sociely and resisl olher grous
or lhe governmenl vhen lhey are seen lo iminge un|uslIy on lheir
inleresls, aclivilies, or uroses. IsoIaled individuaIs, nol members
of such grous, usuaIIy are unabIe lo make a signi!canl imacl on
lhe resl of lhe sociely, much Iess a governmenl, and cerlainIy nol a
diclalorshi.
ConsequenlIy, if lhe aulonomy and freedom of such bodies
can be laken avay by lhe diclalors, lhe ouIalion viII be reIaliveIy
heIIess. AIso, if lhese inslilulions can lhemseIves be diclaloriaIIy
conlroIIed by lhe cenlraI regime or reIaced by nev conlroIIed ones,
lhey can be used lo dominale bolh lhe individuaI members and aIso
lhose areas of lhe sociely.
Hovever, if lhe aulonomy and freedom of lhese indeendenl
civiI inslilulions (oulside of governmenl conlroI) can be mainlained
or regained lhey are highIy imorlanl for lhe aIicalion of oIili-
caI de!ance. The common fealure of lhe ciled examIes in vhich
diclalorshis have been disinlegraled or veakened has been lhe
courageous mcss aIicalion of oIilicaI de!ance by lhe ouIalion
and ils inslilulions.
As slaled, lhese cenlers of over rovide lhe inslilulionaI bases
from vhich lhe ouIalion can exerl ressure or can resisl diclalo-
riaI conlroIs. In lhe fulure, lhey viII be arl of lhe indisensabIe
slrucluraI base for a free sociely. Their conlinued indeendence
and grovlh lherefore is oflen a rerequisile for lhe success of lhe
Iiberalion slruggIe.
If lhe diclalorshi has been IargeIy successfuI in deslroying or
conlroIIing lhe sociely's indeendenl bodies, il viII be imorlanl for
22 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 23
lhe resislers lo creale nev indeendenl sociaI grous and inslilu-
lions, or lo reasserl democralic conlroI over surviving or arliaIIy
conlroIIed bodies. During lhe Hungarian RevoIulion of 1956-1957
a muIlilude of direcl democracy counciIs emerged, even |oining
logelher lo eslabIish for some veeks a vhoIe federaled syslem of
inslilulions and governance. In IoIand during lhe Iale 198Os vork-
ers mainlained iIIegaI SoIidarily unions and, in some cases, look
over conlroI of lhe of!ciaI, Communisl-dominaled, lrade unions.
Such inslilulionaI deveIomenls can have very imorlanl oIilicaI
consequences.
f course, none of lhis means lhal veakening and deslroying
diclalorshis is easy, nor lhal every alleml viII succeed. Il cerlainIy
does nol mean lhal lhe slruggIe viII be free of casuaIlies, for lhose
sliII serving lhe diclalors are IikeIy lo !ghl back in an efforl lo force
lhe ouIace lo resume cooeralion and obedience.
1nc c|ctc insigni inic pcucr !ccs mccn, ncuctcr, inci inc !c|i|crcic
!isinicgrciicn cj !icicicrsnips is pcssi||c. Diclalorshis in arlicuIar
have seci!c characlerislics lhal render lhem highIy vuInerabIe
lo skiIIfuIIy imIemenled oIilicaI de!ance. Lel us examine lhese
characlerislics in more delaiI.
25
FOUR
DICTATOR5HIP5 HAVE WEAKNE55E5
Diclalorshis oflen aear invuInerabIe. InleIIigence agencies,
oIice, miIilary forces, risons, concenlralion cams, and execu-
lion squads are conlroIIed by a overfuI fev. A counlry's !nances,
naluraI resources, and roduclion caacilies are oflen arbilrariIy
Iundered by diclalors and used lo suorl lhe diclalors' viII.
In comarison, democralic oosilion forces oflen aear
exlremeIy veak, ineffeclive, and overIess. Thal ercelion of
invuInerabiIily againsl overIessness makes effeclive oosilion
unIikeIy.
Thal is nol lhe vhoIe slory, hovever.
IdcntIIyIng thc AchI!!cs' hcc!
A mylh from CIassicaI Greece iIIuslrales veII lhe vuInerabiIily of
lhe suosedIy invuInerabIe. Againsl lhe varrior AchiIIes, no bIov
vouId in|ure and no svord vouId enelrale his skin. When sliII a
baby, AchiIIes' molher had suosedIy died him inlo lhe valers
of lhe magicaI river Slyx, resuIling in lhe roleclion of his body from
aII dangers. There vas, hovever, a robIem. Since lhe baby vas
heId by his heeI so lhal he vouId nol be vashed avay, lhe magicaI
valer had nol covered lhal smaII arl of his body. When AchiIIes
vas a grovn man he aeared lo aII lo be invuInerabIe lo lhe en-
emies' veaons. Hovever, in lhe ballIe againsl Troy, inslrucled by
one vho knev lhe veakness, an enemy soIdier aimed his arrov al
AchiIIes' unrolecled heeI, lhe one sol vhere he couId be in|ured.
The slrike roved falaI. SliII loday, lhe hrase AchiIIes' heeI refers
lo lhe vuInerabIe arl of a erson, a Ian, or an inslilulion al vhich
if allacked lhere is no roleclion.
The same rinciIe aIies lo rulhIess diclalorshis. They, loo,
can be conquered, bul mosl quickIy and vilh Ieasl cosl if lheir veak-
nesses can be idenli!ed and lhe allack concenlraled on lhem.
26 Gcnc Sncrp
Wcakncsscs nI dIctatnrshIps
Among lhe veaknesses of diclalorshis are lhe foIIoving:
1. The cooeralion of a muIlilude of eoIe, grous, and insli-
lulions needed lo oerale lhe syslem may be reslricled or
vilhdravn.
2. The requiremenls and effecls of lhe regime's asl oIicies
viII somevhal Iimil ils resenl abiIily lo adol and imIe-
menl con"icling oIicies.
3. The syslem may become rouline in ils oeralion, Iess abIe lo
ad|usl quickIy lo nev silualions.
4. IersonneI and resources aIready aIIocaled for exisling lasks
viII nol be easiIy avaiIabIe for nev needs.
5. Subordinales fearfuI of disIeasing lheir sueriors may nol
reorl accurale or comIele informalion needed by lhe dic-
lalors lo make decisions.
6. The ideoIogy may erode, and mylhs and symboIs of lhe sys-
lem may become unslabIe.
7. If a slrong ideoIogy is resenl lhal in"uences one's viev of
reaIily, !rm adherence lo il may cause inallenlion lo acluaI
condilions and needs.
8. Delerioraling ef!ciency and comelency of lhe bureaucracy,
or excessive conlroIs and reguIalions, may make lhe syslem's
oIicies and oeralion ineffeclive.
9. InlernaI inslilulionaI con"icls and ersonaI rivaIries and hos-
liIilies may harm, and even disrul, lhe oeralion of lhe dic-
lalorshi.
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 27
1O. InleIIecluaIs and sludenls may become reslIess in resonse
lo condilions, reslriclions, doclrinaIism, and reression.
11. The generaI ubIic may over lime become aalhelic, skeli-
caI, and even hosliIe lo lhe regime.
12. RegionaI, cIass, cuIluraI, or nalionaI differences may become
acule.
13. The over hierarchy of lhe diclalorshi is aIvays unslabIe
lo some degree, and al limes exlremeIy so. IndividuaIs do
nol onIy remain in lhe same osilion in lhe ranking, bul may
rise or faII lo olher ranks or be removed enlireIy and reIaced
by nev ersons.
14. Seclions of lhe oIice or miIilary forces may acl lo achieve
lheir ovn ob|eclives, even againsl lhe viII of eslabIished dic-
lalors, incIuding by cou d'lal.
15. If lhe diclalorshi is nev, lime is required for il lo become
veII eslabIished.
16. Wilh so many decisions made by so fev eoIe in lhe dicla-
lorshi, mislakes of |udgmenl, oIicy, and aclion are IikeIy
lo occur.
17. If lhe regime seeks lo avoid lhese dangers and decenlraI-
izes conlroIs and decision making, ils conlroI over lhe cen-
lraI Ievers of over may be furlher eroded.
AttackIng wcakncsscs nI dIctatnrshIps
Wilh knovIedge of such inherenl veaknesses, lhe democralic o-
osilion can seek lo aggravale lhese AchiIIes' heeIs deIiberaleIy
in order lo aIler lhe syslem draslicaIIy or lo disinlegrale il.
The concIusion is lhen cIear: desile lhe aearances of slrenglh,
aII diclalorshis have veaknesses, inlernaI inef!ciencies, ersonaI
rivaIries, inslilulionaI inef!ciencies, and con"icls belveen organiza-
lions and dearlmenls. These veaknesses, over lime, lend lo make
lhe regime Iess effeclive and more vuInerabIe lo changing condilions
and deIiberale resislance. Nol everylhing lhe regime sels oul lo ac-
comIish viII gel comIeled. Al limes, for examIe, even HilIer's
direcl orders vere never imIemenled because lhose benealh him in
lhe hierarchy refused lo carry lhem oul. The diclaloriaI regime may
al limes even faII aarl quickIy, as ve have aIready observed.
This does nol mean diclalorshis can be deslroyed vilhoul risks
and casuaIlies. Lvery ossibIe course of aclion for Iiberalion viII
invoIve risks and olenliaI suffering, and viII lake lime lo oerale.
And, of course, no means of aclion can ensure raid success in every
silualion. Hovever, lyes of slruggIe lhal largel lhe diclalorshi's
idenli!abIe veaknesses have grealer chance of success lhan lhose
lhal seek lo !ghl lhe diclalorshi vhere il is cIearIy slrongesl. The
queslion is ncu lhis slruggIe is lo be vaged.
28 Gcnc Sncrp
29
FIVE
EXERCI5ING POWER
In Chaler ne ve noled lhal miIilary resislance againsl diclalor-
shis does nol slrike lhem vhere lhey are veakesl, bul ralher vhere
lhey are slrongesl. y choosing lo comele in lhe areas of miIilary
forces, suIies of ammunilion, veaons lechnoIogy, and lhe Iike,
resislance movemenls lend lo ul lhemseIves al a dislincl disadvan-
lage. Diclalorshis viII aImosl aIvays be abIe lo musler suerior
resources in lhese areas. The dangers of reIying on foreign overs
for saIvalion vere aIso oulIined. In Chaler Tvo ve examined lhe
robIems of reIying on negolialions as a means lo remove diclalor-
shis.
Whal means are lhen avaiIabIe lhal viII offer lhe democralic
resislance dislincl advanlages and viII lend lo aggravale lhe iden-
li!ed veaknesses of diclalorshis` Whal lechnique of aclion viII
cailaIize on lhe lheory of oIilicaI over discussed in Chaler
Three` The aIlernalive of choice is oIilicaI de!ance.
IoIilicaI de!ance has lhe foIIoving characlerislics:
Il does nol accel lhal lhe oulcome viII be decided by lhe
means of !ghling chosen by lhe diclalorshi.
Il is dif!cuIl for lhe regime lo combal.
Il can uniqueIy aggravale veaknesses of lhe diclalorshi and
can sever ils sources of over.
Il can in aclion be videIy disersed bul can aIso be concen-
lraled on a seci!c ob|eclive.
Il Ieads lo errors of |udgmenl and aclion by lhe diclalors.
Il can effecliveIy uliIize lhe ouIalion as a vhoIe and lhe
sociely's grous and inslilulions in lhe slruggIe lo end lhe
brulaI dominalion of lhe fev.
Il heIs lo sread lhe dislribulion of effeclive over in lhe
sociely, making lhe eslabIishmenl and mainlenance of a
democralic sociely more ossibIe.
Thc wnrkIngs nI nnnvIn!cnt strugg!c
Like miIilary caabiIilies, oIilicaI de!ance can be emIoyed for a
variely of uroses, ranging from efforls lo in"uence lhe oonenls
lo lake differenl aclions, lo creale condilions for a eacefuI resoIu-
lion of con"icl, or lo disinlegrale lhe oonenls' regime. Hovever,
oIilicaI de!ance oerales in quile differenl vays from vioIence.
AIlhough bolh lechniques are means lo vage slruggIe, lhey do so
vilh very differenl means and vilh differenl consequences. The
vays and resuIls of vioIenl con"icl are veII knovn. IhysicaI vea-
ons are used lo inlimidale, in|ure, kiII, and deslroy.
NonvioIenl slruggIe is a much more comIex and varied
means of slruggIe lhan is vioIence. Inslead, lhe slruggIe is foughl
by sychoIogicaI, sociaI, economic, and oIilicaI veaons aIied
by lhe ouIalion and lhe inslilulions of lhe sociely. These have
been knovn under various names of rolesls, slrikes, noncooera-
lion, boycolls, disaffeclion, and eoIe over. As noled earIier, aII
governmenls can ruIe onIy as Iong as lhey receive reIenishmenl of
lhe needed sources of lheir over from lhe cooeralion, submission,
and obedience of lhe ouIalion and lhe inslilulions of lhe sociely.
IoIilicaI de!ance, unIike vioIence, is uniqueIy suiled lo severing
lhose sources of over.
NnnvIn!cnt wcapnns and dIscIp!Inc
The common error of asl imrovised oIilicaI de!ance camaigns
is lhe reIiance on onIy one or lvo melhods, such as slrikes and mass
demonslralions. In facl, a muIlilude of melhods exisl lhal aIIov
30 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 31
resislance slralegisls lo concenlrale and diserse resislance as re-
quired.
Aboul lvo hundred seci!c melhods of nonvioIenl aclion have
been idenli!ed, and lhere are cerlainIy scores more. These melhods
are cIassi!ed under lhree broad calegories: rolesl and ersuasion,
noncooeralion, and inlervenlion. Melhods of nonvioIenl rolesl
and ersuasion are IargeIy symboIic demonslralions, incIuding a-
rades, marches, and vigiIs (54 melhods). Noncooeralion is divided
inlo lhree sub-calegories: (a) sociaI noncooeralion (16 melhods),
(b) economic noncooeralion, incIuding boycolls (26 melhods) and
slrikes (23 melhods), and (c) oIilicaI noncooeralion (38 melhods).
NonvioIenl inlervenlion, by sychoIogicaI, hysicaI, sociaI, econom-
ic, or oIilicaI means, such as lhe fasl, nonvioIenl occualion, and
araIIeI governmenl (41 melhods), is lhe !naI grou. A Iisl of 198 of
lhese melhods is incIuded as lhe Aendix lo lhis ubIicalion.
The use of a considerabIe number of lhese melhods carefuIIy
chosen, aIied ersislenlIy and on a Iarge scaIe, vieIded in lhe
conlexl of a vise slralegy and aroriale laclics, by lrained civiI-
ians is IikeIy lo cause any iIIegilimale regime severe robIems.
This aIies lo aII diclalorshis.
In conlrasl lo miIilary means, lhe melhods of nonvioIenl slrug-
gIe can be focused direclIy on lhe issues al slake. Ior examIe, since
lhe issue of diclalorshi is rimariIy oIilicaI, lhen oIilicaI forms of
nonvioIenl slruggIe vouId be cruciaI. These vouId incIude deniaI
of Iegilimacy lo lhe diclalors and noncooeralion vilh lheir regime.
Noncooeralion vouId aIso be aIied againsl seci!c oIicies. Al
limes slaIIing and rocraslinalion may be quielIy and even secrelIy
racliced, vhiIe al olher limes oen disobedience and de!anl ubIic
demonslralions and slrikes may be visibIe lo aII.
n lhe olher hand, if lhe diclalorshi is vuInerabIe lo economic
ressures or if many of lhe ouIar grievances againsl il are eco-
nomic, lhen economic aclion, such as boycolls or slrikes, may be
aroriale resislance melhods. The diclalors' efforls lo exIoil lhe
economic syslem mighl be mel vilh Iimiled generaI slrikes, sIov-
dovns, and refusaI of assislance by (or disaearance of) indisens-
abIe exerls. SeIeclive use of various lyes of slrikes may be con-
ducled al key oinls in manufacluring, in lransorl, in lhe suIy
of rav maleriaIs, and in lhe dislribulion of roducls.
Some melhods of nonvioIenl slruggIe require eoIe lo erform
acls unreIaled lo lheir normaI Iives, such as dislribuling Iea"els,
oeraling an underground ress, going on hunger slrike, or silling
dovn in lhe slreels. These melhods may be dif!cuIl for some eoIe
lo underlake excel in very exlreme silualions.
lher melhods of nonvioIenl slruggIe inslead require eoIe
lo conlinue aroximaleIy lheir normaI Iives, lhough in somevhal
differenl vays. Ior examIe, eoIe may reorl for vork, inslead
of slriking, bul lhen deIiberaleIy vork more sIovIy or inef!cienlIy
lhan usuaI. Mislakes may be consciousIy made more frequenlIy.
ne may become sick and unabIe lo vork al cerlain limes. r,
one may simIy refuse lo vork. ne mighl go lo reIigious services
vhen lhe acl exresses nol onIy reIigious bul aIso oIilicaI convic-
lions. ne may acl lo rolecl chiIdren from lhe allackers' roaganda
by educalion al home or in iIIegaI cIasses. ne mighl refuse lo |oin
cerlain recommended or required organizalions lhal one vouId
nol have |oined freeIy in earIier limes. The simiIarily of such lyes
of aclion lo eoIe's usuaI aclivilies and lhe Iimiled degree of dear-
lure from lheir normaI Iives may make arlicialion in lhe nalionaI
Iiberalion slruggIe much easier for many eoIe.
