Criminal Procedure Courts

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY.
TRANQUIL SALVADOR III
A. Definition of Criminal Procedure It is the method prescribed by law for the apprehension and prosecution of persons accused of any criminal offense and for their punishment, in case of conviction. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps which one who has committed a crime is to be punished. It is concerned with the procedural steps through which a criminal case passes, commencing with the initial investigation of a crime and concluding with the release of the offender. B. Source of Criminal Procedure
y y y y y y y y y y y y Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure General Order No. 58 dated April 23, 1900 Amendatory acts passed by the Philippine Commission The Quasi-Acts, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Jones law of 1916, the Tydings-McDuffie Law, and the Constitution of the Philippines The Rule of Court of 1940, and the 1964 (passed by Congress), 1985, and 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure Various Republic Acts Presidential Decrees Constitution Art. 3 Bill of Rights Civil Code (Art. 32, 33, 34) Judicial decisions Circulars (SC) The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000)
3. 4. 5.
6.
perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
C. Systems of Criminal Procedure

The Inquisitorial System y The detection and prosecution of offenders are not left to the initiative of private parties but to the officials and agents of law. y Judge is not limited to the evidence brought before him but could proceed with his own inquiry which is not confrontational. The Accusatorial System y Every citizen or a member of the group to which the injured party belongs may bring the accusation against a person suspected as the offender. As the action is a combat between the parties, the supposed offender has the right to be confronted by his accuser. The battle takes the form of a public trial and is judged by a magistrate who renders a verdict. The essence of an accusatorial system is the right to be presumed innocent. To defeat the presumption, the prosecution must establish proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty. Mixed System y Combination of inquisitorial and accusatorial. y Examination of defendants and other persons before filing the complaint is inquisitorial. y Judicial set-up in the Philippines is accusatorial or adversarial.
Can the SC amend the rules through its jurisprudence? Yes. Article 8 Sec. 5 1987 Constitution
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. 2. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
D. Criminal Jurisdiction of Courts a. b. c. d. e. f. g. General Principles Jurisdiction determined by the position Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint Jurisdiction acquired over the person of the accused Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by waiver Jurisdiction not conferred by consent Estoppels by laces to bar attacks on jurisdiction
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III
h. Adherence of jurisdiction i. Action of the court when determined that it has no jurisdiction j. Jurisdiction over Dangerous Drugs cases k. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts l. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts m. Special Jurisdiction of Courts n. Jurisdiction over the PNP by regular Courts o. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan p. Jurisdiction over Public Officers q. Offense deemed committed in relation to Public Office r. Jurisdiction not determined by allegations
s. Distinguished from jurisdiction of Ombudsman t. Certiorari Jurisdiction u. Exclusive Jurisdiction over PCGG cases v. Jurisdiction to annul Judgments w. Jurisdiction over Military and PNP x. Jurisdiction of Military Court y. No jurisdiction over civilians z. Jurisdiction acquired by reason of arrest does not apply to military proceedings
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Court of Appeals
Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
Regional Trial Courts

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction: (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and (2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter CIVIL Cases (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00); (4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00); (5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations; (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
CRIMINAL Cases (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (As amended by R. A, No. 7691) CIVIL Cases (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the 2B 2010
Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (As amended by R. A. No. 7691) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (As amended by R. A. No. 7691)
Special jurisdiction to try special cases. The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Special jurisdiction in certain cases. In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.
Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the where the 2B 2010
value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R. A. No. 7691) Special Rules of Procedure. Whenever a Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable under present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless subsequently amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court. Summary procedures in special cases. In Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases requiring summary disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible. Preliminary investigation. Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, That if after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima facie case, he shall forward the records of the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information with the proper court. No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed with him for preliminary investigation, unless after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds that a probable cause exists. Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served anywhere in the Philippines.
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D. Criminal Jurisdiction of Courts What is jurisdiction?

y y y y Jurisdiction is conferred by LAW Law congress, SC circular Law gives life, gives power to Jurisdiction A judge could only act within the power given by law within the parameter of the law.
Exceptions: Art. 2 RPC Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship; 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. Human Security Law Sec. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of theRevised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act. The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge 2B 2010
How will the judge know if he could act? He will base it on the INFORMATION because LAW says so. The INFORMATION/COMPLAINT tells whether or not he can act on it.
y Determined by the ALLEGATIONS ON THE COMPLAINT/INFORMATION
Power or authority given by the law to a court to hear and determine certain controversies.
VENUE IS JURISDICTIONAL. Place of commission dictates.

Venue is INSEPARABLE to JURISDICTION. BUT VENUE of TRIAL may be transferred.
y In criminal cases, Venue and Jurisdiction is considered as one. In civil cases, separate.
Venue Particular area in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case. It means the place of trial. Procedural May be waived or stipulated in CIVIL cases. BUT NOT IN CRIMINAL cases.
y y y
Jurisdiction The power of the court to decide the case on merits.
Substantive Granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.
Territorial in criminal cases Always the place where the crime is committed Cannot be waived in criminal cases
shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office. Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph.
BUT always start/institute in Location where crime is committed
A. General Principles People v. Mariano 76 SCRA 600

The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing Mariano of estafa. Mariano was the Liaison Officer of Mayor Nolasco and is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of the municipality. The property received were electric cables and cable powers amounting to P4,797.35 which he had a duty to deliver to the Mayor. However he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the items. Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information claiming that the court had no jurisdiction. He claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted by the Military Commission under a charge of malversation and found guilty. He claimed that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco has already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over him. Respondent judge granted the motion to quash stating that since the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court, the case for estafa has already been heard and decided. Issue: Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over estafa and committed by a civilian Held: there is no concurrent jurisdiction Ratio: The question of jurisdiction of respondent CFI is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1948 in Section 44 (f) provides the CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months or fine of more than 200 pesos. Estafa falls under the original jurisdiction of CFI. Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. At the time the criminal case was filed on Dec 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court is the Judiciary Act of 1948. General Order No. 49 dated Oct 4, 1974, redefines the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and malversation are not enumerated therein. Therefore, the Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
Without LAW, Court has no JURISDICTION. If court has no jurisdiction, what should it do? A court cannot transfer, it must dismiss the case. (RCBC case) Example. You reside in Makati, crime was committed in QC. Where do you file? Physical injuries/estafa: QC Residence is IMMATERIAL Libel: has special rules:
y y y y Where the essential elements of crime was committed. Published. Private: residence Public: office Residence is MATERIAL in LIBEL.
BP 22: Where the essential elements of the crime is committed Estafa: where the crime is committed. Example. Crime in Laguna, but tried in Pasig to avoid miscarriage of Justice because he is a mayor in Laguna. Ampatuan Massacre. Though crime was in Maguindanao, it is being tried here in Manila. What Could be transferred is the VENUE of the TRIAL; subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
y Must apply to the Supreme Court
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We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that whoever takes cognizance first acquires jurisdiction exclusive of the other. The Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the crime of estafa against Mariano hence there is no concurrent jurisdiction to speak of. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts. Doctrines: Jurisdiction basic foundation of judicial proceedings. The word jurisdiction is derived from two Latin words juris and dico I speak by the law which means fundamentally the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction acquired by court over subject matter of controversy retained up to the end of litigation. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of instituting the action and not at the time of the commission of the crime. US v. Jueves 23 Phil. 100 The defendants/appellants were charged with the crime of brigandage or highway robbery for having committed the following acts: (1) On the evening of December 31, 1903, in Alabat, Tayabas Province, a band of armed men entered the municipal building, bound the presidente, took seven guns, and killed the Justice of Peace of that town. (2) On the evening of February 04, 1904, a band of some twenty men ( 3 armed with guns and the rest with bolos ) entered the house of Doroteo Maraver, situated in the sitio of Capalohan (at that time, a part of the town of Capalongan, Ambos Camarines ), tied and bound four men, and ordered the women to prepare a meal for them. After eating, they left with them men whom they bound and also some tobacco and rice. They went to the house of Francisco Ambas, one of their prisoners, where they took a hog and other things. Afterwards, they proceeded to a river where they liberated Angelo Lunasco and Doroteo Maraver (two of their prisoners ). (3) On Holy Thursday of 1904, a band of men, armed with a revolver, 3 shotguns, and bolos, went to the barrio of Basiad ( also within the jurisdiction of Capalongan, Ambos Camarines at that time ) taking 3 men as prisoners, conducting them from place to place. One of the prisoners, Juan Talento, managed to escape. (4) One morning of August 1910, two of the accused, Agustin Jueves and Felix Jueves, with their younger brother, Esteban Jueves, all armed with large bolos, entered the house of Serapio Juego, situated near the sea of sitio of Pangas, municipality of Calauag, Tayabas, and took possession of a small quantity of rice. yGraciana Laiman, wife of Francisco Ambos, and Doroteo Maraver identified all
seven of the accused of having committed the unlawful acts. yAngelo Lunasco identified 5 of the accused and Juan Talento identified 3 of the accused of having committed the unlawful acts. yThe testimonies of the witnesses show conclusively that the guilt of the appellants has been established beyond any question of doubt. NOTES: A small portion of the Province of Ambos Camarines was transferred to the Province of Tayabas. The Court of First Instance of Tayabas took jurisdiction of the crime committed within the transferred territory PRIOR to the time jurisdiction was conferred and convicted the appellants. ISSUES: 1.) W/N the Court of First Instance of Tayabas has jurisdiction of the crime committed within the transferred territory PRIOR to the time jurisdiction was conferred. 2.) W/N the assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was conferred is in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Philippine Bill. RATIO: 1.) YES. The territory where the acts complained of in the case at bar were committed having been transferred to the Province of Tayabas prior to the institution of this action, the court of that province had jurisdiction to hear and determine this case.The change of the territory after the crime was committed and before the institution of this action does not touch the offense nor change the punishment therefor. It only includes the place of the commission of the offense within another judicial district, and subjects the Appellants to trial in that district. The court held that the jurisdiction of Tayabas court was complete. 2.) NO. The assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was conferred is not in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Philippine Bill having said that the change of the territory after the crime was committed and before the institution of this action does not touch the offense nor change the punishment. It does not prejudice the rights of the accused. DECISION: The Supreme Court held that CFI of Tayabas has jurisdiction of the crime and affirmed the conviction of the appellants.
Reyes v. Diaz 73 Phils. 484

Issue was W/N there is sufficient evidence to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy and W/N the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest. Doctrine: Courts; Jurisdiction; Supreme Courts Appelate Powers. the issue of jurisdiction which confers appellate powers upon the Supreme Court in a given case is not such 2B 2010
question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere instruction of the pleadings, but that which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter as determined by law. Id; Id; Over subject matter how determined. the question of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land. Id; Id; Question of Filing Cert. of Candidacy; Case at Bar. in the instant case, there is no question of jurisdiction. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestants certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has jurisdiction, but that if such fact is not proven the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact whether or not the protestants certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined. Id; Id; Jurisdiction over Subject Matter and Issue Distinguished. Over Issue Conferred by pleadings May be conferred by consent, either express or implied. Even if not duly pleaded, it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. Over Subject Matter Conferred by law X X
After finding prima facie evidence of petitioners intent to kill and he was on the performance of his duties when the shooting occurred, the City Fiscal recommended the case be referred to the Tanodbayan for further investigation. The Tanodbayan endorsed the filing of information for homicide against petitioner. The case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D.1850 which authorizes the Chief of Phil. Constabulary (PC) to convene court martials to try, hear, and decide cases for criminal acts committed by members of the INC. Petitioner challenges the assumption of jurisdiction by the General Court Martial over his case pursuant to E.O 1040 in relation to E.O. 1012 whereby supervision and control over all units and members of the INC have been placed under NAPOLCOM directly under the Office of the President. Relevant Issue: Whether the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the case. Held: Yes Ratio: It is specifically stated under EO 1012 that only the operational supervision and direction over all units of the INC force stationed or assigned in the diff. cities and municipalities that was transferred from the PC to the city or municipal govt. concerned. Under EO 1040, it is the exercise of administrative control and supervision over all units of the INC forces throughout the country that was transferred to the President of the Phils. The distinction between operational supervision and direction over the INC and jurisdiction or authority of a courtmartial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding is that in the former, it refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance, while in the latter, it refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them. Uy v. Sandiganbayan 312 SCRA 77
Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary 157 SCRA 147

