A. Interpretation: The affirmative should defend the instrumental implementation of a topical policy option.

The negative should debate in the framework established by the affirmative. B. Violation: The neg advocates an alternative that isnt a topical policy option as established in the 1ac. C. Standards: 1. Predictable ground: Forcing the aff to debate in a framework chosen by the neg moots our 1ac because theres no amount of predictability. That stifles debate and makes their criticism pointless because we cant discuss it. Shively in 0
(Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 182-3)

basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic"
The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what

the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain fullfledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic,

agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two
but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. For people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to

discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of They must also agreeand they do so simply by entering into debatethat they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.
begin the discussion. At the very least, the two what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on.

2. Aff choice: Allowing the debate to be focused on the affirmative solves for predictable limited ground. The aff sets the precedent for a policy focused debate by defending a plan enforced through fiat.

Leonardi s Policy Maker (2/2)

3. Critical education relies on the utopian thinking of fiat and political speculation. We solve the K. Streeten 99
(Paul, Econ prof @ Boston, Development, v. 42, n. 2, p 118) First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists assumption plainly would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrows problems, Utopianism is not

the Utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to reinforce the status quo. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform. Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default. Only a few years ago nobody would have expected the
helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing the selfinterested pressures of the obstructionist groups.

Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at moments in history when large numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending slavery is a historical example. It is for these five reasons that Utopians
should not be discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration.

Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision. It is well known that there are three types of economists: those who can count and those who cant. But being able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy of the World Bank, and elsewhere. They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail What we need is a marriage between the the technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We need
to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the barricades. Pedants and the Utopians, between Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

No link- We are not going to try to be an outer special fix to capitalism. This makes no sense, there plan doesnt solve solar flares bro. Link turn-In order for the revolution to get off the ground we need satellites. Look at Occupy wallstreet, that never wouldve spread if it wasnt for the communication occurring. Even if there are problems with satellites they help the disempowered Dickens 10 *Visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex
(Peter, The Humanization of the Cosmos To What End?, Monthly Review Vol 62, No 6, November 2010, dml) Most obviously, the technology allowing a human presence in the cosmos would be focused mainly on earthly society. There

are many serious crises down here on Earth that have urgent priority when considering the humanization of outer space. First,
there is the obvious fact of social inequalities and resources. Is $2 billion and upwards to help the private sector find new forms of space vehicles really a priority for public funding, especially at a time when relative social inequalities and environmental conditions are rapidly worsening? The military-industrial complex might well benefit, but it hardly represents society as a whole. This

is not to say, however, that public spending on space should be stopped. Rather, it should be addressed toward ameliorating the many crises that face global society. Satellites, for example, have helped open up phone and Internet communications for marginalized people, especially those not yet connected by cable. Satellites, including satellites manufactured by capitalist companies, can also be useful for monitoring climate change and other forms of environmental crisis such as deforestation and imminent hurricanes. They have proved useful
in coordinating humanitarian efforts after natural disasters. Satellites have even been commissioned by the United Nations to track the progress of refugees in Africa and elsewhere

The negative embraces too radical of an alternative. We should treat the 1ac as a slow filing away from the spirit of gravity
Deleuze 74
[Gilles; professor at the University of Paris VIII at Vincennes; Desert Islands 240] It means many things. Jaspers and, more recently, Laing have displayed penetrating insight on this topic, even if they are still pretty much misunderstood. Essentially, they say that what is called madness is composed, roughly speaking, of two things: there is a breach, a tearing open, like a sudden light, a wall that is punched through, and then there is this other, very different dimension which could be called collapse. I remember a letter by Van Gogh: We