Since nonvioIenl slruggIe and vioIence oerale in fundamen-
laIIy differenl vays, even Iimiled resislance vioIence during a o-
IilicaI de!ance camaign viII be counlerroduclive, for il viII shifl
lhe slruggIe lo one in vhich lhe diclalors have an overvheIming
advanlage (miIilary varfare). NonvioIenl disciIine is a key lo suc-
cess and musl be mainlained desile rovocalions and brulaIilies
by lhe diclalors and lheir agenls.
The mainlenance of nonvioIenl disciIine againsl vioIenl o-
onenls faciIilales lhe vorkings of lhe four mechanisms of change
in nonvioIenl slruggIe (discussed beIov). NonvioIenl disciIine is
aIso exlremeIy imorlanl in lhe rocess of oIilicaI |iu-|ilsu. In lhis
rocess lhe slark brulaIily of lhe regime againsl lhe cIearIy nonvio-
Ienl aclionisls oIilicaIIy rebounds againsl lhe diclalors' osilion,
32 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 33
causing dissenlion in lheir ovn ranks as veII as fomenling suorl
for lhe resislers among lhe generaI ouIalion, lhe regime's usuaI
suorlers, and lhird arlies.
In some cases, hovever, Iimiled vioIence againsl lhe diclalor-
shi may be inevilabIe. Iruslralion and halred of lhe regime may
exIode inlo vioIence. r, cerlain grous may be unviIIing lo aban-
don vioIenl means even lhough lhey recognize lhe imorlanl roIe of
nonvioIenl slruggIe. In lhese cases, oIilicaI de!ance does nol need lo
be abandoned. Hovever, il viII be necessary lo searale lhe vioIenl
aclion as far as ossibIe from lhe nonvioIenl aclion. This shouId be
done in lerms of geograhy, ouIalion grous, liming, and issues.
lhervise lhe vioIence couId have a disaslrous effecl on lhe olen-
liaIIy much more overfuI and successfuI use of oIilicaI de!ance.
The hisloricaI record indicales lhal vhiIe casuaIlies in dead
and vounded musl be execled in oIilicaI de!ance, lhey viII be
far fever lhan lhe casuaIlies in miIilary varfare. Iurlhermore, lhis
lye of slruggIe does nol conlribule lo lhe endIess cycIe of kiIIing
and brulaIily.
NonvioIenl slruggIe bolh requires and lends lo roduce a Ioss
(or grealer conlroI) of fear of lhe governmenl and ils vioIenl reres-
sion. Thal abandonmenl or conlroI of fear is a key eIemenl in deslroy-
ing lhe over of lhe diclalors over lhe generaI ouIalion.
Opcnncss, sccrccy, and hIgh standards
Secrecy, decelion, and underground consiracy ose very dif!-
cuIl robIems for a movemenl using nonvioIenl aclion. Il is oflen
imossibIe lo kee lhe oIilicaI oIice and inleIIigence agenls from
Iearning aboul inlenlions and Ians. Irom lhe erseclive of lhe
movemenl, secrecy is nol onIy rooled in fear bul conlribules lo fear,
vhich damens lhe siril of resislance and reduces lhe number of
eoIe vho can arliciale in a given aclion. Il aIso can conlribule
lo susicions and accusalions, oflen un|usli!ed, vilhin lhe move-
menl, concerning vho is an informer or agenl for lhe oonenls.
Secrecy may aIso affecl lhe abiIily of a movemenl lo remain nonvio-
Ienl. In conlrasl, oenness regarding inlenlions and Ians viII nol
onIy have lhe oosile effecls, bul viII conlribule lo an image lhal
lhe resislance movemenl is in facl exlremeIy overfuI. The robIem
is of course more comIex lhan lhis suggesls, and lhere are signi!-
canl asecls of resislance aclivilies lhal may require secrecy. A veII-
informed assessmenl viII be required by lhose knovIedgeabIe aboul
bolh lhe dynamics of nonvioIenl slruggIe and aIso lhe diclalorshi's
means of surveiIIance in lhe seci!c silualion.
The ediling, rinling, and dislribulion of underground ubIica-
lions, lhe use of iIIegaI radio broadcasls from vilhin lhe counlry, and
lhe galhering of inleIIigence aboul lhe oeralions of lhe diclalorshi
are among lhe seciaI Iimiled lyes of aclivilies vhere a high degree
of secrecy viII be required.
The mainlenance of high slandards of behavior in nonvioIenl
aclion is necessary al aII slages of lhe con"icl. Such faclors as fearIess-
ness and mainlaining nonvioIenl disciIine are aIvays required. Il is
imorlanl lo remember lhal Iarge numbers of eoIe may frequenlIy
be necessary lo effecl arlicuIar changes. Hovever, such numbers
can be oblained as reIiabIe arlicianls onIy by mainlaining lhe high
slandards of lhe movemenl.
5hIItIng pnwcr rc!atInnshIps
Slralegisls need lo remember lhal lhe con"icl in vhich oIilicaI de!-
ance is aIied is a conslanlIy changing !eId of slruggIe vilh conlinu-
ing inlerIay of moves and counlermoves. Nolhing is slalic. Iover
reIalionshis, bolh absoIule and reIalive, are sub|ecl lo conslanl and
raid changes. This is made ossibIe by lhe resislers conlinuing lheir
nonvioIenl ersislence desile reression.
The varialions in lhe reseclive over of lhe conlending sides
in lhis lye of con"icl silualion are IikeIy lo be more exlreme lhan in
vioIenl con"icls, lo lake Iace more quickIy, and lo have more diverse
and oIilicaIIy signi!canl consequences. Due lo lhese varialions,
seci!c aclions by lhe resislers are IikeIy lo have consequences far
beyond lhe arlicuIar lime and Iace in vhich lhey occur. These ef-
fecls viII rebound lo slrenglhen or veaken one grou or anolher.
34 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 35
In addilion, lhe nonvioIenl grou may, by ils aclions exerl in-
"uence over lhe increase or decrease in lhe reIalive slrenglh of inc
cppcncni grcup lo a greal exlenl. Ior examIe, disciIined courageous
nonvioIenl resislance in face of lhe diclalors' brulaIilies may induce
unease, disaffeclion, unreIiabiIily, and in exlreme silualions even
muliny among lhe diclalors' ovn soIdiers and ouIalion. This
resislance may aIso resuIl in increased inlernalionaI condemnalion
of lhe diclalorshi. In addilion, skiIIfuI, disciIined, and ersislenl
use of oIilicaI de!ance may resuIl in more and more arlicialion in
lhe resislance by eoIe vho normaIIy vouId give lheir lacil suorl
lo lhe diclalors or generaIIy remain neulraI in lhe con"icl.
Fnur mcchanIsms nI changc
NonvioIenl slruggIe roduces change in four vays. The !rsl
mechanism is lhe Ieasl IikeIy, lhough il has occurred. When mem-
bers of lhe oonenl grou are emolionaIIy moved by lhe suffering
of reression imosed on courageous nonvioIenl resislers or are
ralionaIIy ersuaded lhal lhe resislers' cause is |usl, lhey may come
lo accel lhe resislers' aims. This mechanism is caIIed conversion.
Though cases of ccntcrsicn in nonvioIenl aclion do somelimes ha-
en, lhey are rare, and in mosl con"icls lhis does nol occur al aII or
al Ieasl nol on a signi!canl scaIe.
Iar more oflen, nonvioIenl slruggIe oerales by changing lhe
con"icl silualion and lhe sociely so lhal lhe oonenls simIy cannol
do as lhey Iike. Il is lhis change lhal roduces lhe olher lhree mecha-
nisms: accommodalion, nonvioIenl coercion, and disinlegralion.
Which of lhese occurs deends on lhe degree lo vhich lhe reIalive
and absoIule over reIalions are shifled in favor of lhe democrals.
If lhe issues are nol fundamenlaI ones, lhe demands of lhe o-
osilion in a Iimiled camaign are nol considered lhrealening, and
lhe conlesl of forces has aIlered lhe over reIalionshis lo some
degree, lhe immediale con"icl may be ended by reaching an agree-
menl, a sIilling of differences or comromise. This mechanism is
caIIed ccccmmc!ciicn. Many slrikes are sellIed in lhis manner, for
examIe, vilh bolh sides allaining some of lheir ob|eclives bul nei-
lher achieving aII il vanled. A governmenl may erceive such a
sellIemenl lo have some osilive bene!ls, such as defusing lension,
crealing an imression of fairness, or oIishing lhe inlernalionaI
image of lhe regime. Il is imorlanl, lherefore, lhal greal care be
exercised in seIecling lhe issues on vhich a sellIemenl by accom-
modalion is accelabIe. A slruggIe lo bring dovn a diclalorshi is
nol one of lhese.
NonvioIenl slruggIe can be much more overfuI lhan indicaled
by lhe mechanisms of conversion or accommodalion. Mass nonco-
oeralion and de!ance can so change sociaI and oIilicaI silualions,
eseciaIIy over reIalionshis, lhal lhe diclalors' abiIily lo conlroI
lhe economic, sociaI, and oIilicaI rocesses of governmenl and lhe
sociely is in facl laken avay. The oonenls' miIilary forces may be-
come so unreIiabIe lhal lhey no Ionger simIy obey orders lo reress
resislers. AIlhough lhe oonenls' Ieaders remain in lheir osilions,
and adhere lo lheir originaI goaIs, lheir abiIily lo acl effecliveIy has
been laken avay from lhem. Thal is caIIed ncntic|cni cccrcicn.
In some exlreme silualions, lhe condilions roducing nonvioIenl
coercion are carried sliII furlher. The oonenls' Ieadershi in facl
Ioses aII abiIily lo acl and lheir ovn slruclure of over coIIases.
The resislers' seIf-direclion, noncooeralion, and de!ance become so
comIele lhal lhe oonenls nov Iack even a sembIance of conlroI
over lhem. The oonenls' bureaucracy refuses lo obey ils ovn Iead-
ershi. The oonenls' lroos and oIice muliny. The oonenls'
usuaI suorlers or ouIalion reudiale lheir former Ieadershi,
denying lhal lhey have any righl lo ruIe al aII. Hence, lheir former
assislance and obedience faIIs avay. The fourlh mechanism of
change, !isinicgrciicn of lhe oonenls' syslem, is so comIele lhal
lhey do nol even have suf!cienl over lo surrender. The regime
simIy faIIs lo ieces.
In Ianning Iiberalion slralegies, lhese four mechanisms shouId
be kel in mind. They somelimes oerale essenliaIIy by chance.
Hovever, lhe seIeclion of one or more of lhese as lhe inlended mecha-
36 Gcnc Sncrp
nism of change in a con"icl viII make il ossibIe lo formuIale se-
ci!c and muluaIIy reinforcing slralegies. Which mechanism (or
mechanisms) lo seIecl viII deend on numerous faclors, incIuding
lhe absoIule and reIalive over of lhe conlending grous and lhe
alliludes and ob|eclives of lhe nonvioIenl slruggIe grou.
DcmncratIzIng cIIccts nI pn!ItIca! dc!ancc
In conlrasl lo lhe cenlraIizing effecls of vioIenl sanclions, use of lhe
lechnique of nonvioIenl slruggIe conlribules lo democralizing lhe
oIilicaI sociely in severaI vays.
ne arl of lhe democralizing effecl is negalive. Thal is, in
conlrasl lo miIilary means, lhis lechnique does nol rovide a means
of reression under command of a ruIing eIile vhich can be lurned
againsl lhe ouIalion lo eslabIish or mainlain a diclalorshi. Lead-
ers of a oIilicaI de!ance movemenl can exerl in"uence and aIy
ressures on lheir foIIovers, bul lhey cannol imrison or execule
lhem vhen lhey dissenl or choose olher Ieaders.
Anolher arl of lhe democralizing effecl is osilive. Thal is,
nonvioIenl slruggIe rovides lhe ouIalion vilh means of resislance
lhal can be used lo achieve and defend lheir Iiberlies againsl exisling
or vouId-be diclalors. eIov are severaI of lhe osilive democraliz-
ing effecls nonvioIenl slruggIe may have:
Lxerience in aIying nonvioIenl slruggIe may resuIl in lhe
ouIalion being more seIf-con!denl in chaIIenging lhe
regime's lhreals and caacily for vioIenl reression.
NonvioIenl slruggIe rovides lhe means of noncooeralion
and de!ance by vhich lhe ouIalion can resisl undemo-
cralic conlroIs over lhem by any diclaloriaI grou.
NonvioIenl slruggIe can be used lo asserl lhe raclice of
democralic freedoms, such as free seech, free ress, inde-
endenl organizalions, and free assembIy, in face of reres-
sive conlroIs.
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 37
NonvioIenl slruggIe conlribules slrongIy lo lhe survivaI, re-
birlh, and slrenglhening of lhe indeendenl grous and in-
slilulions of lhe sociely, as reviousIy discussed. These are
imorlanl for democracy because of lheir caacily lo mobi-
Iize lhe over caacily of lhe ouIalion and lo imose Iim-
ils on lhe effeclive over of any vouId-be diclalors.
NonvioIenl slruggIe rovides means by vhich lhe ouIa-
lion can vieId over againsl reressive oIice and miIilary
aclion by a diclaloriaI governmenl.
NonvioIenl slruggIe rovides melhods by vhich lhe ou-
Ialion and lhe indeendenl inslilulions can in lhe inleresls
of democracy reslricl or sever lhe sources of over for lhe
ruIing eIile, lhereby lhrealening ils caacily lo conlinue ils
dominalion.
Cnmp!cxIty nI nnnvIn!cnt strugg!c
As ve have seen from lhis discussion, nonvioIenl slruggIe is a com-
Iex lechnique of sociaI aclion, invoIving a muIlilude of melhods,
a range of mechanisms of change, and seci!c behavioraI require-
menls. To be effeclive, eseciaIIy againsl a diclalorshi, oIilicaI
de!ance requires carefuI Ianning and rearalion. Iroseclive
arlicianls viII need lo undersland vhal is required of lhem.
Resources viII need lo have been made avaiIabIe. And slralegisls
viII need lo have anaIyzed hov nonvioIenl slruggIe can be mosl
effecliveIy aIied. We nov lurn our allenlion lo lhis Ialler cruciaI
eIemenl: lhe need for slralegic Ianning.
38 Gcnc Sncrp
5IX
THE NEED FOR 5TRATEGIC PLANNING
IoIilicaI de!ance camaigns againsl diclalorshis may begin in a
variely of vays. In lhe asl lhese slruggIes have aImosl aIvays been
unIanned and essenliaIIy accidenlaI. Seci!c grievances lhal have
lriggered asl iniliaI aclions have varied videIy, bul oflen incIuded
nev brulaIilies, lhe arresl or kiIIing of a highIy regarded erson, a
nev reressive oIicy or order, food shorlages, disresecl lovard
reIigious beIiefs, or an anniversary of an imorlanl reIaled evenl.
Somelimes, a arlicuIar acl by lhe diclalorshi has so enraged lhe
ouIace lhal lhey have Iaunched inlo aclion vilhoul having any
idea hov lhe rising mighl end. Al olher limes a courageous indi-
viduaI or a smaII grou may have laken aclion vhich aroused su-
orl. A seci!c grievance may be recognized by olhers as simiIar
lo vrongs lhey had exerienced and lhey, loo, may lhus |oin lhe
slruggIe. Somelimes, a seci!c caII for resislance from a smaII grou
or individuaI may meel an unexecledIy Iarge resonse.
WhiIe sonlaneily has some osilive quaIilies, il has oflen
had disadvanlages. IrequenlIy, lhe democralic resislers have nol
anlicialed lhe brulaIilies of lhe diclalorshi, so lhal lhey suffered
graveIy and lhe resislance has coIIased. Al limes lhe Iack of Ian-
ning by democrals has Iefl cruciaI decisions lo chance, vilh disaslrous
resuIls. Lven vhen lhe oressive syslem vas broughl dovn, Iack
of Ianning on hov lo handIe lhe lransilion lo a democralic syslem
has conlribuled lo lhe emergence of a nev diclalorshi.
Rca!IstIc p!annIng
In lhe fulure, unIanned ouIar aclion viII undoubledIy Iay sig-
ni!canl roIes in risings againsl diclalorshis. Hovever, il is nov
ossibIe lo caIcuIale lhe mosl effeclive vays lo bring dovn a dicla-
lorshi, lo assess vhen lhe oIilicaI silualion and ouIar mood are
rie, and lo choose hov lo iniliale a camaign. Very carefuI lhoughl
|csc! cn c rcc|isiic csscssmcni of lhe silualion and lhe caabiIilies of
39
lhe ouIace is required in order lo seIecl effeclive vays lo achieve
freedom under such circumslances.
