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PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE G.R. 132988 PANGANIBAN; July 19, 2000 MINI

NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to (1) annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. FACTS - 1997- President Ramos issued AO 372 (pertinent portions included) -1998Preident Estrada amended section 4 reducing he amount withheld from LGUs to %% from 10%. - Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten10% of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6,
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Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. -The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation." ISSUES (a) WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; (b) WON Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments: are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. HELD Preliminary discussion (definition of crucial concepts): (a) the scope of the President's power of general supervision over local governments -Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general supervision. -(distinction between supervision an control) In Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not
by law or those already being undertaken on a regular basis; i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by law; and j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities. 3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs 4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities 5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems 6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.

"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998 WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum; WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with available resources; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct: SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, governmentowned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas: 1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on the following: a. Operationalization of new agencies; b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions; c. Filling of positions; and d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source. 2. Suspension of the following activities: a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted out; b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles; c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings funded by grants; d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments in the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet; e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions and agencies in the performance of their regular functions and those that are funded by grants; f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and those involving regular competitions/events; g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from government received by the person concerned; h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required

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followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them (b) the extent of the local governments' autonomy -Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy -(difference between autonomy and decentralization) -in Limbona v. Mangelin as follows: "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency." 1. YES -Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. -Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals -However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally. -There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. -Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments -While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. - the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. 2. NO -A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning -Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

Page 26 Nature of Power of Eminent Domain as Exercised by LGUs

BELUSO v MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ) 498 SCRA 113 Aug 7, 2006; AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ KOOKY
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - The Belusos owned parcels of land covered by Free Patent, and which became the subject of Resolution No. 95-29 issued by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay on Nov 8, 1995. The Resolution authorized the municipal government through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings. - The Belusos filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for expropriation, alleging that the taking is not for public use but for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically motivated as they voted against the incumbent officials; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries had not actually or freely signed the petition. RTC denied the MTD and declared the expropriation for public use and that the municipality had the lawful right to take the property upon payment of just compensation. - RTC issued an order appointing three persons as Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the property. The Belusos filed a motion to hold the meeting of the commissioners in abeyance. This was denied by the RTC. - The Belusos filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, claiming that they were denied due process. They subsequently filed a Memorandum where they argued that based on the Petition for Expropriation filed by the Municipality, such expropriation was based only on a resolution and not an ordinance, contrary to Sec 19 of RA 7160 (LGC), and that there was no valid and definite offer to buy the property as the price offered was very low. The CA dismissed the petition. ISSUE WON the expropriation, exercised by means of a resolution and not ordinance as required by law, is valid. (NOTE: even if the objection was belatedly raised by the Belusos, the SC considered it since the fact upon which it is based is apparent from the petition for expropriation itself.)

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HELD NO. - A local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its law making body. RA 7160 (LGC) expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution will not suffice. As held in Municipality on Paranaque v V.M. Realty Corp, xxx An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. Sec 192 of RA 7160 requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. xxx - Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subjects to its control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent ut inferior since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation
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and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principals will or modify the same. - Several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec 9, Art III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. - On July 2000, the Cebu City SP passed an ordinance (Ordinance 1843) which authorized the initiation of expropriation proceedings for Lot 1029. - The Lagcaos filed an action seeking to declare Ordinance 1843 unconstitutional which was dismissed by the TC. Petitioners Claim: - Ordinance 1843 is unconstitutional insofar as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters. This is violative of the concept of public use as it will only benefit a handful of people. ISSUE WON the intended expropriation of Lot 1029 through Ordinance 1843 is unconstitutional HELD YES, Ordinance 1843 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is violative of the Lagcaos right to due process Ratio Local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Reasoning - The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the expropriation of a private individuals property. The courts cannot even adopt a hands-off policy simply because public use or public purpose is invoked by an ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and determined. - Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project. - RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing. - Sec. 9 provides for the order of acquiring lands for socialized housing: (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

Limitations
LAGCAO V LABRA 440 SCRA 279 CORONA; October 13, 2004 AIDA
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - In 1964, Cebu province donated 210 lots to Cebu City. One of these lots was Lot 1029 found in Capitol Hills. - The Lagcaos purchased this lot in 1965 and payment was to be made by installments. However, later that year, the lots were reverted back to Cebu province, including Lot 1029. - Cebu province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 to the Lagcaos which prompted the petitioners to file an action for specific performance in the Cebu CFI. - In 1986, the CFI ruled (later affirmed by the CA) in the Lagcaos favor and ordered Cebu City to execute the final deed of sale. A TCT was later issued in favor of the Lagcaos and Crispina Lagcao. - When the Lagcaos tried to take possession of the property, they saw that it was filled with squatters. An ejectment proceeding was instituted by the Lagcaos which was granted by the MTCC and affirmed by the RTC, the latter issuing a writ of execution and an order of demolition. - The MTCC suspended the demolition for 120 days in response to a request by Cebu City Mayor Garcia because the city was still looking for a relocation site. - However during the suspension period, the Cebu City Sangguniang Panlungsod passed a resolution which

Sec 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take the possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

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(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and (f) Privately-owned lands - Sec. 10 states that that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. - In the case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice JBL. Reyes vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the abovequoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. - Nothing in the records indicates that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9. Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. There was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. - For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Disposition Petition granted. FACTS - The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig. - The residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. - The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of the Ching Cuancos which is abutting E. R. Santos Street. - The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. - The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. - The municipality filed a complaint, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of the Local Government Code. - The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. - The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. - The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiffs motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. - The plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property. - Plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with called Damayan Street. - JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted. - During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiffs messenger, testified on direct examination that on February 23, 1993, he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store. - The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property to the co-owners. However, the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy. - RTC: plaintiff as having a lawful right to take the property in question for purposes for which the same is expropriated. As gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance

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with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid. - CA: affirmed the order of the RTC. Plaintiff substantially complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, particularly the requirement that a valid and definite offer must be made to the owner. The letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot, was a substantial compliance with the valid and definite offer requirement under said Section 19. - CA noted that there was also constructive notice to the defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579. It upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks. - CA denied MR: It was not precluded from considering the photocopy of the letter, notwithstanding that the same was excluded by the trial court, since the fact of its existence was duly established by corroborative evidence. ISSUES 1. WON the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint 2. WON property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent 3. WON the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with HELD Right of Eminent Domain - usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. - an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. - provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit the power which would, otherwise, be without limit. - Our Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards

Requisites
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. V MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF PASIG, 466 SCRA235, 253 AUGUST 9, 2005; CALLEJO, SR. LORA

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against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power. - exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. - Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. - When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained. - the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. - The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 1. NO. - The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer (Art 35 IRR of LGC) to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. - An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offerors promise into a contractual obligation. - The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. - The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. - A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. - The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property. - However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face. - The respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. - The respondent offered the letter only to prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-ofway. The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho. - Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom he failed to identify. He stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and later gave the letter back to him bearing the signature purportedly of one Luz Bernarte. However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination, that he did not see Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter. - Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the coowners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties. - There is no legal and factual basis to the CAs ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the

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dorsal portion of petitioners TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer. - A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. - Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos. - Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road, a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property. - In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. - The Ching Cuancos specifically denied such allegation for want of sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to its correctness. 2. YES. Court rejected the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. - Manosca v. CA citing Sea v. Manila Railroad Co.: The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use. 3. YES. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code.

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Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. - Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. - The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. - Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere. - The whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondents complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims. - There is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Disposition Petition GRANTED. from placing obstructions and closing the the Poblacion-Tomana-Canyakan barrio road and to allow plaintiff barrio to remove the obstructions and repair the barrio road so as to enable convenient passage through it. Later, Barrio Matictic filed MTD on the ground that an expropriation proceeding, not an injunction, is the better remedy. Judge Geraldez granted the motion. -However, a complaint for Eminent Domain involving the same property was filed by the Municipality of Norzagaray with the same court. The defendants filed MTD alleging lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of cause of action and plaintiff municipalitys lack of capacity to sue. Their principal contention is that the plaintiff municipality, in the absence of an approval from the Office of the President, may not properly file the subject expropriation case. -The municipality later filed an amended complaint alleging that it had obtained authority from the Office of the President to institute expropriation proceedings. Defendants filed their MTD anew, arguing on plaintiff's lack of cause of action and asserting that a subsequent authorization would not cure the jurisdictional defect attaching to the plaintiff's complaint when the subject case was initially filed. -The court ordered the plaintiff municipality to submit plans of the land to be expropriated, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. For failure to comply with this order, the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. -Upon appeal, CA ordered CFI Bulacan to proceed with the expropriation case pursuant to Rule 67.3 of the Rules of Court. At this point however, the Norzagaray mayor displayed reluctance to prosecute the case. In fact, he requested the Municipal Council to withdraw the expropriation proceedings. The Municipal Council, however, refused to accede to the wishes of the mayor. -Brgy Matictic, chagrined and confronted by the attitude of its mayor, filed a Motion for Intervention grounded on its averment that the result of the expropriation case will greatly affect the social and economic development of the area. This motion was noted by CFI Bulacans Judge Elbinias. -Without taking any further action on the motion for intervention, Judge Elbinias issued an order dismissing, without prejudice, the expropriation case, on the singular reason that at the time the expropriation case was initially filed there was no showing of any prior Presidential approval - a requisite that should have been first complied with, pursuant to Section 2245 of the Revised Administrative Code. -Plaintiff municipalitys MFR was denied. It no longer appealed. -Barangay Matictic filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus, praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the lower court to allow and admit the petitioner's complaint in intervention. ISSUE WON mandamus lies. (WON the complaint admitted) in

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intervention should be

HELD: NO -Proper party to appeal or seek a review of the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings would be the Municipality of Norzagaray. Barrio Matictic, which is a different political entity, and although a part and parcel of the aforesaid municipality, has no legal personality to question the aforestated orders because by itself, it may not continue the expropriation case. Since the municipality did not appeal, the dismissal of the expropriation case became final and there is no more proceeding wherein Barangay Matictic may possibly intervene. The dismissal of the expropriation case has no less the inherent effect of also dismissing the motion for intervention which is but the unavoidable consequence. -Nothing is lost to the petitioner. If at all petitioner can rightfully establish that it is allowed by law to institute a separate and independent action of its own, then there would be no necessity for it to intervene in the case initiated by the Municipality of Norzagaray which is now apparently no longer interested in continuing the expropriation proceedings. The dismissal of the expropriation case was without prejudice. The municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan can revive its action. There is no need for the proposed intervention of Barrio Matictic. What it may do is to urge the municipality to file its case anew. If the Barangay has obtained authority for itself to pursue the action of eminent domain, then the more reason there is to refuse its intervention. Disposition Petition denied for lack of merit.

