PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation G.R. No.

71091 January 29, 1988 HENRY GALUBA vs. ALFREDO LAURETA Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 71091 January 29, 1988 HENRY GALUBA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ALFREDO and REVELINA LAURETA, HON. JUDGE BRAULIO YARANON, THE SHERIFF OF BAGUIO CITY, respondents. RESOLUTION

FERNAN, J.: The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to annul an amicable settlement arrived at by the parties through the mediation of the Lupong Tagapayapa, in the absence of a repudiation of said amicable settlement within the 10-day period provided for in Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1508. In a quitclaim and waiver executed on July 10, 1982, Alfredo and Revelina Laureta ceded to petitioner all their rights and interests over a house and lot located in Quezon Hill, Baguio City for P70,000. Petitioner paid the Lauretas P50,000 with the balance payable later. When P18,000 of the balance remained unpaid, the parties brought the matter before the barangay captain of Victoria Village in Baguio City. On February 10, 1984, the parties entered into an amicable settlement whereby they agreed that the P18,000 would be paid in monthly installments starting April, 1984 and that non-compliance therewith would "mean execution in accordance with the Barangay Law." 1 A month later, petitioner discovered that the house he had bought was encroaching on the adjoining lot, that the owner thereof was demanding payment for such encroachment, and that there were arrears on electric bills and taxes amounting to P6,117. Consequently, on July 17, 1984, he filed in the office of the barangay captain of Victoria Village an unsworn complaint for the annulment of the amicable settlement. He alleged therein that his consent to said settlement had been vitiated by mistake or fraud and therefore, the amicable settlement should be annulled and a new one entered into by the parties. 2 Meanwhile, the Lauretas filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch IV, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution based on the amicable settlement. As the inferior court issued the writ, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City a complaint for the annulment of the amicable settlement with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/ or restraining order. 3 The lower court denied the prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the Lauretas filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Alleging that in praying for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner wanted to "circumvent the mandatory provisions of P. D. 1508," the Lauretas averred that "without the unmeritorious petition for preliminary injunction," the dispute between them and petitioner was subject to amicable settlement. They cited Section 6 of P.D. 1508 which provides:
SEC. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.No complaint, petition action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office of adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases: [1] Where the accused is under detention; [2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; [3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and [4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

In his comment and opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioner contended that the lower court had jurisdiction over the case because he had named as defendants therein the municipal trial court and the sheriff of Baguio City and hence, the complaint fell under the exceptions in Section 2 [21 of P.D. 1508]. He also expressed doubt that the Lauretas were still residing in Baguio City as Alfredo Laureta had been considered at large in some pending criminal cases against him. He asserted that he had substantially complied with P.D. 1508 because he filed the aforementioned complaint of July 31, 1984 before the barangay captain and that after two months of trying to locate defendants, the barangay captain of Victoria Village as Pangkat Chairman,' issued a certification to file action on October 11, 1984. Thereafter, the Lauretas filed an addendum to their motion to dismiss stating that the complaint did not state a cause of action as petitioner failed to repudiate the amicable settlement or to file a "Petition for [the] nullification of the award" pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. 1508, and that said complaint should have been filed in the municipal trial court. 4 In his opposition thereto, petitioner argued that the 10-day repudiation period having expired, he was left with no recourse but to file the action for nullification in court considering that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, specifically Section 9[1] thereof which gives regional trial courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and its repealing clause under Section 47, should prevail over the provisions of P.D. 1508. On January 9, 1985, the lower court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction as well as cause of action. Citing Sections 11 and 13 of P.D. 1508, the lower court said:"... [T]here is no authorized judicial procedure under P.D. 1508 for the annulment of an amicable settlement. Only an arbitration award, which is different from an amicable settlement, may become the subject of a petition for nullification to be filed yet with the proper municipal trial court. ..." The Court noted the fact that petitioner failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the 10-day period provided for in Section 11 of P.D. 1508 as the parties entered into said amicable settlement on February 10, 1984 and yet it was only on July 27, 1984 when petitioner repudiated it through an unsworn complaint for its annulment.