If one vishes lo accomIish somelhing, il is vise lo Ian hov lo
do il. The more imorlanl lhe goaI, or lhe graver lhe consequences
of faiIure, lhe more imorlanl Ianning becomes. Slralegic Ian-
ning increases lhe IikeIihood lhal aII avaiIabIe resources viII be
mobiIized and emIoyed mosl effecliveIy. This is eseciaIIy lrue for
a democralic movemenl vhich has Iimiled maleriaI resources and
vhose suorlers viII be in danger lhal is lrying lo bring dovn
a overfuI diclalorshi. In conlrasl, lhe diclalorshi usuaIIy viII
have access lo vasl maleriaI resources, organizalionaI slrenglh, and
abiIily lo erelrale brulaIilies.
To Ian a slralegy here means lo caIcuIale a course of aclion
lhal viII make il more IikeIy lo gel from lhe resenl lo lhe desired
fulure silualion. In lerms of lhis discussion, il means from a dic-
lalorshi lo a fulure democralic syslem. A Ian lo achieve lhal
ob|eclive viII usuaIIy consisl of a hased series of camaigns and
olher organized aclivilies designed lo slrenglhen lhe oressed
ouIalion and sociely and lo veaken lhe diclalorshi. Nole here
lhal lhe ob|eclive is nol simIy lo deslroy lhe currenl diclalorshi
bul lo emIace a democralic syslem. A grand slralegy lhal Iimils
ils ob|eclive lo mereIy deslroying lhe incumbenl diclalorshi runs
a greal risk of roducing anolher lyranl.

Hurd!cs tn p!annIng
Some exonenls of freedom in various arls of lhe vorId do nol
bring lheir fuII caacilies lo bear on lhe robIem of hov lo achieve
Iiberalion. nIy rareIy do lhese advocales fuIIy recognize lhe
exlreme imorlance of carefuI slralegic Ianning before lhey acl.
ConsequenlIy, lhis is aImosl never done.
Why is il lhal lhe eoIe vho have lhe vision of bringing o-
IilicaI freedom lo lheir eoIe shouId so rareIy reare a comre-
hensive slralegic Ian lo achieve lhal goaI` InforlunaleIy, oflen
mosl eoIe in democralic oosilion grous do nol undersland
lhe need for slralegic Ianning or are nol accuslomed or lrained lo

40 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 41
lhink slralegicaIIy. This is a dif!cuIl lask. ConslanlIy harassed by
lhe diclalorshi, and overvheImed by immediale resonsibiIilies,
resislance Ieaders oflen do nol have lhe safely or lime lo deveIo
slralegic lhinking skiIIs.
Inslead, il is a common allern simIy lo reacl lo lhe inilialives
of lhe diclalorshi. The oosilion is lhen aIvays on lhe defensive,
seeking lo mainlain Iimiled Iiberlies or baslions of freedom, al besl
sIoving lhe advance of lhe diclaloriaI conlroIs or causing cerlain
robIems for lhe regime's nev oIicies.
Some individuaIs and grous, of course, may nol see lhe need
for broad Iong-lerm Ianning of a Iiberalion movemenl. Inslead, lhey
may naveIy lhink lhal if lhey simIy esouse lheir goaI slrongIy,
!rmIy, and Iong enough, il viII somehov come lo ass. lhers as-
sume lhal if lhey simIy Iive and vilness according lo lheir rinciIes
and ideaIs in face of dif!cuIlies, lhey are doing aII lhey can lo imIe-
menl lhem. The esousaI of humane goaIs and IoyaIly lo ideaIs are
admirabIe, bul are grossIy inadequale lo end a diclalorshi and lo
achieve freedom.
lher oonenls of diclalorshi may naveIy lhink lhal if onIy
lhey use enough vioIence, freedom viII come. ul, as noled earIier,
vioIence is no guaranlor of success. Inslead of Iiberalion, il can Iead
lo defeal, massive lragedy, or bolh. In mosl silualions lhe diclalor-
shi is besl equied for vioIenl slruggIe and lhe miIilary reaIilies
rareIy, if ever, favor lhe democrals.
There are aIso aclivisls vho base lheir aclions on vhal lhey
feeI lhey shouId do. These aroaches are, hovever, nol onIy
egocenlric bul lhey offer no guidance for deveIoing a grand slral-
egy of Iiberalion.
Aclion based on a brighl idea lhal someone has had is aIso
Iimiled. Whal is needed inslead is aclion based on carefuI caIcuIa-
lion of lhe nexl sles required lo loIe lhe diclalorshi. Wilhoul
slralegic anaIysis, resislance Ieaders viII oflen nol knov vhal lhal
nexl sle shouId be, for lhey have nol lhoughl carefuIIy aboul lhe
successive seci!c sles required lo achieve viclory. Crealivily and
brighl ideas are very imorlanl, bul lhey need lo be uliIized in order
lo advance lhe slralegic silualion of lhe democralic forces.
AculeIy avare of lhe muIlilude of aclions lhal couId be laken
againsl lhe diclalorshi and unabIe lo delermine vhere lo begin,
some eoIe counseI Do everylhing simuIlaneousIy. Thal mighl
be heIfuI bul, of course, is imossibIe, eseciaIIy for reIaliveIy veak
movemenls. Iurlhermore, such an aroach rovides no guidance
on vhere lo begin, on vhere lo concenlrale efforls, and hov lo use
oflen Iimiled resources.
lher ersons and grous may see lhe need for some Ianning,
bul are onIy abIe lo lhink aboul il on a shorl-lerm or laclicaI basis.
They may nol see lhal Ionger-lerm Ianning is necessary or ossibIe.
They may al limes be unabIe lo lhink and anaIyze in slralegic lerms,
aIIoving lhemseIves lo be reealedIy dislracled by reIaliveIy smaII
issues, oflen resonding lo lhe oonenls' aclions ralher lhan seiz-
ing lhe inilialive for lhe democralic resislance. Devoling so much
energy lo shorl-lerm aclivilies, lhese Ieaders oflen faiI lo exIore
severaI aIlernalive courses of aclion vhich couId guide lhe overaII
efforls so lhal lhe goaI is conslanlIy aroached.
Il is aIso |usl ossibIe lhal some democralic movemenls do
nol Ian a comrehensive slralegy lo bring dovn lhe diclalorshi,
concenlraling inslead onIy on immediale issues, for anolher reason.
Inside lhemseIves, lhey do nol reaIIy beIieve lhal lhe diclalorshi
can be ended by lheir ovn efforls. Therefore, Ianning hov lo do
so is considered lo be a romanlic vasle of lime or an exercise in
fuliIily. IeoIe slruggIing for freedom againsl eslabIished brulaI
diclalorshis are oflen confronled by such immense miIilary and
oIice over lhal il aears lhe diclalors can accomIish vhalever
lhey viII. Lacking reaI hoe, lhese eoIe viII, neverlheIess, defy
lhe diclalorshi for reasons of inlegrily and erhas hislory. Though
lhey viII never admil il, erhas never consciousIy recognize il, lheir
aclions aear lo lhemseIves as hoeIess. Hence, for lhem, Iong-lerm
comrehensive slralegic Ianning has no meril.
The resuIl of such faiIures lo Ian slralegicaIIy is oflen draslic:
one's slrenglh is dissialed, one's aclions are ineffeclive, energy is
vasled on minor issues, advanlages are nol uliIized, and sacri!ces
are for naughl. If democrals do nol Ian slralegicaIIy lhey are IikeIy
lo faiI lo achieve lheir ob|eclives. A oorIy Ianned, odd mixlure of
42 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 43
aclivilies viII nol move a ma|or resislance efforl forvard. Inslead,
il viII more IikeIy aIIov lhe diclalorshi lo increase ils conlroIs and
over.
InforlunaleIy, because comrehensive slralegic Ians for Iibera-
lion are rareIy, if ever, deveIoed, diclalorshis aear much more
durabIe lhan lhey in facl are. They survive for years or decades
Ionger lhan need be lhe case.
Fnur Impnrtant tcrms In stratcgIc p!annIng
In order lo heI us lo lhink slralegicaIIy, cIarily aboul lhe meanings
of four basic lerms is imorlanl.
Grcn! sircicgq is lhe concelion lhal serves lo coordinale and
direcl lhe use of aII aroriale and avaiIabIe resources (economic,
human, moraI, oIilicaI, organizalionaI, elc.) of a grou seeking lo
allain ils ob|eclives in a con"icl.
Grand slralegy, by focusing rimary allenlion on lhe grou's
ob|eclives and resources in lhe con"icl, delermines lhe mosl aro-
riale lechnique of aclion (such as convenlionaI miIilary varfare or
nonvioIenl slruggIe) lo be emIoyed in lhe con"icl. In Ianning a
grand slralegy resislance Ieaders musl evaIuale and Ian vhich res-
sures and in"uences are lo be broughl lo bear uon lhe oonenls.
Iurlher, grand slralegy viII incIude decisions on lhe aroriale
condilions and liming under vhich iniliaI and subsequenl resislance
camaigns viII be Iaunched.
Grand slralegy sels lhe basic framevork for lhe seIeclion of
more Iimiled slralegies for vaging lhe slruggIe. Grand slralegy aIso
delermines lhe aIIocalion of generaI lasks lo arlicuIar grous and
lhe dislribulion of resources lo lhem for use in lhe slruggIe.
Sircicgq is lhe concelion of hov besl lo achieve arlicuIar ob-
|eclives in a con"icl, oeraling vilhin lhe scoe of lhe chosen grand
slralegy. Slralegy is concerned vilh vhelher, vhen, and hov lo !ghl,
as veII as hov lo achieve maximum effecliveness in slruggIing for
cerlain ends. A slralegy has been comared lo lhe arlisl's concel,
vhiIe a slralegic Ian is lhe archilecl's bIuerinl.
12
12
Roberl HeIvey, ersonaI communicalion, 15 Augusl 1993.
Slralegy may aIso incIude efforls lo deveIo a slralegic silua-
lion lhal is so advanlageous lhal lhe oonenls are abIe lo foresee
lhal oen con"icl is IikeIy lo bring lheir cerlain defeal, and lhere-
fore cailuIale vilhoul an oen slruggIe. r, if nol, lhe imroved
slralegic silualion viII make success of lhe chaIIengers cerlain in
slruggIe. Slralegy aIso invoIves hov lo acl lo make good use of
successes vhen gained.
AIied lo lhe course of lhe slruggIe ilseIf, lhe slralegic Ian is
lhe basic idea of hov a camaign shaII deveIo, and hov ils searale
comonenls shaII be !lled logelher lo conlribule mosl advanla-
geousIy lo achieve ils ob|eclives. Il invoIves lhe skiIIfuI deIoymenl
of arlicuIar aclion grous in smaIIer oeralions. IIanning for a
vise slralegy musl lake inlo consideralion lhe requiremenls for suc-
cess in lhe oeralion of lhe chosen lechnique of slruggIe. Differenl
lechniques viII have differenl requiremenls. f course, |usl fuI!II-
ing requiremenls is nol suf!cienl lo ensure success. AddilionaI
faclors may aIso be needed.
In devising slralegies, lhe democrals musl cIearIy de!ne lheir
ob|eclives and delermine hov lo measure lhe effecliveness of efforls
lo achieve lhem. This de!nilion and anaIysis ermils lhe slralegisl
lo idenlify lhe recise requiremenls for securing each seIecled ob|ec-
live. This need for cIarily and de!nilion aIies equaIIy lo laclicaI
Ianning.
Taclics and melhods of aclion are used lo imIemenl lhe slral-
egy. 1cciics reIale lo lhe skiIIfuI use of one's forces lo lhe besl ad-
vanlage in a Iimiled silualion. A laclic is a Iimiled aclion, emIoyed
lo achieve a reslricled ob|eclive. The choice of laclics is governed
by lhe concelion of hov besl in a reslricled hase of a con"icl lo
uliIize lhe avaiIabIe means of !ghling lo imIemenl lhe slralegy. To
be mosl effeclive, laclics and melhods musl be chosen and aIied
vilh conslanl allenlion lo lhe achievemenl of slralegic ob|eclives.
TaclicaI gains lhal do nol reinforce lhe allainmenl of slralegic ob|ec-
lives may in lhe end lurn oul lo be vasled energy.
A laclic is lhus concerned vilh a Iimiled course of aclion lhal
!ls vilhin lhe broad slralegy, |usl as a slralegy !ls vilhin lhe grand
slralegy. Taclics are aIvays concerned vilh !ghling, vhereas slral-
44 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 45
egy incIudes vider consideralions. A arlicuIar laclic can onIy be
underslood as arl of lhe overaII slralegy of a ballIe or a camaign.
Taclics are aIied for shorler eriods of lime lhan slralegies, or in
smaIIer areas (geograhicaI, inslilulionaI, elc.), or by a more Iimiled
number of eoIe, or for more Iimiled ob|eclives. In nonvioIenl
aclion lhe dislinclion belveen a laclicaI ob|eclive and a slralegic
ob|eclive may be arlIy indicaled by vhelher lhe chosen ob|eclive
of lhe aclion is minor or ma|or.
ffensive laclicaI engagemenls are seIecled lo suorl allain-
menl of slralegic ob|eclives. TaclicaI engagemenls are lhe looIs of lhe
slralegisl in crealing condilions favorabIe for deIivering decisive al-
lacks againsl an oonenl. Il is mosl imorlanl, lherefore, lhal lhose
given resonsibiIily for Ianning and execuling laclicaI oeralions be
skiIIed in assessing lhe silualion, and seIecling lhe mosl aroriale
melhods for il. Those execled lo arliciale musl be lrained in lhe
use of lhe chosen lechnique and lhe seci!c melhods.
Mcinc! refers lo lhe seci!c veaons or means of aclion. Wilhin
lhe lechnique of nonvioIenl slruggIe, lhese incIude lhe dozens of
arlicuIar forms of aclion (such as lhe many kinds of slrikes, boy-
colls, oIilicaI noncooeralion, and lhe Iike) ciled in Chaler Iive.
(See aIso Aendix.)
The deveIomenl of a resonsibIe and effeclive slralegic Ian
for a nonvioIenl slruggIe deends uon lhe carefuI formuIalion and
seIeclion of lhe grand slralegy, slralegies, laclics, and melhods.
The main Iesson of lhis discussion is lhal a caIcuIaled use of
one's inleIIecl is required in carefuI slralegic Ianning for Iiberalion
from a diclalorshi. IaiIure lo Ian inleIIigenlIy can conlribule lo
disaslers, vhiIe lhe effeclive use of one's inleIIecluaI caacilies can
charl a slralegic course lhal viII |udiciousIy uliIize one's avaiIabIe
resources lo move lhe sociely lovard lhe goaI of Iiberly and democ-
racy.
5EVEN
PLANNING 5TRATEGY
In order lo increase lhe chances for success, resislance Ieaders
viII need lo formuIale a comrehensive Ian of aclion caabIe of
slrenglhening lhe suffering eoIe, veakening and lhen deslroy-
ing lhe diclalorshi, and buiIding a durabIe democracy. To achieve
such a Ian of aclion, a carefuI assessmenl of lhe silualion and of lhe
olions for effeclive aclion is needed. ul of such a carefuI anaIysis
bolh a grand slralegy and lhe seci!c camaign slralegies for achiev-
ing freedom can be deveIoed. Though reIaled, lhe deveIomenl of
grand slralegy and camaign slralegies are lvo searale rocesses.
nIy afler lhe grand slralegy has been deveIoed can lhe seci!c
camaign slralegies be fuIIy deveIoed. Camaign slralegies viII
need lo be designed lo achieve and reinforce lhe grand slralegic
ob|eclives.
The deveIomenl of resislance slralegy requires allenlion lo
many queslions and lasks. Here ve shaII idenlify some of lhe im-
orlanl faclors lhal need lo be considered, bolh al lhe grand slrale-
gic IeveI and lhe IeveI of camaign slralegy. AII slralegic Ianning,
hovever, requires lhal lhe resislance Ianners have a rofound
underslanding of lhe enlire con"icl silualion, incIuding allenlion lo
hysicaI, hisloricaI, governmenlaI, miIilary, cuIluraI, sociaI, oIilicaI,
sychoIogicaI, economic, and inlernalionaI faclors. Slralegies can
onIy be deveIoed in lhe conlexl of lhe arlicuIar slruggIe and ils
background.
f rimary imorlance, democralic Ieaders and slralegic Ian-
ners viII vanl lo assess lhe ob|eclives and imorlance of lhe cause.
Are lhe ob|eclives vorlh a ma|or slruggIe, and vhy` Il is crilicaI lo
delermine lhe reaI ob|eclive of lhe slruggIe. We have argued here
lhal overlhrov of lhe diclalorshi or removaI of lhe resenl dicla-
lors is nci enough. The ob|eclive in lhese con"icls needs lo be lhe
eslabIishmenl of a free sociely vilh a democralic syslem of govern-
menl. CIarily on lhis oinl viII in"uence lhe deveIomenl of a grand
slralegy and of lhe ensuing seci!c slralegies.
47
IarlicuIarIy, slralegisls viII need lo ansver many fundamenlaI
queslions, such as lhese:
Whal are lhe main obslacIes lo achieving freedom`
Whal faclors viII faciIilale achieving freedom`
Whal are lhe main slrenglhs of lhe diclalorshi`
Whal are lhe various veaknesses of lhe diclalorshi`
To vhal degree are lhe sources of over for lhe diclalorshi
vuInerabIe`
Whal are lhe slrenglhs of lhe democralic forces and lhe gen-
eraI ouIalion`
Whal are lhe veaknesses of lhe democralic forces and hov
can lhey be correcled`
Whal is lhe slalus of lhird arlies, nol immedialeIy invoIved
in lhe con"icl, vho aIready assisl or mighl assisl, eilher lhe
diclalorshi or lhe democralic movemenl, and if so in vhal
vays`
ChnIcc nI mcans
Al lhe grand slralegic IeveI, Ianners viII need lo choose lhe main
means of slruggIe lo be emIoyed in lhe coming con"icl. The merils
and Iimilalions of severaI aIlernalive lechniques of slruggIe viII need
lo be evaIualed, such as convenlionaI miIilary varfare, guerriIIa
varfare, oIilicaI de!ance, and olhers.
In making lhis choice lhe slralegisls viII need lo consider such
queslions as lhe foIIoving: Is lhe chosen lye of slruggIe vilhin
lhe caacilies of lhe democrals` Does lhe chosen lechnique uliIize
slrenglhs of lhe dominaled ouIalion` Does lhis lechnique largel
48 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 49
lhe veaknesses of lhe diclalorshi, or does il slrike al ils slrongesl
oinls` Do lhe means heI lhe democrals become more seIf-reIianl,
or do lhey require deendency on lhird arlies or exlernaI suIiers`
Whal is lhe record of lhe use of lhe chosen means in bringing dovn
diclalorshis` Do lhey increase or Iimil lhe casuaIlies and deslruclion
lhal may be incurred in lhe coming con"icl` Assuming success in
ending lhe diclalorshi, vhal effecl vouId lhe seIecled means have
on lhe lye of governmenl lhal vouId arise from lhe slruggIe` The
lyes of aclion delermined lo be counlerroduclive viII need lo be
excIuded in lhe deveIoed grand slralegy.
In revious chalers ve have argued lhal oIilicaI de!ance
offers signi!canl comaralive advanlages lo olher lechniques of
slruggIe. Slralegisls viII need lo examine lheir arlicuIar con"icl
silualion and delermine vhelher oIilicaI de!ance rovides af!rma-
live ansvers lo lhe above queslions.
P!annIng Inr dcmncracy
Il shouId be remembered lhal againsl a diclalorshi lhe ob|eclive of
lhe grand slralegy is nol simIy lo bring dovn lhe diclalors bul lo
inslaII a democralic syslem and make lhe rise of a nev diclalorshi
imossibIe. To accomIish lhese ob|eclives, lhe chosen means of
slruggIe viII need lo conlribule lo a change in lhe dislribulion of
effeclive over in lhe sociely. Inder lhe diclalorshi lhe ouIa-
lion and civiI inslilulions of lhe sociely have been loo veak, and lhe
governmenl loo slrong. Wilhoul a change in lhis imbaIance, a nev
sel of ruIers can, if lhey vish, be |usl as diclaloriaI as lhe oId ones.
A aIace revoIulion or a cou d'lal lherefore is nol veIcome.
IoIilicaI de!ance conlribules lo a more equilabIe dislribulion
of effeclive over lhrough lhe mobiIizalion of lhe sociely againsl
lhe diclalorshi, as vas discussed in Chaler Iive. This rocess
occurs in severaI vays. The deveIomenl of a nonvioIenl slruggIe
caacily means lhal lhe diclalorshi's caacily for vioIenl reression
no Ionger as easiIy roduces inlimidalion and submission among
lhe ouIalion. The ouIalion viII have al ils disosaI over-
fuI means lo counler and al limes bIock lhe exerlion of lhe dicla-
lors' over. Iurlher, lhe mobiIizalion of ouIar over lhrough
oIilicaI de!ance viII slrenglhen lhe indeendenl inslilulions of
lhe sociely. The exerience of once exercising effeclive over is
nol quickIy forgol. The knovIedge and skiII gained in slruggIe viII
make lhe ouIalion Iess IikeIy lo be easiIy dominaled by vouId-be
diclalors. This shifl in over reIalionshis vouId uIlimaleIy make
eslabIishmenl of a durabIe democralic sociely much more IikeIy.
Extcrna! assIstancc
As arl of lhe rearalion of a grand slralegy il is necessary lo as-
sess vhal viII be lhe reIalive roIes of inlernaI resislance and exlernaI
ressures for disinlegraling lhe diclalorshi. In lhis anaIysis ve have
argued lhal lhe main force of lhe slruggIe musl be borne from inside
lhe counlry ilseIf. To lhe degree lhal inlernalionaI assislance comes
al aII, il viII be slimuIaled by lhe inlernaI slruggIe.
As a modesl suIemenl, efforls can be made lo mobiIize vorId
ubIic oinion againsl lhe diclalorshi, on humanilarian, moraI, and
reIigious grounds. Lfforls can be laken lo oblain diIomalic, oIilicaI,
and economic sanclions by governmenls and inlernalionaI organiza-
lions againsl lhe diclalorshi. These may lake lhe forms of economic
and miIilary veaons embargoes, reduclion in IeveIs of diIomalic
recognilion or lhe breaking of diIomalic lies, banning of economic
assislance and rohibilion of inveslmenls in lhe diclaloriaI counlry,
exuIsion of lhe diclaloriaI governmenl from various inlernalionaI
organizalions and from Iniled Nalions bodies. Iurlher, inlernalionaI
assislance, such as lhe rovision of !nanciaI and communicalions
suorl, can aIso be rovided direclIy lo lhe democralic forces.
Fnrmu!atIng a grand stratcgy
IoIIoving an assessmenl of lhe silualion, lhe choice of means, and a
delerminalion of lhe roIe of exlernaI assislance, Ianners of lhe grand
slralegy viII need lo skelch in broad slrokes hov lhe con"icl mighl
besl be conducled. This broad Ian vouId slrelch from lhe resenl
lo lhe fulure Iiberalion and lhe inslilulion of a democralic syslem.
50 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 51
In formuIaling a grand slralegy lhese Ianners viII need lo ask
lhemseIves a variely of queslions. The foIIoving queslions ose (in
a more seci!c vay lhan earIier) lhe lyes of consideralions required
in devising a grand slralegy for a oIilicaI de!ance slruggIe:
Hov mighl lhe Iong-lerm slruggIe besl begin` Hov can lhe
oressed ouIalion musler suf!cienl seIf-con!dence and slrenglh
lo acl lo chaIIenge lhe diclalorshi, even iniliaIIy in a Iimiled vay`
Hov couId lhe ouIalion's caacily lo aIy noncooeralion and
de!ance be increased vilh lime and exerience` Whal mighl be
lhe ob|eclives of a series of Iimiled camaigns lo regain democralic
conlroI over lhe sociely and Iimil lhe diclalorshi`
Are lhere indeendenl inslilulions lhal have survived lhe dic-
lalorshi vhich mighl be used in lhe slruggIe lo eslabIish freedom`
Whal inslilulions of lhe sociely can be regained from lhe diclalors'
conlroI, or vhal inslilulions need lo be nevIy crealed by lhe demo-
crals lo meel lheir needs and eslabIish sheres of democracy even
vhiIe lhe diclalorshi conlinues`
Hov can organizalionaI slrenglh in lhe resislance be deveIoed`
Hov can arlicianls be lrained` Whal resources (!nances, equi-
menl, elc.) viII be required lhroughoul lhe slruggIe` Whal lyes of
symboIism can be mosl effeclive in mobiIizing lhe ouIalion`
y vhal kinds of aclion and in vhal slages couId lhe sources
of over of lhe diclalors be incremenlaIIy veakened and severed`
Hov can lhe resisling ouIalion simuIlaneousIy ersisl in ils de!-
ance and aIso mainlain lhe necessary nonvioIenl disciIine` Hov
can lhe sociely conlinue lo meel ils basic needs during lhe course of
lhe slruggIe` Hov can sociaI order be mainlained in lhe midsl of
lhe con"icl` As viclory aroaches, hov can lhe democralic resis-
lance conlinue lo buiId lhe inslilulionaI base of lhe osl-diclalorshi
sociely lo make lhe lransilion as smoolh as ossibIe`
Il musl be remembered lhal no singIe bIuerinl exisls or can be
crealed lo Ian slralegy for every Iiberalion movemenl againsl dic-
lalorshis. Lach slruggIe lo bring dovn a diclalorshi and eslabIish
a democralic syslem viII be somevhal differenl. No lvo silualions
viII be exaclIy aIike, each diclalorshi viII have some individuaI
characlerislics, and lhe caacilies of lhe freedom-seeking ouIalion
viII vary. IIanners of grand slralegy for a oIilicaI de!ance slruggIe
viII require a rofound underslanding nol onIy of lheir seci!c
con"icl silualion, bul of lheir chosen means of slruggIe as veII.
13

When lhe grand slralegy of lhe slruggIe has been carefuIIy
Ianned lhere are sound reasons for making il videIy knovn. The
Iarge numbers of eoIe required lo arliciale may be more viIIing
and abIe lo acl if lhey undersland lhe generaI concelion, as veII
as seci!c inslruclions. This knovIedge couId olenliaIIy have a
very osilive effecl on lheir moraIe, lheir viIIingness lo arliciale,
and lo acl arorialeIy. The generaI oulIines of lhe grand slralegy
vouId become knovn lo lhe diclalors in any case and knovIedge
of ils fealures olenliaIIy couId Iead lhem lo be Iess brulaI in lheir
reression, knoving lhal il couId rebound oIilicaIIy againsl lhem-
seIves. Avareness of lhe seciaI characlerislics of lhe grand slralegy
couId olenliaIIy aIso conlribule lo dissension and defeclions from
lhe diclalors' ovn cam.
nce a grand slralegic Ian for bringing dovn lhe diclalor-
shi and eslabIishing a democralic syslem has been adoled, il is
imorlanl for lhe ro-democracy grous lo ersisl in aIying il.
nIy in very rare circumslances shouId lhe slruggIe dearl from
lhe iniliaI grand slralegy. When lhere is abundanl evidence lhal lhe
chosen grand slralegy vas misconceived, or lhal lhe circumslances
of lhe slruggIe have fundamenlaIIy changed, Ianners may need lo
aIler lhe grand slralegy. Lven lhen, lhis shouId be done onIy afler a
basic reassessmenl has been made and a nev more adequale grand
slralegic Ian has been deveIoed and adoled.
52 Gcnc Sncrp
13
Recommended fuII Ienglh sludies are Gene Shar, 1nc Pc|iiics cj Ncntic|cni Aciicn
cj Ncntic|cni Aciicn, (oslon, Massachusells: Iorler Sargenl, 1973) and Ieler Acker-
man and Chrisloher KruegIer, Sircicgic Ncntic|cni Ccn"ici, (Weslorl, Conneclicul:
Iraeger, 1994). AIso see Gene Shar, Waging Nonviolent Stuggle: Twentieth Century
Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential. oslon: Iorler Sargenl, 2OO5.
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 53
P!annIng campaIgn stratcgIcs
Hovever vise and romising lhe deveIoed grand slralegy lo end
lhe diclalorshi and lo inslilule democracy may be, a grand slral-
egy does nol imIemenl ilseIf. IarlicuIar slralegies viII need lo be
deveIoed lo guide lhe ma|or camaigns aimed al undermining lhe
diclalors' over. These slralegies, in lurn, viII incororale and guide
a range of laclicaI engagemenls lhal viII aim lo slrike decisive bIovs
againsl lhe diclalors' regime. The laclics and lhe seci!c melhods of
aclion musl be chosen carefuIIy so lhal lhey conlribule lo achieving
lhe goaIs of each arlicuIar slralegy. The discussion here focuses
excIusiveIy on lhe IeveI of slralegy.
Slralegisls Ianning lhe ma|or camaigns viII, Iike lhose vho
Ianned lhe grand slralegy, require a lhorough underslanding of lhe
nalure and modes of oeralion of lheir chosen lechnique of slruggIe.
}usl as miIilary of!cers musl undersland force slruclures, laclics,
Iogislics, munilions, lhe effecls of geograhy, and lhe Iike in order
lo Iol miIilary slralegy, oIilicaI de!ance Ianners musl undersland
lhe nalure and slralegic rinciIes of nonvioIenl slruggIe. Lven lhen,
hovever, knovIedge of nonvioIenl slruggIe, allenlion lo recommen-
dalions in lhis essay, and ansvers lo lhe queslions osed here viII
nol lhemseIves roduce slralegies. The formuIalion of slralegies for
lhe slruggIe sliII requires an informed crealivily.
In Ianning lhe slralegies for lhe seci!c seIeclive resislance
camaigns and for lhe Ionger lerm deveIomenl of lhe Iiberalion
slruggIe, lhe oIilicaI de!ance slralegisls viII need lo consider vari-
ous issues and robIems. The foIIoving are among lhese:
Delerminalion of lhe seci!c ob|eclives of lhe camaign and
lheir conlribulions lo imIemenling lhe grand slralegy.
Consideralion of lhe seci!c melhods, or oIilicaI veaons,
lhal can besl be used lo imIemenl lhe chosen slralegies.
Wilhin each overaII Ian for a arlicuIar slralegic camaign
il viII be necessary lo delermine vhal smaIIer, laclicaI Ians
and vhich seci!c melhods of aclion shouId be used lo im-
ose ressures and reslriclions againsl lhe diclalorshi's
sources of over. Il shouId be remembered lhal lhe achieve-
menl of ma|or ob|eclives viII come as a resuIl of carefuIIy
chosen and imIemenled seci!c smaIIer sles.
Delerminalion vhelher, or hov, economic issues shouId be
reIaled lo lhe overaII essenliaIIy oIilicaI slruggIe. If eco-
nomic issues are lo be rominenl in lhe slruggIe, care viII be
needed lhal lhe economic grievances can acluaIIy be rem-
edied afler lhe diclalorshi is ended. lhervise, disiIIusion-
menl and disaffeclion may sel in if quick soIulions are nol
rovided during lhe lransilion eriod lo a democralic soci-
ely. Such disiIIusionmenl couId faciIilale lhe rise of diclalo-
riaI forces romising an end lo economic voes.
Delerminalion in advance of vhal kind of Ieadershi slruc-
lure and communicalions syslem viII vork besl for inilial-
ing lhe resislance slruggIe. Whal means of decision-making
and communicalion viII be ossibIe during lhe course of lhe
slruggIe lo give conlinuing guidance lo lhe resislers and lhe
generaI ouIalion`
Communicalion of lhe resislance nevs lo lhe generaI ou-
Ialion, lo lhe diclalors' forces, and lhe inlernalionaI ress.
CIaims and reorling shouId aIvays be slriclIy facluaI. Lx-
aggeralions and unfounded cIaims viII undermine lhe cred-
ibiIily of lhe resislance.
IIans for seIf-reIianl conslruclive sociaI, educalionaI, eco-
nomic, and oIilicaI aclivilies lo meel lhe needs of one's ovn
eoIe during lhe coming con"icl. Such ro|ecls can be con-
ducled by ersons nol direclIy invoIved in lhe resislance ac-
livilies.
Delerminalion of vhal kind of exlernaI assislance is desir-
abIe in suorl of lhe seci!c camaign or lhe generaI Iib-
eralion slruggIe. Hov can exlernaI heI be besl mobiIized
54 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 55
and used vilhoul making lhe inlernaI slruggIe deendenl
on uncerlain exlernaI faclors` Allenlion viII need lo be given
lo vhich exlernaI grous are mosl IikeIy, and mosl aro-
riale, lo assisl, such as non-governmenlaI organizalions (so-
ciaI movemenls, reIigious or oIilicaI grous, Iabor unions,
elc.), governmenls, and1or lhe Iniled Nalions and ils vari-
ous bodies.
Iurlhermore, lhe resislance Ianners viII need lo lake measures
lo reserve order and lo meel sociaI needs by one's ovn forces during
mass resislance againsl diclaloriaI conlroIs. This viII nol onIy creale
aIlernalive indeendenl democralic slruclures and meel genuine
needs, bul aIso viII reduce credibiIily for any cIaims lhal rulhIess
reression is required lo haIl disorder and IavIessness.
5prcadIng thc Idca nI nnncnnpcratInn
Ior successfuI oIilicaI de!ance againsl a diclalorshi, il is essenliaI
lhal lhe ouIalion gras lhe idea of noncooeralion. As iIIuslraled
by lhe Monkey Masler slory (see Chaler Three), lhe basic idea is
simIe: if enough of lhe subordinales refuse lo conlinue lheir coo-
eralion Iong enough desile reression, lhe oressive syslem viII
be veakened and !naIIy coIIase.
IeoIe Iiving under lhe diclalorshi may be aIready famiIiar
vilh lhis concel from a variely of sources. Lven so, lhe demo-
cralic forces shouId deIiberaleIy sread and ouIarize lhe idea
of noncooeralion. The Monkey Masler slory, or a simiIar one,
couId be disseminaled lhroughoul lhe sociely. Such a slory couId
be easiIy underslood. nce lhe generaI concel of noncooeralion
is grased, eoIe viII be abIe lo undersland lhe reIevance of fulure
caIIs lo raclice noncooeralion vilh lhe diclalorshi. They viII
aIso be abIe on lheir ovn lo imrovise a myriad of seci!c forms of
noncooeralion in nev silualions.