LGU to Exercise Power Without Need of Government Approval

BRGY MATICTIC VS. JUDGE ELBINIAS AND SPS SERAPIO 148 SCRA 83 ALAMPAY; FEBRUARY 27, 1987 MARGE
FACTS -Barrio Matictic filed with CFI Bulacan an action for injunction against the Sps Serapio to enjoin the latter

Necessity of Taking
MASIKIP V CITY OF PASIG 479 SCRA 391 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; JANUARY 23, 2006 ANTON
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari assailing a decision of the CA. FACTS

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- Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip (MASIKIP) is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at PagAsa, Caniogan, Pasig City. - In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the City of Pasig (PASIG, then a municipality) notified MASIKIP of its intention to expropriate a 1,500-sq. m portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to an ordinance enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. - March 23, 1994: PASIG wrote MASIKIP another letter, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." - MASIKIP sent a reply stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." - PASIG reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of MASIKIPs property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents." - February 21, 1995: PASIG filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. MASIKIP filed a Motion to Dismiss. - Trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE(S) 1. WON Motion to Dismiss was appropriate responsive pleading. 2. WON genuine necessity for expropriation was established. HELD 1. YES. Reasoning The rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service. - The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendants property for the use specified in the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiffs attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading. 2. NO Ratio The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Reasoning Records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. MASIKIPs lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. - There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this. Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the expropriation. - Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT: - The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. - Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise. SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the

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power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. Disposition Petition for review is granted. Decision of the CA is reversed.

Just Compensation
EPZA V DULAY 149 SCRA 305 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.; APRIL 29, 1987 GERALD AZURA
NATURE Petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order against the CFI of Cebu FACTS - The President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a parcel of land of the public domain in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority. The proclamation included 4 parcels of land owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. EPZA offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation in Sec. 92, PD 464, as amended. They failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. - The petitioner filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones. The respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises. - The respondent judge declared the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The judge also issued a 2nd order, subject of this petition, appointing

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commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. - Petitioner filed an MFR and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that PD 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. The motion was denied. The petitioner filed the present petition. - The petitioner maintains that under P.D. No. 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. ISSUE/S 1. WON the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is valid and constitutional HELD 1. NO Ratio The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Reasoning Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners. The strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the city assessor long before martial law, when land was much cheaper and assessed values of properties were stated at a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. On just compensation: Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. Disposition PD 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. The petition is DISMISSED.

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Ratio Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.). Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. Reasoning The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution 2. NO Reasoning It is true that have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. However, no such restrictions are present in this case. The CA relies on Sec 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads: Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years frm its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation. - The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award." The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the

No Need for DAR Authority

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V CA 222 SCRA 173 QUIASON; MAY 17, 1993 MONCH
FACTS - The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Governor Villafuerte then filed 2 cases for expropriation against Ernesto and Efren San Joaquin before the RTC. - The San Joaquin moved to dismiss the case on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. It was denied by the RTC and granted the Provinces motion of issuance of rit of possession - The San Joaquins filed a petition before the CA to set aside such order. The Province claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. The Solicitor General, in its comment, stated that under Sec 9 of the LGC, there is no need for approval by the Office of the President for the exercise of eminent domain by the SP. However, it is of the view that the Province must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. - The CA set aside the order of the RTC and ordered that the expropriation proceedings be suspended until the Province has obtained the approval of the DAR. ISSUE/S 1. WON the expropriation is for a public purpose 2. WON there is a need for prior approval before the Province can exercise the power of eminent domain HELD 1. YES

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applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with. Reasoning Sec. 19 of the LGC provides that, Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws Municipality of Paranaque contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority on the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. It seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. But the court disagrees. - The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. - In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. - The Court is not convinced by V.M. Realtys insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different

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from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. - If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.

Ordinance or Law Necessary

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE V. V.M. REALTY CORP G.R. No. 127820 PANGANIBAN; July 20, 1998 AJANG
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Municipality of Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land located in Eakas, San Dionisio Paranaque. Allegedly, it was for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. RTC authorized the petitioner to take possession of the subject property. V.M. Realty filed an aswer containing an affirmative defense and counterclaim alleging that the main complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code and the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Thus, the trial court issued a resolution nullifying its first order and dismissed the case. ISSUES 1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action. 2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved HELD: 1. NO A resolution is different from an ordinance. Ratio The right of the municipality of Paranaque to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However, such right may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Paraaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action. - A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of

Foreshore Lands
CHAVEZ V PEA, AMARI G.R. NO. 133250 CARPIO; MAY 6, 2003 REAN
NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS SCs decision on July 9, 2002 is summarized as follows: [a] The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Consti and existing laws. [b] The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. Govt can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the govt can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. [c] Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Sec 3, Art. XII of 1987 Consti which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

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[d] Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Sec 2, Art. XII of 1987 Consti which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the govt can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Sec. 3, Art. XII of1987 Constit which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain ISSUES 1 WON the Amended JVA is unconstitutional 2 WON the Decision should be made to apply prospectively, not retroactively to cover the Amended JVA HELD 1 YES - Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Art. XII of 1987 Consti. Under A409 of CC, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Consti, and thus declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. 2 NO - Amari argues that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached, citing De Agbayani v. PNB. Amari also asserts that a new doctrine of the Court cannot operate retroactively if it impairs vested rights. Amari maintains that the new doctrine embodied in the Decision cannot apply retroactively on those who relied on the old doctrine in good faith, citing Sps Benzonan v. CA - Amaris reliance on De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is misplaced. These cases would apply if the prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended JVA was that a private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and the Decision annulled the law or reversed this doctrine. Obviously, this is not the case here. - The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is one of 2 main reasons why the Decision annulled the Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. Clearly, the Decision merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any existing judicial doctrine. - Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the Decision does not overrule existing law or doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of 1973 Consti, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be sold to private corporations. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the ban to include any alienable land of the public domain. - There are, of course, SC decisions which, while recognizing a violation of the law or Constitution, hold that the sale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated because of "weighty considerations of equity and social justice. The invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or constitutional ban has been achieved. But none of these cases apply to Amari. - Thus, SC has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Phil. citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. In the instant case, however, Amari has not transferred the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact, Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA. - The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of the land may no longer be questioned under the principle of res judicata, provided the reqts for res judicata are present. Under this principle, the courts and the parties are bound by a prior final decision, otherwise therell be no end to litigation. As SC ruled in Toledo-Banaga v. CA "once a judgement has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be." In the instant case, there is no prior final decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari. Disposition Motions for Reconsideration without merit, and hereby DENIED with FINALITY

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CRUZ; March 18, 1991 JAVI
FACTS 1969- Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158: RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of this province to traffic effective October 31, 1969, and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties. The province thus conveyed portions of the closed road to those affected by the resolution, in exchange for their own properties on which was laid a new concrete road leading to the Capitol Building. The portions of the old road fronting petitioners house were plated to vegetables and converted into a piggery farm Petitioner filed a complaint with the CFi of Catanduanes for Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages., alleging that the land fronting his house was a public road owned y the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He said Resolution No. 158 ad the deeds of exchange were invalid, as was the closure of the northern portion of the road. Both the CFI and the CA upheld Resolution 158. CA said that Pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, municipal authorities can close, subject to the approval or direction of the Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. Although in this case the road was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by the provincial board of Catanduanes, the closure, nevertheless, is valid since it was ordered by the approving authority itself. However, while it could do so, the provincial government of Catanduanes could close the road only if the persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code being very explicit on this. petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because Resolution No. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. He maintains that the public road was owned by the province in its governmental capacity and, without a prior order of closure, could not be the subject of a barter. Control over public roads, he insists, is with Congress and not with the provincial board ISSUES WON the provincial board has authority to close the road and use it or convey it for other purposes

Jurisdiction to Order Closure

CABRERA V. CA 195 SCRA 314

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HELD YES - The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the following provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code: R.A. No. 5185, Section 11 (II) (a): II. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils, as provided for in the pertinent sections of the Revised Administrative Code shall take effect without the need of approval or direction from any official of the national government: Provided, That such actions shall be subject to approval or direction by the Provincial Board: (a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246; xxx xxx xxx Sec. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. With the prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed. - also, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads. Dispositive CA decision affirmed -Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al: they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. On Oct 4, 2005, a rally KMU cosponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. Further, on Oct 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa in front of UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. 3 other rallyists were arrested. -All petitioners assail BP 880 as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. [SEE ORIG FOR BP 880 AND CPR. I WILL ONLY INCLUDE HERE THE PART ABOUT FREEDOM PARKS] ISSUES 1. WON BP 880 is constitutional 2. WON CPR is constitutional and legal. HELD 1. YES. Reasoning BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of BP 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal

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Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. "Public" does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard - the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6a. The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6c substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time: Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision. The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course. If this is so, the degree of observance of BP 880s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park w/in 6 months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986. Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the laws system of regulation of the peoples exercise of their right

Freedom Parks
BAYAN V ERMITA GR 169838 AZCUNA; APRIL 25, 2006 BRI
FACTS -Bayan, et al: citizens and taxpayers; their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when their rally (Oct 6, 2005) was violently dispersed by policemen implementing BP 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985.) -Jess del Prado, et al: 26 individual petitioners; they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action (Sep 26, 2005) was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. Also, on Oct 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.

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to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after 30 days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Sec 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings. 2. NO. Reasoning In an affidavit by Sec. Ermita, he said that CPR is in consonance with the legal definition of "maximum tolerance" under Sec 3c of BP 880, which is the "highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same." Unfortunately, "maximum tolerance" has acquired a different meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. Others felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular connotation of "maximum tolerance" has departed from its real essence under BP 880. SC rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by BP 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance. CPR has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

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(Par. 8, Art. III, Chapter I, Part X, Integrated Reorganization Plan) and in lieu thereof, the Board of Transportation was created with broader jurisdiction, power and authority (Par. (a), No. 4, Article III, Chapter I, Part X the power of the Board of Transportation to issue certificate of public convenience for the operation of water transportation utilities is absolute and without any qualification. Respondents argue that the judicial decisions relied upon and invoked by the petitioner were rendered prior to the effectivity of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, and, therefore, the pronouncements therein made are no longer governing. Respondents claim that the earlier court rulings would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the prescribed Integrated Reorganization Plan creating the Board of Transportation in substitution of the former Public Service Commission. Accordingly, private respondents contend that the Board of Transportation has the jurisdiction and authority to grant a certification of public convenience for the operation of a motor boat ferry service within the territorial jurisdiction of a municipality, without need for an indorsing resolution from the municipality concerned - In resolving this petition, two sets of legal provisions are to be considered: (1) Under Article XX, Chapter 57, Title IX, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code, entitled "Conduct of Certain Public Utilities," Sections 2318-2320 provide that a municipal council shall have authority to acquire or establish municipal ferries; that the municipal authorities may either conduct said public utility upon account of the municipality or let it be a private party who is the highest and best bidder for a period of one year, or upon the previous approval of the Provincial Board, for a longer period not exceeding five years. (2) Under Paragraph (a)-(c) No. 4, Article III, Chapter I, Part X of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (Presidential Decree No. 1), the functions of the respondent Board of Transportation are as follows: a.) IIssue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of public land, water and air transportation utilities and services such as motor vehicles, railroad lines, domestic and overseas water carriers, domestic and international air carriers and similar public utilities; b.) Establish,prescribe and regulate routes,zones and/or areas of operation of particular operators of public land, water and air service transports; and determine fix and/or prescribe fares, charges and/or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where fares, charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such fares, charges, or rates; c.) Establish, fix, and/or prescribe rules, regulations, standards and specifications in all cases related to the