Facts: Petitioner is a regular member of the Integrated National Police (INC) of Tacloban City, with rank of Patrolman. On April 16, 1982, at around 6pm while directing traffic, petitioner tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a tricycle driver, for violation of traffic rules and regulations. An altercation occurred between them and resulted in the shooting at the left cheek leading to the death of Romeo Lozano. The widow of Lozano, Mrs. Lozano, filed an administrative complaint against petitioner in NAPOLCOM.NAPOLCOM issued a decision which held petitioner guilty of grave misconduct with a penalty of Dismissal from Service. On a motion for reconsideration, petitioner was held guilty for Less Grave Misconduct and modified the penalty to suspension for 6 months without pay. During the pendency of the administrative case, Mrs. Lozano filed a complaint for homicide with the City Fiscals Office of Tacloban.
Uy was member of Phil. Navy. He was designated by his supervisor to act on his behalf during his absence which included authority to sign disbursement vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the Navy. 6 Informations for estafa through falsification of official documents were filed against him and other coaccused regarding malversation of the funds for seal rings. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations and one of the grounds is that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused. Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Petitioner and Sol Gen submit that it is the court-martial who has jurisdiction over the case because at the time the informations were filed, the controlling law on the jurisdiction over the AFP is PD 150. Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan has jurisdicition? Held: No. 2B 2010
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Ratio: Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petitioner at the time of the filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law. The petitioner did not fall within the rank requirement stated in Sec 4 of Sandiganbayan Law, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
xxx 5)
All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Jurisdiction determined by the position

Subido v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 122641; January 20, 1997) Facts: On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and Rene Parina, a BID special agent, while in the performance of their official functions, issued and implemented a warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimuk, knowing fully well that the BID decision requiring Maksimuks deportation was not yet final and executory. This resulted to the detention of Maksimuk for a period of 43 days, causing him undue injury. Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. For their part, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case since when it was filed, Subido was no longer part of the service and Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 27. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case Ruling: Yes. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case by virtue of Section 2 of R.A. 7975, which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 Section 2: Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 4: Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense; 1) Officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 6758), specificially including:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to the office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with the Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14, and 14-A. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in said R.A. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested n the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Blg. 129. Contrary to the claims of the petitioners, R.A. 7975 applies since what is considered is the time of the commission of the crime, during which Subido was still Commissioner of BID. Similarly, although Parina was holding a position with a classification lower than salary grade 27, it still applies to him since he is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the principal accused. Jurisdiction is only vested on the other courts if none of the principal accused where occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27. CUYCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 137017-18, February 8, 2000 FACTS: Graft Investigation Officer Ma. Lourdes M. Vilaria-Yap found probable cause for the indictment of Ramon G. Cuyco (petitioner), Generoso P. Germino and Melcy V. Wee for violation of Section 3(a), R.A.3019, and Cuyco with Rolando R. Madarang for violation of Section 3(e) of the same Act. (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) She recommended the filing of two informations against Cuyco. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation, and the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against Cuyco for both offenses. Cuyco filed a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the cases. The Sandiganbayan issued resolutions denying the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of Cuyco and his co-accused for ninety (90) days. Cuyco filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to set aside the resolutions in question and to dismiss the criminal cases for want of jurisdiction. This was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the cases against petitioner for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e), R.A.3019, as amended. HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction. 2B 2010

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RATIO: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses and felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where the accused holds a position with salary grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. At the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), R.A., as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 6758) in relation to their office.
Philippines, with principal address at 9 floor, GR Antonio Bldg, TM Kalaw, ERmita in said city in the following manner: the said accused. The City of manila was alleged in the information so the Manila RTC has jurisdiction. US v Gallegos Facts: y y y Criminal complaint for adultery includes both parties. Mariano Gallegos had relations with Benita Antioquia several times, and as a result Antioquia gave birth to a daughter Complaint includes both Gallegos and Antioquia, but only Gallegos was arrested, because Antioquia could not be apprehended after due diligence
C. Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint

Buaya v. Polo Facts: Buaya is the insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Company. She is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to Country Bankers. The account of Buaya was audited and it was showed that P358,850 was unremitted. She was charged with estafa in the Manila RTC. Buaya filed a motion to Quash on the ground that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction because she is from Cebu and that the case is civil in nature (a separate civil case was filed) but was denied. She filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was also denied. So now, she filed a certiorari in the Supreme Court questioning the denials of such motion by Judge Polo. The case did not go through the Court of Appeals Issue: Did the court have jurisdiction over the case? Held: YES. Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Estafa was sufficiently addressed in the information. Estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and the case can be instituted upon any place where any of the essential requisites of Estafa were committed. One of the essential requisites of rd Estafa is damage or prejudice to 3 persons. Here, given that the main office of Country Bankers is in Manila, the non remittance of Buaya which caused damage to Country Bankers was committed in Manila. The information in this case reads as follows: that during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corp represented by Banez duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws of the
Issue: 1. W/N, in a criminal action for adultery one of the defendants may be tried alone when for some reason or other his co-defendant has not been arrested and brought to trial 2. W/N prosecution, after closing its case, may present additional proof relating to the jurisdiction of the court Held/Ratio: 1. Yes. While the law provides that the complaint must be presented, in a criminal action for adultery (a) by the offended person and (b) against both of the alleged culprits, there is no provision of law requiring that they shall be tried jointly. In fact, there is a positive provision of law permitting them to be tried separately (section 33, general orders no. 58) Yes. Section 31, General Orders no. 58 provides that after both parties have presented their evidence, they may offer rebutting testimony only, unless the court, in the furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new and additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. The question of jurisdiction of the court is always a question of importance. If evidence is necessary to prove that fact, so far as the place of the commission of the rime is concerned, in the interest of justice the court may always permit it to present additional evidence, if that fact appears before the trial of the case is closed
2.
D. Jurisdiction acquired over the person of the accused

REPUBLIC vs. SUNGA June 20, 1988 2B 2010
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An Information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. A hearing was set but was postponed since Rafael Anadilla was not yet arrested by the authorities. The court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set a new trial date. However, 4 months before the trial date, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads: Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio. Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order. SO ORDERED. The order was based on an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE which was executed and notarized by the victim and mentioned that: a. he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the case b. he had forgiven the accused c. his material witnesses could not be located, and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but was also denied. Hence the petition and issue of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. HELD: No. RATIO: The court cites a similar case Crespo v. Mogul in its when it answered that the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The rule is that once a complaint is filed, the disposition of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the court when the case has been submitted to it as his jurisdiction ends in the direction and control of the prosecution of the case. Only the court can decide what the best direction is for the case, as it is within its exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, almost 10 years have elapsed since the date of the filing of the information, hence it was not unusual that the victim could not find his witnesses, the testimonies of whom are needed to convict the accused. The fiscal still believed that he could convict the accused without thee testimonies in his MR! Although the Crespo doctrine holds that it is the courts duty to judge whether a case should be dismissed, any move of the offended part to dismiss the case, even without objection of the accused, should first be submitted to the fiscal. It is only after the fiscals hearing that the court should exercise its duty to continue or dismiss the case.
E. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by waiver

US v De la Santa *This case was decided in 1907, when the old Penal and Civil Codes were still in effect. The old Penal Code provision on seduction covered the age range of 12-23, while the old Civil Code places a womans age of majority at 23. Facts: y y y y y Issues: y y y Does the father have such right to institute a Seduction complaint, taking Teofilas age (of majority, upon filing) into consideration? Does De la Santas lack of objection over the complaint, being outside the CFIs jurisdiction, effectively make him waive his right to such defect? With Teofilas attendance and testimony in the CFI proceedings, may she be said to have instituted the proceedings, though the complaint was signed and sworn by her father? 2B 2010 De la Santa allegedly seduced Teofila Sevilla in 1902, under promise of marriage, when she was under 21. The complaint was filed only in 1906, when she was already 24. It was at Esteban Sevillas instance, private prosecutor and Teofilas dad, that the complaint was filed. The Marinduque CFI convicted De la Santa of Seduction. Hindi na dumaan sa CA yung case.
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Held/Ratio y No. Article 448 of the old Penal Code does not automatically authorize the institution of criminal proceedings by all the mentioned parties. Though the act may only be committed upon a woman still legally incapacitated, all other alternative parties mentioned, like the father, lose their right to do so when the victim reaches the age of majority. Though mentioned disjunctively, the right to institute criminal proceedings in seduction is exclusively and successively conferred in the order they are named. (victim muna, then parents, then grandparents, then guardian) Also, the lawmakers did not intend this conjunction of rights, bearing in mind the possibility of pardon by the offended party while these other persons are attempting to file complaints. No. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, in the trial court or on appeal. Jurisdiction may only be conferred by law, and the accused cannot confer jurisdiction, by waiver or otherwise. No. Nothing on record indicated such, and the fact that she was subpoenaed compelled her to appear, voluntary or not. (beside the point daw, taking active part in the proceedings is not sufficient basis for this unless she herself submitted and formally maintained the complaint)
The fact that the CFI of Manila took jurisdiction of the offense charged, because, in the opinion of the court, the place of the commission of the crime was not clearly shown, is not an obstable to the courts declaring itself to be without jurisdiction as soon as the lack of jurisdiction appeared from proceedings subsequently had. Jurisdiction over criminal cases cannot be conferred by consent.
G. Estoppels by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ALEX REGALARIO ET.AL. GR NO. 101451 MARCH 23,1993 Facts: Regalario and 6 others were found guilty of murder of a Menardo Garcia. (CrimPro relevant) Judgment of conviction was promulgated on Jan 17 and a copy of which was received by the appellants counsel the next day, Jan 18. Appellants filed MR on Jan 31 but the court denied on Feb 22. On March 14, appellants filed notice of appeal but the trial court denied for having been filed out of time. (Syllabus topic relevant)Neither the State nor private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal made by the appellants nor objected to the order of the trial court to forward the records to the SC for appellate review Issue: On the matter of filing within the reglamentary period: Whether the lower court erred in denying notice of appeal on the ground of being filed out of time y Appellants claim: computation of 15 days within which to file notice of appeal should have been counted from Feb 23(day after the MR was denied) and not from Jan 31 (day the verdict pre-MR was given) y In short, the appellants claim that the 15 day reglamentary period should have restarted on the day of the denial of the MR y On the matter concerning the syllabus topic, Estoppel by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction y (Counsel for the state questions authority of the Supreme Court to review the case) Ruling of the lower court: (Issue on procedure is being questioned for the first time in the Supreme Court) y y Ruling of the Supreme Court: (TRIAL COURT DENIAL OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AFFIRMED): y y The notice of appeal was filed beyond the reglamentary period set by law Section 6 of Rule 122 states that: appeal must be taken 15 days from promulgation or notice of judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new 2B 2010
y y y
F. Jurisdiction not conferred by consent