Desile lhe dif!cuIlies and dangers in allemls lo commu-
nicale ideas, nevs, and resislance inslruclions vhiIe Iiving under
diclalorshis, democrals have frequenlIy roved lhis lo be ossibIe.
Lven under Nazi and Communisl ruIe il vas ossibIe for resislers
lo communicale nol onIy vilh olher individuaIs bul even vilh Iarge
ubIic audiences lhrough lhe roduclion of iIIegaI nevsaers,
Iea"els, books, and in Ialer years vilh audio and video casselles.
Wilh lhe advanlage of rior slralegic Ianning, generaI guide-
Iines for resislance can be reared and disseminaled. These can
indicale lhe issues and circumslances under vhich lhe ouIalion
shouId rolesl and vilhhoId cooeralion, and hov lhis mighl be
done. Then, even if communicalions from lhe democralic Ieader-
shi are severed, and seci!c inslruclions have nol been issued or
received, lhe ouIalion viII knov hov lo acl on cerlain imorlanl
issues. Such guideIines vouId aIso rovide a lesl lo idenlify counler-
feil resislance inslruclions issued by lhe oIilicaI oIice designed
lo rovoke discrediling aclion.
RcprcssInn and cnuntcrmcasurcs
Slralegic Ianners viII need lo assess lhe IikeIy resonses and re-
ression, eseciaIIy lhe lhreshoId of vioIence, of lhe diclalorshi
lo lhe aclions of lhe democralic resislance. Il viII be necessary lo
delermine hov lo vilhsland, counleracl, or avoid lhis ossibIe
increased reression vilhoul submission. TaclicaIIy, for seci!c
occasions, aroriale varnings lo lhe ouIalion and lhe resislers
aboul execled reression vouId be in order, so lhal lhey viII knov
lhe risks of arlicialion. If reression may be serious, rearalions
for medicaI assislance for vounded resislers shouId be made.
Anlicialing reression, lhe slralegisls viII do veII lo consider
in advance lhe use of laclics and melhods lhal viII conlribule lo
achieving lhe seci!c goaI of a camaign, or Iiberalion, bul lhal viII
make brulaI reression Iess IikeIy or Iess ossibIe. Ior examIe, slreel
demonslralions and arades againsl exlreme diclalorshis may be
dramalic, bul lhey may aIso risk lhousands of dead demonslralors.
The high cosl lo lhe demonslralors may nol, hovever, acluaIIy a-
Iy more ressure on lhe diclalorshi lhan vouId occur lhrough
everyone slaying home, a slrike, or massive acls of noncooeralion
from lhe civiI servanls.
56 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 57
If il has been roosed lhal rovocalive resislance aclion
risking high casuaIlies viII be required for a slralegic urose,
lhen one shouId very carefuIIy consider lhe roosaI's cosls and
ossibIe gains. WiII lhe ouIalion and lhe resislers be IikeIy lo
behave in a disciIined and nonvioIenl manner during lhe course
of lhe slruggIe` Can lhey resisl rovocalions lo vioIence` IIanners
musl consider vhal measures may be laken lo kee nonvioIenl
disciIine and mainlain lhe resislance desile brulaIilies. WiII such
measures as Iedges, oIicy slalemenls, disciIine Iea"els, marshaIs
for demonslralions, and boycolls of ro-vioIence ersons and grous
be ossibIe and effeclive` Leaders shouId aIvays be aIerl for lhe
resence of cgcnis prctcccicurs vhose mission viII be lo incile lhe
demonslralors lo vioIence.
AdhcrIng tn thc stratcgIc p!an
nce a sound slralegic Ian is in Iace, lhe democralic forces
shouId nol be dislracled by minor moves of lhe diclalors lhal may
leml lhem lo dearl from lhe grand slralegy and lhe slralegy for a
arlicuIar camaign, causing lhem lo focus ma|or aclivilies on unim-
orlanl issues. Nor shouId lhe emolions of lhe momenl erhas
in resonse lo nev brulaIilies by lhe diclalorshi be aIIoved lo
diverl lhe democralic resislance from ils grand slralegy or lhe cam-
aign slralegy. The brulaIilies may have been erelraled reciseIy
in order lo rovoke lhe democralic forces lo abandon lheir veII-Iaid
Ian and even lo commil vioIenl acls in order lhal lhe diclalors couId
more easiIy defeal lhem.
As Iong as lhe basic anaIysis is |udged lo be sound, lhe lask of lhe
ro-democracy forces is lo ress forvard slage by slage. f course,
changes in laclics and inlermediale ob|eclives viII occur and good
Ieaders viII aIvays be ready lo exIoil oorlunilies. These ad|usl-
menls shouId nol be confused vilh ob|eclives of lhe grand slralegy
or lhe ob|eclives of lhe seci!c camaign. CarefuI imIemenlalion of
lhe chosen grand slralegy and of slralegies for arlicuIar camaigns
viII grealIy conlribule lo success.

59
EIGHT
APPLYING POLITICAL DEFIANCE
In silualions in vhich lhe ouIalion feeIs overIess and frighlened,
il is imorlanl lhal iniliaI lasks for lhe ubIic be Iov-risk, con!dence-
buiIding aclions. These lyes of aclions such as vearing one's
cIolhes in an unusuaI vay may ubIicIy regisler a dissenling
oinion and rovide an oorlunily for lhe ubIic lo arliciale
signi!canlIy in acls of dissenl. In olher cases a reIaliveIy minor (on
lhe surface) nonoIilicaI issue (such as securing a safe valer suIy)
mighl be made lhe focus for grou aclion. Slralegisls shouId choose
an issue lhe merils of vhich viII be videIy recognized and dif!cuIl
lo re|ecl. Success in such Iimiled camaigns couId nol onIy correcl
seci!c grievances bul aIso convince lhe ouIalion lhal il indeed
has over olenliaI.
Mosl of lhe slralegies of camaigns in lhe Iong-lerm slruggIe
shouId not aim for lhe immediale comIele dovnfaII of lhe diclalor-
shi, bul inslead for gaining Iimiled ob|eclives. Nor does every cam-
aign require lhe arlicialion of aII seclions of lhe ouIalion.
In conlemIaling a series of seci!c camaigns lo imIemenl
lhe grand slralegy, lhe de!ance slralegisls need lo consider hov lhe
camaigns al lhe beginning, lhe middIe, and near lhe concIusion of
lhe Iong-lerm slruggIe viII differ from each olher.
5c!cctIvc rcsIstancc
In lhe iniliaI slages of lhe slruggIe, searale camaigns vilh differ-
enl seci!c ob|eclives can be very usefuI. Such seIeclive camaigns
may foIIov one afler lhe olher. ccasionaIIy, lvo or lhree mighl
overIa in lime.
In Ianning a slralegy for seIeclive resislance il is necessary
lo idenlify seci!c Iimiled issues or grievances lhal symboIize lhe
generaI oression of lhe diclalorshi. Such issues may be lhe a-
roriale largels for conducling camaigns lo gain inlermediary
slralegic ob|eclives vilhin lhe overaII grand slralegy.
These inlermediary slralegic ob|eclives need lo be allainabIe
by lhe currenl or ro|ecled over caacily of lhe democralic forces.
This heIs lo ensure a series of viclories, vhich are good for moraIe,
and aIso conlribule lo advanlageous incremenlaI shifls in over
reIalions for lhe Iong-lerm slruggIe.
SeIeclive resislance slralegies shouId concenlrale rimariIy on
seci!c sociaI, economic, or oIilicaI issues. These may be chosen in
order lo kee some arl of lhe sociaI and oIilicaI syslem oul of lhe
diclalors' conlroI, lo regain conlroI of some arl currenlIy conlroIIed
by lhe diclalors, or lo deny lhe diclalors a arlicuIar ob|eclive. If
ossibIe, lhe camaign of seIeclive resislance shouId aIso slrike al
one veakness or more of lhe diclalorshi, as aIready discussed.
Thereby, democrals can make lhe grealesl ossibIe imacl vilh lheir
avaiIabIe over caacily.
Very earIy lhe slralegisls need lo Ian al Ieasl lhe slralegy for lhe
!rsl camaign. Whal are lo be ils Iimiled ob|eclives` Hov viII il heI
fuI!II lhe chosen grand slralegy` If ossibIe, il is vise lo formuIale
al Ieasl lhe generaI oulIines of slralegies for a second and ossibIy
a lhird camaign. AII such slralegies viII need lo imIemenl lhe
chosen grand slralegy and oerale vilhin ils generaI guideIines.
5ymbn!Ic cha!!cngc
Al lhe beginning of a nev camaign lo undermine lhe diclalorshi,
lhe !rsl more seci!caIIy oIilicaI aclions may be Iimiled in scoe.
They shouId be designed in arl lo lesl and in"uence lhe mood of
lhe ouIalion, and lo reare lhem for conlinuing slruggIe lhrough
noncooeralion and oIilicaI de!ance.
The iniliaI aclion is IikeIy lo lake lhe form of symboIic rolesl
or may be a symboIic acl of Iimiled or lemorary noncooeralion.
If lhe number of ersons viIIing lo acl is smaII, lhen lhe iniliaI acl
mighl, for examIe, invoIve Iacing "overs al a Iace of symboIic
imorlance. n lhe olher hand, if lhe number of ersons viIIing lo
acl is very Iarge, lhen a !ve minule haIl lo aII aclivilies or severaI
minules of siIence mighl be used. In olher silualions, a fev indi-
60 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 61
viduaIs mighl underlake a hunger slrike, a vigiI al a Iace of symboIic
imorlance, a brief sludenl boycoll of cIasses, or a lemorary sil-in
al an imorlanl of!ce. Inder a diclalorshi lhese more aggressive
aclions vouId mosl IikeIy be mel vilh harsh reression.
Cerlain symboIic acls, such as a hysicaI occualion in fronl
of lhe diclalor's aIace or oIilicaI oIice headquarlers may invoIve
high risk and are lherefore nol advisabIe for inilialing a camaign.
IniliaI symboIic rolesl aclions have al limes aroused ma|or
nalionaI and inlernalionaI allenlion as lhe mass slreel demonslra-
lions in urma in 1988 or lhe sludenl occualion and hunger slrike
in Tiananman Square in ei|ing in 1989. The high casuaIlies of dem-
onslralors in bolh of lhese cases oinls lo lhe greal care slralegisls
musl exercise in Ianning camaigns. AIlhough having a lremen-
dous moraI and sychoIogicaI imacl, such aclions by lhemseIves
are unIikeIy lo bring dovn a diclalorshi, for lhey remain IargeIy
symboIic and do nol aIler lhe over osilion of lhe diclalorshi.
Il usuaIIy is nol ossibIe lo sever lhe avaiIabiIily of lhe sources
of over lo lhe diclalors comIeleIy and raidIy al lhe beginning of
a slruggIe. Thal vouId require virluaIIy lhe vhoIe ouIalion and
aImosl aII lhe inslilulions of lhe sociely vhich had reviousIy been
IargeIy submissive lo re|ecl absoIuleIy lhe regime and suddenIy defy
il by massive and slrong noncooeralion. Thal has nol yel occurred
and vouId be mosl dif!cuIl lo achieve. In mosl cases, lherefore, a
quick camaign of fuII noncooeralion and de!ance is an unreaIislic
slralegy for an earIy camaign againsl lhe diclalorshi.
5prcadIng rcspnnsIbI!Ity
During a seIeclive resislance camaign lhe brunl of lhe slruggIe is
for a lime usuaIIy borne by one seclion or more of lhe ouIalion.
In a Ialer camaign vilh a differenl ob|eclive, lhe burden of lhe
slruggIe vouId be shifled lo olher ouIalion grous. Ior examIe,
sludenls mighl conducl slrikes on an educalionaI issue, reIigious
Ieaders and beIievers mighl concenlrale on a freedom of reIigion
issue, raiI vorkers mighl melicuIousIy obey safely reguIalions so as
lo sIov dovn lhe raiI lransorl syslem, |ournaIisls mighl chaIIenge
censorshi by ubIishing aers vilh bIank saces in vhich rohib-
iled arlicIes vouId have aeared, or oIice mighl reealedIy faiI
lo Iocale and arresl vanled members of lhe democralic oosilion.
Ihasing resislance camaigns by issue and ouIalion grou viII
aIIov cerlain segmenls of lhe ouIalion lo resl vhiIe resislance
conlinues.
SeIeclive resislance is eseciaIIy imorlanl ic !cjcn! lhe exis-
lence and aulonomy of indeendenl sociaI, economic, and oIilicaI
grous and inslilulions oulside lhe conlroI of lhe diclalorshi, vhich
vere brie"y discussed earIier. These cenlers of over rovide lhe
inslilulionaI bases from vhich lhe ouIalion can exerl ressure or
can resisl diclaloriaI conlroIs. In lhe slruggIe, lhey are IikeIy lo be
among lhe !rsl largels of lhe diclalorshi.
AImIng at thc dIctatnrs' pnwcr
As lhe Iong-lerm slruggIe deveIos beyond lhe iniliaI slralegies inlo
more ambilious and advanced hases, lhe slralegisls viII need lo
caIcuIale hov lhe diclalors' sources of over can be furlher reslricled.
The aim vouId be lo use ouIar noncooeralion lo creale a nev
more advanlageous slralegic silualion for lhe democralic forces.
As lhe democralic resislance forces gained slrenglh, slralegisls
vouId Iol more ambilious noncooeralion and de!ance lo sever
lhe diclalorshis' sources of over, vilh lhe goaI of roducing in-
creasing oIilicaI araIysis, and in lhe end lhe disinlegralion of lhe
diclalorshi ilseIf.
Il viII be necessary lo Ian carefuIIy hov lhe democralic forces
can veaken lhe suorl lhal eoIe and grous have reviousIy of-
fered lo lhe diclalorshi. WiII lheir suorl be veakened by reveIa-
lions of lhe brulaIilies erelraled by lhe regime, by exosure of lhe
disaslrous economic consequences of lhe diclalors' oIicies, or by a
nev underslanding lhal lhe diclalorshi can be ended` The diclalors'
suorlers shouId al Ieasl be induced lo become neulraI in lheir
aclivilies (fence sillers) or referabIy lo become aclive suorlers
of lhe movemenl for democracy.
During lhe Ianning and imIemenlalion of oIilicaI de!ance
62 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 63
and noncooeralion, il is highIy imorlanl lo ay cIose allenlion
lo aII of lhe diclalors' main suorlers and aides, incIuding lheir
inner cIique, oIilicaI arly, oIice, and bureaucrals, bul eseciaIIy
lheir army.
The degree of IoyaIly of lhe miIilary forces, bolh soIdiers and
of!cers, lo lhe diclalorshi needs lo be carefuIIy assessed and a
delerminalion shouId be made as lo vhelher lhe miIilary is oen
lo in"uence by lhe democralic forces. Mighl many of lhe ordinary
soIdiers be unhay and frighlened conscrils` Mighl many of lhe
soIdiers and of!cers be aIienaled from lhe regime for ersonaI, fam-
iIy, or oIilicaI reasons` Whal olher faclors mighl make soIdiers and
of!cers vuInerabIe lo democralic subversion`
LarIy in lhe Iiberalion slruggIe a seciaI slralegy shouId be de-
veIoed lo communicale vilh lhe diclalors' lroos and funclionaries.
y vords, symboIs, and aclions, lhe democralic forces can inform lhe
lroos lhal lhe Iiberalion slruggIe viII be vigorous, delermined, and
ersislenl. Troos shouId Iearn lhal lhe slruggIe viII be of a seciaI
characler, designed lo undermine lhe diclalorshi bul nol lo lhrealen
lheir Iives. Such efforls vouId aim uIlimaleIy lo undermine lhe moraIe
of lhe diclalors' lroos and !naIIy lo subverl lheir IoyaIly and obedi-
ence in favor of lhe democralic movemenl. SimiIar slralegies couId
be aimed al lhe oIice and civiI servanls.
The alleml lo garner symalhy from and, evenluaIIy, induce
disobedience among lhe diclalors' forces oughl nol lo be inlerreled,
hovever, lo mean encouragemenl of lhe miIilary forces lo make a
quick end lo lhe currenl diclalorshi lhrough miIilary aclion. Such
a scenario is nol IikeIy lo inslaII a vorking democracy, for (as ve
have discussed) a cou d'lal does IillIe lo redress lhe imbaIance of
over reIalions belveen lhe ouIace and lhe ruIers. Therefore, il
viII be necessary lo Ian hov symalhelic miIilary of!cers can be
broughl lo undersland lhal neilher a miIilary cou nor a civiI var
againsl lhe diclalorshi is required or desirabIe.
Symalhelic of!cers can Iay vilaI roIes in lhe democralic
slruggIe, such as sreading disaffeclion and noncooeralion in lhe
miIilary forces, encouraging deIiberale inef!ciencies and lhe quiel
ignoring of orders, and suorling lhe refusaI lo carry oul reres-
sion. MiIilary ersonneI may aIso offer various modes of osilive
nonvioIenl assislance lo lhe democracy movemenl, incIuding safe
assage, informalion, food, medicaI suIies, and lhe Iike.