Proprietary Function
MUNICIPALITY OF ECHAGUE V. ABELLERA 146 SCRA 180 ALAMPAY; December 12, 1986 MINI
FACTS - Since 1936, petitioner municipality through its Sangguniang Bayan had been operating a municipal ferry service traversing the Cagayan River, within its municipality. Petitioner either operated the ferry service itself, or leased the operation of the same to the highest bidder. - in 1977, private respondent Ballad furnished petitioner a copy of a decision by the BoT granting Ballad a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a two-motor boat service for public transportation of passengers and freight across the Cagayan River, within the municipality of Echague. Ballad gave notice that he would start his boat service operation in 1978 and the municipality had to stop its own ferry boat service within his routes. - Petitioner never heard of the application of Ballad with the BoT to operate the ferry service - Petitioner contends a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Echague favorably indorsing to the respondent Board, Ballads application for a CPC to operate the ferry service, is a jurisdictional prerequisite before respondent Board can award a CPC to Ballad. Since there was no such favorable indorsement, the Board issued a CPC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE WON an indorsing resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan is a requisite before the respondent Board may award a certificate of public covenience HELD YES - in previous cases, it has been held that "a private party desiring to operate a municipal ferry service should first be awarded by the municipality the right to operate the service before he could file an application for a certificate of permit with the Public Service Commission." - The Court does not subscribe to the theory of the private respondent that with the Integrated Reorganization Plan mandated by Presidential Decree No. 1 and promulgated on September 24, 1972, wherein the Public Service Commission was abolished

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issued Certificates of Public Convenience; and administer and enforce the same through the Bureau of Transportation of the Department and appropriate police or enforcement agencies of the Government. We hold that the specific jurisdiction and authority given by Sections 2318-2320 of the Revised Administrative Code to a municipality to operate or lease the ferry service within its own territorial limits should prevail. The grant of supervision and authority by Administrative Code to municipalities or municipal councils over public utilities such as municipal ferries, markets, etc. is specific, and undoubtedly was "intended to provide an additional source of revenue to municipal corporations for their maintenance and operation" (Municipality of Gattaran vs. Elizaga, 91 Phil. 440) On the other hand, the authority conferred on the respondent Board of Transportation was intended principally to insure and safeguard the convenience, comfort and safety of the public. - We decline to accept the proposition that the operation of the ferry being then exercised by petitioner municipality, pursuant to clear provisions of the law, was removed by a general reorganization plan which-was intended only to indicate the agency which would supervise or regulate the operation of public services. The provisions of the Revised Administrative Code which grant to the municipal council of Sangguniang Bayan the power to acquire or establish municipal ferries, are different and should be distinguished from the authority of the Board of Transportation to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience. While the establishment of a municipal ferry is first given to a municipality, ferry service will nevertheless be subject to the supervision and control of the Board of Transportation. The winner in a public bidding conducted by the municipal council obtains the privilege to operate the ferry service, but he has to apply for a Certificate of Public Convenience from the Board of Transportation which then has the duty to regulate the operation, route, rates to be charged, as well as specify the kind of equipment to be used for the comfort, convenience and safety of the public using the ferry. - Both Sangguniang Bayan and the Board of Transportation, in effect, act in concert with each other. They do not usurp nor appropriate functions particularly given to the other. Dispositive CPC issued to Ballad declared null and void FACTS - A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. - The heirs of the deceased Laureano Bania Sr. instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney in the CFI of San Fernando, La Union. However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and the driver of its dump truck. The Complaint was later amended wherein the Municipality and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. - The Municipality filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the Collision. Judge Firme however, deferred the resolution of the grounds for the MTD until the trial. - Subsequently however, judgment was rendered against the Municipality and Alfredo Bislig but the complaint was dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot. ISSUE WON the Municipality is liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. HELD NO. Ratio The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Reasoning The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution: "the State may not be sued without its consent." - Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State

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files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. - Municipal corporations like provinces and cities are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. - A distinction should be made between suability and liability. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. - Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise, a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power. - It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. - In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the driver of the dump truck is presumed to be performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

Suability of LGUs
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO V. JUDGE FIRME 195 SCRA 692 MEDIALDEA; APRIL 8, 1991 RICKY

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- Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CFI is modified, absolving the municipality of any liability. supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer. ISSUES WON the City of Dagupan has control or supervision over a national road HELD YES -Under Art 21893, it is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. - This control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties: Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the following duties: (j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the public sewer system. - The charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located. - The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, cannot be used to exempt the city. The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand Art 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works." - The city cannot be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said provincial road belongs
3

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more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than as a city officer. This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. - There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear. Dispositive CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded.

GUILATCO V CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO; MARCH 21, 1989 JOEY
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Guilatco, while about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. - She incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses. From the time of the mishap, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty in going up the stairs of her office. Thus, she has been deprived of her income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several pounds and is no longer her former jovial self. She has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. - She filed an action for the recovery of damages against the city of Dagupan and Alfred Tangco, the City Engineer. - Tangco admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. He also admitted that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened. - Trial court held the City of Dagupan liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as for attorneys fees. - CA reversed on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard. - The city contends that Perez Boulevard is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or

Invalid Contracts
CITY OF MANILA V. TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORP. 24 SCRA 466 (1968) REYES, J.B.L; July 31, 1968 KIDEL CRUZ
NATURE 3 separate appeals FACTS -2 parcels of land were reclaimed from the Bay of Manila and given to the City of Manila by authority of Act 1360, enacted on 26 June 1905, by the Philippine Commission. -Subsequently, these parcels were brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, in the name of the City, per its Original Certificate of Title No. 1909. -The City of Manila conveyed one of these parcels to Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks (BPOE), subject to the following conditions: 1) that this land parcel with the improvements raised in the same will be free of contribution by a period of 10 years from the 20 of February of 1909; 2) that the completed the breakwater adjacent to the parcel would be preserved and repaired without expenses on the part of the City of Manila and that no wharf be built on the property; and 3) that the City of Manila has, at its option, to repurchase any time the said property for public use or after fifty years from the July 13, 1911, upon payment original price of the sale of the land plus the value of the improvement.) The foregoing conditions were annotated on the transferee's TCTs. -Subsequently, the City of Manila also conveyed the second parcel to the Army and Navy Club of Manila, subject to the following conditions: 1.) That the said property with the existing improvements is exempted

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

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from contribution for a period of 10 years from the date from the City Engrs certification. 2.) That no wharf be constructed in front or contiguous to the property or parcel of land. 3.) That this land property or parcel was only used for aims of club only and by clubs of social or recreational kind and by the people and for the aims of the govt. 4.) That the City of Manila has the option at any time repurchase this land parcel for aims public after 50 years from the Sept. 20 1918 upon payment of the original price of the sale of the land plus the value of the improvement. The foregoing conditions were likewise annotated on the transferees TCT. -The charter of the Army and Navy Club expired on 25 June 1958 and its members formed the American Club, Inc., which was later renamed as the Army and Navy Club of Manila, Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9332 was thus cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51988 in the name of the new corporation and entry No. 18115/T-9332 was carried over to the new certificate of title. -Then Mayor Arsenio Lacson of Manila advised the BPOE that the City of Manila will exercise its right to repurchase the BPOE land. The city fiscal, however, believed that the City did not have any cause of action, because, in his opinion, the right of the City to reacquire the property could not extend beyond 10 years from and after the original conveyance, as provided by Article 1508 of the Civil Code. -BPOE filed a petition for the cancellation of the right of the City to repurchase the property as annotated in the TCT. The Army and Navy Club also filed a similar petition. Both the petitioners invoked the opinion of the city fiscal that Manila can no longer exercise the option. Despite notice to it, the City of Manila did not appear or oppose the petitions for cancellation. -The lower court granted the petitions and the Register of Deeds made the corresponding entries of cancellation. -BPOE, supposedly a non-profit entity, sold the parcel of land that it held to Tarlac Development Corporation for P4.7 M under certain conditions. - the City of Manila, filed two petitions for the reannotation of the entries that were ordered cancelled and, after hearing, the court issued granted the petitions. This order is now contested in these appeals. ISSUE WON the court a quo erred in decreeing the reannotation of the entries in the TCTs. (Both BPOE and Tarlac Devt Corp claim res judicata.) HELD No. - There are at least two reasons why this claim can not be sustained: (1) Both the City and the BPOE entertained the view that this stipulation was void in so far as it exceeded the ten-year period fixed for repurchase in sales a retro by A1508 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, then in force (now Article 1606 of the new Civil Code). This conformity led the City not to file any opposition to the appellant's petition for an order to delete the entry of the City's option, as annotated in their certificates of title. The court's 1963 order granting such deletion was, in fact and in law, a judgment by consent. -But the rule is clear, and it is supported by abundant authority, that a consent decree, in which the officials of a municipality assumed obligations not authorized by law, is null and void (Kelley vs. Milane etc.). Thus, the fact that, by consent of the municipal officers, an agreement or stipulation made by them has been put in the form of a judgment, in an effort to give it the force and effect of a judgment, does not cure a lack of power in the officers to make it, and if such power is lacking, the judgment as well as the stipulation is void (St. Paul v. Chicago). - Consent judgments, are in effect, merely contracts of parties, acknowledged in open court, and ordered to be recorded. As such, they bind the parties themselves thereto as fully as other judgments; but, when parties act in a representative capacity, such judgments do not bind the cestui que trustent, unless the trustees had authority to act; and when (as in the present case) the parties to the action, the town authorities, had, as appears above, no authority to issue the bonds, their honest belief, however great, that they had such power, would not authorize them to acquire such power, and bind the town by consenting to a judgment. It is not a question of a fraudulent judgment, but a void judgment for want of authority to consent to a decree to bind principals (the tax payers), for whom they had no authority to create an indebtedness by consenting to a judgment any more than they would have had by issuing bonds. If authorized to create the indebtedness, either the bonds or the consent judgment would be equally an estoppel, but, as they had no such authority, neither bonds nor judgment is binding on the tax payers." (Union Bank of Richmond v. Oxford) -Did the officials of the City of Manila have power and authority to agree to the deletion of the entry in appellant's certificates of title, and eliminate therefrom the right reserved to the City to repurchase the land in question "for public purposes only" at any time after 50 years from 13 July 1911, upon payment to the buyer or its successors of the original price of the sale of the land plus the value of the improvements? . ->The City of Manila cannot be prevented from exercising its power of eminent domain for it does not arise from contract, nor can it be barred by prescription. In fact, it would exist without any reservation or stipulation at all. -> The elimination of this part of the contractual reservation in favor of the City commits the latter to pay the actual market value of the land at the time of