US vs Reyes Facts The defendant was charged with the crime of estafa and falsification. He is an employee of the Manila-Dagupan Railway. He issued a ticket to a passenger who was going from Manila to Caloocan who continued his trip to Malolos. The ticket issued that simulated the trip was from Manila to Bocaue which costs 18 cents. There was a 1 peso and 22 cents difference in the fare. The complaint does not designate the place where the falsification was committed. Issue: Where must the jurisdiction be vested? Held: The case must be tried in Tarlac and not in Manila. y According to the testimony of the accused, he rendered an account to the station master at Tarlac of the Money collected during the trip. It is also there where he delivered the stub in which the simulation or falsification was committed. In an itemized account of the collections made him on the trip, an entry corresponding to the stub alleged to have been falsified was dated in Tarlac and contains an invoice of delivery signed by the accused and a receipt signed by the station master for the sum of 6 pesos and 48 cents. Because it was within the territory of the court that the appropriation constituting the crime of estafa was committed and the accused made use of the document alleged to be false at the same territory.
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y y
trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his attorney... The rule states period shall only be interrupted thus appellants only had 1 day with which to file notice of appeal with the trial court Estoppel by laches to bar attacks of jurisdiction of the court had already attached. Neither the public or private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal or objected to the order of the trial court to forward records to the Supreme Court for appellate review. It was only after appellants had already filed their briefs with the SC that counsels for the state raised the issue of belated appeal and lack of appellate jurisdiction of the SC in the case.
y y y
H. Adherence of jurisdiction
Dela Cruz vs. Moya Facts: Section -Dela Cruz is a Member of the Armed Forces Intelligence and Operations
y y
Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder (of Gargar and Lumangyao) were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against 14 persons, 5 whom are members of the PNP Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment Prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused Private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan (SB) on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers RTC issued an order denying the motion The prosecution, represented by the OSG, prayed for a TRO challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge Magallanes to transfer the cases to the SB
Issue: w/n RTC of Bacolod City has jurisdiction over the case instead of the SB - YES Ruling: At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the SB was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 y Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial. y For lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the RTC and not of the SB y The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to public office." y The SB partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corruption), it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 (R.A. 7975) and officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758) y Also, upon express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the SB shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the SB under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the SB CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION: y Padilla: the act of Torres was undoubtly connected with his position as station commander of PNP; others were performing as law enforcers such y 2B 2010
- armed with a MISSION ORDER, DelaCruz proceeds to Maco, Davao del Norte to investigate reports of illegal cockfighting being conducted - Delacruz and company catches operators of cockfighting, including deceased Eusebio Cabito in flagrante -Delacruz and co.fails to arrest operators but confiscates evidence of the crime (eg. Gaffs, fighting cocks, etc) -Delacruz and co. were followed by the cockfight operators on their way back to the PC headquarters, fighting ensued wherein Delacruz shot Cabito Aug 2, 1979 Delacruz is charged with homicide in the CFI of Davao Issues: Held: W/N CFI has jurisdiction over the subject matter NO.
Ratio: -Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing must have jurisdiction over of the subject matter of the case. Determined by the statute at force at the time the action was commenced -at that time General Order.59 was operative giving military tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel while in the performance of their official duty -Delacruz was executing a Mission Order=performing official duties -court records contain a copy of Mission Order; certificate from secretary of DND is unnecessary -CFI was without jurisdiction to try the case People vs Magallanes Facts:
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y Uy v. CA Facts:
that the case must be prosecuted in the SB. The informations must have been filed with the SB. Kapunan: in favor of granting bail
Binay vs. Sandiganbayan FACTS: 2 cases, one against Binay, another against Magsaysay Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 3 separate informations against Binay for violation of Art 220 RPC, 2 violations of Sec3(e), RA3019, alleging that these crimes were committed during Binays incumbency in Makati Sandiganbayan denied motion to quash - filing of charges to filing of information took 6 years thus denied his right to due process Sandigan granted motion to suspend accused pendente lite and ordered him suspended for 90 days RA 7975 took effect redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Binay filed a motion to refer his case to the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that the resolutions denying motion to quash and granting preventive suspension were issued when the Sandiganbayan had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases (DENIED) Municipal Mayor - classified as grade 27; at the time of the commission of the offenses, Binay was municipal mayor, although he received salary less than that received by grade 27, the compensation act was not yet in existence at the time of the commission of the crimeAt the time the act was passed, Binay was receiving salary under grade 28 SC issued a TRO based on Binays motion Magsaysay-mayor of San Pascual, Batangas; charged w/ violation of RA3019, w/ the RTC of Batangas; another info. was filed w/ the Sandiganbayan, for overpricing a landscaping project Magsaysay filed a motion to quash the info. w/ the Sandiganbayan-no jurisdiction over the matter-DENIED prosecutor Mallonga filed a petition w/ the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan by virtue of RA7975 SC: it is the Sandiganbayan w/c has jurisdiction over the cases *when RA7975 took effect, Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan; on the other hand, the RA was already in effect when the info. against Magsaysay was filed w/ the RTC; while the cases were pending, RA8249 was enacted
Uy formed a partnership with Leong to contribute to the formers lumber business. A lumber store was erected using the funds Leong contributed. Their relationship soured and this prompted Leong to ask for her investment back. The checks issued by Uy were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Leong lodged a complaint for Estafa and a violation of BP 22. Manila RTC acquitted Uy from Estafa but was convicted for BP 22. Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law Whether the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel applies Held: The RTC of Manila did not acquire jurisdiction. No. Ratio: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by the courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or anyone of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The various dealings were held in Manila, and thus the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the Estafa case. However, there is no evidence that shows that jurisdiction over the BP 22 was acquired. (related sa issue ng crimpro) The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117 Sec.3, states that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on the ground of (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the accused or the offense charged. Sec. 8 of the same rule says that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, is deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash. However, Section 3(b) states that an exception to this is the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In this case, it cannot be said that Uy is estopped to question the jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila even if she questioned it 5 years into the trial already. It can be questioned at any stage of the proceeding. EXCEPTIONS
ISSUE: 1. Had the sandigan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the pages of RA 7975 coupled with the filing earlier of an 2B 2010
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information for the same offense before the RTC having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense -Binay and Magsaysay contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because 1) at the alleged time of the commission of the offenses, they were not classified as grade 27; 2) municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration of Sec.4(a)(1) of PD1606 as amended by RA7975; 3) congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; also contend that pay scales determine salary grade classifications HELD: SANDIGANBAYAN RETAINS JURISDICTION OVER BINAYs CASE the constitution states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of govt officials and EEs, congress shall take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions; RA6758 provides that differences in pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions; grade, as defined in PD958: all classes of positions w/c, although different with kind of subject matter or work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions w/in one range of basic compensation; grade w/c determines salary; possible that an officials salary may be less than prescribed for his grade to determine WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, reference should be made to RA6758 and the index of occupational services, position titles and salary grades; salary grade is a matter of law, not of proof; index lists municipal mayors under salary grade 27, therefore, are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan the rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. RA7975, Sec.7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule; the provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in w/c trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan the trial of Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of RA7975, therefore, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over the case
Binay invokes the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character w/c would have st prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the 1 instance; filing of the info. in Sandiganbayan-subsequent happening or event no application; RTC never had jurisdiction over the case estoppel cannot be successfully invoked; jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel; estoppel remains the exception rather than the rule no double jeopardy when the accused enters a plea in a court that has no jurisdiction. SANCHEZ and MANAGAY vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Petitioners are officers of the Philippine Army (PA). Lt. Col. Lino A. Sanchez at times material hereto was Commanding Officer, 9th Post Engineer Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Support Group (HHSG), Philippine Army. Major Vicente S. Managay was G-4, HHSG, Philippine Army. A pre-trial investigating officer, submitted a report to the Commanding General, Philippine Army, stating that there was a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of the Articles of War for causing the wrongful release of P599,547.00 for payment of renovation of an office in the Phil. Army. On the basis of the report, they initiated court martial proceedings against petitioners before the Philippine Army Permanent General Court Martial. Both of the petitioners were arraigned before the Court Martial and both pleaded not guilty. The investigating officers also referred the findings to the Provincial Prosecutor while there were court martial proceedings against the petitioners recommending the filing of an information with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners for violation of R.A. No. 3019. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal endorsed the records to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman filed with Sandiganbayan information against them for the violating the said RA. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and was denied through a resolution stating that the offenses charged in the court martial are distinct and separate from each other. Thus, the petitioners were also arraigned in Sandiganbayan and they pleaded not guilty. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial reiterating that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case as the court martial had acquired original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to R.A. No. 7055, and that the acts complained of in the charge sheet in the court martial and the Information before the Sandiganbayan were the same or identical. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for lack of merit. 2B 2010
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Hence, the petitioners filed the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: No. Though the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction when the case was filed, it no longer had jurisdiction over the case under RA 7975. This law removing the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the case was passed before the motion for reconsideration was submitted. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction when the motion for reconsideration was denied. LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Adherence of Jurisdiction (Exceptions) & Action of the Court when determined that it has no jurisdiction & Jurisdiction of the SB (Offense deemed committed in relation to Public Office) Facts: 11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Petitioner Lacson and petitioners-intervenors Acop and Zubia were members of ABRITG. SPO2 de los Reyes exposed to the media that what actually happened between the members of the Kuratong Baleleng and the ABRITG was a summary execution (rub-out) and not a shoot-out. Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel to investigate the incident. Upon investigation, all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the incident were absolved from any criminal liability because it was a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels ruling and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against 26 respondents, including Lacson, Acop and Zubia. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation and 11 informations for murder were filed against Lacson, as principal, Acop and Zubia as accessories before the Sandiganbayans Second Divisio Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, the SB allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed 11 amended informations before the SB, wherein Lacson was charged only as an accessory. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the SB, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They said that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the SB to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. They did not qualify under the said requisites because the highest ranking principal has the rank of only a Chief Inspector and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thus, the SB admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the QC RTC, which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting the cases should remain with the SB. Petitioner and some of the accused opposed. Pending the motions for reconsideration, RA 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the SB by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (a & c) of R.A. 7975. Even before the issue of jurisdiction came up with the filing of the amended informations, the house bill for that was already introduced in Congress. ISSUES: WON Sections 4 & 7 of R.A. 8249 is unconstitutional. WON the statute violates the petitioners right to due process and equal protection clause because the provisions seemed to have been designed for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the case. WON the statute is an ex-post facto law. Whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction. WON the offense of multiply murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers, making the case fall within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. HELD: SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF R.A. 8249 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. The issue on due process and equal protection is too shallow to deseve merit. There were no concrete evidence and convincing argument presented. The classification made by the law was reasonable and not arbitrary. There is nothing ex post facto in the statute. Generally, ex post facto laws deal with the retroactive effect of penal laws and the said R.A. is procedural in nature. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES. For a case to be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it must be shown that the offense charged in the information was committed in relation to the office of the accused. In People v. Montejo, the court held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimacy must be alleged in the information, which is what determines the jurisdiction of the court. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would show the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged. It does not even matter whether the phrase committed in relation to his office appears in the information or not. 2B 2010
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In the case at bar, what the amended information contains is a mere allegation that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office and that is not sufficient. Such phrase is merely a conclusion of law. Since it was not proven that the crime of murder was committed in the discharge of their duties, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the cases.
RULING: Petition should be dismissed without prejudice to RCBCs instituting an original action with the proper court of jurisdiction. The complaint is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metro Manila MTCs. Instead of ordering the transfer of the complaint to the MTC, respondent RTC judge, therefore, should have dismissed the case prayed for by RCBC for lack of jurisdiction. RATIO: A. Civil actions and settlement of estate proceedings, testate or intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies when warranted, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), or Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in Metro Manila, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs (the amount of which must be specifically alleged), shall, after the effectivity of R.A. 7691, be filed with the metropolitan and municipal trial courts. B. Civil actions or a settlement of estate proceedings, aforesaid, pending with regional trial courts which have already reached the pretrial stage at the time of the effectivity of R.A. 7691 shall remain with said courts for proper disposition. The transfer of pending cases (which have already reached the pretrial stage) to metropolitan or municipal trial courts may be allowed, however, provided the following conditions concur; viz.: (a) the case is cognizable by the municipal or metropolitan trial court under the present provisions of the Act; and (b) the parties agree to the transfer of the case from the regional trial court to the municipal or metropolitan trial court. C. R.A. 7691 took effect on 15 April 1994 or fifteen (15) days after its publication on 30 March 1994. Cases filed on or after such effectivity date must accord with the new jurisdictional mandate; a disregard thereof shall constitute a ground for the dismissal of the action or proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. REPUBLIC VS. ASUNCION FACTS: Private Respondent Alexander Dionisio Y Manio, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street, Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded there, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. Pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City 2B 2010
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Action of the court when determined that it has no jurisdiction
US v Morales Facts: Morales was convicted of brigandage under Section 1 Act No. 518 by the CFI in Manila. He contended, however, that CFI Manila has no jurisdiction on him because he was arrested in Malabon and was subsequently brought to Manila from their place of arrest contrary to Sec.1 Act No 518 which states that person guilty of brigandage must be punished in the place in which they may be taken or from which they may have fled. Issue: Does CFI Manila have jurisdiction? Held and Ruling: No, it does not have jurisdiction since Morales was arrested in Malabon and not in Manila. Pursuant to Sec. 1 Act No. 518, they must be punished in the place where they may be taken or where they may have fled. SC Remanded the case to the proper court with jurisdiction. RCBC V. ISNANI FACTS: Lolita Encelan filed a complaint, on 27 April 1994 (a few days after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7691), with the Makati Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), seeking to recover from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation the amount of $5,000.00 as actual damage or its Philippine peso equivalent of approximately P137,675.00. RCBC thereupon moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint was cognizable by the metropolitan trial court (in Metro Manila), not the RTC, the principal demand prayed for not being in excess of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000). RTC Judge Lucia V. Isnani, instead of dismissing the complaint, transferred, on 08 July 1994, the entire records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC"). Upon learning of the transfer, RCBC sought (with the MTC) a reconsideration thereof. On 16 September 1994, respondent MTC Judge Navarro-Quiambao issued an Order denying the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the complaint was properly filed with the RTC of Makati?
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Prosecutor filed a case with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an information charging Dioniso with the crime of homicide. While trial was already in progress, the respondent Judge issued an order, motu propio, an order requiring the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court should still proceed with the trial of the case. In view of the decision of the SC in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, the Sandiganbayn has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense id higher than prision correcional. The murder charge against petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death hence it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it. Respondent Judge dismissed the Criminal Case for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Private prosecutor moved for reconsideration, citing the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts as provided in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court. The respondent judge denied the motion. Hence this petition ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. NO. 6975 VESTS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING PNP MEMEBERS ONLY IN THE REGULAR COURTS WHICH EXCLUDES THE SANDIGANBAYAN SINCE IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY AND STATUTORILY A SPECIAL COURT. RATIO: INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM REGULAR COURTS IN R.A. 6975 Police forces have traditionally been under the civil authority. The overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution against martial law regime and the militarization of the police forces prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and maintenance of one police force. R.A No. 6975 on the PNP are intended to implement Section 6, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, national in scope and civilian in character. This civilian character is unqualified and unconditional and is therefore, all-embracing. The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of R.A. No. 6975 faithfully carried out this mandate. The civilian character refers to its orientation and structure. The mandate of Section 46 R.A 6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and to return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts and was explicitly provided for in the original Section 68 of the House Bill No. 23614. The terms civil courts and regular courts were used interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the Senate and House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP.
IS SANDIGANBAYAN INCLUDED IN THAT TERM Regular Courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law. Per Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987, such lower courts include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shara District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Sharia Circuit Courts. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article xiii of the 1973 Constitution. This was revised by P.D. 1606 and amended by P.D. 1860 then 1861. Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: a. Exclusive original jurisdiction: Violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, R.A. 1379, and Chapter 2 Title VII of the RPC; 2. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their officeb. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction Undoubtedly then, Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts of Sec. 46 R.A. No. 6975. Courts of special jurisdiction, which are permanent in character, are also regular courts. The Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a permanent anti-graft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to certain classes of offenses This is further strongly indicated by Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1606 which vests upon it all the inherent powers of a court of justice and places it on the same level as the Court of Appeals, and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which grants it appellate jurisdiction over certain case decided by the RTC, MeTC, MTC, and MCTC. ***That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office must, however, be alleged in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Sec. 4(a)(2). This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office and If it was in relation to his office, DIRECTING the respondent judge to transmit the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it; or If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set aside the Challenged Orders, to proceed with the hearing of the case and to render judgment thereon. Cunanan v. Arceo There was a fistfight between victim and 2 other people which resulted to death of victim. An information for murder was filed at the RTC of Pampanga against Cunanan. It did not allege that Cunanan was in performance of his official functions. He was arraigned and trial was completed. Before rendering decision, the judge ordered that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The judge issued another order stating that the case be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan as if it was originally filed with the Sandiganbayan following jurisprudence laid down in Republic v. Asuncion. The 2B 2010 1.
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petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal contending that the information filed did not contain any averment that the crime was committed in relation to his office. Issue: W/N RTC judges correctly applied the doctrine of Asuncion, considering that the absence of jurisdiction of RTC became apparent only after completion of trial and submission of case for decision. Held/Ratio: Yes, order for dismissal and transfer was correct. Even if the information failed to include that the petitioner was in performance of his official functions, the fact was proven during trial. There are only two requisites for Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction based on the law: (a) that the crime was committed by a public officer in relation to his office and (b) that the crime has a penalty higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for more than 6 years or a fine greater than 6,000. Petitioner also cannot use the defense of double jeopardy, RTC never had jurisdiction over the case. The order of dismissal is not equal to acquittal. His trial in Sandiganbayan will be his first jeopardy. Lacson v. Executive Secretary Facts stated above. Issue/doctrine relevant to action of court when it determines that it has no jurisdiction: Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan Discussed above. Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the [10] cases falls with the Regional Trial Court. We sustain petitioner's contention. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, issued on August 5, 1998, September 21, 1998,
and December 16, 1998, in Criminal Case Nos. 23016 and 23017, and makes the temporary restraining order permanent. The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 23016 and 23017, for lack of jurisdiction. However, the Ombudsman may re-file the cases with the court of proper jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga City, and inform this Court of the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from finality.
J. Jurisdiction over Dangerous Drugs cases

MORALES V. CA Petitioner: Ernesto Morales Respondents: Court of Appeals, Hon. Alfredo Gustilo, as presiding judge of RTC, and People of the Philippines Facts Petitioner was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground the penalty for the offense charged should not exceed prision correccional or six years worth of imprisonment and that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the case. In denying this motion, the RTC reasons out that, while MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases with penalties of not more than six years of imprisonment, an exception is provided in the said Act. It provides the Court of First Instance (currently, the RTC) shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable under the Act. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the case. Hence, this petition In raising the same to SC, petitioner furthers that, since only about 0.5 gram of shabu was involved, the imposable penalty would not exceed prision correccional. Therefore, RTC doesnt have jurisdiction over his case. The proper penalty was only Issue Whether RTC has jurisdiction to try petitioners alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. W/N the CA has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the issue is the jurisdiction of respondent RTC judge to try the alleged violation of RA 6425.
Held Petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolutions of 8 August and 2B 2010
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13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the challenged orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116, are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction. CA had jurisdiction over the petitioners special civil action for certiorari. Ratio Section 32 of RA 7691 reads: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offender or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. It must be noted, however, that the exclusive jurisdiction of these courts does not cover those cases which, by law, fall within the RTCs and Sandiganbayans exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the prescribed penalty. In the case at bar, the Dangerous Drugs Act specifically confers upon the RTC the jurisdiction over cases such as this. Appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a new action, such as that of a special civil action for certiorari. Though the most logical step was for SC to simply set aside the resolutions and direct it to CA, SC agrees that it would further delay the case. Also, SC has has concurrent jurisdiction over the special action.
Sec. 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. There shall be created a Metropolitan Trial Court in each metropolitan area established by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the other cities or municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities as are grouped together pursuant to law. Sec. 26. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. Sec. 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital Region. There shall be a Metropolitan Trial Court in the National Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two (82) branches. There shall be:
Thirty branches (Branches I to XXX) for the city of Manila with seats thereat; Thirteen branches (Branches XXXI to XLIII) for Quezon City with seats thereat; Five branches (Branches XLIV to XLVIII) for Pasay City with seats thereat; Five branches (Branches XLIX to LIII) for Caloocan City with seats thereat; One branch (Branch LIV) for Navotas with seat thereat; Two branches (Branches LV and LVI) for Malabon with seats thereat; Two branches (Branches LVII and LVIII) for San Juan with seats thereat; Two branches (Branches LIX and LX) for Mandaluyong with seats thereat; Seven branches (Branches LXI and LXVII) for Makati with seats thereat; Five branches (Branches LXVIII to LXXII) for Pasig with seats thereat; One branch (Branch LXXIII) for Pateros with seat thereat; One branch (Branch LXXIV) for Taguig with seat thereat; Two branches (Branches LXXV and LXXVI) for Marikina with seats thereat; Two branches (Branches LXXVII and LXXVIII) for Paraaque with seats thereat; One branch (Branch LXXIX) for Las Pias with seat thereat; One branch (Branch LXXX) for Muntinlupa with seat thereat; Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for Valenzuela with seats thereat;
K. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by RA 7691.
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Sec. 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. The Supreme Court shall constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may be established by law whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities comprising the metropolitan area. Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which shall be his permanent station and his appointment shall state branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch within said metropolitan area as the interest of justice may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.
L. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts
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Sec. 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. In every city which does not form part of a metropolitan area, there shall be a Municipal Trial Court with one branch, except as hereunder provided: Sec. 30. Municipal Trial Courts. In each of the municipalities that are not comprised within a metropolitan area and a municipal circuit there shall be a Municipal Trial Court which shall have one branch, except as hereunder provided: Sec. 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. There shall be a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each area defined as a municipal circuit, comprising one or more cities and/or one or more municipalities. The municipalities comprising municipal circuits as organized under Administrative Order No. 33, issued on June 13, 1978 by the Supreme Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537, are hereby constituted as municipal circuits for purposes of the establishment of the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the appointment thereto of Municipal Circuit Trial Judges: Provided, however, That the Supreme Court may, as the interests of justice may require, further reorganize the said courts taking into account workload, geographical location, and such other factors as will contribute to a rational allocation thereof, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 537 which shall be applicable insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Act. Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a municipal circuit which shall be his official station. The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality where the Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall hold sessions. Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (As amended by R. A, No. 7691)
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (As amended by R. A. No. 7691) Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R. A. No. 7691) Sec. 36. Summary procedures in special cases. In Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases requiring summary disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable 2B 2010
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to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible. Section 37. Preliminary investigation. Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, That if after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima facie case, he shall forward the records of the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information with the proper court. No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed with him for preliminary investigation, unless after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds that a probable cause exists. Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 38. Judgments and processes. (1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing, stating clearly the facts and the law on which they were based, signed by the Judge and filed with the Clerk of Court. Such judgment shall be appealable to the Regional Trial Courts in accordance with the procedure now prescribed by law for appeals to the Court of First Instance, by the provisions of this Act, and by such rules as the Supreme Court may hereafter prescribe. (2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in cases falling within their jurisdiction, may be served anywhere in the Philippines without the necessity of certification by the Judge of the Regional Trial Court.
corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.
N. Jurisdiction over the PNP by regular Courts

Section 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, That criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.
O. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

RA 8249 AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court ofjustice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed by the President." Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other 2B 2010
M. Special Jurisdiction of Courts

Sec. 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas
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compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan." Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted. Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; "(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and "(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. "b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the 2B 2010
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Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. "Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: 'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case. "A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon. "Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. "Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.
"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court. "In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal." Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect. Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. People v. Magallanes (kidnap and ransom of 2 by 14 where 5 were PNP members) Case discussed above.
a. Jurisdiction over Public Officers

Sanchez v. Demetriou 227 SCRA 627 Facts: The Presidential Anti Crime Commission requested the filing of charges against Sanchez in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez. DOJ conducted a preliminary investigation. A PNP Commander invited Sanchez for questioning. He was identified by two people who executed extrajudicial confessions implicating Sanchez as principal in the rape-slay. He was put on arrest status and taken to DOJ. A warrant was subsequently issued from the RTC of Manila. Cases 2B 2010
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were filed in the RTC of Laguna but the case was transferred to the RTC of Manila. Motion to quash was filed because 1) Only the Ombudsman had the competence to investigate and 2) As a public officer, he can only be tried by the Sandiganbayan. Issues: 1) Did the Ombudsman have the sole competence to investigate? 2) Can he be tried in the regular courts? Held and Ratio: 1) No. Though the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officials, the authority is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority 2) Yes. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioners office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. (The case did not state the decisions of the lower courts.) Uy v. Sandiganbayan 312 SCRA 77 Case discussed above.
2. Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those in (Govt Owned or Controlled Corporations) GOCCs, embraced in Title VII of the RPC 3. Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees including those employed in GOCCS in relation to their office. Nowhere does the act of falsification belong to the abovementioned cases where the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction. Falsification of Public Document is embraced in Title IV of the RPC. Perhaps the nearest reason for Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of the case is scenario 3 in the above enumeration. However, it does not appear that the official positions of Bartolome and Coronel were connected to the offense they committed. They did not need to be government employees to falsify a public document. In the light of the Montilla case, it was upheld that when public office is not an essential ingredient of the offense such that the offense cant exist without the office, it does not fall under Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. People v. Magallanes Case discussed above Cunanan v. Arceo Case discussed above Lacson v. Executive Secretary Case discussed above People v. Cawaling People v. Cawaling [G.R. No. 117970. July 28, 1998]
b. Offense deemed committed in relation to Public Office

Bartolome v. People Facts: Rolando Bartolome and Elino Coronel are both officers of Ministry of Labor, NCR, Manila. They conspired to falsify the Civil Service Personal Data Sheet of Bartolome th making it appear that he passed the career service exam and that he was a 4 year AB student of FEU. Ricardo Buenviaje, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor filed a case at the Sandiganbayan accusing them of the crime of Falsification of Official Document. Sandiganbayan convicted them. Petitioners now question the validity of Sandigabayans ruling. Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioners case SC Ruling: Proceedings in Sandiganbayan are null and void ab initio. Under Section 4 of PD 160, Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: 1. Violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and RA 1379
Facts: Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo were accused of shooting RONIE ILISAN inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. Both sides presented their version of the facts but the RTC found the Prosecutions account much more credible. The pertinent facts as stated by the Prosecution is as follows: The killing happened in the evening at the ricefield of Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon xxx Vicente Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the victim, were drinking tuba at C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon. When they stood up to go home, Luz Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told them not to go out because the accused were watching them outside about three (3) meters from the restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them upon their request and they went out and walked towards home. About a hundred meters from the restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor Cawaling, the four (4) policemen, namely, Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas, the mayors brother-in-law, flashlighted them and 2B 2010
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Diosdado Venus ran going back. The two (2) brothers also ran towards home to the house of their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo blocked them on the gate of the fence of their sisters house. Ronie Elisan ran towards the ricefield. The accused were chasing them. Vicente Elisan saw his brother Ronie f[a]ll down on the ricefield while he ran towards the bushes and la[y] on the ground. Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling and raising his two (2) hands. All the six (6) accused approached him with their flashlights and shot him. Ronie fell down about twenty (20) meters from the bushes where Vicente Elisan hid behind the coconut tree. Co-accused Cawaling said []you left him, he is already dead.[] Mayor Cawaling was armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both with armalites, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos were both with .38 caliber and so with civilian Alex Batuigas. They left towards the house of Mayor Cawaling. xxx The Regional Trial Court of Romblon convicted the accused of murder Lawyer for Accused ex-Mayor contends that the trial court gravely erred in not acquitting Accused-Appellant Ulysses M. Cawaling considering that there was blatant absence of due process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial. Issues: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case Held: The trial court had jurisdiction Ratio: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment. Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000). Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that murder or homicide may be committed both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said crime, viz.: xxx the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statutexxx Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased. But the use or
abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas In the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986] Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
c. Jurisdiction not determined by allegations

Republic v. Asuncion Cunanan v. Arceo Deloso v. Domingo
d. Distinguished from jurisdiction of Ombudsman

Aguinaldo v. Domagas Natividad v. Felix
e. Certiorari Jurisdiction
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7975 AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Executive Order No. 184, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Division of the Court; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) divisions of three justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time. 2B 2010
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"The first three divisions shall be stationed in the Metro Manila area, the fourth division shall be in Cebu City for cases coming from the Visayas region, and the fifth division shall be in Cagayan de Oro City for cases coming from the Mindanao region. "Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein." Section 2. Section 4 of the same Decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; "(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and "(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. "In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27", or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. "The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative 2B 2010
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to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the people of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. "Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." Section 3. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case. "A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon. "Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. In case the penalty imposed is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused filed an appeal. "Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.
"Decisions and final orders of other courts, in cases cognizable by said courts under this Act shall be appealable to the Sandiganbayan within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice to the parties." Section 4. Section 9 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be inforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court." Section 5. Section 10 of the same Decree is hereby repealed. Section 6. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1486, 1606 and 1861, Executive Orders Nos. 101 and 184 and all other laws, decrees, orders and rules of which are inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. Approved: 30 March 1995
f. Exclusive Jurisdiction over PCGG cases

Olaguer v Regional Trial Court Facts: Philippine Journalists Inc (PJI) executed a mortgage in favor of Developmen Bank of Philippines(DBP) for certain financing accomodations.
PJI assigned 67% of stocks to DBP. DBP appointed certain PJI stockholders as proxies. PJI failed to comply with its obligation to DBP leading to the cancellation of appointment of petitioners and designated Olaguer, Velez, and De Leon (Petitioners). Olaguer also asked some of respondent to assign shares not only to the three proxies by DBP but also to two others to be chosen by him so they can sit in the PJI board of directors. 2B 2010
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Though Olaguer was voted chairman of the board and CEO of PJI, he failed to comply with his commitment which gave respondents to cancel the assignment. He also did some illegal acts which gave rise to several complaints in court against herein Petitioners. Before the cases were resolved, then president Cory Aquino terminated his his appointment as member of the board of directors of DBP. Despite the termination, Olaguer still continued with the performance of his functions. There was an agreement enetered into b DBP and herein respondents calling for a special stockholders meeting to elect a new board of directors. Olaguer contends that the agreement cannot be implemented because Olaguer claims that he has just been designated the fiscal and team leader of the PCGG assigned to PJI and that all his actions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG, and that it is PCGG which exercises the voting rights of all PJI common stocks sequestered since 1986. . Olaguer then filed a motion to dismiss the cases against him on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of herein petitioners. The motion to dismiss was denied thus this petition Issue W/N the trial court has jurisdiction over the case Held No, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. It is the Sandiganbayan who has jurisdiction over PCGG cases. Ratio There is no dispute that PJI is now under sequestration by the PCGG and that civil case no. 0035 was filed in Sandiganbayan wherenin the PJI is listed as among the corporations involved in the unexplained wealth wealth case against Marcos. Records also show that Olaguer was acting in behalf of the PCGG and under Section 2 of EO !$, the Sangiganbyana has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the unexplained wealth of Marcos. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the RTC and coequal bodies have no power to control the other. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNANCE V PEA 159 SCRA 556
venture agreement with the approval of the Textile Export Board. 2/3 of the two corporations were subscribed to Local Investors and the 1/3 was subscribed to Hongkong Investors.
The PCGG appointed Saludo as OIC of the two corporations with authority to manage and operate it. Saludo and Yeung Chun Ho were the authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. Yam Kam Shing became a co-signatory of Yeung Chun Ho. However, in a Memorandum addressed to the depository banks Saludo revoked the authorization previously issued because Yiam Kam Shing was a Hongkong Chinese International staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. When OIC Saludo withdrew money from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company for the payment of salaries Yim Kam Shing instituted an action for damages with a writ of preliminary injunction against Metropolitan bank, PCGG, PCGG Commissioner Bautista and OIC Saludo. He questions the revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing as a corepresentative. PCGG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Regional Trial court has no jurisdiction over PCGG or over the subject of the case. The Judge denied PCGGs motion to dismiss. The PCGG filed this petition to the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the Trial Court over it. ISSUES: I. Whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over the PCGG and properties sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its powers. II. Whether Regional Trial Courts may interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of PCGG. HELD: I. NO. The RTC do not have jurisdiction over the PCGG. II. NO. Jurisdiction over all sequestered cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and properties under the past regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review only by the SC.
RATIO:
FACTS: PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms, American Inter-Fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Both firms have been organized by joint
I. The RTC and the CA have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under applicable Executive Orders and Article XVIII, section 26 of the Constitution. It may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of PCGG. Under Section 2 of EO 14, all cases of the PCGG regarding the Funds, moneys, assets, and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by Former Pres. Marcos, 2B 2010
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Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessary fall likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. II. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, PCGG is a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. EO no 14, section 2 also provides that the PCGG shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. All those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with the exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the SC.
(P3,000,000.00) as attorney's fees, and five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) as litigation expenses, and costs of suits. In due time, CDCP/PNCC filed with the trial court an appeal from said decision to the Court of Appeals. On October 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the decision of the trial court. On March 19, 1997, the Supreme Court, by a minute resolution denied the petition for review filed by CDCP/PNCC. On July 7, 1997, the Supreme Court denied CDCP/PNCC's motion for reconsideration of the minute resolution. On October 9, 1997, upon motion of WUTIC, the trial court issued a writ of execution against CDCP/PNCC. Subsequently, Sheriff Roberto V. Harina issued notices of garnishment against the accounts, shares of stocks and income of CDCP/PNCC with 1 various banks and corporations. Sometime in October 1997, PCGG Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza, as board member of PNCC, attended a PNCC board meeting, and discovered the writ of execution and notices of garnishment. PCGG noted that substantial stockholdings or equity in CDCP/PNCC, CDCPI, AHL and the shareholdings of Rodolfo M. Cuenca in CDCP/PNCC were under sequestration or otherwise impleaded in the sequestration case pending with the Sandiganbayan. However, PCGG did not participate in the action before the trial court to enforce the foreign judgment. Hence, PCGG had no opportunity to verify and evaluate WUTIC/AHL's claim, vis a vis that of Rodolfo M. Cuenca. Additionally, PCGG claimed that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint to enforce a foreign judgment and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution considering that the case involved a sequestered corporation, and sequestered stockholdings of Rodolfo M. Cuenca. PCGG contended that the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to E.O. No. 14 and 14-A, over cases involving sequestered assets. On November 20, 1997, after realizing that WUTIC/AHL's claim could be Cuenca's in disguise, PCGG issued en banc Resolution No. 97-188 enjoining PNCC and/or any person, agent, representative acting in its behalf and stead from taking any action that would dissipate and/or affect the assets of CDCP/PNCC, without getting prior clearance and approval from the Sandiganbayan. On December 1, 1997, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari to annul the Regional Trial Court's decision in Civil Case No. 91-3291, and the corresponding writ of execution and notices of garnishment. On January 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan motu proprio dismissed the petition. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The Sandiganbayan held that the case before the trial court was for enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not for recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Hence, it ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the action for annulment of the decision of the trial court. The Sandiganbayan ruled that not every claim against a sequestered asset or 2B 2010
g. Jurisdiction to annul Judgments

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan World Universal Trading & Investment Co., S.A. (WUTIC) was a sociedad anonima registered in Panama, but was not registered or licensed to do business in the Philippines. It is represented by its attorney-in-fact, M.M. Lazaro & Associates. Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, now known as Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC), is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was under sequestration by the PCGG. On July 24, 1987, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Rodolfo M. Cuenca for the sequestration of PNCC for acquiring in an illegal manner assets in the Cuenca-owned corporations, to wit: Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, now known as Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC), Asia International Hardwood Limited, a Hongkong-based company, and Construction Development Corporation International Limited, Hongkong, a wholly-owned subsidiary or alter ego of CDCP/PNCC, among other entities. The case is still pending with the Sandiganbayan.
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Sometime in 1991, claiming to be an assignee of Asia Hardwood Limited (AHL), a Hongkong-based company owned by Rodolfo M. Cuenca, WUTIC, through its attorney-in-fact, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134, Makati, a complaint against CDCP/PNCC to enforce a foreign judgment which WUTIC had obtained in Hongkong against Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines International Limited (CDCPI), Hongkong, a corporation wholly-owned by CDCP/PNCC. After trial on the merits, on December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of WUTIC. The trial court considered CDCP/PNCC and CDCPI as "one corporate entity" and held them liable to pay WUTIC the amount of US$2,994,513.65, with 12% interest per annum, from November 28, 1991, until fully paid, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of payment, plus three million pesos
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entity falls within its jurisdiction. It further stated that it only had appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Regional Trial Court in criminal cases involving offenses relating to public office, and not over civil cases. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the Regional Trial Court decision in Civil Case No. 91-3291 has become final, and that, pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to annul the judgment, not the Sandiganbayan. Meanwhile, on January 28, 1998, in violation of the PCGG Resolution No. 97-188, WUTIC and CDCP/PNCC, entered into an agreement on the manner of satisfying the trial court's decision. According to WUTIC, the Regional Trial Court, Makati approved the agreement. As per agreement, on January 29, 1998 PNCC paid WUTIC fifty percent (50%) of the judgment debt. The balance was payable in twelve (12) months. CDCP/PNCC already paid the February, March and April 1998 installments. On March 10, 1998, PCGG filed this petition for certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan's resolution. On March 23, 1998, we required respondents to file comment on the petition, to which they complied. We give due course to the petition. Petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it, without any motion to dismiss filed by any of the parties. Petitioner further avers that, pursuant to Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over all PCGG cases involving ill-gotten wealth, whether civil or criminal, and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases. Since CDCP, as the party liable, is a sequestered corporation, then the complaint to enforce a foreign judgment against CDCP is a PCGG case, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, including jurisdiction to annul the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, pursuant to the exclusive and original jurisdiction it has not only on principal cases involving "ill-gotten wealth," but also on all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases. The petition is impressed with merit. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the petition without a motion to dismiss filed by any of the parties. We rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in a sequestrationrelated case. It will be noted that three corporations involved in this petition, PNCC/CDCP, AHL and CDCPI, Hongkong, are under sequestration and are defendants in the sequestration case pending before the Sandiganbayan. AHL had claims against CDCPI, amounting to US$2,994,513.65 plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum and other costs, and assigned the same to WUTIC. Eventually, WUTIC obtained a favorable judgment in a Hongkong court to claim the indebtedness, amounting to about US$5,132,842.56 against CDCPI. Due to the closure of CDCPI in Hongkong, WUTIC filed a case with Regional Trial Court against PNCC/CDCP to enforce a foreign judgment obtained
against CDCPI. Considering that it was initially a claim by AHL against CDCPI, Hongkong, both corporations known as Cuenca-owned and under sequestration, there is valid ground for PCGG to evaluate the validity of WUTIC's claim as a legitimate assignee, or merely a dummy corporation set up to circumvent the sequestration case. It should be noted that despite the initial sequestration orders and the case filed with the Sandiganbayan against stockholdings of Rodolfo M. Cuenca and the so-called Cuenca-owned corporations, including AHL, PNCC/CDCP and CDCPI, the PCGG was not made a party in the civil case in Hongkong and the case to enforce the foreign judgment filed with the trial court. Considering the interconnections between the participating corporations in the said transaction, and the existence of the sequestration case, PCGG should have been informed of the above cases to question and verify the veracity of the claim. We are aware of various schemes employed to circumvent sequestration orders, dissipate sequestered assets, and thwart PCGG's efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth. Even the Sandiganbayan intimated that there is a possibility that WUTIC is a dummy corporation formed by Rodolfo Cuenca, or his alter ego, to reach the sequestered assets. Hence, there is a need to vigorously guard these assets and preserve them pending resolution of the sequestration case before the Sandiganbayan, considering the paramount public policy for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. We disagree with the Sandiganbayan that it has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the Regional Trial Court's judgment in a sequestration-related case. We have held that the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases.
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Consider the fact that
PNCC/CDCP and CDCPI and Rodolfo Cuenca's equity thereat are in custodia legis in the sequestration case pending with the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan itself recognized that WUTIC could be a dummy corporation formed by Cuenca himself. Sequestered assets and corporations are legally and technically in custodia legis, under the administration of the PCGG. Executive Order No. 2 specifically prohibits that such assets and properties be transferred, conveyed, encumbered, or otherwise depleted or concealed, under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law. Considering that PNCC/CDCP and AHL are sequestered corporations, and WUTIC's claim is questionable, the payment of a substantial amount of money can result in the deterioration and disappearance of the sequestered assets. "Such a situation cannot be allowed to happen, unless there is a final adjudication and disposition of the issue as to whether these assets are ill-gotten or not, since it may result in damage or prejudice to the Republic of the Philippines." Republic Act 7975, an act amending P.D. 1606, provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, or the so-called ill-gotten wealth cases. Since we have ruled that the civil case before the Regional Trial Court is considered as arising from, incidental to, or related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the decision of the Regional Trial Court in such case. 2B 2010
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WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the resolution dated January 8, 1998 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Civil Case No. 180. Let the records be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Uy v. Sandiganbayan Case discussed above
P. Jurisdiction of Military Court h. Jurisdiction over Military and PNP

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7055 - AN ACT STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE MILITARY RETURNING TO THE CIVIL COURTS THE JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN OFFENSES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, OTHER PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW, AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PRESIDENTIAL DECREES SECTION 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code other special penal laws, or local government ordinances regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: provided, that the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed thereforee in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances. SECTION 2. Subject to the provisions of Section 1 hereof, all cases filed or pending for filing with court-martial or other similar bodies, except those where the accused had already been arraigned, shall within thirty (30) days following the effectivity of this Act transferred to the proper civil courts: provided, that the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall, upon petition before commencement of trial and with the written consent of the accused, order the transfer of such excepted case or cases to the proper civil courts for trial and resolution. SECTION 3. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-A, 1850 and 1952, and all acts, general orders, executive orders, and other presidential issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved: June 20, 1991 2B 2010 In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Abadilla IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N. ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA FACTS: On January 27, 1987, a group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in Quezon City ostensibly for the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional government. While the takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the national capital, it did not succeed. On January 29, 1987, the mutineers surrendered to the military authorities and the possession of the facility was restored to the owners and managers thereof. Soon thereafter, the military authorities conducted an investigation of the matter. On April 18, 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black Saturday Revolt," did not succeed either. After the incident, the military authorities also conducted an investigation. The investigation disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radio-television facilities. He was charged for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition). Article of War 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866. Regarding the investigation conducted on "The Black Saturday Revolt", it was found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was also involved in the mutiny. The Board of Officers conducting the investigation and recommended that the case be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against the Colonel. A General Order dropping Abadilla from the Rolls of Regular Officers was issued and an order of arrest was filed against Abadilla who was at large when both investigations were conducted. As a result, a combined element of the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary arrested Abadilla. Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla, the spouse of Colonel Abadilla, together with their minor children went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the detention of Colonel Abadilla.
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ISSUES: When Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May 9, 1987, he became a civilian and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer subject to military law HELD: The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts for offenses he committed while still in the military service. This Court cannot countenance such an absurd situation. Established principles in remedial law call for application. The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest applies only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to proceedings under military law. At the time the military investigations were commenced, Colonel Abadilla was an officer of the AFP subject to military law.
Do military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for crimes allegedly committed during martial law when civilian courts are open and functioning?
RULING: The trial contemplated in the due process clause of the Constitution is by judicial and not by executive or military process. Military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. By the principle of separation of powers, interpreting the law as to when a person has violated it is a judicial function vested in the judiciary. As long as civil courts are open and functioning, military courts have no jurisdiction over civilian offenses. Also, Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 lifted martial law and revoked General Order No. 8 (creating military tribunals). Cases under military courts should be immediately transferred to civilian courts. Abadilla v. Ramos Abadilla vs Ramos FACTS: A group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7). The takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the national capital, however it did not succeed. After the incident another group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black Saturday Revolt," did not succeed either. The investigations for both incident disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders of both the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radio-television facilities as well as The Black Saturday Revolt. The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him. A charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel. Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted. Respondent Major General Renato De Villa, Commanding General of the PC and Vice-Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla. Also, respondent AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued General Orders No. 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. Later, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed charges against Colonel Abadilla. Colonel Abadilla was arrested by a group composed of the Philippine Army and the PC. He was detained by the military. The spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with their minor children went to the Supreme Court and filed a petition for habeas corpus, 2B 2010
a. No jurisdiction over civilians

Olaguer v. Military Commission Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558, 22 May 1987, 150 SCRA 144.
FACTS: Petitioners were detained by the military for subversion. The Armed Forces Chief of Staff created Military Commission No. 34 to try the petitioners criminal case. Petitioners filed for a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. While the petition was pending, the Military Commission convicted and sentenced the petitioners to death by electrocution.
ISSUE:
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challenging the validity of the detention of Colonel Abadilla. There main contention was (as to jurisdiction) when Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers, he became a civilian and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer subject to military law. On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that military jurisdiction had fully attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service in the military. ISSUE: Is the detention of Colonel Abadilla illegal? (The resolution of this issue will relate to the jurisdiction of the military authorities over the person of Colonel Abadilla.) HELD Col. Abadilla is under military jurisdiction Ratio As early as March, 1987, months before Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers, the military authorities began the institution of proceedings against him. As of that time, he was certainly subject to military law. He was under investigation for his alleged participation in the unsuccessful mutinies when he was an officer of the AFP. His superiors could not confine him during the period of investigation because he was at large. This disregard for military duty and responsibility may have prompted his superiors to cause him to be dropped from the rolls of officers. The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution in the first place. The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest applies only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to proceedings under military law. At the time the military investigations were commenced, Colonel Abadilla was an officer of the AFP subject to military law. As such, the military authorities had jurisdiction over his person. His earlier arrest could not be effected because he was at large. PS The petitioner cited various cases with regards to the lost of jurisdiction of military tribunals over discharged from the service but the Court found that this cases were
inapplicable to the case (one of the cases deals with being honorably discharged). Tan v. Barrios WILLIAM TAN, ET. AL. V. BARRIOS, ET. AL. G.R. Nos. 85481-82. October 18, 1990
Facts Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos authorized the creation of military tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel. Its jurisdiction was modified (exclusive of the civil courts) to include violations of the law on firearms and other crimes directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the countrys safety and security. Yet, the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts and vice versa. Twelve people were arrested and charged for the crimes of murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm and unlawful possession of a pistol with ammunition before the Military Tribunal. Since this was a celebrated case, Marcos withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts and for the Military Tribunal to retain it. All the accused pleaded not guilty. Martial rule ended and the military tribunals and commissions were abolished. In Cruz vs. Enrile, SC nullified the proceedings in military courts against the civilians and ordered the re-filing of informations against them in the proper civil courts. In Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (Olaguer was sentenced to death without receiving evidence in his defense), SC said that even during the period of martial law as long as those courts are open and functioning, military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts. It declared unconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to try civilians and nullified the proceedings convicting non-political detainees. Without conducting an investigation, State Prosecutor Barrios filed with RTC two informations for the mentioned crimes. He also failed to provide the RTC Judge the supporting affidavits and the SC order which is the basis of filing them because there is no SC order to re-file the criminal cases. The petitioners filed before SC a petition for certiorari to annul the informations. RTC issued warrants of arrest. SC issued a TRO and ordered the respondents to comment. The Solicitor General argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a military commission were null and void because SC ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians, hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal; do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil court. Barrios defended the re-prosecution on the ground that it will not constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal. Issue 2B 2010
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Whether or not Barrios committed grave abuse of discretion by re-filing the informations Held: YES. Ratio The petitioners had been acquitted by the military court. Cruz vs. Enrile should be given a limited application for those who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings and prayed for retrial in the civil courts, not all who had been tried and sentenced by a court martial during the period of martial law. The petitioners reprosecution, based on Cruz in which they took no part and were not heard, would be violative of their right to due process. In Cruz, the Secretary of Justice was ordered to file the necessary informations in the proper civil courts but it did not nullify the court martial proceedings against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military courts. SC applied retroactively the rule on re-prosecution before the proper civil courts and prospectively for those released from custody. The doctrine in Olaguer is that the trial of civilians by military process was not due process. However, only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the case. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" if, such as in this case, the proceedings were fair, there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court. The re-filing of the information against the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy. Furthermore, depriving them of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military commission would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling.
b. Jurisdiction acquired by reason of arrest does not apply to military proceedings

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Abadilla
2B 2010
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Additional Cases Isip vs. People He who alleges must prove his allegations. Isip is charged with the crime of estafa. Apparently, Isip received jewelries that he was supposed to sell. On the due date, he failed to return neither the jewelries nor the proceeds of the supposed sale to the rightful owner. In his petition, he claimed that the trial court in Cavite, the tribunal that tried the case, had no jurisdiction. He claimed that that the transaction was entered into in Manila. The Court rejected such claim stating that Isip failed to prove such allegations. In such case, jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENE RALLA BELISTA G.R. NO. 164631 FACTS Belista inherited 8 parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the lots under the coverage of CARP for which she is claiming for just compensation. DAR and LBP estimated the lots at P277, 582.58 and P317, 259.31, respectively. Believing that her lots were grossly, she filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against LBP at the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V. The Adjudicator decided that subject lots are valued at P2.8M and ordered LBP to pay Belista. Both parties filed for motion for reconsideration. This time, the Adjudicator, reduced the value of the lots to P2.5M. Aggrieved, LBP, petitioned with the RTC. RTC Ruling: RTC dismissed the case motu proprio for failure to exhaust first administrative remedies and in violation of 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure which states that appeal of Regional Adjudicators decision should first be filed at DARAB and not the RTC. CA affirmed the ruling To summarize, LBP did this: Adjudicator RTC CA RTC & CA said LBP should have done this: Adjudicator DARAB RTC CA However, LBP contends that DARAB Rules of Procedure is not applicable to them because its effectivity began February 8, 2003 while petition was filed at RARAD on November 11, 2002. Furthermore ISSUE W/N CA was correct in ruling that decision of Adjudicator HELD 1. NO. Decision of DARAB may be appealed directly to the RTC.
RATIO The dates are irrelevant to determine the jurisdiction of the RTC. SC ruled that, according to R.A. No. 6657, which instituted CARP, decision of the Adjudicator need NOT be appealed first to DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Main ratio: Sec. 57 of RA 6657 provides that RTC sitting as SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowner. If 2003 DARAB rules are to be applied, the RTC would have appellate jurisdiction, which is contradictory to RA 6657. Sub-ratio: Another source of conflict is Sec. 50 of RA 6657, which provides that DAR shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. SC made a distinction between the SAC and DAR. DAR as an administrative agency cannot be granted the exclusive power to exercise eminent domain, which is a judicial function. DAR is vested with preliminary determination for just compensation but subject to challenge in courts. People vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. They apparently misappropriated for their personal use P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of 2 Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest." He argued that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan this time sustained respondents' contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 25741 for lack of jurisdiction. The prosecution filed for a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Thus, the instant special civil action for certiorari. Issues: a) W/N Sandiganbayan grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of jurisidiction b) W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying prosecutions motions for reconsideration Ratio: a) YES. The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. While it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the 2B 2010
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AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above considerations indicate that the AFP-RSBS is imbued with public interest. As such, it is a government entity. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case at hand. b) The resolution of the Sandiganbayan was a final order that finally disposed of the case. Thus, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of procedure, and Section 7 of PD1606 apply. These state that: Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules may be availed of only where there is no appeal, or any plain, 6 speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal. Said rule may be relaxed when the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient, and where strict application of the rules would frustrate the ends of justice. Serana vs Sandiganbayan Jan. 22, 2008 Facts: Petitioner Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Estrada as a student regent of UP. She discussed with Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. She then, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI) One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Bugayong, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother for estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Petitioner claimed that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.She further contended that she had no authority to receive funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case Held: Yes Ratio: Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to 45 those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.ESQUIVEL vs OMBUDSMAN Facts PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are both residents of Nueva Ecija but assigned with the Regional Intelligence Division in Pampanga. Esquivel is the elected municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecija. They charged petitioner who is a municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecijia and his brother who is barangay captain for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. 2B 2010
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PO2 Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parent's house in Nueva Ecija when petitioners arrived and disarmed Eduardo of his pistol. They forced him to board petitioner's vehicle and brought him to the Municipal Hall. The mayor believed that Eduardo was among those who raided his jueteng den and arrested members of crime syndicates connected with him. PO2 Eduardo also stated that while their way to the town hall, the Mayor hauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. The mayor then struck him with a handgun which caused him to lose consciousness. When he awoke, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition so that he could be released. The records of Eduardo's complaint was forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to file their counter affidavits. They stated that Eduardo is a fugitive from justice and was subject to an illegal possession of firearm complaint. The deputy ombudsman then recommended that the Mayor be indicted for the crime of grave threats only and his brother with less serious physical injuries. The other charges against PO2 were dismissed. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation/resolution. thereafter, information was filed against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman. The motion was then denied by the OSP. Petitioners were then arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges. They then claimed grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering the resolution with the Supreme Court. Issue 1. w/n the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the information against petitioners 2. w/n the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the criminal cases. Held 1. No. 2. No. Decision DISMISSED.The petition is without merit. Petitioner's Argument 1 The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to consider the evidence that PO2 Eduardo was in good physical condition. Ratio 1
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and thereafter file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. The Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reason or absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners failed to prove such. There was no abuse of discretion on the Ombudsman in disregarding the admission found in the document signed by PO2 stating tthat he was in good physical condition. The admission merely applied to the execution of the document and not the truthfulness of its content. Petitioner's Argument 2 The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in RA 7975. As the positions of municipal mayor and barangay captain were not mentioned, they claimed that they are not covered. Ratio 2 Municipal mayor fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. it is only in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher that exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC, MTC etc. Under the Local Government Code, the muncipal mayor has a salary grade of 27. Since his brother is a co-accused with the mayor who is covered by the RA, he is likewise covered though he may be only a barangay captain. Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the criminal cases is clearly founded on law. ESQUIVEL vs OMBUDSMAN Facts PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are both residents of Nueva Ecija but assigned with the Regional Intelligence Division in Pampanga. Esquivel is the elected municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecija. They charged petitioner who is a municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecijia and his brother who is barangay captain for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. PO2 Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parent's house in Nueva Ecija when petitioners arrived and disarmed Eduardo of his pistol. They forced him to board petitioner's vehicle and brought him to the Municipal Hall. The mayor believed that Eduardo was among those who raided his jueteng den and arrested members of crime syndicates connected with him. PO2 Eduardo also stated that while their way to the town hall, the Mayor hauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. The mayor then struck him with a handgun which caused him to lose consciousness. When he awoke, he was forced to 2B 2010
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sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition so that he could be released. The records of Eduardo's complaint was forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to file their counter affidavits. They stated that Eduardo is a fugitive from justice and was subject to an illegal possession of firearm complaint. The deputy ombudsman then recommended that the Mayor be indicted for the crime of grave threats only and his brother with less serious physical injuries. The other charges against PO2 were dismissed. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation/resolution. thereafter, information was filed against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman. The motion was then denied by the OSP. Petitioners were then arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges. They then claimed grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering the resolution with the Supreme Court. Issue 1. w/n the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the information against petitioners 2. w/n the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the criminal cases. Held 1. No. 2. No. Decision DISMISSED.The petition is without merit. Petitioner's Argument 1 The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to consider the evidence that PO2 Eduardo was in good physical condition. Ratio 1 The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and thereafter file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
The Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reason or absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners failed to prove such. There was no abuse of discretion on the Ombudsman in disregarding the admission found in the document signed by PO2 stating tthat he was in good physical condition. The admission merely applied to the execution of the document and not the truthfulness of its content. Petitioner's Argument 2 The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in RA 7975. As the positions of municipal mayor and barangay captain were not mentioned, they claimed that they are not covered. Ratio 2 Municipal mayor fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. it is only in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher that exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC, MTC etc. Under the Local Government Code, the muncipal mayor has a salary grade of 27. Since his brother is a co-accused with the mayor who is covered by the RA, he is likewise covered though he may be only a barangay captain. Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the criminal cases is clearly founded on law. BERNADETTE MONDEJAR v. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN FACTS: In a sworn letter complaint Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC Tacloban City, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct relative to a Criminal Case for violation of BP 22. Mondejar alleged that Judge Buban issued a hold departure order against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of SC Circular No. 39-97 which provides that hold departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned order. Judge Buban admitted having issued the hold departure order because he was not aware of the Circular. He was not furnished a copy and managed to secure a copy only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the Tacloban RTC. Later on he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order. As regards the issue of denial of due process, he said that Mondejar and counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date. ISSUE: W/N Judge has jurisdiction to issue the hold departure order. 2B 2010
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HELD: NO. RATIO: Circular 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Par. 1 of the circular specifically provides that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case. Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Members of the bench must exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the development in law and jurisprudence. Judges should always be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge their duties and functions with zeal and fervor. Also, Circular 39-97 is not a new circular. Foz, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines Facts: Petitioners are accused of libel in this case because of an article printed in a daily publication called Daily Panay. The article was supposedly libelous because it attacked a certain Dr. Portigo, exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The article spoke of Dr. Portigo being an incompetent physician, taking advantage of the poor for his monetary gain. The article was published July 5, 1994. On March 1, 1995, petitioners pleaded not guilty; thereafter trial ensued. On December 4, 1997, the RTC of Iloilo finds petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to 3 months 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year eight months 21 days of prision correcional as maximum and a fine of P1,000 each. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on February 20, 1998 but it was denied. Petitioners then filed an appeal to the CA; on November 24, 2004, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a resolution dated April 8, 2005. Petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, raising for the first time the issue of whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City Branch 23 had jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court said that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised anytime, even on appeal or motions for reconsiderations, which leaves the case to one final issue. Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23 had jurisdiction to try the case Ruling: No, the RTC of Iloilo. Branch 23 had no jurisdiction Ratio: Libel cases can only be instituted in 4 places according to the rules on venue in Article 360. 1. 2. 3. 4. Whether the offended party is a public official is a public official or private person, the criminal action may be filed in the CFI of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the CFI of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. if the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the CFI of Manila. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the CFI of the province where he hel d office at the time of the commission of the offense.
In the present case, Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the offense, so the venue is either the place where the article was first published or the place of his residence. In the information filed, it only alleged that Daily Panay was in general circulation in the province of Iloilo, nowhere is there proof that the article was indeed first published in the city of Iloilo. In the case of Dr. Portigos residence, the information only alleged that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City. According to the SC, this does nothing to prove that Dr. Portigo is actually residing in Iloilo City, the only thing it stresses was that Dr. Portigo was a medical practioner in Iloilo City. Finally the Supreme Court stresses the importance of the fact that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the information, and based on the information, there was no clear fact indicating that the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23 had jurisdiction over the case, therefore the petition was granted and the criminal case was dismissed. DOJ vs. LIWAG Facts: Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges which they did, and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed. Subsequently, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her 2B 2010
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complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the kidnapping for ransom and murder of a number of Chinese individuals. Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. They maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. Held and Rationale: DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the revised penal Code but it cannot diminish the PLENARY power and PRIMARY jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees. RA 6770 Sec 15(1) authorizes the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power is not given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other investigative bodies such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power. Nor can the petitioners seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction as this implies equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. The settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ. LAZATIN V. DESIERTO G.R. 147097
After preliminary investigation, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) recommended filing 14 counts of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said resolution was approved by Ombudsman, thus 28 Informations were filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner submitted reconsideration, it was granted by the Sandiganbayan who ordered reinvestigation. Office of the Special Prosecutors (OSP) recommended dismissal for lack or insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman however ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP resolution. OLA recommended to proceed with the trial. Ombudsman adopted OLAs resolution. Petitioners main allegation is that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn OSPs resolution because of lack of authority to do so. They alleged that base on the constitution, the Ombudsman and OSP are separate entities and thus the prior does not have the power to overturn any decision made the latter. Second, checks were issued to Lazatin as reimbursement for advances he made. Decision of lower courts/CA: Sandiganbayan/Ombudsman. Directly filed with SC from
Issue: Whether Ombudsman has the authority to overturn the OSP. Ratio : This Court held that giving the prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, 13, Article IX provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise with other functions or duties as may be provided by law. Thus, the Legislature passed R.A. No. 6770, which contains Section 3, placing the OSP under the Ombudsman was upheld by this court. Section 7 of Article IX expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special prosecutor, shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayans/Special Prosecutors power or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman. Perez v. Sandiganbayan: the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filinf of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. Decision Ombudsman was properly acting with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercising its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved its released resolution. Antonino v. Desierto GR No. 144492 December 18, 2008 FACTS On October 3, 1963, Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Presidential Proclamation No. 168: do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort site purposes, under the administration 2B 2010
Facts: The Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint Affidavit against petitioners CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID, and ANGELITO A. PELYAO with Illegal Use of Public Funds. The complaint alleged irregularities in the use of Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Main reason: He was both the proponent and implementer of the projects funded by CDF, signed the vouchers and supporting documents pertinent to disbursement and he also was the one who received such. It was alleged that petitioner, together with the help of Morales, David, and Pelayo was able to convert his CDF into cash.
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of the municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the said municipality and more particularly described as follows: Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the barrio of Dadiangas, Municipality of General Santos, province of Cotabato. Containing an area of 52,678 sq. m. On the other hand, the property subject of PP No. 168 was thereafter subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 sq. m., Lot X containing 15,020 sq. m. and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 sq.m., or a total of 52,678 sq.m. which is still equivalent to the original area. Pres. Marcos then issued PP No. 2273 amending PP No. 168 declaring Lot Y-1 and Lot Y-2 open to disposition under the provisions of Public Land Act. Thus, leaving only Lot X reserved for recreational and health resort site purposes. The private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions of Lot X. Public respondent Jonillo as Deputy Land Management Inspector, then recommended for the approval of the survey authority requested by the private respondents for Lot X. Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private respondents by public respondent CENR Officer Rivera. As a result, Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots. Respondent City Mayor Nuez, assisted by respondent City Legal Officer st Nalangan issued 1 Indorsements addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X applied by private respondents. Thereon, public respondents Jonillo and City Assessor Dinopol, together with recommendation for approval from respondent Rivera, submitted an appraisal of the lots requested by private respondents. Subsequently, respondent Jonillo prepared a letter-report addressed to the Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen applicants recommending for the private sale of the subject lots without public auction. Respondent CENR Officer Rivera, also issued recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants addressed to the DENR Officer for the approval of the appraisal of the subject lots and of the private sale. A notice of sale was issued by respondent Diaz also on the same date stating therein that the subject lots will be sold. Certificates of Title were issued by the Register of Deeds of Gen. Santos City to the private respondents. Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against the private respondents together with the public respondents for violation of paragraphs e, g, and j, Section 3 of RA No. 3019, as amended, and for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. OMBUDSMANS RULING The Ombudsman also ruled that public respondents Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against the respondents were dismissed.
ISSUE W/N THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND ITS CHARTER RULING The petition is DISMISSED. The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule. Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails. RATIO/DOCTRINE 22 Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides: SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Petitioner failed to establish that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time. In this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration. After the respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the issue head-on. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final. Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant Petition ought to be dismissed. Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act 2B 2010
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or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be 23 illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary rule would encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. This rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the 25 petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo, where we laid down the following exceptions to the rule: 1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; 4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; 10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform 26 a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. Sesbre o v. Aglugub Feb. 28, 2005 Facts: Three complaints were filed in the sala of Judge Aglugub against Enrique Marcelino, Susan Nu ez, Edna Tabazon and Fely Carunungan (who are all members of the traffic unit management group of San Pedro, Laguna). The cases filed were for falsification and usurpation of authority. After conducting a preliminary examination, Aglugub (respondent) issued a consolidated resolution dismissing the cases of falsification and grave threats for lack of probable cause then setting for arraignment the case of usurpation of authority. A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581
Upon arraignment, one of the accused, Marcelino did not appear, thus respondent issued a warrant of arrest. Subsequently, complainant Atty. Sesbre o filed a private complainants urgent manifestation alleging that the accused were also charged of a violation of R.A 10 and praying that warrants also be issued. (take note of this, this is the one relevant to issue related to crimpro.) Acting on this matter, respondent judge issued an order stating that a charge for violation of R.A 10 was already included in the charge of usurpation of authority but was not resolved due to oversight. Respondent also furthered that R.A. 10 applies only to members of seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities , hence there was no probable cause for the complaint. Citing Sec.6 (b), rule 112 of the revised rules of criminal procedure, respondent judge dismissed the case and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for review. (fact relevant to topic) Complainant filed a Motion for reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against non- appearing accused. Respondent judge did not act on these arguing that the court already lost jurisdiction on over the case. (because it was already forwarded to the PPO) During the hearing, accused Tabazon, Carunungan and Nu ez did not appear, but petitioner did not mover for the issuance of warrants nor the cancellation of the hearing, instead he filed a complaint against the judge, charging him with Gross ignorance of the law, neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service relative to criminal case of People v. Marcelino et al, hence this case. ISSUES: W/N the respondent judge erred in conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of usurpation of authority W/N respondent judge erred in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial W/N respondent judge erred in dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10 W/N respondent judge erred in transmitting the case to the PPO instead of the ombudsman. (only this issue will be discussed because the case is under the topic of ombudsman) Arguments: Respondent argues that R.A 6770, (ombudsman act of 1989), the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor, thus the PPO can take action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Complainant argues further that there is no provision in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 specifically deputizing the PPO to be the deputized ombudsman prosecutor and that respondent failed to comply with Administrative order no. 8 since he has yet forwarded her resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman. 2B 2010
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Decision: YES. When respondent judge forwarded the case to the PPO she based her action on Sec. 5 of Rule 112 which provides that the resolution of the investigating judge is subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor, or the ombudsman or deputy as the case may be and that under RA 6770, the Provincial prosecutor has jurisdiction over the case. (violation of R.A10). Although this may be true, Sec. 31 of R.A 6770 provide3s that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the ombudsman to act as special investigator or prosecutor only in certain cases. Such provision in not applicable to this case. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNANCE V PEA 159 SCRA 556 FACTS: PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms, American Inter-Fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Both firms have been organized by joint venture agreement with the approval of the Textile Export Board. 2/3 of the two corporations were subscribed to Local Investors and the 1/3 was subscribed to Hongkong Investors.
II. Whether Regional Trial Courts may interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of PCGG. HELD: I. NO. The RTC do not have jurisdiction over the PCGG. II. NO. Jurisdiction over all sequestered cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and properties under the past regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review only by the SC. RATIO: I. The RTC and the CA have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under applicable Executive Orders and Article XVIII, section 26 of the Constitution. It may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of PCGG. Under Section 2 of EO 14, all cases of the PCGG regarding the Funds, moneys, assets, and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by Former Pres. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessary fall likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. II. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, PCGG is a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.
The PCGG appointed Saludo as OIC of the two corporations with authority to manage and operate it. Saludo and Yeung Chun Ho were the authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. Yam Kam Shing became a co-signatory of Yeung Chun Ho. However, in a Memorandum addressed to the depository banks Saludo revoked the authorization previously issued because Yiam Kam Shing was a Hongkong Chinese International staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. When OIC Saludo withdrew money from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company for the payment of salaries Yim Kam Shing instituted an action for damages with a writ of preliminary injunction against Metropolitan bank, PCGG, PCGG Commissioner Bautista and OIC Saludo. He questions the revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing as a corepresentative. PCGG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Regional Trial court has no jurisdiction over PCGG or over the subject of the case. The Judge denied PCGGs motion to dismiss. The PCGG filed this petition to the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the Trial Court over it. ISSUES: I. Whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over the PCGG and properties sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its powers.
EO no 14, section 2 also provides that the PCGG shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. All those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with the exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the SC. Punzalan v. Pena (2004) Topic/Issue: Petition for Certiorari (Rule 1, Sec. 65, Rules of Court) Parties: Petitioners: Rosalinda Punzalan (shooting victim) Punzalan (mother), Randall Punzalan, Rainier
Respondents: Dencio Dela Pena (initial victim), Robert Cagara (Plata family driver; gun carrier) Punzalan & co.:Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex Toto Ofrin (attempted to stab using balisong), and several others Dela Pena & co.:Dencio Dela Pena, Michael Plata, Robert Cagara FACTS: 2B 2010
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Alleged crime The Punzalan and Plata families were neighbors in Mandaluyong City. Respondent Dencio Dela Pena was a house boarder of the Plata family. He was standing near the Plata home on the night of 13 August 1997, when the group of Petitioner Rainier Punzalan (referred to as Punzalan & co.) approached him and shouted Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili ang sombrero mo? Dela Pena replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawan pa ninyo ako. Irked by Dela Penas response, Punzalan & co. assaulted him by slapping his face, punching and kicking him. Dela Pena escaped just as Toto Ofrin of Punzalan & co. tried to stab Dela Pena with a balisong. Punzalan & co. then chased after Dela Pena. As Dela Pena was fleeing, he encountered Cagara, the Platas family driver. Cagara was carrying a gun, which Dela Pena grabbed and pointed to Punzalan & co. to scare them off. Michael Plata who was nearby, intervened by wrestling the gun away from Dela Pena, which caused it to accidentally fire, hitting Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Dela Pena, Plata and Cagara (referred to as Dela Pena & co.) ran to the Platas house and locked themselves in. From the outside of the house, Punzalan & co. shouted Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin naming kayo! Charges filed Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide and Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. The Department of Justice (DOJ) directed that Dela Pena be likewise investigated for the charge of Attempted Homicide. Dela Pena & co. then filed countercharges, including Attempted Murder against Punzalan & co., and one for Grave Threats against Toto Ofrin. Subsequently, Cagara filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier Punzalan. Cagara alleged that during a meeting at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, Rosalinda told him, Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho. Rulings of the Prosecutor and Justice Secretary On 28 July 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong issued a Joint Resolution dismissing the complaint against Rosalinda Punzalan and the charge of Attempted Murder filed by Dela Pena against Punzalan & co. On appeal by Dela Pena and Cagara, the Justice Secretary on 23 March 2000 issued a Resolution reversing the Joint Resolution dated 28 July 1998 and modifying the following charges: y y y Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan reduced to Slight Oral Defamation Attempted Murder against Punzalan & co. reduced to Attempted Homicide Grave Threats against Toto Ofrin reduced to Other Light Threats
On reconsideration, the Justice Secretary on 6 June 2000 set aside the Resolution dated 23 March 2000 and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against Punzalan & co. and Rosalinda Punzalan (i.e. all charges against Petitioners are dropped) Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) The Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari at the CA seeking to reinstate the modified criminal charges as indicated in the ruling of the Justice Secretary dated 23 March 2000. The CA granted their petition, but denied reinstatement of the charge of Other Light Threats against Toto Ofrin. Hence this appeal. ISSUES: y y Whether the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy in this case Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against Petitioners
HELD: Whether the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy in this case YES. Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against Petitioners NO. The Resolution of the Justice Secretary dated 6 June 2000 is REINSTATED (i.e. all charges against Petitioners are dropped)
y y
RATIO: Petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction; OR with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; AND there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Lack of jurisdiction defined when respondent does not have the legal power to determine the case. Grave abuse defined when the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law. It must amount to: y y y y y y a capricious, whimsical exercise of judgment, OR when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; AND it must amount to an evasion of positive duty to act in contemplation of law. It is not enough that there is abuse of discretion, such abuse must be grave. Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against Petitioners NO. Following the definitions above, the Court finds that there was no abuse of discretion committed by the City Prosecutor: In dismissing the charge of Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan the alleged defamatory statement was uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor. The City Prosecutor, being the proper officer at the 2B 2010
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time of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses and determine probable cause. The City Prosecutor, after observing the conduct of the parties, deemed that there was no probable cause. This was also upheld by the Justice Secretary in his Resolution. Jurisprudence provides that the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor, and ultimately, that of the Justice Secretary. In dismissing the charge of Attempted Homicide against Punzalan & co. this was in the nature of a countercharge, which the DOJ did not deem necessary to pursue. After Rainier Punzalan had filed his complaint, the DOJ directed that Dela Pena also be investigated for the charge of Attempted Homicide filed by Rainier. Therefore the complaint of Dela Pena of Attempted Homicide against Punzalan & co. was no longer necessary since the same could be threshed out in proceedings relating to the Attempted Homicide charge filed by Rainier.
COURT OF APPEALSS DECISION: Affirmed the decision of the RTC ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman had the authority to file the same in light of this Supreme Courts ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. RATIO: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." Said exercise of primary jurisdiction is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770. This goes to show that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. SUPREME COURTS DECISION: Supreme Court dismissed the case and held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute Castros case against respondents in the RTC even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the regular prosecutors.
The Court also finds that the Justice Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Absent any finding of grave abuse, jurisprudence in Samson, et. al. v. Guingona dictates that the Court should not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations. The determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the filing of an information against an offender must be left with the investigating prosecutor. SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009 FACTS: On May 31, 2000, Sharon Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court with Malversation of Public funds. It was found that as the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, she appropriated, took, misappropriated, embezzled and converted her collections and other accountabilities worth P556,681.53 to her own personal use and benefit. Then on August 31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the Information. She was claiming that the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated only by the public prosecutor since she was a public employee with a salary grade 27.
RTCS DECISION: The RTC denied Castros Motion to Quash since jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. Moreover, it pointed out that the Supreme Court expressly recognizes in the case of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases is cognizable by the RTC.
PANAGUITON V DOJ GR 167571 FACTS Cawili and his business associate Tongson borrowed from Panaguiton (petitioner) sums amounting to 1,979,459. Cawili and Tongson issued checks signed by both of them to Panaguiton but these were dishonored upon presentation. Panaguiton made 2B 2010
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demands to pay but to no avail. He formally filed a complaint on August 24 1995 for violating BP 22 before the City Prosecutors Office. Tongson moved to drop his name from the case as his signatures were allegedly falsified. Case against him was dismissed but afterwards upon finding that Tongson might have indeed signed the checks, the chief state prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. Tongson moved for reconsideration but denied. In 1999 assistant prosecutor dismissed the complaint for the action has prescribed pursuant to Act 3326, which provides for the prescriptive periods of statutes without their own (4 years for BP22). She claims that the filing of the complaint on August 24 1995 did not interrupt the running of the period as the law refers to judicial and not administrative proceedings. Panaguiton appealed to the DOJ, but was dismissed. He moved for reconsideration two times before it was held that the prescription had not elapsed. However in another resolution the DOJ ruled that prescription has set in. Panaguiton filed certiorari petition in CA but was dismissed for failure to attach a proper verification and certification for non-forum shopping and that the DOJ resolution (saying prescription has set in) dated August 9 2003 submitted was a mere photocopy. Panaguiton complied but the CA still denied. ISSUE Procedural: P.1. W/N verification subsequently attached by Panaguiton substantially complies with the rules P.2. W/N dismissal of the case for failure to attach certified true copy was warranted (he submitted only a photocopy) Substantive: S.1. W/N The filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolled the prescriptive period.
P.2. A certified true copy was actually attached in Annex A for the August 9 resolution. The photocopy attached was for the August 3 resolution and this wasnt the resolution the petitioner seeks to be reversed. S.1. When Act 3326 was passed into law, preliminary investigation of cases was done by the justices of peace, and not by agents of the executive department (i.e. prosecutors). Thus, the prevailing rule at that time is that prescription is tolled once filed with the justice of peace (a judicial process). However, since then, the conduction of a preliminary investigation was moved to the function of the executive department. Today, the term proceedings must be understood to mean either executive or judicial proceedings. With this interpretation, any type of investigation may ultimately lead to sufficiently toll prescription. To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays not under his control. As seen in this case, various conflicting opinions of the DOJ delayed his cause. Aggrieved parties who do not sleep on their right should not be allowed to suffer simply because of circumstances beyond their control.
HELD P.1. YES. Subsequent attachment substantially complied with requirements of the law. P.2. NO. Case shouldnt have been dismissed. S.1. YES. Filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolls the prescriptive period for violations of BP22. RATIO P.1. The verification was intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations therein are true and not a mere product of fiction. Deficiency in the verification may be excused or dispensed with as this doesnt affect jurisdiction. At times the court even waives the requirement or just allows corrections. 2B 2010

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY.

TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

C. Systems of Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

Regional Trial Courts

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

D. Criminal Jurisdiction of Courts What is jurisdiction?

VENUE IS JURISDICTIONAL. Place of commission dictates.

Jurisdiction The power of the court to decide the case on merits.

Substantive Granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

BUT always start/institute in Location where crime is committed

A. General Principles People v. Mariano 76 SCRA 600

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

Reyes v. Diaz 73 Phils. 484

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary 157 SCRA 147

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

B. Jurisdiction determined by the position

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

C. Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint

D. Jurisdiction acquired over the person of the accused

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

E. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by waiver

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

G. Estoppels by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction

F. Jurisdiction not conferred by consent

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

Action of the court when determined that it has no jurisdiction

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

J. Jurisdiction over Dangerous Drugs cases

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

L. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

N. Jurisdiction over the PNP by regular Courts

O. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

M. Special Jurisdiction of Courts

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

a. Jurisdiction over Public Officers

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

b. Offense deemed committed in relation to Public Office

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

c. Jurisdiction not determined by allegations

d. Distinguished from jurisdiction of Ombudsman

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

f. Exclusive Jurisdiction over PCGG cases

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

g. Jurisdiction to annul Judgments

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III

Consider the fact that