The lower court suggested that "an action for the annulment or rescission of the contract he had with private defendants with a prayer for injunction to restrain in the meantime the enforcement of the amicable settlement" would perhaps be availed of by the petitioner. From said order, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to this Court. The records of the case having been erroneously transmitted to the Court of Appeals, said court certified the case to this Court on March 19, 1985. 5 In his petition for review on certiorari, petitioner contended that "there must be a provision of judicial procedure that supplements the deficiency of P.D. 1508." Finding it in Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, petitioner averred that P.D. 1508 being a special law, the Rules of Court may be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character. Thus, under Rule 39, his remedy against an executory amicable settlement which, by analogy is a final judgment, is an action to annul it. Moreover, petitioner asserts that he has a cause of action because of the fraudulent act or misrepresentation of private respondents herein. As private respondents failed to file a timely comment on the petition, they filed an explanation, apology and comment alleging that during the extended period for the filing of said comment, petitioner partially satisfied the "judgement of the barangay court 6 by paying them P2,000 thus misleading them to believe that petitioner had abandoned the petition; that on December 6, 1985, the deputy sheriff received from Mrs. Elizabeth Galuba, wife of petitioner, four [4] checks in the total amount of P10,000 representing full satisfaction of Galuba's obligation to them; that petitioner himself requested the municipal trial court of Baguio City to issue a certification that he had fully settled his obligation in Barangay Case No. 76 which certification was issued by the clerk of said court on May 18, 1980; that as petitioner himself requested for said certification, they thought that petitioner would take the initiative of filing a motion to dismiss the petition; that having settled his obligation in said case, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the barangay captain, and that they admit that they erred in not informing this Court of the settlement of the case. In his reply to said explanation, apology and comment, the petitioner alleged that he was forced to satisfy his obligation because "there was nothing more to stay the execution of the amicable settlement" [sic] after the municipal trial court had issued the writ of execution. He insisted that "the absence of "authorized judicial procedure under PD 1508" must be supplemented by the Revised Rules of Court in conjunction with the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, BP Blg. 129." We vote to deny the petition for review on certiorari. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in character. Thus, in Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444, Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 216 and Peregrina v. Panis, 133 SCRA 72, We accordingly held that the conciliation process at the barangay level is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court. In Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470, We ruled that non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. Once the parties have signed an amicable settlement, any party who finds reasons to reject it must do so in accordance with Section 13 of P.D. 1508 which states:
SEC. 13. Repudiation. Any party to the dispute may, within ten [10] days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the Barangay Captain a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing of a complaint, provided for in Section 6, hereof.

Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which were promulgated "for the amicable settlement of disputes at the barangay level, without judicial recourse," also provides that "[f]ailure to repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement within the time limits respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said grounds," i.e., fraud, violence or intimidation. Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy set forth in Section 13 must face the consequences of the amicable settlement for he can no longer file an action in court to redress his grievances arising from said settlement. It should be emphasized that under Section 11 of said law, "[t]he amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of the ten [10] days from the date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court." Hence, the lower court correctly held that P.D. 1508 does not provide for a judicial procedure for the annulment of an amicable settlement because the remedy of repudiation supplants the remedy of a court annulment. An aggrieved party may only resort to a court action after he has repudiated the settlement in accordance with Section 13 as Section 6 clearly states that repudiation is a precondition to the filing of a complaint regarding any matter within the authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa. It should be clarified, however, that the "petition for nullification" mentioned in Section 11 refers to an arbitration award pursuant to Section 7 of the same law and not to an amicable settlement. The primordial objective of P.D. 1508 is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To allow court actions assailing unrepudiated amicable settlements would exacerbate congestion of court dockets. This is repugnant to the spirit of P.D. 1508. Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the ten-day period, petitioner is left with no recourse but to abide by its terms. He, therefore, acted correctly when he eventually fully satisfied his obligation pursuant to the amicable settlement, thereby, rendering his case moot and academic. ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Record of Civil Case No. 397-R, p. 8. 2 Record of Civil Case No. 397-R, pp. 23-24. 3 Civil Case No. 397-R, 4 Record in Civil Case No. 397-R, p. 26. 5 Rollo, p. 3. 6 Rollo, p. 36. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation G.R. No. L-62339 October 27, 1983 SPOUSES MORATA vs. SPOUSES GO Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-62339 October 27, 1983 SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, respondents. Amado G. Olis for petitioners. Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.