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expropriation. Considering the uninterrupted rise in real estate values, it can be readily seen that by consenting to the deletion of the annotation the City of Manila was made, in effect, to donate to the BPOE, or its successor-in-interest, Tarlac Development Corporation, the difference between the original price at which the land was sold to the BPOE in 1911 and the market price of the land at the time the City decided to reaquire it for public purposes. It requires no argument to show that the City executive officers had no power to bind the City to a stipulation so unfavorable to its interests, and so prejudicial to its taxpayers. They so far exceeded their powers as to taint the settlement and judgments with constructive fraud, and this, though less reprehensible, can be no less fatal to the validity of the judgment than actual fraud. (State ex rel. Bradway vs. De Mattos). (2) A further reason for this Court to deny the effect of res judicata lies in the fact that proceedings under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act presuppose unanimity among the parties; hence, the said 1963 order of the Land Registration Court lacks the quality of being an adjudication on the merits of a controversy, that is an essential requisite of res judicata (Rule 39, section 49), since there was no controversy resolved by the Court. And this was never truer than in the case at bar, where the decree of cancellation of the entry was, in fact, the result of an agreement between the parties, being a judgment by consent, as previously shown. -At any rate, since the 1963 order to cancel the entry originally annotated on the back of the certificates of title of appellant BPOE reserving the right of the City of Manila to reacquire the property after 50 years from the original conveyance to said appellant was, and is, null and void, as previously shown, such nullity should necessarily result in the reannotation of the deleted entries on said certificates of title of the BPOE, as well as on the other transfer certificates derived therefrom, including that of the Tarlac Development Corporation, as transferee of the BPOE, subject to the right of said Development Corporation to sue for cancellation of the annotation on its own certificates (T.C.T. No. 73444 of Manila) as hereinafter reserved. The subsequent order of reannotation must also be done on the TCT of the Army and Navy Club. Rights of the Tarlac Development Corporation: Whether the Tarlac Development Corporation is entitled to hold the property (covered by T.C.T. No. 73444) free from the reserved rights of reacquisition of the City of Manila, on account of its claim of being a purchaser in good faith, involves essentially a question of fact. The right is reserved to TDC to initiate a distinct action where its rights may be fully clarified and determined; but the reannotation order should be made effective on Tarlac's Certificate of Title No. 73444, as a preventive measure to protect

LocGov A2010
the eventual rights of the City of Manila against the claims of future transferees. Dispositive: The appealed orders of the Land Registration Court decreeing the reannotation are hereby affirmed, subject only to the right reserved to the Tarlac Development Corporation, to bring another action for the clarification of its rights, as stated in the body of this opinion exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. - In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. - Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body, - Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. - Heads of political subdivisions are subject to Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised w/in sphere of legit powers. - President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. - LBC 55 is also void bec of lack of publication. 2. NO. - Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. - Just because Mandaue City's locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the city's own revenues.

Page 40
FELICIANO, J. INA
FACTS The OIC Mayor of Marawi City, Basman, issued a memo to all heads of offices re the immediate transfer of the offices from the old capitol bldg to the new one. Radia was the City Engineer of Marawi City. The OIC Mayor, Basman, terminated his appointment for insubordination and appointed a new person to the position. Radia protested his termination to the Civil Service Commission regional director. CSC affirmed OIC mayors termination of Radias appointment. The Review Committee, headed by the Minister of Justice, also affirmed the OIC Mayors action. Radia showed that he was on vacation and sick leave when the memo was issued. He reported to work after his leave, but wasnt able to show where he reported. ISSUE WON the termination of Radias appointment as City Engineer should be declared null and void HELD NO. - The organic law in effect at that time (Provisional Constitution) did not require the existence of any cause for removal or termination of any of the elective and appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution. This being so, petitioner was lawfully terminated from his position as City Engineer of Marawi City upon the designation or appointment and qualification of petitioner's successor. - Although the Provisional Constitution did not require any ground or cause for removal as above pointed out, the Government, in an act of auto-limitation and "to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel in the Career Civil Service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New Government," issued Executive Order No. 17 dated 28 May 1986, which enumerated certain grounds for the separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. - The Review Committee held that petitioner's persistent failure to comply with lawful orders of respondent Basman fell within Ground No. 5 of Executive Order No. 17. - Petitioner contends that under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 17, it is the "Ministry Head concerned" who is authorized to determine who may be separated from the service, and that the OIC Mayor is not "Head of a Ministry" and, therefore, without power to terminate the petitioner. This argument does not persuade. The Solicitor General has pointed out that although heads of local governments like provincial governors and municipal mayors may be under the supervision of the Secretary of Local Government.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

DADOLE V. COA 393 SCRA 262 DEC 3, 2002 CHRISCAPS
FACTS - RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue rcvd monthly allowances of P1260 ea. Mandaue increased it to P1500 for ea judge. - DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55). Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to petitioner judges, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. They were also asked to reimburse. - Judges filed w/ Office of City Auditor a protest. Auditor treated the protest as MFR and indorsed the same to COA regional office. COA denied petitioners MFR. - Petitioner judges said that LBC 55 is void for infringing on local autonomy of Mandaue. They also allege that circular is void for lack of publication. - SolGen filed manifestation supporting petitioner judges. - COA insists that the constitutional & statutory authority of city govt to provide allowances to judges isnt absolute. One such law imposing limitation on LGUs' autonomy is Sec 458, par. (a) (1) [xi], of RA 7160, w/c authorizes disbursement of additional allowances and other benefits to judges subject to the condition that the finances of the city government should allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely enforcing the condition of the law when it sets a uniform maximum amount for the additional allowances that a city government can release to judges stationed therein. ISSUES 1. WON LBC 55 is void 2. WON yearly appropriation ordinance by Mandaue that provides for addl allowances to judges contravenes annual appropriation laws by Congess HELD 1. YES. - We recognize that, although our Constitution6 guarantees autonomy to local government units, the

LGU Not Attached to DILG

RADIA V REVIEW COMMITTEE 157 SCRA 749 (1988)

LocGov A2010
Local Governments are not "attached to" the Department of Local Governments in the same sense that bureaus and offices under, for instance, the Department of Justice are attached to that department. Provinces and municipalities are instrumentalities or units of local government vested with their own legislative and executive powers under the Local Government Code. Accordingly, for the limited purposes of Executive Order No. 17, Section 1 of which states that: Any office, agency, instrumentality or government-owned or controlled corporation, which is not attached to any ministry, including any of a constitutional commissions and state, colleges and universities, shall be considered a ministry for purposes of this Order. - heads of local governments may well be considered as Ministry (department) Heads with the meaning of Executive Order No. 17. It is in any event important to recall in this connection that petitioner's removal was reviewed and confirmed by the Review Committee, a body which is certainly of ministerial rank, being composed of "the Minister of Justice, as Chairman, and the Executive Secretary, the Minister of Budget, the Minister for Government Reorganization, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, or there duly authorized representatives, as Members." Thus, the requirement of Executive Order No. 17, if it is a requirement, that the removal of petitioner be effected by a "Ministry Head" may be regarded as substantially complied with. governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. -Hence, the present petition seeking reversal of decision of the RTC ISSUE WON Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional HELD No -Section 187 provides: Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. -In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments, and the policy of local autonomy in general. -Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or

Page 41
both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. -Under Section 187, all the Secretary of Justice is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. Disposition Petition granted

Power of Review of DOJ

DRILON V LIM 235 SCRA 135 CRUZ; AUGUST 4, 1994 APPLE
FACTS -The Secretary of Justice, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances as provided by Section 187 of the Local Government Code and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy -In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local

Section 27 Prior Consultations Required

PROVINCE OF RIZAL V EXEC SEC G.R. 129546 Chico-Nazario; December 13, 2005 RACH
NATURE Petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the CA Decision, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635 FACTS - This is a case involving the continued use of San Mateo Landfill as garbage dumpsite even though it is part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. History: On 17 Nov 1988, the respondent Sec of the DPWH and the DENR and the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) entered into a

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MOA which provides in part that the DENR agrees to immediately allow the utilization by the Metropolitan Manila Commission of its land property located at Pintong Bocaue in San Mateo, Rizal as a sanitary landfill site, subject to whatever restrictions that the government impact assessment might require. - On 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote Gov. Elfren Cruz of the MMC, Sec. Fiorello Estuar of the DPWH, the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, and Sec. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., pointing out that it had recently passed a Resolution banning the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its jurisdiction, asking that their side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold in abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters. - It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988 and owned by the DENR was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and Natural Resource Office, (CENRO) DENR-IV, Rizal Province, submitted a Memorandum that such illegal Dumping Site operation inside (the) Watershed Reservation is in violation of P.D. 705, Revised Forestry Code. The CENRO submitted another Investigation Report to the Regional Executive Director which states in part that the dumping site is without the concurrence of the Provincial Governor, Rizal Province and without any permit from DENR who has functional jurisdiction over the Watershed Reservation; and that about 1,192 families residing and cultivating areas covered by four (4) Barangays surrounding the dumping site will adversely be affected by the dumping operations of MMC including their sources of domestic water supply. - On 19 Feb 1990, the DENR Environmental Management Bureau granted the Metro Manila Authority (MMA [formerly MMC]) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of a two-and-a-half-hectare garbage dumpsite. - On 16 Nov 1993, DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala sent MMA Chairman Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. a letter stating that after a series of investigations by field officials of the DENR, the agency realized that the MOA entered into on 17 November 1988 is a very costly error because the area agreed to be a garbage dumpsite is inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation. - Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies aforementioned, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August 1995, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. - On 24 November 1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented by former Senator Jovito Salonga, sent a letter to President Ramos requesting him to reconsider Proclamation No. 635. - On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. The hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction was held on 14 August 1996. - CA denied these petitions. - Aside from other procedural remedies availed of, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite by the MMDA that caused the people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the Marcos Highway to stop the dump trucks from reaching the site for five successive days. On the second day of the barricade, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally, and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province. As a result, MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay, agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. - On 19 July 1999, then Pres Joseph E. Estrada, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31 December 2000. - On 11 Jan 2001, Pres Estrada directed DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to REOPEN the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic. ISSUES 1. WON the San Mateo Landfill shall remain permanently closed 2. WON the power to control and regulate the San Mateo Site belongs to the national governments 3. WON the circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed violated the LGC HELD 1. YES - We thus feel there is also the added need to reassure the residents of the Province of Rizal that this is indeed a final resolution of this controversy, for a brief review of the records of this case indicates two self-evident facts. First, the San Mateo site has adversely affected its environs, and second, sources of water should always be protected.

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a) The adverse effects of the site were reported as early as 19 June 1989, when the Investigation Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of DENR-IV-1 stated that the sources of domestic water supply of over one thousand families would be adversely affected by the dumping operations. The succeeding report included the observation that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental factors of the community. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay. b) Water is life, and must be saved at all costs.The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. 2. NO - The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority, thus: SEC. 2. Mandate. - (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources. 3. YES Ratio Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. Reasoning Contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991. - Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with

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appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained. - During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, he added that (t)his is the problem, sir, the officials we may have been talking with at the time this was established may no longer be incumbent and this is our difficulty now. That is what we are trying to do now, a continuing dialogue.[47] - In fact, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province. The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. - Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby made permanent. others, the site of the Coliseum as such. The classification led to the cancellation of the cockpit license. -Resolution 378, Code Ordinance, Series of 1985, reclassified Block 125 (where the cockpit is located) as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. 9 mems of the sangguniang panlungsod participated, 4 voting for amendment, 4 voted against it, 1 abstained. Vice-mayor, as presiding officer, voted for amendment to break the deadlock. -When Resolution No. 378 was transmitted to then Mayor Paderanga for approval, he merely returned the same within 10 days, stating that his approval was not necessary as it did not involve a disposition of city government funds. -with Resolution No. 378, next mayor issued the Coliseum permit to operate cockpit dated April 2, 1986. It was renewed on January 5, 1987 -Private respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc. (Gallera) protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Game Fowl Commission (PGC): no certificate of registration issued by PGC -PGC: sent telegram to station Commander of Gingoog City to suspend temporarily the operation of the cockpit. Subsequently sent telegram to mayor to stop any cockfight in the coliseum in lieu of its failure to register with PGC. -Gallera filed Special Civil Action for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction before RTC Gingoog City against Casino: Resolution No. 378 is invalid: the classification of Coliseums site is still within the residential zone of Gingoog City therefore Mayors permit issued are null and void for being in violation of Sec. 6 of the Rules and Regulations of PGC -RTC: issued preliminary injunction until PGC finally decided the controversy; subsequently declared the Mayors permits to be null and void. -Casino appealed; CA affirmed ISSUES 1. WON the PGC controls the operations of the Coliseum with respect to local/ordinary cockfights during Sundays, holidays and fiestas, despite the fact that the mayor of Gingoog City had issued permits 2. WON the mayors permits are null and void as Resolution 378 did not amend Resolution 49 the votes not obtained HELD 1. YES, power of review Reasoning. The PGC has the power not of control but only of review and supervision. -Review is a reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of correction. The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law. This the PGC did by bringing to the attention of the local authorities the non-compliance by petitioner with

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the rules involved in this case which we find reasonable and necessary in the discharge of the regulatory functions of PGC. PGC may, for that purpose and as it did here, indicate its disapproval of the acts of the local officials concerned to stress and perform its role with respect to the regulation of cockpits. -The task of granting licenses to operate cockpits is lodged with City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians. This is specifically granted to them by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1802-A. This is not to say that the power to grant licenses is absolute. It must be noted that certain requirements must be complied (with) before a license may issue. First, the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in connection with the operation of cockpits must be observed. And second, that there must be concurrence of the Sanggunians. 2. YES, null and void and votes necessary Reasoning. Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and the Local Government Code require only a majority for the enactment of an ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by the resolution in question without complying with the categorical requirement of a three-fourths vote incorporated in the very same ordinance sought to be amended. The pertinent provisions in the aforesaid city charter and the Local Government Code obviously are of general application and embrace a wider scope or subject matter. In the enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the aforementioned laws cannot be disputed. Undeniably, however, Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto is a specific and particular provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a different number of votes. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect only such cases within its language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. -In sum, Block 125 where Coliseum is located remains classified as a residential area, hence the operation of a cockpit therein is prohibited. This weighty consideration, which should actually be the principal basis for the nullification by respondent court of the two mayor's permits issued to petitioner (private respondent-appellant therein), was explained as follows: Disposition. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 30, 1989 and its resolution dated October 27, 1989 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

Section 30 Review of Executive Orders

CASIO V. CA 204 SCRA 449 REGALADO, DECEMBER 22, 1991 CHA
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS -Prior to the Passage of Resolution No. 49, Code Ordinance, Series of 1984, The Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum (Coliseum) was licensed as a cockpit under Sec. 2285 to 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the said ordinance classified certain areas of Gingoog City as residential zones, declaring among

LocGov A2010 Section 34 Role of Peoples and NGOs

MAGTAJAS V PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCOR 234 SCRA 225 / GR 111097 CRUZ; JULY 20, 1994 JOJO
FACTS - In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased, renovated and equipped a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., and prepared to inaugurate its casino. There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of the casino. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed and objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. - The Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO City enacted Ordinance No. 3353 (which prohibited the issuance of business permit and cancelled existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino, and provided penalties for violation therefor) and Ordinance No. 3375-93 (which prohibited the operation of casino and provided penalties for violation therefor). - Pryce, joined by PAGCOR as intervenor, assailed the ordinances before the CA as invalid and prayed for a writ of prohibition. CA ruled in favor of respondents and issued the writ prayed for. MR was denied. - CDO and its mayor (Magtajas) filed petition for review. Petitioners arguments, among others : a. It is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16. In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and business within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. b. The Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation and casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of CDO has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the LGC. c. Its interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the LGC has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State. d. That when the Code expressly authorized the LGUs to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. e. Gambling is intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869. ISSUE WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO has the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of the PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits (WON the ordinances it enacted are valid) HELD NO - PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. PAGCOR, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenueearner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. - The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the

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judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. - Tests of validity of an ordinance: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. - Under Sec. 458 of the LGC Code, LGUs are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. - The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to the operate a casino in CDO City. Under the LGC, LGUs have no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this connection, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the LGUs pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a price source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. - It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the LGC, LGUs may (and

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indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read in the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary. - The ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. - The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute: Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. - Municipal corporation owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. - This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. - The power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the LGC, which empowers the LGUs to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. - Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, the ordinances are declared ultra vires and void. PADILLA, J., concurring: Despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in CDOPAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. - That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character. - It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) What is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do no always justify the means. - I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same is true of gambling. - The national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of CDO for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of values? DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of CDO City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the city, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people of CDO City and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.

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-Bolalin, a candidate for Barangay Captain, charged Judge Occiano of the MTC of Balatan, Camarines Sur, with gross inefficiency and neglect of duty for failure to render a decision on Election Protest No. 1. -Petitioner claims the Judge was absent from court for 5 consecutive months resulting in his nonfeasance of cases submitted to his court, and that would solemnize marriages without being present at the ceremony. Occiano denied such allegations, claiming that Election Protest No. 1 was not submitted for decision on Feb. 27, 1995, as the last pleading was submitted on Sept. 5 of that year. ISSUE WON Judge Occiano is guilty of delay in deciding Election Protest No. 1 HELD YES. A protest contesting the election of a barangay officer should be decided by the MTC within 15 days from its filing. The period here is mandatory since such a case involves public interest. As such, election protest cases should be given preferential attention and Occianos inaction for 8 months shows his incompetency. -If indeed his caseload from both the MTC and MCTC prevented the disposition of his cases within the reglementary periods, respondent should have asked the this Court for a reasonable extension of time, which he failed to do. -there is also merit in the charge of absenteeism; Judge Occiano had been absent for several days without any application for leave, contrary to his claims and certificates of service which falsely indicated that his cases had been decided. As such, he violated the right to a speedy disposition of cases stated in Art. 3 Sec. 16 of the Constitution. The falsified documents made him administratively liable for serious misconduct under Rule 140 ROC and criminally liable under the RPC. Disposition WHEREFORE, Judge Occiano is found guilty of undue delay, absenteeism and falsification of documents and is hereby suspended for 6 months with possible criminal prosecution

V. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS Section 390 Composition

BOLALIN V OCCIANO A.M. NO. MTJ-96-1104 REGALADO, J.; JAN. 14, 1997 KIYO
FACTS

Katarungang Pambarangay
FELICIDAD UY VS. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS DAVIDE, JR.; SEPTEMBER 26, 1994 ATHE
NATURE Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS

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- Felicidad Uy subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building located at Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor. - The sublease contract expired. However, the petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties. - An argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing. The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees. - Atayde and her employee had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the petitioner. - The private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati. - The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain but only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993. - The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati. - Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses. - The petitioner submitted the required counteraffidavits. In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati that there was an ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner. - The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for noncompliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. - Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss on the ground that the accused had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati considering that accused and complainant are residents of different barangays; that the offense charged occurred in the Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense is about to prescribe. - The motion to reconsider was denied. - Hence this special civil action for certiorari. ISSUE WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Arguments of Atayde: The denial of the motion to dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable in the case of private respondent Javier since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement. HELD YES. Reasoning In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation for which the mediation was reset, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati. Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system. Some Notes The revised katarungang pambarangay law has at least three new significant features, to wit: 1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00

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in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. 2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. 3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary." What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of the complaint is unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days. Rationale behind each feature The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon and if the mediation and conciliation process at that level would be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships among protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace and order therein enhanced. The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the Local Government code, also broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the parties. Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result. 14 Elsewise stated, convenience is the raison d'etre of the rule on venue. The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the

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parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the difference between peace and a fullblown, wearisome, and expensive litigation between the parties. Note from the Court This Court wishes to emphasize the vital role which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge are SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this decision. Held No. PD 1508 declares that generally, disputes involving parties actually residing in the same city or municipality, or in adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities, should first be brought before the appropriate Barangay Lupon which shall have the authority to bring together the parties for amicable settlement." The proceedings before the Lupon are a "precondition" to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other "government office," PD 1508 further declaring that "No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudiration unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated." - A complaint or petition filed in court or other government office without compliance with the precondition may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. - The venue of these pre-requisite proceedings for conciliation is the Lupon of the barangay: (1) in which the parties to the dispute are actually residing, or (2) where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, if the parties are actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality,or (3) where the real property or any part thereof is situated, if the dispute affects real property or any interest therein. - However, In the case at hand the "precondition" does not apply to disputes over which the Lupon has no authority. - The question has already been passed upon and answered by thisCourt. In Tavora vs. Veloso, et al., the Court en banc held that the "precondition" had no application to cases over which the Lupon had no authority. Specifically, the Court ruled that by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other." In such a situation, where the Lupon is without jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of adjoining' barangays, the nature of the controversy is of no momentwhether or not affecting real property or interest therein, located in the same city or municipality. And the principle is not at an altered by the proviso of

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Section 3 of PD 1508(governing venue) that "disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated." The "quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section ;" but obviously, the rule on venue is utterly in-consequential as regards a case over which the Barangay Lupon does not, in the first place, have any jurisdiction. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Order of the TC is hereby annulled and set aside, and the case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings, with costs against private respondents.

