PARSI: IRAN AND ISRAEL

IRAN

AND

ISRAEL: THE AVOIDABLE WAR

Trita Parsi
Dr. Parsi is an adjunct professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS and the author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007).

he summer war between Israel and Lebanon was not limited to the Israeli Defense Forces and the Lebanese Hezbollah. The 34day war, whose immediate spark was a border attack by Hezbollah that left several Israeli soldiers dead and several taken prisoner, has much deeper roots than a simple border dispute. At the heart of the conflict lies a shifting geopolitical balance in an orderless Middle East where two traditional allies Israel and Iran have been pitted against each other for control of the region. While Americas selfdefeating policies in Iraq and the conflict around Irans uranium-enrichment program have caused this conflict to come to a head by prompting Washingtons regional decline and accelerating Irans rise the roots of the conflict stretch back to the end of the Cold War. But even though Iran and Israel are currently entangled in a strategic rivalry that neither one sought, a climactic military confrontation between the two is far from inevitable. Only decades ago, Iran and Israel, the Middle Easts two key non-Arab states, enjoyed a close but secret relationship. The essence of this entente was not the inevitability of a non-Arab alliance against the

Arab masses per se, but a congruence of interests formed by the configuration of power in the region. Iran and Israel shared interests because they shared common threats: the Soviet Union and militant Arab states. In the power balance of the region at the time, an Iranian-Israeli entente made sense. Due to the continuing existence of these threats, many aspects of the IsraeliIranian relationship survived the Iranian Revolution in spite of Irans new state ideology. For instance, Israel was a key provider of arms to the new theocracy in Iran during the Iraq-Iran War, and there are indications that Israels attack on Iraqs nuclear site at Osirak in 1981 was facilitated by Iranian intelligence and assistance. In addition, Israel lobbied Washington extensively in the 1980s to open up relations with Iran, in spite of Ayatollah Khomeinis venomous rhetoric against the Jewish state. These efforts culminated in the Iran-contra scandal. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Saddam Hussein in 1991 the last Arab power that could pose a significant conventional military threat to Iran and Israel the geopolitical map of the Middle East was reconfigured
Journal Compilation 2007, Middle East Policy Council

2007, The Author

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and the rationale for the covert or overt cooperation between the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic evaporated. In the new emerging Middle East, the two nonArab powerhouses no longer shared common security imperatives. The distribution of relative power shifted toward Iran and Israel and formed a nascent bipolar structure in the region. While the elimination of key threats improved the security environments of both, it also left both states unchecked. Without Iraq balancing Iran, Tehran could now become a threat, Israeli strategists began to fear. In addition, Iran could become Israels strategic competitor for Washingtons support, particularly when Israels strategic utility to America had been put in question. Without the Soviet Union to be a bulwark against in the Middle East, Israels role in Americas strategic calculations had lost much of its raison dtre. While the New World Order provided Iran with an opportunity to reintegrate itself into the region in political and economic terms, it posed a major challenge to Israel. It did not take long before these former allies began acting against each other. Israel inverted its periphery doctrine and sought peace with its immediate Arab neighbors largely in order to focus its resources on the challenge Iran could pose. In addition, in stark contrast to its policies in the 1980s, Israel now took the lead in opposing any dialogue or diplomacy between Washington and Tehran. Iran, in turn, interpreted the peace process as an attempt to establish an Israel-centric Middle East order founded on Irans prolonged isolation. Peace between the Arabs and Israel could not be sustained without a common threat percep-

tion by these states against Iran, Tehran feared. The statements of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which spelled out this very vision and the strategic logic for the peace process, did little to alleviate Irans fears. The peace process itself, however, was the weakest link connecting the parts of this vision. Without successful peace making between the Israelis and Palestinian, the Israeli-centric Middle East order could be evaded, Iran reasoned. Hence, in the early 1990s, Iran reached out to rejectionist Palestinian organizations that Tehran had traditionally enjoyed poor relations with partly because they supported Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and partly because they were Sunni fundamentalist organizations that rejected the Iranian theocracys Shiite identity. The peace process provided Iran and the rejectionist Palestinian groups with a common threat. While Irans obstructionism played a minor role in undoing the Oslo process, Oslos collapse removed a strategic threat to Iran and revealed that even peripheral disputes would now be encapsulated within Iran and Israels geopolitical rivalry. By 1994, both Israel and Iran began undermining any U.S. policy initiative in the region however removed from their core interests that they deemed beneficial to the other.1 THE SUMMER WAR This struggle between Iran and Israel was primarily fought through proxies. Iran supported violent anti-Israeli groups, and Israel used its allies within the American domestic political scene to isolate Iran. This did not prevent the summer war of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah from reaching a new and heightened phase in the conflict.

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Since 2003, Americas position and by an intent to preempt Iran. With a credibility in the region had become potential future showdown with Iran in significantly weakened by the chaos in mind, Tel Aviv seemed to have sought an Iraq. Iran, on the other hand, had opportunity to neutralize Hezbollah and serendipitously benefited from Americas Hamas in order to weaken Irans deterpolicies. The defeat of Irans traditional rence and retaliation capabilities. (The Arab rival, Iraq, and the emergence of a summer war was preceded by heavy pro-Iranian Shiite leadership there, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza.) Through removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanithese groups, Iran could bring the war to stan, Americas unpopularity in the region, Israeli territory, a scenario that further the Arab governments perceived inability accentuated Israels vulnerability to to act indepenasymmetric wardently of Washingfare. By preempton or oppose its Rather than facing an amateur tively attacking policies, Americas Hamas and militia, the Israelis soon perceived inability Hezbollah, Israel realized that they were fighting could significantly to push Iran back militarily and deprive Iran of its a well-trained and wellTehrans unhinability to retaliate equipped guerrilla army. . . . dered march against the Jewish Israeli intelligence had failed to state in the event of towards a nuclear fully discover before the war capability all a U.S. assault on served to Iran. what Hezbollah was hiding in strengthen Irans In fact, the Jewish its arsenals. position in the state had planned region and inand prepared for crease Israels war against strategic vulnerability. Hezbollah for more than two years. In These developments significantly 2005, a senior Israeli army officer began increased Israeli fears that American giving off-the-record PowerPoint presentainaction against Iran could leave Israel tions to American diplomats, journalists and alone in facing a nuclear Iran riding on a think tanks, setting out in great detail the wave of anti-American and anti-Israeli plan for the expected operation. Of all sentiment in the region at a time when the Israels wars since 1948, this was the one Jewish state had failed to reduce tensions for which Israel was most prepared, with its immediate Arab neighbors, includProfessor Gerald Steinberg of Bar Ilan ing the Palestinians. University explained.2 According to Israels deputy defense The summer war between Israel and minister, Ephraim Sneh, war with Iran was Lebanon took place against this backdrop. not a question of if, but when. War with The fighting may have been sparked by Iran is inevitable, he told me at a conferHezbollahs cross-border raid, but Israels ence in southern Europe on July 28, 2006, unprecedented decision to expand a border halfway through the war. Lebanon is just clash into a full-scale war was motivated

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a prelude to the greater war with Iran, he said with frightening certainty. Once Iran obtained a nuclear capability, however, this option would no longer be available to Israel. In addition, even absent a U.S. assault on Iran, such a strategic pushback against Iran would be beneficial to Israel and the United States. In fact, Tehran was expecting some form of Israeli offensive against its Shiite Lebanese ally, though the Iranian intelligence services had predicted that a much smaller campaign would occur in the fall of 2006.3 As it became increasingly likely, though, that Israel would fail to debilitate Hezbollah quickly through its massive air campaign, Washington and London provided Tel Aviv with the political cover to continue the war in spite of the international communitys protests and calls for an immediate ceasefire. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice referred to the fighting as the birth pangs of a new Middle East and argued that a return to the status quo was unacceptable.4 After some initial successes, the Israelis were stunned at Hezbollahs powerful response, including its firing of thousands of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. Rather than facing an amateur militia, the Israelis soon realized that they were fighting a well-trained and wellequipped guerrilla army. Hezbollah even used a Chinese-made C-807 missile against an Israeli warship off Lebanons coast, catching the Israelis off guard and disabling the ship. Israeli intelligence had failed to fully discover before the war what Hezbollah was hiding in its arsenals. The Lebanese fought a high-tech war, and they paid as much attention to the media battle as they did to the fighting on the ground. Trained and equipped by the

Iranians, Hezbollah fighters cracked the codes of Israeli radio communications, intercepting reports on the casualties they had inflicted. Whenever an Israeli soldier was killed, Hezbollah confirmed it by listening to the Israeli radio and then sent the reports immediately to its satellite TV station, Al-Manar, which broadcast the news live. Thus, Arab audiences knew the names of Israeli casualties and where they had been killed well before the Israeli army had a chance to inform the soldiers families. The psychological impact of this on the Israelis, who had grown accustomed to superiority over the armies of their Arab neighbors, was devastating. As the war progressed, Israeli tactical miscalculations and strategic shortsightedness changed the situation on the ground, as well as public opinion in Israel. At the outset, the vast majority of the Israeli public supported the war. It was seen as a defensive and necessary war to finally put an end to Hezbollahs border attacks. However, the initial euphoria of the Israeli leadership and the Israeli public soon turned to despair. After a few weeks of hard fighting with no clear gains for the Israeli Defense Forces, polls showed that 63 percent of Israelis believed that Olmert should resign, while 74 percent wanted the inexperienced Moroccan-born defense minister, Amir Perez, to step down as well.5 The battle cry at the beginning of the war Let Israel win! had by the third week turned into Well settle for a draw. Even the Iranians were surprised by the outcome and Hezbollahs fighting power. The fear, and to some extent the expectation, had been that Israel would destroy Irans Lebanese ally, after which the entire regional calculus would change

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in Irans disfavor.6 Instead, Irans and even more so, Hezbollahs stock in the Arab street rose to unprecedented levels; Israel and the United States were weakened; and pro-Western Arab governments found themselves squeezed between their disgruntled populations and a White House that showed little consideration for the interests and wishes of its allies. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan three key U.S. allies whose regimes would have much to lose from Irans rise took the unusual step in the early days of the war of chastising Hezbollah for having started the war. Never before had an Arab government so publicly denounced an Arab group fighting Israel.7 The Saudi calculation was that, by offering political cover for other countries to condemn Hezbollah, America would rein in the Israelis. But the Saudi move backfired. The Bush administration worked to prolong the war rather than shorten it, embarrassing the Saudi leadership by revealing its lack of influence over the Bush White House.8 At the same time, popular support for Hezbollah was so strong in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt that their leaders were quickly forced to change their antiHezbollah line. In a double irony, Iran was not only strengthened by Israels move, it benefited even further from Washingtons weakening of its Arab rivals. By the end of the 34-day war, Hezbollah had won a stunning victory by simply having withstood and survived Israels onslaught. Rather than reinforcing the deterrent effect of Israels invincibility, the war to weaken Iran only made Israel itself more vulnerable.

CAN WAR BE AVOIDED? A year later, Israel and Iran continue to gravitate towards open military conflict. In a chaotic Middle East guided by a balanceof-power paradigm, where powerful states vie for regional preeminence, where Israel seeks a guaranteed strategic military edge over all regional states that have Israel within their reach, where Iran views religious fanaticism and asymmetric warfare as legitimate political tools, and where the United States justifies its regional presence on the grounds that the local giant (Iran) must be counterbalanced, conflict will remain the norm rather than the exception. With Washington unwilling to recognize Iran as a regional power with legitimate security interests, with Israel insisting on maintaining military superiority over its neighbors while clinging to its arsenal of 200 nuclear warheads, and with Iran openly predicting the military exodus of the United States from the region, open warfare may be avoided, but peace will remain elusive. A sustainable peace in the Middle East can only be achieved if coupled with a sustainable security order. Such an order must, by definition, be inclusive and reflect the reigning geopolitical balance. The order the United States pursued in the 1990s, under the policy of dual containment, was based on the exclusion of two of the strongest powers in the region, Iran and Iraq. The order the United States seeks today is equally disconnected from regional realities, particularly Irans growing influence and Americas declining position. Over the past 12 months, the security situation in Iraq has continued to deteriorate while an increasing number of Republican lawmakers have turned against the Bush administrations Iraq policy. The

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Ehud Olmert government in Tel Aviv blasted by the Winograd Commission for its abysmal performance during the 2006 war is widely unpopular in Israel and risks being replaced by the hardline Likud party, led by Benjamin Netanyahu. In Tehran, the clerical regimes nuclear program has rapidly grown and may soon reach an industrial scale. Disregarding these power realities is becoming increasingly costly for Washington and Tel Aviv. Yet, Israel seems trapped in old thinking. As Irans power rises, Israel fears that Washington will be increasingly compelled to strike a deal with Tehran. Such a deal will most likely include some level of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, which theoretically will enable Tehran to master the fuel cycle. Even if Iran doesnt weaponize, Israel views such an arrangement as unacceptable since an Iran with nuclear technology would significantly limit Israels maneuverability in the region. Fearing that Washington will betray Israeli security interests in a U.S.-Iran dialogue, many in Tel Aviv prefer war over negotiations. But lacking the military capability to destroy Irans nuclear program itself in spite of much fanfare to the contrary Israel is pressuring the Bush administration to strike Iran before the end of 2007. In June of this year, Israels deputy prime minister, Shaul Mofaz, visited Washington to hold strategic discussions regarding Irans nuclear program with Bush administration officials. According to press reports, Mofaz urged the United States to give diplomacy with Iran an expiration date of the end of the year, after which the military option would be exercised. Sanctions must be strong enough to bring about change in the Iranians by the end of 2007, Mofaz told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.9

An alternative route would be for Israel to initiate an attack on Irans nuclear facilities with the calculation that Tel Avivs inevitable failure to eliminate the nuclear program and Iranian retaliation against Israeli and American targets would force the United States to join the military campaign. Some elements in Washington may quietly be encouraging Israel to pursue this strategy since it would provide the United States with a casus belli and enable the administration to bypass a warweary Congress and U.S. public. This course of action would, however, come at a high cost for Israel since it would reveal the Jewish states inability to destroy the Iranian nuclear program on its own and thereby expose the limits of the operational capabilities of the Israeli air force, instead of leaving them ambiguous. Much like the war with Hezbollah, this option may end up significantly undermining Israels deterrence, particularly if Iran uses the Israeli attack as grounds to abrogate the nonproliferation treaty and redouble its efforts to achieve nuclear status.10 Moderate elements in Israel, however, recognize that recent events indicate that the security of the Jewish state is no longer served by this balance-of-power paradigm. Israel cannot indefinitely balance its more populous neighbors, particularly as they like Iran begin to master nuclear technology. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israels former foreign minister, argued in the pages of Haaretz last year that the question today is not when Iran will have nuclear power, but how to integrate it into a policy of regional stability before it obtains such power. The answer to the Iranian threat is a policy of dtente, which would change the Iranian elites pattern of conduct.11

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This is indeed no simple task. But, given the new balance in the region and the likelihood of continued Iranian power accumulation, Israels security will be better achieved through a significant restructuring of the security environment that deprives Iran of any incentives to continue its aggressive stance towards the Jewish state. The only policy that can achieve such a strategic redesign is comprehensive negotiations between the United States and Iran with the aim of
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dtente and a new security order. Rather than objecting to such negotiations and rendering them more difficult by beating on the war drums, Israels security would be better served by supporting U.S.-Iran talks and by pushing for Israels security needs to be addressed in those discussions. As problematic as dtente or negotiations with Iran may be, if the goal is peace and not just the mere avoidance of war, there is much to suggest that no alternative path to a policy of regional integration exists.

For an in-depth discussion on Iran and Israel's tug of war in the 1990s, see Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007). 2 Matthew Kalman, Israel Set War Plan More Than a Year Ago, San Francisco Chronicle, July 21, 2006. 3 Interview with Javad Zarif, Irans UN ambassador, New York, October 12, 2006. 4 Doyle McManus, Iran Is Bushs Target in Lebanon, Los Angeles Times, July 30, 2006. 5 Uzi Mahnaimi, Humbling of the Supertroops Shatters Israeli Army Morale, Sunday Times, August 27, 2006. 6 Interview with Javad Zarif, Irans UN ambassador, New York, October 12, 2006. 7 Hassan M. Fattah, Fearful of Iran, Arab Leaders Criticize Militants, The New York Times, July 17, 2006. 8 Dampened Trust? A Conversation with Nawaf Obaid, SUSRIS, August 22, 2006. 9 Eli Lake, Israel Seeking New Deadline on Iran Bomb, New York Sun, June 8, 2007. According to Channel 2 News in Israel, Mofaz went on to declare to Rice that Israel would bomb Iran's nuclear facilities by years end if diplomacy and sanctions fail to persuade Tehran to suspend its enrichment activities. 10 Even in the best-case scenario, a military campaign against Iran's nuclear program is unlikely to destroy the expertise Iran has amassed over the years. As a result, military action can at best delay the nuclear program, not destroy it. 11 Shlomo Ben-Ami, The Basis for Iran's Belligerence, Haaretz, September 7, 2006.

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