ESCOLIN., J.: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory process of arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, Petitioners contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts, now known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts. The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R22154. On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents. On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order dated October 3, 1982, as follows:
Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, shall be elevated for nullification of the award or for execution of the same, and considering that from the provision of Section 14 of the same law, the pre- condition to the filing of a complaint as provided for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law. In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants, of the order of September 2. 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby denied. [Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].

From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated December 2, 1982, We required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R22154. We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases: [1] Where the accused is under detention; [2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; [3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and [4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations

Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: [1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; [4] Offenses where there is no private offended party; [5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2 By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation. The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored tradition of amicably settling disputes among family and barangay level without judicial resources would promote the speedy administration of justice and implement the constitutional mandate to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen the family as a basic social institution; WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice contributes heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality of justice; WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion and thereby enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable to formally organize and institutionalize a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level.

There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is situated.

for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].

But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5 of the law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts. Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons. Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro is to that extent modified. This Circular takes effect immediately.

It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]." Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying petitioners' motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Fernando, CJ Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ concur. Makasiar and Teehankee, JJ., reserves his vote. De Castro, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.: concurring: I concur. The case filed by the Go spouses in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the collection of P49,400 from the Morata spouses, Civil Case No. R-22154, is covered by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, Presidential Decree No. 1508. The impression that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts does not seem to be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay or to those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality (Sec. 3). Cases between or among those persons should undergo the conciliation process, whatever may be the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved as long as they do not belong to the following cases:
(a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities unless such barangays adjoin each other; (b) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities; (c) Where one party is the government or any sub-division or instrumentality thereof; (d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a fine exceeding two hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus, physical injuries requiring medical attendance for not exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light threats, unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters for settlement; (f) Offenses where there is no private offended party, for example, littering, gambling, jaywalking, public scandal, vagrancy and prostitution; and, (g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in the interest of justice, determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government and Community Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan Pambarangay Rules).

The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in section 6 of the law. Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9, 1979 has enjoined all Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian

Courts, city courts, municipal courts and their clerks of court to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon their receipt of the certification of the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within their respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies to the cases in Regional Trial Courts or Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a complaint for damages in the sum of P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority of the Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Opinion No. 81, Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series of 198 1). The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court contemplates situations for the enforcement or nullification of settlement or arbitration award. If there is no award, the city or municipal court will have no occasion to intervene. Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and should receive commensurate remuneration for their work is another question.

Separate Opinions AQUINO, J.: concurring: I concur. The case filed by the Go spouses in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the collection of P49,400 from the Morata spouses, Civil Case No. R-22154, is covered by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, Presidential Decree No. 1508. The impression that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts does not seem to be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay or to those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality (Sec. 3). Cases between or among those persons should undergo the conciliation process, whatever may be the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved as long as they do not belong to the following cases:
(a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities unless such barangays adjoin each other; (b) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities; (c) Where one party is the government or any sub-division or instrumentality thereof; (d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a fine exceeding two hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus, physical injuries requiring medical attendance for not exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light threats, unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters for settlement;

(f) Offenses where there is no private offended party, for example, littering, gambling, jaywalking, public scandal, vagrancy and prostitution; and, (g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in the interest of justice, determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government and Community Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan Pambarangay Rules).