BLARDONY V. COSCOLLUELA G.R. NO. 70261 GRIO-AQUINO; FEBRUARY 28, 1990 GLAISA
NATURE Petition for review of RTC decision FACTS - The petitioner Mauro and the private respondent Rosario are spouses. They begot one child named Patricia Araneta Blardony. Due to irreconcilable differences, the spouses separated. - On different dates, the spouses executed the following agreements: (a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981 for the support of their child, Patricia; (b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing the Compromise of Settlement of Advances claimed by private respondent from petitioner; (c)The Deed of Conveyance of a property situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa; and (d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private respondent in favor of petitioner over a property situated in Calatagan, Batangas. - Rosario filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the CFI. - Mauro admitted that he had abandoned the conjugal home since March 1981; that before the filing of the petition, he and his wife, assisted by their respective counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership but their attempt failed due to their inability to agree upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership properties and he prayed the court to order "a fair and equitable dissolution of their conjugal partnership in accordance with law." - Mauro filed a motion to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508, because both are residents of

AGBAYANI V. BELEN 145 SCRA 635 Narvasa; November 24, 1986 GIULIA
Facts - In the order of respondent Judge, he dismissed the civil action instituted by the petitioners against private respondents and other persons for quieting of title and damages involving 3 parcels of land in Pangasinan. - The Court sustained the defendants' MTD "on the ground that ... (it had) not yet acquired jurisdiction to try the case" because of the failure of the petitioners to submit the controversy to conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their complaint with the Court. The TC justified that the instant action falls within the jurisdiction of the Lupon Tagapayapa and therefore the parties should first appear before the Lupon Chairman for the Pangkat of the barangay where the poperties are located. - While it appears that the parties reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, the real property subject matter of the case are located in one barangay. Based on this, the TC ffound that the action should have been in the authority of the lupon in compliance with the provision of PD 1508. Issue WON the TC was correct

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the same Municipality of Makati. Judge dismissed Rosarios petition. - Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the courts were reorganized and the case was transferred to Judge Coscolluela, Jr. - Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses, and commissions. ISSUE WON parties could go directly to court without passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in Section 6 of P.D. 1508. HELD - YES. While the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its non-compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant." Mauro waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable partition of the conjugal properties. - Under Section 6.3 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite - The issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not `coupled' in the strict sense of the word with the instant petition, are essentially involved in this petition because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia Araneta Blardony who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and because the resolution or decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete without a clear cut disposition on the partition of the personal and real properties of the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery thereof to the proper parties. various articles of merchandise from petitioners store and failed to pay the same. The Dius brought the matter before the Barangay chairman for conciliation and possible amicable settlement. There was no settlement reached as Pagba alleged that the Diu also owed them money arising from the repair and maintenance of a boat belonging to the petitioners and from the cost of two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. - In compliance with the provisions of PD No. 1508, Katarungang Pambaragay Law, the barangay chairman thereafter issued a certification to the effect that no settlement was reached and that the complaint for the dispute may be filed in Court. - The Municipal Trial Court dismissed the complaint based on its ruling that the receipts of goods constituting the evidence were not admissible as they were not properly identified in Court. In its ruling, the MTC noted that the case could have been dismissed at its inception if the respondents seasonably claimed that there was no compliance with the provisions of PD No. 1508 on reconciliation. - On appeal with the RTC, Pagba was ordered to pay the Dius the amount owed plus interest, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit. - On further appeal with the CA, the ruling of the RTC was set aside on the ground that there was no compliance with the provisions of PD No. 1508 in that the barangay chairman failed to convene the Pangkat ng tagapamayapa to explore all possibilities of amicable settlement. - Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE/S WON the confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508 HELD Yes Ratio: Under Section 412 of the Local Government Code, the confrontation before the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. Reasoning From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with Presidential Decree No 1508 which does not require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to appear before the pangkat caused any prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before the barangay chairman and, as will hereafter be discussed, their sham insistence for a meeting before the pangkal is merely a ploy for further delay. We are thus forced to remind them that technicalities should not be made to desert their true role in our justice system, and should not be used as obstructions therein.

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The court a quo was likewise correct in invoking the doctrine in Tijam and, as indicated by the factual scenario in this case, private respondents are clearly in estoppel to assail the Jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case. Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense. Disposition Petition is granted. The judgment of the CA is set aside and the judgment of the RTC is reinstated.

Sangguniang Kabataan
REYES V FERRER 156 SCRA 314 CORTES; DECEMBER 11, 1987 OWEN
FACTS - Reyes was appointed member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City to represent the Kabataang Barangay Federation in Davao City of which he had been elected president (Local Government Code, BP 337 sec. 173) for a term of 3 years unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law, permanently incapacitated, dies, or resigns from office. (Sec. 123). The Provisional Constitution of 1986 provides that "all elective and appointive employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. - February 23, 1987 > Ferrer designated Rasgo to replace Reyes as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City representing the youth sector. - RTC > Reyes, alleging that he is entitled to hold office until 1988, filed with RTC Davao City a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. Judge denied the injunction, disposing the petition for quo warranto, on the ground that the petitioner had no cause of action - Reyes contends > Provisional Constitution (Proclamation No. 3) did not at all "change the complexion or character of the terms of office of all elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution" to that of

DIU VS CA (BUSHNELL AND PAGBA) 251 SCRA 472 REGALADO, J; TITO ROMY
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from CA judgment FACTS - Pagba purchased from the petitioners on credit

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"hold-over" capacities unless their terms of office already expired. > Citing B.P. Blg. 337, his term of office lasts up to 1988. - Solicitor General countered > Reyes replacement on February 23, 1987 was in accordance with the limitation imposed by Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution - that the appointment or designation of successors be made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. > his term of office as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod had already expired by virtue of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) which provides that "all incumbent officials whose terms of office shall expire on March 28, 1986 shall hold office until June 30, 1986 or until their successors shall have been elected and qualified." > a memorandum dated August 15, 1986 issued by then Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. that "all operations of Kabataang Barangay shall cease effective August 20, 1986. until further notice. ISSUE WON designation of Rasgo as replacement of Reyes as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City representing the youth sector is valid HELD NO Reasoning - There is no question that the designation of Reyes successor on February 23, 1987 was within the oneyear limitation set in the Provisional Constitution. On that date, however, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect (de Leon v. Esguerra) Section 27, Article XVIII which provides This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. - The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Thus, from February 2, 1987, all acts of the public respondent must be consistent with the 1987 Constitution which > ensures the autonomy of local governments (Art. II, sec. 25 and Art. X, secs. 2, 14, among others) > guarantees security of tenure in the civil service (Art. IX-B, sec. 2[3]) > limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments (Art. X, sec. 4). > all existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked one such law being The Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which + declares as a State Policy the guarantee and promotion of the autonomy of local government units (Sec. 2) + limits Presidential power over local governments to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law" (Sec. 14). - It also makes special provision regarding representation of the youth sector by specifying their qualification, term of office: Sec. 173. Composition and Compensation. (1) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang panlungsod members; and the members who may be appointed by the President of the Philippines consisting of the presidents of the katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay and the kabataang barangay city federation. - Even assuming that the replacement of Reyes could have been made, the appointing power is bound by the said law to observe the qualifications of the appointee to the Sangguniang Panglungsod. In the case at bar, Rasgo was never the president of the Kabataang Barangay city federation, hence he lacks the eligibility and qualification required by law to be the representative of the youth sector to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City. Inasmuch as Rasgo's appointment is not valid, the tenure of Reyes could not be terminated. - The Kabataang Barangay organization is still an existent entity, contrary to the assertion of the Solicitor General, as shown by Memorandum Circular No. 87-18 of the Ministry of Local Government issued on April 27, 1987, which states: Pending the final decision of the President on the status of the Kabataang Barangay Organization, all Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors are hereby directed to refrain from extending any appointment to a member of the Kabataang Barangay Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, pursuant to Sections 205(a), 173 and 146, respectively, of the Local Government Code. Disposition Order denying prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is SET ASIDE and. Rasgo is ENJOINED from continuing to perform the functions of the office of the member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod representing the youth of Davao City. Reyes is ordered immediately REINSTATED to such office.

Page 49
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari decision of RTC Manila nullifying an order of DILG, which in effect cancelled the general elections for SK slated on December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila, on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the first elections for the SK under the Local Government Code FACTS - sec. 423 of LGC provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman, 7 members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Sec 532(a) provides that the 1st elections for the SK shall be held 30 days after the next local elections. The Code took effect on January 1, 1992. The 1st local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on Aug. 27, 1992, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, providing guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30, 1992, which placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the COMELEC. After two postponements, the elections were finally scheduled on Dec. 4, 1992. Registration for candidates and voters were held. - DILG Sec. Alunan issued a letter-resolution exemption for the City of Manila, exempting the City from holding the SK elections on the ground that elections held previously on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the 1st under the LGC. It based its resolution on the ff LGC provision (532[d]): All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sangguniang shall be deemed vacant until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That, elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code. - Mirasol, et al., representing 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC Manila. Said RTC nullified the DILG resolution. Thus, this petition by DILG Sec. ISSUE 1. WON the instant petition is moot considering that 2nd elections has been held on May 13, 1996 2. WON the DILG secretary has authority to determine whether Manila came within the exemption clause of 532(d) as exempt from holding elections on Dec. 4, 1992 (WON COMELEC can provide that DILG shall have direct control and supervision over the election

ALUNAN V MIRASOL GR 108399 MENDOZA; July 31, 1997 MAIA

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of the SK with technical assistance by the COMELEC) HELD 1. NO Ratio This case is not moot and it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the 1990 KB Manila elections because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the RTC and these officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections. Reasoning Southern Pacific Terminal Case: the questions involved are usually continuing, and these considerations ought not to be, as they might be defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (parties) have their rights determined without a chance of redress. Roe v Wade: W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of non-mootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' 2. YES Ratio DILG supervision was to be exercised within the framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to perform was only the enforcement of the rules. Reasoning The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the legislative policy evident in several statutes (as shown by PDs and presidential issuances directing the DILG to issue rules and implement the same for the elections of Kabataang Barangays [KB, precursor of SK]) -it is contended that COMELEC did not name the brgys which, because they had already conducted KB elections between 1988 and 1992, were not to be included in the 1992 SK elections. That these barangays were precisely to be determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority given to the DILG to supervise the conduct of the elections. Since 532(d) provided for KB officials whose term of office was extended beyond 1992, authority to supervise the conduct of elections in that year must necessarily include the authority to determine which KB would not be included in the 1992 elections. This authority is nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between 1988 and 1992 elections had been held in a given KB. If elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held in 1992 since the term of office of KB officials so elected was extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under [LGC]. In doing this, SILG was to act merely as the agent of the Congress, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. - it is also contended that the May 26, 1990 KB Manila elections were void because (a) they were called at the instance of then Mayor Lopez who did not have authority to do so and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision - The 1990 elections for the KB were called by Mayor Lopez, Jr., pursuant to his EO 21. However, it was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the aftermath of the EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of the LGC that the exception clause of sec. 532(d) was inserted, which may be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid under existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. - lastly, it is contended that the exemption of the barangays of Manila from the elections for SK officers in 1992 would deny the youth voters in those barangays of the equal protection of laws. It is contended that there were other brgys which conducted elections during 1888 to 1992, but were allowed to conduct SK elections in 1992. Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Even assuming that only barangays in Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections in 1992 while the rest were allowed even if KB elections had already been held there before, this fact does not give the youth voters in the 897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because what the other barangays did was contrary to law. There is no discrimination here. Respondents equal protection argument violates the dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong right. Disposition Petition is granted. Decision reversed

Page 50
Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 as she was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old. Garvida filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. MCTC found Garvida qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. - On April 23, 1996, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman but was disapproved due to her age. Garvida was allowed to run by the COMELEC Regional Director. - On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to Garvida informing her of her ineligibility. Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila. - On May 2, 1996 COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of Garvida in the event she won in the election. Garvida garnered 78 votes as against Sales votes of 76. The Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim Garvida as the winner. - On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Garvida the winner for the position of SK chairman "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." Issues 1.WON COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy 2.WON she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK was proper Held 1. No. It is the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. -The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or

GARVIDA V. SALES 271 SCRA 767 PUNO :April 18, 1997 DA

Facts Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers denied her application because she exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng

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typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail. 2. The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age it sought to provide its members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance. Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. - The LGC of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. - Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the LGC of 1991. Under Section 424 of the LGC, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. - A closer look at the LGC will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. - The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday." Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election. Garvida may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, Garvida was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the LGC and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election . The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. - The ineligibility of Garvida does not entitle Sales, the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the LGC Garvida should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated,

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is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months." - The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman. - To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman SC ordered that vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo by simple majority from among themselves.