The army is one of lhe mosl imorlanl sources of lhe over of
diclalors because il can use ils disciIined miIilary unils and vea-
onry direclIy lo allack and lo unish lhe disobedienl ouIalion.
Dc!cncc sircicgisis sncu|! rcmcm|cr inci ii ui|| |c cxccpiicnc||q !ij!cu|i,
cr impcssi||c, ic !isinicgrcic inc !icicicrsnip ij inc pc|icc, |urccucrcis, cn!
mi|iicrq jcrccs rcmcin ju||q suppcriitc cj inc !icicicrsnip cn! c|c!icni in
ccrrqing cui iis ccmmcn!s. Slralegies aimed al subverling lhe IoyaIly
of lhe diclalors' forces shouId lherefore be given a high riorily by
democralic slralegisls.
The democralic forces shouId remember lhal disaffeclion and
disobedience among lhe miIilary forces and oIice can be highIy
dangerous for lhe members of lhose grous. SoIdiers and oIice
couId execl severe enaIlies for any acl of disobedience and execu-
lion for acls of muliny. The democralic forces shouId nol ask lhe
soIdiers and of!cers lhal lhey immedialeIy muliny. Inslead, vhere
communicalion is ossibIe, il shouId be made cIear lhal lhere are a
muIlilude of reIaliveIy safe forms of disguised disobedience lhal
lhey can lake iniliaIIy. Ior examIe, oIice and lroos can carry oul
inslruclions for reression inef!cienlIy, faiI lo Iocale vanled ersons,
varn resislers of imending reression, arresls, or deorlalions, and
faiI lo reorl imorlanl informalion lo lheir suerior of!cers. Disaf-
fecled of!cers in lurn can negIecl lo reIay commands for reression
dovn lhe chain of command. SoIdiers may shool over lhe heads of
demonslralors. SimiIarIy, for lheir arl, civiI servanls can Iose !Ies
and inslruclions, vork inef!cienlIy, and become iII so lhal lhey
need lo slay home unliI lhey recover.
5hIIts In stratcgy
The oIilicaI de!ance slralegisls viII need conslanlIy lo assess hov
lhe grand slralegy and lhe seci!c camaign slralegies are being
imIemenled. Il is ossibIe, for examIe, lhal lhe slruggIe may nol
go as veII as execled. In lhal case il viII be necessary lo caIcuIale
64 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 65
vhal shifls in slralegy mighl be required. Whal can be done lo in-
crease lhe movemenl's slrenglh and regain lhe inilialive` In such
a silualion, il viII be necessary lo idenlify lhe robIem, make a
slralegic reassessmenl, ossibIy shifl slruggIe resonsibiIilies lo a
differenl ouIalion grou, mobiIize addilionaI sources of over,
and deveIo aIlernalive courses of aclion. When lhal is done, lhe
nev Ian shouId be imIemenled immedialeIy.
ConverseIy, if lhe slruggIe has gone much beller lhan execled
and lhe diclalorshi is coIIasing earIier lhan reviousIy caIcuIaled,
hov can lhe democralic forces cailaIize on unexecled gains and
move lovard araIyzing lhe diclalorshi` We viII exIore lhis ques-
lion in lhe foIIoving chaler.
67
NINE
DI5INTEGRATING THE DICTATOR5HIP
The cumuIalive effecl of veII-conducled and successfuI oIilicaI
de!ance camaigns is lo slrenglhen lhe resislance and lo eslabIish
and exand areas of lhe sociely vhere lhe diclalorshi faces Iimils
on ils effeclive conlroI. These camaigns aIso rovide imorlanl
exerience in hov lo refuse cooeralion and hov lo offer oIilicaI
de!ance. Thal exerience viII be of greal assislance vhen lhe lime
comes for noncooeralion and de!ance on a mass scaIe.
As vas discussed in Chaler Three, obedience, cooeralion,
and submission are essenliaI if diclalors are lo be overfuI. Wilh-
oul access lo lhe sources of oIilicaI over, lhe diclalors' over
veakens and !naIIy dissoIves. WilhdravaI of suorl is lherefore
lhe ma|or required aclion lo disinlegrale a diclalorshi. Il may be
usefuI lo reviev hov lhe sources of over can be affecled by oIili-
caI de!ance.
Acls of symboIic reudialion and de!ance are among lhe avaiI-
abIe means lo undermine lhe regime's moraI and oIilicaI cuincr-
iiq ils Iegilimacy. The grealer lhe regime's aulhorily, lhe grealer
and more reIiabIe is lhe obedience and cooeralion vhich il viII
receive. MoraI disarovaI needs lo be exressed in aclion in order
lo seriousIy lhrealen lhe exislence of lhe diclalorshi. WilhdravaI
of cooeralion and obedience are needed lo sever lhe avaiIabiIily of
olher sources of lhe regime's over.
A second imorlanl such source of over is numcn rcscurccs,
lhe number and imorlance of lhe ersons and grous lhal obey,
cooerale vilh, or assisl lhe ruIers. If noncooeralion is racliced by
Iarge arls of lhe ouIalion, lhe regime viII be in serious lroubIe.
Ior examIe, if lhe civiI servanls no Ionger funclion vilh lheir normaI
ef!ciency or even slay al home, lhe adminislralive aaralus viII
be graveIy affecled.
SimiIarIy, if lhe noncooeraling ersons and grous incIude
lhose lhal have reviousIy suIied seciaIized s|i||s cn! |ncu|-
c!gc, lhen lhe diclalors viII see lheir caacily lo imIemenl lheir
viII graveIy veakened. Lven lheir abiIily lo make veII-informed
decisions and deveIo effeclive oIicies may be seriousIy reduced.
If sychoIogicaI and ideoIogicaI in"uences caIIed inicngi||c
jccicrs lhal usuaIIy induce eoIe lo obey and assisl lhe ruIers
are veakened or reversed, lhe ouIalion viII be more incIined lo
disobey and lo noncooerale.
The diclalors' access lo mcicric| rcscurccs aIso direclIy affecls
lheir over. Wilh conlroI of !nanciaI resources, lhe economic
syslem, roerly, naluraI resources, lransorlalion, and means of
communicalion in lhe hands of acluaI or olenliaI oonenls of
lhe regime, anolher ma|or source of lheir over is vuInerabIe or re-
moved. Slrikes, boycolls, and increasing aulonomy in lhe economy,
communicalions, and lransorlalion viII veaken lhe regime.
As reviousIy discussed, lhe diclalors' abiIily lo lhrealen or
aIy scnciicns unishmenls againsl lhe reslive, disobedienl, and
noncooeralive seclions of lhe ouIalion is a cenlraI source of
lhe over of diclalors. This source of over can be veakened in
lvo vays. Iirsl, if lhe ouIalion is reared, as in a var, lo risk
serious consequences as lhe rice of de!ance, lhe effecliveness of lhe
avaiIabIe sanclions viII be draslicaIIy reduced (lhal is, lhe diclalors'
reression viII nol secure lhe desired submission). Second, if lhe
oIice and lhe miIilary forces lhemseIves become disaffecled, lhey
may on an individuaI or mass basis evade or oulrighl defy orders lo
arresl, beal, or shool resislers. If lhe diclalors can no Ionger reIy on
lhe oIice and miIilary forces lo carry oul reression, lhe diclalorshi
is graveIy lhrealened.
In summary, success againsl an enlrenched diclalorshi requires
lhal noncooeralion and de!ance reduce and remove lhe sources of
lhe regime's over. Wilhoul conslanl reIenishmenl of lhe necessary
sources of over lhe diclalorshi viII veaken and !naIIy disinle-
grale. Comelenl slralegic Ianning of oIilicaI de!ance againsl
diclalorshis lherefore needs lo largel lhe diclalors' mosl imorlanl
sources of over.
68 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 69
Esca!atIng Irccdnm
Combined vilh oIilicaI de!ance during lhe hase of seIeclive re-
sislance, lhe grovlh of aulonomous sociaI, economic, cuIluraI, and
oIilicaI inslilulions rogressiveIy exands lhe democralic sace
of lhe sociely and shrinks lhe conlroI of lhe diclalorshi. As lhe civiI
inslilulions of lhe sociely become slronger vis--vis lhe diclalorshi,
lhen, vhalever lhe diclalors may vish, lhe ouIalion is incremen-
laIIy buiIding an indeendenl sociely oulside of lheir conlroI. If and
vhen lhe diclalorshi inlervenes lo haIl lhis escaIaling freedom,
nonvioIenl slruggIe can be aIied in defense of lhis nevIy von
sace and lhe diclalorshi viII be faced vilh yel anolher fronl in
lhe slruggIe.
In lime, lhis combinalion of resislance and inslilulion buiIding
can Iead lo !c jccic freedom, making lhe coIIase of lhe diclalor-
shi and lhe formaI inslaIIalion of a democralic syslem undeniabIe
because lhe over reIalionshis vilhin lhe sociely have been fun-
damenlaIIy aIlered.
IoIand in lhe 197Os and 198Os rovides a cIear examIe of lhe
rogressive recIaiming of a sociely's funclions and inslilulions by
lhe resislance. The CalhoIic church had been erseculed bul never
broughl under fuII Communisl conlroI. In 1976 cerlain inleIIecluaIs
and vorkers formed smaII grous such as K..R. (Workers Defense
Commillee) lo advance lheir oIilicaI ideas. The organizalion of
lhe SoIidarily lrade union vilh ils over lo vieId effeclive slrikes
forced ils ovn IegaIizalion in 198O. Ieasanls, sludenls, and many
olher grous aIso formed lheir ovn indeendenl organizalions.
When lhe Communisls reaIized lhal lhese grous had changed lhe
over reaIilies, SoIidarily vas again banned and lhe Communisls
resorled lo miIilary ruIe.
Lven under marliaI Iav, vilh many imrisonmenls and harsh
erseculion, lhe nev indeendenl inslilulions of lhe sociely con-
linued lo funclion. Ior examIe, dozens of iIIegaI nevsaers and
magazines conlinued lo be ubIished. IIIegaI ubIishing houses an-
nuaIIy issued hundreds of books, vhiIe veII-knovn vrilers boycol-
led Communisl ubIicalions and governmenl ubIishing houses.
SimiIar aclivilies conlinued in olher arls of lhe sociely.
Inder lhe }aruseIski miIilary regime, lhe miIilary-Communisl
governmenl vas al one oinl described as bouncing around on lhe
lo of lhe sociely. The of!ciaIs sliII occuied governmenl of!ces and
buiIdings. The regime couId sliII slrike dovn inlo lhe sociely, vilh
unishmenls, arresls, imrisonmenl, seizure of rinling resses, and
lhe Iike. The diclalorshi, hovever, couId nol conlroI lhe sociely.
Irom lhal oinl, il vas onIy a maller of lime unliI lhe sociely vas
abIe lo bring dovn lhe regime comIeleIy.
Lven vhiIe a diclalorshi sliII occuies governmenl osilions
il is somelimes ossibIe lo organize a democralic araIIeI govern-
menl. This vouId increasingIy oerale as a rivaI governmenl lo
vhich IoyaIly, comIiance, and cooeralion are given by lhe ou-
Ialion and lhe sociely's inslilulions. The diclalorshi vouId lhen
consequenlIy, on an increasing basis, be derived of lhese characler-
islics of governmenl. LvenluaIIy, lhe democralic araIIeI governmenl
may fuIIy reIace lhe diclaloriaI regime as arl of lhe lransilion lo
a democralic syslem. In due course lhen a conslilulion vouId be
adoled and eIeclions heId as arl of lhe lransilion.
DIsIntcgratIng thc dIctatnrshIp
WhiIe lhe inslilulionaI lransformalion of lhe sociely is laking Iace,
lhe de!ance and noncooeralion movemenl may escaIale. Slralegisls
of lhe democralic forces shouId conlemIale earIy lhal lhere viII
come a lime vhen lhe democralic forces can move beyond seIeclive
resislance and Iaunch mass de!ance. In mosl cases, lime viII be
required for crealing, buiIding, or exanding resislance caacilies,
and lhe deveIomenl of mass de!ance may occur onIy afler severaI
years. During lhis inlerim eriod camaigns of seIeclive resislance
shouId be Iaunched vilh increasingIy imorlanl oIilicaI ob|eclives.
Larger arls of lhe ouIalion al aII IeveIs of lhe sociely shouId be-
come invoIved. Given delermined and disciIined oIilicaI de!ance
during lhis escaIalion of aclivilies, lhe inlernaI veaknesses of lhe
diclalorshi are IikeIy lo become increasingIy obvious.
70 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 71
The combinalion of slrong oIilicaI de!ance and lhe buiIding
of indeendenl inslilulions is IikeIy in lime lo roduce videsread
inlernalionaI allenlion favorabIe lo lhe democralic forces. Il may aIso
roduce inlernalionaI diIomalic condemnalions, boycolls, and em-
bargoes in suorl of lhe democralic forces (as il did for IoIand).
Slralegisls shouId be avare lhal in some silualions lhe coIIase
of lhe diclalorshi may occur exlremeIy raidIy, as in Lasl Germany
in 1989. This can haen vhen lhe sources of over are massiveIy
severed as a resuIl of lhe vhoIe ouIalion's revuIsion againsl lhe
diclalorshi. This allern is nol usuaI, hovever, and il is beller lo
Ian for a Iong-lerm slruggIe (bul lo be reared for a shorl one).
During lhe course of lhe Iiberalion slruggIe, viclories, even on
Iimiled issues, shouId be ceIebraled. Those vho have earned lhe
viclory shouId be recognized. CeIebralions vilh vigiIance shouId
aIso heI lo kee u lhe moraIe needed for fulure slages of lhe
slruggIe.
Hand!Ing succcss rcspnnsIb!y
IIanners of lhe grand slralegy shouId caIcuIale in advance lhe os-
sibIe and referred vays in vhich a successfuI slruggIe mighl besl
be concIuded in order lo revenl lhe rise of a nev diclalorshi and lo
ensure lhe graduaI eslabIishmenl of a durabIe democralic syslem.
The democrals shouId caIcuIale hov lhe lransilion from lhe
diclalorshi lo lhe inlerim governmenl shaII be handIed al lhe end
of lhe slruggIe. Il is desirabIe al lhal lime lo eslabIish quickIy a nev
funclioning governmenl. Hovever, il musl nol be mereIy lhe oId
one vilh nev ersonneI. Il is necessary lo caIcuIale vhal seclions of
lhe oId governmenlaI slruclure (as lhe oIilicaI oIice) are lo be com-
IeleIy aboIished because of lheir inherenl anli-democralic characler
and vhich seclions relained lo be sub|ecled lo Ialer democralizalion
efforls. A comIele governmenlaI void couId oen lhe vay lo chaos
or a nev diclalorshi.
Thoughl shouId be given in advance lo delermine vhal is lo be
lhe oIicy lovard high of!ciaIs of lhe diclalorshi vhen ils over
disinlegrales. Ior examIe, are lhe diclalors lo be broughl lo lriaI in
a courl` Are lhey lo be ermilled lo Ieave lhe counlry ermanenlIy`
Whal olher olions may lhere be lhal are consislenl vilh oIilicaI
de!ance, lhe need for reconslrucling lhe counlry, and buiIding a
democracy foIIoving lhe viclory` A bIood balh musl be avoided
vhich couId have draslic consequences on lhe ossibiIily of a fulure
democralic syslem.
Seci!c Ians for lhe lransilion lo democracy shouId be ready
for aIicalion vhen lhe diclalorshi is veakening or coIIases.
Such Ians viII heI lo revenl anolher grou from seizing slale
over lhrough a cou d'lal. IIans for lhe inslilulion of democralic
conslilulionaI governmenl vilh fuII oIilicaI and ersonaI Iiberlies
viII aIso be required. The changes von al a greal rice shouId nol
be Iosl lhrough Iack of Ianning.
When confronled vilh lhe increasingIy emovered ouIalion
and lhe grovlh of indeendenl democralic grous and inslilulions
bolh of vhich lhe diclalorshi is unabIe lo conlroI lhe diclalors viII
!nd lhal lheir vhoIe venlure is unraveIIing. Massive shul-dovns of
lhe sociely, generaI slrikes, mass slay-al-homes, de!anl marches, or
olher aclivilies viII increasingIy undermine lhe diclalors' ovn orga-
nizalion and reIaled inslilulions. As a consequence of such de!ance
and noncooeralion, execuled viseIy and vilh mass arlicialion
over lime, lhe diclalors vouId become overIess and lhe democralic
defenders vouId, vilhoul vioIence, lriumh. The diclalorshi vouId
disinlegrale before lhe de!anl ouIalion.
Nol every such efforl viII succeed, eseciaIIy nol easiIy, and
rareIy quickIy. Il shouId be remembered lhal as many miIilary vars
are Iosl as are von. Hovever, oIilicaI de!ance offers a reaI ossibiIi-
ly of viclory. As slaled earIier, lhal ossibiIily can be grealIy increased
lhrough lhe deveIomenl of a vise grand slralegy, carefuI slralegic
Ianning, hard vork, and disciIined courageous slruggIe.
72 Gcnc Sncrp
73
TEN
GROUNDWORK FOR DURABLE DEMOCRACY
The disinlegralion of lhe diclalorshi is of course a cause for ma|or
ceIebralion. IeoIe vho have suffered for so Iong and slruggIed
al greal rice meril a lime of |oy, reIaxalion, and recognilion. They
shouId feeI roud of lhemseIves and of aII vho slruggIed vilh lhem
lo vin oIilicaI freedom. Nol aII viII have Iived lo see lhis day. The
Iiving and lhe dead viII be remembered as heroes vho heIed lo
shae lhe hislory of freedom in lheir counlry.
InforlunaleIy, lhis is nol a lime for a reduclion in vigiIance.
Lven in lhe evenl of a successfuI disinlegralion of lhe diclalorshi
by oIilicaI de!ance, carefuI recaulions musl be laken lo revenl
lhe rise of a nev oressive regime oul of lhe confusion foIIoving
lhe coIIase of lhe oId one. The Ieaders of lhe ro-democracy forces
shouId have reared in advance for an orderIy lransilion lo a de-
mocracy. The diclaloriaI slruclures viII need lo be dismanlIed. The
conslilulionaI and IegaI bases and slandards of behavior of a durabIe
democracy viII need lo be buiIl.
No one shouId beIieve lhal vilh lhe dovnfaII of lhe diclalorshi
an ideaI sociely viII immedialeIy aear. The disinlegralion of lhe
diclalorshi simIy rovides lhe beginning oinl, under condilions
of enhanced freedom, for Iong-lerm efforls lo imrove lhe sociely and
meel human needs more adequaleIy. Serious oIilicaI, economic, and
sociaI robIems viII conlinue for years, requiring lhe cooeralion of
many eoIe and grous in seeking lheir resoIulion. The nev oIili-
caI syslem shouId rovide lhe oorlunilies for eoIe vilh varying
oulIooks and favored measures lo conlinue conslruclive vork and
oIicy deveIomenl lo deaI vilh robIems in lhe fulure.
Thrcats nI a ncw dIctatnrshIp
ArislolIe varned Iong ago lhal . . . lyranny can aIso change inlo
lyranny. . .
14
There is amIe hisloricaI evidence from Irance (lhe
14
ArislolIe, 1nc Pc|iiics, ook V, Chaler 12, . 233.
}acobins and NaoIeon), Russia (lhe oIsheviks), Iran (lhe AyaloI-
Iah), urma (SLRC), and eIsevhere lhal lhe coIIase of an ores-
sive regime viII be seen by some ersons and grous as mereIy lhe
oorlunily for lhem lo sle in as lhe nev maslers. Their molives
may vary, bul lhe resuIls are oflen aroximaleIy lhe same. The
nev diclalorshi may even be more crueI and lolaI in ils conlroI
lhan lhe oId one.
Lven before lhe coIIase of lhe diclalorshi, members of lhe oId
regime may alleml lo cul shorl lhe de!ance slruggIe for democracy
by slaging a cou d'lal designed lo reeml viclory by lhe ouIar
resislance. Il may cIaim lo ousl lhe diclalorshi, bul in facl seek onIy
lo imose a nev refurbished modeI of lhe oId one.
B!nckIng cnups
There are vays in vhich cous againsl nevIy Iiberaled socielies can
be defealed. Advance knovIedge of lhal defense caacily may al
limes be suf!cienl lo deler lhe alleml. Irearalion can roduce
revenlion.
ImmedialeIy afler a cou is slarled, lhe ulschisls require Ie-
gilimacy, lhal is, accelance of lheir moraI and oIilicaI righl lo ruIe.
The !rsl basic rinciIe of anli-cou defense is lherefore lo deny
Iegilimacy lo lhe ulschisls.
The ulschisls aIso require lhal lhe civiIian Ieaders and ouIa-
lion be suorlive, confused, or |usl assive. The ulschisls require
lhe cooeralion of seciaIisls and advisors, bureaucrals and civiI
servanls, adminislralors and |udges in order lo consoIidale lheir
conlroI over lhe affecled sociely. The ulschisls aIso require lhal lhe
muIlilude of eoIe vho oerale lhe oIilicaI syslem, lhe sociely's
inslilulions, lhe economy, lhe oIice, and lhe miIilary forces viII
assiveIy submil and carry oul lheir usuaI funclions as modi!ed by
lhe ulschisls' orders and oIicies.
The second basic rinciIe of anli-cou defense is lo resisl lhe
ulschisls vilh noncooeralion and de!ance. The needed cooera-
lion and assislance musl be denied. LssenliaIIy lhe same means of
slruggIe lhal vas used againsl lhe diclalorshi can be used againsl
74 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 75
lhe nev lhreal, bul aIied immedialeIy. If bolh Iegilimacy and
cooeralion are denied, lhe cou may die of oIilicaI slarvalion and
lhe chance lo buiId a democralic sociely reslored.
CnnstItutInn draItIng
The nev democralic syslem viII require a conslilulion lhal eslab-
Iishes lhe desired framevork of lhe democralic governmenl. The
conslilulion shouId sel lhe uroses of governmenl, Iimils on
governmenlaI overs, lhe means and liming of eIeclions by vhich
governmenlaI of!ciaIs and IegisIalors viII be chosen, lhe inherenl
righls of lhe eoIe, and lhe reIalion of lhe nalionaI governmenl lo
olher Iover IeveIs of governmenl.
Wilhin lhe cenlraI governmenl, if il is lo remain democralic,
a cIear division of aulhorily shouId be eslabIished belveen lhe
IegisIalive, execulive, and |udiciaI branches of governmenl. Slrong
reslriclions shouId be incIuded on aclivilies of lhe oIice, inleIIigence
services, and miIilary forces lo rohibil any IegaI oIilicaI inlerfer-
ence.
In lhe inleresls of reserving lhe democralic syslem and im-
eding diclaloriaI lrends and measures, lhe conslilulion shouId
referabIy be one lhal eslabIishes a federaI syslem vilh signi!canl
rerogalives reserved for lhe regionaI, slale, and IocaI IeveIs of gov-
ernmenl. In some silualions lhe Sviss syslem of canlons mighl be
considered in vhich reIaliveIy smaII areas relain ma|or rerogalives,
vhiIe remaining a arl of lhe vhoIe counlry.
If a conslilulion vilh many of lhese fealures exisled earIier in
lhe nevIy Iiberaled counlry's hislory, il may be vise simIy lo reslore
il lo oeralion, amending il as deemed necessary and desirabIe. If
a suilabIe oIder conslilulion is nol resenl, il may be necessary lo
oerale vilh an inlerim conslilulion. lhervise, a nev conslilu-
lion viII need lo be reared. Irearing a nev conslilulion viII
lake considerabIe lime and lhoughl. IouIar arlicialion in lhis
rocess is desirabIe and required for rali!calion of a nev lexl or
amendmenls. ne shouId be very caulious aboul incIuding in lhe
conslilulion romises lhal Ialer mighl rove imossibIe lo imIe-
menl or rovisions lhal vouId require a highIy cenlraIized govern-
menl, for bolh can faciIilale a nev diclalorshi.
The vording of lhe conslilulion shouId be easiIy underslood
by lhe ma|orily of lhe ouIalion. A conslilulion shouId nol be so
comIex or ambiguous lhal onIy Iavyers or olher eIiles can cIaim
lo undersland il.
A dcmncratIc dcIcnsc pn!Icy
The Iiberaled counlry may aIso face foreign lhreals for vhich a
defense caacily vouId be required. The counlry mighl aIso be
lhrealened by foreign allemls lo eslabIish economic, oIilicaI, or
miIilary dominalion.
In lhe inleresls of mainlaining inlernaI democracy, serious
consideralion shouId be given lo aIying lhe basic rinciIes of
oIilicaI de!ance lo lhe needs of nalionaI defense.
15
y Iacing resis-
lance caacily direclIy in lhe hands of lhe cilizenry, nevIy Iiberaled
counlries couId avoid lhe need lo eslabIish a slrong miIilary caac-
ily vhich couId ilseIf lhrealen democracy or require vasl economic
resources much needed for olher uroses.
Il musl be remembered lhal some grous viII ignore any con-
slilulionaI rovision in lheir aim lo eslabIish lhemseIves as nev
diclalors. Therefore, a ermanenl roIe viII exisl for lhe ouIalion lo
aIy oIilicaI de!ance and noncooeralion againsl vouId-be dicla-
lors and lo reserve democralic slruclures, righls, and rocedures.
A mcrItnrInus rcspnnsIbI!Ity
The effecl of nonvioIenl slruggIe is nol onIy lo veaken and remove
lhe diclalors bul aIso lo emover lhe oressed. This lechnique
enabIes eoIe vho formerIy feIl lhemseIves lo be onIy avns or
viclims lo vieId over direclIy in order lo gain by lheir ovn efforls
grealer freedom and |uslice. This exerience of slruggIe has imor-
76 Gcnc Sncrp
15
See Gene Shar, Citi|icn-Bcsc! Dcjcnsc. A Pcsi-Mi|iicrq Wccpcns Sqsicm (Irinc-
elon, Nev }ersey: Irincelon Iniversily Iress, 199O).
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 77
lanl sychoIogicaI consequences, conlribuling lo increased seIf-es-
leem and seIf-con!dence among lhe formerIy overIess.
ne imorlanl Iong-lerm bene!ciaI consequence of lhe use of
nonvioIenl slruggIe for eslabIishing democralic governmenl is lhal
lhe sociely viII be more caabIe of deaIing vilh conlinuing and
fulure robIems. These mighl incIude fulure governmenlaI abuse
and corrulion, maIlrealmenl of any grou, economic in|uslices, and
Iimilalions on lhe democralic quaIilies of lhe oIilicaI syslem. The
ouIalion exerienced in lhe use of oIilicaI de!ance is Iess IikeIy
lo be vuInerabIe lo fulure diclalorshis.
Afler Iiberalion, famiIiarily vilh nonvioIenl slruggIe viII ro-
vide vays lo defend democracy, civiI Iiberlies, minorily righls, and
rerogalives of regionaI, slale, and IocaI governmenls and nongov-
ernmenlaI inslilulions. Such means aIso rovide vays by vhich
eoIe and grous can exress exlreme dissenl eacefuIIy on issues
seen as so imorlanl lhal oosilion grous have somelimes resorled
lo lerrorism or guerriIIa varfare.
The lhoughls in lhis examinalion of oIilicaI de!ance or non-
vioIenl slruggIe are inlended lo be heIfuI lo aII ersons and grous
vho seek lo Iifl diclaloriaI oression from lheir eoIe and lo es-
labIish a durabIe democralic syslem lhal resecls human freedoms
and ouIar aclion lo imrove lhe sociely.
There are lhree ma|or concIusions lo lhe ideas skelched here:
Liberalion from diclalorshis is ossibIe,
Very carefuI lhoughl and slralegic Ianning viII be required
lo achieve il, and
VigiIance, hard vork, and disciIined slruggIe, oflen al greal
cosl, viII be needed.
The ofl quoled hrase Ireedom is nol free is lrue. No oulside
force is coming lo give oressed eoIe lhe freedom lhey so much
vanl. IeoIe viII have lo Iearn hov lo lake lhal freedom lhemseIves.
Lasy il cannol be.
If eoIe can gras vhal is required for lheir ovn Iiberalion,
lhey can charl courses of aclion vhich, lhrough much lravaiI, can
evenluaIIy bring lhem lheir freedom. Then, vilh diIigence lhey
can conslrucl a nev democralic order and reare for ils defense.
Ireedom von by slruggIe of lhis lye can be durabIe. Il can be
mainlained by a lenacious eoIe commilled lo ils reservalion
and enrichmenl.
78 Gcnc Sncrp
APPENDIX ONE
THE METHOD5 OF NONVIOLENT ACTION
16
THE METHOD5 OF NONVIOLENT PROTE5T AND
PER5UA5ION
Fnrma! statcmcnts
1. IubIic seeches
2. Lellers of oosilion or suorl
3. DecIaralions by organizalions and inslilulions
4. Signed ubIic slalemenls
5. DecIaralions of indiclmenl and inlenlion
6. Grou or mass elilions
CnmmunIcatInns wIth a wIdcr audIcncc
7. SIogans, caricalures, and symboIs
8. anners, oslers, and disIayed communicalions
9. Lea"els, amhIels, and books
1O. Nevsaers and |ournaIs
11. Records, radio, and leIevision
12. Skyvriling and earlhvriling
Grnup rcprcscntatInns
13. Deulalions
14. Mock avards
15. Grou Iobbying
16. Iickeling
17. Mock eIeclions
5ymbn!Ic pub!Ic acts
18. DisIay of "ags and symboIic coIors
19. Wearing of symboIs
79
16
This Iisl, vilh de!nilions and hisloricaI examIes, is laken from Gene Shar,
The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Iarl Tvo, The Methods of Nonviolent Action.
2O. Irayer and vorshi
21. DeIivering symboIic ob|ecls
22. Irolesl disrobings
23. Deslruclion of ovn roerly
24. SymboIic Iighls
25. DisIays of orlrails
26. Iainl as rolesl
27. Nev signs and names
28. SymboIic sounds
29. SymboIic recIamalions
3O. Rude geslures
Prcssurcs nn IndIvIdua!s
31. Haunling of!ciaIs
32. Taunling of!ciaIs
33. Iralernizalion
34. VigiIs
Drama and musIc
35. Humorous skils and ranks
36. Ierformance of Iays and music
37. Singing
PrnccssInns
38. Marches
39. Iarades
4O. ReIigious rocessions
41. IiIgrimages
42. Molorcades
HnnnrIng thc dcad
43. IoIilicaI mourning
44. Mock funeraIs
45. Demonslralive funeraIs
46. Homage al buriaI Iaces
80 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 81
Pub!Ic asscmb!Ics
47. AssembIies of rolesl or suorl
48. Irolesl meelings
49. Camou"aged meelings of rolesl
5O. Teach-ins
WIthdrawa! and rcnuncIatInn
51. WaIk-ouls
52. SiIence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one's back
THE METHOD5 OF 5OCIAL NONCOOPERATION
OstracIsm nI pcrsnns
55. SociaI boycoll
56. SeIeclive sociaI boycoll
57. Lysislralic nonaclion
58. Lxcommunicalion
59. Inlerdicl
NnncnnpcratInn wIth sncIa! cvcnts, custnms, and InstItutInns
6O. Susension of sociaI and sorls aclivilies
61. oycoll of sociaI affairs
62. Sludenl slrike
63. SociaI disobedience
64. WilhdravaI from sociaI inslilulions
WIthdrawa! Irnm thc sncIa! systcm
65. Slay-al-home
66. TolaI ersonaI noncooeralion
67. IIighl of vorkers
68. Sancluary
69. CoIIeclive disaearance
7O. Irolesl emigralion (hijrat)
THE METHOD5 OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION:
(1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTT5
ActInn by cnnsumcrs
71. Consumers' boycoll
72. Nonconsumlion of boycolled goods
73. IoIicy of auslerily
74. Renl vilhhoIding
75. RefusaI lo renl
76. NalionaI consumers' boycoll
77. InlernalionaI consumers' boycoll
ActInn by wnrkcrs and prnduccrs
78. Workmen's boycoll
79. Iroducers' boycoll
ActInn by mIdd!cmcn
8O. SuIiers' and handIers' boycoll
ActInn by nwncrs and managcmcnt
81. Traders' boycoll
82. RefusaI lo Iel or seII roerly
83. Lockoul
84. RefusaI of induslriaI assislance
85. Merchanls' generaI slrike
ActInn by hn!dcrs nI !nancIa! rcsnurccs
86. WilhdravaI of bank deosils
87. RefusaI lo ay fees, dues, and assessmenls
88. RefusaI lo ay debls or inleresl
89. Severance of funds and credil
9O. Revenue refusaI
91. RefusaI of a governmenl's money
ActInn by gnvcrnmcnts
92. Domeslic embargo
93. IackIisling of lraders
94. InlernalionaI seIIers' embargo
95. InlernalionaI buyers' embargo
96. InlernalionaI lrade embargo
82 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 83
THE METHOD5 OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION:
(2) THE 5TRIKE
5ymbn!Ic strIkcs
97. Irolesl slrike
98. Quickie vaIkoul (Iighlning slrike)
AgrIcu!tura! strIkcs
99. Ieasanl slrike
1OO. Iarm vorkers' slrike
5trIkcs by spccIa! grnups
1O1. RefusaI of imressed Iabor
1O2. Irisoners' slrike
1O3. Crafl slrike
1O4. IrofessionaI slrike
OrdInary IndustrIa! strIkcs
1O5. LslabIishmenl slrike
1O6. Induslry slrike
1O7. Symalhelic slrike
RcstrIctcd strIkcs
1O8. DelaiIed slrike
1O9. umer slrike
11O. SIovdovn slrike
111. Working-lo-ruIe slrike
112. Reorling sick (sick-in)
113. Slrike by resignalion
114. Limiled slrike
115. SeIeclive slrike
Mu!tI-Industry strIkcs
116. GeneraIized slrike
117. GeneraI slrike
CnmbInatInns nI strIkcs and ccnnnmIc c!nsurcs
118. Hartal
119. Lconomic shuldovn
THE METHOD5 OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION
RcjcctInn nI authnrIty
12O. WilhhoIding or vilhdravaI of aIIegiance
121. RefusaI of ubIic suorl
122. Lileralure and seeches advocaling resislance
CItIzcns' nnncnnpcratInn wIth gnvcrnmcnt
123. oycoll of IegisIalive bodies
124. oycoll of eIeclions
125. oycoll of governmenl emIoymenl and osilions
126. oycoll of governmenl dearlmenls, agencies and
olher bodies
127. WilhdravaI from governmenl educalionaI inslilulions
128. oycoll of governmenl-suorled organizalions
129. RefusaI of assislance lo enforcemenl agenls
13O. RemovaI of ovn signs and Iacemarks
131. RefusaI lo accel aoinled of!ciaIs
132. RefusaI lo dissoIve exisling inslilulions
CItIzcns' a!tcrnatIvcs tn nbcdIcncc
133. ReIuclanl and sIov comIiance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direcl suervision
135. IouIar nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. RefusaI of an assembIage or meeling lo diserse
138. Sildovn
139. Noncooeralion vilh conscrilion and deorlalion
14O. Hiding, escae and faIse idenlilies
141. CiviI disobedience of iIIegilimale Iavs
ActInn by gnvcrnmcnt pcrsnnnc!
142. SeIeclive refusaI of assislance by governmenl aides
143. Iocking of Iines of command and informalion
144. SlaIIing and obslruclion
145. GeneraI adminislralive noncooeralion
84 Gcnc Sncrp
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 85
146. }udiciaI noncooeralion
147. DeIiberale inef!ciency and seIeclive noncooeralion by
enforcemenl agenls
148. Muliny
DnmcstIc gnvcrnmcnta! actInn
149. Quasi-IegaI evasions and deIays
15O. Noncooeralion by consliluenl governmenlaI unils
IntcrnatInna! gnvcrnmcnta! actInn
151. Changes in diIomalic and olher reresenlalion
152. DeIay and canceIIalion of diIomalic evenls
153. WilhhoIding of diIomalic recognilion
154. Severance of diIomalic reIalions
155. WilhdravaI from inlernalionaI organizalions
156. RefusaI of membershi in inlernalionaI bodies
157. LxuIsion from inlernalionaI organizalions
THE METHOD5 OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION
Psychn!ngIca! IntcrvcntInn
158. SeIf-exosure lo lhe eIemenls
159. The fasl
(a) Iasl of moraI ressure
(b) Hunger slrike
(c) Salyagrahic fasl
16O. Reverse lriaI
161. NonvioIenl harassmenl
PhysIca! IntcrvcntInn
162. Sil-in
163. Sland-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. MiII-in
167. Iray-in
168. NonvioIenl raids
169. NonvioIenl air raids
17O. NonvioIenl invasion
171. NonvioIenl inler|eclion
172. NonvioIenl obslruclion
173. NonvioIenl occualion
5ncIa! IntcrvcntInn
174. LslabIishing nev sociaI allerns
175. verIoading of faciIilies
176. SlaII-in
177. Seak-in
178. GuerriIIa lhealer
179. AIlernalive sociaI inslilulions
18O. AIlernalive communicalion syslem
EcnnnmIc IntcrvcntInn
181. Reverse slrike
182. Slay-in slrike
183. NonvioIenl Iand seizure
184. De!ance of bIockades
185. IoIilicaIIy molivaled counlerfeiling
186. IrecIusive urchasing
187. Seizure of assels
188. Duming
189. SeIeclive alronage
19O. AIlernalive markels
191. AIlernalive lransorlalion syslems
192. AIlernalive economic inslilulions
Pn!ItIca! IntcrvcntInn
193. verIoading of adminislralive syslems
194. DiscIosing idenlilies of secrel agenls
195. Seeking imrisonmenl
196. CiviI disobedience of neulraI Iavs
197. Work-on vilhoul coIIaboralion
198. DuaI sovereignly and araIIeI governmenl
86 Gcnc Sncrp
APPENDIX TWO
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT5 AND NOTE5 ON
THE HI5TORY OF FROM DICTATOR5HIP
TO DEMOCRACY
I have incurred severaI debls of gralilude vhiIe vriling lhe
originaI edilion of lhis essay. ruce }enkins, my SeciaI Assislanl
in 1993, made an ineslimabIe conlribulion by his idenli!calion of
robIems in conlenl and resenlalion. He aIso made incisive recom-
mendalions for more rigorous and cIearer resenlalions of dif!cuIl
ideas (eseciaIIy concerning slralegy), slrucluraI reorganizalion, and
ediloriaI imrovemenls.
I am aIso gralefuI for lhe ediloriaI assislance of Slehen Coady.
Dr. Chrisloher KruegIer and Roberl HeIvey offered very imorlanl
crilicisms and advice. Dr. HazeI McIerson and Dr. Ialricia Iarkman
rovided informalion on slruggIes in Africa and Lalin America, re-
secliveIy. Hovever, lhe anaIysis and concIusions conlained lherein
are soIeIy my resonsibiIily.
In recenl years seciaI guideIines for lransIalions have been
deveIoed, rimariIy due lo }amiIa Raqib's guidance and lo lhe
Iessons Iearned from earIier years. This has been necessary in order
lo ensure accuracy in Ianguages in vhich lhere has earIier been no
eslabIished cIear lerminoIogy for lhis !eId.
Irom Diclalorshi lo Democracy vas vrillen al lhe requesl
of lhe Iale I Tin Maung Win, a rominenl exiIe urmese democral
vho vas lhen edilor of Knii Pqcing (1nc Ncu |rc jcurnc|).
The rearalion of lhis lexl vas based over forly years of re-
search and vriling on nonvioIenl slruggIe, diclalorshis, lolaIilarian
syslems, resislance movemenls, oIilicaI lheory, socioIogicaI anaIysis,
and olher !eIds.
I couId nol vrile an anaIysis lhal had a focus onIy on urma,
87
as I did nol knov urma veII. Therefore, I had lo vrile a generic
anaIysis.
The essay vas originaIIy ubIished in inslaIImenls in Knii Pqcing
in urmese and LngIish in angkok, ThaiIand in 1993. Aflervards
il vas issued as a bookIel in bolh Ianguages (1994) and in urmese
again (1996 and 1997). The originaI bookIel edilions from angkok
vere issued vilh lhe assislance of lhe Commillee for lhe Resloralion
of Democracy in urma.
Il vas circuIaled bolh surreliliousIy inside urma and among
exiIes and symalhizers eIsevhere. This anaIysis vas inlended onIy
for use by urmese democrals and various elhnic grous in urma
lhal vanled indeendence from lhe urman-dominaled cenlraI
governmenl in Rangoon. (urmans are lhe dominanl elhnic grou
in urma.)
I did nol lhen envisage lhal lhe generic focus vouId make lhe
anaIysis olenliaIIy reIevanl in any counlry vilh an aulhorilarian
or diclaloriaI governmenl. Hovever, lhal aears lo have been lhe
ercelion by eoIe vho in recenl years have soughl lo lransIale
and dislribule il in lheir Ianguages for lheir counlries. SeveraI er-
sons have reorled lhal il reads as lhough il vas vrillen for lheir
counlry.
The SLRC miIilary diclalorshi in Rangoon vasled no lime
in denouncing lhis ubIicalion. Heavy allacks vere made in 1995
and 1996, and reorledIy conlinued in Ialer years in nevsaers,
radio, and leIevision. As Iale as 2OO5, ersons vere senlenced lo
seven-year rison lerms mereIy for being in ossession of lhe banned
ubIicalion.
AIlhough no efforls vere made lo romole lhe ubIicalion for
use in olher counlries, lransIalions and dislribulion of lhe ubIica-
lion began lo sread on lheir ovn. A coy of lhe LngIish Ianguage
edilion vas seen on disIay in lhe vindov of a bookslore in angkok
by a sludenl from Indonesia, vas urchased, and laken back home.
There, il vas lransIaled inlo Indonesian, and ubIished in 1997 by a
ma|or Indonesian ubIisher vilh an inlroduclion by Abdurrahman
Wahid. He vas lhen head of NadhIaluI IIama, lhe Iargesl MusIim
organizalion in lhe vorId vilh lhirly-!ve miIIion members, and Ialer
88 Gcnc Sncrp
Iresidenl of Indonesia.
During lhis lime, al my of!ce al lhe AIberl Linslein Inslilulion
ve onIy had a handfuI of holocoies from lhe angkok LngIish
Ianguage bookIel. Ior a fev years ve had lo make coies of il vhen
ve had enquiries for vhich il vas reIevanl. Laler, Marek ZeIaskievz,
from CaIifornia, look one of lhose coies lo eIgrade during MiIoso-
vic's lime and gave il lo lhe organizalion Civic Inilialives. They
lransIaled il inlo Serbian and ubIished il. When ve visiled Serbia
afler lhe coIIase of lhe MiIosevic regime ve vere loId lhal lhe book-
Iel had been quile in"uenliaI in lhe oosilion movemenl.
AIso imorlanl had been lhe vorksho on nonvioIenl slruggIe
lhal Roberl HeIvey, a relired IS Army coIoneI, had given in udaesl,
Hungary, for aboul lvenly Serbian young eoIe on lhe nalure and
olenliaI of nonvioIenl slruggIe. HeIvey aIso gave lhem coies of
lhe comIele 1nc Pc|iiics cj Ncntic|cni Aciicn. These vere lhe eoIe
vho became lhe lor organizalion lhal Ied lhe nonvioIenl slruggIe
lhal broughl dovn MiIosevic.
We usuaIIy do nol knov hov avareness of lhis ubIicalion has
sread from counlry lo counlry. Ils avaiIabiIily on our veb sile in
recenl years has been imorlanl, bul cIearIy lhal is nol lhe onIy faclor.
Tracing lhese conneclions vouId be a ma|or research ro|ecl.
Irom Diclalorshi lo Democracy is a heavy anaIysis and is nol
easy reading. Yel il has been deemed lo be imorlanl enough for al
Ieasl lvenly-eighl lransIalions (as of }anuary 2OO8) lo be reared,
aIlhough lhey required ma|or vork and exense.
TransIalions of lhis ubIicalion in rinl or on a veb sile incIude
lhe foIIoving Ianguages: Amharic (Llhioia), Arabic, Azeri (Azerbai-
|an), ahasa Indonesia, eIarusian, urmese, Chin (urma), Chinese
(simIi!ed and lradilionaI Mandarin), Dhivehi (MaIdives), Iarsi
(Iran), Irench, Georgian, German, }ing Iav (urma), Karen (urma),
Khmer (Cambodia), Kurdish, Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzslan), NeaIi, Iashlo
(Afghanislan and Iakislan), Russian, Serbian, Sanish, Tibelan,
Tigrinya (Lrilrea), Ikrainian, Izbek (Izbekislan), and Vielnamese.
SeveraI olhers are in rearalion.
elveen 1993 and 2OO2 lhere vere six lransIalions. elveen
2OO3 and 2OO8 lhere have been lvenly-lvo.
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 89
The greal diversily of lhe socielies and Ianguages inlo vhich
lransIalions have sread suorl lhe rovisionaI concIusion lhal lhe
ersons vho iniliaIIy encounler lhis documenl have seen ils anaIysis
lo be reIevanl lo lheir sociely.
Gene Shar
}anuary 2OO8
AIberl Linslein Inslilulion
oslon, Massachusells
90 Gcnc Sncrp
APPENDIX THREE
A Nntc Abnut Trans!atInns
and RcprIntIng nI thIs Pub!IcatInn
To faciIilale disseminalion of lhis ubIicalion il has been Iaced in
lhe ubIic domain. Thal means lhal anyone is free lo reroduce il
or disseminale il.
The aulhor, hovever, does have severaI requesls lhal he vouId
Iike lo make, aIlhough individuaIs are under no IegaI obIigalion lo
foIIov such requesls.
The aulhor requesls lhal no changes be made in lhe lexl, eilher
addilions or deIelions, if il is reroduced.
The aulhor requesls noli!calion from individuaIs vho inlend
lo reroduce lhis documenl. Noli!calion can be given lo lhe
AIberl Linslein Inslilulion (conlacl informalion aears in lhe
beginning of lhis ubIicalion immedialeIy before lhe TabIe of
Conlenls).
The aulhor requesls lhal if lhis documenl is going lo be lrans-
Ialed, greal care musl be laken lo reserve lhe originaI meaning
of lhe lexl. Some of lhe lerms in lhis ubIicalion viII nol lrans-
Iale readiIy inlo olher Ianguages, as direcl equivaIenls for non-
vioIenl slruggIe and reIaled lerms may nol be avaiIabIe. Thus,
carefuI consideralion musl be given lo hov lhese lerms and
concels are lo be lransIaled so as lo be underslood accuraleIy
by nev readers.
Ior individuaIs and grous lhal vish lo lransIale lhis vork,
lhe AIberl Linslein Inslilulion has deveIoed a slandard sel of lrans-
Ialion rocedures lhal may assisl lhem. They are as foIIovs:
A seIeclion rocess lakes Iace lo seIecl a lransIalor. Candi-
91
dales are evaIualed on lheir "uency in bolh LngIish and lhe
Ianguage inlo vhich lhe vork viII be lransIaled. Candidales
are aIso evaIualed on lheir generaI knovIedge surrounding lhe
sub|ecl area and lheir underslanding of lhe lerms and concels
resenl in lhe lexl.
An evaIualor is seIecled by a simiIar rocess. The evaIualor's
|ob is lo lhoroughIy reviev lhe lransIalion and lo rovide feed-
back and crilicism lo lhe lransIalor. Il is oflen beller if lhe lrans-
Ialor and evaIualor do nol knov lhe idenlilies of each olher.
nce lhe lransIalor and evaIualor are seIecled, lhe lransIalor
submils a samIe lransIalion of lvo or lhree ages of lhe lexl,
as veII as a Iisl of a number of signi!canl key lerms lhal are
resenl in lhe lexl.
The evaIualor evaIuales lhis samIe lransIalion and resenls
feedback lo lhe lransIalor.
If ma|or robIems exisl belveen lhe lransIalor's samIe lrans-
Ialion and lhe evaIualor's evaIualion of lhal lransIalion, lhen
eilher lhe lransIalor or lhe evaIualor may be reIaced, deend-
ing uon lhe |udgemenl of lhe individuaI or grou lhal is son-
soring lhe lransIalion. If minor robIems exisl, lhe lransIa-
lor roceeds vilh lhe fuII lransIalion of lhe lexl, keeing in mind
lhe commenls of lhe evaIualor.
nce lhe enlire lexl is lransIaled, lhe evaIualor evaIuales lhe
enlire lexl and gives feedback lo lhe lransIalor.
nce lhe lransIalor has considered lhis feedback and made
any necessary changes, lhe !naI version of lhe lexl is comIele and
lhe lransIaled book is ready lo be rinled and dislribuled.
92 Gcnc Sncrp
Fnr Furthcr RcadIng
1. 1nc Anii-Ccup by Gene Shar and ruce }enkins. oslon: The
AIberl Linslein Inslilulion, 2OO3.
2. Diciicncrq cj Citi|icn Sirugg|c. 1ccnnicc| 1crminc|cgq cj Ncntic-
|cni Aciicn cn! inc Ccnirc| cj Pc|iiicc| Pcucr by Gene Shar.
IubIicalion forlhcoming.
3. On Sircicgic Ncntic|cni Ccnj|ici. 1nin|ing A|cui inc |un!c-
mcnic|s by Roberl L. HeIvey. oslon: The AIberl Linslein Inslilu-
lion, 2OO2.
4. 1nc Pc|iiics cj Ncntic|cni Aciicn (3 voIs.) by Gene Shar. oslon:
Lxlending Horizons ooks, Iorler Sargenl IubIishers, 1973.
5. Sc|j-Ii|crciicn by Gene Shar vilh lhe assislance of }amiIa
Raqib. oslon: The AIberl Linslein Inslilulion, 2O1O.
6. Sccic| Pcucr cn! Pc|iiicc| |rcc!cm by Gene Shar. oslon: Lxlend-
ing Horizons ooks, Iorler Sargenl IubIishers, 198O.
7. 1ncrc Arc Rcc|isiic A|icrnciitcs by Gene Shar. oslon: The AIberl
Linslein Inslilulion, 2OO3.
8. Wcging Ncntic|cni Sirugg|c. 20in Ccniurq Prcciicc cn! 21si Ccniurq
Pcicniic| by Gene Shar. oslon: Lxlending Horizons ooks, Iorler
Sargenl IubIishers, 2OO5.
Ior order informalion, Iease conlacl:
The AIberl Linslein Inslilulion
I.. ox 455
Lasl oslon, MA O2128, ISA
TeI: ISA +1 617-247-4882
Iax: ISA +1 617-247-4O35
L-maiI: einsleinigc.org
Websile: vvv.aeinslein.org
|rcm Dicicicrsnip ic Dcmccrccq 93