have to undermine the wall. he says. Except knocking down the wall is really difficult. And if you do it in a wav that is too brutal. YOU knock yourself out. YOU fall down. You collapse. And Van Gogh added: Just file away at it, slowly. Patiently. So there is this breach, and a possible collapse. Jaspers, when he talks about the schizophrenic process. emphasizes the coexistence of two elements: a kind of intrusion. the arrival of something for which there is no possible expression. something wonderful, so wonderful in fact that it is difficult to articulate: hut it is so repressed in our society-and here you have the second element-that it runs the risk of coinciding with collapse. Here you see the autistic schizophrenic. who no longer moves. and who can remain motionless for years. In the case of Nietzsche, Van Gogh, Artaud, Roussel, Campana, etc., the two elements certainly coexist. A fantastic breach, a hole in the wall. Van Gogh, Nervaland SO many others-have knocked down the wall of the signifier, the wall of mommy-daddy. they went beyond it and speak to us in a voice which is our future. But the second element is nonetheless present in this process, and it is the danger of collapse. No one has the right to deride. to treat with flippancy, the fact that tearing own. the breach slim into or coincides with a kind of collapse. This danger must be considered fundamental. The two elements are connected. It is meaningless to say that Artaud was not
schizophrenic-worse, its shameful and stupid. Artaud was clearly schizophrenic. He achieved a wonderful breakthrough, he knocked down the wall, hut at what price? The price of a collapse that must be qualified as schizophrenic. The breakthrough and the breakdown are two different moments. It would be irresponsible to turn a blind eye to the danger of collapse in such endeavors. But theyre worth it.

No Alt SolvencyGreed and capitalism are inevitable the concepts of property rights and free trade are engrained in our psyche

Wilkinson 5 (Will, policy analyst@CATO, CATO Policy Report, XXVII(1), January/February, http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html, accessed: 29 June 2011, JT)
Perhaps the most depressing lesson of evolutionary psychology for politics is found in its account of the deepseated human capacity for envy and, related, of our difficulty in understanding the idea of gains from trade and increases in productivitythe idea of an ever-expanding "pie" of wealth. There is evidence that greater skill and initiative could lead to higher status and bigger shares of resources for an individual in the EEA. But because of the social nature of hunting and gathering, the fact that food spoiled quickly, and the utter absence of privacy, the benefits of individual success in hunting or foraging could not be easily internalized by the individual, and were expected to be shared. The EEA was for the most part a zero-sum world, where increases in total wealth through invention, investment, and extended economic exchange were totally unknown. More for you was less for me. Therefore, if anyone managed to acquire a great deal more than anyone else, that was pretty good evidence that theirs was a stash of illgotten gains, acquired by cheating, stealing, raw force, or, at best, sheer luck. Envy of the disproportionately wealthy may have helped to reinforce generally adaptive norms of sharing and to help those of lower status on the dominance hierarchy guard against further predation by those able to amass power. Our zero-sum mentality makes it hard for us to understand how trade and investment can increase the amount of total wealth. We are thus ill-equipped to easily understand our own economic system. These features of human naturethat we are coalitional, hierarchical, and envious zero-sum thinkerswould seem to make liberal capitalism extremely unlikely. And it is. However, the benefits of a liberal market order can be seen in a few further features of the human mind and social organization in the EEA. Property Rights are Natural The problem of distributing scarce resources can be handled in part by implicitly coercive allocative hierarchies. An alternative solution to the problem of distribution is the recognition and enforcement of property rights. Property rights are prefigured in nature by the way animals mark out territories for their exclusive use in foraging, hunting, and mating. Recognition of such rudimentary claims to control and exclude minimizes costly conflict, which by itself provides a strong evolutionary reason to look for innate tendencies to recognize and respect norms of property. New scientific research provides even stronger evidence for the existence of such property "instincts." For example, recent experimental work by Oliver Goodenough, a legal theorist, and Christine Prehn, a neuroscientist, suggests that the

human mind evolved specialized modules for making judgments about moral transgressions, and transgressions against property in particular. Evolutionary psychology can help us to understand that property rights are not created simply by strokes of the legislator's pen. Mutually Beneficial Exchange is Natural Trade and mutually beneficial exchange are human universals, as is the division of labor. In their groundbreaking paper, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange," Cosmides and Tooby point out that, contrary to widespread belief, hunter-gatherer life is not "a kind of retro-utopia" of "indiscriminate, egalitarian cooperation and sharing." The archeological and ethnographic evidence shows that hunter-gatherers were involved in numerous forms of trade and exchange. Some forms of hunter-gatherer trading can involve quite complex specialization and the interaction of supply and demand. Most impressive, Cosmides and Tooby have shown through a series of experiments that human beings are able easily to solve complex logical puzzles involving reciprocity, the accounting of costs and benefits, and the detection of people who have cheated on agreements. However, we are unable to solve formally identical puzzles that do not deal with questions of social exchange. That, they argue, points to the existence of "functionally specialized, contentdependent cognitive adaptations for social exchange."

No mindset shift will occur individuals wont adjust their lifestyles Paul R. Ehrlich, Bing Professor of Population Studies, Department of Biology Sciences at Stanford, and Anne H. Ehrlich, Senior Research Associate in the Department of Biological Sciences at Stanford, 1996, Betrayal of Science and Reason: How Anti-Environmental Rhetoric Threatens Our Future, p. 69-70 But human beings are specialists in cultural evolution, which can pro-ceed much more rapidly than can genetic evolution. Through ingenuity and invention, it is possible to enlarge human carrying capacity-as in- deed has happened in the past. Today, widespread behavioral changessuch as becoming vegetarian-potentially could increase Earth's carrying capacity for human beings in a short time as well. As-suming full cooperation in the needed changes, it might be possible to support 6 billion people indefinitely (that is, to end human overpopu-lation, if there were no further population growth). But we doubt that most people in today's rich nations would willingly embrace the changes in lifestyle necessary to increase global carrying capacity. How many Americans would be willing to adjust their lifestyles radically to live, say, like the Chinese, so that more Dutch or Australians or Mexicans could be supported? How many Chinese would give up their dreams of American-style affluence for the same reason? Such lifestyle changes certainly seem unlikely to us, since most current trends among those who can afford it are toward more affluence and consumption, which tend to decrease carrying capacity and intensify the degree of overpopulation. Alt Causes Transition Wars, killing solvency in the process Speeding up the transition will fail and create chaos which prevents social transformation Ted Trainer, lecturer in the School of Social Work, University of New South Wales, March 2000, Democracy and Nature, Vol. 6, No. 1, Where are we, where do we want to be, how do we get there? http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol6/trainer_where.htm If there is a boom we in the Eco-village Movement should welcome it, through gritted teeth, because it will give us the time we desperately need. The last thing we want is a collapse of the system in the immediate future. We are far from ready. Hardly any of the hundreds of millions of people who live in rich world cities have any idea of an alternative to the consumer way and their settlements have no provision for anything but maximising the throughput of resources. By all means lets have a collapse a little later, but the prospects for The Simpler Way depend greatly on how extensively the concept can be established before the mainstream runs into serious trouble. We need at least two more decades to build the understanding, and the most effective way to do that is by developing examples.

Transition wars will kill the planet but not capitalism Flood 04 (Andrew, Anarchist organizer and writer, Civilization, Primitivism, Anarchism, http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=1451)
However it is worth doing a little mental exercise on this idea of the oil running out. If indeed there was no alternative what might happen? Would a primitivist utopia emerge even at the bitter price of 5,900 million people dying? No. The primitivists seem to forget that we live in a class society. The population of the earth is divided into a few people with vast resources and power and the rest of us. It is not a case of equal access to resources, rather of quite incredible unequal access. Those who fell

victim to the mass die off would not include Rubert Murdoch, Bill Gates or George Bush because these people have the money and power to monopolise remaining supplies for themselves. Instead the first to die in huge number would be the population of the poor er mega cities on the planet. Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt have a
population of around 20 million between them. Egypt is dependent both on food imports and on the very intensive agriculture of the Nile valley and the oasis. Except for the tiny wealthy elite those 20 million urban dwellers would have nowhere to go and there is no more land to be worked. Current high yields are in part dependent on high inputs of cheap energy. The mass deaths of millions of people is not something that destroys capitalism. Indeed at periods of history it has been seen as quite natural and even desirable for the modernization of capital. The potato famine of the 1840's that reduced the population of Ireland by 30% was seen as desirable by many advocates of free trade.(16) So was the 1943/4 famine in British ruled Bengal in which four million died(17). For the capitalist class such mass deaths, particularly in colonies afford opportunities to

restructure the economy in ways that would otherwise be resisted. The real result of an 'end of energy' crisis would see our rulers stock piling what energy sources remained and using them to power the helicopter gunships that would be used to control those of us fortunate enough to be selected to toil for them in the biofuel fields. The unlucky majority would just be kept where they are and allowed to die off. More of the 'Matrix' then utopia in other words. The other point to be made here is that destruction can serve to regenerate capitalism. Like it or not large scale destruction allows some capitalist to make a lot of money. Think of the Iraq war. The
destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure may be a disaster for the people of Iraq buts it's a profit making bonanza for Halliburton and co[18]. Not coincidentally the Iraq war, is helping the US A, where the largest corporations are based, gain control of the parts of the planet where much future and current oil production takes place

There are two different types of revolution: the neurotic and the schizoid. The neurotic displaces limits, redrawing the lines further and pretending hes revolted. In the end, he only rebounds off the wall violently and becomes catatonic. The affirmative is neurotic, wildly attempting to throw themselves into revolution but only trapping themselves between the two poles. Instead, we have to use the perm to slowly file away at the Oedipal limiters, transitioning into the schizo-revolutionary pole
Deleuze and Guattari 72
[Gilles and Felix, professors at the University of Paris VIII at Vincennes; AO 135-37]

Very few accomplish what Laing calls the breakthrough of this schizophrenic wall or limit: "quite ordinary people," nevertheless. But the majority draw near the wall and back away horrified. Better to fall back under the law of the signifier, marked by castration, triangulated In Oedipus. So they displace the limit, they make it pass into the interior of the social formation, between the social production and reproduction that they invest, and the familial reproduction that they Fall back on, to which they apply all the investments. They make the limit pass Into the interior of the domain thus described by Oedipus, between the two poles of
Oedipus. They never stop involuting and evolving between these two poles. Oedipus as the last rock, and castration as the cavern: the ultimate territoriality, although reduced to the analyst's couch, rather than the decoded flows of desire that flee, slip away, and take us where? Such is

neurosis, the displacement of the limit, in order to create a little colonial world of one's own. But others
want virgin lands, more truly exotic, families more artificial, societies more secret that they design and institute along the length of the wall, in the locales of perversion. Still others, sickened by the utensility (l'ustensilite) of Oedipus, but also by the shoddiness

and aestheticism of perversions, reach the wall and rebound against it, sometimes with an extreme violence. Then they become immobile, silent, they retreat to the body without organs, still a territoriality, but this time totally desert-like, where all desiring-production is arrested, or where it becomes rigid, feigning stoppage: psychosis. These catatonic bodies have fallen into the river like lead weights, immense transfixed hippopotamuses who will not come back up to the surface. They have entrusted all their forces to primal repression, in order to escape the system of social and psychic repression that fabricates neurotics. But a more naked repression befalls them that declares them identical with the hospital schizo, the great autistic one, the clinical entity that "lacks" Oedipus. Why the same word, schizo, to designate both the process insofar as it goes beyond the limit, and the result of the process insofar as it runs up against the limit and pounds endlessly away there? Why the same word to designate both the eventual breakthrough and the possible breakdown, and all the transitions, the intrications of the two extremes? In
point of fact, of the three preceding adventures, the adventure of psychosis is the most intimately related to the process: in the sense of Jaspers' demonstration, when he shows that the "demonic"-ordinarily repressed-erupts by means of such a state, or gives rise to such states, which endlessly run the risk of making it topple into breakdown and disintegration.

We no longer know if it is the process that must truly be called madness, the sickness being only disguise or caricature, or if the sickness is our only madness and the process our only cure. But in any case, the intimate nature of the relationship appears directly in inverse ratio: the more the process of production is led off course, brutally interrupted, the more the schizo-as-entity arises as a specific product. That is why, on the other hand, we were unable to establish any direct relationship between neurosis and psychosis. The relationships of neurosis, psychosis, and also perversion depend on the situation of each one with regard to the process, and on the manner in which each one represents a mode of interruption of the process, a residual bit of ground to which one still clings so as not to be carried off by the deterritorialized flows of desire. Neurotic
territoriality of Oedipus, perverse territorialities of the artifice, psychotic territoriality of the body without organs: sometimes the process is caught in the trap and made to turn about within the triangle, sometimes it takes itself as an end-in-itself, other times it continues on in the void

Each of these forms has schizophrenia as a foundation; schizophrenia as a process is the only universal.. Schizophrenia is at once the wall, the breaking through this wall, and the failures of this breakthrough: "How does one get through this wall, for it is useless to hit it hard, it has to be undermined and penetrated with a file, slowly and with patience as I see it. What is at stake is not merely art or literature. For either the artistic machine, the analytic machine, and the revolutionary machine will remain in extrinsic relationships that make
and substitutes a horrible exasperation for its fulfillment

them function in the deadening framework of the system of social and psychic repression, or they will become parts and cogs of one another in the flow that feeds one and the same desiring-machine, so many local fires patiently kindled for a generalized explosion the shiz and not the signifier.

Perm Do both The best way to solve capitalism is to let local action coexist with global actions like the plan the alternative alone can never solve Gibson-Graham 2 (Katharine, human geography@ Australian National University, Julie, geography@U of Massachusetts, http://www.communityeconomies.org/papers/rethink/rethinkp3.rtf, accessed: 30 June 2011, JT)
Finally, what

can we say about an economic politics outside the binary frame? In the face of the programs and plans of anti-globalization theorists and political analysts, our micropolitical experiments can easily be dismissed. Most analysts, like Hardt and Negri, offer a vision of an appropriate political response to globalization that is very distant

from the one we are pursuing: Imperial corruption is already undermined by the productivity of bodies, by cooperation, and by the multitudes designs on productivity. The only event that we are still awaiting is the construction, or rather the insurgence, of a powerful organization. The genetic chain is formed and established in ontology, the scaffolding is continuously constructed and renewed by the new cooperative productivity, and thus we await only the maturation of the political development of the posse. We do not have any models to offer this event. Only the multitude through its practical experimentation will offer models and determine when and how the possible becomes real. (2000: 411) We are no longer capable of waiting for the multitude to construct a powerful organization (Gibson-Graham, 1996). Instead, we continue to be inspired by feminism as a global force, one that started small and personal and largely stayed that way, that worked on cultivating new ways of being, that created new languages, discourses and representations, that built organizations, and that quickly (albeit unevenly) encompassed the globe. Globalization appears to call for one form of politicsmobilization and resistance on the global scale. But we believe there are other ways of practicing transformative politicsinvolving an opening to the local as a place of political creativity and innovation. To advocate local enactments is in no way to suggest that other avenues should close down. We

would hope for the acceptance of multiple powers and forms of politics, with an eye to increasing freedoms and not limiting options. Rather than equivocating, with paradoxical certainty, about when and how a challenge to globalization will arise (the Hardt and Negri position), we have engaged in a here and now political experiment working on ourselves and in our backyards.29 This is not because we think that we have found the only way forward, but because we have become unable to wait for an effective politics to be convened on some future terrain. The form of politics we are pursuing is not transmitted via a mass organization, but through a language and a set of practices. A language can become universal without being universalist. It can share the space of power with other languages, without having to eradicate or overthrow them.30 Academic, NGO, and internet networks can become part of a system of transmission, translation, amplification. In our (admittedly hopeful) vision, the language of the diverse economy and accompanying practices of non-capitalist development may have global purchase one day.

WE solve for capitalism on different levels- We gather info on asteroids so later we dont have to rely on the market. And only the perm can solve casae. How the fuck does rejecting capitalism solve asteroids? Means the perm can solve the kritik with a net benefit of the plan. Perm do the plan and then the alt. Theyre in a double bind. Either A. The Alt isnt strong enough to overcome a small process such as putting satellites up or B. The alt is strong enough therefor the perm solves.

Turn: attempts to emancipate subjects only reinforces biopolitical regulation illusions of liberation and free thought deter action. Zizek, Slavoj. 2002. [Senior Researcher at the University of Ljubljana, Ph. D in kicking your ass. Welcome to the Desert of the Real. p. 2]
Is this not the matrix of an efficient critique of ideology not only in totalitarian conditions of censorship but, perhaps even more, in the more refined conditions of liberal censorship? One starts by agreeing that one has all the freedom one wants

then one merely adds that the only thing missing is the red ink: we feel free because we lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom. What this lack of red ink means is that, today, all the main terms we use to designate the present conflict war on terrorism, democracy and freedom, human rights, and so on are false terms, mystifying our perception of the freedom instead of allowing us to think it. In this precise sense, our freedoms themselves serve to mask and sustain our deeper unfreedom. A
hundred years ago, in his emphasis on the acceptance of some fixed dogma as the condition of (demanding) actual freedom, Gilbert Keith Chesterton perspicuously detected the antidemocratic potential of the very principle of freedom of thought: We may say broadly that free thought is the best of all safeguards against freedom. Managed in modern style, the

emancipation of the slaves mind is the best way to prevent the emancipation of the slave. Teach him to worry about whether he wants to be free, and he will not free himselfIs this not emphatically true of our
postmodern time, with its freedom to deconstruct, doubt, distantiate oneself? We should not forget that Chesterton makes exactly same claim as Kant in his What is Enlightenment: Think as much as you like, and as freely as you like, just

obey!

Radical opposition to institutions of power only affirms its existence and structural assumptions on which it operates. This allows the system to simulate its own death, magnifying its power. Baudrillard, Jean. 1990. [French Philosopher and Cultural Theorist. Simulacra and Simulations.
www.thelogician.net/5b_ruminate/5b_foucault.htm] The conjunction of the system and its extreme alternative like two ends of a curved mirror, the "vicious" curvature of a political space henceforth magnetized, circularized, reversibilized from right to lek a torsion that is like the evil demon of commutation, the whole system, the infinity of capital folded back over its own sur&ce: transfinite? And isn't it the same with desire and libidinal space? The conjunction of desire and value, of desire and capital. The conjunction of desire and the law; the ultimate joy and metamorphosis of the law (which is why it is so well received at the moment): only capital takes pleasure, Lyotard said, before coming to think that we take pleasure in capital. Overwhelming versatility of desire in Deleuze: an enigmatic reversal which brings this desire that is "revolutionary by itself, and as if involuntarily, in wanting what it wants," to want its own repression and to invest paranoid and fascist systems? A malign torsion which reduces this revolution of desire to the same fundamental ambiguity as the other, historical revolution. All the referentials intermingle their discourses in a circular, Moebian compulsion. Not so long ago sex and work were savagely opposed terms: today both are dissolved into the same type of demand. Formerly the discourse on history took its force from opposing itself to the one on nature, the discourse on desire to the one on power: today they exchange their signifiers and their scenarios. It would take too long to run through the whole range of operational negativity, of all those scenarios of deterrence which, like Watergate, try to revive a moribund principle by simulated scandal, phantasm, murder - a sort of hormonal treatment by negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real by the imaginary; proving truth by scandal; proving the law by transgression; proving work by the strike; proving the system by crisis and capital by revolution; and for that matter proving ethnology by the dispossession of its object (the Tasaday). Without counting: proving theater by anti-theater; proving art by anti-art; proving pedagogy by antipedagogy; proving psychiatry by anti-psychiatry, etc., etc. Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power, every situation speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt to escape, by simulation of death, its real agony. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. Thus with the American presidents: the Kennedys are murdered because they still have a political dimension. Others - Johnson, Nixon, Ford only had a right to puppet attempts, to simulated murders. But they nevertheless needed that aura of an artificial menace to conceal that they were nothing other than mannequins of power. In olden days the king (also the god) had to die - that was his strength. Today he does his miserable utmost to pretend to die, so as to preserve the blessing of power. But even this is gone. To seek new blood in its own death, to renew the cycle by the mirror of crisis, negativity and anti-power: this is the only alibi of every power, of every institution attempting to break the vicious circle of its irresponsibility and its fundamental nonexistence, of its deja-vu and its deja-mort.

Perm do the plan as an instance to reject capitalism: The alt alone is coopted you need a multitude of standpoints means the perm solves Carroll 10 *founding director of the Social Justice Studies Program at the University of Victoria
(William, Crisis, movements, counter-hegemony: in search of the new, Interface 2:2, 168-198, dml)

Just as hegemony has been increasingly organized on a transnational basis through the globalization of Americanism, the construction of global governance institutions, the emergence of a transnational capitalist class and so on (Soederberg 2006;
Carroll 2010) counter-hegemony

has also taken on transnational features that go beyond the classic organization of left parties into internationals. What Sousa Santos (2006) terms the rise of a global left is evident in specific movementbased campaigns, such as the successful international effort in 1998 to defeat the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI); in initiatives such as the World Social Forum, to contest the terrain of global civil society; and in the growth of transnational movement organizations and of a democratic globalization network, counterpoised to neoliberalisms transnational historical bloc, that address

incipient war of position is at work here a bloc of oppositional forces to neoliberal globalization encompassing a wide range of movements and identities and that is global in nature, transcending traditional national boundaries (Butko 2006: 101). These moments of resistance and transborder activism do not yet combine to form a coherent historical bloc around a counter-hegemonic project. Rather, as Marie-Jose Massicotte suggests, we are witnessing the emergence and remaking of political imaginaries, which often lead to valuable localized actions as well as greater transborder
solidarity (2009: 424). Indeed, Gramscis adage that while the line of development is international, the origin point is national, still has currency.

issues of North-South solidarity and coordination (Smith 2008:24). As I have suggested elsewhere (Carroll 2007), an

Much of the energy of anti-capitalist politics is centred within what Raymond Williams (1989) called militant particularisms localized struggles that, left to themselves are easily dominated by the power of capital to coordinate accumulation across universal but fragmented space (Harvey 1996: 32). Catharsis, in this context, takes on a spatial character. The scaling up of militant particularisms requires alliances across interrelated scales to unite a diverse range of social groupings and thereby spatialize a Gramscian war of position to the global scale (Karriem 2009: 324).
Such alliances, however, must be grounded in local conditions and aspirations. Eli Friedmans (2009) case study of two affiliated movement organizations in Hong Kong and mainland China, respectively, illustrates the limits of transnational activism that radiates from advanced capitalism to exert external pressure on behalf of subalterns in the global South. Friedman recounts how a campaign by the Hong Kong-based group of Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior to empower Chinese mainland workers producing goods for Hong Kong Disneyland failed due to the lack of local mobilization by workers themselves. Yet the same group, through its support for its ally, the mainlandbased migrant workers association, has helped facilitate self-organization on the shop floor. In the former case, well-intentioned practices of solidarity reproduced a paternalism that failed to inspire local collective action; in the latter, workers taking direct action on their own behalf,

more such solidarity work involves grassroots initiatives and participation, the greater is the likelihood that workers from different countries will learn from each other, enabling transnational counterhegemony to gain a foothold (Rahmon and Langford 2010: 63).

with external support, led to psychological empowerment and movement mobilization (Friedman 2009: 212). As a rule, the

Perm do the plan and the alt to work within the stateTurning away from the state prevents mobilization for good causes. Goble, Publisher of RFE/RL, 1998 (Paul, THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOLITICIZATION, Radio Free Europe, October 12, 1998, http://www.friendspartners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981012I.html(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,new), accessed 7-10-9 NB)
First, as people turn away from the state as the source of support, they inevitably care less about what the state does and are less willing to take action to assert their views. That means that neither the state nor the opposition can mobilize them to take action for or against anything. As a result, the opposition cannot easily get large numbers of people to demonstrate even if the opposition is taking positions that polls suggest most people agree with. And the government cannot draw on popular support even when it may be doing things that the people have said they want. That means that the size of demonstrations for or against anything or anyone are an increasingly poor indicator of what the people want or do not want the state to do. Second, precisely because people are focusing on their private lives and taking responsibility for them, they are likely to become increasingly upset when the state attempts to intervene in their lives even for the most benign purposes, particularly if it does so in an ineffective manner. Such attitudes, widespread in many countries and important in limiting the power of state institutions, nonetheless pose a particular danger to countries making the transition from communism to democracy. While those views help promote the dismantling of the old state, they also virtually preclude the emergence of a new and efficient one. As a result, these countries are often likely to find themselves without the effective state institutions that modern societies and economies require if they are to be well regulated. And third, countries with depoliticized populations are especially at risk when they face a crisis. The governments cannot count on support because people no longer expect the governments to be able to deliver.

Combining the political process with outside alternatives is critical to creating real political change. Burke 7 (Pf Politics & International Relations @ U of New South Wales, Sydney, 07 Anthony Burke, Theory & Event, Vol. 10, No. 2)NAR
But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action. This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

Zizek doesnt identify a possible alternative, keeping him in an ivory tower and preventing any change
Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003

(Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf)

Radical,"

<How can one overcome capitalism without imagining an alternative? Zizeks answer relies on his extension of Lacanian clinical principles into social analysis. For Zizek, every social system contains a Symbolic (social institutions, law, etc.), an Imaginary (the ideologies, fantasies and pseudo-concrete images which sustain this system), and a Real, a group which is extimate to (intimately present in, but necessarily external to) the system, a part of no part which must be repressed or disavowed for the system to function. Zizek identifies this group with the symptom in psychoanalysis, terming it the social symptom. Just as a patient in psychoanalysis should identify with his or her symptom to cure neuroses, so political radicals should identify with the social symptom to achieve radical change. This involves a statement of solidarity which takes the form We are all them, the excluded non-part - for instance, we are all Sarajevans or we are all illegal immigrants.26 By identifying with the symptom, one becomes for Zizek a proletarian, and therefore touched by Grace.27 Thus even academics like Zizek can perform an authentic Act while retaining their accustomed lifestyles simply by identifying with anathemas thrown at them by others.28 Since the social symptom is the embodiment of the inherent impossibility of society, identification with it allows one, paradoxically, to recover a radical politics which is rendered unthinkable and impossible by the present socio-symbolic system.29 Identification with the symptom is not an external act of solidarity. Zizek does not accept a division between individual and social psychology, so he believes identifying with the social symptom also disrupts ones own psychological structure. This identification involves neither the self-emancipation of this group nor a struggle in support of its specific demands, but rather, a personal act from the standpoint of this group, which substitutes for it and even goes against its particular demands in pursuit of its ascribed Truth.30>

Zizek offers no guide to a successful deconstruction of the system his theory is a recipe for fragmentation of progressive individuals.
Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003

(Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf)

Radical,"

<As useful as such a reading is, this is not the Zizek who emerges on closer examination. Regarding where radicals - especially active radicals - should proceed from here and now, Zizeks work offers little to celebrate. The relevance of a politics based on formal structural categories instead of lived historical processes, which measures radicalism, not by concrete achievements, but by how abruptly one rejects the existing symbolic order, is questionable.

The concept of the Act is metaphysical, not political, and it leads to a rejection of most forms of resistance. For Zizek, objections to official ideologies which stop short of an Act are the very form of ideology,141 and the gap between complaint and Acts is insurmountable.142 So protest politics fits the existing power relations and carnivals are a false transgression which stabilizes the power edifice.143 This position misreads past revolutionary movements - including the decades-long revolutionary process in Russia - and offers nothing to the development of a left strategy to challenge the existing system. All Zizek establishes, therefore, is a radical break between his own theory and any effective left politics. The concept of the Act is a recipe for

irrelevance - for creating a desert around oneself while sitting in judgement on actual political movements which always fall short of ones ideal criteria.>

Zizeks alternative cannot escape the current social system he merely shifts oppression from one group to another.
Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003

(Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf)

symbolic order or the Law of the Master.

Radical,"

<So the Act is a rebirth - but a rebirth as what? The parallel with Lacans concept of traversing the fantasy is crucial, because, for Lacan, there is no escape from the

We are trapped in the existing world, complete with its dislocation, lack, alienation and antagonism, and no transcendence can overcome the deep structure of this world, which is fixed at the level of subject-formation; the most we can hope for is to go from incapable neurosis to mere alienated subjectivity. In Zizeks politics, therefore, a fundamental social transformation is impossible. After the break initiated by an Act, a system similar to the present one is restored; the subject undergoes identification with a Cause,77 leading to a new proper symbolic Prohibition revitalised by the process of rebirth,78 enabling one effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures,79 which may be the same ones as today, e.g. structural

adjustment policies.80 It is possible to start a new life by replacing one symbolic fiction with another.81 As a Lacanian, Zizek is opposed to any idea of realising utopian fullness. Any change in the basic structure of existence, whereby one may overcome dislocation and disorientation, is out of the question. However, he also rejects practical solutions to problems as a mere displacement.82 So

an Act neither solves concrete problems nor achieves drastic improvements; it merely removes blockages to existing modes of thought and action. It transforms the constellation which generates social symptoms,83 shifting exclusion from one group to another, but it does not achieve either drastic or moderate concrete changes. It means
that we accept the vicious circle of revolving around the object [the Real] and find jouissance in it, renouncing the myth that jouissance is amassed somewhere else.84 It also offers those who take part in it a dimension of Otherness, that moment when the absolute appears in all its fragility, a brief apparition of a future utopian Otherness to which every authentic revolutionary stance should cling.85 This absolute, however, can only be glimpsed. The leader, Act and Cause must be betrayed so the social order can be refounded. The leader, or mediator, must erase himself [sic] from the picture,86 retreating to the horizon of the social to haunt history as spectre or phantasy.87 Every Great Man must be betrayed so he can assume his fame and thereby become compatible with the status quo;88 once one glimpses the sublime Universal, therefore, one must commit suicide - as Zizek claims the Bolshevik Party did, via the Stalinist purges (When the Party Commits Suicide).>