De Jure Municipality
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, ACTING THROUGH ITS. SANGUNIANG BAYAN AND MAYOR, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL 251 SCRA 530 PANGANIBAN, J. (1995) BRY
NATURE This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - This case concerns a boundary dispute between the two municipalities. Plaintiff Municipality of Candijay sued defendant before RTC Tagbilaran to have barangay/barrio Pagahat declared as part of the plaintiff municipality. RTC sustained plaintiff. - On appeal, the respondent Court found that there is equiponderance of evidence in the evidence presented by both parties. Invoking Sapuan vs. CA (1990), the CA said that 'When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. The CA therefore held that the Municipality of Alicias contention must be sustained and reversed the lower courts decision. - It appears that during the proceedings in the trial court, an issue was raised as to the juridical personality of the municipality of Alicia with the end view of depriving it right to present evidence. ISSUE WON Municipality of Alicia has juridical personality

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HELD YES. RatioAlthough EO 265 issued by President Quirino would be void under the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, the Court held that the subsequent governmental acts point to the States recognition of its continued existence as municipality, among which is the passage of the Local Government Code. The Supreme Court applying the equal protection clause held that the Municipality of Alicia is similarly situated with Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon and thus applied the full rationale of the case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. to it. The important portion of the decision is: The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "valdity to acts done that would have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. Reasoning We call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., which will be found very instructive in the case at bench. Therein we stated: Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpased the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon. "At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municpal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "valdity to acts ddone that would have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdictin, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. "All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded."

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Paraaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 744, Series of 1992 which petitioner himself approved on October 6, 1992. Resolution No. 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from November 11, 1992 to February 15, 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the corner of Opena o Rivera Streets - Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit stating that the charge of violation of Sec. 3(f) of RA 3019 has no legal and factual basis because (a) HCCI, which actually started operation, never applied for a mayor's permit as evidenced by his letter reply to Atty. Dilag and the affidavit dated March 11, 1993 of Business Permit and License Office Officer-In-Charge Mrs. Elenita T. Paracale. Moreover, the four letters of Mr. Steve Espina requesting assistance in the issuance of mayor's permit were not filed with the municipal office concerned. Complainant BCCI denied conducting actual operations but only commenced soliciting participants and would-be sponsors to the fair. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but petitioner simply refused to issue the same unless it gives money to petitioner. - Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Rogelio A. Ringpis conducted a preliminary investigation and issued on September 22, 1993 a resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended. Special Prosecutor (SP) II Luz L. Quinones-Marcos, upon review of the Ringpis resolution, recommended the filing of information against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(e) instead of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019. - SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr. issued a memorandum recommending the withdrawal of the Information on the ground that no probable cause exist(s) to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. (3019). - The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on November 3, 1994 recommended the dismissal of the case stating that petitioner "cannot be held liable for violation of either Section 3(f), the original charge, or Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, the pending charge against Mayor Olivarez, because he neither neglect[ed]/refuse[d] to act without sufficient justification on the letter request addressed to him, nor acted through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence causing undue injury to BCCI. If ever the latter sustained injury for the non-implementation of Council Resolution No. 744, S-92, the same is due to the fault and indiscretion of its officers - DSP de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation on the finding that Even discounting evident bad faith on the part of respondent for the sake of argument, he is liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit THRU MANIFEST PARTIALITY, to

Section 444 The Chief Executive: Powers

OLIVAREZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN 248 SCRA 700 OCTOBER 4,1995; REGALADO MEL
NATURE Action for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Paraaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement

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another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit. ISSUE WON the act of petitioner of refusing to grant a permit to BCCI is valid HELD: NO Ratio It is asserted that the executive order granting a permit to the Baclaran-based vendors' associations was issued by petitioner supposedly in the best interest of the municipality as evidenced by its earnings from the night fair in the total amount of P13,512,948.00. While the avowed purpose may prove noble, still it miserably pales in contrast to what appears to be bad faith or manifest partiality on the part of petitioner in refusing to grant a permit to BCCI. Petitioner could not plausibly demonstrate how the issuance of a permit to BCCI would so adversely affect public interest as to warrant its denial. On the contrary, the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque had even passed a resolution, which notably was approved by herein petitioner, expressly allowing BCCI to hold the night fair. This is concrete proof that the grant of authority to operate in favor of BCCI was not at all contrary to law and public policy, nor was it prejudicial to public interest. Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of herein petitioner. Petitioner likewise submits that no permit could be issued because BCCI never filed an application therefor with the proper office, that is, the Business Permit and Licensing Office. This is actually begging the question. It is not denied that on November 13, 1992, BCCI, through its general manager, wrote petitioner requesting for a permit to operate, but this was rejected outright by him on the theory that the application should be made with the proper municipal official. The indifference shown by petitioner to BCCI's application taints his actuations with dubiety. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letterapplication to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether petitioner was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond us for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

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issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of Feb.2, 1987 when the Constitution took effect. - For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for 8 months without pay. On appeal, however, the DILG reversed on the ground that what the mayor had issued to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or a summons. - Mayor Irisari filed a MFR of the order of denial of respondent judge, invoking the resolution of the DILG. - Judge Ario then reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case. He said in his order: The accused asserts that since the question about the warrant of arrest issued against Apolinario Muez has been resolved in an administrative proceedings as not the warrant of arrest contemplated by law, it would follow then that this case now before this Court against the accused be dismissed. The Court finds that the subject matter in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose from one and the same incident and it involved the same parties...The Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency is not tainted with unfairness and arbitrariness neither it shows arbitrary action or palpable and serious error, therefore, it must be respected. - Upon receipt of this order, Muez sent two letters to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging Judge Ciriaco C. Ario with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. ISSUE WON Judge Arino should be held administratively liable. HELD Yes. While respondent judge may have acted in good faith, he should nevertheless be administratively held liable. - The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the RPC, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the information. - Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch. It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a warrant of arrest. It was. In plain terms it stated: You are hereby requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muez of Poblacion, Loreto, Agusan del Sur, for his refusal to acknowledge the Summons...and bring him before the Office of the Municipal Mayor to answer an

MUEZ VS ARIO 241 SCRA 478 MENDOZA; FEB.21, 1995 EVA

NATURE This is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ario of the MCTC of Agusan del Sur for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment as defined and penalized under Art.204 of the RPC FACTS - Dec.26, 1989, Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office Apolinario S. Muez for conference respecting a land dispute which Muez had with one Tirso Amado. Munez failed to attend so Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him the ff day. - Munez was brought before Mayor Irisari, although no investigation was later conducted. - He filed a complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as administrative complaint for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. - After P.I, the investigating officer filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor Irisari in the MCTC of Loreto, Agusan del Sur. The criminal case was later assigned to respondent Judge Ario. - Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the law as, mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest under the former LGC. This was denied on the ground that the power of mayors to

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inquiry/investigation in connection with the complaint of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office. - As a matter of fact Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of the former LGC which expressly provided that in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the accused." This provision had, however, been repealed by Art. III, Sec.2 of the 1987 Constitution, as this Court held in Ponsica v. Ignalaga: No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Sec.143 of the LGC, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution...The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law"... - That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not make the order against him any less an order of arrest, contrary to the opinion of DILG. - The summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest. The summons read: You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the Municipal Mayor...to answer in an inquiry/investigation in connection with a certain complaint of Mr. Tirso Amado lodged in this office. PLEASE FAIL NOT under the penalty of the law. - Respondent Judge Ario should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore, there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. What was before him was a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles. - But there is more than just gross ignorance of legal principles shown here. Although he denies it, what the respondent judge appears to have actually done in this case was to rely on the opinion of the DILG. What we are here concerned is that by relying on the opinion of the DILG, disregarding a previous ruling he had made which was in accordance with law, respondent judge showed lack of capacity for independent judgment. Disposition WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent. He is enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge.

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LOPEZ, JR. V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (LACUNA) G.R. NO. 87119 SARMIENTO; APR 16, 1991
KOOKY
ISSUE WON the City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint Council officers and employees as provided in Sec 15 of the Charter of the City of Manila (RA 409 as amended) HELD YES (Procedural: No appeal lies from the decisions of the CSC. Parties aggrieved may proceed to the SC alone on certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Sec 7, Article IX, Constitution. But SC nonetheless accepted because of the important public interest it involves.) - RA 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila, is a special law, whereas RA 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law, regardless of their dates of passage, and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general. - Repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other. - Lewis v Cook County; Philippine Railway Co. v Nolting:. . . The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of the particular case. The Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. - The provisions of RA 5185, giving mayors the power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city funds, and those of Batas Blg. 337, empowering local executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and employees of the city," were meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments and to highlight the autonomy of local governments. They were not meant, however, to deprive the City Council of Manila for instance, its appointing power granted by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy. Disposition Petition dismissed.
(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and employees of the city, whose appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code;

FACTS - Sept 13, 1988, Vice-Mayor of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council Danilo Lacuna submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointments of 19 officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the provisions of Sec 15 of the Charter of the City of Manila (RA 409, as amended)4 - The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau of the Mayor's office "comment and/or recommendation" on whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the City Council may be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. The Personnel Bureau then forwarded the query to the City Legal Officer, who was of the opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. This was transmitted to the CSC. - On Feb 1, 1989, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-075, and held that it is the City Council to which the appointing power is vested. From this resolution, Gemiliano Lopez, Jr., City Mayor of Manila, appeals. Lopez contends that sec 15 of RA 409 as amended has been repealed by the Decentralization Law (RA 5185)5 and the Local Government Code (Batas Blg. 337)6.
42

Sec. 15. . . . .xxx xxx xxx . . . The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees of the Board.
5

Sec 4. xxx xxx xxx The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police and City Chief of Fire Department and other heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants or deputies shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to Judges, Auditors, Fiscals, City Superintendents of Schools, Supervisors, Principals, City Treasurers, City Health Officers and City Engineers. xxx xxx xxx All other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds, road and bridge funds, school funds, and other local funds, shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the Provincial Governor, City or Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned. . . .
6

Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers, and Duties. xxx xxx xxx (2) The city mayor shall: xxx xxx xxx

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STO. DOMINGO V ORDOEZ 166 SCRA 123 GUTIERREZ; SEPTEMBER 29, 1988 AIDA
FACTS - Sto. Domingo was the municipal planning and development officer of Boac, Marinduque. He held a permanent position until his employment was terminated by respondent OIC Mayor Nepomuceno pursuant to EO 17, Sec. 3. - The grounds for his termination were as follows: - Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the findings of the Commission on Audit that there were anomalies in the renovation of the Boac Municipal Bldg. - Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law for issuing a Certificate of Inspection and Completion of the Construction of the Boac Municipal Building knowing fully well that said construction was not complete and not made in accordance with the plans and specification - Gross negligence and uncooperative character in the discharge of official functions - According to Sto Domingo, he was terminated without due process of law. There was no written specification of charges has been served upon him thus he was unable to answer the charges and to examine the documents presented. Sto. Domingo filed a letter-petition for reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission which the latter transmitted to the Review Committe under Executive Order No. 17, Department of Justice. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE WON the dismissal was effected without due process of law HELD NO Reasoning - EO 17 outlines the rules and procedures to be followed before an employee can be separated from government service. - Under Sec. 7 of EO 17, the proceedings are summary in nature. Pursuant to this provision, the Review Committee promulgated its own rules and regulations, section 5 of which states that "No formal hearing can be conducted nor shall examination of witnesses be allowed." - The petitioner contends that his right to crossexamine the witnesses against him is a requirement of due process. Trial type hearings in administrative investigations are not always necessary Summary proceedings are not per se violations of the principle of due process. - But the fundamental element of democracy is the right to be heard. In the case at bar, the petitioner was heard on his petition for reconsideration filed with the Review Committee. He was accorded every opportunity to present evidence in his behalf The charges against him are easily refuted with documentary evidence regarding the completion of the project and his having attended the seminar at Tagaytay City. There is absolutely no evidence of arbitrariness or caprice in the questioned act of the respondents. - In the Summary Investigation conducted, the Review Committee made the following findings: - After the renovation work was done, a certificate of Settlement and Balances was drawn up, containing all the disbursemenst relative to the alleged renovation. Sto. Domingo, as planning coordinator, signed the certificate and his signature was to the effect that he was warranting the truth of the contents of the certificate. - Sto. Domingo also executed a certificate of inspection and acceptance, signifying that the work was satisfactorily completed. - It was subsequently discovered that the renovation work was incomplete and was in violation of certain rules and regulations, such as unnecessary alterations which led to additional costs. - In a letter of reconsideration in his defense, Sto. Domingo clamed that his lapses were attributed to the town mayors orders for him not to interfere. The Court did not consider this excuse, saying that Sto. Domingo had to fulfill his duties independent of the mayors orders. - Petitioner asserts that the OIC Mayor did not have authority to dismiss him. To substantiate his stand, he cites section 5 of Executive Order No. 17 which refers to the Head of Ministry as the authority to effect dismissals. In his case, he opines that the authority to effect dismissal is the Minister (now Secretary) of Local Governments. - The Court does not agree with this argument. Article 161 of the Local Government Code provides that the municipal planning and development coordinator shall be appointed by the Municipal Mayor. This makes the petitioner a local employee and therefore, subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the mayor. Under section 78 of the Local Government Code, the mayor has the authority to remove, suspend and discipline his appointees pursuant to law. The general rule is that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. There appears to be no abuse by the Mayor of his power to discipline. There are valid grounds to terminate the petitioner's employment. Disposition Petition dismissed.

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LAGANAPAN V ASEDILLO 154 SCRA 377 September 30, 1987; PADILLA LORA
FACTS - Petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. - 1960, his salary was increased to P720.00 per annum, and he was extended an appointment which was approved as provisional under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service. - 1962: the petitioner was given another increase in salary and a corresponding appointment was made which the Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260, to continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of certification of eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna." - 1963, 1964, and 1965: he was again given salary increases, and new appointments were extended to him, which appointments were also approved under Section 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service. - 1967: the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil service eligibility. - Petitioner was told to surrender his firearm and other office equipment to the Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna who was also informed of petitioner's dismissal on the same day. - Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner. - The Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna. - In view thereof, the petitioner complained to the Police Commission which advised him to file an injunction suit against Mayor Asedillo. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages. - In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at

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the pleasure of the appoint power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. - TC: Summary dismissal of the illegal; ordered Asedillo to recall his designation of respondent Epifanio Ragotero as Acting Chief of Police of Kalayaan and to reinstate petitioner to his former position - Respondents appealed directly to the SC. - The appellant Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna additionally claims that the lower court erred in not holding respondent-appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo personally liable for his illegal act ISSUES 1. WON petitioner need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the action for quo warranto and mandamus in court 2. WON since the appointments extended to the appellee as chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna were all provisional in nature, and not permanent, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appointing officer. 3. WON Mayor Elpidio Asedillo alone should be held liable for the back salaries of the petitioner. HELD 1. YES. While there are precedents which hold that before a litigant can bring a matter to court, it is necessary that he first exhaust all the remedies in the administrative branch of the government, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process. 13 The rule does not also apply where insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. - There is no doubt that, in terminating the services of the appellee, the appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily without any semblance of compliance or even an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due process. No charges were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in order to give the appellee an opportunity to defend himself, despite the provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, that "Members of the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law." - Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies before appellee could come to court for the protection of his rights. Besides, it appears that the order was immediately executed and the appellee was immediately removed from office and replaced by the appellant Epifanio Ragotero on the same day, so that appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, even if available to the appellee, was not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. - Furthermore, appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not a pre-requisite to, nor a bar to the institution of quo warranto proceedings, so that, as pointed out by the trial court, to require the appellee to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing this action, could easily result in a grave injustice of barring him forever from bringing the matter to the courts of justice for judicial determination. 2. NO. While it may be true that the appellee was holding a provisional appointment at the time of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official who could be dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days after receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission. Here, no such certification was received by Mayor Elpidio Asedillo thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal of the appellee. 3. NO. The records show that the action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo, not personally, but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, and he appeared and defended the action in such capacity. Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of the petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least protesting the petitioner's summary dismissal from his position, even abolished the appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna. - This act of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner, as to make said municipality equally liable, as held by the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the reinstatement of petitioner and for the payment of his back salaries. - A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. - Salcedo vs. Court of Appeal: the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor

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refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate. - Nemenzo vs. Sabillano: the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation. - Rama vs. Court of Appeals: the governor, vicegovernor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations. Disposition. Judgment Modified. Since reinstatement of the petitioner-appellee to his former position is no longer feasible and hence, it cannot be enforced, in view of the appointment of a permanent chief of police, the petitioner-appellee is entitled only to back salaries which, however, should be limited to a period of five (5) years. In addition, respondent Mayor Asedillo who was sued in his official capacity as municipal mayor, having passed away, the liability to pay petitioner his back salaries must now devolve upon the respondent municipality alone.

NESSIA vs. FERMIN 220 SCRA 622 Bellosillo; March 30, 1993 MARGE
FACTS -A complaint for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of his official duties as the then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias was filed by Jose V. Nessia against Jesus M. Fermin and the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental. Nessia theorized that Fermin deliberately ignored and caused the nonpayment of the reimbursement vouchers because Nessia defied the Fermin's request to all municipal officials to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections. -In his answer with counterclaim, Fermin disputed the allegations in the complaint and countered that the claims of Nessia could not be approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations therefor. -Victorias concurred with the arguments of Fermin, and added that plaintiff Nessia was blamable for his predicament because he neither gave Fermin the justification for drawing funds in excess of budgetary appropriations nor amended his vouchers to conform thereto. However, the municipality failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and was declared in default.

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-On the basis of the evidence, and citing Art. 27 of the Civil Code7, TC found Mayor Fermin liable for damages for maliciously refusing to act on the reimbursement vouchers. [PhP 1425.75 for reimbursement, P10k as moral damages, P2k as exemplary damages, P3k as attys fees + costs] -Victorias did not appeal. Both Nessia and Fermin elevated the case to the CA, Nessia praying for an increase in the award of moral and exemplary damages, and Fermin seeking exoneration from liability. -CA found that the vouchers were not shown to have been received by the mayor; and even if received, could not be approved for payment because they were submitted late and were not supported by an appropriation. It ruled that evidence as well as the complaint itself did not establish unjust inaction, and dismissed the case. ISSUES 1. WON Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers, hence, liable under Art. 27 of the Civil Code 2 WON CAs dismissal of the complaint absolved Victorias from liability, even though it did not appeal the decision of the trial court HELD 1. YES. -As between the findings of the CA drawn simply from the reading of the records and the TSNs, and the determination of the TC which heard the case, the opinion of the latter deserves greater acceptance, even if both conclusions are supported by evidence. -Since proof of the receipt of the vouchers has not been confuted, the secretary should have indicated on the letter she received that the enclosures therein were not so enclosed or attached, otherwise, it could be presumed that they were actually enclosed or attached thereto, and properly received by the addressee. Moreover, the version favoring receipt of the vouchers carries the presumption of regularity in official acts, more so that the handwritten name of the secretary, which closely resembles her signature, immediately follows the list of enclosures. -On the defense of lack of appropriation, while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may, nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. This provision against official inaction finds its ally in Sec. 3, par. (f), of R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
7

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as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," which criminalizes "[n]eglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of . . . discriminating against any interested party." -It is apparent that public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may the plaintiff continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the plaintiff is left in the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be equated with "disapproval." -Baldivia v. Lota: Respondent [mayor] could have, and should have, either included the claim of petitioners in the general budget he is bound to submit, pursuant to section 2295 of the Revised Administrative Code, or prepared a special budget for said claim, and urged the municipal council to appropriate the sum necessary therefor. In any event, if the municipal mayor fails or refuses to make the necessary appropriation, petitioners may bring an action against the municipality for the recovery of what is due them and after securing a judgment therefor, seek a writ of mandamus against the municipal council and the municipal mayor to compel the enactment and approval of the appropriation ordinance necessary therefor (AmJur). -This is precisely what the petitioner did; he filed a collection case to establish his claim against Fermin and the Municipality of Victorias, which Nessia satisfactorily proved. 2. NO. -A non-appellant cannot, on appeal, seek an affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. BUT here, the fact that the CA decision essentially exonerated the Municipality of Victorias from liability is a mere consequence of the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action, although erroneously. In any case, this matter has become irrelevant considering the conclusion herein reached. Disposition Petition granted. CA decision set aside. RTC decision reinstated and affirmed.

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.