The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in section 6 of the law. Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9, 1979 has enjoined all Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian Courts, city courts, municipal courts and their clerks of court to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon their receipt of the certification of the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within their respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies to the cases in Regional Trial Courts or Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a complaint for damages in the sum of P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority of the Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Opinion No. 81, Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series of 198 1). The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court contemplates situations for the enforcement or nullification of settlement or arbitration award. If there is no award, the city or municipal court will have no occasion to intervene. Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and should receive commensurate remuneration for their work is another question. Footnotes
1 Promulgated June 11, 1978. 2 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Gimenez, I SCRA 267. 3 SECTION 11. Effect of amicable settlement and arbitration toward the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days after the date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court. 4 SECTION 12. Execution.The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution within one (1) year from the date of settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city/municipal court. 5 SECTION 14. Transmittal of settlement and arbitration award to court.- The Secretary of the Lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the local city or municipal court within five (5) days from the date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day period for repudiating the settlement and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the settlement and the Barangay Captain. 6 Dated November 9, 1979. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation G.R. No. L-65072 January 31, 1984 APOLINAR R. ROYALES, ET AL. vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-65072 January 31, 1984 APOLINAR R. ROYALES and PRESENTACION GREGORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE PLANAS, HON. J. CESAR SANGCO etc., et al., respondents. Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.: Sought to be annulled in this petition for review is a final and executory judgment rendered by the City Court [now Metropolitan Trial Court] of Manila in Civil Case No. 057662-CV on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Jose Planas, plaintiff therein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process before the filing of the case in court, as required by P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law." The facts upon which this issue rests are the following: The spouses Apolinar R. Royales and Presentacion Gregorio, petitioners herein, are the lessees of a residential house owned by respondent Jose Planas located at No. 1866 Int. I, Oroquieta St., Manila. On August 25, 1980, Planas instituted before the then City Court of Manila an ejectment suit against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 057662-CV and assigned to the sala of Judge J. Cesar Sangco. Issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. Respondent Planas testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined by petitioners' counsel. On November 10, 1981, when neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared at the hearing despite due notice, the case, on motion of respondent Planas, was considered submitted for decision. On November 26, 1981, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby accordingly rendered ordering defendants and all persons holding or claiming under them to immediately vacate the house located at No. 1866 Int. I Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, subject of this action and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff and to pay to the latter; 1. The sum of P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and 2. The costs of suit.

After the decision had become final and executory, Planas filed a motion for execution and the same was granted by the court. Execution of the judgment was however restrained by the Regional Trial Court of Manila upon the filing by petitioners of a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, wherein they assailed the said decision on ground of lack of jurisdiction, allegedly arising

from failure of respondent Planas to submit the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation as required by P.D. 1508. After due hearing, the Regional Trial Court handed down a decision declaring the judgment of the trial court null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Having found that "the parties in the case are residents not only of the same city, but of the same barangay, i.e., Bgy. 336, Zone 34, District 2, City of Manila," the court ruled:
Like the court of origin, this court is equally barren of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the subject controversy which was prematurely filed with the city court, even before it could be referred to the barangay authorities for conciliation as explicitly required under P.D. 1508, something the private respondent admittedly failed to do. The failure to allow the LUPON to act on the controversy at bar prior to the institution of the instant ejectment case did render the city court, and even this court, devoid of competence and jurisdiction to pass upon the present complaint of private respondent. There is, therefore, no recourse left but to dismiss it, without prejudice to refiling it after due observance of the formalities prescribed by law on the matter.

Reconsideration of the decision having been denied, respondent Planas appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which on July 12, 1982 promulgated a decision vacating the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, thus confirming the decision of the City Court of Manila. Unable to obtain a reconsideration thereof, petitioners filed the instant petition before this Court. The petition is devoid of merit. In disputes covered by P.D. 1508, as in the case at bar, the barangay conciliation process is a precondition for the filing of an action in court. This is so provided by Section 6 of the said law:
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in Court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement had been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated. ...

There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the complaint, the case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. In fact, respondent Planas failed to allege in his complaint compliance with this condition precedent. But is this omission fatal? Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; 1 but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo. While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntary. As this Court ruled in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy: 2

. . . . . . . a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86, A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court . . . . And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R.-SP-00342 is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, MelencioHerrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: A simple ejectment case has gone all the way to this Court and assigned not to a Division thereof but to the Banc on what appears to be a legal question of some novelty but which to me does not deserve the treatment accorded to it. I think it is enough that the case has gone before the City Court, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals. But having reached this Court and for this Court only to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, a simple denial of the petition instead of the full treatment given to it would have been sufficient and more appropriate.

Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: A simple ejectment case has gone all the way to this Court and assigned not to a Division thereof but to the Banc on what appears to be a legal question of some novelty but which to me does not

deserve the treatment accorded to it. I think it is enough that the case has gone before the City Court, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals. But having reached this Court and for this Court only to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, a simple denial of the petition instead of the full treatment given to it would have been sufficient and more appropriate. Footnotes
1 Johnston Lumber Co. vs. Court of Tax Appeal, 101 Phil. 151; De Guzman vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 30 SCRA 857. 2 23 SCRA 29. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation