National Defence

Dfense nationale

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS

(English) (Supersedes B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Ch 2 dated 2004-11-05)

Custodian: J7 Doctrine 2

Ch 2

2005-08-15

Ca n a da

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Insert latest changed pages, dispose of superseded pages in accordance with applicable orders. Dates of issue for original and changed pages are:

Original........................... 0 ............... 2000-12-18 Change........................... 1 ............... 2004-11-05 Change........................... 2 ............... 2005-08-15

Change .......................... 3.................................. Change .......................... 4.................................. Change .......................... 5..................................

Zero in Change No. Column indicates an original page. Total number of pages in this publication is 256 consisting of the following: Page No. Change No. Page No. Change No.

Title ............................................................................ 2 A................................................................................. 2 i/ii................................................................................ 1 iii/xii ............................................................................ 2 1-1 to 1-2.................................................................... 1 1-3 to 1-5.................................................................... 1 1-6 to 1-8.................................................................... 1 2-1 to 2-5.................................................................... 1 2-6 to 2-7.................................................................... 1 2-8.............................................................................. 1 2A-1 to 2A-2............................................................... 1 3-1 to 3-4.................................................................... 1 4-1 ............................................................................. 1 4-2 to 4-5.................................................................... 1 4-6 to 4-8.................................................................... 1 5-1 to 5-4.................................................................... 1 5-5 to 5-8.................................................................... 1 5-9 to 5-10.................................................................. 0 6-1 to 6-4.................................................................... 1 7-1 to 7-4.................................................................... 1 7-5 to 7-8.................................................................... 1 7-9 to 7-10.................................................................. 1 8-1 to 8-2.................................................................... 1 9-1 to 9-6.................................................................... 1 10-1 to 10-6................................................................ 1 11-1 to 11-6................................................................ 1 12-1 to 12-8................................................................ 1 13-1 to 13-6................................................................ 1 14-1 to 14-14.............................................................. 1 15-1 to 15-7................................................................ 1 15-8 to 15-10.............................................................. 1

16-1 to 16-8 ................................................................2 17-1 to 17-8 ................................................................1 17-9 to 17-11 ..............................................................1 17-12 to 17-14 ............................................................1 17A-1 to 17A-2 ..........................................................1 18-1 to 18-4 ................................................................1 18-5 to 18-9 ................................................................1 18-10 to 18-14 ............................................................1 19-1 to 19-10 ..............................................................1 20-1 to 20-6 ................................................................1 21-1 to 21-8 ................................................................2 22-1 to 22-8 ................................................................2 23-1 to 23-6 ................................................................1 24-1 to 24-6 ................................................................1 25-1 to 25-4 ................................................................1 26-1 to 26-2 ................................................................1 27-1 to 27-2 ................................................................1 28-1 to 28-12 ..............................................................2 29-1 to 29-2 ................................................................1 30-1 to 30-2 ................................................................1 31-1 to 31-2 ................................................................1 32-1 to 32-2 ................................................................1 33-1 to 33-4 ................................................................0 34-1 to 34-2 ................................................................1 GL-1 to GL-10.............................................................1 LA-1 to LA-6 ...............................................................1

Contact Officer: J7 Doctrine 2 2004 DND/MDN Canada

Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

B Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 PREFACE

1. B-GG-005-004/AF-000, CF Operations, Edition 1 was conceptualized in the early 1990s. A considerable amount of change has occurred since this manual was introduced and since this manual was last amended in 2000. This includes the extensive development of joint doctrine in the United States, in NATO and in Canada. Change 1 to the manual is now being released to update the manual. Most chapters in this manual have seen at least minor revisions as part of this change while other have seen major rewrites. Several chapters, noted as under development, are in preparation for Change 2. As part of this Change the manual has been re-numbers to reflect its position in the joint doctrine hierarchy: it is now B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, CF Operations. 2. Doctrine provides the fundamental principles by which all CF operations are conducted. A CF operation is defined as the employment of an element or elements of the CF to perform a specific mission. 3. The CF is a unified force and, as a matter of routine, conducts operations involving elements of at least two environments. Notwithstanding the legal aspects of the NDA, which describes the CF as a single service, when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to operate in the same theatre or area of operations in support of the same national strategic objective, they will operate under a joint structure using internationally recognized joint terminology. 4. ECS are responsible for the development and maintenance of their respective doctrine. However, Environmental doctrine does not provide adequate guidance for the employment of military forces when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to cooperate. The CF requires well developed and clearly understood CF doctrine to underpin multi-Environment military operations, in either a domestic or international scenario. The DCDS is responsible for the development and maintenance of CF concepts and doctrine. The DCDS exercises this responsibility through the CFDB, which is chaired by the DGJFD and has representation from each of the ECS and NDHQ group principals. 5. This publication is the keystone operations manual within the CF doctrine hierarchy. The manual uses generic terminology and structures that are applicable to all CF Operations. This publication comprises a framework for a hierarchy of other keystone manuals and subordinate publications that provide amplifying guidance, principles and procedures regarding CF Operations. CF joint doctrine is distributed electronically and is available at the following websites: a. Intranet: http://dcds.mil.ca/dgjfd/dpdt/pages/j7doc_home_e.asp b. Internet: http://www.forces.gc.ca/dcds/jointDoc/pages/j7doc_home_e.asp 6. If, in a CF operation, conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Environmental publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CDS, in consultation with the ECS, provides more current and specific guidance.

i Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 FOREWORD 1. The manual outlines the operations that the CF carries out. It explains basic command and control structures and enabling functions. This manual is designed for use by the following: a. Commanders and their staffs at the strategic and operational levels; b. the Joint staff (J Staff) at NDHQ; c. task forces established for routine and contingency operations, as well as all formations and agencies supporting such operations; and

d. command and staff colleges and other teaching institutions within the framework for officer professional development. 2. This manual is presented in four major sections. The first section, chapters 1 to 7, outlines the basic doctrinal concepts and guidance for CF operations. The second section, chapters 8 to 13, details the types of operations in which the CF may become involved. The third section, chapters 14 to 29, gives an overview of the enabling functions that allows operations to be conducted. The final section, chapters 30 to 34, covers support to CF operations. 3. This manual is to be used in conjunction with other CF joint keystone and subordinate publication, such as B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CF Operational Planning Process. It supersedes Edition 1, B-GG-005004/AF-000, CF Operations dated 200-12-18. 4. 5. Comments and recommendations for changes should be forward to the custodian: J7 Doctrine 2. The Joint Capabilities Review Board is the ratification authority for this manual.

ii Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

PART I - DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 1 - CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE........................................................................................................ 1-1 Section I - Introduction 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 1-1

National Policy Framework .............................................................................................. 1-1 Mission of the Canadian Forces....................................................................................... 1-1 Strategic Objectives ......................................................................................................... 1-1 Operational Priorities........................................................................................................ 1-1 Canadian Forces Doctrine ............................................................................................... 1-2 1-3

Section II - Military Operations and Armed Conflict 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1-3 Levels of Operation .......................................................................................................... 1-3 The Spectrum of Conflict.................................................................................................. 1-3 The Continuum of Operations .......................................................................................... 1-3 The Levels of Conflict....................................................................................................... 1-4 Strategic Level of Conflict ................................................................................................ 1-4 Operational Level of Conflict ............................................................................................ 1-5 Tactical Level of Conflict .................................................................................................. 1-5 1-6

Section III - CF Operations 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1-6 Categories of CF Operations ........................................................................................... 1-6 Task Force ....................................................................................................................... 1-6 Domestic Operations........................................................................................................ 1-7 International Contingency Operations .............................................................................. 1-7 Principles of CF Operations ............................................................................................. 1-7 Phases of an Operation ................................................................................................... 1-8 2-1 2-1

CHAPTER 2 - COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CF OPERATIONS Section I - Terminology and Principles 201. 202. 203.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2-1 Terminology...................................................................................................................... 2-1 Principles of Command .................................................................................................... 2-3 2-5

Section II - Command and Control of Canadian Forces Operations 204. 205. 206.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2-5 National Command Structure........................................................................................... 2-5 Operational Command Structure ..................................................................................... 2-7 2-8

Section III - Transfer of Authority 207.

The Transfer Process....................................................................................................... 2-8

Annex A - Examples of Residual Responsibilities .........................................................................2A-1

iii Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

CHAPTER 3 - CAMPAIGN PLANNING 301. 302. 303.

3-1

General ............................................................................................................................ 3-1 Planning Components .................................................................................................... 3-1 Operational Functions...................................................................................................... 3-2 4-1 4-1

CHAPTER 4 FORCE EMPLOYMENT Section I General 401. 402.

The Force Employment (FE) Process ............................................................................. 4-1 Command and Operations Planning................................................................................ 4-1 4-2

Section II - The CF Operational Planning Process 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409.

Concept of the CF Operational Planning Process ........................................................... 4-2 Design of the Planning Process....................................................................................... 4-2 Planning Categories ........................................................................................................ 4-3 Orders.............................................................................................................................. 4-3 Plans................................................................................................................................ 4-4 Other Planning Documents.............................................................................................. 4-5 Approving Planning Documents ...................................................................................... 4-5 4-6

Section III Review of Operations 410. 411.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 4-6 The Lessons Learned Process ........................................................................................ 4-6

CHAPTER 5 - THE USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS.................................................................................. 5-1 Section I Key Concepts 501. 502. 503. 5-1

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 5-1 Key Concepts on the Use of Force.................................................................................. 5-1 Principles in the Use of Force.......................................................................................... 5-2 5-5

Section II - Controlling the Use of Force 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 5-5 Self-Defence .................................................................................................................... 5-5 Rules of Engagement ...................................................................................................... 5-5 Purpose of ROE............................................................................................................... 5-5 ROE in Peacetime ........................................................................................................... 5-6 ROE During Transition From Peacetime to Armed Conflict............................................. 5-6 ROE During Armed Conflict............................................................................................. 5-6 Factors Influencing Development of ROE ....................................................................... 5-7 Promulgation of ROE....................................................................................................... 5-7 Precedence of ROE......................................................................................................... 5-8

iv Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE Section III Targeting 514. 515. 516. 5-9

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 5-9 Targeting Process ............................................................................................................ 5-9 Planning and Execution of Targeting ............................................................................... 5-9 6-1

CHAPTER 6 COLLECTIVE TRAINING 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 6-1 Types of Training.............................................................................................................. 6-1 Levels of Collective Training Activities ............................................................................. 6-1 Categories of Collective Training Activities ...................................................................... 6-2 Training Organization and Responsibilities...................................................................... 6-2 Strategic Collective Training ............................................................................................ 6-2 Operational and Tactical Collective Training.................................................................... 6-3 7-1 7-1

CHAPTER 7 TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION Section I - The Task Force 701. 702. 703. 704.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 7-1 Establishing a Task Force................................................................................................ 7-1 Command of a Task Force............................................................................................... 7-2 Responsibilities ................................................................................................................ 7-3 7-5

Section II - Task Force Headquarters Staff 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710.

Staff Functions and Activities ........................................................................................... 7-5 Composition of the TFHQ Staff ........................................................................................ 7-5 Command and Control ..................................................................................................... 7-7 Structure and Size............................................................................................................ 7-7 Support Unit ..................................................................................................................... 7-7 CIS Unit............................................................................................................................ 7-7 7-9

Section III - Theatre Activation/Close Out 711. 712.

Theatre Activation Team (TAT) ........................................................................................ 7-9 Mission Closeout Team.................................................................................................... 7-9

PART II - OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 8 - COMBINED OPERATIONS 801. 802. 803. 804. 8-1

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 8-1 Structure of a Combined Operation ................................................................................. 8-1 Command and Control ..................................................................................................... 8-1 ROE for Combined Operations ........................................................................................ 8-2 9-1

CHAPTER 9 - NATO OPERATIONS 901. 902.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 9-1 Structure of the NATO Alliance ........................................................................................ 9-1 v Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. NATO Military Commands ............................................................................................... 9-2 NATO Precautionary System........................................................................................... 9-2 NATO Security and Defence Strategy ............................................................................. 9-2 NATO Force Structure ..................................................................................................... 9-4 NATO Command and Control.......................................................................................... 9-5 Canadian Consideration .................................................................................................. 9-6 10-1

CHAPTER 10 PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 1001. 1002. 1003. 1004. 1005. 1006. 1007.

General .......................................................................................................................... 10-1 Canada and International Security ................................................................................ 10-1 Peace Support Operations ............................................................................................ 10-1 Related Operations ....................................................................................................... 10-3 Key Principles ................................................................................................................ 10-4 Participation Guidelines ................................................................................................. 10-4 Canadian Response Options......................................................................................... 10-5 11-1

CHAPTER 11 - NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS 1101. 1102. 1103. 1104. 1105. 1106.

General .......................................................................................................................... 11-1 Threat Environment ....................................................................................................... 11-1 Related Operations........................................................................................................ 11-2 Physical Components of the Evacuation Chain............................................................. 11-3 Command and Control of Evacuation Operations ......................................................... 11-4 Combined Evacuation Operations ................................................................................. 11-5 12-1

CHAPTER 12 - DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 1201. 1202. 1203. 1204. 1205. 1206. 1207. 1208. 1209. 1210. 1211. 1212. 1212. 1214. 1215.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 12-1 Terminology ................................................................................................................... 12-1 The Domestic Environment ........................................................................................... 12-2 Matrix of Authorities for Domestic Operations ............................................................... 12-3 Command and Control of Domestic Operations. ........................................................... 12-4 Use of Force .................................................................................................................. 12-4 The Emergencies Act .................................................................................................... 12-4 Aid of the Civil Power..................................................................................................... 12-4 Assistance to Law Enforcement Operations.................................................................. 12-5 Provision of Services .................................................................................................... 12-6 Training and Equipment................................................................................................. 12-6 Intelligence..................................................................................................................... 12-7 Logistics......................................................................................................................... 12-7 Public Affairs.................................................................................................................. 12-7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 12-8 13-1

CHAPTER 13 - SEARCH AND RESCUE 1301. 1302. 1303. 1304. 1305. 1306.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 13-1 Principles ....................................................................................................................... 13-1 Composition of SAR Forces .......................................................................................... 13-2 Types of Missions .......................................................................................................... 13-2 Peacetime SAR ............................................................................................................. 13-3 Wartime SAR ................................................................................................................. 13-5

vi Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

PART III - ENABLING FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER 14 COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 1401. 1402. 1403. 1404. 1405. 1406. 1407. 1408. 14-1

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 14-1 Principles of CIS............................................................................................................. 14-2 Architecture .................................................................................................................... 14-5 Physical Dependencies ................................................................................................. 14-6 CIS Planning .................................................................................................................. 14-7 Command and Control of CIS ...................................................................................... 14-10 C2 and Management of CIS......................................................................................... 14-12 C2 Sustainment............................................................................................................ 14-13 15-1 15-1

CHAPTER 15 - INTELLIGENCE Section I Intelligence 1501. 1502. 1503. 1504. 1505. 1506. 1507. 1508. 1509. 1510. 1511.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 15-1 The Role of Intelligence ................................................................................................. 15-1 The Principles of Intelligence ........................................................................................ 15-1 The Intelligence Cycle .................................................................................................... 15-2 The Intelligence Estimate............................................................................................... 15-3 Intelligence Planning ...................................................................................................... 15-3 Areas of Intelligence Responsibility and Interest ........................................................... 15-5 Intelligence Sources....................................................................................................... 15-5 Intelligence in Operations............................................................................................... 15-6 Geomatics Support to Operations.................................................................................. 15-7 Command and Control of Intelligence Operations ......................................................... 15-7 15-8

Section II Counter-Intelligence 1512. 1513. 1514. 1515. 1516.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 15-8 Principles of CI ............................................................................................................... 15-8 CI Support ...................................................................................................................... 15-8 CI Activities .................................................................................................................... 15-9 Command and Control ................................................................................................. 15-10 16-1

CHAPTER 16 - NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENCE 1601. 1602. 1603. 1604. 1605. 1606. 1607. 1608. 1609.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 16-1 NBC Defence Doctrine................................................................................................... 16-1 Detection, Identification, Monitoring ............................................................................... 16-2 Communication and Information System, Warning and Reporting ................................ 16-3 Physical Protection......................................................................................................... 16-3 Hazard Management...................................................................................................... 16-4 Conduct Medical Countermeasures and Support .......................................................... 16-5 Concepts and Considerations ........................................................................................ 16-6 Special Considerations .................................................................................................. 16-8

vii Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE CHAPTER 17 - AIRSPACE CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL Section I - Airspace Control 1701. 1702. 1703. 1704. 1705. 1706. 1707. 17-1 17-1

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 17-1 Terminology and Principles .......................................................................................... 17-1 The Airspace Control Plan............................................................................................. 17-3 Developing the Airspace Control System ..................................................................... 17-4 Implementation of Airspace Control .............................................................................. 17-5 Organization of Airspace Control................................................................................... 17-6 Responsibility for Airspace Control................................................................................ 17-7 17-9

Section II - Air Defence 1707. 1709. 1710. 1711. 1712.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 17-9 Concept of Air Defence ................................................................................................. 17-9 Implementation of Air Defence ...................................................................................... 17-9 Organization of Air Defence ........................................................................................ 17-10 Responsibilities for Air Defence................................................................................... 17-11 17-12

Section III - Air Traffic Control 1713.

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 17-12

Annex A Airspace Control Plan................................................................................................. 17A-1 CHAPTER 18 SPACE OPERATIONS Section I - Attributes of Space Systems 1801. 1802. 1803. 1804. 1805. 1806. 18-1 18-1

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 18-1 General .......................................................................................................................... 18-1 Environmentally Influenced Attributes ........................................................................... 18-1 Logistically Influenced Attributes ................................................................................... 18-2 Politically/Legally Influenced Attributes.......................................................................... 18-3 Commercial Influenced Attributes.................................................................................. 18-4 18-5

Section II - Space Force Roles and Missions 1807. 1808. 1809. 1810. 1811.

General .......................................................................................................................... 18-5 Enhancing Operations ................................................................................................... 18-5 Space Forces Support ................................................................................................... 18-7 Space Control ................................................................................................................ 18-7 Force Application ........................................................................................................... 18-8 18-10

Section III - Space Employment Concepts 1812. 1813. 1814. 1815. 1816. 1817. Ch 2 2005-08-15

Command of Space Forces ......................................................................................... 18-10 Role of Military Space Power....................................................................................... 18-10 Enhancing Operations ................................................................................................. 18-10 Supporting Space Forces ............................................................................................ 18-11 Space Control .............................................................................................................. 18-12 Application of Force ..................................................................................................... 18-12 viii

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE 1818. 1819. Space Operations Planning ......................................................................................... 18-12 Education, Training and Exercises............................................................................... 18-13 19-1

CHAPTER 19 - CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION 1901. 1902. 1903. 1904. 1905. 1906. 1907. 1908. 1909. 1910.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 19-1 Civil-Military Considerations........................................................................................... 19-1 CF Civil-Military Definitions ............................................................................................ 19-2 Principles in Considering Joint Civil-Military (CM) Activity ............................................. 19-3 Types of Civil-Military Activities...................................................................................... 19-4 Civil-Military Activities in Support of the Force ............................................................... 19-5 Support to the Civil Environment.................................................................................... 19-6 Civil-Military Considerations in Operational and Campaign Planning ............................ 19-7 Civil-Military Capability in Operations ............................................................................ 19-7 NDHQ Organization and Responsibilities for Civil-Military Co-operation...................... 19-8 20-1

CHAPTER 20 METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT 2001. 2002. 2003. 2004 2005. 2006. CHAPTER 21 C4ISR 2101. 2102. 2103. 2104. 2105. 2106. 2107. 2108. 2109. 2110.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 20-1 Objective of Meteorology and Oceanography Support .................................................. 20-1 Principles of Meteorology and Oceanography Support.................................................. 20-2 Organization and Responsibilities.................................................................................. 20-2 Planning Meteorology and Oceanography Support ....................................................... 20-3 Command and Control of MET OC Support .................................................................. 20-5 21-1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 21-1 C4ISR Definition............................................................................................................. 21-1 C4ISR Scope ................................................................................................................. 21-1 C4ISR Aim ..................................................................................................................... 21-2 C4ISR Model.................................................................................................................. 21-3 C4ISR Principles ............................................................................................................ 21-4 C4ISR Capability Configuration ..................................................................................... 21-5 Definitions ...................................................................................................................... 21-5 Supporting Concepts/Capabilities ................................................................................. 21-7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 21-7 22-1

CHAPTER 22 INFORMATION OPERATIONS 2201. 2202. 2203. 2204. 2205. 2206.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 22-1 Purpose and Definition of Information Operations ......................................................... 22-1 Fundamental Principles of Information Operations ........................................................ 22-2 Information Operations and the Levels of War............................................................... 22-5 Information Operations Organization ............................................................................. 22-5 Command and Control ................................................................................................... 22-5 23-1

CHAPTER 23 - ELECTRONIC WARFARE 2301. 2302. 2303. 2304.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 23-1 Objectives of Electronic Warfare.................................................................................... 23-1 Components of Electronic Warfare ................................................................................ 23-1 Planning Electronic Warfare........................................................................................... 23-2 ix Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE 2305. 2306. 2307. The Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell .................................................................... 23-3 Command and Control................................................................................................... 23-4 Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre ............................................................ 23-4 24-1

CHAPTER 24 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 2401. 2402. 2403. 2404. 2405. 2406. 2407. 2408. 2409. 2410.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 24-1 The Canadian Forces and PSYOPS ............................................................................. 24-1 Scope of PSYOPS......................................................................................................... 24-2 Principles of PSYOPS ................................................................................................... 24-2 Factors Affecting PSYOPS ............................................................................................ 24-2 Categories of PSYOPS.................................................................................................. 24-3 PSYOPS Actions ........................................................................................................... 24-4 Counter PSYOPS .......................................................................................................... 24-4 Command and Control of PSYOPS............................................................................... 24-5 PSYOPS Capabilities .................................................................................................... 24-5 25-1

CHAPTER 25 - PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN CF OPERATIONS 2501. 2502. 2503. 2504. 2505. 2506. 2507. 2508. 2509.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 25-1 Principles of PA in CF Operations ................................................................................. 25-1 Elements of National Defence PA ................................................................................. 25-1 Areas of Responsibility .................................................................................................. 25-1 PA Co-ordination ........................................................................................................... 25-1 PA Management and Command Responsibility ........................................................... 25-2 Command and Control of PA......................................................................................... 25-2 PA Function in CF Operations ...................................................................................... 25-2 PA Strategic Level Planning ......................................................................................... 25-3 26-1 27-1 28-1

CHAPTER 26 - FORCE PROTECTION (Under Development) CHAPTER 27 - MILITARY ENGINEERING (Under Development) CHAPTER 28 HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT 2801. 2802. 2803. 2804. 2805. 2806. 2807. 2808. 2809. 2810. 2811.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 28-1 Framework for Health Services Support........................................................................ 28-1 Objectives and Tasks of Health Services Support......................................................... 28-1 Principles and Precepts of Health Services Support ..................................................... 28-2 Structure for Health Services Support ........................................................................... 28-4 Health Services Support and the Geneva Conventions ............................................... 28-5 Health Services Support Policies................................................................................... 28-6 Concept of Health Services Support............................................................................. 28-7 Responsibilities and Relationships ............................................................................... 28-8 Planning of Health Services Support ........................................................................... 28-10 Command and Control of Health Services Support.................................................... 28-10 29-1

CHAPTER 29 SPECIAL FORCES (Under Development)

PART IV CF SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 30 SUPPORT TO CF OPERATIONS (Under Development) x Ch 2 2005-08-15 30-1

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

CHAPTER 31 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND STRUCTURES (Under Development) CHAPTER 32 MOVEMENT 3201. 3202. 3203. 3204.

31-1 32-1

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 32-1 Principles of Movement.................................................................................................. 32-1 Movement Resources .................................................................................................... 32-1 Organization and Responsibilities.................................................................................. 32-2 33-1

CHAPTER 33 - PERSONNEL SUPPORT 3301. 3302. 3303. 3304. 3305. 3306. 3307. 3308. 3309. 3310.

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 33-1 Principles of Personnel Support .................................................................................... 33-1 Concept of Personnel Support ....................................................................................... 33-1 Elements of Personnel Support ..................................................................................... 33-2 Operational Personnel Management (OPM).................................................................. 33-2 Personnel Services ....................................................................................................... 33-3 Health Services Support ................................................................................................ 33-3 Associated Tasks ........................................................................................................... 33-3 Personnel Support Planning Sequence ..........33-4 Summary ........................................................................................................................ 33-4

CHAPTER 34 - MILITARY POLICE (To be Written)

34-1

GLOSSARY LIST OF ABBREVIATION

GL-1 LA-1

xi Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

This Page Intentionally Blank

xii Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE SECTION I - INTRODUCTION 101. NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK

1. National policy reflects Canadas interests both in the domestic and international environments. Defence policy supports national policy particularly foreign policy, the Canadian Forces (CF) being an instrument of national policy. It is the Government's responsibility to define Canadas national interests and to provide the necessary guidance and focus to strategic policy makers and planners. This strategic guidance determines how the Government will employ the CF. The foreign policy objectives enunciated by the Government are: a. the promotion of prosperity (involving sustainable development) and employment; b. the protection of Canadian peace and security within a stable global framework; and c. 102. the projection of Canadian values and culture. MISSION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

1. The mission of the CF is: to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values, while contributing to international peace and security. 103. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. The Strategic Objectives that support the mission of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF are: a. to generate and employ effective, multi-purpose, combat-capable forces; b. to provide sound advice on defence and national security to the Government and timely information to Parliament and the Canadian public; c. to play a unifying role and provide effective support to the Governments broad programs and policies;

d. to strengthen the Defence Team based on our vision and shared values; and e. to optimize the use of resources available and to promote efficiency and cost effectiveness. 104. 1. OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES The 1994 White Paper assigns the following operational tasks to the CF: a. Defending Canada. Protecting Canadas national territory and areas of jurisdiction, helping civil authorities to protect and sustain national interests, and assisting in national emergencies. b. Defending North America. Protecting the Canadian approaches to the continent in partnership with the US, in accordance with the CANUS Basic Security Plan and particularly through NORAD; promoting Arctic security; and pursuing opportunities for defence with the US in other areas. c. Contributing to International Security. Participating in a full range of multilateral operations through the UN, NATO, other regional organizations and coalitions of like-minded countries; 1-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 supporting humanitarian relief efforts and restoration of conflict-devastated areas; and participating in arms control and other confidence-building measures. 105. CANADIAN FORCES DOCTRINE

1. CF doctrine provides the fundamental tenets for the employment of military forces to translate the CF mission and strategic objectives into action. More specifically, it provides commanders with underlying principles to guide their actions in planning and conducting operations. While CF and Environment specific doctrine are separate bodies of doctrine, the two must be compatible. All CF plans and operations will be based on the doctrine contained in this publication. 2. The CF will operate internationally as part of an alliance or coalition. Thus, CF doctrine should be consistent, as far as practicable, with the doctrine of major allies and alliances to provide the capacity to conduct combined operations. 3. Operational effectiveness of the CF depends on the development of doctrine and sufficient personnel, training and equipment to employ it effectively. Procedures should be developed from doctrine so that they will be suitable for use in any operation, with only minor changes to cater for different command structures or variations in force levels, structures and/or capabilities.

1-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION II - MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ARMED CONFLICT 106. INTRODUCTION

1. Military Operations. An operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, training or an administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objective of any battle or campaign. Gradations of scale and intensity exist in military operations. These gradations are described in terms of a continuum which distinguishes among low, mid and high-level military operations according to their objective, the use of force, the scale, and the tempo of activity. 107. LEVELS OF OPERATION

1. Low-level Operations. Military operations that are normally conducted by forces-in-being, applying the minimum force necessary to achieve the mission. Contact with opposing forces may be infrequent. 2. Mid-level Operations. Military operations that involve most, if not all, of a nation's forces-in-being and may require the mobilization of additional resources. Deadly force will be applied, although there may be restrictions on the types of weapons used or the geographic area in which they are employed. Military activity will be conducted with speed and violence, but may be non-continuous and localized in an area of operations. 3. High-level Operations. The entire range of modern weaponry may be used, including weapons of mass destruction. The sustained conduct of such operations will demand the mobilization of a nation's entire military potential. Military activity will be conducted continuously with maximum speed and violence throughout the theatre. 108. THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

1. Relations between different peoples exist in a condition either of peace or of conflict. Peace exists when there is an absence of violence or the threat of violence. Conflict exists when violence is either manifested or threatened. The object of conflict is to impose one's will upon the enemy. The means to that end is the co-ordinated employment of the various instruments of national power including diplomatic, economic and political efforts as well as the application, or threat, of violence by military force. The spectrum of conflict (Figure 1-1) describes the varying states of relations between nations or groups and the continuum of operations relates to the range of military responses to peace and conflict (including war). 2. In conflicts which have proven resistant to both peacemaking and peace enforcement efforts, there may be no alternative left but for the parties to embark on a policy of war. War is essentially a subset of conflict and not an isolated state; as with peace and conflict, the distinction between conflict other than war and war will be blurred, as a conflict may encompass a period of war fighting and then transition to prosecution through other means. 109. THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS

1. The continuum of operations embraces the concept of combat and non-combat operations. Combat operations are military operations where the use or threatened use of force is essential to accomplish a mission. Non-combat operations are defined as military operations where weapons may be present but their use is primarily for self-defence purposes. 2. The military response to war is referred to as war fighting. Activities during peacetime and conflict other than war are classified as operations other than war (OOTW). Within NATO some OOTW missions are referred to as Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5 CRO). 3. While the overall focus must be on war fighting, the CFs frequent role in OOTW is critical and cannot be ignored. In military terms there may be little if any distinction between the conduct of combat operations in war fighting and OOTW. Canadian units, in peace and conflict, have proven repeatedly that well trained, well1-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 led and properly equipped combat capable forces can quickly adapt to the requirements of non-combat operations.

Figure 1-1. Military Operations and Armed Conflict 110. THE LEVELS OF CONFLICT

1. The military response to conflict must be consistent with national policy objectives. The translation of policy goals into military action must be done in a manner which ensures clarity and preserves unity of effort. Accordingly, military activity has been categorized into three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. These levels of conflict allow commanders to visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Each level is defined by the outcome intended - not by the level of command or the size of the unit or formations involved. While the levels form a hierarchy, there are no sharp boundaries and they often overlap. 2. This delineation into levels of conflict has limitations. Factors such as the advent of information technology are compressing these levels, blurring the distinction between each. The key is not the level at which an activity transpires or where the transition occurs, but to ensure that all activities are co-ordinated and focused towards achievement of the strategic objective. 3. An understanding of the complexities of working at the operational level in a joint and combined context is essential for the CF to participate in the planning and conduct of, campaigns and major operations. Commanders must develop an appreciation of the interaction of the levels of conflict in order that they may provide timely and astute advice to Government on the use of military force in domestic and international operations. 111. STRATEGIC LEVEL OF CONFLICT

1. At the top of this hierarchy is the strategic level of conflict. The strategic level of conflict is that level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish strategic military objectives, sequence the objectives, define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power, develop strategic plans to achieve the objectives, and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plans. 2. Within the context of national security strategy, a nation employs all of its resources - political, economic, scientific, technological, psychological and military - to achieve the objectives of national policy. Military strategy is that component of national or multinational strategy that presents the manner in which 1-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of likeminded nations. 3. Strategy is the sole authoritative basis for all operations. It determines the conduct of all military actions and guides operations by establishing aims, allocating resources, and imposing conditions on military action. The overriding criteria for the conduct of military operations are the strategic objectives. The operational commander's principal task is to determine and pursue the sequence of actions that will serve most directly that objective. 112. OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF CONFLICT

1. The operational level of conflict is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, and initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain those events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics: they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. 2. The operational level is not defined by the number and size of forces or the echelon of headquarters involved. In a large scale conflict, a corps may be the lowest level of operational command. However, in smaller scale conflict, operational level activity can take place at much lower levels. Regardless of its size, a military force tasked to achieve a strategic objective, is being employed at the operational level. 113. TACTICAL LEVEL OF CONFLICT

1. The tactical level of conflict is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and manoeuvre of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives established by the operational level commander. 2. At the tactical level, forces are deployed directly for battle and combat power is applied directly to defeat an enemy at a particular time and place. However, the tactical level should never be viewed in isolation, for tactical success alone does not guarantee strategic success. Battles and engagements generally shape the course of events at the operational level. They become relevant only in the larger context of the campaign and the campaign, in turn, only gains meaning in the context of strategy. A comprehensive view is required to understand that the three levels of conflict are inextricably linked.

1-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION III - CF OPERATIONS 114. INTRODUCTION

1. A CF Operation is defined as the employment of an element or elements of the CF to perform a specific mission. Certain CF operations are enhanced when environmental components operate in concert. Force entry operations provide good examples: airborne operations require land and air forces to be employed together; amphibious assaults may involve maritime, land and air forces. Other operations that are normally co-planned and conducted include: psychological operations (PSYOPS); electronic warfare (EW); operations security (OPSEC); intelligence; NBC defence; air defence; and peace support operations (PSO). 2. The CF is a unified force and, as a matter of routine, conducts operations involving elements of at least two environments. Notwithstanding the legal aspects of the National Defence Act (NDA), which describes the CF as a single service, when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to co-operate, they will do so under a joint structure, using internationally recognized joint terminology. 3. CF doctrine must cater to both domestic and international operations without generating confusion within a Canadian force or amongst our allies, hence the use of joint terminology. In all cases a commander will be named and appropriate elements will be assigned as required. Command and control (C2) relationships will be based on the principles outlined in Chapter 2 - Command and Control of CF Operations and will be specified in the DCDS warning orders. 115. 1. CATEGORIES OF CF OPERATIONS There are two categories of CF operations which stem from the mission objectives in the DP: a. Routine Operations; and b. Contingency Operations. 2. Routine Operations. Routine operations are those operations for which a given Capability Component (CC) has been specifically tasked, organized and equipped. Routine operations use existing command and control relationships and there is no requirement to use joint terminology. Doctrine for routine operations is generally Environmental in nature. 3. Contingency Operations. Contingency operations can be conducted in either a domestic or international theatre. If an operation does not clearly fall into the routine category, then it is a contingency operation, and a grouping, tailored to the operation is generated. Any grouping created for a contingency operation, regardless of size, is called a Task Force (TF). 116. TASK FORCE

1. Concept. In previous doctrinal publications, the term Force was used to describe a grouping created for a specific mission. This term, while useful in many ways, is not found in NATO terminology and can have a variety of interpretations. The term Task Force is found in AAP-6, and is defined as a temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. The TF concept provides a generic descriptor for a force of any size and composition ranging from a section sized organization to a major formation. It can be employed across the spectrum of conflict, at any level. As the TF will be a mission specific grouping, it may or may not contain elements of two or more environments of the CF. Should the TF be multi-environmental in composition, then the adjective joint shall be employed to describe all aspects of the operation. TF structure and organization is further described in Chapter 7 - Task Force Organization.

1-6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

2. Command and Control. As several elements of the CF may be required to co-operate to achieve the mission, the structure and C2 relationships for TFs must be clearly defined. In all cases, C2 relationships will be based on the principles outlined in Chapter 2. The CF has one deployable joint HQ, based on the Joint Operations Group (JOG) in Kingston. The core element is the Joint Headquarters (JHQ). It is intended primarily for employment on international contingency operations. When the CF JOG is tasked to form a TF HQ and it is joint it will be designated as the JTF HQ. A TF Commander (TFC), once appointed, reports directly to the commander who established the TF. 117. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. Domestic operations cover the spectrum from the simple provision of military equipment and personnel to assist in flood assistance or fire fighting, armed assistance to Corrections Canada, to the commitment of combat capable land forces to deal with major aid to the civil power missions. Domestic operations are classified as either routine or contingency and are usually initially conducted by one of the existing formation-based HQs (MARLANT, MARPAC, LFAA, SQFT, LFCA, LFWA, 1CAD, CFNA). 2. Routine Operations. Routine operations are those that fall within the delegated authority of the operational commander, and can be conducted with the resources integral to the formation units. In routine operations, TFs are formed and TFCs are normally appointed on the initiative of the operational commander. In this case, the TFC would report to the tasking formation. Normal C2 relationships apply to the formationbased HQ. 3. Contingency Operations. As a routine operation develops, there may be indicators that it will soon overwhelm the capabilities of the initiating commander. Similarly, it may be evident in the early stages of planning that a domestic contingency operation is beyond the capabilities of the formation-based HQ. The NDCC monitor all routine operations to ensure that when support is requested or the limit of authority is insufficient, a supplementary Op O is issued to designate the operation as a contingency and to establish the revised chain of command. Often such operations are based on NDHQ contingency plans and are controlled by the DCDS, on behalf of the CDS, through the NDCC. The designated TFC will report to the CDS through the DCDS. The resources of the JOG may be employed in domestic contingency operations. In such a scenario, the structure and C2 relationships would be similar to an international operation. 118. INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1. As most international operations will be joint and combined in nature, CF personnel must understand the concepts, doctrine and procedures for planning, organizing and conducting joint and combined operations. Allied, coalition and United Nations (UN) mandated operations are all considered to be combined operations. 2. The JHQ is the deployable HQ for international contingency operations; further detail, on structure and organization, can be found in Chapter 7. 3. Forces generated for a specific contingency, will normally be assigned OPCOM to the Canadian TFC. The role the Canadian TFC plays in a combined force is as follows: a. When functioning as an operational commander, the entire Canadian TF will normally be assigned OPCON to the Force Commander of the Combined Force; or b. When not functioning as an operational commander, the Canadian TF elements are normally assigned OPCON to the Force Commander of the Combined Force and the principal function of the Canadian TFC will be as the Canadian National Commander (CNC) with the JTFHQ serving as a National Command Element (NCE). 119. 1. PRINCIPLES OF CF OPERATIONS The planning and control functions of NDHQ in operations should be confined, as far as practicable, 1-7 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 to the strategic level, leaving operational activities to the TFC and tactical activities to subordinate commanders. 2. The TFC must be appointed as soon as the operation is initiated and must be provided adequate resources and staff. The TFC must be delegated a level of command authority over all Canadian forces in the theatre of operations which will be exercised through subordinate commanders (see Chapter 7). 3. The TFC is responsible for determining manpower requirements to support the concept of operations (CONOP). This includes the requirement for combat troops, support personnel, and HQ staff (see chapter 33 - Personnel Support). As the TFC is also responsible for forecasting the logistic capabilities, including the level of support required from the Support Group, an appropriate level of administrative control must also be authorized. 4. A properly organized and employed force can concentrate combat power that is greater than the sum of the combat powers of its constituent components. Application of the following guidelines will provide for more effective employment of the force: a. establish a command structure that clearly defines overall command responsibility as well as command responsibility for each phase of a campaign or operation. Once a command structure is defined, the appropriate level of command authority is delegated to subordinate commanders; b. ensure that communications and information systems (CIS) are interoperable, survivable, and complemented by standardized formats; c. select forces to participate in operations based on their utility, expertise, combat readiness and functions - not on equity. If a single-environment force is all that is required, only that force should be employed;

d. plan and conduct, as necessary, training tailored to the circumstances of the operation; including such considerations as the religious, cultural, legal, political and operational aspects of the area of operations; e. delegate necessary decision making authority to the point of action. Commanders on the scene must be able to make instantaneous decisions in order to accomplish the mission and to protect their commands; f. apply overwhelming force at decisive points. Forces containing a wide array of military power should be employed against decisive objectives; and

g. organize and train in peacetime for wartime operations. 5. The complexities of modern operations demand that forces train collectively and, when practicable, that operational plans are rehearsed. As there is no standing TF or TFC, it is essential that a full operational level task force, including the C2 structure (i.e., the JTFHQ), combat and support elements is assembled and trained regularly (see Chapter 6 Collective Training). 120. PHASES OF AN OPERATION

1. All CF operations are conducted in five broad phases. These phases are: (1) warning; (2) preparation; (3) deployment; (4) employment; and (5) re-deployment. These phases are further divided in operational and campaign plans as necessary to execute an operation. 2. A more detail description of the activities associated with these phases is in Chapter 4.

1-8 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CF OPERATIONS SECTION I - TERMINOLOGY AND PRINCIPLES 201. INTRODUCTION

1. Command and control (C2) doctrine provides the framework within which military resources drawn from different organizations can operate together effectively to accomplish a common mission. This framework must be flexible and responsive to changing circumstances with which the CF might be faced. 2. For the C2 of CF operations, the CF has two permanent joint HQs, one static (NDHQ) and one deployable the Joint Headquarter (JHQ) of the Joint Operations Group (JOG). The JHQ is intended primarily for employment on international contingency operations. When the JHQ, or any portion thereof, is tasked to deploy, it is referred to as the JTFHQ. See also articles 116, 118 and 119. 3. For C2 of domestic contingency operations, the CF has established eight formation based HQs. These HQs might not be permanently established with appropriate, deployable C2 organizational structures. Should a domestic operation require deployable C2 capabilities that are beyond their capacity, the JHQ will normally be tasked to meet this requirement. See also articles 116, 117 and 119. 202. TERMINOLOGY

1. Fundamental to the development of CF doctrine and procedures is the need to use agreed terminology. Where terms already exist in the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, these shall be either used directly or adapted to meet Canadian requirements. The terms "command" and "control", although closely related and frequently used together, are not synonymous. The distinction is clarified in the following definitions. 2. Command. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces. The CDS exercises command over the CF. Commanders exercise command over their own forces at all levels, under the authority of the CDS, as do subordinate commanders over their own units. Command is further defined in terms of three levels: full, operational and tactical command. a. Full Command. The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no alliance or coalition commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him, as nations, in assigning forces to an alliance or coalition, assign only operational command (OPCOM) or operational control (OPCON). The term "full command" is equivalent to "command" as defined in QR&Os. It applies at all levels of command, from the CDS down to the unit commander. The task force commander (TFCs) cannot assume full command of units or components over which they exercise authority; rather, they are delegated OPCOM of those assets. Within the TF, subordinate commanders continue to exercise command in accordance with regulations and Environmental doctrine. b. Operational Command. The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON and/or tactical control (TACON) as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. In the CF, a commander assigned OPCOM may delegate that authority. While OPCOM allows the commander to assign separate employment to components of assigned units, it cannot be used to disrupt the basic organization of a unit to the extent that it cannot readily be given a new task or be redeployed. The commander will normally exercise OPCOM through commanders

2-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 of subordinate components of a TF. OPCOM of one Environment's units by another Environmental commander may be necessary: (1) when effective integration of effort is needed; (2) when the peculiarities of the operation dictate; or (3) when the distance from, or communication with higher authority presents unacceptable difficulties. c. Tactical Command. The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. It is narrower in scope than OPCOM but includes the authority to delegate or retain TACON.

3. Control. That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. This term is defined specifically under operational, tactical, administrative and technical control. a. Operational Control. The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. Units are placed under commanders' OPCON so that commanders may benefit from the immediate employment of these units in their support, without further reference to a senior authority and without the need to establish a forward agency. The commander given OPCON of a unit may not exceed the limits of its use as laid down in the directive without reference to the delegating authority. OPCON does not include the authority to employ a unit, or any part of it, for tasks other than the assigned task, or to disrupt its basic organization so that it cannot readily be given a new task or be redeployed. Since OPCON does not include responsibility for administration and logistics, that responsibility would have to be clearly specified. A commander assigned OPCON may delegate that authority. b. Tactical Control. The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. In general, TACON is delegated only when two or more units not under the same OPCON are combined to form a cohesive tactical unit. A commander having TACON of the unit is responsible for the method used. c. Administrative Control. The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect of administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

d. Technical Control. The control applied to administrative or technical procedures and exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction. It parallels command channels but is restricted to control within certain specialized areas. Operational commanders may override this type of control if its application is seen to jeopardize the mission. 4. Command, Control and Information System. An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications which provides authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct, and control their activities. This comprehensive command, control and information system enhances C2 which, in common military usage, describes the process by which commanders plan, direct, control and monitor any operation for which they are responsible. 5. OPCOM and OPCON. There are important differences between these concepts. OPCOM allows commanders to reassign forces away from their own force, to specify missions and tasks, and to assign 2-2

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 separate employment of components of assigned units. OPCON is more limited and does not include authority to reassign forces or to assign separate employment of components of units concerned. If commanders have forces assigned for a continuing mission where they would need freedom to employ them with little or no constraint, and where delegation of OPCON to a subordinate commander may be necessary, they should be given OPCOM. However, if commanders have been given a limited mission or task, or if forces are assigned with limitations on their activities, commanders should be given OPCON. If a mission can be achieved without either authority being delegated to a commander, forces may be directed simply to act in support. Table 2-1 summarizes the degrees of authority associated with OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM and TACON.

ACTIVITY Assign missions or tasks (1) Direct assigned forces Delegate authority in CF Ops

Authority ALL* ALL OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON

OPCOM YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES

OPCON YES (2) YES YES YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO YES (4)

TACOM YES (2) YES (3) YES NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO

TACON YES (3) YES (3) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO

NOTES 1. A mission is a task that together with its purpose, clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for it. 2. Provided it is in accordance with the mission assigned to the commander. 3. Local direction only. 4. Only for the particular mission or task 5. Canada will normally retain OPCOM. * The term ALL means the described activity applies equally to all degrees of authority.

Delegate authority in combined ops. (5)

OPCON TACOM TACON

Reassign forces Assign separate employment Administrative responsibility Deploy units

ALL ALL ALL ALL

Table 2-1.

Table of Degrees of Command Authority

6. Administration and Logistics. Transfer of Authority (TOA) does not include a delegation or change of administrative or logistic responsibilities. Such delegation or change must be specifically ordered, either separately or together with the delegation of command authority. On occasion, changes to the degree of command authority may require changes to administrative or logistic responsibilities, and circumstances will arise in which administrative or logistic considerations place constraints on operations. A delegating authority must, always consider the possible administrative and logistic implications of any intended operational arrangement. Some aspects of administration, logistics and technical control will not be transferred to a TFC but will be retained by the respective force generator. These retained responsibilities are termed residual responsibilities. 203. 1. PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND The principles of command which must always be considered are as follows: a. unity of command;

2-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 b. span of control; c. chain of command;

d. delegation of authority; e. freedom of action; and f. continuity of command.

2. Unity of Command. In a military unit or formation, a single commander will be authorized to plan and direct operations. The commander will be held responsible for an operation's success or failure, and has the authority to direct and control the personnel and materiel committed to the task. 3. Span of Control. There is a limit to how much one person can effectively direct. A formation or unit's number of subordinates and activities, and its area of operations, must be such that one person can command or control the formation or unit. 4. Chain of Command. The structure of the C2 process is hierarchical. The commander at each level responds to orders and direction received from a higher authority and, in turn, issues orders and direction to subordinates. Bypassing levels of command in either direction is justified only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as the need for immediate action or the loss of communication with intermediate commanders. In such cases, the chain of command must be re-established as quickly as possible and the intermediate commander advised of the action taken. 5. Delegation of Authority. If the scope and complexity of operations are such that one person alone cannot direct or supervise all tasks, command authority should be delegated. Commanders may delegate all or any part of this authority and will decide how much authority will be exercised on their behalf by the staff and how much by subordinate commanders. Delegation means that: a. a commander must identify the essential aspects which will be handled personally, and then delegate authority to subordinates for those activities which are within their capability or do not require the commander's personal involvement; b. authority which has been delegated may be withdrawn or adjusted by a commander at any time; and c. the transfer of authority and assignment of responsibility for functions or tasks within the formation or unit in no way relieves commanders of their ultimate responsibilities.

6. Freedom of Action. Once the task or mission has been established and the necessary orders have been given, subordinate commanders must be permitted maximum freedom to take initiative and exercise their skills and knowledge of the local situation in the planning and conduct of the operation. 7. Continuity of Command. Command must be maintained at all times. To do so, the following conditions must be met: a. commanders will establish a clear procedure for succession of command in the event that they become casualties or are unable, for any other reason, to exercise command themselves; b. plans, organizations and facilities will be put in place to provide for a capability to overcome physical fatigue, equipment failures and inevitable personnel and equipment casualties resulting from enemy attack, and any interruptions during moves or transfers of the command authority from one location to another; c. an alternate headquarters should be available to replace the main headquarters when it is out of operation, either in accordance with planned procedures or as a result of enemy attack; and 2-4

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

d. subordinates must be fully aware of the commander's CONOP and intentions so that, if there is a loss of communications, headquarters, or commanders, the subordinates are capable of continuing operations without higher direction or consultation until the chain of command is restored.

2-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION II COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS 204. INTRODUCTION

1. Effective and responsive C2 is vital to the success of operations. C2 of a TF may be exercised either directly or through subordinate components, or a combination of both. The achievement of military objectives in preparation for or prosecution of armed conflict depends primarily on the ability to put the right forces in the right place at the right time. C2 has its basis at NDHQ where the responsibility for establishing deployable forces is retained. 2. Levels of Command. CF operational doctrine calls for three levels of command: Strategic, Operational and Tactical, which correspond to the three levels of conflict - defined in articles 110-113. a. Strategic Level of Command. That level of command through which control of a conflict is exercised at the strategic level and overall direction is provided to military forces, advice is given to political authorities, and co-ordination is provided at the national level. b. Operational Level of Command. That level of command which employs forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre or area of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. At the operational level, sea, land and air activity must be conceived and conducted as one single concentrated effort. Activities at this level link strategy and tactics. c. 205. Tactical Level of Command. That level which directs the use of military forces in battles and engagements designed to contribute to the operational level plan. NATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

1. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS is responsible to the Minister of National Defence (MND) for the conduct of military operations. The CDS, by virtue of his appointment, commands the CF and generally operates at the strategic level. The CDS issues orders and instructions to the CF through the chain of command. The authority and responsibility of subordinate commanders, including the ECS, formations and units, are promulgated in these orders and instructions. The CDS will delegate command authority and assign missions to subordinate commanders and adjust these assignments as circumstances dictate; group and regroup, concentrate or disperse forces; change priorities; and co-ordinate and support operations as deemed necessary to achieve the goals assigned to the CF by the Government of Canada. 2. Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). The VCDS is responsible to the CDS for force planning and development. As chief of staff (COS) at NDHQ, the VCDS co-ordinates the activities of the group principals. 4. Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS). The DCDS is the chief operations officer for the CF and is responsible to the CDS for directing the operations of the CF. The DCDS is assisted by the COS J3 who is responsible to him for issuing all operational tasking for the CF to meet programmed and emergency activities. 5. National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) J Staff. The J Staff is responsible for the staff effort related to the planning, conduct and co-ordination of operations at the strategic level. Its purpose is to focus and accelerate NDHQ matrix activities in the planning, execution and sustainment of operations. It offers the J3 (DCDS) ready access to the NDHQ Groups and provides an operational commander with a single point of contact (POC) within NDHQ for each operation.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

2-6

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

6. The Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS). Within the confines of their respective Environments, the ECS are responsible for a. exercising command of assigned units in accordance with the Canadian Forces Organizational Orders and as directed by the CDS; b. generating and maintaining operationally-ready forces; c. providing advice on matters affecting security, national defence and the Canadian Forces;

d. providing inputs to the development of force structure options and providing input to the development of plans and taskings for CF operations; e. exercising command of assigned forces conducting force generation and routine operations; f. exercising command of other forces that may be assigned;

g. carrying out residual administrative and technical control measures when forces are transferred to OPCOM or OPCON of a TFC. 206. OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURES

1. Introduction. In keeping with the concepts and guidance described in Chapter 1, commanders are responsible for accomplishing their missions with minimum loss of life and expenditure of resources and for ensuring that their actions lead to the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. Formation commanders are assisted in the execution of their duties by their headquarters and staff. For the conduct of operations, the CF has established one deployable joint HQ, the CF JHQ, and eight static formation-based HQs. 2. CF JHQ. The primary role of this deployable HQ is to plan, organize and direct the conduct of international contingency operations. In certain circumstances, they may be tasked to deploy on domestic contingency operations. When any portion of the JHQ deploys on a contingency operation, that portion is called a JTFHQ and the subordinate elements, a JTF. 3. Formation-based HQs. The primary role of formation-based HQs (MARLANT, MARPAC, LFAA, SQFT, LFCA, LFWA, 1CAD, CFNA) is to plan, organize and direct the conduct of routine operations and limited contingency operations and to generate forces for contingency operations. These HQs do not possess a full deployable capability. Should a domestic contingency operation require the close presence of a deployed commander and HQ, then C2 would be exercised through a subordinate commander and HQ, tasked as the TFC and TFHQ respectively. In this case, the TFC would report directly to the tasking HQ, who would, in turn, deal with NDHQ. If the TF required augmentation from another Environmental formation, the request would be staffed through NDHQ, who would in turn re-assign the necessary elements to the TF, using the TOA process. The TF would then be referred to as a JTF. 4. Supported/Supporting Commanders. On operations a commander having primary responsibilities for all aspects of a task who receives support from one or more supporting commanders is called a supported commander. Normally, the TFC will be a supported commander. A supporting commander provides the supported commander with forces or other support and develops a supporting plan. For instance, the coordinator of strategic lift into theatre could be designated a supporting commander. The execution of residual administrative, logistic or technical measures does not make a force generator a supporting commander.

2-7 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION III - TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY 207. THE TRANSFER PROCESS

1. In peacetime, the operational elements of the CF may not be under the command of the agency that will command them on operations. This is especially the case for contingency operations when the force generators are tasked to provide units / formations to the DCDS, the force employer. The mechanism by which units pass from OPCOM or OPCON of one agency to another is known as Transfer of Authority (TOA) and is defined as the formal transfer of a specified degree of authority over forces assigned to an operation. This transfer occurs between force generators and the supported commander (TFC) and between national forces and combined force commanders. The degree of authority transferred and the mechanism to effect TOA, is determined by the CDS and specified in orders when deemed appropriate by the CDS and TFC. 2. There are two key operational declarations in preparation for the TOA process: a. OPRED for Deployment. Force generators are responsible to declare to the CDS that their units and personnel have met all the training and administrative pre-requisites for deployment. b. OPRED for Employment. TFCs are responsible to declare to the CDS that their units are ready to conduct operations. 3. Force generators retain command of their units until they embark for deployment or until they reach certain geographical location. The elements assigned to the TF will be declared OPRED for deployment prior to departure. The first TOA occurs on deployment as OPCOM is passed to the CDS. The date/location of the transfer will be promulgated either in the Wng O, OP O or PLAN. Once the forces arrive in theatre they complete either Reception, Staging and Onward Integration (RSOI) in a new theatre, or complete the BOI for rotating units. The TFC then declares the TF OPRED for employment. TOA for employment occurs in two sections. In the first OPCOM of the forces is transferred to the Canadian TFC. In the second, OPCOM or OPCON is transferred to the combined force commander. The reverse of the above process occurs when a force re-deploys. 4. Residual Responsibilities. Once the TFC has assumed command of the TF elements through the TOA process, force generators, while no longer in the operational chain of command, will maintain their support responsibilities, minus that authority and responsibility which has been transferred to the TFC. These responsibilities are collectively referred to as residual responsibilities (see Annex A for some examples).

Ch 1 2004-11-05

2-8

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 ANNEX A EXAMPLES OF RESIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES A001. CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF 1. The Air Force retains residual for responsibility for airworthiness issues. Specifically, Chief of Air Staff (CAS) retains responsibility for overall airworthiness for air assets assigned to a TFC, and this is effected in the following manner: a. Operational Airworthiness Authority is retained by Comd 1 CAD, and effected by 1 CAD HQ staff. This includes such issues as operational flying procedures and aircrew training and standards; b. Technical Airworthiness Authority is retained by Director Technical Airworthiness; c. Flight Safety issues shall be reported and staffed IAW direction issued by the Director of Flight Safety (DFS), who is also the Airworthiness Investigative Authority; and

d. Aircraft maintenance policy and technical matters are a CAS and Comd 1 CAD responsibility, effected through staff at 1 CAD HQ.

2A - 1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

2A - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 3 CAMPAIGN PLANNING 301. GENERAL

1. A campaign is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involves maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6) 2. Fundamentally, a campaign is the integration and sequencing of operations and engagements to achieve a desired strategic effect. Greater detail on campaign planning is contained in B-GJ-005-500/FP000, CF Operational Planning Process. 302. PLANNING COMPONENTS

1. There are several operational concepts that are fundamental to the design and conduct of campaigns. These concepts are accepted in Canadian and allied doctrines as planning tools for campaign design. a. End State. The end state is the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6). b. Centre of Gravity. The Centre of Gravity is defined as characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. There are as a minimum two centres of gravity at each level: the oppositions and ones own. c. Decisive Points. A decisive point is a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. The point may exist in time, space or in the information environment. An alternative definition that has been found to provide additional clarity is a battlespace condition that must be achieved in order to threaten or attack the adversarys centre of gravity.

d. Lines of Operation. Lines of operation establish the relationship between decisive points, produce a critical path to the centre of gravity and ensure that events are tackled in a logical progression. e. Sequencing. The arrangement of events within a campaign in an order that is most likely to achieve the desired end state. f. Direct and Indirect Approach. Lines of operation are carefully sequenced to flow through the defined decisive points towards an opponents centre of gravity using either a technique of a direct or an indirect approach. These approaches are not geographic in nature but indicate the overall methodology for achieving the centre of gravity. In campaign planning the direct approach is normally equated with an attack on the adversarys strengths, while the indirect approach seeks to neutralize the centre of gravity through attacking critical vulnerabilities.

g. Culmination. An operation, battle or engagement reaches its culminating point when the current situation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. h. Manoeuvre. To manoeuvre is to seek to gain a position of advantage in respect to the opponent from which force can be applied or threatened. i. Tempo. Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the opposition. A faster relative tempo will allow one side to seize the initiative and dictate the conduct of operations. Tempo incorporates the capacity of a force to transition from one operational posture to another. By varying tempo or rhythm of operations a commander can impose threats to which an opponents decision cycle is increasingly unable to react, and thus to which his responses are increasingly inappropriate. 3-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

j.

Operational Pause. In order to regenerate fighting power before reaching a culminating point, a commander may find it necessary to plan an operational pause. Operational pauses must be sequenced to avoid ceding the initiative to the adversary.

2. Operational Planning Process. The planning for a campaign is conducted using the CF operational planning process. This process is detailed in B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CF Operational Planning Process. 3. Flexibility. Sequencing and synchronizing operations through decisive points along the line of operations is the key to sound campaign planning. Until the end state is realized, the campaign plan must be continuously adapted to changing circumstances (including the oppositions), resources, and limiting factors. This flexibility is obtained by examining contingencies in the following manner: a. Branch Plans. Branch plans are contingencies built into the basic plan for adjusting the ongoing operation if necessary to ensure the maintenance of the overall operational design. They can put the execution of a plan back on track after a setback or take advantage of opportunity. b. Sequel Plans. Sequels are plans for subsequent operations based upon the probable outcomes of current operations. Planning and executing a sequel will reduce the risks associated with transition between phases. 303. 1. OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS Six functions are integrated at the operational level for conducting a campaign: a. Operational Level Command. Command decisions start and stop action, set objectives, direction, priorities and parameters of the campaign endeavour. This function includes the setting of the decision-action cycle and its attendant planning process. It establishes the command support system, specifies the organization of command and command relationships and establishes the battlespace framework for continued operations. Parallel with and complementary to the command process is the exercise of control. Co-ordination and integration of activities such as information operations, air defence, communication and information systems management, special operations, reconnaissance, etc. are vital command and control responsibilities within a joint force. b. Operational Information. Information operations expand the commanders area of interest and area of influence. They include interaction with media, industry, joint and combined forces, worldwide computer networks and the perceptions of the opposition. The management of information is critical to efficient and effective operations. Tactical intelligence provides information on the environment and on enemy capabilities as they affect combat. Operational intelligence provides information that has an impact on the campaign; it must reflect the broader perspective of operations. c. Operational Manoeuvre. Operational manoeuvre is the disposition of forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of the campaign by securing operational advantage before battle is joined or by exploiting success. The campaign commander must be able to apply force at the decisive points. It is judicious application of force that wrests initiative from the opponent and retains it for the friendly force.

d. Operational Firepower. Operational firepower is the application of lethal and non-lethal firepower to achieve decisive impact on the conduct of the campaign. Operational firepower is distinguished from tactical fire support in both the way it is planned and in the impact it is intended to achieve. Operational firepower requires the integration of land, maritime and aerospace firepower with the subtler effects of information operations in general and command and control warfare in particular. e. Operational Force Protection. Operational force protection is the conservation of the fighting potential of a force, through both active and passive measures, so that it can be applied at the 3-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 decisive time and place. Force protection has two components. The first includes all actions that are taken to counter the enemys fires and manoeuvre by making soldiers and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. The second component of force protection includes actions to keep soldiers healthy and to maintain fighting morale. It also means guarding their equipment, infrastructure and supplies from loss or damage. f. Operational Sustainment. Operational sustainment comprises those logistical and support activities required to sustain campaigns and major operations. Resourcing, deconfliction and allocation of assets are strategic matters but ones that require consultation with the operational commander. Operational sustainment consists of requirement consolidation, apportionment and prioritization and route control. During the campaign, these sustainment capabilities may often limit options for manoeuvre. The campaign commanders concept of operations must therefore be supported by the concurrent development of a concept of sustainment.

3-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

3-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 4 FORCE EMPLOYMENT SECTION I - GENERAL 401. THE FORCE EMPLOYMENT (FE) PROCESS

1. Introduction. The FE process includes all activities required to plan, conduct and review CF operations. The activities inherent to the FE process are independent of organization or command level. This chapter provides an overview of the force employment process as follows: a. Plan Operations. The CF Operational Planning Process (CF OPP) is used to prepare plans and/or OP Os for CF operations; complete detail is contained in B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CF Operational Planning Process. It includes plan review: the amendment or re-issue of such plans and orders as required during the conduct of CF operations. An outline of the CF OPP constitutes the bulk of section II of this chapter. b. Conduct Operations. This sub-process is generally described in the other chapters of this manual, in other Joint doctrine manuals and in Environmental doctrine publications. c. Review Operations. J7 Lessons Learned is responsible for improving the CFs ability to plan and conduct operations by capturing lessons learned at the strategic military level. The review subprocess is described in Section III of this chapter. COMMAND AND OPERATIONS PLANNING

402.

1. Command. The exercise of command (defined at article 202.2) is the most important activity in the CF, whether in peace or in conflict, throughout the continuum of operations. Warfighting and other defence activities are not possible without effective command. 2. Authority, Responsibility and Accountability. Command is vested in an individual who has total responsibility. Commanders possess authority and responsibility with regards to their assigned forces, and are accountable, while in command, to their superiors and to the nation. All members of the CF, as individuals, are responsible for their actions and the direct consequences of these actions. This is a basic legal precept. Commanders have a responsibility to make decisions, issue orders, and monitor the execution of assigned tasks. Together with these command responsibilities, commanders accept the additional burden of accountability to their superiors, and the nation, for the actions of their subordinates. This accountability is the complement of authority, and can never be delegated. Whether delegated, or inherent to a command, the precepts of responsibility, authority and accountability ultimately affect the lives of everyone under a commanders command. 3. Command Organization and Planning. The CFs approach to FE is command driven. Part of this encompasses the requirement to plan for operations. In this regard, because of the responsibility, authority and accountability inherent to the position, a commander has unique tasks to perform throughout the planning process. For instance, commanders should personally carry out mission analysis and provide planning guidance to the staff. In simple terms, the commander must arrive at a responsible solution within certain time constraints despite being faced with varying situations, which are often complex, ambiguous and uncertain. At most levels, a staff exists to assist and support the commander. The staff has no authority by itself; it derives its authority from the commander and exercises it in his name. Therefore, all of its activities are undertaken on the commanders behalf. The staff is organized and their efforts focused and synchronized, to assist the commander throughout the decision making process.

4-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION II - THE CF OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS 403. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

1. The CF OPP is a co-ordinated process to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned operational tasks and to plan possible future tasks. Planning may be inhibited by inadequate information, insufficient time and limited resources. The planning process is designed to optimize logical, analytical steps of decision making in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. 2. Application. The planning process is applicable to any type of operation. It applies to both Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning. While the objectives and the stages of the planning process remain the same, a commander will selectively exclude or limit some of the planning tasks in order to meet time limitations in a crisis action planning situation. 3. Objectives. The objectives of the planning process are as follows: a. to standardise the planning process within the CF; b. to ensure strategic/political control is maintained during the development of a plan; c. to enable the commander and staff to translate strategic political objectives provided by the Government of Canada into strategic/ operational-level military objectives;

d. to enable commanders to guide development of the plan including the synchronization of operational combat functions; and e. to maximize the commanders and staffs creative thinking and associated thought processes. 4. Output. The output of the planning process is a plan or an operations order (OP O), designed to achieve an assigned mission and produce a desired end-state. 404. DESIGN OF THE PLANNING PROCESS

1. The planning process is applicable to all CF operations. It consists of five stages, leading from the initiation of planning through to plan review. It is cyclical, as necessary, to keep a plan current. The five stages, which mirror the NATO Bi-SC Guidance on Operational Planning, are as follows: a. Initiation, b. Orientation, c. Course of Action (COA) Development,

d. Plan Development, and e. Plan Review.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

4-2

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

C F O P E R A T IO N A L P L A N N IN G

D E L IB E R A T E P L A N N IN G

C R ISIS A C T IO N P L A N N IN G

C O M P L E X I T Y

SDP

OPLAN

CONPLAN

IM P L O C A M P A IG N P L A N T IM E A V A IL A B L E
Figure 4-1. CF Operational Planning

OP O

405.

PLANNING CATEGORIES

1. General. In order for the CF to undertake the full spectrum of its roles and missions there are two planning categories: Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning. 2. Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning is not subject to the immediate pressures of time or prevailing threats. Deliberate planning consists of initiating and developing plans in anticipation of a known or anticipated future event or circumstance that Canada will or might face. The final product is normally an OPLAN, CONPLAN or SDP. The NDHQ J Staff and the ECS staffs co-operate to develop and maintain these plans. 3. Crisis Action Planning. Crisis action planning consists of initiating and developing plans in response to a current or developing crisis. It requires an expeditious co-ordination and approval. While following the same stages as in deliberate planning some activities are truncated to meet time constraints. . The final product is normally an OP O. Crisis Action Planning may use an existing OPLAN or a CONPLAN, either by activating it through an Impl O if it is sufficiently detailed, or using it as a guide for the development of an OP O. 406. ORDERS

1. Warning Order (Wng O). A Wng O is a notice of an impending operation and an order that is to follow. It provides as much information as practical and maximises the available planning time provided to subordinate commands to allow them to prepare for the operation in the shortest time possible. 2. Operations Order (OP O). An OP O is a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the co-ordinated execution of an operation. OP Os are the normal final outcome of Crisis Action Planning and are produced in sufficient detail for execution. A commander may disseminate an OP O by any means, including verbal, if required. 3. Fragmentary Order (FRAG O). A Frag O is an abbreviated form of an OP O, issued as required to 4-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 amend a previously issued OP O. The Frag O will include only the parts of the original OP O that have changed. 4. Implementation Order (IMPL O). An IMPL O is the mechanism used to direct the implementation of an OPLAN or CONPLAN. 5. 407. Termination Order (TERM O). A TERM O is issued to formally terminate an operation. PLANS

1. General. A plan is a proposal for executing a command decision or project; it is not normally an executable document. It is prepared in the deliberate planning environment and represents the commands preparation for future or anticipated operations. Plans are usually initiated at the strategic and operational levels. Because plans concern future operations and help the staff make assumptions about the nature of the situation at the time of execution, they cannot remain static. As the commander and staff change or adjust their estimates to reflect the current analysis of this situation, they must also change the plans to reflect the results of this analysis. There are five types of plans: OPLAN, CONPLAN, SDP, SUPLAN and Campaign Plan. The terms draft, advance and final may form part of the title of these plans. 2. Operations Plan (OPLAN). An OPLAN is a plan prepared through the deliberate planning process to address a known defence mission that will be executed within a specified time period. It is typically produced when the defence mission is critical to national security and extensive co-ordination of complex issues is required. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan that identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources necessary to implement the plan. OPLANs are based on an Initiating Directive and are produced in co-ordination and consultation, with relevant subordinate commanders, civil authorities and nations. An OPLAN may be implemented at a prescribed time, on signal or through an IMPL O when the conditions of execution occur and an execution time is determined, and then becomes the OP O. 3. Contingency Operation Plan (CONPLAN). A CONPLAN is a plan prepared to address possible future security risks or in response to a current or developing crisis. A CONPLAN reflects potential response options but no specific time is set for the operation until higher authority approves the execution of the CONPLAN. It is initiated by the staff or by an Initiating Directive based on known or assumed planning factors resulting from confirmed intelligence or approved assumptions, limitations and constraints. A CONPLAN is produced in as much detail as possible, including all appropriate supporting annexes, in co-ordination and consultation with relevant subordinate commanders, civil authorities and Nations. A commander may implement a fully developed CONPLAN at a prescribed time, in accordance with prescribed measures (e.g. NATO precautionary measures) through an IMPL O or on order. However, if more than minor changes or updates are required then an OP O must be developed. The Initiating Authority approves subordinate level CONPLANs. 4. Standing Defence Plan (SDP). A plan required by a commander to cater for a short/no-notice potential risk in order to fulfill their assigned role whilst in a peacetime posture. The purpose of a SDP requires that it be a fully developed plan capable for execution, with forces assigned and execution authority delegated to the appropriate level of command. 5. Supporting Plan (SUPLAN). A SUPLAN supports a plan by providing detailed direction and information on a particular aspect of the plan. It can be a stand-alone document or can be incorporated as an annex within the supported main plan. 6. Campaign Plan. A campaign plan is prepared when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. Thus, a campaign plan is a series of related plans or orders aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. 408. OTHER PLANNING DOCUMENTS

1. Planning Guide (PG). PGs provide planning guidance in specific areas to operations planners. The intent of these guides is to supplement the planning information available within approved doctrine, the Defence

Ch 1 2004-11-05

4-4

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Plan, Directives, and other documents. PGs should not repeat information available from these source documents but rather, detail unique planning considerations within a specific area that are not covered elsewhere. The format of a PG normally follows the OPLAN format. 2. Initiating Directive. The Initiating Directive is an instrument to start and guide operational planning but it is not the authority to execute. It provides the situation, political and/or military objectives, key assigned tasks and the desired political and military end states. The DCDS will issue an Initiating Directive to the operational level commanders/JOG directing they commence operational planning. Similarly, operational level commanders will issue their Initiating Directives to their formation commanders directing their planning. 3. Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The completion of a CONOPS document is the preliminary step in the development of an operational plan or order. The CONOPS expresses the military commanders intentions on the use of forces, time and space to achieve his mission, objectives, and end state. It includes how the capabilities of the available resources are to be synchronized towards this goal. 409. APPROVING PLANNING DOCUMENTS

1. On behalf of the CDS, the DCDS approves strategic-level CONPLANs, OPLANs, CONOPS and PGs. The CDS normally approves OP Os, IMPL Os, SDPs, and campaign plans. A TFC, once deployed for operations, approves all operational-level plans and orders related to the overall mission. 2. Once the DCDS releases a strategic-level plan as an advance or final version in the deliberate planning environment, tasked subordinate commanders will prepare their own plans.

4-5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION III - REVIEW OF OPERATIONS 410. INTRODUCTION

1. In the logical flow from doctrine to training to operations, the lessons learned process complements these activities by providing the feedback and follow-on action to ensure there is constant learning, correction of mistakes and recognition of what is done well. Failure to implement a vigorous lessons learned system promotes the repetition of previous errors. 2. Most militaries employ a lessons learned mechanism. One system is based on post operation or post exercise reports: recommendations are sent through the chain of command with the intention of preserving sound practices and correcting problem areas. The weakness of this approach is that often, the reports end up in filing cabinets, unread; and the necessary changes to doctrine, training and procedures do not take place. The CF has recognized that a more systematic goal rather than task-oriented lessons learned process which incorporates a focussed effort to make requisite changes is essential. This recognition has led to the creation of the J7 LL Section within DG Joint Force Development/ DCDS Gp at NDHQ. 3. J7 LL is responsible for improving the CFs ability to plan and conduct operations by capturing lessons learned at the strategic military level. When directed, the section will capture lessons learned at the operational-level. In co-ordination with joint and environmental staffs, J7 LL will: a. collect lessons learned data relating to military strategic-level planning, mounting, deployment, employment and redeployment issues; b. collate and analyse the data to extract issues for further detailed staffing within the joint and environmental staffs; c. propose solutions to effect improvements to doctrine, procedures, training or materiel; and

d. monitor the implementation of solutions. 411. THE LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS

1. General. The strategic-level lessons learned process must evolve to ensure that implementation of solutions to operational problems becomes more streamlined and that valid performance measurements can be made. To date, a four step lessons learned process to achieve the goal has been implemented: data collection, analysis, validation, and follow-on action. 2. Data Collection. A Data Collection Plan is formulated and data collected from all appropriate sources: the TFCs report; J Staff and TF questionnaires; Situation Reports (SITREPs); and, notes collected by J7 LL staff at meetings, operations briefings, discussions and mission de-briefs. However, the questionnaires are the primary method of data gathering. The questionnaires are fine-tuned and modified to suit each operation. For large operations or exercises, the lessons learned staff will conduct in-theatre visits to acquire a better appreciation of the mission, collect further observations and provide assistance with the completion of the questionnaire and the TFCs report. 3. Analysis. Once collected, the data is synthesized into a number of key issues. An issue is a statement of a relatively discrete, though not necessarily simple problem. It is not enough to simply identify the issue or to point out what is inadequate in a certain area. There is a requirement to create permanent solutions to problems. Therefore, the issues are researched with appropriate J Staff agencies and commanders, and solutions are proposed for each problem. Also proposed are offices of primary interest (OPIs) and their assisting offices of co-lateral interest (OCIs) from within the J Staff who will be responsible for the issues through the follow-on action step. It is the OPIs responsibility to ensure that the staff action to solve a particular problem is assigned to the agency or agencies closest to the issue. The output from this step is the Lessons Learned Staff Action Proposal. 4-6

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

4. Validation. The Lessons Learned Staff Action Proposal is submitted to all participants: the contingent; environmental staffs; operational HQ staffs; and, the J Staff. Each participant reviews and validates the proposals contents with emphasis on correct and clear description of the issues, information accuracy, pertinence of the recommendations and OPI appropriateness. Comments raised during the validation process are used to prepare the Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive. 5. Follow-on Action. The Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive comprises an Action Plan which lists the validated solutions determined from the two previous steps. The Directive is sent, under authority of the DCDS (J3), to the previously identified OPIs responsible for co-ordinating the staff action required to address the issues. Target dates are agreed and assigned under the authority of the DCDS. The J7 LL Section monitors the progress of action to implement the Action Plan through quarterly progress reports provided by the OPI and publishes semi-annual status reports in March and September. 6. Lessons Learned. By definition, a lesson is not learned until follow-on action has been completed and doctrine, procedures or equipment have been changed. 7. Progress Report. The format for a progress report comprises the following areas: a. Issue Statement. A clear statement of a multi-faceted issue formulated from the data collection and analysis steps of the lessons learned process; b. Description. Conclusive statements illustrating the depth and scope of the issue; c. Source. The origin of the data (operation and/or exercise);

d. Follow-on Action. Directive statements defining requisite action to solve a particular problem and the OPI responsible for co-ordinating that action. Usually, an action item covers only one aspect of an issue. When all action items have been completed, the issue is closed and, by definition, a lesson is learned; and e. Status of Follow-on Action Implementation. These updates provided by the OPI describe the work accomplished to date to address the action item. These statements correspond directly to the Follow-on Action statements.

4-7

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

4-8

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 5 THE USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS SECTION I - KEY CONCEPTS 501. INTRODUCTION

1. The correct and comprehensive application of both national and international laws and customary practice is important in planning for the use of and employing force in CF operations This chapter provides an overview on key aspects on the use of force with detailed and specific doctrine contained in B-GJ-005-501/FP-010, The Use of Force in CF Operations. 502. 1. KEY CONCEPTS ON THE USE OF FORCE Levels Of Force. There are two levels of force used by the CF: a. Non-deadly Force. That force which is not intended to cause death or serious injury. This is usually through the use of physical force short of the use of firearms or other deadly force. b. Deadly Force. That force which is intended to cause death or serious injury regardless of whether death or serious injury actually results. 2. Minimum Force. The concept of minimum force is related to both non-deadly and deadly force and is the minimum degree of required force that is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, minimum force may include deadly force. 3. Hostile Acts. Hostile acts are divided into two separate categories: a. Hostile Act Against Canada. An attack or other actions that threaten the security of Canada, its forces, citizens, territory or property. b. Hostile Act Against CF Personnel, Units or Forces. An attack or other use of force against CF personnel where there is a reasonable apprehension that death or serious injury will be the likely result. An immediate response to attacks on CF personnel, units or forces is authorized in selfdefence. 4. Hostile Intent. There are two categories of hostile intent: a. Hostile Intent Against Canada. The threat of an attack or other actions that threaten the security of Canada, citizens, territory or property. b. Hostile Intent Against CF Personnel, Units or Forces. The threat of an attack or other use of force against CF personnel where there is a reasonable apprehension that death or serious injury will be the likely result. 5. Determination of Hostile Intent Against Canada and CF Personnel, Units or Forces. Although precise criteria can be established for identifying hostile acts, it is more difficult to recognize hostile intent. Therefore, mission specific hostile intent criteria should be issued. Two basic decision indicators must be satisfied to constitute hostile intent against Canada or against CF personnel, units or forces. These are capability and preparedness to use force, and evidence and intelligence information. Evidence indicating an intention to attack, in addition to capability and preparedness is enhanced by political policy guidance, increasing indications of enemy mobilization and warlike gestures revealed by intelligence sources. The weight of evidence and intelligence indicating an intention to attack must be compelling. For example, isolated acts of harassment, without intelligence information supporting enemy mobilization or other warlike gestures,

5-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 will not normally be considered hostile intent. 503. PRINCIPLES IN THE USE OF FORCE

1. Difference Between Peacetime And Armed Conflict Laws. There is a fundamental difference between the laws governing the use of force in peacetime and those applicable to the use of force during armed conflict. During peacetime, and unless acting in self-defence, the use of military force by the CF is prohibited unless specifically authorized by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). When authorized by the CDS, only minimum force may be used in peacetime after all reasonable non-force options have been exhausted, and the application of such force must cease once the objective has been met. The use of force during armed conflict is regulated by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). 2. The Use Of Force In Peacetime. The following principles on the use of force apply to all operations conducted under the laws of peace, whether the operation is classified as domestic or international: a. Positive Control. The use of force shall be controlled by the on-scene commander and is to cease once the aim has been achieved; b. Reasonable Grounds. CF personnel must be able to justify their actions on the basis that it was reasonable for them to take action in the circumstances. While the members own view of the circumstances will be taken account of, the actions taken will be examined against the objective standard: "would a reasonable person in similar circumstances have taken the same actions?"; c. Reasonable Belief. A reasonable belief is one that is logically and sensibly based on all the facts known at the time and leads to the conclusion that the use of force is necessary. In judging whether an individuals belief in the circumstances was reasonable and that the conclusion to use force was appropriate in the circumstances, the members belief will be examined in light of the completeness of the facts known or available at the time, their ability to comprehend those facts, and the actions taken as a result of that belief. Mere speculation does not constitute reasonable belief;

d. Direct Accountability and Liability. An individual who uses force, or the commander who authorizes it, must be able to identify the facts that led to the belief that the application of force was necessary, that the level of force used was consistent with the level of threat and that the engagement was terminated once the imminent threat ceased to exist. Commanders and individuals will be liable for the use of excessive force; e. Negotiations and Warnings. While in no way negating the right of self-defence and without assuming an unacceptable tactical risk, commanders should make every effort to control the situation through measures short of using force, including personal contact and negotiation. The potentially hostile individual or force should be warned of the situation, emphasizing that forces will take action in self-defence as necessary. Steps that can be employed could include voice, visual signals, radio or other electronic means of communication, manoeuvres, warning shots (when authorized), or other comparable measures that do not involve the application of actual force to warn potentially hostile forces of danger; f. Exhaustion of Other Options. Whenever the operational situation permits, every effort must be made to resolve a potential hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force. In all circumstances, force may only be used if there is no other reasonable way immediately available, consistent with force security, to stop the illegal action or to achieve any other legitimate purpose for which the use of force is authorized;

g. Minimum Force. The use of authorized force, up to and including deadly force, must never be more than what is necessary and reasonable based on the prevailing circumstances. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity and duration, reasonably necessary to achieve the objective for which the force is used and no more;

Ch 1 2004-11-05

5-2

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

h. Proportionality. Only a response proportionate to the perception of the level of threat is justified. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective for which the force is used and no more; i. Duration of Force and Disengagement. The application of force, at whatever level, shall cease when the imminent use of force or the hostile act stops or when it is reasonably believed that the imminent use of force no longer constitutes a threat; Escalation. Unless specifically authorized, escalation of the level of force is to be minimized; Deadly Force. Deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed; Collateral Civilian Damage. Collateral damage, which consists of unintentional injuries to people or damages to structures near targets, shall be minimized;

j. k. l.

m. Retaliation. The use of force in retaliation is prohibited unless specifically authorized by ROE; n. Reprisal. The use of force in reprisal is prohibited; o. Defence of Property (1) The defence of CF or non-military property is not included in the right of personal, unit or force self-defence and is controlled through ROE. Specific ROE must be authorized before members of the CF may use force to defend property and supplies. The level of force authorized to defend property will be based upon the mandate for the operation. Should deadly force to defend property be authorized, it will not be all-inclusive and will generally be restricted to property with designated special status; and (2) To minimize the need to resort to the use of force to protect Defence establishments and force property, every attempt should be made to protect such establishments and property using preventive measures such as available physical security systems and procedures; and. p. The Right to Hold Position. There is no requirement to retreat to avoid situations that justify the use of force in self-defence or to accomplish assigned tasks. Nonetheless, movement to an alternate position is an alternative and sometimes may be the most reasonable way to avoid injury. 3. The Use Of Force During Armed Conflict. The use of force during armed conflict is not unlimited, and principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) must be adhered to. a. Distinction. The principle of distinction, also called the principle of identification, imposes an obligation on commanders to distinguish between legitimate military targets and the civilian objects and the civilian population when conducting military operations; b. Non-discrimination. There are two aspects to the principle of non-discrimination. First, the LOAC binds all sides in an armed conflict. Although one side may label the other an aggressor, that side is not entitled to apply the law in a different way because of that assertion. Secondly, the law is applied without adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, gender, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria; c. Proportionality. This principle implies that collateral damage arising from military operations must not be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated from such operations;

d. Collateral Civilian Damage. This is the incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, arising from the use of military force; 5-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

e. Reprisal. The use of force in reprisal is prohibited; f. Military Necessity. This principle is related to the primary aim of armed conflict the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least possible expenditure of personnel and resources. The concept of military necessity justifies the application of force not forbidden by International Law, to the extent necessary, for the realization of the purpose of armed conflict. The concept makes the following presuppositions: (1) the use of force can be and is being controlled; (2) the use of force is necessary to achieve the submission of the enemy; and (3) the amount of force used is limited to what is needed to achieve prompt submission; g. Humanity. The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. This concept also confirms the basic immunity of civilian populations and civilians from being objects of attack during armed conflict. The immunity of the civilian population does not preclude unavoidable incidental civilian casualties that may occur during the course of attacks against legitimate targets and that are not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; h. Chivalry. This principle refers to the conduct of armed conflict in accordance with certain recognized formalities and courtesies. This concept is reflected in specific prohibitions such as those against dishonourable or treacherous conduct and against misuse of enemy flags and flags of truce; and i. Direct Accountability and Liability. Commanders and individuals will be liable for the use of excessive force.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

5-4

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION II - CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE 504. INTRODUCTION

1. Controlling the use of force during operations is both an operational and a legal imperative. Use of force, self-defence and ROE architectures have been developed to control the use of force. These architectures ensure that political direction and objectives, as well as the rule of law, are accurately translated into military orders and actions to achieve assigned missions. 2. The CF may use force: a. in self-defence; and/or b. as authorized or restricted by ROE issued by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). 505. 1. SELF-DEFENCE For practical purposes, self-defence is divided into two separate categories: a. National Self-Defence. National self-defence is defined as the defence of Canada, Canadian citizens, territory and property from hostile acts or hostile intent. A hostile act or hostile intent may not necessarily involve attack or threat of an attack; therefore, the use of force, may not always be the response to such acts or intent; and b. Personal, Unit or Force Self-Defence. Both international law and Canadian domestic laws recognize the authority to use appropriate force in self-defence, up to and including deadly force. Without further written or oral direction CF personnel are entitled to use force in self-defence to protect: (1) oneself; (2) other members of the Canadian Forces; and (3) non-Canadian military personnel who are attached or seconded to a Canadian force against a hostile act or hostile intent. 506. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. ROE are an indispensable instrument of command and control (C2) for ordering and controlling the use of force during military operations. ROE are orders issued by military authority that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, manner, and limitations within which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied to achieve military objectives in accordance with national policy and the law. The term orders is to be interpreted as the authorized limit of force approved by higher command and should not be interpreted as an obligation to use force. 2. The use of force, and in particular, the authority to use deadly force by Canadian forces to accomplish a mission receives detailed scrutiny and attention by the senior leadership of the CF. Every member of the CF who may be required to use force in self-defence or to accomplish a mission must have a reasonable level of knowledge and understanding of the ROE and supporting doctrine. 507. 1. PURPOSE OF ROE In general, ROE control the use of force in: a. national self-defence;

5-5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 b. defence of personnel and property (force protection) not included under CF personal, unit or force self-defence; and c. mission accomplishment.

2. With the exception of self-defence, during peacetime operations and operations prior to a declaration of armed conflict, ROE provide the sole authority to Canadian forces to use force. ROE are applicable throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. Prior to a declared armed conflict ROE are generally restrictive; in armed conflict, ROE are generally permissive. ROE are not used to assign missions or tasks nor are they used to give tactical instructions. The CDS is the sole authority for the authorization of ROE or changes to the ROE. No commander or member of the CF may issue "orders" to use force that could be construed as ROE or guidance that is more permissive than the ROE authorized by the CDS. 3. In Canada ROE are defined as "orders" that are intended to ensure that commanders and their subordinates do not use force or other measures beyond that authorized by higher command. ROE also provide confirmation as to the level of force that commanders or individuals are legitimately authorized to employ in support of their mission. 4. When up to deadly force is authorized by ROE it is not direction to use deadly force but is authority to use the full range of force up to and including deadly force by a commander or an individual. 508. ROE IN PEACETIME

1. Peacetime ROE draw their authority from the Government of Canada and are in compliance with Canadian and international law. They consist of a standard bank or menu of authorizations that commanders may use to direct, control and order the use of force to achieve an assigned mission in support of broad national interests; to defend against large-scale attacks on an operational or strategic level; or to protect other foreign forces or civilians. In peacetime CF ROE are expressed as authorizations or permissions. With the exception of self-defence, ROE are the sole authority for the use of force in peacetime. 509. ROE DURING TRANSITION FROM PEACETIME TO ARMED CONFLICT

1. A period of tension or crisis exists when diplomatic relations are so strained that violence, conflict or sustained hostilities could erupt. Periods of tension or crisis may last for hours, days, months or possibly years before reverting to normal peacetime conditions or escalating into sustained armed conflict. To address potential threats during these periods, and to enhance the survivability of Canadian forces during a crisis, the peacetime ROE model provides for the authorization of offensive measures. 510. ROE DURING ARMED CONFLICT

1. ROE for armed conflict draw their authority from the Government of Canada and are in compliance with Canadian and international law. During armed conflict, government policy would normally seek to contain the conflict and return to peace on the most favourable terms to Canada. ROE will be drafted based on the unique requirements and objectives of each conflict mission. 2. The Structure of Armed Conflict ROE. When hostilities break out, a commander must be able to seek out, engage and destroy the enemy. In accordance with the principles of their development, ROE may impose specific restraints or prohibitions on the commander for political reasons and senior commanders may wish to do the same for operational requirements. Therefore, the structure for armed conflict ROE is the opposite of peacetime ROE. Unlike peacetime ROE, which are expressed as authorizations, armed conflict ROE are expressed as prohibitions or restrictions. The reason for this structure is two fold: a. the use of force during armed conflict will be controlled and regulated by the LOAC. Armed conflict ROE do not, however, re-state the LOAC; and b. a commander may have to be restricted from exercising the full spectrum of force options available 5-6

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 under international law based on national political, diplomatic or operational imperatives. 3. Rules of Engagement at the Outbreak of Hostilities. At or prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the CDS will issue immediate and clear direction specifying the enemy and allies, direction concerning neutrals within the theatre of operations, and the criteria for targeting enemy military objectives. Direction concerning timings, territorial waters, airspace and landmass of other nations and theatres of operation and other concurrent operations should be included. In addition to this vital information, the status of peacetime ROE must be confirmed, and armed conflict ROE will also be issued. A combination of peacetime and armed conflict ROE may be in effect; armed conflict ROE to address any restrictions on the use of force against the enemy, and peacetime ROE to control the use of force against nations that are not party to the conflict. In the absence of direction, the LOAC is always in effect and will be followed. Once a conflict has ended, the ROE will once again require revision and further direction on its status. 511. 1. FACTORS INFLUENCING DEVELOPMENT OF ROE In order to control the use of military force, the Canadian government and military staffs will be guided by the following factors: a. Legal Prescriptions. Any use of force must comply with Canadian domestic law and international law. International laws include: (1) United Nations Prescriptions. During UN authorized or mandated operations the use of force must comply with the UN Charter and applicable UN Security Council resolutions, mandates and mission statements; (2) The Law of Peace. The international law of peace comprises treaties, conventions and other multilateral and bilateral agreements, and customary international law comprising the norms of international behaviour in times of peace; and (3) The Law of Armed Conflict. International laws, treaties and conventions comprising the Law of Armed Conflict; b. Political and Policy Considerations. To secure and protect national interests at home and abroad, the Government of Canada establishes policies, goals and objectives. The CF and its use of force is but one method in implementing these policies and objectives. Other methods include, economic, social, cultural, diplomatic and technological instruments. However, the use of force by the CF must always be in concert with these other instruments and the overall policies and objectives of the government; c. Diplomatic Considerations. During international operations and, in particular, during combined operations, the overall military objectives and the use of force will be influenced by the collective objectives of the alliance or coalition. These diplomatic considerations may ultimately limit legitimate uses of force, or they may permit a greater latitude in the use of force than would be permitted in a purely Canadian operation; and

d. Operational Requirements. The use of force will also depend on current and future operational considerations. Permission to engage particular targets, while they may be engaged lawfully under the law of armed conflict, may be prohibited for operational reasons. Further, the use of force may also be restricted in designated circumstances to avoid blue-on-blue engagements. 512. PROMULGATION OF ROE

1. The primary goal of Canadas use of force doctrine and ROE architecture is to provide direction on the use of force that is clear, concise, precise and comprehensive. This direction is issued through one of two 5-7

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 separate but related documents: a. ROE Authorization (ROEAUTH) Message. The ROEAUTH message is a concise method of authorizing and issuing mission specific ROE. It requires that a Commander and the force are well versed and trained as per B-GJ-005-501/FP-000, The Use of Force in CF Operations, and the standard Canadian definitions, principles and concepts on self-defence; and/or b. Use of Force Directive. The Use of Force Directive is a comprehensive mission specific document which contains use of force definitions, principles and concepts, direction on self-defence, the authorized numbered ROE for a particular mission and any other direction concerning the use of force for a particular operation. The Use of Force directive may be used when allied forces are participating in an operation and using Canadian ROE and doctrine, and may be used when Canadian forces are participating in an operation where the Force Commanders ROE require amendment and or amplification to meet Canadian legal and operational standards 513. PRECEDENCE OF ROE

1. International Forces. Within an alliance or coalition, when CF personnel are under the operational control of one commander and the tactical control of another, the ROE of the tactical commander shall apply, unless the ROE are more permissive than those of the operational control commander or have not been approved by the CDS. In the latter case, CF units will comply with their last CDS approved ROE until the new ROE are approved. 2. National Forces. The above does not apply when CF formations or personnel etc. transfer OPCON/TACON from one CF commander to another as the ROE for both commanders have been approved by the CDS. The personnel, unit or formation shall adhere to the ROE of the CF commander that has been given operational or tactical control. Commanders gaining control of CF forces shall ensure that they are in possession of approved ROE of the joining force and any other directions issued on the use of force.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

5-8

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION III - TARGETING 514. INTRODUCTION

1. To achieve effective firepower against the enemy, several operational functions must be well coordinated and executed. Systems and procedures for allocating priorities must be effective and targets must be accurately located and identified. To achieve this, a targeting process must be established. 2. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching to them, the appropriate response. It considers strategic and operational requirements and capabilities and the threat to friendly forces. Targeting occurs at all levels of command and is performed by forces capable of attacking targets with both lethal and non-lethal disruptive and destructive means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to de-conflict duplicative targeting by different forces or echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other components of a TF. An effective and efficient target development process and air tasking cycle are essential for the staff to plan and execute air operations. This targeting process should integrate capabilities and efforts at all levels. 515. THE TARGETING PROCESS

1. Targeting is a cyclical, multi-disciplined effort requiring interaction among TF components, separate staffs and cells of the TFHQ, and different weapon systems and delivery platforms or vehicles. On behalf of the TFC, targeting is the responsibility of the J3 division of the general staff. Alternatively, the TFC may establish a targeting co-ordination cell (TCC) whose role is to assist the TFC with the planning and execution of targeting. 2. The TCC is led by the J3 and consists of representatives of the J2 and J3 divisions, and other staffs and cells of the TFHQ as required (e.g., the EWCC). It may also include representatives from the TF components. The TCC is responsible for such activities as co-ordinating target information, preparing and refining target lists, providing target priorities, establishing no-fire areas, and assigning weapon systems to specific targets. 3. The TCC should meet daily to disseminate the TFCs targeting guidance, monitor the effectiveness of targeting efforts, update the target list, validate no-fire areas, and ensure that operations conducted by TF components are not in conflict and that they mutually support and focus on the TFC's CONOP. 516. PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF TARGETING

1. The provision of target intelligence is a function of the J2 staff. The J2 staff identify and locate those enemy targets which pose the greatest threat to the TFC's mission; are high-value targets; or are high-payoff targets (i.e., represent the greatest potential for exploitation). Having identified the targets, each is considered for its criticality in terms of its value to the enemy and its vulnerability to successful attack by friendly forces. 2. Given the targets, their criticality and their vulnerability, the TCC prepares a prioritized target list and attack strategy, along with the desired effects (e.g., destroy, neutralize, disrupt, etc.). The target list should reflect a coherent strategy to degrade or disrupt enemy operations and not just list available targets. Once the target list is approved by the TFC, it is published with instructions on who is to attack each target and when, and the preferred weapon system to be used. As timing is a key factor in targeting, targeting efforts must be synchronized with other operations to maximize the benefits gained through the confusion and disruption before the enemy can recover. 3. The J2 staff provides battle-damage assessments that assess the effectiveness of targeting efforts. The target list and attack strategy are revised or updated based on these assessments.

5-9

Orig

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

Orig

5-10

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 6 COLLECTIVE TRAINING 601. INTRODUCTION

1. The variety and complexity of Canadian Forces (CF) operations presents a daunting challenge for the planning and implementation of national and strategic-level collective training activities, particularly given the number of stakeholders and their individual requirements. In addition, the emergence of asymmetric threats and the requirement to maintain interoperability with federal and provincial governments and their departments, allies and non-government organizations (NGOs) all pose significant doctrinal, procedural and technical challenges. To overcome these challenges, the Collective Training process must support the evolution of new structures, capabilities and concepts. 2. Emerging technologies, innovative organizational restructuring and evolving concepts of command and control, will enable more effective integration of the capabilities of the CF to operate effectively in a joint and combined operational environment. Integration must also take into account the increased complexity of domestic, continental and global threats, and the interdependencies of defence and other government departments (OGDs) in protecting the security of Canadians. Consequently, the need for closer co-ordination with OGDs and agencies. 3. The small size of the three environmental commands is a key factor limiting the range of scenarios in which they may conduct joint operations. Except for a discrete set of domestic circumstances, the CF will normally participate as a contributing nation within a multinational force, often a coalition of like-minded nations, with the emphasis on interoperability with key allies, principally US forces. Notwithstanding this constraint, in preparing for operations, it is essential that lines of communication between the Department of National Defence (DND)/CF and our allies, as well as OGDs, be established and strengthened to ensure that a collaborative joint and combined response can be carried out in times of crisis. 4. The guidance provided in this chapter concentrates on CF collective training and applies to all three levels of collective training activities. 602. TYPES OF TRAINING

1. Within DND there are four types of training: civilian, individual training and education (IT&E), collective and adventure. All must complement each other for the purpose of contributing to the Defence Mission, namely: To defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security. 2. Collective training is training, other than IT&E, designed to prepare teams, units and other elements to perform military tasks in accordance with defined standards. Collective training includes procedural drill and the practical application of doctrine, plans and procedures to acquire and maintain tactical, operational and strategic capabilities. 3. The CDSs direction for collective training is provided in the Strategic Collective Training Guidance (SCTG). The SCTG is in turn used as the basis for the development of the Strategic Collective Training Plan (SCTP). Both documents are products of the strategic collective training process, as defined in DAOD 5031-CT. 603. LEVELS OF COLLECTIVE TRAINING ACTIVITIES

1. As described in DAOD 5031-CT, Collective training activities are defined in terms of the three levels of operations: a. Strategic Collective Training. Collective training that prepares Environment and Group Principal elements to accomplish assigned strategic objectives in support of DCDS-directed, military operations and strategic-level exercises and training activities, involving single environment, joint or combined forces. Strategic collective training involves the: 6-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

(1) participation of the NDHQ Joint Staff; (2) participation of operational-level forces in DCDS-assigned strategic-level training activities; and (3) evaluation and validation of operational-level forces assigned to the DCDS for deployed operations. b. Operational Collective Training. Training that prepares Environment and Group Principal elements to accomplish their assigned operational objectives and tasks. c. 604. 1. Tactical Collective Training. Training that prepares Environment and Group Principal elements to accomplish their assigned tactical objectives and tasks.

CATEGORIES OF COLLECTIVE TRAINING ACTIVITIES For planning purposes training activities may be further identified and defined as follows:

a. Combined. An activity that is conducted by one or more components of the CF in combination with forces from one or more allied nations to accomplish a single mission. b. Joint. An activity that is conducted by elements of two or more environments of the CF. When all environments are not involved, the participating forces are identified. c. 605. Single-Environment. An activity that is conducted by a single environment to meet its specific objectives and requirements. TRAINING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The CDS retains the overall authority and responsibility to ensure that sufficient training is conducted to enable all CF elements to operate together effectively as a multi-purpose, combat capable force. The DCDS is responsible for conducting all collective training at the strategic level. The Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS) and Level One Advisors are responsible to ensure that the essential states of readiness at the operational and tactical level are maintained. 2. For strategic training activities, an NDHQ planning team co-ordinates the training activity. The team includes representatives from the participating ECS and Level One Advisors, and appropriate NDHQ staff branches. A CDS appointed officer conducting the exercise (OCE), ensures all participating headquarters, forces and agencies achieve the training activity objectives. 3. The operational staffs of the individual ECS and Level One Advisors conduct the planning for operational and tactical level training activities. 606. STRATEGIC COLLECTIVE TRAINING

1. Strategic collective training is identified, developed and evaluated in the annual strategic collective training process. The process encompasses two phases, a planning phase and an implementation phase. The Planning Phase involves the development of the SCTG and the SCTP. The implementation phase involves exercise development, conduct and evaluation. 2. Strategic Collective Training Plan (SCTP). The SCTP is approved by the CDS and issued annually. It provides overall direction for CF strategic collective training. The SCTP directs that collective

6-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 training shall satisfy Strategic Collective Training Goals, Collective Training Objectives and the strategic, operational, and tactical performance requirements described in the Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL). 3. Strategic collective training is further amplified in the following documents available at http://dcds.mil.ca/dgjfd/dpdt/ a. DAOD 5031-0 (Learning and Professional Development), b. DAOD 5031-CT (Collective Training), c. Strategic Collective Training Guidance (SCTG), and

d. Strategic Collective Training Plan (SCTP) 607. OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COLLECTIVE TRAINING

1. From the guidance contained in the SCTG, ECSs and applicable Group Principals prepare operational collective training plans (OCTPs), annually, to identify the specific operational training priorities, programs, and initiatives for their organizations. The OCTPs are included as annexes to the SCTP. 2. Further information is available in the following material: a. The role of training in preparation for international operations in the current version of DCDS Direction for International Operations; b. Guidance on CF preparation for domestic operations in the current version of DCDS Direction for Domestic Operations; c. For information on strategic collective training activities contained in the SCTP, contact NDHQ/J7 Trg or visit http://dcds.mil.ca/dgjfd/dpdt/ ; and

d. For detailed information on how to plan and conduct an exercise, the NATO Bi-SC Exercise Planning Guide (EPG) is considered a practical tool for planning all types of training activities at any level. The EPG can be found by contacting NDHQ/J7 Trg or by visiting http://dcds.mil.ca/dgjfd/dpdt/

6-3

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

6-4

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 7 TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION SECTION I - THE TASK FORCE 701. INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter provides guidance for the formation of a task force (TF) and TFHQ. Specific titles will always be used to describe actual deployed forces; for example, Task Force - Haiti (TF HAITI) or to relate to a specific mission; for example TF IFOR. Should there be a requirement to create subordinate TFs, the task force commander (TFC) shall ensure that the name(s) selected will not generate confusion. 702. ESTABLISHING A TASK FORCE

1. A TF will be established for all contingency operations, domestic or international. As the TF will be a mission specific grouping, it may or may not contain elements of two or more environments of the CF. Should the TF be multi-Environmental in composition, then the adjective joint shall be employed to describe all aspects of the operation. Figure 7-1 shows a generic organization of a TF.

Chain of Command
Full Command OPCOM Administrative Control * If Assigned. Note: SOF elms may remain under DCDS vice TFC depending on OPlan

NDHQ CDS

TFC

TFHQ

TF SUPPORT GROUP

TF SIGS ELEMENT

Maritime Component

Land Component

Air Component

SOF* Component

Figure 7-1. A Generic Task Force 2. When a TF is established and a TFC appointed, the commander establishing the TF will: a. define the strategic/operational objectives; b. assign the task or mission; 7-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

c.

allocate forces to the TFC;

d. define the scope and timing of the mission; e. identify supporting commands and agencies; f. identify restraints and constraints on the mission;

g. define the geographic area of responsibility; h. specify and direct the transfer of the appropriate level of command over assigned forces to the TFC; and i. 703. identify the appropriate time for transfer of command authority to the TFC. COMMAND OF A TASK FORCE

1. Command of combat units and support groups on contingency operations is vested in a TFC, in some cases a JTFC, appointed by the CDS. In such operations, the DCDS has responsibility to co-ordinate on behalf of the CDS, strategic level operational planning and CDS operational direction to the TFC. When the CDS establishes a TF, a separate chain of command is activated which has the appointed TFC responding to the CDS. ECS may be tasked to provide support to their forces assigned to an operation; however, they are outside the operational chain of command, except if appointed as the TFC. 2. The TFC, appointed by the CDS, is the operational commander. In appointing the TFC, the CDS must specify the mission, allocate the resources to execute that mission, and specify command and control (C2) arrangements, including the delegation of authority and the allocation of personnel, agencies or elements which will enable the TFC to effectively control resources to accomplish the mission. The TFC may have to deploy to a specific theatre or area of operations, should circumstances require it. Alternatively, in situations where a headquarters exists in the theatre or area of operations, it may be appropriate to operate out of fixed facilities. The TFC, aided by the NDHQ J Staff in the planning and execution of the mission, requires a deployable TFHQ as well as communications and administrative support units. 3. Commanders who are fully conversant with the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of forces of their own Environments may have only limited knowledge of the tactics, techniques, etc. of the components of a TF. Commanders, therefore, must be provided with a staff which will enable them to command and control resources from other Environments and support agencies effectively. Military advice may also be provided by specialist liaison or staff officers and by the commanders of subordinate, supporting or higher commands. 4. Command Relationships. Once a TF is established, a separate chain of command is created under the TFC who reports directly to the establishing commander. This chain of command will then be activated at a time determined at the strategic level and specified in orders through transfer of authority (TOA) (chapter 2, section III). a. Prior to TOA, the TFC is authorized to direct planning for the operation through the designated TFHQ and designated force generators. The designated force generators retain their full range of command responsibilities, as specified in article 704.2, but are responsive to the TFC for planning and preparing forces for the operation. b. Once TOA takes place, the TFC assumes the level of command and responsibility specified by the CDS. The force generators will remain responsible for the provision of certain functions and resources to the TFC, using existing lines of communications (LOC) for these functions wherever possible and keeping the TFC fully informed. Force generators will maintain their usual responsibilities, minus the authority and responsibility that have been transferred to the TFC. 7-2

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

5. Methodology. In general, the number of resources assigned, and the required degree of control over these resources will depend on the task or mission assigned to a TFC. The C2 method used for an operation will depend on the resources allocated to the operation, the degree of authority delegated to the TFC, the nature of the task or mission, and the operational situation. The following two methods are available to the TFC for C2 of a TF. a. Component Method. This method is the norm for joint contingency operations. Using the component method, the JTFC exercises authority over a JTF through component commanders (JTF components are assigned to JTFCs under OPCOM or OPCON). The JTFC issues broad operational directives to each of the component commanders who then translate the directives into detailed plans and orders for their assigned units. Each component has a separate headquarters as its control organization. The JTFHQ and component HQs may be collocated or separate. b. Direct Method. The direct method is an alternate method of command used in contingency operations where the size, complexity, time span and mission of an operation is usually limited. It would be rare to employ this method in international operations. The decision to employ the direct method will normally be made in consultation with the ECS. According to this method, a TFC exercises command authority over a TF directly by issuing detailed orders to subordinate elements. An appropriate staff and control facilities are therefore required. In general, a TFC is provided with advice by his staff and by officers commanding elements of the TF. The span of control that a TFC can effectively manage depends largely on the capacity of the staff and the facilities available. A balance must be struck between the actual or potential span of control and the extent of a commander's involvement in the detailed conduct of operations. If necessary, commanders may delegate to subordinate commanders a level of command authority over elements of their forces. 704. 1. RESPONSIBILITIES Commanders Responsibilities. Once assigned, the TFC will: a. confirm the mission; b. define the operational level objectives; c. assign subordinate tasks;

d. organize forces; e. describe the CONOP; f. set priorities;

g. co-ordinate the use of logistics resources; and h. determine the sequence of operations. 2. Responsibilities of the ECS and Group Principals. ECS and Group Principals, collectively called force generators, are responsible to the CDS for providing suitably trained and equipped forces and for sustaining their assigned capabilities. Generally speaking, sustainment includes the maintenance of operational and technical readiness through the provision of personnel and materiel, pre-deployment preparatory training, Environmental intelligence, electronic warfare analysis and advice on technical matters. Deficiencies or situations which cannot be rectified by the force generator because of lack of capability or authority will be submitted to the CDS for resolution. While the ECS and Group Principals are not part of the operational chain of command, they play a vital role in generating and supporting the forces assigned to TFs and in providing the CDS with strategic advice on environmental, technical and operational matters. They are responsible, within their area of expertise, for: 7-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

a. translating strategic objectives and plans into direction for force generation; b. translating operational objectives and plans into support to operations; c. providing advice to the CDS on technical and operational matters;

d. participating in the strategic-level decision-making process for the preparation and conduct of operations; and e. retention of certain residual responsibilities such as flight safety. 3. Relationship Between the Task Force Commander and Force Generators. There must be no confusion regarding the responsibilities assigned to the TFC, the force generators and other agencies involved. Once the CDS establishes a TF, a separate chain of command is activated, and the TFC reports directly to the CDS and the assigned TF units, report directly to the TFC. Force generators remain responsible for the provision of certain capabilities and resources to their forces, in co-operation with designated group principals. These responsibilities are collectively referred to as residual responsibilities. Existing LOC for personnel and logistics functions will continue to be used wherever possible; any changes deemed appropriate will be clearly identified in the directive ordering TOA. Force generators will maintain their usual responsibilities, minus that authority and responsibility which have been transferred to the TFC through TOA.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

7-4

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION II - TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS STAFF 705. STAFF FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

1. The staff exists to provide advice to the TFC and to subordinate commanders. Its tasks are to collect and analyse information on which the TFC bases decisions and plans, to complete the detail of the plans, to transmit the TFCs instructions and orders quickly and accurately to subordinates, and to monitor execution of the plans. The staff assists the TFC by co-ordinating routine activities and resolving problems within the overall framework of the strategic commander's plans or directions. More specifically, the staff functions are to: a. gather and organize information for presentation to the TFC; b. assist in the preparation of estimates; c. make recommendations to the TFC on tactical and administrative matters;

d. complete the detail of the TFCs plan; e. anticipate future tactical and administrative developments; f. inform higher, subordinate and adjacent commands of developing situations;

g. assist the TFC in providing direction and co-ordination in the execution of the plan; and h. monitor accomplishment of the TFCs directions. 706. COMPOSITION OF THE TFHQ STAFF

1. The staff is comprised of three main categories of staff appointments: personal, special and general. Officers with sea, land and air experience will be assigned to the headquarters in a proportion determined by the nature of the operation and the needs of the TFC (see Figure 7-2 for the general organization of the TFHQ). a. Personal Staff. This staff, which includes aides-de-camp and executive assistants, is responsible for special matters over which the TFC chooses to exercise close personal control. It assists TFCs directly by meeting their personal needs and arranging their work and visit programmes (i.e., appointments, itineraries, documents, transportation, etc.). It also provides an additional link between the TFC and the general staff. b. Special Staff. The special staff assists the TFC with technical, administrative, public affairs, legal and operational matters. Examples of specialist officers are the comptroller, who provides advice on all financial aspects; the commander of the medical group, who is the TFCs authority on health-service support; and the TF Engineer, who keeps the TFC informed of all military engineering activities. The special staff is usually small and is made up of experts who also hold positions within the Environmental components and support group and unit staffs, or within the divisions of the general staff. c. General Staff. The general staff is organized along traditional lines, with a COS responsible for the overall staff co-ordination, and a number of branches and divisions responsible for distinct staff activities. The general staff, which assists TFCs in meeting their responsibilities for overall command of the TF, is involved in planning, co-ordinating and supervising the execution of operations and training, and in arranging the support required by the TF to accomplish its mission. Distinct activities of the general staff will include some or all of the following and be titled as indicated below: (1) Personnel (J1). The J1 staff assists the TFC with the formulation of personnel policies for, and 7-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 with the personnel management of, the TF. The staff is also responsible for administering the military and civilian personnel within the TFHQ. (2) Intelligence (J2). The J2 staff is responsible for providing the TFC with accurate and timely intelligence needed to plan and conduct operations. The staff monitors current operations and is responsible for controlling and co-ordinating all in-theatre intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance agencies and sources organic or available to the TF. The staff is also responsible for disseminating intelligence to the TF. (3) Operations (J3). The J3 staff assists the TFC in planning, directing, controlling and co-ordinating operations and training. As all staff effort must support these activities, J3 is the pre-eminent staff branch. (4) Logistics (J4). The J4 staff assists the TFC with the arrangements for the logistics aspects of the operation; that is, supplies, accommodation, maintenance, and administrative movement. (5) Plans (J5). The J5 staff assists the TFC in planning future operations. (6) Communications and Information Systems (J6). The J6 staff assists the TFC by co-ordinating the procedures to identify, collect, process, present and distribute the information needed by the TFC and by co-ordinating the technical detail for information acquisition and distribution. (7) Civil-Military Co-operation (J9). The J9 staff is responsible to the TFC for the development and execution of policies relating to local national authorities and the civilian population, including host-nation support (HNS) for the TF.

Com d
P e rs o n a l S ta ff

S u p p o rt U n it

L ia is o n S ta ff S p e c ia l S ta ff COS

J1

J2

J3

J4

J5

J6

J9

Figure 7-2. A Generic Operational Level Headquarters 2. Liaison Staff. The TFC is also supported by liaison staff. The use of qualified liaison staff contributes to the success of any mission. In any operation, liaison officers must be knowledgeable about the capabilities and limitations of their own Environments and units; in a combined operation, they must be knowledgeable about the capabilities and limitations of the CF. If required, liaison staff will be detached from the TFHQ to adjacent and other headquarters; liaison staff will also be attached to the TFHQ from other commands. Liaison officers normally work under the direction of the COS. The TFC may also designate an individual to perform liaison duties for a specific purpose or period of time. Liaison staff perform the following 7-6

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 functions: a. acquisition of information for the TFC and the general staff; b. passage of information from the TFC; and c. representation of the TFCs interests.

3. In operations the JTF HQ will employ functional groups to include the Joint Operation Centre, Joint Planning Centre, Joint Logistics Centre, Joint Intelligence Centre and other boards and coordination mechanisms as required. 707. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The TFHQ staff, which is responsible for assisting the TFC to achieve the mission, supports the chain of command but is not part of it. Its purpose is to ensure that the TFC understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of the component parts of the TF. 2. The TFHQ staff is headed by a COS, whose principal tasks are to organize, direct, supervise and coordinate all staff activities of the TFHQ; ensure the co-ordination of staff work with higher, lateral and subordinate commands; assist the TFC in decision making; and assist the TFC in directing and co-ordinating the execution of plans and orders. 3. The TFHQ staff has no authority independent of the TFC. Its influence is derived from and is exercised in the TFCs name. The TFHQ staff must never interfere with or impede the relationship between a senior and subordinate commander. Similarly, the TFHQ staff will not reject proposals or requests from a subordinate commander without the TFCs direction. 708. STRUCTURE AND SIZE

1. The precise structure and size of a TFHQ will vary depending on the nature of the mission. Similarly, location and facilities of the TFHQ will have a major impact on what the TFC and the staff can accomplish. For example, a TFHQ onboard a flagship may have limitations of space and equipment which could affect manning levels and equipment capabilities. TFCs may reorganize the headquarters as required in order to better carry out their duties and responsibilities. 2. For deployed contingency operations in complex situations, the JTF HQ could be based on the JOG. The JHQ will be augmented, as required, by primary or general augmentees when it appears likely that operational level contingency planning will have to be conducted or for a deployment. The activation of the JTFHQ will be initiated through the CDS Wng O. 3. For major domestic operations it may be necessary to augment formation based HQs such as a LFA HQ or maritime coastal command with personnel from the JHQ to allow a 24/7 capability or to carry out functions not normally resident in a formation based HQ. 709. SUPPORT UNIT

1. The support unit is responsible for providing the TFC and the TFHQ staff with the personnel, equipment and transportation required to command subordinate components and units of the TF, and for the administrative support and security of the TFHQ. The composition and functions of the support unit will vary depending on the nature of the operation. Details will be specified in the operation orders. 710. CIS UNIT

1. The CIS unit is responsible for providing the TFC and the TFHQ staff with the personnel, facilities and equipment required to install, operate and maintain operational level CIS facilities and resources as required to 7-7

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 command the TF effectively. The CIS unit may be integrated with the headquarters support unit, in which case the operational level CIS and the administrative and security support to the TFHQ are provided by a single unit. Normally, this capability will be provided by the CF JOGs Joint Signal Regiment (JSR).

Ch 1 2004-11-05

7-8

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION III THEATRE ACTIVATION/CLOSE OUT 711. THEATRE ACTIVATION TEAM (TAT)

1. Past experience has indicated that during the preparation and deployment phases of an operation, a TFC is typically confronted with two different and often mutually exclusive tasks: a. to prepare his TF, particularly units which are not pre-formed such as the NCE/JTFHQ and NSE/JTFSG for the deployment; and b. to prepare the theatre so that the TF can commence operations shortly after arrival of the main body. 2. To resolve this situation a TAT, formed from the CF JOG, may be employed, particularly in time sensitive environments, to conduct the second of these two tasks, theatre preparation, leaving the TFC and the TF to concentrate on the first task, readying for the deployment. The TAT may include a Liaison and Recce Team (LRT) which can act as the advance party of the TAT and/or perform many of the functions of the TAT HQ prior to the deployment of the other elements. 3. The TAT could range in size, up to potentially 300 plus personnel, who prepare the theatre (facilities, contracts, contacts, information) for the TF to commence operations. Elements of the TAT, specifically the LRT could deploy up to 60 days prior to the main body of the TF. 4. Tasks for the TAT for a specific mission will be specified in the Warning Order/Operation Order and the composition of the TAT would be adjusted accordingly. Typical tasks would be: a. establishing liaison with the Force Commander (FC), Force staff, other contingents, Canadian Embassies/Consulates in the area and the Host Nation; b. planning and executing the reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI) of the TF in theatre; c. planning and establishing support arrangements for the TF;

d. planning, design and initial implementation of force beddown for the TF; e. collecting information and intelligence; and f. establishing a functioning TF HQ infrastructure and rear link communications.

5. TAT HQ are tasked tailored for the specific mission and will be described in the Warning Order/Operation Order. 712. MISSION CLOSEOUT TEAM

1. With the cessation of operations in any overseas mission there is a tremendous amount of effort and coordination required to closeout a mission. It is essential that closeout activities be conducted in a deliberate, efficient, effective and controlled manner. Mission closeout is a co-ordinated activity involving the TF in theatre, the NDHQ J3 Intl desk officer, selected J Staff desk officers and the Mission Closeout Team (MCT) from Canada. 2. The role of the MCT is to assist the TF in conducting the closeout and to execute the functions of strategic interest during a mission closeout. This document will identify the range of capabilities required, skeleton organization and the activities that occur from the theatre mission closeout reconnaissance through to the return of the MCT from a theatre of operations. 3. The initiation of mission close out planning would be the reconnaissance by the command element of the MCT, J3 Intl Desk Officer and selected J Staff desk officers to theatre. In consultation with the TFC and his staff, the reconnaissance would result in the mission closeout plan and the drafting and issuing of the strategic order for 7-9

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 mission closeout. The co-ordinated planning of a mission closeout should be initiated early, even though a decision may not have been made on the final cease operations date, as some activities, such as letting of contracts, (movements, engineering services) and preparation and conditioning of stores require significant lead time for implementation.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

7-10

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 8 COMBINED OPERATIONS 801. INTRODUCTION

1. Any military operation that involves the forces of more than one nation acting together to accomplish a single mission is referred to as a combined operation. Allied, coalition and UN mandated operations are all considered to be combined operations. 802. STRUCTURE OF A COMBINED OPERATION

1. Depending on the scope of the mission, land, sea and air components, logistics and communications support may all be included in a combined operation. Nations will contribute to the combined force HQ staff and operational components in accordance with alliance agreements or as agreed at meetings of troop contributing nations (TCNs). The force commander (FC) is usually an officer of the nation contributing the largest number of forces to the operation. A typical combined force structure is illustrated below.

NDHQ CDS

ALLIANCE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, OR COALITION

TFC (CNC) TFHQ (NCE)

FC FHQ COMBINED FORCE COMPONENTS

MARITIME COMPONENT

LAND COMPONENT

AIR COMPONENT

SOF COMPONENT

CF MARITIME FORCES

CF LAND FORCES

CF AIR FORCES

CF SOF FORCES

Operational Chain of Command Full Command OPCOM OPCON Administrative Control Coord / Ln

Figure 8-1. Organization of Combined Force involving Canadian forces 803. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. With the exception of single ship deployments, when one or more elements of the CF operate as part of a combined force, a TF will be established. If elements of two or more Environments of the CF are involved the TFC will be considered a JTFC. See also articles 116, 118 and 119. 2. As this is an international contingency operation, the commander and staff of the Joint Operations 8-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Group (JOG) would normally execute the C2 of the TF. Forces generated will normally be assigned OPCOM to the JTFC. These operations are normally of such scope and complexity as to require the establishment of component commands. 3. The TFCs duties and responsibilities will be as stipulated in the terms of reference (TOR) issued to him by the CDS. These duties will be dependant on the organization of the combined force. The TOR will normally provide the TFC with the powers of punishment of a formation commander in accordance with relevant sections of the NDA. The TOR will also delegate OPCOM over Canadian forces assigned to the combined operation to the TFC while the CDS will retain full command authority. Normally, the TFC will retain OPCOM but will transfer OPCON of the Canadian force to the FC. In rare cases, particularly NATO Article 5 operations, the FC may be given OPCOM of Canadian forces. 4. Logistics. Generally, in coalition combined operations administrative and logistics support remains a national responsibility. In some instances mutual support arrangements are agreed between TCNs and host nation support (HNS) agreements are made. In Allied combined operations the degree of administrative control delegated to a FC and the FC's authority over logistics resources will be agreed to by TCNs and detailed in applicable documents and operation orders. See chapter 31 - Logistics Support for further information. 5. When the TFC is functioning as an operational level commander, the entire TF will normally be assigned OPCON to the FC: a. the TFC exercises OPCOM of the TF and conduct missions as assigned by the FC; and b. all elements of JOG Kingston that are necessary to provide a full C2 capability will deploy. The HQ must have the capability to plan, organize and conduct major operations including re-deployment planning and emergency withdrawal operations. This scenario may require that the TFHQ be augmented. 6. When the TFC is not functioning as an operational level commander, the TF elements are normally assigned OPCON to the FC: a. the TFC becomes the Canadian national commander (CNC). The CNC's roles will be to provide administrative support to the CF elements and to co-ordinate the employment of the CF elements with the combined force headquarters. Other duties and responsibilities will include liaison with other Canadian government agencies in-theatre that may include Canadian consuls, ambassadors, Charg daffaires, Canadian Forces Attachs (CFA), CF staff in NATO posts and Canadian NGOs. On occasion the TFC may be further tasked with an allied or UN command role; and b. only those JOG elements that are necessary to this limited role will deploy. As such, they will not have the capability to plan, organize and conduct major operations with the exception of redeployment planning and emergency withdrawal operations that shall be commenced immediately on arrival in theatre. It will be designed to expand its capabilities, if required. 804. ROE FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

1. ROE for combined operations will be as agreed by TCNs, reviewed and approved for use by Canadian forces in accordance with CF doctrine. For more detail see Chapter 5 of this manual and Chapter 2 of B-GJ-005-501/AF-010, The Use of Force in CF Operations.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

8-2

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 9 NATO OPERATIONS 901. INTRODUCTION

1. Canada is committed to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area and provides forces to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) consistent with current needs. Canada contributes to NATO Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5 CRO) on a case-by-case basis. In the event of an attack on one of the NATO members (Article 5), Canada will make forces available to NATO, as determined by the current DPQ response. Every year, Canada responds to the NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). In the DPQ, Canada states its five-year commitment to the Alliance in terms of forces and financing. Plans for the first year (i.e. the commitment year) are regarded as firm commitments, while plans for the next four years are viewed as statements of national intentions. 2. This chapter summarises the NATO operations and command structure and Canadas participation therein. Greater detail is available in the current edition of the NATO Handbook, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm. 902. STRUCTURE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE

1. The member governments of NATO consult and co-ordinate their policies through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC is the highest authority in NATO. It is in permanent session and meets at least once a week, with full-time representatives of ambassadorial rank. The Council also meets at higher levels, involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government. Regardless of the level at which it meets, the NAC retains its authority, and its decisions have the same status and validity. When integrated defence matters are discussed, 18 permanent representatives meet as the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) (Note: France is not a member of the DPC). 2. To assist in carrying out their roles, the NAC and DPC have established a number of committees. These committees, which cover the whole range of NATO activities, meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff. 3. The Secretary-General of NATO is nominated by member nations and chairs the NAC, the DPC, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). He also acts as the Joint Chairperson (together with the representative of Russia and the representative of the NATO country acting as Honorary President) of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the Joint Chairperson (together with the Ukrainian representative) of the NATOUkraine Commission (NUC). The Secretary-General also directs the International Staff, which is drawn from member nations and acts as the principal spokesperson for the Alliance. 4. The NAC and DPC receive military advice from the Military Committee (MC), which is the highest military authority in NATO. The MC consists of the Chief of Defence Staff or equivalent of the member countries. Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) participate in meetings of the MC in the Chiefs of Staff session (MC/CS) and have direct links to the MC in the Permanent Session (MC/PS). The Chiefs of Defence Staff are permanently represented at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. The MC meets at the military Permanent Representative level at least once a week and at the Chief of Defence Staff level tri-annually. 5. The Chairman of the MC is selected by the Chiefs of Defence Staff and appointed for a three-year term of office. The Chairman represents the MC at meetings of the NAC, DPC, and NPG, providing advice on military matters. 6. The MC is assisted by an integrated International Military Staff (IMS) headed by a General/Flag Officer, selected by the Military Committee, for the position of Director of the IMS (DIMS). The Director may be from any of the member nations other than that represented by the Chairman. 9-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

7. In addition to providing military advice to the NAC and DPC, the MC translates NATO political policy into military policy and provides strategic direction to the MNCs. Direction for all nuclear-related matters comes from the NPG, which is a political rather than a military body. In peace, the MC approves and coordinates war planning, studies the required force structure, and considers other matters such as nuclear arms control. The MC evaluates the needs of MNCs and reconciles them with overall requirements. 903. NATO MILITARY COMMANDS

1. The new security environment has allowed NATO to re-organize the command structure in the last few years. This is an ongoing process. See the NATO Handbook for the current organization. 2. A CJTF is a multinational (combined) and multi-service (joint) task force, task-organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance's military missions requiring multinational and multi-service command and control by a CJTF Headquarters. It may include elements from non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations. This concept was launched in late 1993.when the changing security situation in Europe and the emergence of smaller but diverse and unpredictable risks to peace and stability indicated the need for a new force element. The role of CJTF headquarters is therefore crucial. A CJTF headquarters will be formed around core elements (the "nuclei") from selected "parent" headquarters of the command structure. It will be augmented from other NATO headquarters and by nations and contributing Partner countries as necessary, using a modular approach, in order to meet the requirements of the specific mission. 904. NATO PRECAUTIONARY SYSTEM

1. The NPS is a military and civil arrangement which provides for Alliance political and military preparedness and crisis management. Policy and principles of the NPS are contained in MC 67/4, NATO Precautionary System. The NPS manual lists the precautionary measures and describes the procedures related to the NPS. 905. NATO SECURITY AND DEFENCE STRATEGY

1. New Strategic Concept. NATO approved a revised strategic concept at the 1999 Washington Summit. While recognizing that the Euro-Atlantic security climate has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, the strategic concept also acknowledges new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. This new Strategic Concept: a. Re-affirms: (1) NATOs commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link; (2) NATOs commitment to building the European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance; (3) the importance that the Alliance gives to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; (4) the essential role of NATO nuclear forces. b. It includes the following additions: (1) affirms that the Alliance will contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, including crisis response operations (Non-Article 5); (2) highlights the enhanced role of partnership and dialogue including our relationship with Russia and Ukraine; (3) underlines the need to develop defence capabilities (DCI); 9-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

(4) maintains an open door policy for further Enlargement of the Alliance; (5) seeks co-operation with other organizations to prevent conflict (UN, OSCE, WEU); and (6) provides the guidelines for the Alliances forces. 2. The Alliances strategic concept outlines a broad approach to security based on dialogue, co-operation and the maintenance of a collective-defence capability. It integrates political and military elements of NATOs security policy into a coherent whole, establishing co-operation with new partners in central and eastern Europe as an integral part of the Alliances strategy. It also provides for the major changes in NATOs integrated military forces in order to take account of the changed strategic environment, including substantial reductions in their size and readiness, improvements in their mobility and adaptability to different contingencies, greater use of multinational formations and much-reduced dependence on nuclear forces. 3. NATOs essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom, vital interests and security of all its members through political and military means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. 4. Enforcing security and stability has political, economic, social and environmental implications, as well as the indispensable defence dimension. In order to meet the diversity of its challenges, the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing components of Allied security policy: peacetime activities, crisis management, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. 5. Peacetime activities: a. Partnership and Dialogue. The Allies promote wide-ranging partnership, co-operation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance; thereby reinforcing stability and providing a foundation for the ability to resolve problems and conflicts by peaceful means. b. Consultation. The Alliance serves as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultation on any issues that affect their vital interest, including possible developments posing risks for members security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. c. Operational Planning. Operational planning undertaken in peacetime by NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) and individual members of the Alliance contributes to the overall operational readiness of Allied Forces necessary to achieve Alliance security objectives.

d. Presence. Alliance presence in a specific area can contribute to regional stability. Routine presence is achieved by means of regular operations of Alliance forces throughout the NATO area. e. Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering. Peacetime surveillance in areas of geo-strategic importance is essential and is achieved through the routine presence of Alliance forces in those areas. In peacetime, NATO relies primarily on the intelligence provided by member nations. f. Maintenance of a Nuclear Deterrence. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political (i.e. to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war).

g. Exercises and Training. Exercises and training of NATOs forces, including headquarters and their C2 arrangements, are an important means to enhance readiness, to display Alliance solidarity, and to demonstrate NATOs military capabilities. 5. NATO supports on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping activities of the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and of the UN. NATO support 9-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 may be indirect or direct. Indirect support consists of support along the low end of the contribution spectrum and requires no NATO presence in or immediately around the crisis area. Direct support is more visible and more costly, and includes NATO presence in or immediately around the crisis area. 6. There are five levels of possible NATO support to OSCE or UN peacekeeping activities: a. to advise; b. to co-ordinate; c. to provide service support;

d. to provide observers; and e. to provide forces. 7. Crisis Management. Crisis management through arbitration to resolve conflict between other parties is an important area of Alliance policy for the maintenance of stability and peace in Europe, as well as for global peace and stability. 8. Collective Defence Capability. NATO collective-defence arrangements rely on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces and, in particular, NATOs immediate and rapid-reaction forces demonstrate the Alliances resolve to maintain a credible collective defence and to enhance Alliance cohesion. 906. NATO FORCE STRUCTURE

1. The integrated military structure includes forces made available to NATO by member nations participating in the structure, in accordance with prescribed conditions. These were formerly divided into Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defence Forces and Augmentation Forces. Changes are being introduced to bring the structure into line with NATO's current needs. Subject to political approval, these changes are likely to result in two main types of forces: Deployable Forces (DF) and In-Place Forces (IPF). In order to provide flexibility for conducting the full range of NATO missions, both of these can be sub-divided into three types of forces reflecting their readiness levels: High Readiness Forces (HRF), Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR) and Long Term Build-up Forces (LTBF). 2. Deployable Forces are those forces available for the full range of NATO missions. They can be fully deployed throughout Alliance territory and beyond. They will provide the capability for rapid reaction and reinforcement of In-Place Forces in the case of any Article 5 operation, as well as rapid reaction and rotation of such forces in the case of non-Article 5 crisis response operations. 3. In-Place Forces are predominantly those required for collective defence within or near the territory of the nation providing them. Such forces need not be fully deployable but will be held at appropriate readiness levels. The majority of such forces are provided by individual nations. 4. The readiness levels affecting both types of forces, to which reference is made above, are as follows; a. High Readiness Forces (HRF) consist of a limited but military significant proportion of land, air and maritime forces, capable of deploying rapidly or immediately, either for Article 5 collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations. b. Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR) are forces that would provide the bulk of the forces required for collective defence, for further reinforcement of a particular region and for the rotation of forces needed to sustain non-Article 5 operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory.

9-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 c. Long Term Build-up Forces (LTBF) are those that would provide a long-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case scenario of large-scale Article 5 operations. They would enable the Alliance to build up larger forces needed to undertake specific tasks and to respond to any fundamental changes in the international security environment. Individual nations are responsible for establishing the reinforcement plans needed to provide this long-term capability in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

5. The forces available to NATO are further delineated between those which come under the operational command or operational control of a NATO Strategic Commander when required, in accordance with specified procedures or at prescribed times; and those which member states have agreed to assign to the operational command of a Strategic Commander at a future date, if required. In general, most NATO forces remain under full national command until they are assigned to the Alliance for a specific operation decided upon at the political level. 907. NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Effective implementation of Alliance military strategy depends on the delegation of an appropriate level of command authority to NATO commanders and on an effective deployable command structure supported by fast, secure and reliable communications and information systems. 2. A NATO Combined Force Commander (FC) is generally delegated OPCON over Canadian forces assigned to the operation. The degree of administrative control delegated to a NATO FC and the FCs authority over logistics resources is agreed to by nations and NATO and is detailed in applicable documents. 3. Authority for establishing a NATO combined force is vested in the NATO DPC in conjunction with the MC and the MNCs. The relevant MNC would appoint the FC, assign the mission, define the geographic area of responsibility, assign the operational and support forces provided by the participating nations, and specify the commanders level of authority over assigned forces. The FC would be responsible to the appropriate MNC. Authority for establishing a NATO force for peacekeeping operations rest with the NAC (19-nation membership) rather than the DPC (18-nation membership). 4. Whenever practicable, establishment of a NATO combined force is based on an existing NATO headquarters. The combined force employs established, manned, equipped and trained formations and units appropriate to the mission, which eases the burden of supporting commands with respect to C2, operational procedures, force preparation and sustainment planning. These formations and units may be augmented as required. If there is an operational requirement to form a new unit, it should be created as early as possible. 5. Under most circumstances, NATO combined force would be under the command or control of a MNC, RC or JSRC, in whose area the operation is to be conducted. In this event, the relevant headquarters, augmented as required, would assume responsibility for C2 and support of the operation. It may, however, be necessary to establish a separate headquarters for a combined force. 6. NATO military forces may be required to conduct operations in coalition with forces of other organizations or nations. In this case, C2 would be co-ordinated through a co-ordination, control, communications and integration centre which would link the NATO combined force headquarters with other headquarters. 7. Political control and guidance of a peacekeeping operation is exercised by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) for a OSCE-sponsored operation, and by the UN Security Council for a UN-sponsored activity. OPCON of forces, including NATO forces, involved in a peacekeeping operation will be exercise by the CFC, who may or may not be a serving NATO officer. The CFC is appointed by the CSO for an OSCE operation, and by the secretary-general for a UN operation.

9-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 908. CANADIAN CONSIDERATIONS

1. When the CF is committed to a NATO combined operation, the C2 relationships will normally be as described in Chapters 7 and 8. 2. NATO joint doctrine is described in the Allied Joint Publication series. Other NATO doctrine is established at the Bi-SC level, at various commands and within CJTFs. When participating as a member of a NATO operation, NATO doctrine normally will take precedence over Canadian doctrine.

9-6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 10 PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 1001. GENERAL

1. The complex security problems confronted today defy easy solutions. Often the international community is required to respond to humanitarian emergencies in fragile or failed states where governance and the rule of law are weak or non-existent. Resolving these emergencies and the often accompanying conflict requires a broad range of nation building activities and long-term commitment. 2. The United Nations (UN) is the primary organization through which Canada seeks to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. A broad range of mechanisms is employed by the UN to achieve these ends, including enforcement and peace support operations. Peace support operations (PSOs) include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. A variety of military responses options support these mechanisms. This chapter provides an overview of key issues; greater detail is available in B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, Peace Support Operations. 1002. CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. Canada is well known for its desire to promote international peace and security as the stability of the world directly affects the economy and the quality of life of Canadian citizens. The Canadian government strongly supports the Human Security Agenda: the right for all people in the world to live in peace, harmony and justice. Canada has promoted the development of institutions, particularly multi-lateral ones, that prevent violations of human rights, conduct conflict prevention, support international peace and security and a limited number that possess a capability to respond to aggression. As described in the 1994 Defence White Paper, Canada willingly works with other countries to improve the lot of the worlds population regardless of where they live. 2. Military force is one means Canada can use to promote its national aims. Canada regularly contributes forces to alliances and coalitions, both within Europe and in other regions. The UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are the two most important organizations under which Canada participates in multilateral interventions. It serves Canadian national interests to remain engaged with these organizations. 3. Both these organizations are revising their crisis management procedures to improve their capabilities to respond to complex emergencies. The UN is promoting a broader application of conflict prevention combined with adopting many of the detailed recommendations to improve peacekeeping contained in the Brahimi Report. NATO has accepted obligations beyond the territorial defence focus of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Called Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5 CRO), NATO conducted peace support operations are included in this grouping. 1003. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. Canada participates in a wide variety of peace support operations. These operations are described below. a. Conflict Prevention. Conducted in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, conflict prevention is a range of preventive actions used to monitor and identify causes of conflict and timely action taken to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of hostilities. These actions encompass preventive diplomacy, preventive disarmament, preventive peace building and preventive deployment. Some military activities contribute to conflict prevention: early warning, surveillance, training and security sector reform, and preventive deployment.

10-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 b. Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a peaceful settlement. They can include provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation, sanctions, partnership with funds and programmes, or other operations. Peacemaking is accomplished primarily by diplomatic means; however, indirect or direct military support may be required. c. Peace Building. Peace building is actions that support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political stability. It includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that promote peaceful conditions, reconciliation, a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic growth. Peace building occurs during conflict prevention, while a conflict progresses and is a key focus post-conflict. Peace building is mainly undertaken by civil agencies in the mission area but some military involvement may be necessary.

d. Traditional Peacekeeping Operations (TPKO). Traditional peacekeeping operations (TPKO) are characterized by their impartial conduct, the high level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the forces authorization to use force only in self-defence. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement so that diplomatic negotiations can seek a comprehensive political settlement. The high level of consent and compliance of the parties allows the PKF to be lightly armed and equipped.

PERMISSIVE (PRE-CONFLICT) FULL

CONFLICT PREVENTION

NON-PERMISSIVE (CONFLICT)

TRANSITION (POST-CONFLICT)
TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

C O N S E N T

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION

PEACE MAKING HUMANITARIAN OPERATION

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION

PEACE BUILDING

COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION EXTRACTION

NONE

SANCTIONS

Figure 10-1. Peace Support and Related Operations e. Complex Peacekeeping Operations (CPKO). Complex peacekeeping operations (CPKO) are characterized by their impartial conduct, the low or uncertain level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the PKFs broader authorization to use force. These operations are often initiated after a peace accord has been signed and the parties have consented to the operation. The consent and 10 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 compliance of the actors may be uneven and inconsistently observed throughout their chain of command. The PKF maintains its impartiality by applying the terms of the mandate equally to all parties. Commonly, these operations are launched in failed states or where intrastate conflict has weakened central authority and caused a humanitarian emergency. The military objective of a CPKO is to stabilize the security situation. Initial operations will focus on the delivery of emergency assistance. Follow on activities will provide the security shield behind which international agencies and NGOs attempt to construct a capable state. The aim of a CPK operation will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to encourage, coerce or compel the parties to the conflict to abide by a peace agreement or the mandate. Adequate military forces are required so that the mission has a credible and coercive combat capability. While the more robust use of force must be an option, the operation will still use the minimum force necessary to accomplish its objectives. The scope of these mission can range from simply guaranteeing humanitarian access to full state transitional authority. 1004. 1. RELATED OPERATIONS The following types of operations may take place in conjunction with PSO: a. Enforcement Actions. Enforcement actions are carried out under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are combat operations; all means necessary are used to achieve the political goals of the United Nations. They can precede a PSO, run concurrently or support the termination of one. An enforcement action may set the necessary conditions for the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. These operations are normally conducted by a coalition of willing states or a regional organization vice directly by the UN. (1) Sanctions and Embargoes. Sanctions and embargoes are implemented with varying degrees of military, economic and political actions. They are an attempt to pressure parties to reduce the level of hostilities in a conflict by imposing economic/trade restriction or other limitation. (2) Humanitarian Intervention. Humanitarian interventions are launched to gain humanitarian access to an at risk population when the responsible actors refuse to take action to alleviate human suffering or are incapable of doing so and where actors internal to a state are engaging in genocidal practices. Intervention is a combat operation intended to provide protection to the at risk population and aid workers by imposing stable security conditions that permit humanitarian access. These operations can be precursors to complex peacekeeping operations. b. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation. If the situation in a country or mission area has become unstable, military forces may be used to evacuate designated persons - Canadian or select other nationals in order to ensure their safety. c. Extraction Operation. If the situation in a mission area deteriorates beyond the point that a PSO can make a useful contribution, it may be withdrawn. Depending on its structure and deployment the PKF may require a combat capable force to assist in its withdrawal.

d. Humanitarian Operation. Humanitarian operations involve the use of military resources to assist in the alleviation of human suffering. They may be conducted independently or during a PSO. The prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with specialized civilian, national, international, government or non-government organizations and agencies. Military forces are often employed on humanitarian operations because of their rapid response capability, airlift assets, ability to co-ordinate and plan, unique skills and structure, and where entry/delivery points may be contested. In emergency relief, the military may participate in direct assistance, the face-to-face distribution of goods and services, and indirect assistance, one step removed from the population and involving such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel. Military forces can augment and complement the capabilities of humanitarian agencies.

10-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 1005. KEY PRINCIPLES

1. Impartiality, consent, and the minimum use of force are the fundamental principles that guide military activities in peace support operations. The application of these principles require the judgement of those responsible for the planning and execution of the PSO who will determine the weight and the importance of each principle in relation to the situation in the area of operation. 1006. PARTICIPATION GUIDELINES

1. Certain characteristics in the purpose, design and operational conduct of a mission enhance its prospects for success. First and foremost, these missions should address genuine threats to international peace and security or emerging humanitarian tragedies. Durable, comprehensive multi-disciplinary campaign plans must be developed to secure realistic and achievable solutions. 2. As a starting point for evaluation Canada uses the participation guidelines first outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper. The importance of each specific guideline varies with the nature of the proposed mission. Political and military decision-makers responding to requests for Canadian peacekeepers apply these guidelines flexibly and considered many other factors. The key guidelines are described below: a. Threat to International Security. Before accepting a peace support mission, Canada must determine the existence of a threat to international security. Whereas the threat from a conflict involving two or more sovereign states is clear the destabilizing effect of an intrastate conflict is more difficult to evaluate. Intervention may be considered if a humanitarian emergency exists: genocide, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of human rights. Resource limitations, both for the UN and Canada, dictate that operations should be undertaken only after determining that a crisis poses a serious threat. b. Clear and Enforceable Mandate. Mandates are prepared by the Secretary General and approved by the Security Council through a UN SC resolution. The resolution provides the legal authority for the PSO. It establishes the scope and purpose of the operation, which should be clearly worded, defined, understood and agreed. A mandate must be appropriate to the situation and be based on the worst-case prospects. The force must have the means, both in terms of resources and political will, to secure compliance with the mandate particularly if the consent of the parties could deteriorate rapidly. Agreement to Canadian Participation. With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation has to be accepted by all parties to the conflict.

c.

d. Command and Control and Concept of Operations. Large and diverse military forces, civilian police forces and various humanitarian and non-governmental agencies are all involved in modern day PSO. The mission must therefore have an appropriate command, control and co-ordination structure and a clearly defined concept of operations to ensure all elements are synchronized in the mission area. e. Force Composition, Size and Equipment. Canada prefers to participate in UN-sponsored operations, although it has participated in non-UN operations. The structure of the peacekeeping force must enable it to realistically implement the mission's mandate. The size, composition and equipment must be appropriate to the CONOPs and mission objectives and as a minimum permit credible responses to potential spoilers in the mission area. Forces should not be structured and committed in a traditional peacekeeping stance if coercive measures may be required that would place the force at risk. f. Funding Arrangement and Logistics Concept. If a peace support operation is to be conducted effectively and successfully, it must have an appropriate funding arrangement and logistics support.

10 - 4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 g. Single Identifiable Authority. Before agreeing to participate in a peace support operation, the Canadian government insists on the existence of a single and identifiable authority able to sustain it, both politically and materially. This authority has usually been the UN. During non-UN PSO, one or several states may act as the guarantor. h. Clear ROE. ROE are essential for guiding a commander's actions and delineating the options for the use of force. The ROE must be clear, appropriate to the mission, and designed to remove any legal or semantic ambiguity that could lead a commander to inadvertently violate the mission's mandate or objectives. i. Interference with Other Missions. The Canadian government will examine whether or not it can or will participate in a peace support operation by determining if other missions will be jeopardised. Based on the advice of DFA and DND, the government will determine whether or not to commit Canadian resources and where these resources will be deployed. The lead department is DFA. Acceptable Level of Risk to CF Personnel. Peace support operations present a level of risk to participating personnel. The risks to CF personnel are weighed against the objectives and benefits of a particular mission. In some instances the risk may become so high that Canada will reconsider its support of or participation in a particular mission especially where a mission has been underresourced or the concept of operations has proven inappropriate. For some operations to be credible there may be a requirement to accept casualties on behalf of the mission. CANADIAN RESPONSE OPTIONS

j.

1007.

1. Military Response Options. The military response option selected will be based on the scenario and the best COA selected from the operational planning process. A preliminary range of responses may be activated early in the planning process: increased intelligence collection, pre-staging of assets, and predeployment training. The military contribution must be tactically self-sufficient, sustainable at the operational and strategic level and compatible with the force projection capabilities of the Alliance or coalition. 2. Tactical Self-Sufficient Units. The CF lacks the capability to achieve operational goals by itself in international situations. This is unlikely to change. The capability to conduct operations requires more than just combat capabilities. Enabling capabilities, such as effective command & control, as well as responsive logistics, are central to an effective overall military capability. Therefore, the fundamental asset that the CF contributes to international operations is tactically self-sufficient units (TSSU). They must be capable of being integrated into combined or joint task forces. a. TSSUs embody a collection of tactical capabilities and must be supported by - and have the ability to be supported by - a wide range of tactical, operational and strategic enabling capabilities. They vary in size, dependant on the operation, but must be capable of participating in medium intensity operations. TSSUs must have an adequate combat capability including suitable self-defence and reasonable offensive capability. Examples of TSSUs include a naval task group (TG), a composite battle group or a wing of aircraft. b. CF TSSUs must have the capability to provide the deployed logistic and other support required in the conduct of operations. The overall force design must ensure that these TSSUs are linked to those nationally based support structures that sustain them. This harmonization is essential to ensure that operational support requirements are developed as part of the overall Canadian Forces support concept. A key competency within this capability is that of timely mission planning and theatre reconnaissance and activation. TSSUs are flexible in their organization and structure - this is particularly true in the case of support structures, which are shaped by a range of inter-related planning factors. The TSSUs operate within the framework of a Canadian Task Force organization. 3. Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). In the mid1990s many nations undertook initiatives to establish a rapid-reaction capability for the UN. The SecretaryGeneral officially opened the Planning Element of SHIRBRIG on 2 September 1997. The objective of this 10-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 organization is to provide the UN with a quickly deployable force at the outset of a mission requiring immediate UN presence. The parameters for using this force include two critical prerequisites; first deployment is normally limited to the initial six month rotation; and second, the formation would be used only for operations authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, including Humanitarian Operations. Establishment of the brigade is overseen by a steering committee that consists of military, policy and foreign affairs representatives from participating nations. This committee is responsible for the operation of the Planning Element (PLANELM) which is established in Copenhagen, Denmark. Besides the current contributing nations, any other UN member can offer support when SHIRBRIG is deployed. As a generic model, SHIRBRIG, when deployed, contains mobile headquarters and communication facilities with three or more infantry battalions, and one or more reconnaissance units.

UN NY SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY GENERAL SECRETARIAT

P R M N Y

DFAIT

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

DND CDS

UN FORCE COMMANDER

TFHQ (NCE) TFC (CNC)

COMPOSITE UNITS

MILITARY OBSERVERS

CIVILIAN COMPONENTS TFSE (NSE)

NATIONAL CONTINGENT

NATIONAL CONTINGENT

CANADIAN CONTINGENT

Full Command OPCOM and Adm Control Liaison and Coord Operational Authority

Figure 10-2. Typical UN Force Structure

10 - 6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 11 NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS 1101. GENERAL

1. The Government of Canada has a fundamental obligation to ensure the safety and well being of Canadian citizens. For those citizens abroad, this responsibility is assumed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). 2. Life threatening circumstances can arise for a variety of reason. They may be caused by natural disasters in particular, rapid onset disasters like volcanic eruptions - or they may erupt during civil strife. In whatever instance, the Canadian Mission accredited to an area where risks are developing is responsible to monitor conditions, advise in-country Canadian and plan the safe evacuation of Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEP). 3. Threats may develop so rapidly or be of such a violent nature that it becomes beyond the capabilities of the Canadian Mission staff to ensure the safe evacuation of Canadians. In such situations DFA may request the assistance of the Canadian Forces (CF) to conduct the evacuation. The CF has select assets and resources that can both assist in the overall evacuation and provide it appropriate security. The CF military operation conducted in support of the Canadian Missions evacuation is called a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). 4. A NEO is fundamentally defensive in nature. They are conducted to reduce to a minimum the number of Canadian citizens at risk and to protect them during the evacuation process. They are not an intervention in the issues in the host nation. The end-state for a NEO is when all CEP who wish to be evacuated arrive at the safe haven and the CF task force (TF) has withdrawn from the host nation. Details on the conduct of a NEO are contained in B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations. 1102. THREAT ENVIRONMENT

1. A NEO is only launched when there is a threat posed to the safety of Canadians in the host nation. This threat is a function of the hazard, or the dangers directly posed to the personal safety of Canadians, and the ability of the host nation government to contain that hazard and thereby safeguard Canadians. The NEO environment is characterized as being permissive, uncertain, or hostile: a. Permissive. The host nation government has control such that law and order are upheld in the intended area of operations, and the government has both the intent and capability to assist the NEO. Therefore, no obstruction of or interference with evacuation operations is expected. Host nation support in administrative terms will be made available; b. Uncertain. The host nation government, whether opposed to or supportive of the NEO, does not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. Host nation governmental co-operation and host nation support may be limited or non-existent. There is a possibility of obstruction and interference on the part of individuals, crowds or mobs, or organized factions. The possibility of escalation leading to a hostile environment must be considered in planning; and c. Hostile. Hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively obstruct and interfere with a NEO for the purpose of embarrassing Canada or the host nation government, or to prevent a successful evacuation. Evacuees will be removed under conditions ranging from civil disorder or terrorist action to full-scale combat. 3. The importance of the NEO environment in planning is critical, particularly with respect to force structure, force capabilities, rules-of-engagement (ROE), and logistics: in a permissive environment - a TF can focus mainly on the evacuation with fewer security and logistics concerns; in an uncertain environment 11-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 there is an increased need for security and logistics elements, and a properly structured reaction/reserve force maybe required and more contingency planning will be required; in a hostile environment force structures, ROE and reaction forces will have to be more robust and other tasks, such as crowd confrontation, may be required to be executed. In a hostile environment when opposing forces are well organized a NEO may not be feasible and a rescue operation may be required.

P E R M IS S IV E
FULL
H O S T N A T I O N C O O P E R A T I O N

U N C E R T A IN

H O S T IL E

H U M A N IT A R IA N O P E R A T IO N

NEO NEO F O R C E R E Q U I R E M E N T S

C O M P L E X P E A C E K E E P IN G

E X T R A C T IO N H U M A N IT A R IA N IN T E R V E N T IO N NEO RESCUE O P E R A T IO N

NONE

Figure 11-1. The NEO Environments and Related Operation 1103. RELATED OPERATIONS 1. Complex Peacekeeping Operations (CPKO). These operations are characterized by their impartial conduct, the low or uncertain level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the implementation forces broader authorization to use force. These operations are often initiated after a peace accord has been signed and the parties have consented to the operation. The consent and compliance of the actors may be uneven and inconsistently observed throughout their chain of command. The implementation force maintains its impartiality by applying the terms of the mandate equally to all parties. Commonly, these operations are launched in failed states or where intra-state conflict has weakened central authority and caused a humanitarian emergency. NEOs may be conducted within CPKO when a region of the host nation becomes overtly hostile or as part of a contingency plan when conducting potentially contentious election. 2. Extraction Operation. If the situation in a mission area deteriorates beyond the point that a peace support operation can make a useful contribution, it may be withdrawn. Depending on its structure and deployment the mission may require a combat capable force to assist in its withdrawal. The military assisted withdrawal of a military force is called an extraction. 3. Humanitarian Intervention. Humanitarian interventions are launched to gain humanitarian access to an at risk population when the responsible actors refuse to take action to alleviate human suffering or are incapable of doing so and where actors internal to a state are engaging in gross abuses of human rights. Intervention is a combat operation intended to provide protection to the at risk population and aid workers by 11-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 imposing stable security conditions that permit humanitarian access. These operations can be precursors to complex peacekeeping operations. A NEO may be conducted prior to a humanitarian intervention in order to remove Canadians from a potential combat zone. 4. Humanitarian Operation. Humanitarian operations involve the use of military resources to assist in the alleviation of human suffering. They may be conducted independently or during a PSO. The prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with specialized civilian, national, international, government or non-government organizations and agencies. Military forces are often employed on humanitarian operations because of their rapid response capability, airlift assets, ability to coordinate and plan, unique skills and structure, and where entry/delivery points may be contested. In many host nations where risks are high a large intergovernmental organization (IGO) and non-governmental organization (NGO) population will likely be involved in delivering humanitarian aid, relief and development. Their operations are typically widely dispersed complicating the ability to provide them an easy opportunity for evacuation. 5. Rescue Operations. In some parts of the area of operations well-organized hostile forces may be completely occupying and controlling a region and this could include holding Canadians hostage. In these cases, a NEO proper is inappropriate and a rescue operation will have to be conducted to save the hostages. Rescue operations may form part of a broader NEO campaign plan where select areas of a host nation are dominated by hostile forces and Canadians are hostage to these forces. 1104. 1. PHYSICAL COMPONENTS OF THE EVACUATION CHAIN The components of an evacuation chain are the following: a. Forward Mounting Base. A Forward Mounting Base (FMB) is a secure base, port, airfield or HMC Ship, from which an operation can be launched and supported. It is normally, but not necessarily, external to the host nation and may be an essential staging area depending on available strategic mobility assets and the distances from Canada to theatre. A FMB should have the capacity for the TF to complete its final preparations prior to insertion, serve as a holding area for reinforcements or reserves and be able to receive evacuees if necessary. Depending on the scale of an operation, the FMB may also be required to provide third line support; b. Forward Operating Base. A Forward Operating Base (FOB) is a base or HMC Ship established within the operational area, to support tactical operations; c. Warden System. This system is a network of volunteers, usually selected from among well-known members of the Canadian community. Each Warden, responsible for no more than 20 families, acts as a point of contact between the Head of Mission and the wider Canadian Community passing on information and instructions by a fan-out system;

d. Point of Entry (POE). The place at which the TF enters a host nation before its sub-elements move to their position in the evacuation chain; e. Assembly Points (AP). The location to which the wardens bring their evacuees. Evacuees are received into the custody of the Canadian evacuation organization; f. Evacuation Centre (EC). The main facility for assembling, processing and organizing evacuees for onward movement;

g. Embarkation Site (ES). Location, usually a transportation terminal, where evacuees are embarked on transport for transfer to the safe haven; h. Disembarkation Site (DS). Location in the safe haven, usually a transportation terminal, where evacuees are disembarked and turned over to the local DFA authorities; and

11-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 i. Safe Haven. An area beyond the effects of the disturbance to which evacuees are removed and in which they are administered pending final disposition. It may be elsewhere in the host nation, in another country, in one of Her Majestys Canadian Ships, or in Canada itself. Movement to the safe haven may have to be staged through intermediate facilities.

SAFE HAVEN Port or Beachhead

DS

Port or Beachhead

AP

ES EC AP

DS

Airfield

AP ES EC
Coastline Coastline

AP AP
Assembly Point Evacuation Centre

DS

Disembarkation Site

ES

Embarkation Site

EC

Figure 11-2. 1105.

The Evacuation Chain

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1. On the government's approval of the CF's commitment to an evacuation operation, the CDS establishes the evacuation force, designates the TFC, and develops the strategic-level CONPLAN for endorsement by the government. The CONPLAN is developed in consultation with DFA. 2. The ambassador of the country concerned, under the direction of DFA, is generally responsible for the overall conduct of the evacuation operation, but the government may assign this responsibility to DND for certain operations. In either case, the conduct of military operations and responsibility for military support rests with the TFC. The TFC reports to the CDS, but must remain responsive to the ambassador, with whom military actions are co-ordinated. Liaison between the TFC and the ambassador facilitates C2. A diplomatic liaison officer should be attached to the TFHQ, and the ambassador's staff should include a military attach. 3. The TFC would deploy with a task force headquarters (TFHQ) to the country or to an adjacent friendly country. The TFHQ may also be established on board a Canadian warship participating in the evacuation operation.

11-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

DFAIT

MND

CDS

Ambassador

TFC

Chain of Command
Full Command OPCOM Liaison Reporting

Maritime Component

Land Component

Air Component

SOF* Component

* If Assigned

Figure 11-3. Command Structure for an Evacuation Operation 1106. COMBINED EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1. The CF may be required to assist in the evacuation of citizens of another country, or may be assisted in evacuating Canadian citizens by forces from other countries. Such evacuations will be conducted as combined operations. For a combined evacuation operation, guidelines and principles will be provided by combined doctrine, if available, or by the doctrine of the lead country in the operation. 2. The lead country concept provides for a single-command structure and for unity of command, which is essential for all military operations. The lead country designates a combined force commander (CFC), who controls the planning and execution of the operation; supporting countries provide forces and materiel as required. The CFC's headquarters staff should be augmented with military representatives from all supporting countries. The lead country must be sensitive to the political, cultural and military needs of partner countries. Diplomatic as well as military planning groups should be established to co-ordinate the operation at the highest levels. Figure 11-4 illustrates a lead-country command structure for a combined evacuation operation. Generally, a Canadian national commander (CNC) is given OPCOM over Canadian forces participating in a combined operation. The CNC then transfers OPCON of these forces to the CFC. 3. Countries may elect to retain control of their military forces for an evacuation operation, in which case a parallel command structure is established. Co-ordination cells are formed to provide interface among the participating countries, their joint commanders and their Environmental components. Co-ordination cells should also have host-country representation. Because of the continuous need to co-ordinate such aspects as C2, support, and engagements with opposing forces, the execution of an operation under the parallel command structure may prove to be more difficult than under the lead-country arrangement.

11-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 4. Combined Action with Other Nations. A crisis sufficiently severe to prompt a Canadian evacuation operation will almost certainly prompt other states to do the same for their entitled persons. In planning for a NEO, the ambassador or high commissioner and the JTFC may consider the possibility of combined action with other nations evacuation forces. A unified, multi-national operation works best when the participating forces have worked together in the past, enjoy a degree of standardization in doctrine and operating procedures, and have confidence in each other. The success of such a multi-national force will also be dependent upon the co-ordination and co-operation of the various diplomatic missions involved. Approval for Canadian Forces participation in an integrated, multi-national evacuation operation must come from national-level authorities. Regardless of whether this occurs, there are obvious benefits to be gained from liaison and co-ordination of activities with other national forces. It should be noted that divergent national agenda may make co-ordination difficult regardless of whether a multi-national force is created.

S U P P O R T IN G N A T IO N (C A N A D A )

L E A D N A T IO N

MND CDS

DEFENCE M IN IS T R Y

T F C (C N C ) T F H Q (N C E )

FC FHQ C O A L IT IO N F O R C E C O M P O N EN T S

M AR IT IM E C O M P O N EN T

L AN D C O M P O N EN T

A IR C O M P O N EN T

SOF C O M P O N EN T

CF M AR IT IM E FO RC ES

CF L AN D FORCES

CF A IR F O R C E S

CF SOF FO RC ES

O p e ra tio n a l C ha in o f C o m m a n d F u ll C o m m a n d O PC O M O PC O N Ad m in is tra tive C o ntro l C o o rd / L n

Figure 11-4. Combined Evacuation Operation - Lead-National Command Structure

11-6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 12 DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 1201. INTRODUCTION

1. Domestic contingency operations are conducted to provide assistance during civil emergencies, support national development goals or support and/or restore the maintenance of public order and security. With the exception of aid of the civil power (ACP) provided under Part VI of the NDA, JTFs established for domestic contingency operations will be in a supporting role. In the particular case of ACP the CF takes control of dealing with an extraordinary situation beyond the ability of the civil powers to manage, although only until such time that the civil authorities are able to effectively resume control. 2. It must be emphasised that while operational chains-of-command exist in the CF for force generation, only the CDS will direct the CF in any domestic operation or crisis with a potential for use of armed force. CF resources will be employed under the control and direction of the CDS operating through a clear military chain of command. 3. CF resources employed in domestic operations shall be under military command and operate (if applicable) with guidelines on the use of force and rules of engagement (ROE) issued by the CDS. 4. The CF is organized, equipped and trained as a multi-purpose combat force. Provision of personnel, equipment or services for other purposes will be from within existing resources. Specialized equipment for police tasks (such as riot control) will not be procured. No specific training is to be conducted for non-defence roles, unless directed by the CDS. 5. Any decisions to employ defence resources for non-defence tasks must be consistent with the CF mandate, must not result in an unacceptable degradation of CF capability and must not compete with or duplicate similar services readily available within the private sector. Full cost is to be recovered when defence resources are expended executing tasks for which other agencies have both a mandate and resource allocation, unless other arrangements apply. 6. In most cases, authority to respond to requests for provision of services has been delegated to operational commanders, who may make further delegation commensurate with the responsibilities and resources of their subordinate commanders. The provision of routine, traditional and minor services within these delegations should be actioned at the lowest practical level. 1202. 1. TERMINOLOGY The following terminology is used in this chapter: a. Emergencies Act. For domestic operations, the act which authorizes a Governor-in-Council to declare a public welfare emergency or a public order emergency. Upon declaring one of these emergencies, the Governor-in-Council is empowered to pass regulations in specified areas so as to enable the taking of special temporary measures to deal with a national emergency. A public welfare emergency or a public order emergency must be declared by an Order-In-Council under the Emergencies Act. b. National Emergency. An urgent and critical situation that seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportion as to exceed or threaten the capacity of a province or the Government of Canada to deal with it. A national emergency may be one of the following: (1) Public Welfare Emergency. An emergency which results in danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources so serious as to be a national emergency. Public welfare emergency may include: fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake, disease, accidents or pollution.

12-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

(2) Public Order Emergency. An emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada. Threats to the security of Canada may include: espionage, sabotage, foreign influenced activities that are detrimental to the interests of Canada, acts of serious violence against persons or property, and activities directed toward undermining the Government in Canada. c. Aid of the Civil Power. ACP is specifically addressed and defined in Part VI of the NDA as assistance to provincial governments. Thus, ACP is assistance provided by the CF to provincial authorities following an appropriate requisition, where a riot or disturbance of the peace is beyond the powers of the provincial authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with, for the purpose of restoring order to the extent that the Civil Authority can again exercise its responsibilities.

d. Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directives (CFAAD). The CFAADs is an order-in-council that authorize CF assistance to the RCMP for the purpose of suppressing, preventing or otherwise dealing with the disturbance of the peace. e. Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Policing Directions (CFAPPD). The order-in-council covering CF assistance to Provincial, Territorial and Municipal Law enforcement Agencies. f. Law Enforcement Agency (LEA). Any police force at federal, provincial, territorial or municipal level, including other government department (OGDs) with law enforcement mandates such as Correctional Services Canada (CSC), Fisheries, Customs and Excises and Immigration.

g. Non-defence agencies. Agencies other than DND, including OGDs and the Canadian public in general. h. Requisition. A demand for CF assistance to which the CDS must, in law, respond. i. j. Request. An application for CF assistance for which the CF response is discretionary. In some cases approval authority may be delegated. Operational Commander. In the context of domestic operations the designated operational level commanders are: Commander MARLANT, Commander MARPAC, the LFA Commanders, Commander 1 CAD and Commander CFNA. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

1203.

1. The mandate of the CF is to train for and conduct military operations on behalf of the Government of Canada. Military operations conducted in the domestic environment will inevitably be subordinate to the mandate of some other government or agency. The CF will operate in a supporting role with limitations and restrictions on the extent of the support which can be provided. Notwithstanding that responsibility for a specific emergency or crisis is assigned to others, the CF will inevitably be regarded as a source of manpower, material and expertise. 2. The following list, while not comprehensive, serves to indicate the spectrum of activities in which the CF could become involved: a. nationally sponsored cultural or sporting events and conferences (G8); b. natural disasters (floods, forest fires, landslides, severe storms); c. accidents (aircraft crashes or train wrecks);

d. biological, nuclear or chemical accidents; e. serious disturbances in federal penitentiaries; f. pollution incidents;

12-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 g. counter-smuggling operations against such items as drugs, alcohol, or tobacco; h. infringement on Canadian sovereignty or commercial interests, such as unauthorized fishing in Canada's territorial seas; i. j. disputes among ethnic groups and communities; and/or terrorist activities against Canadian citizens or foreign consulates or embassies in Canada.

3. The CF will endeavour to tailor its response to any request for assistance to make best use of capabilities to support the lead department or agency dealing with a particular situation. In most cases, the CFs most useful and valuable contributions will be in areas such as strategic communication, transportation and logistics. In certain circumstances, unique CF capabilities such as EOD support or utility helicopter support may be requested or requisitioned. In extreme circumstances, first response deployments by units or bases closest to the scene of an incident or situation may be appropriate pending the arrival or reinforcement of the appropriate civil agency. 1204. MATRIX OF AUTHORITIES FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. Domestic operations have been classified over a broad continuum of assistance, often with little clear definition between one type of assistance and another. Figure 12-1 shows this continuum. The various types of domestic assistance operations are represented as being conducted under the reference document (x-axis) and the corresponding approval authorities (y- axis). Domestic operations seldom occur in discrete, well defined packages. They must be planned as operations which can move and mutate on the surface created by the axes.

Governor in Council MND

Class 1 sp to prov/terr law enforcem ent & sp to fed law enforcement not covered by OIC or MOU Class 2 & 3 sp to prov/terr law enforcem ent & sp to fed law enforcem ent covered by MOU Humanitarian assistance operations Class 4 sp to prov/terr law enforcement agencies Routine provision of services, locally and within delegated authority Class 2 & 3 sp to prov/terr law enforcem ent & sp to fed law enforcement covered by MOU, as auth by CDS

Public Order / Public W elfare Emergency

CDS Operational Level Commanders Fmn/ Base /Unit Commanding Officer Approval Authority

Aid of the Civil Power

Provision of Services Policy

OIC/MOUs and NDA 273.6 for assistance to law enforcement

NDA Part XI

Emergencies Act

Figure 12-1. Matrix of Authorities for Domestic Operations 12-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 2. The visibility of CF involvement, potential for the use of force, and ROE requirements for CF personnel increase proportionate to the distance from the origin of each type of domestic operation. 1205. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. C2 arrangements for domestic operations must be specified by the CDS and will depend on the location and nature of the operation. Either on receipt of a written requisition from a provincial attorney general, or when directed by the MND or Governor in Council to provide assistance to civil authority, or when a request for assistance for which authority has been delegated has been approved, the CDS will designate an appropriate commander, most probably one of the operational level commanders. While it is likely that the CDS will designate the applicable LFA Commander as his on-site commander, he may use another commander as the situation dictates. 2. The ECS retain, as a primary role, the responsibility for force generation, and operational commanders are doubled-hatted as subordinate commanders in this role. Operational commanders are responsible directly to the CDS for the conduct of domestic operations, and to their respective ECS for force generation. These two roles, while mutually supporting, are separate and distinct. 3. Commanders at every level (down to unit) have a responsibility to maintain contact and liaison with such authorities as the Federal, Provincial or Municipal Police as well as other civil authorities as necessary to maintain community relations and guard against local contingencies. There is one important exception. With respect to potential requisitions for ACP, it is the responsibility of LFA commanders to maintain liaison with the Provincial Government(s) in their areas. While all commanders have a responsibility to keep lines of communications open, it is the CDS who will designate the responsible commander. This will usually be one of the operational commanders. 4. The CDS is responsible to conduct the national assessment, assign forces and order the commencement and cessation of any domestic operation. The operational commander is responsible for the operational level plan, synchronization and the sustainment of assigned forces. Component commanders (if assigned) are responsible to execute and to provide advice to the operational commander. The operational level plan must be developed in co-operation or in partnership with the civil authorities who are being supported. 5. Success of domestic operations is assisted by effective liaison and co-ordination among all involved forces, agencies and organizations at the national and operational levels. Liaison links and joint planning and operations cells with provincial governments, OGDs and other civil authorities should be established and maintained as a matter of course. For a domestic operation, the operational commander uses existing liaison links and establishes additional links, if required. 1206. USE OF FORCE

1. The deployment of the CF in domestic operations is regulated in two ways: through the federal governments exercise of the Crown prerogative or by statute under the NDA in Part VI Aid of the Civil Power. Crown prerogative is the basis for orders-in-council such as CFAADs, the Penitentiary Assistance Order, and the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, which permits the appointment of CF personnel as fishery protection officers. 2. 1207. Chapter 5 and B-GJ-005-501/FP-010, The Use of Force in CF Operations provide further details. THE EMERGENCIES ACT

1. CF operations under the Emergencies Act will be directed by the federal government. The MND and the CDS will conduct the strategic assessment required to determine the CF response appropriate to the emergency situation, and direct the action to be taken. 1208. 1. AID OF THE CIVIL POWER ACP is assistance by the CF provided to provincial authorities following an appropriate request where 12-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 there is a riot or disturbance of the peace, which is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with. ACP is specifically addressed in Part VI of the National Defence Act. ACP operations will maintain or restore the rule of law and order. The CDS must respond to a requisition for assistance in ACP, however he has the authority to determine and adjust the level of the CF response. Response to disturbances of the peace outside provincial jurisdiction are the responsibility of the Federal Government and any request for CF assistance that might arise would be in the form of a request for assistance from an OGD, i.e., Solicitor General. 2. The CDS will designate an operational commander, in most cases the applicable LFA Commander, to act as his personal representative to the province concerned and to conduct operations in support of civil authorities to restore and maintain order until such time as the civil authorities can again effectively manage the situation. 3. The aim of ACP operations is to support and restore the capability of the appropriate civil authority to discharge its lawful mandate. CF activity will be directed towards freeing the resources of the civil authority to deal with the crisis, and will only become directly involved as a force of last resort 1209. ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 1. CF assistance to LEAs may be provided under legislation (e.g. National Defence Act), or under the authority of the Governor-in-council (e.g. CFAAD OICs). CF assistance can also be provided by virtue of an MOU approved by the MND. Examples of these Acts, OICs and MOUs include the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, Food and Drugs Act Narcotic Control Act, CF Armed Assistance to Provincial Policing Direction, Penitentiary Assistance Order, and CF assistance to RCMP for counter drug operations. 2. CF assistance to CSC, normally in a perimeter security role, will be provided in response to a written requisition made directly to the CDS by either the Solicitor General or the Commissioner of Corrections. Under the Penitentiary Assistance Order-in-Council, the CDS must respond and will determine the level of the CF response. 3. Requests for CF assistance from LEAs, with the exception of CF assistance to CSC, are discretionary, and the CDS will determine the level of response, if any. The CFAPPD makes it necessary to define the classes of support that may be requested. 4. The CFAPPD refers to operational equipment and CF personnel and to non-operational equipment. The critical consideration in determining whether equipment is operational or not is the potential public visibility of CF resources. Operational commanders have primary responsibility for making decisions on this criterion when advising provincial or territorial authorities and authorizing requests within their delegated authority. Operational commanders will also have the primary responsibility for determining any potential involvement in a disturbance of the peace. In practical terms, if there is any potential for confrontation or the direct interface of CF personnel with members of the Canadian public in the context of law enforcement operations, there is potential for a disturbance of the peace. 5. The operational status of equipment such as armoured vehicles, weapons and other war fighting equipment is self-evident. The operational status of other CF resources is more nebulous, and the potential for their employment in either an operational or non-operational role will require careful consideration, based on the specifics of situations that will arise. 6. CF support to Provincial, Territorial and Municipal policing is divided into four classes, in accordance with the Matrix of Authorities at figure 12-1: a. Class 1. CF assistance in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement operations where a disturbance of the peace is occurring or may occur, and where the support is in the form of CF personnel and/or operational equipment. Class 1 support must be approved by the MND. Whether the request for assistance is from a provincial or territorial LEA, a written requisition from the Solicitor General to the MND is required. This means that the provincial attorney general or the provincial or territorial minister responsible for public order and security will have first to seek assistance to the Solicitor General of Canada, who has the primary mandate for law enforcement responsibility in Canada. Any assistance 12-5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 requested by a Federal LEA not covered by a CFAAD or under an MOU will follow the same process as described in section 273.6 of the National Defence Act. b. Class 2. CF assistance, in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement operations, where a disturbance of the peace is occurring or may occur, and where the support is limited to non-operational equipment. c. Class 3. CF assistance, in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement operations, where there is no potential for a disturbance of the peace, where the support is in the form of CF personnel and/or operational or non-operational equipment. Responses to class 2 and 3 requests are discretionary and approved at the operational commander level. d. Class 4. CF assistance, in support of other than law enforcement operations, where the support is routine in nature such as the use of ranges, training areas, or infrastructure facilities. Responses to Class 4 requests are discretionary and approved at the lowest practical level consistent with the Provision of Services Policy. 1210. PROVISION OF SERVICES

1. Other requests for CF assistance will consist essentially of the provision of services to non-defence agencies such as OGD, Provincial and Territorial authorities, civilian agencies, defence industries, and the Canadian public. CF assistance provided could range from a CF mandate such as Search and Rescue operations to the requests for support from charitable organizations. The level of approval required varies depending on the nature of the request, its aptness to the pursuit of national development goals, its relation to a CF mandate, and the availability of CF resources or impact on ongoing CF activities. Approval authority for this type of assistance ranges from unit CO to the MND and are specified in B-GS-055-000/AG-001, Provision of Service Policy. 1211. TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

1. The CF is organized, equipped and trained for general purpose combat operations in accordance with its defence mandate. This general purpose combat capability gives the CF a wide range of both specific and general capabilities that can be employed in domestic operations. The CF will not develop a capability for operations for which it does not have a mandate, i.e.- police duties such as crowd and riot control. The CF will maintain a general purpose combat capability with a view to employment in domestic operations only as a force of last resort. The very prospect of CF deployment should be seen as a powerful deterrent, and any commitment of personnel or resources must be deliberate, decisive, and final. 2. Domestic operations will normally rely on the skills and equipment already possessed through general military training or trades training. Unique training will be conducted only on an exceptional basis, as directed and authorized by the CDS. 3. Training. a. Riot Control and Crowd Confrontation. In domestic operations unanticipated crowd confrontations can occur, and troops must have the threshold training necessary to react to provide security for themselves and their operation. However, this training must not be confused for or expanded into training for a pro-active role in suppressing riots or performing other police duties. Crowd confrontational duties remain a police responsibility. b. Equipment. (1) No special equipment or ammunition will be procured or trained with, for domestic operations. CF policy is to deploy military forces with military equipment. Troops, and in particular infantry units and armoured reconnaissance units, will deploy with their normal unit vehicles and equipment, i.e. light wheeled or tracked armoured fighting vehicles. 12-6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

(2) Normally, only single shot weapons will be used (i.e.-pistols and rifles on single shot semi-automatic). Heavy fire-power weapons and platforms will not be deployed on domestic operations without CDS approval. These include: machine guns, anti-tank weapons, mortars, crew served weapons, artillery, and tanks. 1212. INTELLIGENCE

1. Domestic operations are subject to the provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada; consequently not all approved military doctrine and procedures for the gathering of intelligence for joint and combined operations can be applied. 2. The gathering of intelligence in Canada is the responsibility of the law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Liaison with the LEAs for the sharing of intelligence and other information on Canadian citizens is the responsibility of DG Int/J2/NCIU detachments. Commanders must exercise caution to ensure that police intelligence reports are validated assessments provided through authorized liaison channels. See also chapters 15, 26 and 34. 1213. LOGISTICS

1. In domestic operations, logistics, movements and other service support functions are provided by CF Formations, units and bases augmented, as required by national capabilities and resources and civil services and infrastructure. Primary responsibility for sustainment of assigned forces rests with the designated operational commander. Refer to chapters 30, 31 and 32 for further detail. 2. During certain domestic operations, there is provision made by such means as MOU, letters of agreement or written agreement for DND to recover costs of providing goods and services to OGDs. Regardless, the operational commander must identify, record and report all resources expended in support of the operation. 1214. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. Domestic operations are characterized by intense political, public and media interest. In a particular domestic operation, an effective public-information programme, along with any other initiatives to establish an aware and sensitive public constituency, is essential to further national objectives and to assist military activities. The operation is unlikely to succeed without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the public, especially the local population. Pro-active and aggressive use of public affairs officers and video and still camera teams provide the operational commanders with the means to record and publicize significant events during the operations. 2. In most domestic operations, civil authorities are in control and responsible for establishing the appropriate public and community relations policy and for the directing the public information programme. The CF has a vital role to play in such a programme. Government and other public officials have insufficient knowledge of military capabilities, weapons effects, planning and deployment procedures, reactions times or methods of command and control. Therefore, any issues on such matters, or any other purely military matter, must be dealt with by the CDS at the national level and by the operational commander in the area of operations. 3. To achieve an effective civil-military division of responsibility for public relations, the public information programme should be an integrated effort with civil authorities responsible for overall policy and direction and civil and military authorities working together to implement the programme. 4. Public affairs (PA) in domestic operations will be an integral part of the operational plan and a prime concern of the operational commander. Public affairs officers working in the designated operational HQ will establish and maintain the contacts and conduits for public information dissemination during domestic operations occurring in their areas of responsibility. Augmentation of PA personnel must be anticipated and may be requested from other sources depending on availability and the scope of the operation. In general, public affairs officers engaged in this function during domestic operations are responsible for all aspects of public affairs including the development and execution of communications strategies and plans. They are also responsible to 12-7

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 provide advice and guidance to the operational commander and maintain liaison at the national level if appropriate. Refer also to chapter 25. 1215. CONCLUSION

1. Domestic operations and the associated Matrix of Authorities of assistance are only a sub-set of tasks undertaken by a general purpose combat force. While domestic operations can, by their nature and visibility, be nationally significant and put the CF in a prominent, seemingly liable light, the military force will always be responsible to and under the direction of the civil authority, which retains responsibility for the overall situation. The operational level HQs have a vital responsibility in preparation for potential domestic operations by establishing and maintaining liaison with civil agencies and authorities. An equally vital role is educating provinces, territories, law enforcement agencies and OGDs about CF capabilities and limitations in this important area, in advance of any crisis that may cause a request for CF assistance.

12-8 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 13 SEARCH AND RESCUE 1301. INTRODUCTION

1. Search and Rescue (SAR) is a both a peacetime and wartime task that has as its goal, the prevention of injury and loss of life through alerting, responding and aiding activities. This objective is met through both SAR response (detection, alerting, search and rescue operations) and SAR prevention (efforts to reduce incidents through education and regulation. 2. National SAR doctrine cannot be developed in isolation. It is highly desirable that Canadian SAR procedures be as similar as possible to those used by nations participating in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), NATO, Air Standardization Co-ordinating Committee (ASCC), Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and other Maritime SAR conventions, and following the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR). This requires a high degree of liaison and the acceptance of mutual agreements and standards. 1302. PRINCIPLES

1. Incidents which generate SAR activities may occur day or night and under any climatic or topographic conditions. SAR forces need the following characteristics if they are to respond effectively to such diverse incidents: a. mobility and flexibility; b. the ability to provide rapid response; c. the ability to conduct extended SAR operations;

d. the capability to render on-scene assistance; e. the capability to evacuate distressed personnel; and f. the ability to reach any incident in the area of responsibility.

2. Mobility and Flexibility. Primary SAR forces must be prepared for the rapid deployment of all SAR resources, or elements thereof, tailored as necessary to the scope of the operation. SAR units must, therefore, be organized and equipped to deploy rapidly and to operate wherever suitable minimal facilities exist. Minimal facilities include fuel, communications and accommodations. The urgency of SAR incidents may require the immediate dispatch of aircraft, aircrews, critical spares, and minimum support personnel. SAR forces must be prepared to respond to a variety of incidents and changing circumstances. They must be equipped to provide the flexibility to respond with minimum delay to different and changing scenarios. If the scope of the operation is such, the entire unit must be prepared to deploy using special airlift. Extended operations may require further special airlift support to replenish supplies and essential spares. 3. Rapid Response. Since the probability of survival of incident victims decreases rapidly with the passage of time, particularly if injuries or severe climatic conditions exist, the most essential characteristic of SAR forces is the ability to provide a rapid response. SAR forces must, therefore, be organized and equipped to locate distressed aircraft or ships in minimum time and to render immediate rescue service once the object of the search has been located. Should the initial search response be unsuccessful, primary SAR forces must be capable of mounting full-scale operations as soon as possible thereafter. To provide this rapid response, trained crews and aircraft equipped to perform essential SAR tasks must be maintained on alert status. The aircraft must also have sufficient endurance and suitable navigation systems to conduct an effective search to locate the search object.

13-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

4. Extended Operations. The second most essential characteristic, which is coupled with rapid response, is the ability of SAR forces to conduct extended operations and rapidly search large areas. This is important, particularly when the distress object is an aircraft as the search area may be vast. Ideally, primary SAR forces should be capable of extending the operation to provide complete and effective coverage of the search area in a minimum period of time without the use of secondary forces. 5. On-Scene Assistance. Having located the personnel in distress, SAR forces must be capable of providing immediate assistance when the situation so warrants. If the on-scene forces are rotary-wing equipped, this task is simplified in that the aircraft may alight or hover to permit crew members to assist survivors. With fixed-wing aircraft, survival gear may be dispatched or, if survivors are disabled, SAR Technicians may be parachuted to the scene to provide emergency medical care and survival assistance until evacuation can be achieved. 6. Evacuation. The capability to evacuate distressed personnel must exist. Rotary-wing aircraft are usually most suited for the retrieval of personnel; however, fixed-wing aircraft, surface craft, land vehicles or a combination of these resources may prove more effective in some situations. 7. Range. SAR forces must have the capability to reach any incident within their designated search and rescue region (SRR) boundaries. 1303. COMPOSITION OF SAR FORCES

1. The composition of SAR forces is normally based on a thorough analysis of the need for SAR services within each region. Various factors are taken into consideration, such as the size of the area in which coverage is required, the type of terrain or waters, the type and levels of craft activity, historic levels of distress incidents and possible future trends. SAR forces will normally be comprised of primary and secondary resources. The primary or dedicated resources include CF fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft with SAR Technician teams and Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) vessels. The secondary resources include all federal government vessels and aircraft which are suitable and available for multitasking to a SAR role. At bases where incident potential is high by virtue of the type of aircraft assigned or the nature of operations conducted, local base rescue units may be established. 1304. 1. TYPES OF MISSIONS SAR missions in both peacetime and wartime essentially can be grouped into two types: a. pre-planned precautionary missions; and b. emergency SAR missions for craft and persons in distress. 2. Pre-planned Precautionary Missions. During planned events with high risk, operations involving military aircraft in isolated areas and during transoceanic operations of short-range aircraft, SAR aircraft may be positioned to be immediately available should a distress situation develop, or to provide navigational assistance. Positioning may be at an airport close to the area of operation, orbiting at prearranged positions or flying predetermined routes. Similar precautionary measures may be taken whenever flights carrying members of the Royal Family fly in airspace for which Canadian SAR forces are responsible. 3. Emergency Search and Rescue Missions. By far the greatest demand placed on SAR forces by way of required skill and effort expended is in the performance of emergency SAR missions. The scope of these missions ranges from simple intercept and escort of distressed craft to large-scale searches covering thousands of square miles for missing aircraft, surface craft, submarines or persons. Extended SAR missions in all areas require direction and execution by highly experienced SAR personnel. All available incident data must be collected and evaluated to determine the type and extent of SAR activity required. Advanced bases may be necessary because of the distance to the search area and search patterns must be selected for most effective search depending on weather and terrain. SAR crews must be briefed and communications must be 13-2

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

established to control search participants. Rescue and recovery of survivors may also be a formidable task, particularly if the incident occurs in a remote area and large numbers of survivors are involved. 1305. PEACETIME SAR

1. Inter-Departmental Co-ordination. DND is only one of the government departments with some responsibility for SAR in Canada. The other key federal agency is the Canadian Coast Guard. However, to establish a single spokesperson for the government on SAR matters, the MND has been identified as the Lead Minister and the government spokesperson for SAR. The CDS has been tasked to execute the SAR mission using CF resources. Co-ordination activities between government departments is conducted through the National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue (ICSAR). 2. Specifically, the CF has been given the following basic and complementary SAR tasks: a. Basic SAR Tasks (1) to co-ordinate, control and conduct SAR operations in relation to aeronautical SAR incidents within the Canadian area of responsibility; (2) to provide resources in support of the prosecution of maritime SAR operations and to exercise ultimate authority in the allocation of all SAR resources during a SAR incident; and (3) to conduct ground searches in relation to aeronautical and maritime SAR incidents. b. Complementary SAR Tasks (1) to provide SAR resources when and where available; to assist in the prosecution of humanitarian and civil incidents which occur within provincial or municipal areas of responsibility (this task is handled in accordance with CF directives); and (2) to support Transport Canada (TC) and CCG in SAR prevention through participation in related educational programmes and by advising the appropriate authority of possible infractions of regulations. 3. It should be noted that the CF not only has responsibility for federal air SAR services but also the responsibility for effective operation of the co-ordinated aeronautical and maritime SAR system. As well, the distinction between aeronautical and maritime incidents and missing person cases (unrelated to air or marine incidents) must be understood in terms of jurisdiction. Missing person cases come under federal, provincial or municipal jurisdiction (with any assistance being provided under the terms of assistance to civil authorities). 4. In accordance with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and ICAO agreements to provide SAR services in Canada and adjacent ocean areas, the country has been divided into three Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) for aeronautical and maritime SAR co-ordination. The international boundaries are in accordance with ICAO and IMO agreements. Each Region has a Commander and is served by a Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC). 5. Maritime Rescue Sub-Centres (MRSCs) are established for the purpose of co-ordinating, conducting and controlling response to maritime incidents within the boundaries of local SRR sectors, as well as maximizing use of local knowledge and resources in providing an effective response. MRSCs keep parent JRCCs fully informed of their activities and transfer control of an incident to the parent unit in accordance with established criteria. The JRCCs/MRSCs are manned on a 24 hour / 7-day a week basis and will respond to all incidents until such time as the incident is resolved or until responsibility can be transferred to the appropriate authority. 13-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

6. JRCCs at Victoria, Trenton and Halifax co-ordinate aeronautical and maritime SAR incidents. MRSCs are established at Quebec City, Quebec and St John's, Newfoundland. The SRR Commanders are: a. Comd MARLANT for Halifax SRR; b. Comd 1 CAD for Trenton SRR; and c. Comd MARPAC for Victoria SRR.

7. Due to the national SAR mandate, the SRR Commanders shall be responsible through the DCDS to the CDS for co-ordination of searches within their Regions. The SRR Commanders can also authorize the use of SAR resources under their operational control for other types of humanitarian incidents. They can approve the reduction of minor searches and recommend reduction of major searches - essentially, a search longer than four days or potentially sensitive - within their regions. 8. Comd 1 CAD has been delegated operational command of all primary air SAR resources and each SRR Commander has operational control over primary air and marine SAR resources in the region. Secondary SAR resources are defined as aircraft, vessels or formations established and equipped for other than search and rescue, but which can be expected to respond (when available) to SAR tasking. These include multi-tasked government resources. 9. SRR Commanders may utilize all primary and secondary resources available under their operational command/control in providing SAR services. In instances where a commander's resources are considered to be inadequate for a specific task, assistance may be requested from any suitable source. These may include: a. CF resources from other Regions or Commands that may be tasked through NDHQ/National Defence Command Centre (NDCC); b. CCG resources not assigned to SAR that may be tasked through the appropriate CCG responsibility manager; d. other government departments - SRR commanders shall ensure that procedures exist so that SAR capable resources and the methods for tasking them are readily identified to JRCC/MRSC coordinators ; e. the resources of neighbouring SRRs which may be available and are to be requested through the appropriate JRCC/MRSC; f. marine resources which may be tasked under the Canada Shipping Act by the JRCC/MRSC Coordinator; acting for the SRR commander; and

g. chartering of required resources by the JRCCs if no other resource is available. 10. Underwater Search Operations. Suspension or continuation of a search may depend on underwater detection and recovery measures to locate a missing aircraft or marine craft and establish the fate of its occupants. However, if identification of floating wreckage or an accumulation of evidence which clearly establishes the fate of the aircraft or vessel and its occupants is possible without recourse to underwater search, then there is no responsibility for the SAR system to co-ordinate or participate in underwater detection or recovery action. 11. Submarine SAR Operations. The overall responsibility for SAR in the event of a missing Canadian submarine remains with the SRR Commander. The formulation of plans and the control of SAR operations in a Submiss-Subsunk operation is the function of either Commander MARLANT/ MARPAC. In the event of a lost United States Navy (USN) submarine, the responsibility for overall co-ordination of SAR activities rests 13-4

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

with the "USN Submarine Operating Authority". 12. Joint Areas of Responsibility - Canada/US. When a SAR incident occurs in Canadian territory, involving an aircraft other than US military, US SAR forces will be permitted to provide facilities they consider necessary, but the appropriate Canadian JRCC will be responsible for the search. US Air Force (USAF) or US Coast Guard (USCG) SAR forces will inform the Canadian JRCC of action taken or proposed, but all decisions and activity shall be under the control and subject to ratification by the Canadian JRCC. 13. When an emergency incident occurs involving a US military aircraft in Canadian territory (for which search participation may become necessary), USAF forces will be permitted to take any action that is necessary. Under such conditions, a USAF Searchmaster will be designated. The Searchmaster will report details to the appropriate JRCC and the JRCC will be kept informed of developments; however, SRR Commanders may assume control of any search that arises in their area. This power normally will only be exercised when CF search aircraft are participating or when, in their opinion, the CF is better qualified to conduct the search. When a USAF SAR unit gains knowledge of such an incident, immediate notification will be given to the appropriate Canadian JRCC including: a. full information on the flight plan; b. action being taken; and c. future plans.

14. The USCG is responsible for the co-ordination of SAR activities in the maritime regions and the inland waters which are under the jurisdiction of the US federal government. 1306. WARTIME SAR

1. The primary task of the SAR system in wartime is to support air operations of our own and allied forces with the aim of recovering downed aircrews. In addition, the service is used to recover other armed forces personnel during and after combat activities. The diversity of this task dictates that SAR planning be an integral part of overall war operations planning. If required, SAR forces will be made available to NATO or an Allied Coalition to meet combined operations requirements. The conduct of combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations will be in accordance with STANAG 7030 that identifies the characteristics of CSAR and its support and training requirements. Amplifying material can be found in B-GA-460-000/FP-000, Search and Rescue Operational Doctrine, and ATP 62, NATO CSAR Manual. 2. The specific nature of wartime SAR missions will vary from place to place, and the response required of individual SAR organizations will be determined by factors such as support capabilities, type of SAR facilities available, operating location, tactical situations and enemy threat. For this reason, only broad principles are established to provide guidance for more detailed planning. The development of wartime SAR plans by national SAR authorities should be based on the missions and needs of NATO forces within their area of responsibility. 3. Air Component Commander (ACC). To provide for SAR operations in wartime, the ACC should: a. establish liaison with national SAR authorities; b. include SAR contingency plans in applicable campaign plans; c. provide SAR facilities and supporting forces to Search and Rescue Point of Contact (SPOC) as required by campaign plans and the tactical situation;

d. co-ordinate planned tactical operations and potential SAR requirements with appropriate SPOCs; and e. develop procedures for notifying appropriate SPOCs of downed aircrew and recovery action. 13-5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

4.

National SAR Authorities. CF SAR authorities shall: a. prepare detailed wartime SAR plans for their areas of responsibility in accordance with the SAR requirements of NATO commands; and b. establish rapid and reliable lines of communication with the NATO command and control facilities within their areas of responsibility.

5.

NATO/Allied Coalition Units. NATO/Allied Coalition unit commanders shall:: a. conduct local SAR operations in conjunction with SPOCs in accordance with the provisions of ATP62; b. notify NATO/Allied Coalition command and control facilities and appropriate SPOCs of overdue or suspected downed aircraft as required by applicable war plans; and c. provide Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) data on downed aircrew personnel to the controlling SPOC.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

13-6

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 14 COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 1401. INTRODUCTION

1. All commanders must have the communications facilities and resources necessary to accomplish the mission. A military Communication and Information System (CIS) must provide reliable, rapid and secure exchange of information to enable commanders to execute command and control (C2) of military forces and supporting functions. This is accomplished through the assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel organized so as to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions. CIS must be available for the exercise of C2 at all levels from the CDS down to the lowest tactical and support levels. For contingency operations the national CIS infrastructure, or information management infrastructure (IMI), must be extended or made accessible to deployed forces. CIS units or elements must be included in the composition of deployed forces to terminate/access services and provide CIS support internally. The aim of this chapter is to provide direction for the provision of CIS support to CF operations. It will outline roles, principles, responsibilities, planning considerations, standards and architecture and functional capabilities for CIS. Management of operational information is not included in the scope of this document but is the responsibility of the commanders on the ground in accordance with DND IM Policy. 2. Definitions and Terms. The following definitions and terms will be used: a. CIS is defined as: a Collective term for communication systems and information systems (AAP-6 2002). b. CCIS is defined as: An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications which provides commanders and their staff at all levels with timely and adequate information to plan, direct and control the activities of their troops. (AAP-6 2002). 3. Operational Importance. CIS provide the crucial means for commanders at all levels to exercise effective C2. CIS are an integral and vital part of military operations, and the effective employment and control of CIS resources are command responsibilities. CIS must be deployed and maintained to achieve maximum overall effectiveness in the employment of military forces consistent with the projected rate of activity and scope of operations. Therefore, CIS personnel must be brought into the planning process at the beginning and must interact continuously with those who will oversee and conduct operations. 4. Role. The role of CIS is to provide commanders and their staffs with the means to collect, transport, process, disseminate and protect information. 5. Objectives. The objectives of CIS are to: a. Produce Unity of Effort. CIS must facilitate the integration or combination of inputs, thoughts and impressions from all participants so that the operational effort is fully co-ordinated. b. Exploit Total Force Capabilities. CIS must allow the commanders to utilize the full range of operational and support functions available to them. c. Properly Position Critical Information. CIS must be able to make the right information available when and where it is needed.

d. Produce Fused Information. CIS must facilitate the production of an accurate and comprehensive picture of the battlespace.

14 - 1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 6. Categories. There are generally agreed to be four categories of systems or services that must be provided to deployed forces. They are: C2 information systems (C2IS) - also referred to as CCIS, management information systems (MIS), Quality of Life communications services (QOL), and the underlying communications systems on which the other three depend. a. C2IS. These are required for the exercise of national command of deployed forces by national authorities, the exercise of command of the assigned forces by the force commander, and the provision, management, and movement of relevant operational information between the elements of the force and national headquarters. The information is moved and manipulated using voice, fax, military messaging. There is increasing use of elements of the Canadian Forces Command System (CFCS), environmental tactical systems, video teleconferencing and other networks and applications. The underlying Communications Systems or transport layer provides the means of delivery and distribution for the C2IS applications. b. MIS. These provide for the provision of support to deployed forces. This category includes the various administrative, financial, logistics and other applications that permit or enhance the conduct of operations (e.g. DHRIM, FMAS, CCPS, CFSS, MASIS, EMAF, LOMMIS, ADAM). It also relies on voice, fax, DWAN, and public internet. Distribution of MIS in-theatre will be different than C2IS; the former may go only to a command group or support base, while the latter must go to all components of the force and to their sub-components. c. QOL. These permit deployed personnel to have regular contact with family and friends within the limits the force commander sets to maintain protection of the force. The contact is normally through DND/CF or commercial Communication Systems.

d. Communications Systems. These varied physical, data, network, and transport systems provide for the movement of information in its various forms between the elements of the force. Since communication systems underlie all others primary and alternate communications carriers should be established, maintained and exercised to support essential services. The restoration priorities for communications systems derive from the critical services they must support. 7. Priorities. Priorities for the establishment and restoration of CIS must be set to maintain the essential services necessary to command and support the deployed force. These will vary depending on resources available. The exercise of C2 and critical support can always be accomplished if, as a minimum, voice and military messaging services are available between the force elements, the headquarters exercising control of the force in theatre and national headquarters. Priority should therefore be given to restoring those essential services, richer C2IS capabilities, followed by MIS capabilities and QOL capabilities. The commander will determine specific restoration priorities with J6 advice. Clearly, operations cannot be prosecuted without the right support at the right time and so in some situations; some MIS capabilities might be restored earlier than some less essential C2IS capabilities. In some situations QOL services may be of such importance that they could be restored before less essential C2IS or MIS capabilities. The commander may also authorize the provision of communications services to other government departments (OGD), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), media, and other organizations on a case-by-case basis. 1402. PRINCIPLES OF CIS

1. General. The following principles relating to a CIS must be considered and selectively applied to military operations. Although they are dealt with separately in the list below, there are interrelationships and mutual effects which must be considered, and, when conflicts occur, reconciled, given the operational scenario. 2. CIS Principles

14 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 a. Provision of CIS. CIS support must be as mobile as the force it is supporting. In joint or combined operations, this may involve extending components of the national or coalition CIS between elements of the Combined Joint Task Force. CIS components, liaison, and support will be provided between elements of a force according to the following convention (1) senior to subordinate; (2) supporting to supported; (3) reinforcing to reinforced; (4) left to right; and (5) fixed to manoeuvring. b. Discipline. CIS discipline refers to the control of the flow of information. Controls may be physical or procedural. This principle requires prioritization of information flow consistent with the projected activity and scope of operations. c. Economy. Economy of CIS resources may involve avoiding duplication except that required for survivability, limiting the number of users and imposing strict transmission discipline. Resources and effort must be concentrated on establishing, maintaining and sustaining essential and necessary services first. This may mean that some CIS services normally found in a garrison environment would be excluded from a theatre of operation.

d. Interoperability. Interoperability in CIS is defined in AAP-6(V) as: the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. True interoperability requires common doctrine, concepts, standards, procedures, and protocols. Four degrees of interoperability have been defined as follows, but the ultimate objective is seamless application and data sharing: (1) Level I. Unstructured digital information exchange (e.g. human reads Word document and interprets meaning), (2) Level II. Structured information interchange (e.g. NSN, meaning of a pre-formatted message in MMHS is agreed and shared amongst elements) (3) Level III. Common data structure (e.g. data model for digital elevation in a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is agreed and shared by software) (4) Level IV. Complete integration (e.g. data and software application are shared) e. Standardization. Until such time as full interoperability, (Level IV seamless data and application sharing), is achievable that CIS for joint and combined operations must be standardized as much as is practicable. Standardization includes aspects of hardware, software, and data compatibility. This must be combined with testing to establish, document and maintain interoperable configuration settings. Agreements on general principles for use of bandwidth and restoration procedures are also required. Plans for standardization must ensure that, within resource constraints, the essential operational requirements of all components and agencies are addressed in the level of standardization achieved in a coalition setting. f. Information Priority. CIS systems have a finite capacity, so commanders and staffs at all levels must quantify and prioritise their information requirements in terms of: (1) relative importance, 14 - 3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 (2) file size limitations, and (3) time considerations (including when to send or receive, connection length, and throughput for individual files); g. Liaison. Liaison is the contact or inter-communication maintained between elements of military forces that ensures mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. When the CIS between two elements is unworkable, unreliable, or not interoperable, liaison detachments should be exchanged between the two units. h. Security. Operations Security (OPSEC) considerations are discussed in Chapter 26. Information Technology Security (ITSEC) or CIS security measures are crucial components of Information Security (INFOSEC) in that they protect the information needed to conduct operations and promote good OPSEC. Due to increasing interconnections between national systems, Information Protection must be considered for a CIS capability as a whole and not just within the context of a specific operation. Because of these linkages, the exploitation of a loophole in a friendly CIS in one theatre can generate unintended risks to the security of other nations and coalitions in other theatres of operation. These issues are further developed in Chapters 22 and 23. i. Flexibility. Flexibility is required to meet changing situations and diverse operations with a minimum of disruption or delay. CIS personnel should plan alternative means of providing voice and data communications and maintain a reserve, including spare capacity. The use of mobility, prepositioned resources and commercial or allied facilities should be considered to generate flexibility. When operating within a coalition, the ability to rapidly incorporate new technology used by elements of the force and between the deployed force and national headquarters requires the co-ordination of coalition, single service and national CIS support efforts. Sustainability and Survivability. CIS must be as survivable as the force it supports. CIS must be organized and deployed to ensure that performance under stress degrades gracefully, not catastrophically. Sustainability of CIS can be achieved by providing alternate route, alternate systems (duplicate servers, alternate CPs etc), standardizing equipment, establishing standardized procedures and supervising their execution, countering computer viruses, detecting and monitoring computer intrusion, countering electromagnetic interference, jamming and deception, and establishing effective logistic support programs or similar actions. The survivability of the systems must be such that they continue to deliver pre-defined levels of performance despite hostile actions, natural disaster, and/or any other severe calamity or human technical fallibility. Timeliness. Weapon system technology makes it increasingly feasible for the time between warning and attack to be compressed, so that the processing and transmission time for warning, critical intelligence, operation planning and execution information must be shortened accordingly. The demand for timely communications throughout the area of operations concerning C2, logistics, weather, intelligence and administrative information requires that the element of speed be considered during all aspects of CIS planning. Capacity. Sufficient CIS must be available to meet the expected demand. Degrees of urgency and traffic types and volume will vary widely in operations. Capacity is expressed in terms of bit rate or bandwidth. Reserve capacity must be planned and held for contingencies. Allocation of capacity should be based on the commanders priorities for CIS. When demand exceeds capacity, the allocation of capacity over time is shared and follows these priorities.

j.

k.

l.

m. Availability. CIS must be responsive to operational requirements. Availability is measured in terms of total hours of operation, and downtime for maintenance.

14 - 4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 n. Reliability. This is a measure of the probability that CIS will function properly for a required period of time. Reliability can be achieved by good design, effective maintenance, redundancy of systems and equipment, alternate routing and proper procedures. o. Deployability. All CIS must be designed to allow for a seamless transition from a non-deployed to a deployed posture both from the user and system administrator perspectives. 1403. ARCHITECTURE

1. Integrated Defence Enterprise Architecture. A CIS architecture comprises the Technology, Principles and Best Practices, Views, Standards, Policies & Guidelines, from a perspective that is specific to DND/CF. The CIS architecture used in DND is derived from functional considerations that embody the command and control and force structure, information exchange requirements, time, space and environmental factors. An architecture is required to ensure that the C2 and support functions of the DND/CF can be carried out at all times, wherever the forces are deployed. The following (Fig 14-1) eightdomain technical architecture classification structure is in use within DND:

Figure 14 1. DND Technical Architecture Classification Structure a. Network. This domain defines the technologies and standards required to establish the physical connectivity in the IM/IT infrastructure necessary for DND/CF. The connectivity infrastructure consists of logical elements (structure, topology, bandwidth, management), physical hardware components (wiring, LANs, hubs, routers, switches), and network protocols. b. Platform. This domain includes the technical components required to input/capture, store, retrieve, process and present data/information and to provide an interface between DND/CF's IM/IT environment and the end-user(e.g. workstation, PDA, OA Suite). c. Services. This domain contains the services that enable applications to interoperate. It includes the technologies, rules and practices that link front-end applications (i.e. what users see and use) with back-end/legacy systems (i.e. internal management systems). The domain defines the technologies, standards, and guidelines for seamless, platform-independent, inter-enterprise and intra-enterprise communications, and universal access to business information, with a special focus on supporting electronic commerce and electronic service delivery (e.g. GIS, workflow, messaging, email).

14 - 5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 d. Application. This domain provides the key areas of architecture that enable IM/IT C2 and business applications (e.g. web-centric, distributed, client-server). e. Presentation & Accessibility. This domain includes all rules and technologies that facilitate access to the IM/IT infrastructure at the "front end". It defines the components and standards that enable the interface between one or more applications and the human user. The domain is primarily concerned with the human-computer interface provided through an application or system, (e.g. PDF, XSL, voice recognition) and the design of products, systems, processes and environments that are usable by all people to the greatest extent possible (e.g. common look and feel). f. Information Management. This domain defines the technologies, standards, and best practices that enable the acquisition, processing, integration, maintenance, dissemination and disposition of information (e.g. documents, imagery, metadata, terminology).

g. Systems Management. This domain includes the tools, technologies, and standards necessary to manage DND/CF's IT infrastructure effectively and cost-efficiently in support of the department's business objectives. It includes service support and service delivery processes defined in the Information Technology Information Library (ITIL) framework (e.g. disaster recovery, capacity management). h. Security and Information Assurance. This domain is concerned with IT security, including the security of information. It provides technical IT security solutions to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of DND/CF's IM/IT assets; and, enables secure electronic service delivery. Technologies involved include security management, firewalls, intrusion detection, PKI, cryptography, authentication, authorization, remote access and virus detection. See also Chapters 22 and 23. 2. Other Coalition Architectures. Although there is no standard global architecture, nations are working together to minimize duplication of effort. Commanders should endeavour to choose J6 staff having experience in exchange or liaison positions with the lead nation or the other coalition partner of the force being assembled. The J6 staff advising deployed commanders should be familiar with the architectures of the US DoD and NATO that follow: a. Defence Information Initiative Common Operating Environment (DII COE). This is the foundation for building interoperable systems within USA DoD; b. The NATO Policy for Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Systems Interoperability has identified the NC3 Technical Architecture (NC3 TA) as the foundation for building interoperable systems within NATO and between NATO member nations. 1404. PHYSICAL DEPENDENCIES

1. General. Sustainable and survivable CIS requires a protected facility be provided early in planning and deployment. Personnel providing CIS are usually first-in, last-out. This is especially true when commercial off the shelf (COTS) rather than MIL-SPEC equipment is being used. The following model (Fig 14-2) provides a starting point for J6 and J4 to formulate advice to commanders during the early stages of planning:

14 - 6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

Footprint Building or Shelter Room Ship Vehicle Man or belt pack Containers Security Power
& Freq Filtered Uninterruptible Batteries and Spares

Compatible Volts

Cabling Ventilation Plant Cooling Termination Filtering Moisture control Control Furniture

Climate Control

RF Spectrum

Freq Restrs Emissions ECCM EMC/EMI

Protected Facility Fire & Flood Intrusion Safety interlocks Snow, Ice, Sand, Mud, Mould

Figure 14-2. Critical Dependencies of CIS not organic to CIS force elements 1405. CIS PLANNING

1. General. CIS planning is a command-driven staff activity. The role of CIS planners is to provide the CIS capabilities necessary to satisfy their commanders information exchange requirement. This usually involves providing and maintaining links within the elements of the formation, with flanking or supporting formations, to higher (including national, coalition, and component) headquarters and host nation infrastructure (carriers, service providers, EMS). Planning may include consultation with OGD, NGO, and media. CIS planning is carried out at the: a. Strategic level by DND/CF J6 (DGIMO) as the CIS Planner. Strategic CIS planning is normally performed on DGIMOs behalf by the CF J6 Ops staff; b. Operational level by the Task Force J6 or formation (1 CAD, MARLANT/PAC, Area HQs and CFNA) N/G/A 6 as the CIS Planner. The CF JOG J6 is the CIS Planner for joint/combined contingency planning and theatre activation; and c. Tactical level by the formation J/N/G/A 6 or by the CO of the formation CIS unit supporting the formation;

2. CIS Planning. Commanders must involve CIS staff as early as possible in the planning, mounting, and conduct of operations. Except in exceptional circumstances, they should be included in recce and advance parties. Early liaison with local authorities and commercial interests in the Area of Operations (AO) is essential to ensure the provision of information services and the integration of military and non-military CIS. Effective communications between CIS and command staffs is crucial and includes the following responsibilities: a. Staff to CIS. Staff must: (1) Articulate the commanders information exchange requirements; (2) Identify information management requirements; 14 - 7 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 (3) Provide restoration priorities for critical CIS services and communications channels; (4) Exercise control over critical CIS resources and controlled stores; (5) Provide early information on plans and intentions (6) Direct/approve formation communications and information security policy; (7) Direct/approve EW policy; (8) Direct/approve schedule for provision of CIS services; (9) Enforce CIS policies and procedures; and (10)Order MINIMIZE (when necessary); and b. CIS to Staff. CIS personnel must: (1) Advise on the current state of formation CIS and its impact on operations; (2) Advise on the ability of CIS to support future plans including recommended modifications to policy, allocation of resources, and requirements for CIS support from higher or national sources; (3) Disseminate the timings for the establishment and closure of CIS capabilities; and (4) Provide the official time. c. CIS Liaison. CIS personnel liaise and co-ordinate with OGD, NGO, and media expected to be encountered in the AO with reference to the provision of any services the commander has agreed to provide to these agencies.

3. When designing a CIS (or an extension to the CIS) certain key planning factors must be addressed in addition to the principles discussed in article 1402. These include but are not limited to: a. Information Exchange Requirements. The early identification of the organizations with which the headquarters or force will exchange information is key. Once these linkages are identified the next step is the identification of the information to be exchanged. The following key elements about that information need to be identified: (1) the type of information, (2) the format of the information, (3) the security classification/designation of the information, (4) who requires the information, (5) how often the exchange takes place, (6) when the exchange takes place, (7) the size of the files to be transferred, (8) the medium used for the transfer,

14 - 8 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 (9) the application(s) used to generate and/or read the information, and (10)any other information needed to smooth the transfer of the information. b. Frequency Spectrum Management. The entire frequency spectrum is a finite resource that is used world-wide and in all domains (governments, international organizations and private enterprise). Like any other scarce military resource, frequency assets must be managed by or on behalf of the commander and his operational staff. The management of both CIS and non-CIS frequency spectrum requirements is a CIS staff responsibility. The ADM(IM) has overall responsibility for frequency management within DND. The CFJ6 is the national level co-ordinator for deployed operations. The in-theatre J6 is responsible for operational level frequency spectrum management. The host nation and the coalition commander have responsibilities for the coordination and allocation of frequencies. Responsibilities for spectrum management are defined as follow: (1) National (a) spectrum allocations within CANADA - Industry Canada, (b) frequency management within DND - ADM(IM) delegated to DTSES 5, (c) national level co-ordination of spectrum requirements for contingency operations CF J6, and (2) Deployed Theatre (a) spectrum allocation Host Nation or Coalition J6 if there is no viable host nation government, (b) frequency management in-theatre Coalition J6, and (c) consolidation of Canadian frequency requirements NCE J6. c. Protection of Information. Protection of information is a key component of force protection. Proper implementation of procedures and standards is mandatory to ensure the protection of information and interoperability between all levels and components of the task force. The ADM(IM) has overall responsibility for Information Protection within DND. The CFJ6 is the national level co-ordinator of information protection for deployed operations. The in-theatre J6 is responsible for the operational level protection of information.

d. Interoperability. Procedural and technical interoperability is one of the keys to ensure a military force can achieve unity of effort. Interoperability is required not only within DND but with other government departments, allies and host nations. CIS interoperability is dependent upon technical and procedural compatibilities which are the responsibility of the CIS staff to co-ordinate. The coordination must occur at the highest level necessary to ensure the required degree of interoperability. The ADM(IM) has overall responsibility for CIS interoperability within DND. The CFJ6 is the national level co-ordinator for deployed operations. The in-theatre J6 is responsible for operational level of CIS interoperability.

14 - 9 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 4. Responsibilities For CIS Planning a. Strategic Level. At the strategic level, the CF J6 is responsible for planning the extension of CIS in support of operations. The CF J6 must ensure that the J3 approves sufficient CIS resources are provided to deployed forces to support national and task force strategic and operational IERs. This is accomplished through the task force TO&E that is developed by the JSAT in consultation with the CF J6, the theatre activation team, the task force commander and J6, the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS) and the Joint Operations Group (JOG) as required. b. Operational Level. At the operational level, CIS support is normally planned and co-ordinated by the assigned J6/N6/G6/A6 in co-ordination with the CFJ6. Within a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) environment, the integration of the tactical level CIS plans is a responsibility of the operational level J6 to ensure that national command and control requirements are met. The CIS planning responsibilities may be assigned as follows: (1) Single Environmental. When the DCDS directs an ECS to perform a mission involving only that EC, the responsibility for the CIS planning and co-ordination for that mission will be carried out by the applicable N6/G6/A6. (e.g. single ship op w/coalition force). (2) Theatre Activation. The CFJ6 will plan the initial CIS requirement. (3) Theatre Activation Team (TAT). In most instances, the CF JOG provides a TAT. The theatre level J6 will be deployed and be responsible for planning the initial operational level CIS for the mission with the task force commander. The TAT J6 will refine the detailed CIS plan for the mission in co-operation with the CF J6. Once the National Command Element (NCE) has deployed into theatre, the TAT will hand over control of theatre CIS to the force commander; and (4) Joint Task Force. The detailed CIS planning and preparation of deployed joint operations should normally be delegated to the CJTF J6. c. Tactical Level. The ECs and other force generators are responsible for planning and mounting the CIS resources needed to support the appropriate component (including integration with the coalition CIS plan). In a coalition environment the ECs CIS units and elements will be under the command of their respective component commander. As at the operational level, there may be a requirement to terminate or extend rear links at the tactical level from higher HQs national and/or coalition. Where local infrastructure exists, and the operational situation permits, the tactical level may also use commercial equipments and services to complement or replace military CIS resources. CIS at the tactical level, both HQ staff positions (J6/N6/G6/A6) and line units or elements, is an integral part of the maritime, land, air and support components. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CIS

1406.

1. Principle. The control of CIS is retained at the highest possible level, while the execution of the CIS plan is decentralized to the lowest possible level. Control of CIS capability is vested in an operational authority, who has the authority to accept the risks to the security of national data on behalf of the department imposed by the CIS solution to an operational problem. The control of the management and sustainment of the assigned CIS capability is performed by the CIS staff and line units in response to operational priorities set by commanders at all levels and the technical and security constraints imposed by the National and Combined Force Technical and Security authorities. Command of CIS resources is vested in CIS unit commanders and is the ability to assign resources to tasks and to move CIS elements in support of the commanders plan. 2. Authorities. The following National authorities are defined with respect to the Management and Control of CIS capability:

14 - 10 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 a. Operational Authority (OA): The office that has the authority to define the operating principles, concept of operation and set the operational standards for a Communication and Information System (CIS) capability. The OA also has the authority and responsibility to accept residual risk to the CIS identified by the Certification & Accreditation (C&A) staff. This authority may be delegated to a subordinate commander relative to portions of the CIS capability under the control of the subordinate commander. The OA is responsible for: (1) identifying and prioritizing operational requirements for a CIS capability; (2) developing the CONOPs and SOPs for the use of a CIS Capability; (3) managing the information resident on a network; (4) setting restoration priorities; (5) accepting residual risk; (6) establishing the service level requirements for the CIS capability and segments thereof; (7) establishing priorities for the operational use of bandwidth on a CIS capability; and (8) identifying user display interface requirements for structured data used by a CIS capability. b. Technical Authority (TA): The office that has the authority to establish network administrative policies, manage and configure a CIS, and set technical standards for CIS capabilities. Portions of this authority may be delegated to subordinate offices that may be tasked to carry out portions of the responsibilities of the TA. The TA is responsible for: (1) delivering technology and applications to satisfy operational, security, and information planning requirements; (2) recommending operational CIS policies for endorsement by the OA; (3) approving and promulgating CIS policies; (4) setting CIS technical standards; (5) issuing network administrative policies; (6) establishing disaster recovery plans; (7) managing CIS configuration; (8) managing CIS assets; (9) restoring operations; (10)maintaining service levels set by the operational authority; and (11)identifying technical requirements. c. Security Authority (SA): The office that has the authority to set CIS security standards, develop and recommend network security policies for endorsement by the OA and approval by the TA. Portions of this authority may be delegated to subordinate offices that are tasked to carry out the responsibilities of the SA. The SA is responsible for: 14 - 11 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 (1) recommending CIS security policies for endorsement by the OA and approval by the TA; (2) advising the OA on the acceptability of the residual risk imposed on the CIS by a change to the configuration of the CIS; (3) setting CIS security standards; (4) staffing endorsed CIS security policies to the TA for publication; (5) protecting the CIS from attack; (6) assisting the TA in restoration of CIS operations after an attack; (7) monitoring CIS activity; (8) investigating security breaches; (9) maintaining the C&A of the CIS; and (10)identifying CIS security and audit requirements. 3. Table of Authorities. a. Operational Authority. (1) VCDS. The VCDS is the operational authority for the corporate MIS; and (2) DCDS. The DCDS is the operational authority for the classified CIS networks. The DCDS has delegated this responsibility as follows: (a) COS J3 for operational components of the CIS operating at the SECRET level, and (b) DG INT for intelligence components of the CIS operating at the TS level. b. Technical Authority. The ADM(IM) is the technical authority for all DND/CF CIS. Responsibility for day-to-day operations is usually delegated to CFIOG CF Network Operations Centre (CFNOC) staff. c. Security Authority. The ADM(IM) is the security authority for the DND/CF CIS. The responsibility for maintaining and enforcing security policy has been delegated to D IM Secur. The CIS security policies shall comply with the Government Security Policy and direction of the departmental Senior Official for security matters (VCDS).

d. Procurement Authority. Legal precedent has established that ADM-level signature is the minimum acceptable by the Government of Canada for ADM(Mat) to invoke national security or national emergency provisions. Invoking these provisions permit DND and PWGSC staff to waive the usual competitive process and expedite procurement of CIS in support of deployed or domestic contingency operations for DND/CF and OGD.

14 - 12 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 e. Coalition Authorities. Coalition forces will also establish technical and security authorities. Therefore national CIS elements deployed in a coalition environment will be responsible to both national and coalition authorities. In the case of conflict between National and coalition technical or security policies, the most restrictive one (i.e. the one that implies the least risk to the security of national information) will be adopted while the matter is referred up the national chain of command for a decision by the competent authority. The final decision regarding risk to information is always the prerogative of the relevant operational authority. 1407. C2 AND MANAGEMENT OF CIS

1. General. All CIS to and within deployed forces are considered to be part of the DND/CF architecture. The CIS that is part of this architecture must be managed in such a way as to ensure that it meets the changing needs of all users. This requires a management regime that is authoritative, adaptive and comprehensive without unduly restricting the capabilities of commanders at all levels to exercise effective C2. The management regime must therefore reconcile the need for configuration control with the users needs for devolved planning and conduct of operations. 1408. CIS SUSTAINMENT

1. General. Operational sustainment is a national responsibility involving the resources of the entire DND/CF. Force generators will provide tactically self-sufficient forces for deployment. The DCDS will specify the initial level and period of self-sufficiency required for each operation. Sustainment beyond the initial period will be planned and directed by the DCDS and co-ordinated by the CF Joint Staff. Implementation may be effected through force generators who have the assigned resources. 2. Operational Commanders. Commanders at all levels must plan for and deploy sufficient personnel, equipment, spares and maintenance support to initially sustain integral CIS services based on the operational plan and expected casualties. The degree of sustainability will be set out in general planning guidance (White Paper; DPG), and in orders for specific operations. 3. Long Term Sustainment. Host Nation infrastructure and commercial services in areas of deployed operations may be used to complement military capabilities whenever possible. Where the operational situation is considered stable, commercial CIS services should be considered to reduce the personnel sustainment burden. Potential savings in military CIS resources would have to be reconciled against the potential risks and costs, both financial and operational. The cost of retaining a reserve (back-up) military CIS capability must be factored in. 4. Responsibilities. The responsibility for CIS sustainment operations is shared between commanders, the National, TF and component CIS staffs and the CIS units deployed in support of the deployed force. The specific responsibilities are detailed as follow: a. Commanders. Set priorities for restoration of services, identify and control the sharing or release of critical resources including controlled CIS stores, bandwidth, EM spectrum and impose restrictions on the use, distribution of and access to information based on operational priorities; b. Staffs. Plan CIS sustainment activity and recommend actions to resolve critical CIS issues to the supported formation commander based on the operational situation, commanders priorities and CIS unit requirements. TF and Component J/G/A/N6s should work hand in hand with their J/G/A/N3s to develop and promulgate Information Management procedures to deal with the specific complexities of the collaborative environment that the TF faces, whether as part of a coalition or as part of a domestic operation in support of civil authorities; and

14 - 13 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 c. CIS Units. Execute CIS plans and maintain the CIS infrastructure on a day-to-day basis in such a way as to permit the CIS infrastructure to remain responsive to the supported forces operations. This includes but is not limited to: the provision of backup and restore capability, alternate routing of critical information, monitoring system performance and security, system administration and audit, maintenance of the ITSEC and INFOSEC posture ordered, supporting information management activities and providing help and maintenance services. CIS Unit staffs are also responsible for identifying to their formation staffs any issues requiring co-ordination that are beyond their ability to resolve.

14 - 14 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 15 INTELLIGENCE SECTION I - INTELLIGENCE 1501. INTRODUCTION

1. Intelligence is an essential component of military capability. It exists at all levels of command to support commanders and their staffs in making effective decisions, by providing them with a timely and accurate understanding of the adversary and operational environment. No operation can be planned with real hope of success until sufficient information on the adversary and environment has been obtained and converted into intelligence. No less important is the need to counter adversaries similar efforts by depriving them of knowledge of our own actions, dispositions, capabilities and intentions. 2. Intelligence, in a military context, is the product of our knowledge and understanding of the physical environment; weather, demographics and culture of the operational area, the activities, capabilities and intentions of an actual or potential threat, or any other entity or situation with which the Canadian Forces is concerned. Intelligence is central to the planning and conduct of operations, and to force protection, throughout the spectrum of conflict as it allows the commander to assess the threat or situation and then gain mastery of the environment. 3. Intelligence provides the commander with an assessment of the adversarys capability and activities as well as an estimate of the adversarys probable courses of action, centres of gravity and vulnerabilities. The possession of intelligence can afford a critical advantage over the adversary in that the commander, by getting inside the adversarys decision cycle, can act or react more quickly than the opponent. A commander can therefore plan actions based on this knowledge, which will decrease the risks inherent in operational activity and increase the likelihood of success. 4. Intelligence is command led, which means that the Commander must drive the intelligence process and, while he has his Intelligence staff to advise him, he must have a firm understanding of the intelligence process, its strengths and its limitations. He must have the capability to frame his intelligence requirements succinctly and to interpret the intelligence derived in response to his requirements in the context of his mission. Details on joint intelligence are contained in B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, Joint Intelligence Doctrine. 1502. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. The role of intelligence is to assist in the commanders visualization of the joint battlespace, which will involve the assessment of adversary capabilities, centres of gravity and probable intent. In order to fulfill this role the intelligence system must be able to attain the following objectives: a. Provide warning; b. Inform decision making via predictive analysis; c. Contribute to situational awareness and to attaining the knowledge edge over an opponent; and d. Counter the adversarys intelligence effort. 1503. 1. PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE The intelligence process is governed by the following eight basic principles: a. Centralized Control. Intelligence activities must be centrally controlled to avoid duplication of effort, to provide mutual support, to ensure the efficient and economic use of all resources, and to ensure responsiveness to a commander's requirements; b. Timeliness. The provision of timely intelligence is essential. Intelligence that arrives late is of little 15-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 use. Therefore, the collection effort must be pro-active with dynamic lines of connectivity between collection, intelligence staffs and commanders; c. Systematic Exploitation. Intelligence sources and agencies must be exploited methodically, based on a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations;

d. Objectivity. Intelligence must state the known facts about a situation and the logical conclusions that those facts support. Any temptation to distort information to fit preconceived ideas must be resisted; e. Accessibility. Relevant intelligence must be readily available to commanders, users and intelligence staffs. While the "need to know" principle must be applied, the unnecessary use of restrictive security classifications and caveats is to be avoided; f. Responsiveness. The intelligence staff must be responsive to the commander's requirements. To ensure responsiveness, as operational tempo increases, they must be able to anticipate these requirements;

g. Source Protection. All sources of information must be adequately protected. Exploitation of intelligence must take into account the penalties of compromising the source; and h. Continuous Review. Intelligence must be reviewed continuously and, where necessary, revised, taking account of all new information and comparing it with existing information. 1504. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

1. The intelligence cycle describes the activities whereby information is collected, collated, fused and converted into intelligence and made available to users. The cycle comprises the following four steps that are cyclical in nature: a. direction; b. collection; c. processing; and

d. dissemination. 2. Direction. Direction is the key step, as intelligence requirements must first be determined. Commanders are responsible for stating what they need to know, and when they need to know it. Once intelligence requirements are known, the intelligence staff meets the requirements from existing databases and through the directed collection of information. 3. Collection. Collection involves the exploitation of sources by collection agencies as well as the exploitation of sources and agencies by intelligence staffs. It includes the timely delivery of collected information to intelligence staffs for use in the production of intelligence. Collection agencies must be kept aware of the operational situation and of the importance of relaying information, which they believe to be important, even if they have not been specifically tasked to provide that information. They must also inform their tasking authority immediately whenever they are unable to carry out their assigned task so that other agencies can be employed. 4. Processing. Processing is a five-step sequence that converts information into intelligence. a. Collation. The registering, recording, and sorting of incoming information into related groupings to facilitate systematic processing; b. Evaluation. The determination of the reliability of a source and the credibility of the information 15-2

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 provided; c. Analysis. The identification of salient facts from information received and the drawing of conclusions based on these facts;

d. Integration. The creation of an overall pattern of knowledge from the sum of analysed information; and e. Interpretation. The assessment of what the processed information means. 5. Dissemination. Dissemination is the timely distribution of intelligence, in an appropriate format, by any suitable means, to those who need it. Regardless of format, intelligence products must be disseminated in accordance with the principles of clarity, brevity, regularity, standard terminology, appropriate security, and urgency. The intelligence staff is responsible for ensuring that all information and intelligence is passed to those who need it, including intelligence staffs in superior, subordinate and flanking HQs. 1505. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

1. The intelligence estimate is the analysis of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition. It is used to determine the courses of action open to an adversary or potential adversary and the order of probability of their adoption. This estimate, expressed orally or in writing, provides commanders with a reliable basis for making operational decisions. 2. The intelligence estimate should take into account the following: a. the current situation; b. the mission; c. the adversary situation;

d. factors: (1) the terrain, waters and weather, (2) the adversary's activities and capabilities, including the possibility of reinforcements and forces in adjacent areas being brought to bear on friendly operations, and (3) other pertinent issues like the political and economic situation as they impact on adversary operations; e. the adversary's options and possible courses of action in the area of operations and in adjacent areas. This analysis must also include an assessment on an adversarys centre of gravity (CoG) and its high value targets (key assets which are mission critical); and f. the adversary's likely intentions, including the aims and objectives in immediate and subsequent operations.

3. Intelligence estimates are prepared using an adversarys point of view. In developing the intelligence estimate, assessments must be based on the best available intelligence rather than on speculation. When there are gaps in intelligence on the adversary situation, assumptions may be made. However, the assumptions have to be identified clearly and separated from known facts. For an example of the format for an intelligence estimate, see B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, Chapter 4, Annex A. 1506. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING 15-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

1. An intelligence organisation must be established with necessary personnel and equipment well before the deployment to a theatre of operations. A TFHQ should include core intelligence planning, analytical, geomatics and meteorological staff as part of its permanent cadre. 2. For any operation, an intelligence plan, which explains how the intelligence staff will provide intelligence support, needs to be prepared. The plan takes into account the following: a. Personnel. The intelligence plan must consider the need for intelligence personnel to maintain the intelligence cycle on a 24/7 basis. In combined operations, personnel will also be required to liaise with allied intelligence organisations and staffs. The plan must also identify the sources from which the intelligence personnel will be drawn; b. Communications. Intelligence relies on dedicated, rapid, secure communications for the relay of collected information to the intelligence staff and the dissemination of intelligence to users. This usually means a significant bandwidth requirement. This must be planned for early on in the staff planning process. The intelligence plan, along with the force communications plan, must provide for this requirement; c. IT/IM. The intelligence staff requires access to adequate IT/IM equipment, which must be capable of handling information at the highest security classification level;

d. Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). A deployable SCIF is an essential element of a TFHQ. It allows the reception and processing of highly sensitive, timely, compartmented information and intelligence; and e. SOPs. Simple, concise SOPs to guide the activity of the intelligence staff need to be developed. 3. The intelligence plan is generally provided as an annex to the TFCs plan. See B-GJ-005-200/FP-000 Chapter 4 Annex B for the Intelligence Annex format. Alternatively, it could be prepared separately as one of a number of supporting plans. The TFC's operation order will also include an intelligence annex. 4. In a CF operation, the tasks of the intelligence staff include: a. indications and warning (I&W); b. preparation of the intelligence estimate and/or intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB); c. providing support to the staff planning process. This could include provision of intelligence on the terrain, waters and weather in the theatre of operations and how these affect the adversary's ability to operate;

d. preparation of a collection plan and an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) plan which incorporates all information collection assets available to the force; e. collection, processing and dissemination of current intelligence; f. provision of intelligence on the adversary's, or potential adversary's, location, organisation, capabilities and intentions;

g. provision of target intelligence; h. assessment of battle damage; i. co-ordination of counter-intelligence activities;

Ch 1 2004-11-05

15-4

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 j. k. l. 5. 1507. liaison with allied intelligence staffs in the theatre of operations; liaison with national intelligence staffs; and coordination of medical intelligence. These tasks will be performed in the priority established by the TFC . AREAS OF INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY AND INTEREST

1. A TFC, will usually be allocated an area of intelligence responsibility (AIR): within which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence. The main effort of the intelligence staff, within capabilities of the TFs reconnaissance and surveillance assets, will be directed to this area. 2. The TFC also needs intelligence about adversary activities, capabilities and intentions in adjacent areas if these can affect the mission, or if the TFC can affect the adversary's operations in these areas. Surrounding the area of intelligence responsibility, therefore, is an area of intelligence interest (AII), and is defined as that area within which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future operations. Since this area will likely be beyond the TFC's intelligence collection capability, they will be required to request information or intelligence from higher or adjacent formations. For this, intelligence liaison staff may be required, particularly in combined operations. 1508. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

1. The TF J2 staff must possess sufficient knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of sources and agencies available to them to be able to evaluate their reliability and to select and task them appropriately. 2. Sources can be categorized by the type of sensor by which information is obtained. Sources, which are likely to be of greatest operational value, include: a. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is the term used to describe all intelligence derived from the electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS). It is divided into communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT); b. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). This type of intelligence is derived from imagery obtained by photographic, electro-optical, radar, infrared, thermal and multi-spectral sensors, which can be ground, based, sea borne or carried by overhead platforms. The adage that a picture is worth a thousand words is especially true in intelligence. The information conveyed by an image is clear, concise and in the main unequivocal and will often serve to support or confirm intelligence derived from other sources. The bulk of IMINT is derived from sources such as satellites, aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); c. Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The generic term for any intelligence derived from information collected from and provided by from human sources. This could include reconnaissance patrols, prisoners of war and defectors, refugees or displaced persons, contact reports, and liaison and attach reports. Technically acquired information can quite often detail the number of troops, organisations and equipment, but HUMINT provides a means of determining adversary morale, disposition and intent;

d. Documentary Intelligence (DOCINT). This type of intelligence is based on the assessment of information derived from both published material and the broadcasting media (open sources). However, it may also use material not published in open sources; e. Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT). ACINT is derived from the collection and analysis of acoustic phenomena;

15-5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

f.

Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT). Scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender to facilitate the latters measurement and identification; and

g. Technical intelligence (TECHINT). TECHINT is intelligence concerning foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes. 3. The information collection plan should use sources in a manner that maximizes the individual capabilities of each source and collectively provides the fullest picture of the adversary. In selecting particular sources, intelligence staffs should consider the time lapse between the tasking of the source and the receipt of the requested information. 1509. INTELLIGENCE IN OPERATIONS

1. The TFC is served by an intelligence staff which obtains information and intelligence from a variety of sources and agencies and provides timely intelligence on the adversary and the theatre of operations. 2. The CDS, in allocating forces and defining the support available for an operation, defines the level of intelligence support available to the TFC. The CDS is assisted in this responsibility by the DCDS and the J2/DG Int. 3. Within the DCDS group, J2/DG Int and the National Defence Command Centre (NDCC) share responsibility for intelligence support to the CF. J2/DG Int is responsible for providing strategic intelligence, which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. The NDCC is responsible for providing the current operational intelligence required for the execution and support to CF operations. NDCC maintains a 24/7 watch, which employs the CF Command System (CFCS) as its principal conduit for intelligence and operational information to and from a TFHQ. The TFC determines what intelligence capabilities and assets are needed to support the operation and then liaises with J2/DG Int to establish how the force can be supported. Requests for intelligence support to other national agencies and allied agencies are routed through J2/DG Int during the initiation phase of an operation. Once these links are established, the TFC may liaise directly with these agencies depending on the intelligence concept of operations. (see Figure 15-1).

CANADA
CDS DCDS

J2/DG Int

COS J3 NDCC

Int

nt rre nce Cu lige el

Ch 1 2004-11-05

c gi e te c r a en St llig te In

CFCS
Top Secret & Secret Domains

THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
TFC COS J2

15-6

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

Figure 15-1 Intelligence Support to Operations 1510. GEOMATICS SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

1. Geomatics support planning must start as soon as an operation is initiated (preliminary planning should be undertaken during the warning phase). Acquisition and standardization of geomatics data and products must begin early to ensure a sufficient level of support to IPB, staff planning and operations. All operation plans will have a Geomatics Support Appendix to the Engineer Annex. Geo Teams will normally be attached to the JTFHQ/J2 from the ESU of the JSG. See Ch 27 for more detail. 2. Geomatics support plans provide two levels of support. The first consists of national level support through the provision of capabilities and materiel such as digital data, charts and maps. The second consists of direct support to the TFC through the provision of specialist personnel and equipment for such functions as terrain analysis, surveying and map distribution. 1511. 1. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS The J2 staff of a TFHQ is directly responsible to the TFC for intelligence matters.

2. The J2 staff is responsible for assisting the TFC by providing all possible intelligence concerning the adversary, the situation, terrain and waters in the area of operations. This intelligence includes a detailed knowledge of adversary location and apparent activities, and all that is known about adversary goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, ORBAT, doctrine and tactics, and vulnerabilities. The J2 staff also provides the TFC with the geomatics data and products to support operations. 3. The J2 staff must interact closely with the TFC and with other TFHQ staffs, as well as with intelligence staffs in superior, adjacent and subordinate HQ. Since intelligence and operations staffs are closely related they must ensure that their co-operative activities result in the highest level of operational synergy to support decision making at all levels of command.

15-7

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SECTION II - COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 1512. INTRODUCTION

1. Counter-Intelligence (CI) supports CF operations by providing a clear picture of the threat to the security of DND/CF personnel, property and information at all echelons. By focusing on hostile intelligence collection efforts, CI is designed to provide the commander with an adversary's intelligence collection situation and capability, thereby providing force protection information to counter the threat. 2. The characteristics or peculiarities of each CF deployment will impact directly on the conduct of CI activities, and will determine the emphasis to be placed on the various defensive programs, techniques and support measures available. 1513. PRINCIPLES OF CI

1. CI has borrowed the eight principles of intelligence (centralized control, timeliness, systematic exploitation, objectivity, accessibility, responsiveness, source protection and continuous review) to govern its activities. Three additional principles have been added at the end to highlight the distinctiveness of CI: a. Independence of the CI Function. CI is independent from police services by mandate and the rules of how information is collected, although there are similarities in tradecraft; b. Functional Integration with Intelligence. The need exists for functional integration with the intelligence function. Total independence would be highly inefficient, as databases would be duplicated along with automated systems and channels of communication. CI and Intelligence analysts need to consult in areas of mutual expertise. CI PIRs, drafted by the Int staff, are essential guidance for CI activities; and c. Functional Integration with Security. Functional integration of the CI process and security services is necessary to meet the objectives of force protection, security and FP countermeasures. Investigative and operational aspects of CI are closely linked to military police (MP) activities, especially when dealing with security offences, acts of terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Coordination and de-confliction must be established and maintained between CI and police functions to avoid duplication. CI SUPPORT

1514.

1. The degree of CI support to a task force and the functions to be conducted on deployment will be determined, in part, from assessments of the threat to the CF operation. The level of the threat to security is generally assessed and co-ordinated as follows: a. Strategic level in Canada - by J2/DG Int through the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU); b. Strategic level outside Canada - by J2/DG Int. Once the operation is in progress, the staff would rely, in part, on relevant security intelligence shared with them by the deployed task force; c. Operational level - by J2 of the Joint Task Force (JTF) with assistance from NDHQ; and

d. Tactical level - by the JTF J2 or the G2/N2/A2. 2. CI support to an operation starts early in the process, which is why it is imperative that CI personnel become involved in the earliest stages of planning and pre-deployment. It is at this time that the CI Estimate is prepared for the TFC. This estimate, which contains information on any adversary's capabilities, situation, likely intentions and most probable courses of action, is the basis for the production of the CI OPLAN and CI Collection Plan.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

15-8

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 1515. CI ACTIVITES

1. National laws and the Canadian citizen's expectation of privacy place important restrictions upon the manner in which security information is collected. Within Canada, CSIS and police forces at all levels hold a limited and exclusive mandate for the collection of this type of information through investigative means. For the CFNCIU guidance is found in the Security Intelligence Liaison Program (SILP). It is therefore necessary for the CFNCIU to obtain information through extensive liaison with various police and security agencies. 2. Domestically, DCDS oversight is maintained via the CI Oversight Committee. In Canada, CF CI functions and activities are limited to: a. Liaison. Conduct and maintain intensive liaison with Canadian and allied security and police agencies and organisations; b. Investigations. Investigate known or suspected incidents that threaten the security of DND/CF; c. Briefings. Conduct threat briefings as required to encourage awareness of the threat and to promote support for CI activities;

d. Debriefings. Conduct defensive security debriefings as required to determine any threat to CF personnel, assets or operations; e. Operations Security (OPSEC). Although OPSEC is primarily a J3 responsibility, CI personnel are also responsible to provide advice and assistance with OPSEC counter-measures. This can be done through low level evaluations to monitor the effectiveness of the measures; f. Monitor. Monitor Canadian and international open sources (radio, TV, newspapers, communiqus) for information pertaining to DND/CF;

g. Data Base. The CI database is a crucial element, an essential working tool for effective support to the mission. All relevant information on individuals, organisations and facilities must be entered and kept current; h. Counter Surveillance and Surveillance. As an investigative tool utilized during specific authorized CI investigations and/or operations; and i. Reports. The preparation and submission of CI reports.

4. CI activities conducted during foreign deployments are more advanced. In addition to those activities indicated above, the following are further examples of CI activities that may be employed: a. CI Investigations and Security Operations. A widened mandate and decentralized tasking for CI activities is given to the deployed JTF/J2; b. Debriefings. Close co-operation between the CI collectors/investigators and the Intelligence Branch HUMINT collectors will be necessary to compensate for scarce manpower; c. Censorship. The role of the CI personnel is to help monitor what information may be inadvertently disclosed about a CF formation. Full censorship is an extreme security measure that may be necessary during conflict or crisis. J3, with advice from CFPM and J2/DG INT, is responsible for censorship;

d. Lists. Develop, review and update black, grey and white lists of persons of CI interest. The purpose is to apprehend and interrogate those persons on black and grey lists and to protect those on the white list; e. Raids and Searches. Plan and co-ordinate raids and searches of CI targets. The purpose is to apprehend individuals of interest and to seize, safeguard and exploit material of value. This may include safe houses, military HQs, intelligence facilities, or equipment or civilian facilities (CIMIC can assist with the latter). This is an example of the need for close co-operation with Intelligence HUMINT collectors who 15-9 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 are also interested in such individuals, facilities and equipment; and f. Screening and Vetting. These steps are necessary in order to identify those individuals of CI interest who will attempt to infiltrate friendly units and facilities to collect information needed by the adversary. All locally engaged personnel (LEP) employed by a Canadian Contingent will be screened by a member of the CFNCIU

g. Reconnaissance. CI personnel must be part of the reconnaissance groups for proposed HQ sites. Although a J3 responsibility, CI personnel should, when possible, participate in sweeps of abandoned friendly sites for signs of adversary presence or activities to collect items of interest left behind by friendly forces. 1516. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. For CI, command and control relationships may change depending on the deployment or area of operation. For example: a. during their day-to-day domestic duties, members of the CFNCIU are under the command and control of the CO CFNCIU. However, at times, the DCDS may place elements of the CFNCIU under the tactical control of an operational commander for the duration of a specific domestic operation. While the CFNCIU collectors shall collect information according to the priorities, requirements and lawful direction of the designated commander, they remain under the command of the CO CFNCIU; and b. during foreign operations, deployed CI personnel come under OPCOM of the Task Force Commander and work in an OPCON relationship for the J2. CI will coordinate and de-conflict its activities with HUMINT and MP via the designated Canadian CJ2X staff officer. The CO CFNCIU remains the technical advisor on all CI matters.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

15-10

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 16 NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENCE 1601. INTRODUCTION

1. Canada has ratified and implemented a few conventions on the subject such as: the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Method of Warfare; the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC); the 1993 Paris Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Chemical Weapons which was conceived in order to complete the existing conventions; the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1995 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWC). As a result, Canada does not possess nuclear, biological/toxin or chemical weapons, nor does it intend to employ them. 2. Despite these efforts in the field of arms control, there is firm evidence of a continuing, worldwide proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons and their associated means of delivery. At the same time, the expanding global distribution of nuclear and chemical industries and materials opens up increasing possibilities of the release of toxic materials into the environment as the result of neglect, collateral damage, malicious misuse or natural disaster. A risk is now recognised from deliberate or accidental release of Toxic Industrial Material (TIM), which includes Low Level Radiation (LLR), and similar hazards1, by Releases Other Than Attacks (ROTA), which may influence operations. TIMs are an environmental health and hazardous material management responsibility. NBCD personnel are not equipped nor trained to deal with industrial material. Environmental industrial health hazard and environmental protection and stewardship directions are found in chapter 18 of the DCDS Directions to International Operations (DDIO) and DAOD 4003-0 respectively. Accordingly, joint operations must be planned, conducted and supported against a background of a continued risk of ROTA, and of the employment of NBC weapons by hostile forces including terrorists. 3. The aim of this chapter is to outline the principle factors affecting joint operations in a NBC environment and in dealing with ROTA. It also lists the considerations that should guide commanders and staffs in the preparation of plans and employment of a joint force in a NBC or ROTA environment. 1602. NBC DEFENCE DOCTRINE

1. The NBC Defence (NBCD) doctrine is based on ratified standardization agreements of NATO, Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) and America, Britain, Canada, Australia (ABCA) standardization programs. This will ensure Canadian doctrine is interoperable with allied forces. DND employees and CF members must adhere to the doctrine, which is outlined in B-GJ-005-311/FP-000, CF NBCD Strategic Doctrine and further develop in B-GJ-005-311/FP-010, CF NBCD Operations. Force commanders must be aware that environment specific NBCD capabilities exist and must consider these capabilities in the planning of operations. For example, most Canadian surface combatant vessels are equipped with hardened collective protection allowing them to continue operations in areas of NBC contamination without the burden of individual protective equipment. 2. This NBCD doctrine, in domestic and international operations follows the established Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) Protect Forces Capabilities, which provide guidance to be able to guard troops and equipment from potential or actual threats. These measures range from the use of intelligence to pre-empt an attack to the provision of proper equipment to troops to enhance their survivability. At all three levels (Strategic, Operational, Tactical) the protection of troops and equipment gives the commander greater Hazard. Defined as the adverse impact on health or property, which results from the presence of or exposure to a substance. The significance of the adverse effect depends on the nature and severity of the hazard and the degree to which the effect is reversible. It is evaluated by identified harmful effects associated with exposure. (DDIO Chapter 18) 16-1 Ch 2 2005-08-15
1

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 freedom of movement and action, which would be degraded in the event of successful attack. The CJTL Protect Forces Capabilities further develops the conduct of NBCD through the task of: a. Mitigating the effects of NBC and radiological weapons, conserving fighting power, diminishing utility of NBC weapons and contributing to deterrence; and b. Implementing national disaster control including Nuclear Accident Response to limit the effects of disaster (both national or as a result of widespread NBC weapons use/nuclear accident) on military units and, in co-ordination with Other Government Departments (OGD) and civil agencies, on other areas in Canada. 3. To provide further guidance, the conduct of NBCD has been sub-divided into 5 enabling components: a. Conduct NBC Detection, Identification and Monitoring. Detect, identify and monitor the arrival, dispersion and continued presence of NBC hazards, characterizing nuclear events and specifying all known CBW agents as prioritised; b. Conduct NBC Communication and Information System, Warning and Reporting. Alert the force of the presence of and provide accurate and timely information on current and predicted NBC hazards; c. Execute NBC Physical Protection. Provide individual and collective protection against NBC hazards as required, ensuring combat power is maintained;

d. Conduct NBC Hazard Management. Undertake hazard avoidance and contamination control procedures to minimise susceptibility of equipment, platforms and personnel to NBC weapons effects and to enable rapid recuperation following contamination; and e. Conduct NBC Medical Countermeasures and Support. Provide pre and post exposure treatment and medical support against the effects of NBC hazards. 1603. DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, MONITORING

1. To provide optimum force protection to personnel, maintain the operational tempo and ensure an adequate level of operational effectiveness, the presence of NBC hazards must, through the use of a sensor system, be determined in a timely manner in order to avoid them. The sensor/surveillance system includes a variety of platforms, which have point, remote, and stand off detection capabilities and which may be mounted on land based, sea based, airborne or space based platforms. 2. The NBCD detection, identification and monitoring capability provides an early warning capability at mission critical, fixed assets (air bases, embarkation points, command and control facilities, logistic nodes, etc.). Moreover, this capability of detection, identification, and monitoring of NBC agents provides the CF the capability to conduct: a. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance procedures are necessary to confirm the presence of contamination, from NBC weapons or agents; b. Survey. Survey procedures are necessary to determine the extent of the liquid or particulate hazard and to delineate and mark contaminated area to ensure forces are not inadvertently exposed; c. Sampling and Identification. Early identification of the hazard is necessary to determine the defensive measures and medical countermeasures necessary to mitigate the effects of the hazards. Operational identification will be achieved using in-theatre equipment while forensic identification may require taking samples and shipping them to an accredited laboratory. It is to be noted that forensic identification will be carried out by specialist teams and equipment, as well as moving the 16 - 2 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 samples in a rigorous manner as with police evidence. The purpose of forensic identification is to prove use of agents for the purpose of war crimes or other strategic purposes; and d. Monitoring. Monitoring is necessary in order to know the arrival of a hazard, determining when it is safe to relax the protective posture or remove individual protective equipment (IPE) and identifying who and what is contaminated. 1604. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEM, WARNING AND REPORTING 1. Communication and Information System (CIS), which bear, handle and distribute information, provide the commander with the ability to manage the available information. The occurrence of an NBC event has the potential for generating a large amount of information. Data can be generated from NBC sensors and observers, and from the general intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets of the Joint Force. Additional data will be generated when this NBC data is collected, integrated and analysed by the Joint Force NBC Warning and Reporting capability. The NBC CIS needs to be integrated within the overall CF operational automated information systems. This will ensure the rapid passage of information and reduce the need for duplicate CIS capability. 2. Once an NBC attack, ROTA and/or TIM is detected, all required levels of the Joint Force need to be warned as soon as possible so that timely and appropriate protective measures can be taken. Alarms need to be passed rapidly over CIS or other appropriate means. Alarm functions need to be capable of being set and reset to take account of subsequent changes in the level of risk. 3. Formations and units must be warned of the hazards resulting from an NBC attacks or ROTA. Commanders and staffs at all levels need to assess the impact of NBC events on their plans and decisions on the basis of timely, accurate and evaluated NBC information. Collection, evaluation and exchange of information on NBC incidents are significant contributors to effective NBCD. An NBC Warning and Reporting capability will ensure timely provision of the most accurate data on NBC events and the resulting hazard areas. The TF should establish and use the standardised NBC meteorological reports and NBC warning and reporting procedures laid in ATP-45 and/or Bi-SC Reporting Directive Volume IV. 4. Hazard prediction is necessary to determine the affected area to be warned. Prediction of hazards will be carried out in accordance with the procedures detailed in ATP-45 and, when able, enhanced by the use of automated data processing. 5. NBC reports and messages need to be sent by the quickest means available to all components of the Joint Force that are, or may be, affected by NBC hazards. Reporting to national agencies is also important to allow early consideration, at the political level, of appropriate responses. Where possible the speed and accuracy of the Warning and Reporting system needs to be enhanced by the use of automated data processing and CIS. 1605. PHYSICAL PROTECTION

1. Individual protection and collective protection (COLPRO) measures enhance survivability, however, they can restrict freedom of operations. Therefore, commanders need to reconcile the vulnerability of the Joint Force to NBC hazards with the restrictions imposed by protective measures and the success of the mission. This vulnerability analysis determines the levels of physical protection to be adopted. Commanders must continuously re-evaluate the risk in order to be able to reduce degradation and improve operational efficiency. 2. Individuals need to be provided with an individual respiratory protection system, prophylaxis/pretreatment medications, antidotes, a decontamination kit, a first aid kit, and protective clothing to protect against NBC hazards. Commanders must be aware of the limitations of IPE and respirator in protecting

16-3 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 against certain threats including TIH1. Planned response to a TIH requires the personal protective equipment for the identified hazard. The exposure of personnel to NBC or TIH needs to be continuously monitored and recorded so that the appropriate medical management, support and after-care can be arranged. 3. COLPRO is the process whereby protection from the hazards of NBC contamination is provided collectively to a group of individuals, thereby freeing them from the requirement to wear IPE. There are three categories of COLPRO: fixed (static locations), mobile (usually vehicle or ship installed/mounted) and transportable (usually based on tentage-like equipment that is readily transportable by airlift). Transportable COLPRO will be primarily for field deployable command and control facilities, medical facilities and to provide the environments for the operation of rest and relaxation centres in a contaminated area. Manoeuvre units may require portable COLPRO when not in contact. 4. COLPRO could also provide adequate protection against airborne NBC hazards and may also, depending on design and placing, resist some forms of surface contamination. However, commanders need to be aware that: a. Limited biological detection capability may prevent the accurate detection of Biological Warfare (BW) contamination of individuals seeking to enter COLPRO and thus require the imposition of limitations on entry into COLPRO after the arrival of a BW hazard. Access control is a means used to reduce the secondary transmissible infectious BW agents to the healthy occupants of COLPRO facilities; b. In the presence of immediate or deposited radiation hazards, the protection afforded by the COLPRO will be determined by the density of the surrounding platform or structure. It is unlikely that Transportable COLPRO will offer any significant resistance to the passage of gamma and neutron ionizing radiation; c. COLPRO filters may not be effective against high concentrations of TIH that displace oxygen and may provide only limited protection against some TIM compounds; and

d. Transportable COLPRO may be erected within existing structures (e.g. Airfield buildings or hangars) to provide ballistic protection and ready access to power supplies. 5. When a TF is required to operate for extended periods in a contaminated environment, and equipment is available, collective protection will be provided in priority for medical facilities, command posts, maintenance workshops and rest and recuperation areas. 1606. HAZARD MANAGEMENT

1. Hazard Management is based on the principles of pre-hazard precautions and hazard control. Once personnel or their equipment, vehicles or stores come into contact with hazards, IPE may need to be worn for a prolonged period. Wearing IPE degrades operational performance so its wear should be kept to a minimum, both in terms of the amount of equipment worn and duration. The principle means of countering these difficulties is to avoid hazards and the risk of becoming contaminated. If decontamination does become necessary, it needs to be undertaken as quickly as other operational priorities allow. Hazard management needs to be an integral part of all operational planning and, as far as possible, be prepared well in advance. 2. A commander may be forced to move either due to being faced with prolonged exposure to liquid contamination or as directed by the higher formation. Decontamination will be required before occupying a clean area.

Toxic industrial hazard (TIH) The hazard resulting from the release by any means of toxic industrial material resulting in the contamination or irradiation of personnel or the environment, area or any particular object. (AAP-21(A))

16 - 4 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 3. If the contaminated position cannot be vacated, operations have to continue in place. In this case: a. The mission may have to be limited in time and scope; b. Toxic-free rest and relief areas should be used whenever possible; c. Further exposure to the hazard should be limited by the employment of immediate and operational decontamination measures; and

d. In an ionizing radiation hazard area, dose management shall be implemented. 4. A TF that has been exposed to contamination must have the capability to decontaminate. This is a process of making any person, object or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. NBC contamination may result in the permanent loss of contaminated assets. Decontamination shall be carried out in four levels: a. Immediate Decontamination. Decontamination carried out by individuals upon becoming contaminated, to save life and minimise casualties. This may include decontamination of some personal clothing and/or equipment; b. Operational Decontamination. Decontamination carried out by an individual and/or a unit, restricted to specific parts of operationally essential equipment, materiel and/or working areas, in order to minimise contact and transfer hazards and to sustain operations. This may include decontamination of the individual beyond the scope of immediate decontamination, as well as decontamination of mission-essential spares and limited terrain decontamination; c. Thorough Decontamination. Decontamination carried out by a unit, with or without external support, to reduce contamination on personnel, equipment, materiel and/or working areas, to permit the partial or total removal of individual protective equipment and to maintain operations with minimum degradation. This may include terrain decontamination beyond the scope of operational decontamination; and

d. Clearance Decontamination. Decontamination of equipment and/or personnel on temporary or permanent removal from an operation to a standard sufficient to allow unrestricted transportation, maintenance, employment and disposal. 5. Depending on the degree of operational priority, the impact of decontamination operations on the personnel, the mission, the environment and local civilian infrastructure needs to be considered. Every effort will be taken to minimize the effects by preventing or limiting the spread of contamination by: a. Handling Contaminated Equipment and Supplies. Decontamination will be conducted as close to the contaminated area as tactically feasible to minimize the spread of contamination to the environment; and b. Disposal of Contaminated Waste. The waste products from the removal of hazards from contaminated forces, or the removal of contaminated covers, need to be contained and marked. Waste sites will need to be planned and will most likely require restoration once operations are complete. 1607. CONDUCT MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND SUPPORT

1. The NBC Medical Countermeasures (MedCM) and Support capability provides prophylaxis, pretreatment and post exposure treatment and removes all types of NBC casualties from areas of contamination. MedCM and Support are integral to the force protection package and provide synergy with other countermeasures, providing a means to mitigate the medical consequences that could occur as a 16-5 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 result of limitations in current detection and physical protection capabilities. 2. In many scenarios, despite present and future NBCD measures, casualties may occur and a high level of medical care will be expected. Medical staffs must be trained to handle contaminated casualties. To preserve force effectiveness, prevention and treatment regimes must be designed to minimise the time personnel are away from their primary function. Commanders must be aware that casualty treatment capabilities will be severely degraded in contaminated environments and medical resources severely stressed in the event of a successful attack. Mitigation should include the augmentation of medical units for purposes of casualty decontamination and security. 3. Medical/health service support elements may have to work within contaminated areas; they should, therefore, be provided with mobile and transportable COLPRO systems, or arrangements must exist for their decontamination and immediate evacuation. ROTA conditions will require a specific knowledge of the accepted exposure levels to e.g. LLR and TIMs. In all military operations, there will be a particular need to maintain records of individual exposure to NBC and ROTA hazards to allow properly targeted long-term medical aftercare. 4. In the event of a biological attack resulting in contagious casualties (such as smallpox and plague) there may be a requirement to impose restriction of movement on units attempting to enter or leave the affected area. 1608. CONCEPTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

1. Commanders Responsibilities. NBCD is a command responsibility and falls under the operations organisation for development, implementation and sustainment. The C2 arrangements for an operation must be structured to allow for the establishment of NBC cells at the operational and tactical levels. These NBC cells form the basis of an NBCD C2 system to direct, collect, process and disseminate NBC intelligence, produce hazard prediction, and manage the detection, warning and reporting system. In addition, they provide the NBCD specialist staff to advise the TFC and his staff on all aspects of NBCD. During NATO Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5 CROs), commanders have the particular responsibility to avoid the exposure of individuals to NBC risk, but, if this is not possible, to minimise the exposure to the lowest degree possible. In these circumstances, the Commander shall seek direction on the application of legal peacetime exposure guidelines. 2. Commanders Judgement. Commanders at all levels will have to judge what specific actions and activities they can order to achieve their objectives, while permitting a reasonable safety against hazards presented by ROTA or an adversarys use of NBC weapons. They must be aware of the degradation in performance, which results from the wearing of NBC IPE for protracted periods, and the hazards of body fluid loss in hot or humid conditions. Physical and psychological isolation and problems of personal recognition may cause difficulties in exercising command functions, and communication equipment will become more difficult to use. 3. Intelligence. A current, comprehensive and accurate intelligence assessment of the NBC threat in a joint operations area (JOA) is essential. This must include statements of the categories of weapons (i.e. N, B and C) available to opposing forces, the specific characteristics of any B and C agents in the opponents inventory and the possible means of delivery. The assessment should also incorporate judgements of the likely adversarys intentions in regard to the employment of NBC weapons, plus evidence of the oppositions concept of use. Information is also required on those aspects of the local topography and meteorological conditions in probable areas of use which may affect the hazard presented by the use of NBC weapons, especially the downwind travel of radiation or toxic agents. When applicable, the intelligence information must include details about the possible sources for low level radiation, toxic industrial chemicals and risks of ROTA. Intelligence efforts must also be directed towards the cataloguing of industrial facilities and material stockpiles whose damage, neglect or misuse might result in the emergence of toxic hazards. 4. Threat Levels. The TFC should keep the NBC threat level and ROTA hazards under constant review, and provide an up-dated threat assessment as the situation dictates, so that subordinate commands 16 - 6 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 can implement protective measures as required. In Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5 CROs), special attention should be paid to TIM hazards including LLR. This will ensure that the TF is properly prepared to meet the NBC hazards while avoiding unnecessary degradation of operational performance. 5. Managing the NBC Risk. The acceptable risk to operations from the effects of NBC must be determined by considering all potential NBC threats including TIM and other hazards from ROTA. It must be recognized however that the effects, and defensive measures, are different for NBC and TIM hazards. They cannot be simply lumped together. 6. Concept. Operations in areas with actual NBC or ROTA hazard should be avoided if the mission can be accomplished from outside the hazard. If it is necessary to continue operations in an NBC or ROTA hazard area, an assessment for the hazard must be performed, especially toxic industrial chemicals need to be assessed with the specific chemical property in mind. Longer operations in any hazard will require access to collective protection for rest and relief and all operations in a liquid hazard area will require decontamination. The primary countermeasure against contamination is avoidance; it will reduce, and sometimes eliminate, the need for protection and decontamination. 7. Toxic Industrial Material (TIM). TIM hazard may be encountered as a result of deliberate or collateral damage, or lack of maintenance to industrial facilities and that each TIM, in a particular geographic setting, will represent a unique situation. Commanders and staffs must be aware of the restrictions that TIM contamination can impose on operations and that often vapour from toxic industrial chemicals will be more dangerous than liquid. TIM consequence management operations are normally the responsibility of local civil authorities and will not normally include military resources deployed on operations, as a TF will not normally possess the protective equipment necessary to handle the full range of toxic substances. However, commanders must consider putting in place a multi-discipline response organisation and supporting action plans that will be capable of providing the necessary expertise in light of the TIM threat in the AOR. These specialists may be tasked to provide advice and assistance in the clean up or mitigation of effects of a TIM. In fact, when dealing with ROTA, environmental, occupational health, safety and hygiene experts, engineers, firefighters and NBCD specialists of the TF should be involved to offer detailed advice and specialist equipment. DCDS Direction for International Operations, Chapter 18 provides strategic guidance and limited reference to TIMs. 8. Meteorological Conditions. Meteorology is critical to the effective use of NBC weapons. A commander must consider prevailing meteorological conditions so as to predict the most likely threat direction and the times when an enemy NBC attack would be most effective. 9. Topography. Topography is critical to the effective use of NBC weapons on or near land. Open, flat areas will allow vapour hazards to disperse and dissipate, while rolling or mountainous regions with valleys, estuaries, or fjords will concentrate and channel them. Soil type and its absorption ability will affect the possible hazard duration as will type, amount and height of vegetation. In addition, bodies of water will have a significant effect on the dispersion of vapour hazards because of the effects that the differing temperatures of the land and water will have on air currents. 10. Task. The nature of the task and its vulnerability to NBC attack must be considered. For example, amphibious and mine-clearance operations are more vulnerable because they involve concentrations of personnel, in the open. 11. Plans. Commanders are responsible for NBCD planning and implementation.

12. Equipment. A TFC must be aware of the NBCD equipment that is available to the TF. He can reduce NBC protection if there is a good NBC detection, prediction, warning and reporting system. He must consider the capability and location of NBC detection equipment. Most detection equipment will only sound an alarm indicating the presence of an NBC agent in the immediate vicinity of the detector. Most chemical detection equipment will indicate the presence of liquid or vapour, but not both. It is essential to have responsive communication means for timely reporting and warning of NBC attacks and hazards. If possible, automated systems should be used by all participating nations, including the host nation. 16-7 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

13. Morale and Physical State of Personnel. TFC must also be aware of limitations of the TF's training and experience under real or simulated NBC threat conditions. NBCD training must be as continuous as possible so that troops react correctly when a hazard is encountered. Preparatory training must include operations in a simulated NBC environment. The reaction time needed to implement NBCD procedures and drills will be shorter for keen and alert personnel than for tired, sick or poorly motivated personnel. Furthermore, NBC environment associated degradation will be reduced with well-prepared and alert personnel. 14. Physiological and Mental Degradation. TFC must consider the psychological and physiological effects associated with wearing IPE. When full IPE is worn, planning and direction must be provided to personnel with respect to normal bodily functions. He must also consider the mental effects of being encapsulated in IPE, such as feelings of isolation, anonymity and even claustrophobia. Leaders, because of their need to communicate, gather and assimilate information, and make decisions, are often the first to suffer degradation. 15. Location of Personnel. This will have an effect on the protection levels a commander selects and the resulting performance degradation that might be expected. 16. Work Load. TFC must consider the workload associated with a particular task. Personnel engaged in heavy work while wearing IPE are prone to heat exhaustion, even in temperate environments. 17. Proficiency in NBCD. TF with a proficient NBCD organisation and with personnel well trained in individual drills and team responsibilities will have a significantly greater chance of sustaining operations and will give a commander much more flexibility when operating in an NBC environment. 18. Sustainability. NBC events may place additional friction on the sustainability of the force. NBCD operations will require additional logistic resources and collateral damage may place a burden on the maintenance of the supply chain. The force logistic plan may need a degree of redundancy or protection because of the possible vulnerability of fixed assets and facilities to NBC events at entry points into theatre and on lines of communication. 1609. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. TFC will have to take into account a number of support factors in an NBC or ROTA environment, especially in the fields of supply management, transport, maintenance and engineer support. 2. Supply Management. There will be increased demands placed on the supply system when supporting forces in an NBC environment. Planners will have to use foresight to ensure that additional stocks or measures are in place if a high NBC threat exists in order to compensate for the following factors: a. Loss of supplies due to contamination in storage or in transit; b. Increased maintenance times for damaged or broken equipment that is contaminated, resulting in the requirement to have more replacement equipment on hand to keep units operational; and c. Increased demands for NBCD equipment (replacement IPE, etc.).

3. Transport. The impact of the use of NBC weapons or ROTA on the transportation system of a joint force must be recognised, and movement plans must be flexible to allow for short-notice avoidance of contaminated or hazard areas, including the use of alternate Airports of Embarkation/Debarkation (APOE/APODs) and Seaports of Embarkation/Debarkation (SPOE/SPODs), as required. Host nation cooperation and mutual assistance between national support elements will be important. 5. Maintenance. When IPE must be worn, maintenance and repair of equipment will take longer and may prove impossible. In order to effect extensive repairs, equipment may require supplementary 16 - 8 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 decontamination even after thorough decontamination, which could prove impossible when IPE has to be worn. Depending on the source of the contamination and the equipment contaminated, consideration must be given to passive decontamination; that is quarantining the equipment and letting it decontaminate naturally. Allowance for this will need to be made in TF supply stock levels. 6. Engineer Support. There will be an increased demand for engineer support for such tasks as removal of contaminated soil and materiel, replacement of defensive structures, and installation of additional systems for COLPRO. Survivability may also include the combination of hardening, dispersal, camouflage, concealment and physical protection of personnel and equipment from the effects of NBC attacks. DND/CF Fire Fighters may also provide the minimum/initial emergency response for HAZMAT/NBC incidents. There will also be a greater demand for potable water due to higher individual consumption rates while in an NBC environment. The requirement for large water source to produce sufficient quantities of uncontaminated water for decontamination operations will also be a consideration.

16-9 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

16 - 10 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 17 AIRSPACE CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL SECTION I - AIRSPACE CONTROL 1701. INTRODUCTION

1. The airspace in a theatre of operations is a critical dimension of warfare as it is used by all components of a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct assigned missions. A high concentration of friendly subsurface, surface and air-launched weapon systems must share this airspace without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power. 2. The goal of airspace control is to enhance combat operations effectiveness in accomplishing the commanders objectives. Airspace control is a process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to prevent fratricide, enhance air defence operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat. 1702. TERMINOLOGY AND PRINCIPLES

1. Terminology. The following terms are used in describing and defining airspace co-ordination and control: a. Airspace Control System (ACS). An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures and facilities required to perform airspace control functions. b. Airspace Control Area. Airspace which is laterally defined by the boundaries of the area of operations. The airspace-control area may be subdivided into airspace control sub-areas. c. Airspace Control Authority (ACA). The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area.

2. Airspace Control System Fundamentals. To enhance combat operations effectiveness, the airspace control system must be developed considering the following fundamentals. a. Unity of Effort. (1) Unity of effort is essential to the system. Commanders view the battle through their own lenses; consequently, the objectives of the Joint Force Land Component Commander are not the same as the commander of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). To ensure the airspace requirements of these commanders are addressed within the context of a theatre airspace structure, an Airspace Control Authority (ACA) is designated by the joint force commander (JFC). The ACA achieves unity of effort primarily through centralized planning and control. The ACA should, to the maximum extent possible, co-ordinate with joint force components liaisons prior to hostilities. The ACA must integrate information flow throughout the system to provide necessary information for airspace control throughout the area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA). (2) For most operations, the roles of ACA and Area Air Defence Commander (AADC) are assigned to a single commander, normally the JFACC. This further unifies efforts across the spectrum of airspace use. Vesting appropriate authority and responsibility in a single air component commander provides for the effective exercise of leadership and power of decision over assigned forces to achieve a common objective. The air component commander, as the central authority for the air effort, develops strategies and plans, determines priorities, allocates 17-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 resources, and controls assigned air and space forces to achieve that objective. Having one commander with the responsibility and authority to co-ordinate and integrate air defence and airspace control greatly enhances the effort to gain and maintain control of the air and space environment. Through central authority, an air component commander gives unity and coherency to the defensive effort and to controlling the aerospace environment. The planned and co-ordinated use of airspace gives flexibility to the self-defence of surface forces and helps prevent inadvertent attacks on friendly forces. Co-ordinated air defence and airspace control enables the execution of offensive attacks against an enemys warfighting potential. (3) Centralized control and decentralized execution of aerospace forces helps make those forces responsive, serves to ensure forces are properly used and integrated, and fosters initiative at the action level. While centralized control guides actions to support a broad plan of action, decentralized execution provides flexibility for subordinate commanders to use ingenuity and initiative in attacking targets. b. Close Liaison and Co-ordination. Constraints on the airspace in the combat zone, special missions or the sheer demand for airspace may result in overlapping areas of airspace control. Close liaison and co-ordination between all airspace users is necessary to promote timely and accurate information flow to combat airspace managers. The primary reason for close co-ordination between airspace control, air traffic control, and area air defence elements is to reduce the risk of fratricide and balance those risks with the requirements for an effective air defence. Identification requirements for airspace control must be compatible with those for air defence. Airspace control, air defence, military air traffic control, and supporting command and control (C2) procedures, equipment, and terminology need to be compatible, mutually supporting, and interoperable. c. Common Procedures. Common airspace control procedures within the AOR or JOA enhance the effectiveness of air operations. These procedures need to allow maximum flexibility through an effective mix of identification and control measures. The control structure needs to permit close coordination between land, maritime, special operations forces, and air operations and allow rapid concentration of combat power in a specific portion of airspace in minimum time.

d. Simplicity. Airspace control structure and procedures need to be simple to execute for both ground operations personnel and aircrews. It should include visual, electronic, geographic, and manoeuvre means for sorting friendly and enemy aircraft. e. Reliable and Interoperable C3 Systems. The airspace control system must have a reliable, jamresistant, secure C3 network. Co-ordinated and detailed planning is required to ensure communication systems and procedures are interoperable and compatible among all airspace managers and users. f. Durable, Flexible, and Redundant Systems. Airspace control systems need to be survivable, sustainable, and redundant because they are likely to be prime targets for an attacker. Positive airspace control must be backed by procedural control procedures. The airspace control system in the combat zone needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and to the evolving operation. The system needs to be capable of supporting day, night, and all-weather operations.

g. Concentration of Forces. Airspace control system must allow for the concentration of air forces at the critical phases of the JFC plan. 3. Principles. The concept of airspace control in a theatre of operations is based on the following principles: a. Airspace control should be a major consideration throughout the planning and execution of an operation; 17 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

b. An airspace control area is established by the JFC with boundaries coincident with the area of operations; c. An ACS must be based on unity of effort. A co-ordinated and integrated ACS is essential for success;

d. The ACS must be durable and redundant given the likely targeting of this critical system by the enemy. This will require reliable, jam-resistant and, where appropriate, secure C3 networks; e. An ACA is appointed by the JFC and is delegated the necessary authority to allow the ACA to plan, co-ordinate and organize the ACS and to be responsible for its operation; f. Close liaison and co-ordination among all airspace users is necessary to promote timely and accurate information flow;

g. The ACS needs to be responsive to enemy threat conditions and to the evolving operation. Its design, responsiveness, and procedures must promote the rapid massing of combat power; h. Airspace control procedures must be simple (i.e., undue restrictions should be avoided). Restrictive measures should be clearly identified, established for as short a period of time as possible, in defined airspace only, kept to a minimum, and disseminated to all users expeditiously; Airspace control procedures must be disseminated in an easily understood format, often an ATO, and in a timely manner to all applicable sub-units for the system to function. i. j. Airspace control procedures must be flexible enough to accommodate both planned operations and unforeseen or quick-response operations; and Airspace control procedures do not deny the right of self-defence to any airspace user.

4. Airspace control must allow for the largely unrestricted use of friendly airspace by friendly air forces, while still permitting effective air defence as well as fire-support operations of maritime, land and air forces. There are two main premises in airspace control: a. restrictions cannot be avoided (this affects the movement of all air traffic through the forward area or any airspace containing ground or surface based weapons as well as opening fire policy for sea- or ground-based weapons under exceptional circumstances ), and b. the ACS must be capable of supporting day or night and all-weather operations. 1703. THE AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN

1. The ACA prepares the Airspace Control Plan (ACP), which is approved by the JFC, to establish procedures for the airspace control system in the joint force AOR or JOA. An example of the topics that should be considered when developing an ACP is provided in Annex A, Airspace Control Plan. The ACP must be co-ordinated with the area air defence plan and included in joint operations plans. These documents must be co-ordinated to facilitate continued operations in the event of degraded command and control systems. The ACP must consider procedures and interfaces with the international or regional air traffic systems necessary to facilitate the flow of air traffic into and out of the AOR or JOA. 2. Co-ordination with the Host Nation. The ACP should be co-ordinated both with representatives of the host nation(s) in whose airspace the operations will take place and with representatives of civil air activities operating in and near the airspace. There also should be close planning and co-ordination between representatives of both offensive and defensive weapon systems of coalition and multinational armed services.

17-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

3. Integration with Civil and Military Air Operations. Broad areas of concern for developing the ACP include familiarity with the basic operation plan and knowledge of host and multinational capabilities, procedures of military and civil airspace control and air traffic control systems, and general locations of friendly and enemy forces. Airspace control activities must integrate surface-to-air defence weapons and air defence aircraft for maximum effectiveness. 4. Transitions from Peace to War and War to Peace. The ACP needs to support an orderly transition from peacetime to combat and back to peacetime operations. Such a transition could occur during a period of increasing tensions or suddenly without much warning. 5. Airspace Control Measures. Airspace control measures (ACMs) are the means to define controlled sub-areas within a given airspace. They are referred to as zones, areas, corridors, etc. in their descriptions and define airspace restrictions, access, and control and co-ordination procedures. The Airspace Control Plan should specify what ACMs are to be used in the AOR or JOA and how these measures will be promulgated. The ACP also should include fire support co-ordination measures and all component-unique airspace control measures and terms. 6. Air Traffic Control Integration with Airspace Control. The ACP should provide procedures to fully integrate the resources of military air traffic control (ATC) facilities with terminal-area airspace control responsibilities. ATC facilities should be interfaced and linked with airspace control system communications to form a system that ensures the safe and efficient flow of air traffic supporting the combat effort while permitting maximum combat flexibility. 7. Integration with Air Defence. The integration of air defence in the ACP is critical. The location of specific types of air defence operations and specific procedures for the identification of aircraft are critical to a viable ACP. The area air defence plan needs to be written with detailed engagement procedures consistent with the ACP and operations in the combat zone. Specifically, valid Rules of Engagement for the theatre must be stated in the ACP and amended through the ACO cycle as necessary. Airspace control and area air defence operations need to be capable of functioning in a degraded environment. Detailed engagement procedures and decentralized execution are key to operating in a degraded environment and must be made accessible to ground-based units at the lowest level. 1704. DEVELOPING THE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM

1. Developing an airspace control system requires a great deal of planning by the ACA. The airspace will likely be used by all the TF components. Depending on the situation, the airspace environment may transition from combat to peacetime and back to combat. As such, air defence methods of controlling and identifying aircraft within the airspace and enemy engagement must be addressed. 2. Operational Requirements. Each AOR or JOA has specific operational requirements for airspace control. These requirements must be determined as early as possible to be incorporated in the overall joint force planning effort. Political constraints, national and military airspace control and air traffic control systems and procedures, and the capabilities and limitations of these systems are important considerations. Rules of engagement, disposition of air defence weapons, fire support plans, and procedures for identifying aircraft are also important items that should be considered. Every joint force is different, depending on the mission to be accomplished, forces assigned, and the command structure established by the JFC. In most cases, these forces will have specific operational requirements for airspace that must be taken into account when developing the ACP. 3. Planning Considerations. a. Planning Process. For situations requiring significant involvement of air forces, the air component should identify an appropriate commander. Once appointed, this commander should rapidly 17 - 4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 assemble a joint staff representing all airspace control and air defence forces anticipated for the operation. This staff should proceed with completion of all phases of crisis action planning including the formulation of an ACP and air defence plan for the JFCs approval. These plans must be developed in co-ordination and in parallel with the JFC and other component staffs planning efforts. The airspace control system to execute the air defence plan must be planned and integrated to meet and complement the JFCs campaign plan. b. Integrated Planning Cycles. The airspace planning cycle should be integrated with the planning cycle for the joint campaign plan and the overall air operations plan. Input from all organizations involved in the conflict must be consolidated, and the final ACP must be devised and disseminated to all users. The ACP can be added as an appendix to the operations annex of the joint force operation plan or the overall air operations plan. c. Volume of Air Traffic. Planning for airspace control in the combat zone must consider the aircraft traffic volume for the anticipated offensive operations and the timing constraints placed on those operations. Planning must fully integrate combat airspace management, air traffic control, and air weapons control with air defence operations to respond to enemy actions quickly and with adequate force.

d. Degraded Operations. Plans should anticipate the effects of information operations warfare and communications degradation on system operations. An effective airspace control system needs to plan for the full spectrum from no degradation to full degradation of communications. Plans also should consider the effects of weather and darkness. 4. Transition from Peacetime to Combat Operations. JFCs should have both an ACP that is continually updated in peacetime and throughout the evolution of a campaign and standing airspace control order (ACO) to provide airspace control in the event of surprise attack. The JFACC will likely develop and co-ordinate such plans in most theatres. Peacetime airspace rules and organizations change during actual conflict, and the nature of these changes is different from theatre to theatre. During military operations other than war, normal airspace control and air defence operations may be in place. The ACP needs to provide instructions to transition from peacetime to combat and back again in simple, clear steps. For example, existing air defence structures may be over-whelmed by massed enemy attacks over small geographic areas. These massed attacks may be heavily supported by electronic and communications jamming. Once the scope and nature of enemy massed operations are determined, friendly air defences can be massed within the AOR or JOA to counter the enemy threat. 5. Integration of Airspace Control and Air Defence Operations. Because the two functional areas of airspace control and air defence operations would conflict and interfere with each other if operating independently, prioritization and integration of each mission is essential. Ultimately, the airspace control function must be integrated with air defence operations. Airspace control procedures will be used to assist in aircraft and missile identification, facilitate engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles, and provide safe passage of friendly air vehicles. Normally, the JFACC unifies these functions in the air operations centre. 1705. IMPLEMENTATION OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

1. Methods of Identification. The methods of identification and levels of airspace control vary throughout the spectrum of military operations that include both combat and non-combat activities. The methods of identification employed within an AOR or JOA are positive, procedural, and a combination of the two. The airspace control structure needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and changing tactical situations. It is up to the JFC, through the ACA, to decide the appropriate method to use based on the concept of operations. 2. Positive Control. Control is determined by visual recognition, electronic support systems, non-cooperative target recognition systems, identification friend or foe/selective identification feature systems or 17-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 other physics-based identification techniques. Positive control does not assume identity solely based on location or adherence to airspace procedures. Positive-control facilities may be subject to attack or sabotage and may be restricted by line-of-sight coverage or electronic interference. 3. Procedural Control. Identification assumptions are made based on adherence to agreed upon airspace control measures and rules. Identification is assumed to be friendly as long as rules are followed, but identification is assumed hostile if rules are not followed and the suspect aircraft, UAV etc. is not otherwise positively identified. This method while more restrictive than positive identification, is less vulnerable to interference. It ensures continuity of operations under adverse environmental conditions and must always be available as an immediate fall-back system should positive control be degraded. Security is an important consideration and procedures should be changed periodically to safeguard them. The procedural method includes a system of routes and corridors for friendly air traffic and areas where the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. It may involve rigid identification procedures and separation standards, or it may enable weapon systems and aircraft to operate relatively freely. There may be restrictions on timing, altitude, speed and formation size. These routes, corridors, areas and restrictions are called airspace control measures. While there is no need for dedicated communications, a reliable communication and information system (CIS) is needed to promulgate ACM. The ACA selects those ACMs which are most suitable for the area of operations and the mission. A list of ACMs, that are consistent with NATO Doctrine found in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 40 B, Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War, AJP 3.3.5 and AAP-6, is at Annex B. 4. Most airspace control methods employ a combination of positive and procedural means or measures to effect identification. When employing a combination of identification means, procedural measures may be used to identify friends but are not used to identify hostiles. Visual and electronic systems may be used to identify friends and hostiles. Stated another way, procedural measures may be used to identify friends but positive techniques must be used to identify hostiles. 5. An effective ACS employs a combination of methods for positive and procedural control. The degree to which each control method is used depends on such factors as: a. the nature and strength of the enemy threat, b. the availability, capability and vulnerability of friendly airspace-control facilities, c. the type and intensity of air operations,

d. the type and intensity of land and sea operations, e. the terrain and weather in the combat zone, and f. the number, deployment and characteristics of friendly air defence systems.

6. In a high-electronic-threat environment, the emphasis is on procedural methods. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) is the primary means of identification with the procedural system allowing further discrimination. Airspace is divided into forward and rear areas with different procedures for each. 1706. ORGANIZATION OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

1. An airspace-control area is the basic geographical element of an ACS. The ACA, appointed by the JFC, plans and co-ordinates airspace-control operations in the control area, using resources and capabilities of those components and agencies of the TF capable of effecting airspace control. The airspace-control area may be subdivided into airspace-control sub-areas. The number of sub-areas depends upon the operational situation, the capabilities of the ACA's C2 facilities, geographical factors, the complexity of airspace control requirements, and air defence requirements. Whenever possible, the sub-areas should conform to tactical boundaries.

17 - 6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 2. In co-operation with component commanders and other airspace users, the ACA is responsible for the ACS, the development of the ACP and the preparation and promulgation of periodic airspace-control orders (ACO). 3. The ACP details the boundaries of the airspace-control area and any sub-areas, lists the ACA and any sub-area ACAs, and describes the workings of the ACS. ACPs may come into effect automatically at alert states or on direction of the TFC. New ACPs are issued as required. 4. The ACA implements the ACP by issuing ACO at specific intervals, as promulgated in the ACP, to all components of the TF. Urgent amendments may be issued at any time. 5. ACO contains the specific ACM which are in effect for the period of the ACO. The ACM permit friendly forces to conduct operations with minimum risk of engagement by friendly air-defence systems. Commands or agencies requiring ACM to be established, activated, deactivated or modified forward requests to the ACA. 6. To plan, organize and operate the ACS in accordance with the authority delegated, the ACA establishes an airspace control centre. The airspace control centre performs the following functions and tasks: a. co-ordinate and approve or deny requests for ACM, b. resolve conflicting requests for ACM, and c. 1707. promulgate the activation, deactivation or modification of ACM by ACO. RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL

1. Responsibility for airspace control in a theatre of operations is exercised by the TFC through a designated ACA. A TFC may assign a staff organization to accomplish the broad functions of airspace control. Since airspace control primarily affects air operations, the air component commander is normally appointed the ACA. However, based on such factors as the primary mission, airspace-control capabilities and combat air resources, another component commander may be appointed the ACA. The ACA's authority is limited to the implementation of airspace control. In addition, the TFC is responsible for: a. defining the concept of operations (CONOPs) for airspace use within the area of operations, b. assigning tasks to subordinate commanders and providing priorities for airspace use, and c. monitoring the ACS to ensure that it operates in accordance with their guidance and direction.

2. The ACA, in co-ordinating the airspace-control activities for a TF, has the following planning responsibilities: a. planning and establishing an ACS that is responsive to the needs of the TFC and all airspace users, b. developing co-ordinating policies and regulating procedures to achieve unity and standardization in the application of airspace control in the airspace-control area, c. determining the requirements for airspace control sub-areas and naming sub-area ACAs, if applicable, and

d. developing the ACP. 3. for: During the conduct of operations, the ACA supervises the functioning of the ACS and is responsible

17-7 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

a. promoting the safe, efficient and flexible use of the airspace, b. preparing and issuing periodic ACOs, c. modifying the ACP, specifically the airspace control procedures and ACM, as required, and

d. authorizing deviations from established policies and procedures. 4. Component commanders of a TF have the following responsibilities with respect to airspace control: a. ensuring that all units under their command comply with the ACS, b. co-ordinating their requirements for airspace use with the ACA, c. establishing and maintaining a link with the ACA for planning and co-ordinating airspace-control activities,

d. providing facilities and personnel, when required, to conduct airspace-control in airspace control subareas, e. providing representatives and liaison to the ACA and sub-area ACAs as required, and f. providing airspace control in designated airspace, when required, in accordance with promulgated policies.

17 - 8 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 SECTION II - AIR DEFENCE 1708. INTRODUCTION

1. Air defence consists of all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. 2. In peacetime, air-defence operations involve the surveillance of friendly airspace and sea lines of communication (SLOC) to assist in denying a potential enemy the freedom to conduct reconnaissance and harassment missions and to provide early warning of an attack. During periods of conflict, air defence involves such measures as deception and dispersion, and the detection, identification, interception and destruction of enemy aircraft and missiles. 1709. 1. CONCEPT OF AIR DEFENCE Air defence encompasses both active and passive measures.

2. Active air defence is direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air defence weapons, weapons not used primarily in an air-defence role, and electronic warfare (EW). Airspace control in an active air defence environment can be extremely difficult, but it is crucial to successful air operations and effective air defence. Positive or procedural control methods must be implemented to ensure that friendly air assets can safely transit the airspace without inhibiting air defence or other air operations. Regardless of other controls and measures imposed within defended airspace, air defence forces must be able to readily identify all air assets in the area by electronic, visual or procedural means. 3. Passive air defence is all measures, other than active air defence, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air action. These measures include deception, dispersion and the use of protective construction. Active air defence may not be able to prevent all hostile air missions from reaching their targets. The TFC, therefore, must ensure that passive air defence measures complement active defence to degrade the enemy's targeting capability, to minimize any degradation of the TFC's own combat capability, and to reduce the effects of enemy air attacks. 4. The basic types of air defence are as follows: a. area defence the defence of a broad area, b. point defence the direct protection of vital elements or installations, and c. 1710. self-defence the ability of friendly units to defend themselves against direct attack through the use of organic weapons. IMPLEMENTATION OF AIR DEFENCE

1. Integration of the TFs air-defence resources and capabilities into one air-defence system is essential to provide a quick, flexible response to changing combat situations. The principle of centralized C2 and decentralized execution ensures a maximum degree of efficiency and allows different air-defence weapon systems to operate with optimum freedom of action. Responsibilities for C2 must be carefully defined for all levels of command and for each weapon system to ensure a smooth and controlled flow of orders, directives and information. 2. An air defence C2 arrangement should enable the AADC and component commanders to manage air-defence operations effectively by providing facilities for: a. timely and effective planning, tasking and co-ordination of all air defence resources,

17-9 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 b. surveillance through the co-ordinated use of all available sensors to complete a real-time air picture, c. airspace control to ensure maximum freedom of action and minimum risk to friendly forces,

d. information exchange, e. survivability against physical attack, f. deployable components including mobile control or operations centres,

g. effective CIS, and h. alternate C2 facilities if primary facilities are lost. 3. To co-ordinate and integrate air defence and airspace control in a theatre of operations, the ADC requires a responsive CIS to transfer and process the ATO and ACO for the maritime, land and air forces involved. The CIS must be inter-operable within the TF and, in a combined operation, between the Canadian TF and its allies. 1711. ORGANIZATION OF AIR DEFENCE

1. Air defence operations are controlled by a system made up of a number of sub-systems, all of which are interdependent and complementary. These include: a. early warning, surveillance and aircraft control sensor systems, b. C2 systems, c. fighter aircraft,

d. Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD), including missiles and guns, e. CISs, f. appropriate electronic-warfare assets, and

g. air defence intelligence systems. 2. In a theatre of operations, an air defence area is a specifically defined airspace for which air defence must be planned and provided. Air defence is accomplished by an ADC, appointed by the TFC. The ADC is defined as a duly appointed commander responsible for the air defence of a designated area. 3. Whether defending maritime, land or air forces from air attacks, airspace control and air defence should be accomplished concurrently. In the confusion inherent in areas where forces are engaged, situations are created wherein friendly aircraft could be engaged by friendly forces or enemy aircraft could fail to be engaged because of uncertainties in aircraft identification. For this reason, the TFC generally appoints a single authority for any given airspace (i.e., a single authority to perform the duties of both the ACA and the ADC). This ensures that airspace control and air defence efforts are co-ordinated and, if necessary, integrated. The single authority is generally the Forward Air Control Centre. 4. To exercise responsibility for air defence, the ADC may establish an air defence control centre (ADCC), which is defined as the principal information, communications and operations centre from which all aircraft, anti-aircraft operations, air defence artillery, guided missiles and air warning functions of a specific area of air defence responsibility are supervised and co-ordinated. Where the designated ADC is also the ACA, the ADCC and the airspace control centre are collocated.

17 - 10 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 1712. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AIR DEFENCE

1. With the advice of subordinate commanders, the TFC establishes broad planning objectives and guidelines for airspace control and air defence operations, and for targeting. The TFC's specific responsibilities with respect to air defence include the following: a. defining the air-defence area and appointing the ADC, b. setting priorities and determining the weight of effort to be devoted to air defence, and c. 2. ensuring that air defence operations are conducted in accordance with ROE. In conducting air defence operations in the air defence area, the ADC is responsible for: a. exercising OPCON of all air defence resources and capabilities, as delegated by the TFC, b. co-ordinating all operations involving air defence weapon systems, c. co-ordinating and integrating other airspace usage with air defence operations,

d. developing air defence co-ordinating policies and air defence procedures, e. integrating TF components' air defence resources and capabilities, and f. when necessary, delegating control of air defence resources and capabilities to those units of the TF that have the facilities to control and co-ordinate activities.

3. Once individual ACMs are implemented, air defence operations are conducted under specific ROE with component commanders responsible for the detailed and usually local direction of air defence operations necessary to achieve specific missions or tasks.

17-11 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 SECTION III - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 1713. INTRODUCTION

1. The role of the terminal airfield operations element (air traffic control and airfield management) is to support combat flight operations. This information supplements guidance contained in NATO ATP 40, Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War, and US Joint Pub 352, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. Air defence consists of all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. 2. Air Traffic Controls Function in the Airspace System. Close co-ordination between airspace control, air defence, and air traffic control (tactical aspect of air traffic control) elements is required to maximize combat effectiveness while preventing fratricide and mutual interference. Terminal area air traffic services and airfield management must be capable of supporting operations as required by the JFC. Deployable Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems (DATCALS) provide air traffic control in support of terminal flight operations. DATCALS are designed to ensure safe, flexible, and efficient use of terminal airspace. DATCALS also provide continuity of control with the Theatre Air Control System (TACS) and air base defence. Air traffic control and airfield management personnel will deploy, operate and sustain DATCALS to support operations at bare-base or host-nation locations. While the focus of the capabilities is on deploying large-scale forces into a bare-base scenario, airfield operations packages can also be adapted to small unit and/or single-mission deployments. The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) deployed within the Army Air / Ground System (AAGS) within a land formation is responsible to ensure that this function is observed by aircraft transiting the forward area. This is accomplished by close and constant liaison within the land formations Airspace Control Centre (ASCC) to include dissemination of ATO information applicable to the formation AOR and the positive control of any aircraft conducting operations minus of the Fire Support Co-ordination Line (FSCL) within the AOR. 3. Flight Following Mechanisms. Normally, the air traffic control system uses an automated flight planning system to assist air traffic controllers in maintaining positive control of the terminal area. The air tasking order (ATO) can be used in lieu of a flight planning system. 4. Procedural Control versus Radar Control. Environmental and equipment factors may preclude radar control of all air traffic in the combat zone. Therefore appropriate procedural means must be available. Air assets operating below the co-ordinating level within the forward area must adhere to procedural control as a rule, as radar (positive) control will not be employed in their numerous and often unscheduled activities. Aviation units and UAVs within land forces formations are particularly bound to this process. 5. Airfield Management. Airfield management provides NOTAM receipt and flight planning function. It also provides airfield criteria for inspections, markings, safety, security, parking plans, and munitions and hot fuel areas. A critical element is emergency response planning. 6. Airfield Operations. Airfield operations will co-ordinate, integrate, and regulate the air traffic services and airfield management assets increase operational effectiveness. The JFACC will co-ordinate and plan appropriate relief of the special tactics teams by follow-on, general-purpose air traffic service forces. 7. Planning. Commanders must determine the forces required, the arrival sequence, and what level of risk they are willing to expose the airfield operations forces. Additionally, deployed airfield operations forces must be prepared to be self-sufficient during the early stages of an operation because the logistics system may not be in place. Initial airfield operations should plan to deploy with adequate capability and supplies to maintain operations until the theatre is capable of supporting operations and the re-supply pipeline is established. Air traffic controllers are assigned as combat airspace managers to support the ACC or the JFC in the AOC. Their duties include ACO development and production, as well as planning for the full range of airfield operations to support deliberate and crisis-action planning, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of airfield operations forces. Airfield operations personnel provide liaison support to the various worldwide cells or theatre staffs to ensure the CF and its allies can quickly apply global power to crisis situations anywhere in the world by delivering combat air and ground forces. 17 - 12 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

8. Combat-Specific Training. Airspace control in the combat zone relies heavily on specific procedures and combat-ready personnel. Airspace control procedures and personnel must be trained and exercised in peacetime to be effective in combat. This is particularly true of air traffic control procedures and personnel in the communications zone and rearward. Air traffic controller training should be augmented by combat-specific air traffic control training. In the Combat Zone and forward areas, the Airspace Control Centre established by the Ground Based Air Defence is central to these practices. The activities of the ASCC must be integral to all land formations training activities, actively integrating the tactical helicopters, close air support, and UAV activities taking place in the formation AOR. 9. Capabilities. Airfield operations personnel and DATCALS provide the full range of support from initial visual flight rules and limited instrument flight rules capability to host nation liaison and augmentation. General-purpose DATCALS and airfield operations personnel provide terminal area and airfield support from austere to fully supported host nation airfields with mobile control tower, surveillance radar, precision-landing system, terminal navigational aids space- and ground-based capabilities, or any combination of these. Austere airfield operations can be provided by special tactics teams. General purpose air traffic controllers are capable of providing an initial bare-base ATC capability, but generally these forces are not capable of autonomous operations and require additional base support. 10. Maritime Capabilities. Planners must bear in mind that maritime resources may provide the necessary control, command, surveillance and co-ordination capabilities until land based facilities can be organized, or in lieu of land based facilities. For example, US Navy guided missile cruisers were employed in air traffic control in Mogadishu, Somalia, during UNISOM in 1992/93. Similarly, during littoral or expeditionary operations, US or other NATO aircraft carriers or air-capable amphibious vessels could be well placed to conduct airspace co-ordination and control for the JFC.

17-13 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

17 - 14 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 ANNEX A AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN 1. Purpose. Provide considerations for development of an Airspace Control Plan (ACP).

2. Considerations. Every ACP must be based on the objectives of the military operations, the capabilities and shortcomings of both friendly and enemy forces, and the contributions and complexities introduced by host-nation and multinational forces, as well as the access required to the airspace by nonbelligerent aircraft. ACP considerations include: a. Description of the conditions under which the guidance and procedures in the ACP are applicable (e.g., the exercise, operation plan, operation order, military operation). b. Description of the area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA) within which the ACP applies. c. Appointment of the airspace control authority (ACA); location of ACA headquarters.

d. A list of capabilities that exists within the joint force and in the AOR or JOA to provide airspace control (ground sites, sea-based and airborne capability) and means of communicating with those elements. e. Description of the duties and responsibilities of: (1) The ACA. (2) Each airspace user within the joint force (to include requirements for liaison to and co-ordination with the ACA). (3) Each element used in the airspace control system (site, facility, or airborne platform). f. Description of the interface between the joint force air component commander (JFACC), ACA, the area air defence commander (AADC), and fire support co-ordination elements and the procedures adopted to co-ordinate and de-conflict air defence and operational requirements.

g. Description of interface with the Civilian Aviation Authority, host-nation air traffic control system, and International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). h. Description of the interface between the tactical air control system(s) and the elements within those systems for air traffic control. i. j. k. l. Description of the interface between the army air to ground system(s) and the elements within those systems for air traffic control in the combat zone and forward areas in the land formation battlespace. Description of the interfaces between multinational forces to co-ordinate and de-conflict airspace requirements, as required. Plans to provide for airspace control operations under degraded conditions (alternate headquarters, alternatives for key radar or command and control nodes, and other required capabilities). Description of positive airspace control measures and procedures for the joint force.

m. Description of the procedures to propose, approve, modify, and promulgate each procedural airspace control measure available for use within the AOR or JOA (high-density airspace control zone, joint engagement zone, fighter engagement zone, missile engagement zone, medium-risk

17A - 1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 route, transit route, co-ordinating altitude, air routes, corridors, restricted operations zones, altitude reservations, time slots and other appropriate procedures). n. Description of identification friend or foe or selective identification feature procedures. o. Description of the Air Defence Rules of Engagement established for the theatre as applicable to aerial, land and sea based air defence systems. This must include criteria for target acquisition as well as engagement where such procedures could consist an aggressive action (i.e. radar lock or lasing). p. Description of orbit procedures. q. Description of procedures, systems to compile and promulgate the airspace control order that provides airspace control procedures and guidance in effect for the specified time period. The airspace control order would normally contain: (1) Modifications to guidance and procedures contained in the ACP. (2) Active or current identification friend or foe or selective identification feature procedures. (3) Air Defence ROE changes or amendments. (3) Location and procedures associated with active procedural airspace control measures (highdensity airspace control zone, joint engagement zone, fighter engagement zone, missile engagement zone, medium-risk route, transit route, co-ordinating altitude, air routes, corridors, restricted operations zones, altitude reservations, time slots and other appropriate procedures). (4) Procedures for entering and transiting active restricted operations zones (e.g., amphibious objective area, force air control area (FACA)). (5) Location of active orbit areas. (6) Active unmanned aerial vehicle launch and recovery areas and mission areas.

17A - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 18 SPACE OPERATIONS SECTION I - ATTRIBUTES OF SPACE SYSTEMS 1801. INTRODUCTION

1. Space has been called the ultimate high ground. Control of the high ground, while not a guarantor of victory, confers a strong military advantage. In the information age, this military advantage is more important than ever. 2. While the CF do not currently, and may never, possess systems that perform all the space missions, it is important for CF personnel to be familiar with space doctrine because space systems will have an effect on CF personnel at all levels. Canada does participate in the use of space systems with allies and other governmental departments. As the third nation in space, Canada continues to be a major player in the civil and scientific space arenas, and has an evolving military space capability. Additionally, Canadas size and geographic location may allow, or require, space to play a larger role in providing surveillance of, and enforcing Canadian sovereignty over our territory. 3. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the fundamental principles and basic doctrine for the military use of space. The fundamental principles serve as a starting point to inform personnel on what is possible utilising the space medium. The basic doctrine describes what can be accomplished for the military in space, not necessarily what the CF will do in space, which is restrained by current Canadian policy. National policy, doctrine and real world restrictions will lead to space strategy and space projects to support Canadian national objectives. This doctrine does not contain specific techniques and procedures; rather it provides a framework for what is possible. It is left up to the user to develop solutions to given military situations. Operational level space doctrine will be developed to provide guidance on the employment of specific space systems once they are acquired or become available through allies or commercial means. 1802. GENERAL 1. Space systems have a number of attributes, or characteristics, which make them different from terrestrial-based systems. These attributes affect how space systems can be used by militaries, and can be grouped into four broad categories: environmentally, logistically politically/legally and commercially influenced attributes. 1803. ENVIRONMENTALLY INFLUENCED ATTRIBUTES

1. Environmentally influenced attributes are those that arise from operating in the unique medium of space. Where exactly space begins is somewhat ambiguous, as there is no universally or legally defined point where space starts. For practical military applications, space can be defined as starting where a satellite can orbit, but this still leaves some ambiguity. Technically, a satellite can orbit at 100 km, but the atmospheric effects are still fairly strong and therefore no satellites orbit at this altitude. The effects of the atmosphere gradually taper off with altitude, so the higher a satellite orbits the less it is affected by atmospheric drag. The hard vacuum, or the end of atmospheric influence on satellites, begins at approximately 1,600 km. The environmentally influenced attributes of space include the following: a. Global Presence. Because of their altitude above the earths surface satellites can see large portions of the surface at a time. A satellites potential field of view can vary with altitude, from a circle with a radius of 2,000 km in low earth orbit to approximately a third of the earths surface at a geosynchronous orbit. Constellations of satellites can cover the entire surface of the earth continuously. For missions such as communications and launch detection this can provide a tremendous advantage over terrestrial-based systems. For low earth orbiting satellites in highly inclined (polar) orbits, their ability to scan the entire surface every day or every few days is their prime advantage, particularly for environmental and intelligence missions. b. Predictability. Because satellites are in unpowered flight (essentially they are falling) physical laws dictate their position in space and time. If you know a satellites orbital element set, essentially its position and velocity at a precise time, you can accurately predict its future position. This gives 18-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 satellites more of the attributes of fixed, terrestrial sites compared to more typically manoeuvrable military systems. c. Cluster Areas. Satellites tend to cluster within certain orbits that are useful, depending on their mission. There are three primary clusters and a secondary cluster used by the military. These clusters are: (1) Low earth, highly inclined orbits (approximately 90-120 minute period), used by intelligence, environmental and some types of communications satellites; (2) Semi-synchronous highly inclined orbits (12-hour period), used primarily for navigation satellites; (3) Geosynchronous orbits (24-hour period), used by communications and launch detection satellites; and (4) The less often used highly elliptical, or Molniya, orbit (12-hour period), used, primarily by the Russians, for communications and early warning satellites to provide coverage in the extreme north. d. Vacuum Environment. Because space is a vacuum, the way satellites manoeuvre and the effects of some types of weapons in space are different. The environment of space requires unique methods of controlling satellites, and these methods are often not well understood by those not familiar with space systems. The vacuum of space also creates differences in the effects of certain weapons, particularly nuclear and directed energy weapons. The vacuum of space does not begin at any given point, rather, the effects of the atmosphere gradually taper off. At lower orbits, atmospheric drag effects require satellites to use their on-board engines to maintain their orbit. e. Vast Operating Area. With respect to the terrestrial environments, space systems generally operate at large distances from each other and therefore, in general, space is considered an infinite arena for military operations. However, the space environment is limited, especially in cluster areas, and threats of collision or frequency interference must be managed on a daily basis. 1804. LOGISTICALLY INFLUENCED ATTRIBUTES

1. Space is a difficult area, perhaps the most difficult, in which militaries operate. It is expensive to get space systems into orbit, so only missions where the operational benefit outweighs the cost should be performed by space systems. The following logistically influenced attributes must be considered when making this decision: a. Remote Command and Control. Military space systems are rarely manned. Ground systems provide C2. To provide this C2 often requires a large network of geographically separated ground stations to be able to link with satellites in various orbits. b. Self-sufficient. Satellites are physically on their own once launched, with rare exceptions. All the consumables, such as fuel, coolants and redundant systems, required by a satellite must be on board at launch. The only maintenance that can usually be performed is switching from a failed system to a back-up system, if one is on board. Since back-up systems and fuel add weight as well as lengthen the expected life, they also add to the launch cost. A trade-off on cost versus redundancy must be made when a satellite is designed. Normally, fuel is the limiting factor in determining the planned life of a satellite, so manoeuvring a satellite more than planned reduces its expected life. c. Altitude Trade-offs. Satellites can add to their security from attack by anti-satellite or other groundbased directed energy weapons by orbiting at a higher altitude. This often means some compromises in how effectively the satellite can perform its mission, particularly for intelligence satellites, which provide better resolution the lower they orbit. Lower altitude orbits also require more fuel to maintain. This is caused by the atmosphere affecting their orbit through aerodynamic drag, requiring frequent commanding and fuel usage to maintain the desired orbit. Frequent commanding may also require a larger network of ground stations to perform the commanding.

18-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

1805.

POLITICALLY/LEGALLY INFLUENCED ATTRIBUTES

1. Numerous international treaties and agreements govern the use of space, resulting in the following politically/legally influenced attributes: a. Legal Overflight. Space is not subject to claims of sovereignty by any nation, unlike territorial waters and air space. This means satellites may over fly the territory of another nation without permission, and without hindrance. b. Vehicular Sovereignty. A satellite remains the sovereign property of the nation that owns it. Additionally, the nation that owns a satellite is responsible for any damage it does to another nations territory if it decays from orbit. c. Weapons Restrictions. The deployment or testing of weapons of mass destruction in space is prohibited. Additionally, military installations are prohibited on the moon and other celestial bodies.

d. Frequency Control. Frequency control is a worldwide issue and satellite systems are not immune from this regime. The ITU regulates frequencies used for satellite systems and frequency restrictions must be considered. 2. Politically/legally influenced attributes are really restrictions placed on the use of space, and unlike the environmental and logistical attributes, in theory could change. The attributes mentioned above have persisted for some time now, and it is unlikely that space will have fewer political/legal restrictions in the future. The following is a list of the current treaties and international agreements regulating the use of space (not all of which involve Canada): a. UN Charter (1947) - made applicable to space by the Outer Space Treaty. It prohibits the use of force, or threat of its use, against the territorial integrity of another state. It recognises a states inherent right to self-defence. These provisions apply to military space systems; b. Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) - prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in space or the detonation of any nuclear explosive in space; c. Outer Space Treaty (1967) - the primary agreement placing limits on a states use of space. Among other limits, this treaty prohibits military bases or installations on the moon or other celestial bodies and prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. Additionally, the Outer Space Treaty states that space and celestial bodies are not subject to national claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation. It also says states retain jurisdiction over their space objects, and any personnel in those objects, while they are in space;

d. Return and Rescue Agreement (1968) - requires signatory nations to return astronauts and space objects that land on their territory to the launching nation. It requires the launching nation to pay reasonable costs associated with the return and to pay for any damage caused by hazardous materials the space object may have contained. Also applies in international waters; e. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) abrogated by the US, Canada is not a signatory; f. Liability Convention (1972) - makes the launching nation liable for damage to people or property on Earth or in the atmosphere caused by its space objects. Liability for damage caused by a space object to persons or property on board another space object is determined by who is at fault;

g. Convention on Registration (1974) - requires parties to maintain a registry of all objects they launch into Earth orbit or beyond. It also requires information on each registered object be furnished to the UN as soon as practical, including the basic orbital parameters and general function of the object; h. Agreement Governing Activities on the Moon and Celestial Bodies (1979) - restates many of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty with respect to the Moon and other celestial bodies. It adds the establishment of an international regime for the exploitation of the Moons natural resources. It 18-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 further states that the benefits from this exploitation shall be shared equitably by all states party to the agreement. (Canada is not party to this agreement); and I. Environmental Modification Convention (1980) - prohibits military or hostile use of environmental modification techniques to do damage if such use has widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. Environmental modification techniques are defined as any technique for changing the dynamics, composition, or structure of the earth or outer space through deliberate manipulation of natural processes. COMMERCIALLY INFLUENCED ATTRIBUTES

1806.

1. The commercial space industry has developed rapidly in areas such as communications, remote sensing, and navigation applications. International partnerships, which are not new to the space business, continue to increase especially in the civil, scientific and communication sectors. The International Space Station is a prime example of this increased civil co-operation in space. Increasing commerce in space has resulted in the following commercially influenced attributes: a. Greater Access. Commercial space systems provide access to virtually any nation or organization in the world. Lesser developed nations, terrorist organizations and even organized crime can utilise space systems in todays world. In addition, commercial systems provide additional capabilities to countries that already have access to space systems. From the military perspective, multinational corporations and international partnerships complicate the threat analysis process. For example during the Gulf War, Iraq as well as several coalition partners used ARABSAT for communications and as a result military options to limit access to ARABSAT were limited. b. Domestic Controls. In response to increased access to space derived data many nations have begun to develop methods to control the information. For instance, remote sensing in both Canada and the United States is subject to legal controls, commonly referred to as shutter control, to limit the collection and distribution of data. The selected availability control on GPS is another example of domestic controls to limit data, however this control has been shut off by US presidential direction. Some international organizations also have attempted to control the use of their systems. For instance, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation limits the use of their communication satellites to peaceful purposes. While some nations are attempting to control access to space derived data, other nations have no controls at all. Therefore from the military perspective, commercial access to space data and enemy alliances must be carefully analysed to determine the potential space system threats.

18-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 SECTION II - SPACE FORCE ROLES AND MISSIONS 1807. GENERAL

1. There is a worldwide explosion of the use of space systems, both in the civil/commercial and military arenas. Modern information-based economies are becoming increasingly reliant on the generation of data from, and the movement of data through, space-based systems. The number of nations that recognise the utility of space systems and develop the capability to launch and operate satellites will almost certainly continue to grow in the future. The main reason for this, in particular for the military use of space, is that there are functions that can be performed better, or only, from space. The dependence of modern nations on space-based systems has also opened another avenue for attack. This has made space another medium for military operations. 2. The CF will protect the nations security and sovereignty and increase operational effectiveness utilising space forces. Protecting national security and sovereignty involves both protecting Canadian interests in space and protecting Canada from threats from space. In the broad context of the emerging space security environment there are four fundamental military operational space force roles used to accomplish these two goals: enhancing operations for terrestrial forces, space forces support, space control, and force application. There are a number of missions within each of these roles. For economic or political reasons, many of these missions may be closed to the CF, but our personnel may in some cases participate with allies or coalition partners in operations utilising space forces we dont own, to achieve Canadian objectives. 1808. ENHANCING OPERATIONS

1. Enhancing operations are those missions space systems perform to support sea, land and air forces. Space systems fulfilling this role act as a force multiplier, increasing the effectiveness of the forces they support. Enhancing operations include surveillance and reconnaissance; communications; environmental observation; navigation; and missile warning and defence. Enhancing operations will use both civil and military satellites to increase our forces' ability to detect, plan and act faster than an adversary. 2. Surveillance and Reconnaissance. This area covers support to both reconnaissance (intelligence) and surveillance missions. Space systems may be dedicated to one or the other, or perform both missions as needed. Generally, surveillance implies performing a broader search with less resolution, whereas reconnaissance implies maximizing resolution to gain specific information about a small area or system. Historically, support in this area from space has been more heavily weighted to the reconnaissance side. In the near future, it is possible space systems may replace current ground and air based systems in the surveillance role. In the future these space-based systems may perform roles such as ocean, air and ground surveillance and tracking. 3. Communications. Space-based systems can provide worldwide, secure, jam resistant communications to military forces. This can be accomplished with dedicated military satellites, leasing channels on commercial satellites, or a combination of the two. Dedicated military satellites are designed to be more robust and more secure than their civil counterparts. The military frequencies are selected so they are robust (jam resistant) and they use a wider frequency band so the system can use spread spectrum techniques. Military satellites also tend to use more directional transponders, making it more difficult to intercept their signals and they are designed from the outset for encryption. Commercial communications satellites, on the other hand, are generally cheaper, since you can buy or lease just the capacity you need, leaving someone else to pay for the rest of the satellite. Commercial systems can be particularly valuable during contingencies, when extra capacity is required for a limited time. 4. The cost and size of satellite ground stations have limited the utility of satellite communications in the past. This has now changed and man-portable satellite communications terminals are available. Additionally, new commercial low earth orbiting satellites have the potential to revolutionize communications. These new systems will provide cellular phone service, and potentially computer connectivity, to forces deployed around the world. For peacetime/contingency operations they should prove very useful, however, military users must recognise these systems are new and their vulnerability may degrade their availability during a major conflict. 18-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 5. Environmental Observation. Accurate knowledge of the terrain and weather in an area of operations can be critical for a successful mission. Spaces unique perspective gives tremendous advantages to supporting these two areas. Geosynchronous orbiting satellites can give a continuous weather picture for large areas of the globe, and low earth orbiting satellites can provide a more detailed snap-shot of any given point on earth, twice a day. Remote-sensing satellites, such as RADARSAT, Frances SPOT or the USs LANDSAT as well as other civil and commercial systems can provide a fairly detailed picture of the terrain in an area of operations, with resolutions as good as one metre. By fusing the data from several different types of sensors, invaluable information can be provided to military planners. 6. Navigation. Another important capability that space adds to military operations is very accurate geospatial positioning. Systems such as the USs Global Positioning System (GPS) or Russias GLONASS use constellations of satellites to transmit radio signals that allow users to determine their precise threedimensional position, velocity and time. This capability is provided 24 hours a day and in all weather. Additionally, since the GPS receivers operate passively, the users position remains secure. These systems can greatly increase the effectiveness of weapons delivery, aiding in improving first round accuracy of indirect fire weapons and precise delivery of bombs, as well as assisting navigation and improving situational awareness for commanders. 7. Missile Warning and Defence. Ballistic missile warning and missile defence capabilities combine to provide the capability to protect the nation or troops from ballistic missile weapon systems transiting through space. Missile warning can be performed using either space-based or terrestrial-based systems or a combination of both. Missile warning data can be used to cue either passive or active defence systems at all level of operations (i.e., strategic, operational and tactical). Functionally, missile warning is generally separated into a strategic and a theatre component. The strategic component is part of the NORAD Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system, while the theatre component is part of the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) Theatre Event System (TES) (note: the ITW/AA also provides some limited amount of theatre event data to its users). This separation is made necessary due to the difference in philosophy and functionality between the two systems. Likewise, missile defence is separated into a strategic and a theatre component, e.g., National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). a. ITW/AA and NMD. Canada participates in the ITW/AA system operated with the US through NORAD. The ITW/AA system uses space-based infrared sensors that detect the heat plume generated by a missile launch and provide initial launch warning indications, and ground-based radar to confirm the attack and determine the impact points. The use of two different system technologies, or dual phenomenology, provides better confidence that an attack is actually occurring, and not just a system malfunction (note: the ITW/AA uses other mission areas such as intelligence to augment sensor data in the process of identifying and processing event data). Strategic missile defence can be either passive or active. Passive defence, or deterrence, relies on the capability to correctly characterize an attack before it can hit its target, allowing a retaliatory attack to be launched that will inflict unacceptable damage to the attacker. Active missile defence, or NMD in this case, uses the missile warning data to cue some form of weapon that is capable of destroying the incoming missiles or warheads before they can strike their targets. There are two basic types of anti-ballistic missile weapons and two basing options. Interceptors, or anti-ballistic missiles, use a warhead or the kinetic energy of the collision to destroy the incoming warheads. Directed energy weapons use concentrated electromagnetic radiation, such as a laser, to destroy the inbound warhead. Either of these weapons can be terrestrial-based or space-based, though no space-based system has ever been deployed or tested by any nation to date. Although the US is examining options, only the Russians currently have deployed a strategic ballistic missile defence system. b. TBMW and TMD. TBMW uses satellite infrared sensors that detect the heat plume generated by a missile launch and provide initial launch warning of a theatre ballistic missile, and if available groundbased radar to characterize the attack further. Once an attack has been detected, passive or active defence measures can be taken. Passive defence consists of notifying the threatened personnel to seek shelter and don protective gear if appropriate. Active defence requires a weapon to fire at the incoming missile to destroy it. Currently ground-based missiles and high-energy lasers are capable 18-6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 of performing this function. Examples include the Patriot Missile System, the Tactical High Energy Laser System, and the Airborne Laser System 1809. SPACE FORCES SUPPORT

1. The supporting space forces mission is the support given to space systems from terrestrial-based forces. These activities deploy and sustain the space systems involved in the missions listed in the other sections. Supporting space forces includes two missions: launch operations and satellite operations. 2. Launch Operations. For space systems to perform their missions they must first get into space. The capability to perform launch operations is critical to assure access to space. Ideally, a military launch capability should provide the capacity to quickly integrate satellites and launch vehicles and rapidly launch to replace satellites that fail or reconstitute systems that have been destroyed or degraded by the actions of another party. Launch capability can be independent, through allies or purchased on the commercial launch market. Canada currently has no domestic launch capability, and depends upon allies and commercial launch services to provide this capability. 3. Satellite Operations. Once space systems are deployed to space they require constant support to sustain their mission capability. This requires a mission control centre to plan and perform the necessary commanding and a system of ground stations to provide the command uplink and telemetry downlink. Satellite operations also involve monitoring the satellite telemetry to ensure the satellite systems are operating properly. While maintenance generally cannot be performed on a satellite to repair failures, most satellites have redundant systems. These redundant systems allow ground operators to bypass failed equipment, maintaining the satellites mission capability. Ground systems should be redundant to reduce vulnerabilities as well as interoperable with different satellite systems to increase redundancy and reduce operating costs. 1810. SPACE CONTROL

1. Space control is roughly equivalent to the air superiority or sea control missions. Space control involves assuring access to, and the utilisation of space in support of friendly operations while denying the same to enemy forces. There are three primary missions within the space control mission area: surveillance of space, protection and negation. It should be noted that Canadian policy prohibits the weaponization of space and anti-satellite weapons. 2. Surveillance of Space. Surveillance of space involves the detection, tracking, and identification of space objects. Surveillance of space allows manoeuvring satellites to avoid collisions with space debris and ensures that launches of new satellites will not collide with either another satellite or space debris. An effective surveillance of space capability allows friendly forces to know when enemy intelligence satellites are overhead and provides the warning for effective protection operations and the targeting data for effective negation operations. In order to assure friendly use and deny enemy use we must be able to track and identify objects in earth orbit. To be effective, surveillance of space must be broad and continuous. This allows changes to be detected quickly and the threat characterized. 3. To give an indication of the size of the surveillance of space task, since 1957 over 26,000 objects have been catalogued and almost 9,000 objects are currently tracked and reported to the UN. The United States has accepted, under the Outer Space Treaty, the obligation to track and report on all manmade earth orbiting objects. This is a civil obligation, but is fulfilled by US Air Force sensors and NORAD/USSPACECOM work centres reporting the data to the UN. 4. Two capabilities are needed to meet the surveillance of space mission requirements: the surveillance sensors to acquire the data and the analysis capability to exploit the data. Three different types of sensors can be used to collect the data: radar sensors, either parabolic dish, radar interferometry, or phased array; optical sensors, essentially large cameras or optically scanning detection fences; or passive systems. Each system has its advantages and disadvantages. Ideally, a surveillance of space system would incorporate all three types, however this is very expensive. A surveillance of space sensor system, to provide coverage of all orbits, must include a worldwide network of sensors. In the future, space-based surveillance sensors will eliminate the requirement to base sensors outside national territory. Canada is currently developing a 18-7 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 space-based surveillance of space sensor for integration in the US Space Surveillance Network to be deployed in the 2005-7 timeframe. 5. To be useful, surveillance of space sensors must provide data to a work centre that can process the data. This data correlation involves tasking the sensors to watch a particular position in space at a given time, correlating the observations with known objects, updating the orbital data for the known objects, and classifying and cataloguing the new objects detected. This is a very complex task, requiring skilled personnel operating powerful computers with complex software. This work must be accomplished continuously, or objects will become lost. A lost object is one for which we can no longer correlate observations to a given object. There are always going to be lost objects because of the large number of objects, the break-up of many, and the small size and difficulty of tracking others. The task of the surveillance of space analysis centre is to minimise the number of lost objects and maximize the number of known objects. 6. Protection. Protection, also known as defensive counter space operations, assures our use of space systems. There are two components to protection operations: active and passive. Active measures neutralize threats to friendly space systems by manoeuvring the spacecraft to avoid the threat, deploying decoys, using alternate ground links (if it is the space/ground link that is under attack), or using an active counter space attack (see negation below). Passive defences must be built into a space system when it is designed. Passive defence measures include hardening the satellite against electromagnetic pulse or kinetic attack, encrypting the space/ground links, spread spectrum techniques to protect the uplink/downlink, and giving the satellite an autonomous capability. An autonomous capability allows the satellite to operate for extended periods without commanding from ground stations. Additionally, ground to satellite links can be made mobile, making it more difficult to attack a space system through its ground station. Finally, hiding their true mission or leaving a satellite turned off until it is needed can protect satellites. By doing this, it makes it less likely an adversary will realise that a satellite should be attacked. 7. Negation. Negation, or offensive counter space, operations prevent an adversary from using their space systems. Negation operations can involve attacks by, and against, either space-based or terrestrialbased forces. These attacks can be lethal or non-lethal. Currently, for most militaries, including the CF, the only lethal negation capability involves attacking the terrestrial-based portion of a space system with terrestrial-based forces. Canadian policy prohibits the weaponization of space, including anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Most space systems must be constantly commanded, or flown, to effectively perform their mission, so operations against ground-based satellite control systems can be very effective. An additional advantage to attacking the terrestrial satellite system infrastructure is that it does not require specialized forces or weapons; it can be performed using systems designed for general sea, land and/or air combat. 8. Attacking the space portion of a space system is more difficult, requiring dedicated ASAT weapons. ASATs can employ either directed energy, explosive or kinetic weapons, capable of destroying or disabling the targeted satellite. Lethal ASATs can leave significant space debris in orbit, which may adversely affect friendly space systems in the future. 9. Non-lethal negation operations can use a friendly ground station to jam a satellites links, disrupt its payload or actively take over the commanding of the satellite. Diplomacy can also have a negation role. If the adversary relies on other nations systems diplomacy can be used to convince those nations to turn off access. 1811. FORCE APPLICATION

1. Force application consists of systems based in space or pass through space that are capable of applying force against ground, sea and air targets in support of terrestrial military operations. Currently no military openly has the capability to perform this mission from space, but this does not mean they will not in the future. The only system that met this definition in the past was the Soviet fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS). The FOBS was a nuclear weapon launched into orbit, in a southerly direction. The weapon would achieve orbit, but be de-orbited over its target before the first orbital revolution was complete. This system was intended to avoid NORADs north facing missile warning systems. This system was tested 18 times between 1966-1971. It was to have been dismantled under the SALT II Treaty, but this treaty was never ratified. Unclassified sources are uncertain as to its current operational status. It is clear, however, that any nation that possesses nuclear weapons and the capability to orbit payloads could develop a similar 18-8 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 system. Many countries have the ability to project force application through space with ballistic missiles. This distinction is important because it not only makes ballistic missiles a form of space force application, but the defence against ballistic missiles becomes a form of space control. 2. Other examples of potential force application from space would include space-based lasers that could attack earth-based targets. A space-based laser for the purpose of destroying ballistic missiles would not fall under this category; it would be an example of missile defence, an enhancing operation. It would also be possible to have a space-based system that could fire some sort of conventional warhead or kinetic weapon to hit terrestrial targets. It is illegal, under current treaties, to base nuclear weapons in space. A final example of force application could be a space plane or trans-atmospheric plane acting as a bomber. It is unlikely any of these examples will become operational within the next decade, in any military.

18-9 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 SECTION III - SPACE EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS 1812. COMMAND OF SPACE FORCES

1. Centralized C2 of space operations supporting CF operations is critical. Space forces are global in nature, so this centralized control will normally reside at the national level. The CDS will co-ordinate the use of national, and if available, allied, space resources for the operational commander. Where appropriate, this task may be delegated to the DCDS. 2. The operational level commander will have command and control of the CF Joint Space Support Team (JSST) and may be given control of ground equipment, such as satellite communications terminals, that utilise space systems. The JSST will provide the operational commander with space situational awareness and will provide the link to national space assets. When control of ground equipment is given to the operational commander, it should be made clear that control of the actual space asset is being retained at the national level. Commanders, however, should be aware of the potential capabilities of Canadian, allied and available commercial space systems, and how to integrate these capabilities into their military operations. Operational commanders can then request the space support that will best meet their operational requirements. 1813. ROLE OF MILITARY SPACE POWER

1. Space forces can influence and participate in military operations across the spectrum, from peacetime and contingency operations through the full range of armed conflict. This support can come from dedicated Canadian or combined Canadian/allied military space systems or commercial space systems. 2. During future conflicts, space systems will act as force enhancers, allowing smaller more agile military forces to continue to perform the missions of their larger predecessors. Space systems will support every facet of combat, combat support and combat service support. The importance of military space support is increasing, as the world moves from the industrial age to the information age. 3. Space systems are capable of supporting the CF through the full spectrum of military operations, from peacetime operations through operations other than war to full-scale war. The various space systems contribute in different ways as operations move through the spectrum. 1814. ENHANCING OPERATIONS

1. Surveillance and Reconnaissance. During peacetime operations space assets provide data to the intelligence community to develop and maintain a detailed picture of world events and threats. This data supports military planning, ensures timely warning of changing threats and supports national leaders in their political, economic and diplomatic interaction with the rest of the world. Data derived from space sources can also support military assistance to civil authorities during natural disasters and humanitarian missions. In addition, surveillance and reconnaissance space assets provide the legal means to monitor treaty compliance. During operations other than war and hostilities, surveillance and reconnaissance space assets support the area of operations to the maximum extent possible. Space assets provide troop locations and, during war, indications of enemy plans, target and route planning information, and support battle damage assessment. After peace returns, surveillance and reconnaissance space assets provide information to ensure peace terms and conditions are met. 2. Communications. Communications satellites perform their mission continuously in essentially the same manner through the spectrum of military operations. Satellite communications can be critical to forces operating on missions outside the country, particularly those operating in remote regions in support of peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, by their very nature, often operate in areas without access to modern or intact communications networks. 3. During hostilities, communications capacity between the theatre of operations and NDHQ will be maximized. Satellite communications are essential for operations at all levels, providing necessary data for planning and tasking to strategic, operational and tactical forces. Direct broadcast satellites can be used to ensure needed data, including space-derived intelligence, geomatics and weather data is received by the fielded forces in a timely manner. Consideration may be given to moving satellites to improve coverage and throughput capacity. It is unlikely in any future conflict that any coalition will have enough military 18-10 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 communications satellites to support the information requirements of modern warfare. Commercial satellite communications channels will almost certainly be required to augment the communications system capacity. 4. After a conflict, terrestrial communications systems will probably have been destroyed in enemy territory, and may be damaged or destroyed in friendly territory. Space communications systems can support the re-establishment of critical civil infrastructure and legitimate government institutions until terrestrial based communications grids can be rebuilt. 5. Environmental Observation. Environmental observation satellites provide data for military forecasters, who in turn provide weather forecasts for all military operations as well as contingency operations. Earth resource satellites provide data to track ice conditions as well as providing updated geomatics data. Geomatics data will be critical when planning new peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, since these tend to be in areas for which up-to-date maps are not available. 6. During hostilities data collection in support of the theatre of operations is emphasised. Accurate weather data is critical to operational planning in general, but also to determine danger areas in the event of nuclear, biological or chemical attacks on friendly forces. Dissemination of weather data must be maximized, probably utilising space communications. Remote sensing is gathered on the area of operations to support geomatics and targeting. Remote sensing data may be used to cue surveillance and reconnaissance space systems. Post-hostilities, environmental systems and remote sensing systems support damage assessment so rebuilding can begin. Accurate weather data will be necessary, as large segments of the population are likely to be displaced by the conflict. 7. Navigation. Navigation satellites provide accurate, all weather navigation assistance during normal peacetime operations, as well as supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Satellite aided navigation may also be used, in the near future for precision approaches by aircraft. Its importance during search and rescue operations will grow also. The next generation of military and civilian search and rescue beacons may have an integrated GPS capability. During conflicts, navigation satellites remain critical for accurate navigation, and necessary for precise delivery of weapons to ensure target destruction and minimise collateral damage. Navigation data provides precise position and timing for rendezvous and coordinated attacks without resorting to radio communications. Navigation warfare measures will be taken to assure friendly use, and deny adversaries the use, of navigation satellite signals. 8. Missile Warning and Defence. Strategic missile warning systems, especially if there is no antiballistic missile (ABM) capability, are primarily peacetime systems. The capability to immediately detect and characterize an attack contributes to deterrence. The capability to detect any attack and launch a devastating counterattack is the principal defence against nuclear war. Essentially, missile warning systems maintain wartime level operations even during peace. This is one of the pillars of NORADs and NATOs defensive capability. For theatre-level operations, such as the Gulf War, emphasis is placed on providing missile warning coverage of the area of operations. Additional processing systems may be used to ensure coverage is maximized. Missile warning satellites cue any available missile defence systems to protect friendly forces from tactical ballistic missile attack and allow friendly forces to take passive defensive measures. Communications systems must be capable of disseminating missile warning data quickly to the friendly forces. 9. If an ABM system is available, the missile warning systems cue the ABM systems tracker, which provides guidance to the actual ABM weapon. ABM systems can be developed either as theatre missile defence (TMD) systems or national/continental missile defence systems (NMD). Canada currently has neither type of system, but could participate in operations where TMD systems are available. Within NORAD, Canada is currently participating with the US in research and consultations investigating a possible NMD system for North America. If a NMD system were developed it would only provide a limited defence against an accidental, unauthorised or rogue nation attack. The Government of Canada will determine whether Canada will participate in an NMD system based on Government policies, which include recognition of the importance of the ABM treaty. 1815. SUPPORTING SPACE FORCES

1. Launch Operations. During peacetime, launch operations replace satellites as needed. After a conflict starts, launch operations will replace friendly satellites that are damaged by enemy action or fail due 18-11 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 to normal causes. Launch processing times will be trimmed to the maximum extent possible to ensure needed space support is maximized. The emphasis is on maintaining support to the area of operations with minimal interruptions. For a time after a conflict ends launch processing may remain in the conflict mode if many systems must be replaced over a short period of time. 2. Satellite Operations. Satellite operations maintain C2 over all satellites, keeping systems operating efficiently while maximizing satellite life during peacetime operations. During hostilities or operations other than war, satellite controllers ensure satellite payloads provide the necessary support to the area of operations. Satellites may be moved to adjust coverage and maximize support to the required geographic locations. Maximizing support will be the driving factor, and satellite life may be traded for increased support. Mobile satellite control systems may be deployed to make the ground to satellite link less vulnerable to direct or terrorist attacks. After operations return to their peacetime tempo, satellites that were moved during a conflict may be moved back to their pre-conflict orbits. 1816. SPACE CONTROL

1. Surveillance of Space. The mission of surveillance of space is to maintain a catalogue of all objects in orbit. The catalogue is used to determine the space order of battle. Occasionally, low earth orbit satellites may need to manoeuvre to avoid space debris, exercising satellite protection capabilities. When a conflict starts, surveillance of space assets detect attacks on friendly space assets so protective measures can be taken. 2. Protection. Protection measures begin during peacetime, when satellites must be designed and built with survivability measures. Passive protection measures that can be designed into satellite systems include hardening against electromagnetic pulse, armour to protect critical components and some autonomous capability. Passive protection measures also make satellite systems more robust against normal hazards of space such as static build up and micro meteors. Once a conflict starts, active protection measures will be our primary concern. Friendly satellites, particularly those in more vulnerable low earth orbits, may need to manoeuvre to avoid enemy threats. Camouflage and occasional relocation, to keep their location hidden, protect friendly satellite ground links in the theatre. 3. Negation. Prior to a conflict, negation measures consist primarily of maintaining good intelligence on potential adversaries. Detailed knowledge of potential enemy space systems is required for an effective negation campaign if a conflict starts. The first negation measures will likely be diplomatic efforts to deny enemy forces access to other nations space systems. Friendly land and air forces can target enemy ground stations and launch infrastructure to break their ground to satellite links and cut their ability to reconstitute their space systems. If the enemy forces have their own satellite systems, those satellites may be attacked if national authorities, allies and coalition partners approve. Satellites may be attacked by either destroying them or by disrupting or jamming their payloads and satellite to ground communications. The physical destruction of a satellite would result in a significant number of small fragments left in orbit. These fragments will be difficult or impossible to track and could have a significant adverse impact on friendly space operations. The use of non-lethal weapons or attacks against the ground component of a space system should be preferred when planning space control operations. 1817. APPLICATION OF FORCE

1. It is unlikely that Canada, or any of our potential coalition partners, will deploy or use space weapons designed to target ground targets. Principally, we must just maintain awareness that these weapons could be developed and used against us. The only defence against these weapons would be to eliminate their launch facilities with either ground or air forces before the weapons can be launched. 1818. SPACE OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. Space Operations Integration. Space forces provide presence and capabilities that enhance the ability to sustain military operations effectively and efficiently. Space capabilities should be fully integrated into all planning efforts as soon as they are initiated. This will ensure the planning optimizes the force multiplier effect for space support to terrestrial forces. 2. Space Control Planning Factors. To be effective, policy compliant counter space planning must be carried out early to maximize its impact at the critical time during a conflict. In addition, many aspects of 18-12 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 space control must be integrated into the design of space systems. It is much more difficult to create an effective protection strategy after space systems have been designed and launched. Day to day operations for space systems require detailed procedures and advanced planning. Mistakes during routine satellite commanding can require the switch to back-up systems with the resulting loss of future failure recovery, the use of fuel to re-stabilize the orbit or, in rare cases, cause the loss of a satellite. Space operations must remain error free. 3. Peacetime Planning. Even during peacetime, space support will be a scarce commodity. There are often more requests for support from space systems than can be satisfied. By having detailed, prioritised plans in advance, competing requests for support can quickly be resolved. This ensures space support is optimized. 4. Crisis and Wartime Space Operations. Crisis, contingency and war plans will have an integrated space support annex. The annex will identify how to obtain and co-ordinate space support, available space systems, operational constraints and shortfalls, and space control requirements. Integrating space support at the beginning of the planning process ensures space support is maximized. Advanced planning provides a good indicator of where additional support will be needed. This allows for commercial or allied support to be requested early, allowing access to the needed capabilities to be acquired.

1819.

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EXERCISES

1. Education and Training. Effective utilisation of military space systems and the military use of civil space systems require specialized training. Effective leadership in the future will require all military officers to be trained and knowledgeable on the effective use of space to support military operations. This fact must be recognised, and military space capabilities need to be taught throughout the spectrum of military training and professional education. Training and experience in space operations are critical skills. Personnel who have the training and experience to serve in space operations positions must be managed properly. 2. War Games and Exercises. Space systems provide effective support from peacetime operations, through operations other than war such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and ultimately to high intensity warfare that NATO must be prepared to wage. To ensure that all levels of leadership receive experience utilising space systems to support operations, space systems should be incorporated into all levels of war gaming and exercises. The experience gained from using space systems to support exercises will allow the CF to integrate better with allies in future operations. Because space systems are not readily visible, and interface with users primarily through computers, they lend themselves to effective simulation. By incorporating space systems in exercises and war games that simulate this full spectrum of military operations, CF personnel gain experience that will prove invaluable when they are called upon to perform real world missions in support of Canadian interests.

18-13 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

18-14 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 19 CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION 1901. INTRODUCTION

1. The strategy to deal with complex emergencies involves a broad range of international actors, including military forces. The prime role of military forces in modern peace support operations (PSO) remains the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment to enable the equally vital work of the civilian organizations to proceed. 2. In many operations military forces have had to adapt to the greater degree of interaction required with the local government and population and a broad variety of humanitarian actors. Similarly, humanitarian agencies have had increased interaction with military forces. Therefore, the need to communicate, collaborate and co-ordinate seemingly dissimilar individual efforts is essential in order to execute a collective strategy. Thus, civil-military associated activities, and the military personnel responsible for conducting these activities, have become important considerations in contemporary operations. 3. Civil-military co-ordination (CM Co-ord), civil-military operations (CMO), civil affairs (CA), civil-military co-operation (CIMIC), civil military affairs (CMA), or some derivative of it, has long been an integral part of the military profession. However, civil-military activities have become a more integral part of, and help achieve politico-military objectives in both domestic and international operations. In order to exploit the potential force enabler or multiplier effects, particularly in complex emergencies, embracing and implementing civil-military activities is a critical dimension of CF operations and must be a key component of campaign and operational planning, at all levels. This chapter provides a brief overview of civil-military cooperation; details are contained in B-GG-005-004/AF-023, Civil-Military Co-operation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War. 4. Commanders, both on domestic and international operations, need appropriate civil-military staff capability in order to carry out basic tasks: assessment, liaison, and interface with relevant civilian organizations. 1902. CIVIL-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

1. For a deployed JTF Commander the primacy of the military mission is unquestionable. However, a commander, and staff, irrespective of environment, must consider the complexity of the civilian environment in which operations will be conducted and how to best interact with the wide range of actors and factors affecting the mission. In this context there are a number of aspects, which have civil-military implications, in both international and domestic situations: a. Force protection; b. Protection and/or control of civil population; c. Targeting and/or protection of indigenous cultural artefacts, religious entities and vital infrastructure;

d. Collaboration with and/or support to the indigenous civic structures; e. Collaboration with and/or support to civilian agencies; f. Support to the information campaign;

g. Support to humanitarian emergencies and/or emergency life support; h. Gaining support for the force from indigenous populations and governments;

19 - 1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 i. j. k. l. Assessing the impact of the civil environment on the military mission; Assessing the impact of the political environment and/or objective on the military mission; Training foreign nationals in CIMIC or CMO; Assessing and facilitating host nation support (HNS) resource capability or gaps in support of the military logistics plan; and

m. Identifying or sourcing host nation linguists for translation and interpreter functions. 2. Generally, civil-military considerations encompass planning, staffing, resources, commitment, assessment and liaison architecture in support to the military force and in to support the civil environment. The CF approach to civil-military considerations in operations will vary depending on the level of application (strategic to tactical), the relative orientation on the spectrum of conflict, the maturity of the operation and the organization with which the CF is with engaged. The CF may be required to pay heed to NATO, UN and US doctrine, while maintaining a Canadian flavour and remaining responsive to Canadian national policy goals and objectives. 3. UN/Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and DPKO. The UN regards Civil Military Co-ordination (CM Co-ord) as vital to the success of complex emergencies, recognizing both elements have their own role to play. The use of military forces for pure humanitarian roles, called military civil defence assets (MCDA) under the OCHA definition, is articulated under the Oslo Agreement. In the UN system, co-ordination of humanitarian tasks performed by military forces or the request for the use of such forces is undertaken by a humanitarian assistance co-ordinator (HAC) with in-theatre activity co-ordinated by an on-site operations centre (OSOC). 1903. CF CIVIL-MILITARY DEFINITIONS

1. Civil Military Co-ordination. These are those relationships developed at a national or strategic joint level with other government departments, inter-alia inter-agency, to provide input to and /or develop national guidance with respect the Canadian response to international or domestic crises. 2. Civil-Military Operations. Military activities associated with an operation that ensure that military commanders comprehend, make use of and mitigate any negative impact of the civil environment on military operations and plans. 3. Civil-Military Co-operation. This is a military function, possibly joint, the purpose of which is to support the commander's tactical or operational mission: by establishing and maintaining co-ordination and co-operation between the military force and all civilian elements in the commanders' joint operations area (JOA); and by assessing the impact of civilian environment on operations or vice versa. CIMIC also has functional tasks with international and domestic operations, as well as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and humanitarian operations (HO). Tactical CIMIC has two main component functions: support to the force and support to civil administration. a. Support to the Military Force (SMF). Largely force protection (FP) in nature, SMF is activity in the area of operation (AO), the design and application of which provide the force the maximum possible secure civil environment in which to operate. This constitutes elements of population and resources control, militarycivic action, civil-military resources control in host nation support, civil environment assessment and advice on gaining indigenous support for and freedom of movement of the force, and lastly, involvement in the forces information campaign. b. Support to Civil Administration (SCA). Those activities planned and undertaken in an AO, directly or in co-ordination with the international community, to assist the indigenous government, authorities 19 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 and populace. The type of conflict, maturity of involvement, national guidance and international presence will dictate the level and duration of support. The Law of Armed Conflict, international human rights law and national law apply as well. Situations may dictate that martial law or temporary military governorship could apply. 4. Host Nation Support (HNS). This is the capability assessment, procurement or contracting of resources provided by civilian actors and agencies to assist the commander in the execution of the military mission. CIMIC has a role within HNS, undertaking assessment, liaison and facilitation as part of civil military resource control (CMRC). 5. Humanitarian Operations. Operations undertaken by a military commander for the specific provision of humanitarian aid and assistance in response to human generated or natural disasters. Tactical CIMIC support to this type of activity deviates very little from other types of operations. 6. Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). In NATO, CEP is a national responsibility. In Canada, this element is co-ordinated by the Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP), operating as a Group within DND and is headed by an Associate Deputy Minister (ADM) who reports to the DCDS. OCIPEP, formerly Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC), is a civilian organization, which supports the MND in carrying out his mandate to advance civil preparedness and critical infrastructure protection in Canada for emergencies of all types. For the CF, CEP is synonymous with domestic operations and CIMIC functions largely remain the same, to include civil environment assessment and liaison with civil agencies at all levels. Liaison with OCIPEP is vital. 7. Civil-Military Liaison (CML). This is the primary method of interface with all civilian actors in the commanders AO for the purpose of establishing co-ordination and co-operation in support of the commanders mission. Such specialized liaison, by trained CIMIC generalists, is carried out during most phases of an operation. It permits situational CIMIC assessments which form the basis for planning CIMIC activities. 1904. PRINCIPLES IN CONSIDERING JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY (CM) ACTIVITY

1. CM Planning. Canadian civil-military doctrine establishes ten guiding-principles, which constitute a coherent framework in civilmilitary campaign planning: a. Inter-Agency Orientation. Many contemporary missions are weak in the civil dimension due to a lack of co-operation and understanding between stakeholders. CF campaign and mission planning will benefit if the various national agencies for international or domestic activities, including the CF, develop strategic guidance from which operational planning and tactical implementation can occur. While not a panacea for interaction with civilian agencies, such national level collaboration will facilitate clearer interaction in theatre. The development of the measures of effectiveness (MOE) for the civil end state, which the Comd and the J9/G5 staff must consider, should be an inter-agency collaborative effort. b. Mission Primacy. While a civil-military partnership is the cornerstone of success for the joint strategy in theatre, the military commander must be wary that humanitarian objectives are not permitted to supersede the fundamental security mission. c. Command Responsibility. Civil Military Relations, CMO planning and CIMIC is a command responsibility. Commanders must ensure that the civilmilitary environment and its impact on operations is thoroughly accounted for in planning.

d. Minimizing Impact on Civil Environment. Commanders must understand the political dynamic in the AO. Political parties may be represented at the municipal level and will certainly influence, if not determine, the degree of compliance by the population, police forces and military or paramilitary forces, with existing agreements. Strategies must be developed in co-operation with IGOs/NGOs to

19 - 3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 foster co-operation towards the desired civil end state. Even so, all military actions and interaction with the civil environment should attempt to minimize any negative impact. e. Freedom of Movement or Action. Restrictions to the movement of civilian agencies and military elements within a defined AO should not be allowed. Restrictions by local parties may reflect noncompliance with agreements and can impede the mandated tasks of both the military force and that of IGOs/NGOs. f. Collaboration, Co-operation, Co-ordination and Communication. Co-operative attitudes and behaviour toward civilian agencies, civil authorities and the population, will improve relations and mutual understanding and foster a willingness to co-ordinate efforts. As no legal authority or command responsibility exist over civilian agencies, commanders and civil-military staffs, at all levels, must seek their co-operation. Thus a TFC or unit commander must know the civilian agencies operating in the AO, their respective charter, mandate, capabilities, range of civil tasks and funding sources. A collaborative view is essential to gain the trust, confidence and support of IGOs and NGOs. Civil-military priorities will be discussed and common goals established accordingly. On-going civil-military liaison is critical to strengthen co-ordination efforts and meet mission objectives.

g. Flexibility. Based on changing situations in the civil environment, unforeseen tasks require flexibility from a TFC. Consultation with civil partners may be required for additional tasks affecting joint activities or micro-projects. Note, that in a war-fighting or low intensity conflict scenarios, the TFC could withdraw his support to civil authorities to foster compliance. This approach is not recommended for other types of operations. h. Security. Force protection (FP) measures, including OPSEC, are required to ensure a secure environment for the conduct of military operations. Civilian agencies may be preoccupied with their own security and their evacuation plan. The TFC must address the legitimate concerns of both civilian and military personnel. Impartiality towards all parties to a conflict and transparency in civilmilitary relationships will increase security and positive interaction. i. Information Sharing. Area assessments, unclassified formation and situational assessments provide useful information which can be shared with IGOs/NGOs to facilitate their work and improve collaboration. Similarly, NGOs gather, process and disseminate their own information, which may be useful to military commanders, particularly in the planning of civil-military activities. Consent from civilian agencies to share their information must be encouraged. While the CIMIC staff should not generally be tasked to actively collect information, CIMIC must inform the J2/G2 staff of significant items. In UN operations the OCHA On-site Operations Centre (OSOC) and theatre Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Centres (HACC) should be accessed. TYPES OF CIVIL MILITARY ACTIVITIES

1905.

1. There are two main aspects of CM activity in which tactical CIMIC is involved: civil-military activities in Support of the Military Force (SMF); and civil-military activities in support to civil environment (SCE). Figure 19-1 illustrates the various sub-components and their interrelationships in support of a military operation. While civil-military considerations and the use of J9/G5 staff and CIMIC forces are important in all military operations, including PSO, NEO, HO, the range of CM related activities will vary by operation.

19 - 4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

SUPPORT TO INFORMATION CAMPAIGN CIVIL-MILITARY RESOURCE CONTROL SUPPORT TO THE FORCE

POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL MILITARY-CIVIC ACTION

OPERATIONAL/ TACTCIAL CIMIC

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ENVIRONMENT

SUPPORT TO ADMINISTRATION AND PEACEBUILDING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC OPERATONS

Figure 19-1. 1906. 1.

Types of CIMIC Support

CIVIL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE FORCE Support to the Military Forces

a. Support to Information Campaign. The interface with and activities in the civil environment, as part of the commanders mission, will out of necessity be an important enabler of the formation information operations (IO) campaign. Thus, a close association between the J9/G5 staff and the IO staff is important. This is not to indicate that civil-military activities are always IO in nature, although there is a great tendency to view CIMIC as an active collector and driver of IO. This is not the case. b. Civil-Military Resource Control (CMRC). CMRC is an element of HNS. In this activity, CM staff and CIMIC line assets will be employed, where applicable, to assess the HN resource capability, facilitate its access for J4 staff, and where necessary, assisting in contractual arrangements or agreements. This function is co-ordinated with the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre during a NATO operation and through the Joint TF Support Group for Canadian purposes. Arranging contracts is not a J9/G5 function.

19 - 5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 c. Population and Resource Control (PRC). This is largely a force protection measure taken by a military commander in concert with indigenous governments and international agencies to remove the general population from harms way or from negatively impacting in the execution of the military mission. The movement and physical presence of civilians, who might require some degree of humanitarian aid such as medicine, food, water, shelter, clothing and similar items, can hinder military operations and or place themselves in harms way. This could include actions taken to remove Canadians in NEO operations. PRC is more prevalent in early stage combat operations or PSO. While J9/G5 staffs and CIMIC forces assess aspects of PRC activity, this does not imply a role or a willingness to create or manage refugees or internally displace personnel (IDPs) oriented facilities. Population controls include curfews, movement, travel permits, registration cards and resettlement of civilians. Resource controls could include licensing, regulations, checkpoints, ration controls and inspection of facilities. In addition, measures against attack or unwanted destruction will be taken to protect places and objects, such as historic monuments, works of art, museums, vital infrastructure and places of worship. Generally, under International Humanitarian Law, all commanders must provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for all civilians, establish law and order, and protect private property within their AO.

d. Military Civic Action (MCA). This is predominantly a force protection measure or action taken by a military commander, preferably, in concert with local civil agencies or indigenous military forces enhance the support for indigenous government and forces, and by extension the TF, by the indigenous populace at large. This will largely involve small projects beneficial to civil society, based on assessment and recommendation by the J9/G5 staffs and CIMIC forces. This is most characterized by hearts and minds activities in non-permissive or less-than-permissive environments and is predominantly a Battle group or Brigade level activity. Examples include the hiring of local contractors and labour, as well as fostering national development such as minor repair of roads, health clinics, and schools. Minor or micro-projects currently pre-dominate this component of tactical CIMIC. These can be internally TF funded or done by indigenous forces or population without funding. The likelihood of IGO/NGO funding to support hearts and minds projects in war and low intensity conflict is less probable due to the impartiality issue and potential conflict with humanitarian assistance activities. Performing MCA tasks is a military decision but they need to be co-ordinated with the receiving civil society, humanitarian agencies and the appropriate Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordinator. 1907. SUPPORT TO CIVIL ENVIRONMENT

1. Support to civil environment fulfils obligations arising from treaties, agreements and other requirements of international law. There are four forms of support to the civil environment: humanitarian assistance, support to civil administration and peace building, support to civil administration in occupied territory, support to civil authorities in domestic operations. a. Humanitarian Assistance Tasks (HA). Humanitarian assistance tasks involve the provision of humanitarian aid or services to at risk population with no particular military objective in the provision. These tasks may be part of the broad mandate assigned to a task force, provided on an ad hoc basis to humanitarian agencies when spare capacity is available, or be core tasks of a humanitarian operation. b. Support to Civil Administration and Peacebuilding. The Canadian government or indigenous governments of friendly territories may request military forces to perform basic government-related functions for short durations during PSO, international emergencies, OOTW or war. These tasks are normal performed during the first stage of a response to an emergency/deployment for instance, assuming policing functions in a newly established PSO. As situations stabilize, any functions performed by the armed forces in support to civil administration should and must return to civilian agencies. An identified civil end-state will play a significant role in determining military forces contribution. A national (or coalition) civil-military interagency assessment and recommendation to the Canadian Government will provide the context for a national decision to undertake this type of activity. In the CF context, the CDS is the authority, who acts on direction of the Canadian 19 - 6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 government. The arrangement to provide civil administration support with general support CIMIC and CIMIC functional specialists (FS) to this task outlines: the expected nature, extent and duration of the support; limits of authority and the liability of military personnel and defines the civil-military relationships that will exist. c. Civil Administration in Hostile or Occupied Territory. During war or force-on-force conflict, occupying alliances, coalition forces or a nation, may be legally and ethically required to conduct civil administration activities. This form of support to civil administration differs from the above-noted activity, in that it is imposed on a HN population by a military force acting on the authority of a nation, alliance or coalition of nations. The administered territory effectively comes under military control, perhaps putting into place a civil administrator. However this should be a temporary measure, seeking to hand-over civil administration to indigenous governments or international agencies as necessary. Undertaking these functions will be largely carried out by CIMIC functional specialists and possibly jointly with civilian experts deployed by government authority(ies). Note, that an occupying force has an obligation under the 1949 Geneva Convention IV on the Treatment of Civilians and the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 to ensure a just and effective administration of support to an hostile or occupied territory. Specific obligations are laid out in these conventions and must be complied with by the occupying force.

d. Support to Domestic Operations. Civil Military functions are largely assessment and liaison oriented with interface with OCIPEP, provincial and municipal emergency management offices. The aim of civil military activities in support of a domestic operation is to contribute to the accomplishment of the mission. The paramount requirement will be to establish effective liaison through J9/G5, at all levels, with civil agencies including government and private organizations to communicate the scope and limitations of the military support that may be provided. 1908. CIMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN OPERATIONAL AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING

1. The fundamentals of the operational planning are covered in B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CF Operational Planning Process, and apply to both domestic and international operations. CM aspects of the planning process are covered in detail in B-GG-005-004/AF-023, Civil-Military Co-operation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War. 1909. CIVIL-MILITARY CAPABILITY IN OPERATIONS

1. Staff. Situation dependant, the TFC will have a J9 or G5 staff cell of at least five persons The J9, J9 Ops, and J9 Interagency liaison and J9 Plans, J9 Sp. This staff size and structure will vary according the situation, but a J9 /G5 cell must be present in all TF down to and inclusive of Battle Gp. In most cases, where the TAT is deployed a JOG J9 cell, augmented as necessary, will perform the initial CIMIC assessment and function in theatre. QRF CIMIC teams of the CF Joint CIMIC Gp would be the likely source of augmentation. In a purely humanitarian operation, deployment of the DART would be augmented by CIMIC as well. 2. CIMIC Forces. Elements of the CF Joint CIMIC Group will be force generated and deployed as necessary. Again the requirement for tactical and operational CIMIC will vary from situation to situation. However, the basic rule establishes a general support (GS) CIMIC element of four CIMIC teams and a HQ staff per Bde Gp sized land component. Where the TFC is largely air force or maritime based, the CIMIC component would be smaller but none the less evident. A basic GS CIMIC team consists of enough personnel to man a CIMIC Centre or house on a 24/7 plus provide two CML teams. CIMIC Functional Specialists (FS) will be force generated and deployed as necessary. However, early and accurate civil assessment should identify this need during campaign planning, thus FS will likely be members of the CIMIC element. The number and type of FS will vary. 3. Coalition Civil Affairs (CA) and NATO CIMIC. The need might arise that CF forces could be deployed as components of a larger composite force structure. CIMIC elements so deployed will not be less 19 - 7 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 than CIMIC element size and maybe allocated to support an allied formation. Further, allied CIMIC or CA units deployed in support of a Canadian TFC will be provided a dedicated Canadian CML team. 4. CIMIC Centres. CIMIC centres or houses would be deployed outside the military compound within the communities. At least one CIMIC centre, should be co-located with the lead agency to provide information on the tactical situation in the AO and to co-ordinate with IOs, NGOs and UN agencies, local authorities and if necessary the population at large. If establishing a CIMIC Centre is not feasible, liaison should be established with the OSOC, Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Center (HACC), or its equivalent. 5. Interpreters and Translators. Interpreters are invaluable in multinational operations in daily contacts, negotiations and patrols and especially in civil-military activities. 6. Liaison in International Operations. The maximum use of liaison teams will enhance interoperability and unity of effort in a domestic, coalition or multinational operations. Interoperability will make it imperative that liaison teams be equipped with compatible communications for effective liaison with military and civilian agencies involved in CIMIC activities. LOs can assist in planning and co-ordination with civilian agencies and should be located with lead agencies for planning and co-ordination purposes. Where applicable, CML teams will also be in daily contact with civilian agencies and local authorities, civil contractors and civil labour for the planning, execution, co-ordination and control of minor, and in rare circumstances or major rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, occurring in the AO. 7. Liaison in Domestic Operations. Except for large scale crises where the CDS designates an alternate TFC with national level support, LFA commanders are responsible, within their Areas, for domestic operations and for maintaining liaison with provincial authorities, a procedure which may not be familiar to all civil agencies. In the case of nationally directed domestic operations and full manning of the PSEPC National Support Center, the NDHQ J9 staff, augmented if necessary, will man a 24/7 CIMIC cell in PSEPC. In any instance, LFAs maintain appropriate liaison with each provincial/territorial capital, to provide liaison, to develop personal working relationships and to build mutual understanding and confidence. Liaison between stakeholders, crisis managers and decision makers will be required in case of major disasters disabling utilities and essential communication services and is an Area G5 CIMIC function. The small G5 capability within the Air force and Maritime structures would fulfil a similar but limited role. The JOG J9 cells will be required to liaise with federal agencies deployed across multiple provincial boundaries and co-ordinate activity with LFA G5 dets. The essential points of contact to be maintained are with: a. PSEPC at the strategic level; b. provincial emergency measures organizations and provincial Attorney Generals staffs; c. emergency planning staffs in major urban centres;

d. provincial law enforcement agencies; and e. the Canadian Red Cross, particularly if it becomes the lead humanitarian agency. 1910. NDHQ ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1. The CDS, through the DCDS and COS J3 assisted by the NDHQ J9 staff (J9 Ops and Plans, J9 Doctrine and Training, J9 Inter-agency), along with input from J4 Log (HNS), J5PA, J5 Legal, J9 CIMIC, PK Pol 6, is responsible for establishing broad civil-military policies based on national strategic objectives and in accordance with the Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL). For a particular operation, international or domestic, the DCDS will: a. effect inter-governmental liaison to formulate a national civil-military campaign plan and to de-conflict anticipated MCA from HA, where necessary 19 - 8 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

b. conduct a detailed assessment of the pending civil environment with a view to determining its status, impact on operations and potential for assistance requirements ; c. establish specific CM policies in accordance with international and domestic laws, and based on broad policies, to meet the requirements of the political-military situation

d. task the appropriate ECS/Environmental commanders to provide identified CIMIC units, and CIMIC functional specialists and support personnel; e. ensure that the operation plan adequately addresses all civil-military aspects including MCA funding where appropriate; and f. ensure that tactical CIMIC support is commensurate with the aim and scope of the operation

g. designate the commander for specific humanitarian operations which, may require deployment of the DART for domestic or international operations;. 2. Based on the specific CM policies established by the CDS, the TFC, with advice from the national J9 and his/her own J9/G5 staff must: a. determine the level of CIMIC staff and line support needed to plan and conduct CIMIC activities b. refine civil environment assessments with situational assessments; and c. plan for the conduct of such CIMIC activities as may be appropriate in the AO.

3. CIMIC aspects of an operation will affect several divisions of NDHQ, particularly the J1, J3, J4 and J5 divisions. The detailed co-operative arrangements for CMR and CIMIC are the responsibility of the J9 Directorate. This responsibility involves: a. preparing the civil-military estimate in supporting plan; b. advising the TFC on military requirements for CIMIC activities and recommending policies and procedures for such activities; c. collecting, interpreting, collating and disseminating information on civil-military matters;

d. advising the TFC on matters concerning the civilian population, local government, institutions, the economy, and resources available for military use; e. recommending to the TFC policies concerning obligations to the population in the AO and obligations relative to treaties, agreements and international and domestic laws; f. establishing policy and procedures for co-ordinating military support to the population and for resources control programmes;

g. establishing policy and procedures for the supervision of community relations by the TFC in the AO; h. where necessary, establishing or co-ordinating policy and procedures for standing Joint Military Commissions in the AO; i. assisting SAMP and J1 staffs in processing and reorienting PW and detained persons, and in relocating and settling dislocated civilians; and

19 - 9 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 j. in conjunction with the J4 staff, assess capability and impact , identify and facilitate the procurement of local resources and HNS for operations.

4. To obtain the co-operation of the civilian population, CIMIC also plays an important function in IO along with PsyOps and PA. Thus, PSYOPS support to CIMIC activities through political, military and economic actions is critical. 5. J4 Log and J8 Fin, assisted by the J9 cell are responsible for logistic HNS arrangements.

19 - 10 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 20 METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT 2001. INTRODUCTION

1. During military operations, accurate, timely and reliable Meteorology and/or Oceanography (Met Oc) information can provide the commander with the knowledge necessary to anticipate and exploit the best window of opportunity to plan, execute, support and sustain specific operations. Exploiting Met Oc information to optimize employment of sensors, weapons, logistics, equipment and personnel and, to assess hostile forces limitations is key to successful military operations. Likewise, military operations can be made needlessly difficult by failing to consider the effects of Met Oc conditions. A thorough knowledge of weather, and an ability to exploit this understanding, enhances tactical effectiveness, efficiency and safety of military forces. 2. This chapter provides the basic doctrine, roles and planning considerations to describe how Met Oc resources should be employed in support of joint operations. 2002. OBJECTIVE OF METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT

1. Met Oc personnel provide tailored information on the climatological (historical), current and forecast conditions of the atmosphere, ocean and land environments within or through which military forces, both friendly and hostile, operate. Met Oc resources operate as an integral part of the joint force. Their most important function is to provide the commander and subordinate forces with an environmental characterization of the theatre of operations. This information can enhance mission effectiveness through optimum employment of resources and by leveraging the limitations of hostile forces that may result from environmental factors. 2003. 1. PRINCIPLES OF METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT The following principles must be considered for the provision of Met Oc support: a. Timeliness. Met Oc operations are only effective when users receive accurate Met Oc information in time to consider its impact within their decision making cycle. The rapidly changing nature of the air and ocean environments makes Met Oc data extremely perishable. Therefore, effective environmental support to joint operations is dependent upon timely and reliable communications that allow for the rapid transfer and refresh rate of Met Oc data to all deployed forces. b. Accuracy. Operators depend on accurate Met Oc information to plan and conduct their operations. The capability to collect data within the area of interest with sufficient spatial and temporal coverage to model and forecast the Met Oc conditions along with the perishable nature of Met Oc data will affect accuracy. The impact these factors have on forecast accuracy should be explained to enable operators to weigh these factors when making weather sensitive operational decisions. c. Relevance. Each operation requires tailored Met Oc information so that the user can quickly identify and apply relevant information without additional analysis or manipulation. Meeting this principle requires users to define specific requirements for conciseness, content, format, medium and frequency of delivery.

d. Consistency (One Area, One Forecast Concept). Met Oc products and services consistency is essential. Consistency is achieved through the One Area, One Forecast concept whereby operational planning is based on a common official forecast. It is expected that the component tactical level forecast may take various forms because of a difference in mission focus. However, Met Oc personnel will use the official forecast as a starting point and fuse in situ data to produce tailored mission specific products.

20-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 e. Telecommunications. The perishable nature of environmental data, particularly meteorological data, makes timely data manipulation key to effective Met Oc support. Telecommunication of Met Oc information should be designed to fulfil the data collection, storage, retrieval and dissemination efforts of the Met Oc forces at all levels. To the maximum extend possible, common CIS systems should be used to conduct Met Oc operations. Close co-ordination between the Met Oc and J6 staffs is required to ensure Met Oc telecommunication requirements are addressed. f. Information Control. Implementing meteorology (METCON), oceanography (OCCON) and/or ice (ICECON) information control procedures may be required to deny unauthorized use of operationally sensitive environmental information without prejudice to friendly operations.

g. Readiness. Met Oc forces, databases, products and equipment must be responsive to the requirements of operators. Communications equipment will be interoperable with joint and component capabilities. h. Effectiveness. Effectiveness requires Met Oc organizations at all levels to be fully integrated in the planning and execution of operations and to use client feedback to continually improve their overall effectiveness. i. Centralized Co-ordination, Decentralized Execution. The execution of Met Oc tasks requires careful control and co-ordination of personnel, equipment and materiel. The most efficient use of scarce resources is generally achieved through centralized co-ordination at the highest practical level, with execution delegated to the lowest practical level. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2004.

1. The provision of Met Oc support to operations is a command responsibility at each level of command. 2. At the strategic level, the Director Meteorology and Oceanography (D Met Oc) at NDHQ is ultimately responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate Met Oc support to operations. D Met Oc, on behalf of the DCDS, is responsible for developing and executing Met Oc concept of operations, identifying information requirements and ensuring unity of effort. 3. At the operational level, Formation HQ Met Oc OPIs are ultimately responsible for planning, assembling, organizing and tasking the resources required to support operations. The Met Oc OPIs are best positioned to develop the details of the required Met Oc support given their proximity to the operations planners. Formation Met Oc OPIs consists of: a. OIC Met Oc Operations Support Centre Pacific, Esquimalt; b. SSO Met Oc MARLANT, Halifax; c. Army Meteorology Officer, Combat Training Centre, Gagetown (for NDHQ DLFR); and

d. A3 Meteorology, 1 CAD, Winnipeg. 4. Upon execution of the operation, the DCDS or the JTFC Met Oc OPI would be responsible for providing Met Oc support to the operation. In domestic operations or a Canadian lead operation, this support would be provided through a Met Oc OPI of a Formation, the JOG or either LFAA, SQRT, LFCA or LFWA. In a coalition operation, Met Oc support would be provided by the coalition. 5. The Canadian Forces Weather and Oceanography Services Management Committee (CFWOS MC) consists of D Met Oc representatives and the Formation Met Oc OPIs and serves as the focal point for Met Oc support to the CF. When planning is initiated for an operation, especially a joint operation where the required Met Oc resources are beyond the capability of a single command to provide, the CFWOS MC can 20-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 assist the Joint Met Oc Co-ordination Officer by focusing the experience, expertise and technical capabilities of the Met Oc community to support the operation being planned. 6. When required, a Joint Met Oc Co-ordination Officer (J Met Oc Coord O) will be identified to serve as the focal point for the co-ordination of Met Oc support for a specific operation. In all phases of the operation planning process, the J Met Oc Coord O will work with planners to ensure the appropriate mix of Met Oc resources are identified for the operation. The J Met Oc Coord O during the planning phase will in most cases be different from the J Met Oc Coord O during the execution of an operation. The transition of responsibilities from the planning staff to operations staff will have to be closely co-ordinated. The J Met Oc Coord O responsibilities are as follows: a. Ensure Met Oc capabilities, considerations and requirements are included in the operation plan including the provision of Met Oc inputs to the development of functional annexes such as intelligence, operations, command and control and CIS; b. Assist planners at all levels understanding the state of the Met Oc environment in which the operation will take place; c. Ensure that all available Met Oc information and systems, as well as allies and indigenous assets and data, are properly considered and made available;

d. Identify Met Oc requirements from all joint force components, establish Met Oc product requirements and co-ordinate Met Oc support services for the joint force; e. Formulate a concept of Met Oc operations which supports the overall concept of operations; f. Generate the joint force Met Oc staff and equipment;

g. Ensure the widest dissemination of Met Oc operations information, ideally, through the use of network homepage technologies; h. Consistent with the scope and mission of the joint force, recommend the establishment and location of the Joint Met Oc Forecast Unit (JMFU); and i. Actively monitor and evaluate the planning and execution of the operation.

7. If required, Environment Canadas Weather Services Centres at 19 Wing Comox, 8 WingTrenton, 14 Wing Greenwood and in METOC Halifax could be tasked with Joint Met Oc Forecast Unit (JMFU) responsibilities. An invaluable aspect of the JMFU is the ability to fuse Met Oc information from several sources with operational and tactical information from the joint force into a coherent Met Oc picture and provide a comprehensive suite of customer tailored products. Under the direction and guidance of the Joint Met Oc Co-ordination Officer, the JMFU develops, integrates and maintains the theatre operational database including the official theatre forecast from which tailored mission specific products are produced. 2005. PLANNING METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT

1. Proper planning permits a systemic examination of all Met Oc aspects of an operation and ensures critical requirements are met. The work of the J Met Oc Coord O should focus on two distinct tasks which must be accomplished concurrently throughout the operation planning process sequence. The two tasks consist of developing the framework for Met Oc support in theatre and, identify key Met Oc impact factors and integrate them into the planning process. 2. During the initiation stage, the Met Oc planner should gather broad operation characteristics such as likely area of operations/interest and time scales. At this early stage, Maritime Rapid Environmental

20-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Assessment (Maritime REA), if required, should focus on Category 1 activities (assessment activities performed from outside the AOI) such as archive searches and remote sensing. 3. In the orientation stage, focus is on determining the broad requirements, assessing the available Met Oc support, initiate support for immediate requirements and provide products and advice to the planning process. He should also identify key Met Oc impact factors to be integrated into the Commanders Planning Guidance and the Intelligence Estimate and to be considered during the mission analysis process. Liaison with nations involved to check national support plan and first co-ordination should be started. At the same time, climatological data, especially critical Met Oc factors should be verified and impact factors refined and provided to planners. 4. In the course of action development stage, the Met Oc support planner should develop a framework for Met Oc support to the operation, while taking into consideration the basic principles for Met Oc support. The requirement for a dedicated REA operation should also be established and the requirement for subsequent categories of REA, particularly those requiring assets in theatre, should be identified from comparing the outcome of Category 1 REA with the operational requirement (gap analysis). The critical Met Oc impact factors, including preliminary results of an REA program, have to be reviewed in more detail and their effect on the planning of the operation considered. 5. During the plan development stage, the Met Oc support planner should review the mission characteristics in more details and analyse those operations which may experience a major impact from Met Oc factors. Key mission characteristics that need to be examined include the mission, the order of battle and disposition of the TF, the areas of operations and interest, an estimate of the anticipated duration of the operation, the availability of Met Oc support from allies and through HNS agreements and, the extent and availability of the CIS infrastructure in the area of operations. The Met Oc support plan must be fully defined, using outputs from the previous planning phases while ensuring that the support plan is fully integrated with the overall plan. When implemented, the location and manning of the REA fusion and command centres requires attention and co-ordination. Note that Met Oc issues may also need to be addressed within other functional annexes (intelligence, operations, CIS, etc), and this can only be achieved by full integration with the planning team. The following aspects should be addressed by the Met Oc support plan: a. Definition of the scope and intent of Met Oc support along with a statement of the mission critical Met Oc parameters that may influence operations and the probability of their occurrence; b. Planning assumptions, constraints and restraints that affect the Met Oc support plan; c. Met Oc support mission statement and operation objectives;

d. Concept of support, defining the overall organization, manning, equipment and product requirements; e. Taskings allocated to subordinate commands, assigned Met Oc units and assets for the provision of products and resources; f. Responsibilities, defining roles of the key players involved;

g. Co-ordinating instructions, which concern arrangements for forecast co-ordination and co-ordinated production and exchange of Met Oc information; h. Service support, describing in broad terms how Met Oc forces will be sustained logistically and administratively; and i. Command and control, indicating the channels for controlling Met Oc operations and a brief description of strategic and tactical communications architectures that will be developed to support Met Oc data transmission and information flow. Instructions for denying Met Oc data and information

20-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 to the enemy through implementation of METCON, OCCON and/or ICECON procedures should also be included as required. 6. Both during the planning and execution phase of the operation, Met Oc support arrangements must be adaptive to changes in concepts of operations, requirements and capabilities. Met Oc planners should closely monitor developments in the mission or scope of the operation, anticipate changes in operator requirements and assess impacts on Met Oc support. 2006. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MET OC SUPPORT

1. Although Met Oc support staff and resources are normally part of the Operations (J-3) staff, the Task Force commander may organize them as necessary to best support the mission. It must be emphasised that the Task Force commander is responsible for support to deployed Met Oc detachments. These detachments must use the appropriate chain of command to submit their requirements.

20-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

20-6 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 21 C4ISR 2101. INTRODUCTION

1. Released in July 1999, Shaping the Future for Canadian Defence A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020) provides the strategic vision for the development of the Canadian Forces in the 21st Century. It states, at its core, the strategy is to position the force structure of the CF to provide Canada with modern, tasktailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations. Achieving the goals outlined in Strategy 2020 will in large part be determined by the CFs ability to integrate advanced information technologies with appropriate operational and organizational concepts to achieve potentially revolutionary improvements in force projection and employment. 2. As a reflection of Command Intent, a robust, interconnected, and integrated Command & Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability is to be established that provides trusted, relevant and timely decision-quality information in support of command. While serving the specific needs of each environment, the C4ISR capability must be inherently joint and interoperable, facilitating linkages with key allies, other government departments (OGDs), and essential elements in the public domain. 3. C4ISR is a critical force enabler. The objective of C4ISR is to ensure that the CF develops and maintains a C4ISR capability that effectively supports Command in the 21st century. This entails a reliable and secure means to exercise Command and to exploit information and intelligence. Successful implementation of the characteristics espoused by C4ISR will manifest itself in significant C2 capabilityenabling improvements by promoting unity of effort and faster decision-cycle times. This will directly enhance the CFs ability to: a. field multiple Tactically Self-Sufficient Units (TSSUs) capable of integrated, multi-national, joint and combined operations; b. achieve effective Command regardless of the effects of distance, environmental factors and the actions of opposing forces; and c. synchronize forces to achieve desired operational effects.

4. The scope and physical manifestation of the CF C4ISR capability must recognize CF operational realities. There are a number of issues and factors that can potentially constrain CF C4ISR development including technological realities, evolution of CF C2 doctrine, CF manning concepts and funding. Nevertheless, if there is one capability that cannot be allowed to erode, it is CF Command & Control and its enabling sub-components. Whatever military capability the CF does field and regardless of what it is asked to do, support to Command must be done well effectively, efficiently and economically through a modern, flexible and comprehensive C4ISR capability. 2102. C4ISR DEFINITION 1. Command & Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (C4ISR ) consists of the concepts, connectivity, information systems, sensors, and tools in support of and required to achieve effective Command & Control across the entire spectrum of CF operations through the timely attainment of trusted and relevant information. 2103. C4ISR SCOPE 1. Effective C2 requires a dynamic C4ISR capability in support of Command that is integrated throughout the force structure and provides a secure knowledge-sharing environment. Information 21-1 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 technologies are not in or of themselves sufficient to achieve unity of effort through common intent. Equally important are structure, which includes our organizations and personnel, and doctrine. As such, the CF must encompass all these components to successfully promote an effective and integrated C4ISR capability. C4ISR is a joint operational concept that involves organizations, their missions and culture, and the key processes necessary to support effective Command. C4ISR is about people, their competencies and their tasks. Ultimately, it is about how the organization, the people, processes and equipment are integrated to deliver effective and synergistic C4ISR support to Command1. 2. A CF-wide C4ISR capability must be developed with the following shared characteristics in support of decision-makers and be able to: a. synchronize and focus knowledge rapidly; b. readily learn and adapt through feedback and performance measurement; c. be versatile at every level;

d. strike a balance between information sharing and information protection; e. support a capacity for simultaneity in planning and execution; f. share an awareness of the global situation; and

g. be structured for distributed operations. 3. Fusion of sensor or data based derived information takes place at multiple levels. Fusion can be automated within computer programs or understood as part of the cognitive process of operators involved in analytical processes, or sensor operators. The essence of fusion however is the distillation of data to support decision-making and the effective employment of the C4ISR Sensor to Shooter architecture of systems. The desired outcome of data fusion is the production of a Common Operating Picture that would cognitively support coherent determinations by multiple decision makers within similar circumstances. 2104. C4ISR AIM

1. The underlying C4ISR aim is promoting the Commanders ability to practically exploit information at all levels of command, and in all operational environments. In this regard, two distinct requirements act in opposition to each other and must be addressed in a state of balance. The first requirement is to satisfy the mission commanders information needs that are unique and specific to the mission, circumstances and environment. To this end, C4ISR solutions must be tailored specifically to the operational requirement and created as part of the force generation activity. Their creation is thus decentralized and will naturally reflect the specific requirements of that given mission. Left to proceed independently, the potential for individual services to evolve on divergent paths is high. 2. The second C4ISR requirement is generated by the fact that no military command exists in isolation. The requirement to exploit and exchange information with subordinate, superior and flanking elements transcends a joint chain of command in a continuum spanning from the seat of our government to the forward edge of military capability. It also includes lateral connections to allied governments and other government departments at all levels. This demands that C4ISR doctrine, concepts and systems evolve along a single convergent path, interoperable across all environments. 3. Fulfilling these two divergent requirements will be a complex undertaking. It is an example of a solution requiring decentralized execution with centralized coordination in order to achieve a state of synergy. It requires a strategy that is command-centric, driven by operational requirements and processes
1

The principles of Command and Leadership are not part of C4ISR. Nevertheless, C4ISR must be cognizant of concept development in these and other associated fields. 21-2

Ch 2 2005-8-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 rather than by technology. Command Guidance and the associated CF C4ISR Campaign Plan confirms the intent of CF leadership with respect to C4ISR capability development, and provides specific guidance to ensure that a delineated path is followed. 2105. C4ISR MODEL 1. The overall C2 desired end-state is to reduce uncertainty to the point where the commander is confident that the decisions being made are the best obtainable in the operational circumstances. This relates to a C4ISR practical end-state that will be achieved when our command processes are not constrained by artificial barriers within our doctrine, organization or systems, or those of our allies, and we operate from a position of decisive information superiority over the forces in opposition to us. The desired end-state is a condition established by a set of bounds that are dynamic and evolve due to such factors as technological advances, C2 concept evolution, and personnel concepts; and other factors more difficult to quantify, such as individual commanders expectations or requirements, real-world drivers, and situational dynamism. In other words, there is a variability associated with the end-state. As such, integral to CF C4ISR capability development will be the establishment of convergence points, defining in real terms the conditions for success at intermediate stages.

C4ISR TIM OV-1

DECISION MAKERS
Higher Authorities Engaged Forces

Commanders

Create Knowledge

Collect Information

Situational Awareness + Decision Support Background Information

Assessments & Forecasts Reference Material Information Repositories
Virtual Knowledge Base ISR & Situational Data

Integrated Information Products

Current Data
Sensors Observations Situation Reports

Fusion Capability

INFORMATION GRID - COLLABORATIVE INFO ENVIRONMENT SECURITY LAYER ACCESS CONTROL - DISSEMINATION LAYER

Figure 21-1 C4ISR Target Integration Model Operational View One (High-Level) 2. The blue print for this capability will be a baseline Target Integration Model (TIM), which will define, in real terms, the information requirements and associated target design required to fulfill this objective. Key TIM components and capabilities include: a. A Collaborative Information Environment that provides connectivity between all commanders and their staff, and permits full collaboration and interoperability amongst CF units, key allies, OGDs, and essential elements in the public domain; b. A CF C4ISR fusion and decision support capability that provides 24/7 Global Watch and Mission monitoring through the coordinated tasking, processing and exploitation of information from multiple sources; 21-3 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

c.

A trusted Common Operating Picture (COP) that is relevant and available to all levels of command;

d. Fully integrated CF-wide C2IS core processes to include integrated support tools for both C2IS2 and ISR; e. A fully integrated and distributed Virtual Knowledge Base that will be the common repository for all CF operations and intelligence information products; and f. A consolidated set of concepts, tools, techniques and procedures ensuring compliance with national security policy and operational requirements.

3. The transformation of an integrated CF C4ISR capability is a complex undertaking. It is managed through the C4ISR Campaign Plan as guided by overall command strategy, including the following guidance: a. Crucial to the success of the C4ISR effort will be the convergence of supporting technology. To this end, operational networks and information systems are to converge on the classified domain at the secret level; b. An enterprise approach is required for all Information Management initiatives and core processes; c. All C4ISR-related technology is to be developed using standards-based GOTS/COTS3 technology wherever possible;

d. Optimum use of the web is to be made. Web technology is now ubiquitous and has become a standard form of communication. Associated network content management system concepts, tools, techniques and procedures are to be developed; e. The issues and initiatives concerning our most important asset personnel must be fully integrated into any C4ISR plan. This includes skill-set establishment and training; and f. Collaboration and knowledge-sharing is to be made a goal of all CF units and focused upon, within appropriate business plans.

2106. C4ISR PRINCIPLES 1. The following principles are to be applied across the entire spectrum of CF C4ISR initiatives: a. C4ISR process solutions must be driven by end-user needs. This includes information fusion, content management and security doctrine. Active leadership is key to overall CF C4ISR development and requirements management; b. Connectivity between individual C2 information systems is a shared responsibility. In general terms, the higher-level system will assume the lead for capability development under the guidance of a common architecture and standard. Nevertheless, new capabilities, regardless of implementation level, must be common to established overall connectivity specifications; c. C4ISR process solutions that require less bandwidth demand/consumption4 are preferred5. In many instances, it will be preferable to process data and develop useable products away from the front lines of a deployed element (i.e. minimize the forward C4ISR footprint);

C2IS - Command & Control Information System(s). GOTS/COTS government/commercial off-the-shelf. 4 A balance between this and the following two principles will have to be made. Solutions will need to be iterated in information management policy. 5 Ceteris paribus - all other things being equal.
3

21-4 Ch 2 2005-8-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

d. In general terms, C4ISR information is to be stored once and replicated/shared as required. Emphasis is to be placed on sharing products but this must be balanced off with need-to-know criteria; e. C4ISR process solutions able to accommodate distributed processing are preferred. Distributed processing should complement effective on-site C4ISR support for a deployed commander; f. An open architecture approach should be employed when developing C4ISR initiatives. All classified C2IS will, wherever possible, be integrated into the Defence Enterprise Architecture.

g. The assignment of C4ISR resources and tasks will be determined on a mission-by-mission basis. Requirements will be established individually with C4ISR products tailor-made to fulfill mission needs; h. The responsibility for properly tagging information will rest with the producer. It will be the responsibility of producers to properly post and determine access criteria for their products. This can be achieved only by the establishment and maintenance of CF-wide standards; and i. The producer is responsible for product quality control with respect to both trustworthiness and relevance. It will also be the producers responsibility to ensure that the products posted are current.

2107. C4ISR CAPABILITY CONFIGURATION 1. System of Systems. The C4ISR capability is comprised of several component systems. As such, the C4ISR capability is a manifestation of a system of systems to craft a new and more profound capability comprised of four main grids or sub-systems. 2. Command Centric Operational Management System incorporates the command and control (C2) system that empowers Commanders at all echelons of Command, and across the Span of Command for a given Operation to accomplish Mission Command to the level of assigned authorities within a highly distributed understanding of Commanders Intent. 3. Intelligence and Operations Collection System can be pictured as the eyes and ears of the military force in the battlespace. It includes the platforms and sensors associated with information gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as the information processing and reporting technologies required to forward the information from the sensing platform to command fusion centre(s) for analysis or to an weapons platform for immediate engagement. 4. Information Analysis and Distribution System, referred to primarily as the communications, computers as well as some aspects of command, control and intelligence (C4I) component of the system of systems, is the skeletal structure supporting sensing, operating, and action systems of the military force. Composed predominantly of networks of computers and communication devices, its purpose is to permit the collection, analysis and correlation of information from all information sources and to distribute the derived knowledge to commanders and decision makers at all levels across the battlespace. 5. Precision Engagement System is the strike capability of the military force. It includes the vast array of precision weapons available today to inflict maximum damage on a selected target while simultaneously limiting or preventing cascading or collateral damage as a result of the attack. 2108. DEFINITIONS 1. Fundamental to the development of the C4ISR capability is the need to use agreed terminology. Where terms already exist in the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, these shall be either used directly or adapted to meet Canadian requirements. The following definitions are used when referring to the key definitions related to C4ISR: 21-5 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

a. Command and Control (C2). These terms although closely related and frequently used together, are not synonymous. The distinction is clarified in Chapter 2 Section 202 of this manual; b. Information. Data of every description, derived from multiple sources, which may be used in the production of operational information on the enemy and hostile forces, environment, friendly and neutral forces, and other aspects affecting the battlespace; c. Information superiority. The ability to acquire, exploit, protect and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying an adversarys ability to do the same;

d. Operational Information. All information, including intelligence, associated with the commanders area of influence and interest in relation to the enemy and hostile forces, environment, friendly forces, neutral forces, and other aspects of the battlespace, that includes information beyond the commanders area of influence and interest such as the media, industry, joint and combined forces, worldwide information grid, and perceptions by friendly, neutral and opposition elements; e. Situational Awareness. The combined knowledge of friendly forces, hostile forces, the environment and other aspects of the battlespace; f. Common Operating Picture (COP). A singular representation of Operational Information, based on common data and information shared by more than one command that can be tailored by users. Note: The representation shows both temporal and spatial relationships, and the assessed confidence value of the information. It facilitates collaborative planning, self-synchronization, and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness;

g. Intelligence. The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. Note: A full discussion of intelligence products, activities and organizations is clarified in Chapter 20 of this manual and supporting subordinate intelligence doctrinal publications; h. Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Note: Surveillance implies a continuous observation over a continuous or extended period of time; i. Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area; Fusion. The enabling of a coherent, shared situational awareness through the consolidation and integration of all-source operational information on forces (friendly, neutral and enemy/hostile), the environment and all other aspects affecting the mission space; Command Decision Support Capability. This capability refers to the set of tools and processes that, collectively, enhance the ability of commanders to make decisions and implement them. Note: Command decision support capability can be grouped into two broad categories: those elements that enhance the commanders situational awareness, and those that facilitate the execution of the commanders decisions; and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance. This capability combines command direction, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, and processed information and intelligence to provide timely, fused, multi-source Operational Information to the COP. Note: Integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance directly focuses on supporting current military operations and is more than the sum of intelligence plus surveillance plus reconnaissance. The synergy created by

j.

k.

l.

21-6 Ch 2 2005-8-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 integrating the tasking and control of these traditional data sources with focused dissemination of the fused product resulting from these activities creates an entirely new level of capability. 2109. SUPPORTING CONCEPTS/CAPABILITIES 1. Common Operating Picture: The Recognised Picture, as required by a Commander to support decision making, is derived from information management efforts, infrastructure, systems, plans or strategies. The visualization of this picture is compiled from real-time and non real-time sources through the actions of both automated and human resources. To be effective it must be timely, accurate and complete. These parameters also will ensure that surveillance assets are employed in an organised and efficient manner. Superimposed on these parameters will be a command appreciation of the picture and situational awareness. The recognized picture is a multi-levelled, multi-dimensional presentation of Air, Land and Maritime parameters. Critical to the viability of the COP is the knowledge requirement of placing Friendly, Neutral, and Enemy positions geographically; the first step of which is developing a coherent and precise picture of Friendly (Blue) assets. The mantra of location, location, location rings true as the foundational element of the COP. Knowing where Blue assets are located enables the precise development of enemy and neutral locations as sensed by blue resources. The communications architecture must therefore be able to accommodate precise blue position data and corresponding sensed data. 2. Decision Support processes are covered in detail in the various chapters of this manual as well as other supporting CF and Allied publications. Intelligence Process, B-GJ-005-200/FP-006 Operational Planning Process, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Information Operations processes, B-GG-005-004/AF-010 Risk Management for CF Operations, B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 Targeting Process, (AJP 3.9 - under development)

2110. CONCLUSION 1. The CF C4ISR capability through a system of systems integrates and synchronizes the collection and synthesis of information from sensors, information handling processes and databases, to support collaborative planning efforts, and to allow decentralized operations based on missionoriented orders from Commanders. It remains an objective that Commanders at all levels must actively seek to achieve, to support and optimize decision-making. The ongoing Information-based Revolution in Military Affairs will continue to transform the nature of warfare and the conduct of military operations. One of the principal transformations will be that commanders and decision-makers at all levels will work in an informationsaturated environment. In order to make effective decisions, they will need enough of the right information to make decisions but not so much information that they are overwhelmed. Because sensor data accessible by decision makers is expected to increase by a billion-fold within the coming decade, a whole new approach to the collection, processing, and dissemination of this information will be required if useful understanding is to be obtained from this flood of data. An integrated C4ISR capability will contribute to enhancing the ability of commanders to make decisions and implement them in a timely and effective manner in an information-rich environment.

21-7 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

21-8 Ch 2 2005-8-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 22 INFORMATION OPERATIONS 2201. INTRODUCTION 1. Information forms the basis of the decision making process. This is true from the strategic level down to the lowest tactical level. It is applicable across the spectrum of conflict and is equally important in peace. The possession of information and the means to gather it are not the only factors involved. The ability to process and interpret information, disseminate it to the right people at the right time, and to use it to the best effect are equally important. At the same time, the security, integrity and reliability of the information and information systems must be ensured. 2. Future operations will encompass conflict prevention, conflict and post conflict activities, and will be dominated by uncertainty and the threat of rapid escalation. There may be several groups involved in the conflict or crisis and the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could play a significant role. The future battlespace will be non-linear, with several operations taking place simultaneously. Opponents are likely to avoid superiority in conventional arms and attack perceived weaknesses, increasing the likelihood of asymmetric attacks. NATO Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5 CRO), such as peace support operations (PSO), have increased in prominence. In such operations, gaining the support of the protagonists and the international community will be a specific objective. The area of operations (AO) may be subject to a breakdown of law and order among the civil population, which could manifest itself in chaos and crime. There may also be a large movement of refugees within, into and out of the AO. The Canadian Forces may well be operating amongst a host nation or local population, who may not be sympathetic to the CFs role or presence, and who may even be a party to the conflict. 3. Conflict will be the focus of much international and diplomatic activity and this will inevitably subject the CF to media pressure and attempts by adversaries to influence opinions and alter perceptions. With the worldwide proliferation of cheap and highly effective information technology (IT), all participants and other interested parties (civilians, neutrals, media, etc.) in any type of conflict have become users or recipients of information. In most cases, the careful use of information to influence perceptions and attitudes will be as important as any combat operations; applied early it may even prevent conflict in the first place. 2202. PURPOSE AND DEFINITION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. The importance of managing information in the achievement of military objectives has therefore led the CF to adopt the co-ordinating strategy of information operations (IO) as an integral part of military operations. It is important to note that in the CF, IO has replaced C2W in its entirety, and the C2W term is no longer employed. Formed on the foundation of C2W, the IO enablers, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Operations Security (OPSEC), Public Affairs (PA), Electronic Warfare (EW), Deception, Destruction and Computer Network Operations (CNO), span the entire spectrum of conflict. They can assist in the achievement of all end states, from the unconditional surrender of an adversary through to wider acceptance of existing peace settlements. These enablers are integrated and co-ordinated with other military and non-military activities to achieve the commanders mission. 2. Information operations is defined as:

Actions taken in support of national objectives that influence an adversarys decision makers by affecting others information and/or information systems while exploiting and protecting ones own information and/or information systems and those of our friends and allies. 3. Information operations is the overarching co-ordinating strategy that integrates the effects of its enablers, military force and non-military activities to achieve the desired end-state. Overall direction of IO is a national concern and the government must be actively involved, setting clear political objectives and providing detailed guidance to the military at the strategic level. The planning and implementation of the military aspects of IO will therefore occur at the strategic and operational levels. This section therefore 22 - 1 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 focuses on these levels. 4. IO and other CF actions must be fully integrated to maximize the overall effects of both. Unless IO has a clearly defined aim that directly supports the achievement of the commanders mission, considerable effort and resources will be wasted. Changing perceptions, for example, or degrading an adversarys communication and information systems (CIS), will achieve little unless they result in actions that the CF can exploit, or which contribute materially to the success of the commanders mission. Therefore, IO must be part of the operational planning process from the outset of the mission. 5. Current CF IO Policy and Doctrine. Current CF IO policy is articulated in the Information Operations Policy for CF International Operations. Doctrine is contained in B-GG-005-004/AF-010, CF Information Operations. 2203. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. There are two categories of IO: defensive IO and offensive IO, depending on the nature of action involved. a. Defensive IO. Defensive IO is defined as actions taken to maintain access to and effective use of information, information based processes, command and control (C2) systems and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict and to protect information critical to achieving specific objectives. The conduct of defensive IO builds on existing security policies, doctrine and procedures to ensure that friendly information, information-based processes and CIS are adequately protected against the effects of others efforts to acquire, exploit or otherwise manipulate information to the detriment of the commanders military decision or political consultation processes and operational objectives; and b. Offensive IO. Offensive IO is defined as actions taken to influence a potential adversarys available information, information based processes, C2 systems and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict in pursuit of specific objectives or in reaction to a specific threat. The conduct of offensive IO will be based on political guidance following military advice depending upon a specific situation. 2. IO Enablers. IO is a collection of enablers that work in unison to assist in the achievement of the command objectives. The following a brief outline of each of the enablers and their purpose: a. Physical Destruction. Physical destruction contributes to IO by demonstrating the intent, capability and will to take decisive action. It also disrupts an adversarys ability to exercise command and control through the destruction of key targets. The physical destruction plan must also take account our own vulnerabilities and operations security (OPSEC) plan; b. Electronic Warfare (EW). EW contributes to IO in five ways: (1) As a source of intelligence for planning and monitoring the effects of IO; (2) As a means to disrupt the decision-makers ability to exercise command and control by attacking adversary C4I nodes, denying their use at critical moments through jamming; (3) As a component (electronic deception) of a deception plan; and (4) Through the use of Electronic Protection Measures (EPM); c. Operations Security (OPSEC). OPSEC denies critical information to the adversary, preventing the obtainment of detailed friendly dispositions, intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities. OPSEC addresses the overall security of an operation and is not a process to protect all information. It supplements, but does not replace, standing security measures. OPSEC denies the adversary the information needed for effective decision-making. As such the OPSEC plan may require the 22 - 2 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 destruction or neutralisation of key adversary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. OPSEC must address the unclassified sources of information that may be used as indicators by the adversary; d. Deception. Deception is defined as those measures designed to mislead the adversary decisionmaker by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information to induce a reaction prejudicial to the adversarys interests. Historically, it has been one of the most effective components of IO, paying big returns for the resources involved. While OPSEC denies information, deception fills the void with information tailored for the adversarys consumption leading to definite, but incorrect, decisionmaking. OPSEC is essential to deception in order to conceal those aspects and indicators that would allow the enemy to determine the reality behind the deception; e. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). PSYOPS is defined as planned activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviours, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. PSYOPS supports IO by influencing decision-makers directly or indirectly. PSYOPS aims to: (1) Weaken the will of the adversary or potentially hostile audiences; (2) Reinforce the feelings of friendly target audiences; and (3) Gain the support of the uncommitted target audiences; f. Computer Network Operations (CNO). CNO can contribute to the achievement of all the objectives of IO, but successful exploitation or attacks may require assistance from national agencies. They will be of limited use against a less sophisticated adversary with low dependence on information technology, or one possessing effective back up systems. CNO has three elements: defence, exploitation and attack: (1) Defence. Actions to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within CF information systems and computer networks. (2) Exploitation. Enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. (3) Computer Network Attack (CNA). Due to national sensitivities this may be conducted on an individual national basis. The intrusion into a computer system or network, via the software or hardware, to: destroy, deny user access, to modify or manipulate the data, information or functionality on that system or network, in whole or part. CNA includes physical damage to components induced by manipulation or modification of the software; g. Public Affairs (PA). PA is a distinctive function within DND/CF that helps establish and maintain mutual lines of communications, understanding, acceptance and co-operation between an organization and its audiences. PA differs from PSYOPS in that PA releases information through uncontrolled media sources while PSYOPS uses controlled sources for information distribution; and h. Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). CIMIC is a military function that supports the commander's mission by establishing and maintaining co-ordination and co-operation between the military force and all civilian actors in the commanders area of operations (AO). CIMIC can support IO by gaining the support of local populations by providing tangible benefits to the civil population thus undermining enemy IO. CIMIC staff knowledge of local attitudes may assist in assessing the effectiveness of IO. 3. Legal Implications and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Legal advisers should be consulted to ensure that activities are consistent with International and Domestic law. All IO targets must be legitimate military objectives and their attack must offer a definite military advantage. Use of some IO enablers may

22 - 3 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 require ROE. 4. Intelligence Support to IO. Intelligence support is critical to the planning, execution, and assessment of IO. Intelligence must be readily accessible, timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed to support an array of CF IO requirements. The conduct of sophisticated IO requires unique and detailed intelligence. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is vital to successful IO. Intelligence products must support IO planning, provide analysis of a potential adversarys IO vulnerabilities, allow determination of a potential adversarys IO capabilities and intentions, provide Indications & Warnings (I&W) of any potential threat and contribute directly to the Precautionary Measures System. 5. Planning Fundamentals of IO. The implementation of IO should be based on certain fundamental principles, which shape the commanders campaign and direct the way in which it is conducted. These are: a. Commanders Guidance. The commanders guidance reflects higher-level intent and guides and influences all lower level plans. The commander drives the campaign, and exercises control of all IO within a framework of timely decision-making and consultation up and down the chain of command to maintain internal and external support. The commanders intent will therefore define the IO aim, which in turn supports the strategic mission. This aim must specify the end state; b. Co-ordination. IO must be closely integrated throughout the chain of command. All elements of IO must be co-ordinated and synchronized with other operational activities in order that one activity does not compromise or negate another, particularly between the individual IO enablers. This is normally accomplished through an Information Operations Co-ordination Cell (IOCC); c. Accurate Intelligence. IO must be founded on timely and accurate intelligence regarding all parties to the conflict, and on neutral audiences whose perceptions may influence the outcome of the mission. This intelligence should form the background to the commanders estimate;

d. Decisive Points. IO must focus on the adversarys decision makers, derived from an in-depth analysis of the adversary. At the same time, the commander must identify friendly decision makers and give them the appropriate degree of protection; e. Centralized Planning. The principle of centralized planning and decentralised execution (within defined lines of operation) at lower levels generally applies to IO. However, centralized control will be required for activities such as deception when all involved force elements must adhere rigidly to the plan; f. Targeting. The IO target list includes the full array of targets inside and outside the AO. IO offers scope for influencing targets through soft techniques such as diplomacy and military training assistance to, at the other end of the spectrum, more traditional hard kill techniques. IO representation in the targeting cell is essential if effective co-ordination of IO targets is to be integrated into the overall targeting process;

g. Timely Preparation. IO planning and implementation must start early, particularly where shaping behaviour is key to success, because both planning and execution take time, and results can be slow to emerge. Hence, direction, as part of the planning process, must be given at the earliest opportunity. Aspects of some defensive IO take more preparation as, particularly for CIS, some defensive measures have to be built in at the design and manufacturing stage; h. Flexibility. The goal of IO is to influence decision-makers perceptions and C2 procedures and capability. Perceptions, in particular, are susceptible to change with little or no notice. The IO plan must, therefore, be proactive and flexible enough to respond to other events, particularly to exploit sudden changes in popular mood; and

22 - 4 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 i. Monitoring and Effects Analysis. The successful prosecution of IO relies on continuous monitoring and evaluation of the effects, short and long-term, of its inter-related activities on the target. This is achieved by the directed collection of all-source intelligence material. INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE LEVELS OF WAR

2204.

1. Operations by Canadian Forces are directed, planned and conducted at three levels: direction at the military strategic level, and planning and conduct at both the operational and tactical levels. Actions are defined as military-strategic, operational or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving the specified objectives. a. The Military Strategic Level. At this level, armed forces are deployed and used within an overarching political framework and in a synchronized fashion with other non-military initiatives, e.g. diplomatic, economic and high-level media operations. The military strategic input to IO will include political guidance, goals and objectives, limitations and the draft campaign plan. It is at this level that military co-ordination with the higher-level political and media aspects of the plan take place; b. The Operational Level. At the operational level, armed forces are deployed and employed to attain strategic and/or campaign objectives within the AO. The operational commander refines the campaign for the AO, creates the operational plan and directs operations. In doing so the commander will ensure that operational objectives support the strategic IO objectives and that forces and resources are allocated as necessary. The operational commander should always maintain the capability to be able to change the emphasis of the IO plan to react to developments, e.g. to use PSYOPS to take advantage of a successful kinetic attack; and c. The Tactical Level. At the tactical level, forces are employed to conduct military tasks and gain military objectives some of which will be derived from IO objectives. Where IO focuses on perceptions and attitudes, the tactical level is vital; the actions of a few can greatly influence the perceptions of many.

2. Distinguishing Levels of Operations. The distinction between the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of joint operations will seldom be clear-cut. This is especially true of IO, where tactical activities can influence global perceptions, and where the interaction between the political and military spheres of influence assumes greater importance. 2205. 1. INFORMATION OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION Within the organization of IO, in general, the following applies: a. Strategic IO objectives require approval from the MND through the DM, CDS and the DCDS; b. Termination or degradation of operational networks and CF wide defensive measures (INFOCONs) must be approved by the DCDS; c. All other responses fall under the authority of DCDS and have been delegated to J3 IO and J6 IO; and

d. J6 IO will co-ordinate planning and implementation of defensive measures to deter and defeat CNAs. Any active measures such as computer network attack and electronic counter measures will require the DCDS or higher authority. 2206. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The Strategic Level. The DCDS is responsible for developing the military strategic plan or OP O, and co-ordinating all military strategic IO activities. The OPLAN, CONPLAN or OP O will include direction and guidance to the TFC. 22 - 5 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

2. The Commander. The JFC and the component commanders within the JOA remain responsible for the military aspect of IO within their span of command and within their respective AO. As such the JFC ensures that the campaign plan is consistent with the political objectives. A Canadian TFC must be aware of the JFC IO intent but develop the plan within the guidance provided by the DCDS. The commander provides guidance for planning and conducting IO and assigns responsibility for the employment of resources in pursuit of IO objectives. The designated commander may be responsible for co-ordinating the integration of all supporting units assets, IO strategy, and planning. The concept of operations should clearly state the IO objectives. 3. The IO Officer. Commanders are supported by staffs with diverse structures, responsibilities and supporting infrastructures. Commanders will tailor their organizations to meet their unique situation and mission. An Information Operations Officer will be appointed to assist the COS J3 in managing and planning the IO support plan. The IO Officer will be the co-ordinating authority for IO activities. The IO Officer ensures that the impacts of all activities on the decision makers is considered and de-conflicted, maintaining unity of effort in support of the political and military objectives. The IO officers responsibilities are: a. To advise the commander on IO; b. To plan IO activities in support of the campaign for the COS J3; c. To co-ordinate the overall IO effort on behalf of the commander;

d. To co-ordinate IO activities with national and joint centres and NATO agencies as authorised; e. To provide IO representation in the targeting selection, reviewing and co-ordination process; and f. To review ROE from an IO perspective, making recommendations for changes as appropriate.

4. IO Co-ordination. IO co-ordination is affected through the existing targeting co-ordination processes and the IOCC. 5. The IO Co-ordination Cell (IOCC) a. Role. The role of the IOCC is to prepare a coherent IO plan for submission to the targeting working groups and provide a forum for co-ordination, de-confliction and monitoring of approved plans. It will be chaired by COS J3 with J3 IO acting as the secretary to the cell. b. Membership. The IOCC is an executive group and therefore it is essential that the representatives have the authority to speak and make decisions on behalf of their organization. The membership is not fixed but will depend upon the mission, the role of IO in accomplishing the commanders objectives and the adversarys ability to conduct IO. Cell representatives may call on additional expertise, such as CNO experts or strategic intelligence experts, as required. An example of possible cell composition is provided in Figure 22-1. Detailed information on the IOCC is provided in Chapter 4 of B-GG 005-004/AF-010, CF Information Operations. c. Responsibility of Representatives. Representatives provide information on their future intentions and advice on the employment of their assets. Through the IOCC, activities are de-conflicted and intentions amended to ensure coherence before submitting plans to the targeting working groups, JCB and ultimately the commander for approval. Representatives from the subordinate commands, usually the IO Officer, will provide expertise and act as liaison for IO matters between the higher and subordinate commands.

22 - 6 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

POL/MIL LEGAL PA SOF Component Reps

Int Ops Log Plans CIS

Chair: COS J3

Secretary: J3 IO IO CO-ORDINATION CELL

PSYOPS OPDEC

CNO
OPSEC EW Engr CIMIC

Figure 22-1. Example of an IO Co-ordination Cell

22 - 7 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

22 - 8 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 23 ELECTRONIC WARFARE 2301. INTRODUCTION 1. Electronic warfare (EW), one of the enablers of information operations (IO). It consists of military action involving the use of electro-magnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent its use by hostile forces and to retain its effective use by friendly forces. EW is a force multiplier and is an integral part of operations and the overall IO strategy. Success at any level of modern conflict demands the domination of the electromagnetic spectrum. Thus it is essential that commanders have experienced EW staff to provide the appropriate focus for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 2. Traditionally, each CF Environment has employed EW differently; it is important to appreciate these differences when planning the operational employment of EW assets. For a CF operation, the development of an EW policy and the applications of EW by the task force commander (TFC) must consider the capabilities and resources of the TF elements. 2302. OBJECTIVES OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1. EW objectives must be consistent with the IO objectives of the TFC. Specific EW objectives are to: a. determine and assess enemy capabilities by monitoring the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum; b. provide immediate threat warning; c. deny an enemy the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum; d. ensure maximum exploitation of hostile and neutral electromagnetic radiation; e. retain the effective use of one's own electromagnetic equipment in the face of hostile, neutral or friendly electronic countermeasures (ECM) activity; and f. retain the effective use of friendly electromagnetic equipment in the face of hostile intelligence collection. 2. Both enemy and friendly forces will vie to gain dominance by using their full suite of communications, surveillance, target acquisition and weapon systems operating across the electromagnetic spectrum. 2303. COMPONENTS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1. EW is comprised of the following three basic divisions: a. electronic support measures (ESM); b. ECM; and c. electronic protective measures (EPM). 2. ESM. ESM involve actions taken to search for, intercept, identify and locate radiated electromagnetic energy sources with the aim of exploiting such radiation. ESM provide supporting EW information for ECM, EPM, and other actions such as threat detection, warning, avoidance, target acquisition and homing. ESM are passive and can be employed across the spectrum of conflict. In peacetime, they build up an intelligence database for operations.

23-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

3. ECM. ECM involve actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's use of electromagnetic energy to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum. ECM operations are either planned (this is the preferred type since ECM operations may adversely affect the activities of nearby friendly forces) or spontaneous. Spontaneous operations should only be conducted when, in the TFC's judgement, they would favourably influence the ongoing operation or are required to protect essential resources. ECM are sub-divided into the following categories: a. Electronic Jamming. This countermeasure, which can be carried out from any number of platforms using a wide variety of techniques, consists of the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy, with the aim of impairing the enemy's use of electronic devices, equipment or systems. This includes jamming for self-defence, such as anti ship missile defence. The control of jamming resources is exercised by the TFC; however, under certain situations, control may be delegated to subordinate commanders. As jamming can cause interference in friendly electronic systems, it must be: (1) authorized by appropriate rules of engagement (ROE); (2) fully co-ordinated with all other operations or offensive actions; (3) fully co-ordinated with the J2 staff to determine the effects of jamming on intelligence activities; and (4) fully co-ordinated with the communications staff to avoid self-defeating mutual interference. b. Electronic Deception. The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of electromagnetic energy so as to confuse, seduce, distract or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy's electronic systems. It is particularly effective when the enemy relies upon the use of electromagnetic emissions, and when it is fully integrated into the overall operation as part of an overall deception plan. Electronic deception requires detailed planning, co-ordination and execution as it is vulnerable to detection. It has few of the disadvantages of jamming, but can be very manpower and resource intensive. c. Electronic Neutralization. This countermeasure involves the use of electromagnetic energy to temporarily or permanently damage enemy electronic devices. It may occur as a by product of jamming or through the use of directed energy weapons. Co-ordination of electronic neutralization is the same as for jamming. 4. EPM. These measures involve actions taken to ensure effective use by friendly forces of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of electromagnetic energy. EPM are sub-divided as follows: a. Active EPM. Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters, to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. b. Passive EPM. Undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and technical features of equipment, which are meant to ensure effective, friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 2304. PLANNING ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1. EW, as one of the IO enablers, must not operate in a vacuum, void of integration with other IO activities (see chapter 22 Information Operations). As a co-ordinated IO effort must be carefully and logically planned, a well defined role for EW must be formulated as early as possible and included in the TFC's EW policy. 2. Control and co-ordination of EW operations flow from and are a function of the EW policy issued to the TFC by the strategic level commander. The EW policy is implemented by the TFC, and co-ordinated by the 23-2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 operations staff, in the form of plans, orders and instructions, provides guidance or direction on such matters as the following: a. allocation of EW capabilities and resources; b. responsibilities for the control and co-ordination of EW capabilities and resources; c. development of EW procedures and techniques; and d. restrictions on the use of ECM. 3. The planning of EW operations is complicated by the need to co-ordinate the activities of elements which are often functionally different and geographically scattered. EW must, therefore, be integrated into the TFC's operation plan. The operation plan must provide flexibility for the component commanders to optimize their EW capabilities. Component operation plans provide direction for accomplishing specific EW missions to support the operations plan, and the necessary tasking for subordinate EW units. To this end, the TFCs operation plan should: a. identify EW capabilities and resources available and how these are to be employed; b. assign tasks commensurate with EW capabilities of the TF elements; and c. promulgate procedures and methods for the control and co-ordination of EW activities. 4. As part of the EW co-ordination process, critical frequencies must be identified and catalogued by means of the restricted frequency list (RFL). This list must be held to a minimum and must be continuously evaluated for operational and tactical significance. The RFL is comprised of the following three frequency classifications: a. Taboo Frequencies. Friendly frequencies on which jamming or other intentional interference is prohibited (e.g., distress, vital communications and early warning air defence radar frequencies). Taboo frequencies are identified by the J3 division of the general staff. b. Protected Frequencies. Friendly frequencies on which interference must be minimized. The decision to jam these frequencies rests with the commander conducting EW. Protected frequencies are identified by the TFHQ J3 and J6 divisions. c. Guarded Frequencies. Enemy frequencies used as a source of information and on which jamming is controlled. These frequencies may be jammed if the tactical advantage gained would outweigh the subsequent loss of intelligence. Guarded frequencies are identified by the TFHQ J2 and J6 divisions. 5. In addition to being integrated with IO efforts, EW operations must be co-ordinated with other operational activities such as air defence and airspace management. This is achieved through close cooperation among the divisions of the general staff and among higher, lower and lateral headquarters. Overall co-ordination of EW resources and activities is exercised by the Joint EW Co-ordination Cell (EWCC). 2305. THE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CO-ORDINATION CELL 1. The role of the EWCC is to plan, direct, monitor and co-ordinate all EW activities on behalf of the TFC. Manning is determined by the overall structure of the TFHQ, and is proportionate to both the scale and nature of the operation and the available EW resources. The EWCC's primary responsibility is the effective and efficient management of EW capabilities and resources. EWCC staff must continually perform the following functions: a. collect and process EW information relevant to the conduct of operations;

23-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 b. access the CF EW Operational Support Centre (EWOSC) database for: (1) the electronic order of battle (EOB), (2) military and civil communications, and (3) EW equipment capabilities and vulnerabilities; c. assist intelligence staff to evaluate EW information and draw appropriate conclusions; d. co-ordinate the dissemination of EW information throughout the TF; e. provide recommendations to the TFC on the use of EW in response to various measures; and f. collate the RFL. 2306. COMMAND AND CONTROL 1. The EWCC is a cell within the headquarters and is responsible to the TFC through the J3.

2. EWCCs should be established in all component HQs at a level commensurate with the task. Tactical EWCCs are responsible to the component commanders within the overall command authority of the TFC. 2307. ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTRE 1. The CF use software (s/w) intensive EW systems. To utilize fully these s/w driven systems, operational s/w support is essential. This support should comprise an EW database, a threat analysis facility, and Environmental operational s/w support through their respective integrated support stations (ISS).

E W O P E R A T IO N A L S U P P O R T
THREAT A N A L Y SIS C ST COLOCATED EW CC A L L IE D S IG IN T DA TABA SE DATA P R O D U C T IO N
NAVY IN T E G R A T E D SUPPORT S T A T IO N

MAR COM

SH IP EW SY ST E M S

EW D A TABA SE

CF EW D ATABA SE

LAND IN T E G R A T E D SUPPORT S T A T IO N

LPC

LAND EW SY ST E M S

D G Int

EOB & S C E N A R IO S

A IR IN T E G R A T E D SUPPORT S T A T IO N

A IR C O M

A IR C R A F T EW SY ST E M S

DREO

F O N C T IO N A L CONTROLE

IN P U T

EW OSC

IS S

OUTPUT

Figure 23-1 Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre 23-4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

2. The EWOSC provides the necessary EW operational s/w support. It houses the CF EW data base (CFEWDB), threat analysis facility and the Environmental ISS (see Figure 23-1). Each ISS is under the functional control of and tasked by its respective command. The EWOSC, through the EWCC, provides the following support: a. The CFEWDB provides database support for: (1) platform, weapon and emitter location correlation, (2) the EOB, (3) scenario development, and (4) a central EW library; and b. The threat analysis facility: (1) supports reprogramming of EW equipment by: (a) threat interaction and analysis, and (b) threat vulnerability analysis; (2) supports programming of threat simulators, and (3) provides analysis of threat changes.

23-5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

23-6

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 24 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 2401. INTRODUCTION

1. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is joint, part of Information Operations (IO), and a valuable force multiplier ideally suited for all services in small to large deployment. Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) define PSYOPS as planned psychological activities using methods of communications and other means directed to approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives planned. They include strategic psychological operations (SPO), crisis response psychological operations (CRPO) and combat psychological operations (CPO). 2. The purpose of PSYOPS is to analyse, and when required, influence the perceptions, emotions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or groups with the goal of achieving political or military objectives while preventing the effective use of these activities by an enemy or adversary. PSYOPS are an important component of the political, military and ideological actions that support the attainment of both immediate and long term objectives. PSYOPS tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for understanding and changing the perceptions, emotions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or specific target groups provide commanders with their primary means of communication with opposing military forces, potential adversarys and civilian groups. 3. The conduct of PSYOPS is a continuous process and their success or failure is often known only after an operation is executed. When effectively integrated with other operations, PSYOPS contribute significantly to the success of the mission. It is important to note that PSYOPS are not confined to influencing the attitudes and behaviour of enemy troops on the battlefield, but also encompass activities undertaken in times of peace and crisis to support the achievement of national political objectives in an operational area. Although this chapter is concerned with military psychological operations, it is important that these are consistent with any concurrent psychological activities conducted by non-military agencies; therefore co-ordination is paramount, particularly on peace support operations (PSO). It is very important that good liaison is maintained with civilian agencies and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the AO to avoid conflicting PSYOPS activities. 4. This chapter discusses PSYOPS doctrine in broad terms and also how PSYOPS relate specifically to CF operations. In the planning and conduct of CF PSYOPS, the NATO definitions are used. Further detail is available in B-GJ-005-313/FP-000, Psychological Operations. 2402. THE CANADIAN FORCES AND PSYOPS

1. PSYOPS shall not be conducted in peace, crisis or war unless approved by the CDS. PSYOPS shall be authorized within the approved AO, to include the area of interest to a TFC. Once a military operation is launched, concurrent PSYOPS can be planned, conducted, executed and co-ordinated at all three levels simultaneously, within directives and limitations issued by the CDS. Coherence between the political and military messages is paramount to achieving the mission. 2. CF planners at all levels must understand the potential of PSYOPS and selected CF personnel should be qualified as specialists in the planning and application of PSYOPS. 3. Any information or intelligence gathering in support of domestic and international operations involving PSYOPS, may only be conducted within the constraints of Canadian laws and policy. It is therefore paramount that friendly forces have an understanding and an appropriate level of training of the TF PSYOPS program, objectives and current themes.

24-1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

2403.

SCOPE OF PSYOPS

1. The scope is all encompassing with regard to spectrum of conflict, operations and audience. The psychological dimension of conflict is as important as the physical. Conflict is a struggle of wills, which takes place in peoples minds as well as on the battlefield. Conflict is a struggle of power, which may be political, military or economical. A critical point is that PSYOPS are also enhanced by the expansion of mass communication capabilities. The effectiveness of communication depends on the perception of the communicators credibility and capacity to carry out promises or threatened actions. 2. The three basic objectives of PSYOPS are to: a. Weaken the will of the enemy or adversary by lowering morale and reducing the efficiency of his force through the creation of doubts, dissidence and disaffection within their ranks (i.e., activities directed at the enemy or potentially hostile target audiences); b. Reinforce the support of friendly target audiences; and c. Gain the support and co-operation of the uncommitted or undecided audience.

2404. PRINCIPLES OF PSYOPS 1. The following principles apply to the conduct of a PSYOPS campaign: a. Mission. The most important principle is that the PSYOPS mission must be clearly defined in terms that correspond to the supported TFCs vision of how the operation will proceed; b. Research and Evaluation. PSYOPS themes, activities and symbols should be based on thorough research and analysis of target audience, and of friendly and adversary PSYOPS capabilities; c. Empathy. The ability of PSYOPS practitioners to empathize with target audience is fundamental to the effect of PSYOPS.

d. Co-ordination. There must be close co-ordination among all agencies involved in the planning and conduct of PSYOPS; e. Timeliness. Rapid exploitation of PSYOPS themes is often critical, thus quick planning, pre-testing and approval procedures must be developed to ensure fleeting opportunities can be exploited; f. Truthfulness. All missions must be based on the truth, and where possible on empirical fact;

g. Acknowledgment of the Source. In the CF, PSYOPS actions and operations must be acknowledged by their sponsor to allow dissemination; and h. Credibility. The credibility of the source and the message is fundamental to the success of all PSYOPS missions. 2405. FACTORS AFFECTING PSYOPS

1. The following factors affect a PSYOPS campaign planned at the strategic level, controlled at the operational level and executed at the tactical level: a. Selection of Suitable Target Audiences. Targeting is defined as the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. The goal is to obtain from selected target audiences a desired response in support of the 24-2

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 TFCs mission. The three types of target audience are groups (collections of people bound together by common activities and goals); categories (collections of people who share specific demographics such as race, religion, sex or age); and aggregates (collections of people identified by a common geographic area). Therefore, PSYOPS will always rely heavily on specialized areas of study, such as social and behavioural intelligence for careful planning b. Selection and Development of Credible Themes. A theme is an idea or topic on which a psychological operation is based. Once a target audience is selected, care must be taken to select corresponding themes which will produce the desired response. Themes must be believable and support the mission, and PSYOPS objectives. Themes (e.g. mine awareness saves lives within a community; freedom of movement, of goods and services improve the quality of life of citizens...) must urge the target audience to adopt attitudes and behaviour which are realistic and acceptable to this target audience c. Co-ordination of Operations. PSYOPS themes will be perceived by target audiences as expressions of national policy or that of the organization leading the operation. Any inconsistency between themes used by political authorities, military forces at various levels of command or civilian agencies, may discredit the mission. Careful co-ordination of PSYOPS among all organizations and agencies, authorized to conduct such operations, is paramount.

d. Timeliness. Psychological activities conducted at the correct moment will significantly enhance or, if required, minimize the impact of operations on the day-to-day activities of the population. The PSYOPS staff must be able to analyse the enemy or adversarys psychological situation, identify suitable target audiences, select themes, plan, co-ordinate and execute operations as the situation develops. 2. When conducting PSYOPS, PA must not be compromised and must maintain its credibility and reliability in the eyes of the national and international media, as well as the national and international public. Therefore, PSYOPS messages should be formulated in close co-operation with PA. As specified in the IO doctrine, PA activities allow a TFC to influence an adversarys or a potential adversarys perception about the friendly forces intent, capability and vulnerability. At the same time, PA activities will not be used as a military deception capability or to provide disinformation to either internal or external audiences. PA activities will be consistent with ongoing OPSEC efforts, another pillar of IO. 2406. CATEGORIES OF PSYOPS

1. Further to Article 2401, PSYOPS fall into three classifications which, in the context of combined warfare, facilitate the division of responsibility among national authorities, host nations and operational commanders. To prevent loss of credibility, coherent planning among all levels of command, including civilian agencies, must permeate PSYOPS. These classifications are known as: a. Strategic Psychological Operations (SPO). Defined as Planned psychological operations that pursue objectives to gain the support and co-operation of supportive and neutral audiences and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile audience to commit aggressive action, and contribute to crisis management and deterrence in support of diplomatic actions. SPO are high level (i.e. national government level) PSYOPS directed toward supportive, hostile, potentially hostile or neutral audiences. Normally the objectives of SPO are long term and political in nature. b. Crisis Response Psychological Operations (CRPO). Defined as Planned psychological operations conducted as an integral part of Crisis Response Operations, designed to create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to co-operate among the parties in conflict and civilian population in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), in order to assist in the achievement of mission objectives and protect the forces. CRPO are conducted at the operational and tactical level and are the responsibility of the DCDS for operational level and the Task Force Commander for tactical level. CPRO are an integral part of military operations, being in consonance with National and Coalition strategic objectives. The objectives are to assist in the achievement of the mission and protect the force. CRPO are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, Peace Support Operations and are based on adherence to true and factual information. 24-3

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

c.

Combat Psychological Operations (CPO). Defined as Planned psychological operations conducted against approved target audiences in support of the commander as an integral part of combat operations and designed to defeat the enemy by reducing or eliminating the will to continue aggression in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), as well as to support the operational freedom of the commander. CPO are conducted at the operational and tactical level. They are the responsibility of the respective Canadian commander and are planned and executed in consonance with National and Coalition strategic objectives. They must be fully co-ordinated with all other aspects of an operation. (IO in particular).

2. CPO and CRPO conducted by a TFC will not target the international media, friendly nations or forces, or civilian audiences outside the AOR. In peace, crisis and war, PSYOPS activities will be conducted in the TFCs AO, which will include its area of influence and occasionally, portions of the TFCs area of interest. The latter could infringe on an adjacent units AOR. For instance, PSYOPS activities in an area of interest could apply to a municipality or community straddling the boundary separating two units or formations. Therefore, the coordination of PSYOPS activities among adjacent units becomes crucial to unity of purpose and unity of effort at all levels of command. 2407. PSYOPS ACTIONS

1. A range of actions may be planned, exclusively or partially, to achieve psychological impact on a particular audience. These actions may include: a. political actions such as amnesties for political prisoners and imposition of emergency legislation; b. diplomatic actions such as creating alliances and breaking or restoring diplomatic relations; c. economic actions such as imposing or lifting economic sanctions, trade tariffs and civil aid programmes; and

d. military actions such as shows of force, limited combat operations (e.g., raids), military assistance to friendly or neutral nations and military participation in civil aid programmes, and restrictive measures in areas of low intensity conflict (e.g., curfews). 2. While these actions are not the direct responsibility of military PSYOPS agents or units, they must be coordinated with the psychological activities of agents or units supporting the operational commander. 2408. COUNTER PSYOPS

1. The aim of counter PSYOPS is to shield an audience from hostile messages and lessen their impact. In this context, PSYOPS aim to counter information, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour detrimental to the objectives of a CF operation. Any misinformation or disinformation propagated will be exploited by extremist political, paramilitary and military groups to gain public support in support of their own objectives. 2. Counter PSYOPS uses capabilities to analyse an enemy or adversarys propaganda and its effect on friendly populations and friendly forces. Analysis of propaganda sources (white, grey and black), content, intended audience, media selection and effectiveness are done using subjective or objective methods: a. Subjective Methods. These methods are based on the background, experience and judgement of the analyst or specialist; and b. Objective Methods. These methods employ classification systems and statistical databases over a period of time. Staffs must therefore streamline and co-ordinate their data collection and data processing activities to prevent duplication of effort and wastage of resources. 3. Counter PSYOPS methods in peace, crisis and war rely on the critical collection of information pertaining to an enemy or adversarys intentions. These intentions are the focus of the TFCs Priority Intelligence 24-4

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Requirements. Themes are identified and techniques are employed to counter the effect of propaganda. Themes selected for this purpose aim to reduce the enemys or adversarys real or potential prestige and status, counter the effects of his propaganda and inform audiences about the TFs intentions and measures, so as to prevent or minimize civilian interference with the orderly conduct of military operations. 2409. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF PSYOPS

1. PSYOPS must be fully integrated with IO and the intelligence cycle to provide the force protection (FP) required by the military force and civilian agencies, across the spectrum of conflict. PSYOPS, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and public affairs (PA) also create a synergy which is an effective force multiplier to shape public opinions, perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour in support of CF operations and the mission. It is always advantageous to begin operations as early as possible to modify perceptions, emotions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour away from confrontation, to deter violence and to foster the peaceful resolution of disputes or conflicts. When possible, PSYOPS activities should be initiated prior to the introduction of forces into an AO. 2. When the CF must conduct PSYOPS to support a military operation, the CDS will authorize the policy and guidance for use by the TFC through the national Information Operations Co-ordination Cell (IOCC) J3 IO within the Joint staff. The CDS may also assign specialist staff officers or PSYOPS detachments, such as Tactical PSYOPS Teams (TPT), to the TFC as required. The primary role of the TPT is to enable TFC to directly communicate with target audience within his AOR. 3. At the operational level, the TFHQ staff is responsible to the TFC for integrating PSYOPS into the IO activities of their operations. The implementation of PCA, BPA and PSPA are the responsibility of the TFC. The TFC may also be involved in the implementation of SPA. On behalf of DCDS, the J3 staff would supervise PSYOPS, in close co-ordination with J5 PA and J9 CIMIC staff, through the TFHQ IOCC. 4. At the tactical level, PSYOPS units or teams will conduct PSYOPS activities as authorized by the chain of command, within the CDS guidelines. 2410. PSYOPS CAPABILITIES

1. PSYOPS can support joint and environmental operations across the spectrum of conflict and continuum of operation. The CF may, on an ad-hoc basis, generate a PSYOPS capability to support operations. As required, selected personnel will undergo PSYOPS training should there be a requirement to plan for or use PSYOPS. 2. In considering the generation of a PSYOPS capability, the Task Force TO&E would detail the personnel, individual and collective training, and equipment required to provide all or some of the following capabilities: a. command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS); b. research and analysis, and propaganda production; c. intelligence/military information and military police resources with access to Internet and Interpol, in light of criminal activities prevalent in an AO;

d. access to radio, television and film/video productions, including a broadcast capability; e. graphic production; f. newspaper/leaflet publication;

g. printing capability; h. loudspeaker teams;

24-5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 i. j. k. l. man-portable loudspeaker systems to address large crowds or groups spread over large areas; combat camera cell, both for civilian police (CIVPOL) and the military, in domestic and international operations; audio-visual teams; information technology specialist and web design.

m. language proficiency/ethnic background among PSYOPS teams deployed in the AO; n. interpreters and translators, as required; and o. combat service support resources. 3. Effective PSYOPS TTPs enhance force protection and the security of individuals and material in an AO. These TTPs will help modify attitudes and behaviours in support of the TF political and military objectives. PSYOPS will be most effective, as a force multiplier, when employed with PA, whose function it is to provide timely and accurate information, and CIMIC. The use of all available means of disseminating credible and factual information, including the troops in direct contact with the local population, such as in the case of foot patrols, must be exploited by the TFC to enhance the combat effectiveness of the TF. 4. In order to build the best message for the target audience, PSYOPS staff will have to interact very closely with Academics in many area of knowledge such as psychology, communication, political science, language, culture, sociology, economics, ethnology, history, philosophy.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

24-6

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 25 PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN CF OPERATIONS 2501. INTRODUCTION

1. Public affairs (PA) has been involved in nearly all CF operations since World War Two and continues to be an active element helping, as a member of the operation's team, to achieve the mission's operational objectives. PA is a force multiplier and an integral part of CF operations employing highly skilled personnel using modern communications methods to reach Canadian and international audiences. 2. PA is defined as a function that provides information released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support. 3. 2502. Current PA doctrine is contained in B-GJ-005-361/FP-000, Joint Public Affairs. PRINCIPLES OF PA IN CF OPERATIONS

1. The fundamental principle of PA in CF operations is to support operational activities by promoting understanding and awareness among Canadians of our role, mandate and activities, and of the CFs contributions to Canadian society and the international community. DAOD 2008 and PA policy state that Canadians will be well informed through openness and transparency and that PA is integrated in CF operations at all levels. 2. PA in CF operations, from the strategic to the tactical level, has two primary purposes: a. provide the Task Force Commander (TFC) and the Task Force (TF) with operational PA support; and b. provide Canadians with accurate up-to-date information about the operation commensurate with operational security. 2503. ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE PA

1. PA at National Defence is divided into four elements, Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM (PA)), Army PA, Navy PA and Air force PA, all of which provide direct or indirect support to CF operations. ADM (PA) heads Defence Public Affairs and provides public affairs support to Departmental Level 1s as well as CF operations, while Environmental PA staffs deal with Environment specific PA issues and concerns. The Director Public Affairs Operations and Training (DPOAT), manages and co-ordinates strategic PA for CF operations on behalf of ADM (PA). 2504. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. ADM (PA) consists of a corporate staff that deals with broad-scale departmental issues and is concerned with overall development of strategic PA policy for DND/CF. DPOAT carries the designation J5PA and is ADM (PA)s representative in the CF`s Joint Staff system. This element derives its operational guidance from CF operational doctrine as well as government legislation and departmental directives and instructions. The day-to-day planning and execution of PA co-ordination and support for CF operations is the responsibility of J5PA Coord and his staff located in the J5PA Co-ordination Centre (J5PA CC). Environmental PA staffs are responsible for environment specific activities in the domestic/garrison context and are regularly consulted for the provision of PA resources. 2505. PA CO-ORDINATION

1. PA supports the TFC and is responsible for the planning and implementation of PA Plans that support the commanders overall mission goals. PA must therefore be co-ordinated with other information programs that the commander may employ during a mission, such as civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) and PSYOPS 25 - 1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 so that messages and information activities do not conflict. PA has an active role to play in any information operation (IO) campaign, developed and implemented by a commander and participates in IO Co-ordination Committees (IOCC) (see Chapter 22 Information Operations). 2. PA personnel do not participate in dis-information activities that a CF operation might employ. To do so would damage any trust Public Affairs Officers (PAO) will have with the media who are the conduit to various audiences (see Chapter 24 - PSYOPS). PA actively supports CIMIC activities since many activities are complementary (see Chapter 19 - Civil-Military Co-operation). 2506. PA MANAGEMENT AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

1. The management of the PA function is a key element in the planning and conduct of military operations. It is important, therefore, that PA be involved in all phases of an operation. Experience has shown that a well-developed PA plan and properly assigned resources are vital to the success of the mission. PA directions and guidance may be found in CF strategic and operational manuals, PA operations manuals and procedures and other related instructions. 2. Experience has also shown that the presence of journalists can have a profound effect on a mission. Commanders and their staffs must be cognizant of the need to maintain a positive relationship with the media and to foster a spirit of co-operation that is consistent with operational security and mission objectives. The acquisition of accurate and timely information during an operation will be a prime concern for the media, therefore, as much information as possible will be disclosed during a mission commensurate with DAODs and the security requirements of that operation. PA is a command responsibility as defined in DAODs and requires support at all levels in order to attain the missions PA goals and objectives. 2507. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF PA

1. PA is an integral part of any CF operation and must be adequately resourced and staffed in order to effectively conduct the function for the TFC. The TFC will ensure that the necessary resources are made available. PA officers (PAOs) are designated as personal staff within TF Headquarters. The PAO is the TFC's primary advisor on PA matters and, since events/incidents may occur at any time during a mission, he/she must necessarily have unlimited access to the commander. 2. TF PAO is directly responsible to the TFC for PA matters but must also be responsive to NDHQ J5PA on the tech-net while deployed on an operation. Deployed PA staffs may liaise at any time with other PAOs on technical matters. This capability gives the TFC the advantage of a wider view on issues surrounding the operation and can save considerable time and effort in research and collation of information needed to resolve a developing situation associated with the operation. 2508. PA FUNCTION IN CF OPERATIONS

1. Support and guidance for the PA function CF ops flows from Defence PA doctrine and government communications guidelines, national political aims, DND/CF policies and plans and national military objectives. J5PA is responsible for developing and issuing, through DCDS Wng O, Op O and plans, PA Guidance (PAG) for CF operations. 2. The TFC is advised and assisted by the TF PAO who develops a PA plan for the operation using PAG issued by the DCDS. The TF PAO develops and executes the TF PA plan through TFCs operations order (OP O) for all phases of the deployment. Pre-deployment and post deployment PA activities are coordinated with J5PA, force generators and the Joint Operations Group (JOG) PA staffs for all joint operations. 3. The TFC is responsible for ensuring that: a. TF has a PA plan that supports the operation and that it is co-ordinated with strategic guidance; b. TF PA is co-ordinated with IO being conducted in the area of operation (AO); 25 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

c.

PA resources are made available commensurate with the size and complexity of the mission; and

d. a positive relationship with media is maintained consistent with the aims of the mission and security of the operation. 4. The PA structure within a TF provides PA support, advice, guidance, co-ordination, analysis, information, planning, preparation, training and evaluation to the TF, TFC and his staff. PA requires close cooperation with the media, CIMIC, IO and other PA organizations and agencies in the AO. Once an operation has been approved, the level of PA support needed for the operation will be co-ordinated between J5PA, force generators and JOG. Liaison may also be required with internal and external organizations such as Joint Staff, DFA, CIDA or PSEPC for joint domestic operations. 5. The TFC should as much as possible exploit the capabilities of PA and other functions in a concerted campaign, especially in the development, execution and completion of activities to achieve the aims of the mission. The capabilities of PA constitute a force multiplier because it has the potential of lessening tensions by providing accurate and timely information to local audiences about the roles, tasks and activities of the deployed force. 2509. PA STRATEGIC LEVEL PLANNING

1. Strategic level PA planning will follow the five stages of the CF Operational Planning Process (OPP). PA will conduct an assessment of PA requirements for an operation during the CF`s first planning stage with a view to develop the strategic Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) in stage two. The development of a PA COA and CONOPS will depend necessarily on the COA developed and accepted by the strategic Commander in stage three. The PAG and PA CONOPS will be used to develop the strategic PA Plan in stage three which will form the framework to develop and write the PA Annex to the DCDS contingency plan (CONPLAN) or operations plan (OPLAN), in stage four. The PA annex to an OPLAN provides strategic guidance for operational level PA planning and development of operational and tactical level PA plans. 2. Once a COA has been approved by the strategic commander, a warning order (Wng O) will be issued, normally in stage three that will contain the strategic PAG. It should be recognized that the fluidity of some operations may result in truncation of the planning process and PA will need to be flexible in the application of its planning. The objective of strategic and operational PA planning will aim to provide viable and effective PA support to the TFC and members of the TF and provide accurate and timely information to Canadians. Review of the PA annex to the OPLAN will be an ongoing process that will likely lead to revision of the plan as the operation matures. 2. Strategic PA planning for a CF operation is conducted by J5PA Coord who will, in most cases, coordinate PA activities with ECSs and designated TF PA staffs with the latter becoming more involved in planning and execution of PA once the strategic Wng O has been issued. Strategic PA activities for all phases of the operational planning process (OPP) will be detailed in the B-GJ-005-361/FP-000. 3. Development of strategic PA plans flows from CF and PA operational doctrine. PA planning for CF Ops involves development, writing and implementation of PA aspects of an OPLAN or CONPLAN. PA staff at the joint strategic and operational level will necessarily be involved at the outset of the planning for an operation. The formulation of PA plans for CF operations will require frequent consultation between all levels of PA staffs and a variety of other offices including CIMIC, IO, J3 Ops and JOG, to name a few. 4. PA objectives and messages listed in the PA annex of the OP Plan would reflect objectives and messages articulated in the DND/CF Annual Strategic Public Affairs Plan. The TF PA staff is responsible for preparing the operational PA plan and can expect assistance from PA at the strategic level. The operational PA plan should contain at least the following elements: a. operational PA objectives;

25 - 3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 b. PA approach; c. PA messages;

d. target audiences; e. execution elements; f. media support requirements; and

g. PA command and control.

25 - 4 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 26 FORCE PROTECTION

UNDER DEVELOPMENT

26 - 1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

26 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 27 MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT

Under Development

27-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

27 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 28 HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT 2801. INTRODUCTION

1. Commanders are ultimately responsible for the health of their personnel. Commanders have direct influence over many of the factors that determine health i.e., the ability to carry out duties unimpeded by physical, psychological or social problems. Commanders must be cognizant of the direct relationship between the health of their command and the ability to achieve operational objectives. Only in this way will they be confident that their command has been fully prepared prior to deployment, that their plans can be prosecuted to the fullest extent and that their personnel will be able to sustain the required effort. Individual members also have considerable responsibilities for their own health, this includes the following preventive advice. 2. Commanders and their staff are obligated to consider the impact of casualties on the operations plan (OPLAN) and how their sick and injured are to be cared for. This requires an understanding of the principles that underpin the delivery of effective health services support (HSS). The CF health services (CFHS), medical and dental, advise commanders on health and health related matters and deliver the HSS required. However, commanders have considerable health related responsibilities and only they can balance the health and health care risks involved in their plan and decide if they are acceptable. 3. Whereas HSS in the context of health risk management is an aspect of Force Protection that should be planned in conformance with primary operations doctrine, HSS must also be executed with views to the legal, operational and moral imperatives for effective HSS delivery. This chapter addresses key elements of military strategic level and operational level HSS doctrine. Detail is oriented primarily to planning and organizational aspects; clinical subject matter is excluded. Amplification of this chapter is contained in B-GJ005-410/FP-000, Health Services Support to Canadian Forces Operations. 2802. FRAMEWORK FOR HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. As an outcome of legislation, policy, and military efficiency, CF members have their health protected, promoted and restored in accordance with the principles expressed in the Canada Health Act. The levels of health care accessibility and quality of health care afforded CF members are to be comparable to those afforded to Canadians, in general. The CFHS are centralized in the CF Health Services Group (CF H Svcs Gp) under the leadership of the Commander CF H Svcs Gp. The Commander CF H Svcs Gp is responsible to the CDS for provision of an all-encompassing single line of HSS that equally applies to the CF s Regular Force and Reserve Force components. 2. The mandate of the CFHS is to provide the HSS necessary to sustain a multi-purpose, deployable, combat capable force across the full spectrum of military scenarios. Professional, effective and efficient ingarrison and operational HSS is provided through a strong framework of professional standards and a single corporate management entity. On behalf of the CDS, the CF Surgeon General develops the military strategic level direction for medical care. This direction is translated into policy actions by CF H Svcs Gp HQ and "pushed" to the operational and tactical level elements for implementation. The CF H Svcs Gp HQ DCOS Dental develops military strategic level direction for dental care. Policy direction is translated into implementation and sustainment actions and pushed down to the operational and tactical level dental care elements for implementation.

2803.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. The primary objective of HSS is to conserve the fighting strength of the supported force. In-garrison, this consists of preventing illness and injury and maintaining personnel at a high level of medical and dental 28 - 1 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 fitness. On operations, this consists of prevention of illness and injury; salvage of life and limb; rapid return to duty of the sick or injured; and evacuation, definitive care and rehabilitation of the sick and injured who are not expected to return to duty within a reasonable period of time. 2. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), the emphasis is on the prevention of illness and injury, and where prevention fails, to minimize the impact of illness or injury on each member of the supported force. In MOOTW, particularly at the lower end of the Spectrum of Conflict, HSS must be organized and positioned to deal with individual cases in addition to supporting the mission as a whole. In MOOTW, Force Health Protection (FHP) measures and care of individuals who are sick or become injured deserve additional consideration due to the heightened sensitivity of the Canadian public to casualties. 2804. 1. PRINCIPLES AND PRECEPTS OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT Principles. HSS should be guided by the following principles: a. Conformity. HSS must conform to the constraints imposed by the physiology and pathology of the sick and injured, and be governed by the highest standards of medical and dental practice and ethics. HSS should also conform to OPLANs, requirements and the supported Environment's operations doctrine. Only by participating in the development of OPLANs can HSS planners ensure adequate support at the right time and the right place; b. Proximity. The speed with which treatment is initiated is extremely important in reducing morbidity and mortality. HSS therefore involves appropriate positioning of resources, moving resources as necessary to maintain appropriate proximity to the supported forces, and providing for rapid evacuation of the sick and injured. Resources should be positioned so that initial surgery can be completed within six hours of injury/on set of illness. Initial surgery, carried out as soon as possible after injury/onset of illness, ideally within the first hour, is the most important factor in reducing mortality rates and is the focal point of operational HSS. The efficient allocation of resources and the judicious location of treatment facilities should optimize access to treatment; c. Flexibility. Detailed and carefully planned HSS helps to ensure minimum reaction time. Flexibility essential for rapid response should be maintained by committing only the HSS resources that are required for current or imminent tasks;

d. Mobility. The Health Services (HS) should be associated in all aspects with and maintain close proximity to the forces they support. Treatment units should retain mobility as long as possible. Resources should be organized to allow part of a unit to move while the remainder holds the sick and injured until they can be cleared. Mobility is measured by the extent to which a unit can move its personnel and equipment with organic transportation; e. Continuity. Treatment must be continuous and progressive to the level necessary for the definitive treatment of the sick and injured to minimize mortality and morbidity. The sick and injured should be evacuated through a series of HSS facilities, each with an increasing capability for assessment and treatment. Sorting of the sick and injured to reflect priorities for treatment and evacuation or return to duty should be conducted at every HSS treatment facility en route. The flow of the sick and injured should be continuous and as smooth as possible. Capabilities of treatment facilities should be complimentary, both in terms of clinical procedures and the numbers of the sick and injured that can be managed. The operations of essential treatment facilities should not be terminated until their functions have been assumed by another facility; and f. Control. Control of HSS resources should be exercised at the highest level possible to ensure that all HSS requirements are considered and that resources are used efficiently. Effective control of HSS resources depends on the timely exchange of accurate information between commanders and staffs. General Precepts. The general precepts that form the basis of HSS are: 28-2 Ch 2 2005-08-15

2.

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

a. Compliance with Humanitarian Conventions. The conduct of HSS activities shall comply with The Hague and Geneva Conventions and Protocols. Without discrimination, all persons entitled by The Hague and Geneva Conventions and Protocols will be treated on the basis of their clinical need and resources available; b. Levels of Health Care. Health care shall be provided at levels of accessibility and quality comparable to those being afforded to Canadians, in general; c. Prevention. The prevention of injury and illness is a key factor in the sustainment of personnel and is the basic principle of HSS. Significant personnel savings can be achieved through measures that promote health and prevent casualties. Prevention shall include training, applying appropriate health protection measures, and providing ambulatory care, health surveillance and health advice;

d. Balance. HSS capabilities shall be in balance with the supported forces strength and exposure to health threats in accordance with agreed casualty rates, workload estimates and the ability to deal with the definitive needs of the sick and injured. Determination of casualty rates is a command responsibility; e. Spectrum of Health Services Support. HSS shall be provided on a progressive basis ranging from health protection, first aid, emergency resuscitation and stabilization of vital functions, to evacuation and definitive specialized care; f. Time-related Constraints of Health Services Support. Resuscitation and stabilization of the sick and injured shall be performed in a timely manner and comply with state of the art emergency medical and/or dental practice, given the military environment. Planning shall take into account that resuscitation and stabilization may require immediate life saving intervention as well as intensive care procedures. Such support shall be provided as promptly as possible, ideally within the first hour of injury/onset of illness. Additional surgery necessary to save limbs or systems and surgery to prevent potentially disabling complications shall be available as soon as possible after the healthaffecting event;

g. Triage. The sick and injured shall be sorted into categories for treatment and evacuation according to the urgency of their clinical needs to ensure health care of the greatest benefit to the largest number. This is essential when casualties occur simultaneously and in numbers beyond the capacity of the HSS facility. Triage shall be repeated at every opportunity; h. Fitness for Evacuation. The clinical condition of the sick and injured shall govern the priority, timing, means and destination of evacuation. Medical Regulating staff shall provide co-ordination; i. j. Continuity of Care. The sick and injured passing through the HSS system shall be given care that is continuous, relevant and progressive. In-transit care shall be provided during evacuation; Communication with the Sick and Injured. The ability to communicate between a casualty and the attending HS staff is an element of patient care. Provisions shall be made so that sick and injured and HS will be able to communicate with each other; Health Confidentiality. Health information on a Canadian shall not be communicated to any individual or organization that does not have a medical and/or dental need to know. Health information on non-Canadians shall be communicated in accordance with the subject casualtys national policies and procedures; Health Services Support Information. The provision of information on HSS operations shall be in accordance with DND/CF regulations and mission-specific operation orders/instructions; and

k.

l.

28 - 3 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 m. Mutual Support Agreements and Affiliations. Normally, the tactical-level HSS capabilities required by a tactical component of a Task Force shall be primarily formed from CF H Svcs Gp resources routinely affiliated with Environments through Mutual Support Agreement. The Environments amongst other things provide unique to Environment training, collective training, foster affiliations, and provide support to CF H Svcs Gp force generation. On operations, the tactical-level HSS capabilities normally receive administration and logistics support from or through the supported tactical component. 2805. STRUCTURE FOR HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. HSS is structured to correspond to the command and control (C2) relationship at each level of organization. Each division of HSS becomes more sophisticated from lower to higher. 2. The basic structure for HSS is comprised of: a. Tactical Level Support. Tactical support is sub-divided into Unit and Formation level tactical support. Unit tactical level support includes self-aid, buddy aid and HSS provided by HS elements organic or attached to units, e.g. ship's sickbay, unit medical station, and squadron medical element. Formation tactical level support is derived from HSS elements organic or attached to lower level Environmental formations, i.e., fleet support vessel, forward logistic site sickbay, field ambulance and airfield medical station; b. Operational Level Support. This level of HSS is provided by HSS elements operationally responsible to the Canadian Task Force Commander (TFC)/Canadian National Commander (CNC); and c. Strategic Level Support. Normally, Canada-based HSS formations and units, e.g. CF H Svcs Gp; formation HQ affiliated H Svcs Gps and H Svcs Centres, Canadian Forces Environmental Medical Establishment (CFEME) and Canadian Medical Equipment Depot (CMED). In exceptional circumstances, strategic level support may be supplemented by allied military and foreign nation definitive care capabilities provided support meets Canadian standards of accessibility and quality of care.

3. HSS is further structured based on clinical capabilities designed to meet the characteristics of the operational environment and to play a specific part in FHP and the progressive assessment, treatment, evacuation and hospitalization of the sick and injured. These capability sets are referred to as Roles" and are relative to both medical and dental care. 4. Roles of Medical Care. The medical care roles of support are: a. Role 1. The minimum capabilities of this Role include locating sick and injured, providing them with first aid and emergency medical treatment, evacuating them from the site of injury/onset of illness to a safer location, sorting them according to treatment precedence, and stabilizing and preparing them for evacuation to the next Role of care, if required. Role 1-capability facilities may be enhanced to include capacities for limited casualty holding, Role 1 dental care, diagnostic services, preventive medicine services, and operational stress reaction management; b. Role 2. The minimum capabilities of this Role emphasize efficient and rapid evacuation of stabilized casualties from supported elements, and en route sustaining care. Damage control emergency surgery may be performed. Sick and injured requiring minor care may be held for short periods and returned to duty. Medical and dental materiel re-supply may be provided to supported Role 1 facilities. Role 2 capabilities may be enhanced to include capabilities for intensive care, essential postoperative care, blood replacement, diagnostic services, and stress reaction and mental health management; c. Role 3. The minimum capabilities of this Role emphasize resuscitation, initial surgery, postoperative care, and short-term surgical and medical patient care. Diagnostic services such as x-ray 28-4 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 and laboratory, and limited scope internal medicine and psychiatric services are available. Reception and storage of medical and dental materiel and blood in the area of operations (AO), and distribution to supported units is provided, as well as repair of medical and dental equipment within the AO. Other ancillary capabilities include liaison teams for tracking Canadian casualties/patients in allied or Host Nation facilities, teams providing assistance with stress reaction and mental health management, and co-ordination of preventive medicine activities in the AO. Role 3 capabilities may be enhanced with specialist surgical (neuro-surgery, maxillofacial, burns, etc.) capabilities, advanced and specialist diagnostic capabilities (CT scan, arthroscopy, sophisticated laboratory tests, etc.), major medical, surgical, dental, and nursing specialities, and environmental health and industrial hygiene capabilities; and d. Role 4. This Role includes definitive-care hospitalization, re-constructive surgery, rehabilitation, storage and distribution of national medical and dental materiel/stocks inclusive of blood, blood products and intravenous fluids, and major repair or replacement of medical and dental equipment. 5. Dental Roles of Support a. Role 1. This Role is emergency dental care. It includes the control of life threatening oral conditions, the treatment of acute dental conditions and the initial stabilization of maxillofacial injuries for evacuation. Examples of role 1 dental care are sedative dressings, extractions, and therapeutic medications; b. Role 2. This Role is sustaining dental care. It includes the treatment of urgent dental conditions and treatment provided to intercept potential dental casualties. Role 1 dental care may be provided at role 2 dental treatment facilities. Examples of role 2 dental care are definitive restorations, gingival curettage, and endodontic therapy; c. Role 3. This Role is maintaining dental care. It includes more complex and comprehensive treatment to preserve functional dental fitness. Role 3 dental care includes treatment by dental specialists and the initial surgical management of maxillofacial injuries. Role 1 and Role 2 care may be provided at Role 3 dental treatment facilities. Examples of Role 3 dental care are complex restorations and extractions, initial maxillofacial surgery, and preventative oral hygiene treatment; and

d. Role 4. This Role is rehabilitative dental care. It includes the full range of definitive dental treatment services. Role 4 dental care is comprehensive treatment to repair and restore full oral function and aesthetics lost to injury or disease. Examples of Role 4 dental care are fixed prosthetics, osseointegrated implants, and maxillofacial prostheses. 2806. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

1. Under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, certain personnel, when captured, are protected against becoming prisoners of war (PW) and are, instead, classified as Retained Personnel. The enemy, for the purpose of providing health care to Canadians, retains these personnel until the enemy assumes responsibility for PW health care. Protected personnel include: a. HS personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of the sick and injured, the prevention of disease, and the administration of HSS units and establishments; and b. Non-HS personnel assigned to HSS units while exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of the sick and injured, the prevention of disease, and the administration of HSS units and establishments. However, these personnel become PW once they are no longer exclusively engaged in HSS related functions.

28 - 5 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 2. To warrant protected status, eligible personnel must carry a Geneva Conventions identification card and wear, on the left arm, an armlet bearing the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem. Personnel whose legal status as protected personnel is in doubt are treated as PW until their situation is adjudicated. 3. HSS units, facilities, and equipment also qualify for protected status as follows: a. HSS units and facilities distinguished by the conspicuous display of one of two emblems officially recognized by the Geneva Conventions: the Red Cross emblem on a white background or the Red Crescent (used by most Muslim countries). Emblems such as the Red Star of David used by Israel and the red diamond used by non-denominational organizations should also be respected; b. All HSS treatment facilities and all types of ambulances are entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions and may display the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem even when not directly engaged in care of sick and injured. Unit headquarters, support areas and conveyances other than ambulances are entitled to display the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem if they are engaged exclusively in HSS operations. Protection of conveyances may depend on specific agreements between adversaries such as special marking of conveyances, adherence to certain land routes, air corridors and shipping lanes, and limitations on travel times; and c. HSS units, facilities, and conveyances not displaying the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem may be mistaken for combatant elements and might become the objects of direct attack. The decision to not display the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem rests with the operational commander. Any order to conceal the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem should be given only in exceptional circumstances.

4. Protected personnel may carry only individual small arms for self-defence and to defend the sick and injured placed under their care; however, overall security plans must not require protected personnel to take offensive action against the opposing forces. Protected personnel are permitted to fire only when they or the sick and injured under their care are under direct attack. HSS units and facilities may be located within defensive perimeters protected by HSS unit personnel. Protected personnel must not be employed as perimeter guards of resources other than those entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions. Conversely, the use of non-HS personnel as perimeter guards of HSS facilities/locales does not circumvent these restrictions, since non-HS personnel whose sole duty is support of an HSS unit or facility are protected personnel under the Geneva Conventions while so employed. 5. Establishing and operating HSS treatment facilities at each PW camp to provide HSS for PW interned in the AO are legal obligations. Retained HS personnel may be employed in these facilities, but if they are not available or sufficient, Canadian HS personnel must be tasked. Fit PW may be employed as litter bearers for sick or injured PW. Hospitalization of PW and retained personnel in the AO is effected through Canadian or allied resources according to the needs of the sick and injured. Security and Military Police forces must be employed to assure security of sick and injured PW. 6. The Geneva Conventions, forming part of the Law of Armed Conflict, do not in the strict technical sense apply to MOOTW. However, Canadian forces, in keeping with the principles of the Geneva Conventions, will respect the stipulations on the display of the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem. 2807. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT POLICIES

1. Every effort will be taken to provide deployed CF personnel accessibility to health care and health care comparable to that available to Canadians, in general. 2. To the greatest extent practical, HSS to deployed CF elements on combat operations will be provided by Canadian medical and dental services. In multinational (combined) operations, agreements with select allies for sharing HS facilities can represent an efficient way to provide support. Coalition partners, Host Nation and contracted support may also be leveraged. Responsibility for planning, co-ordination, and ensuring national standards are respected remains with CF HSS staffs at all times. The overriding criteria 28-6 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 must be that the resultant accessibility to health care and health care are comparable to that available to Canadians, in general. 3. As a general policy, the sick and injured are treated on the basis of their clinical need and the resources available. If there is a disparity between the workload, either the number of sick and injured and the degree and complexity of treatment required, and the treatment capacity, the capacity will be organized to optimize benefit to the maximum number of sick and injured. 4. The Evacuation Policy reflects a command decision concerning the retention or evacuation of sick and injured from the AO. At theatre level, the policy is established by the CDS, in consultation with the Theatre Commander with advice from CAS, Commander CF H Svcs Gp, and, as applicable, the DCDS Joint Staff. The evacuation policy should indicate the maximum time in hours or days that the sick and injured that are expected to return to duty may be held at a given level/role of support. Sick and injured not expected to return to duty within the stipulated number of hours or days are evacuated as soon as possible, provided the travel does not worsen their condition. The evacuation policy for a given operation is influenced by such factors as: a. The distance from the AO to Canada or a designated support base; b. The operational situation, especially the casualty estimate; c. The availability of strategic evacuation means;

d. The possibility that the sick and injured may carry (and therefore risk disseminating) a highly transmissible disease, whether endemic to the AO or the result of exposure to a biological agent; and e. The capability and capacity of HSS facilities in theatre. 5. The HS are responsible for the safety, feeding, clothing, discipline, and general welfare of the sick and injured from the time they come under care until they are discharged to duty or are otherwise released. HSS organizations are not responsible for collecting and burying the dead, except for their own dead and those who die while under their care. 6. In certain situations, it may not be possible to evacuate all the sick and injured. If sick and injured are likely to be subject to capture, they are to be left with the minimum number of HS personnel necessary for their treatment, and such supplies as are required until their captors become responsible for them. The decision to abandon sick and injured to the opposing forces rests with the operational commander, with HSS authorities providing necessary information and advice. 7. The CFHS are organized and equipped to provide HSS for CF members and other entitled personnel. The civilian population in the AO will have a different demographic profile and associated health needs. Therefore, except for civil emergency operations, the CF normally limits HSS to civilian populations to the provision of emergency medical and dental care when resources and operational exigencies permit and on a cost recovery or no cost to Canada basis. This provision normally extends only to examination and treatment sufficient to alleviate pain and suffering and to preserve life and limb to the extent required for evacuating the casualty to an appropriate civilian treatment facility. CF casualty evacuation conveyances may be used to transport the casualty to and from the nearest appropriate treatment facility. Note: Provision of this level of care must not interfere with the provision of HSS to CF members and other entitled personnel. 2808. CONCEPT OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. Conceptually, HSS is provided by an integrated health care system throughout the continuum of predeployment, deployment and post-deployment with care being provided by a skilled team of military and nonmilitary health care providers that is structured to meet the unique needs of military service. HSS entails

28 - 7 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 health promotion, FHP, appropriate assessment and treatment, and evacuation of the sick and injured in the most efficient manner possible to facilities capable of providing the necessary care. 2. An HSS treatment facility cannot be reduced below the minimum capabilities of its given numeric descriptor. Therefore an HSS element cannot be described as a Role minus. Specific clinical capabilities, such as mental health, specialty surgical, or diagnostic services, may enhance any Role depending on the operational situation resulting in a Role plus situation. Canadian Role 4 HSS capabilities will not normally be deployed into the AO. 3. Personnel belonging to organizations without integral HSS elements, or personnel dispersed throughout the AO, will receive HSS on an Area basis. 4. While it would be unusual for Role 1 support to be provided by other than Canadian resources, any Role may be provided through negotiations with allies, Host Nation, or other third parties. This type of arrangement will be more common in MOOTW where the size of the Canadian contingent is modest. Regardless of the source of HSS in the AO, close liaison is maintained between in-theatre commands, the Host Nation, deployed HSS resources, and CF authorities in Canada. 5. In compliance with the CFs policy of centralized HSS and the CFs accountability framework for HSS, HSS in the AO is provided by the TF HSS element i.e., TF H Svcs Unit. The Commander of the TF H Svcs Unit is responsible to the TFC/CNC for all functions intrinsic to Roles 1, 2 and 3 and for command, control, and co-ordination, including national medical liaison teams to track the Canadian sick and injured admitted to allied or other foreign-nation or third party facilities. The TFCs/CNCs principle health advisor and HSS planner is the TF Surgeon who, as necessary/if necessary should have timely access to occupational and environmental medicine expertise, either within the Task Force or in Canada. This includes Flight Surgeon or Aviation Medicine Specialist advice with a view to compliance with the Aeronautics Act. The TF Surgeon is part of the TFHQ. The TF Surgeon exercises professional technical control of health care provided in the AO by Canadian HS personnel and liaises with theatre level and Canada-based HSS authorities on behalf of the TFC/CNC. 6. To carry out its HSS functions, the TF H Svcs Unit may consist of a number of Roles 1, 2, 3 and ancillary HSS capabilities configured to support the tactical component(s) and Force Troops of the TF. The size, type and number of HSS capability modules is based on casualty planning figures approved by the DCDS Joint Staff. Casualty planning figures will take into account the operational risk as well as risks identified through diligent analysis of available medical intelligence. 7. HSS component elements must be capable of operating in asymmetric threat environments, in particular NBC/CBRN environments. This includes decontamination of HSS facilities and the sick and injured who arrive at a treatment facility without being decontaminated or who become contaminated while at the treatment facility. Significant personnel reinforcement from outside the HSS elements will be needed to provide casualty decontamination for a mass casualty (MASCAL) situation. 2809. RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS

1. The provision of HSS to operations is a command responsibility at all levels. In exercising this responsibility, commanders are assisted by senior HSS personnel, who are responsible to commanders for: a. Advice on health measures; b. Planning and implementing HSS, including: (1) FHP; (2) Collection, evacuation and tracking of sick and injured throughout the AO; (3) Medical and dental treatment, including hospitalization;

28-8 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 (4) Procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance and disposal of medical and dental materiel; (5) Storage and distribution of blood and blood products; (6) Distribution and location of HSS units; (7) Medical intelligence; and (8) HSS aspects of CIMIC programmes; c. Training of HSS personnel; and

d. Advice, assistance and supervision of paramedical training of non-HS personnel. 2. NDHQ is ultimately responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate HSS for CF operations. The DCDS Joint Staff, on behalf of the CDS, are responsible for the following measures which influence HSS: a. J3 Staff: (1) Establishing casualty planning figures from which HSS capability requirements can be developed; and (2) Developing the military strategic-level OPLAN from which the required HSS structure can be developed; b. J4 HSS Staff organizing the overall provision of HSS within the context of the sustainment plan; c. J4 Log - co-ordinating and controlling the strategic movement of HSS forces and resources;

d. The availability of CF aero medical evacuation (AE) support to CF operations is a shared CAS/ DGHS responsibility that is predicated on flight safety and airworthiness being paramount. In this regard, DGHS ensures that all health services staff employed on AE duties meet the prescribed aircrew medical standards and have completed all the requisite aircrew training as specified in 1 CAD orders and STANAG 3114 (Edition 7). DGHS also ensures that all medical equipment used in AE has been certified as being compliant with existing regulations and standards specified by the Aeronautics Act through processes established by the CAS (CF Air Authority); e. DGHS is the senior HSS staff officer in the CF. The CF Surgeon General is a separate position held by the senior medical advisor in the CF, the senior dental advisor in the CF is Director Dental Services at CF H Svcs Gp HQ. J4 HSS representation for the NDHQ/DCDS Joint Staff is provided from within CF H Svcs Gp HQ; and f. DGHS/Commander CF H Svcs Gp is responsible for: (1) Developing military strategic-level HSS plans to support operations; (2) Developing and issuing standards of medical and dental care, and orders, directives and clinical policies on HSS matters; (3) Exercising command and control of assigned HSS resources; (4) Developing, organizing, equipping and training CF H Svcs Gp elements prior to transfer of authority on deployment to an operational Commander, including individual and unit military training, individual and team level clinical training and assembly of the TF H Svcs element; (5) In partnership with J4 Log, co-ordinating HSS aspects of Host Nation or other support agreements; and 28 - 9 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

(6) In partnership with J3 Engr, the co-ordination of any military engineer support to HSS such as utilities, infrastructure and the disposal of bio hazardous waste. 3. The TFC/CNC is responsible for forecasting HSS capabilities and resources needed to support their concept of operations and, once in the AO, for the overall provision of HSS. The TFC/CNC exercises these responsibilities through their TF Surgeon. 4. With its size tailored to the needs of the mission, the TF HSS staffs can facilitate co-ordination of HSS to all tactical components of the TF and Force Troops. The TF Surgeon is the senior health advisor to the TFC/CNC and sets technical and clinical policy for the TF. Specific responsibilities of the TF HSS staff include: a. Developing the HSS estimate; b. Developing the HSS annex to the OPLAN and Op O; c. Assisting the TFC/CNC to develop the intra-theatre evacuation policy;

d. Co-ordinating medical intelligence activities; e. Issuing instructions concerning HSS technical and clinical matters, in consultation with appropriate subject matter experts; f. Co-ordinating HSS activities in support of CIMIC programmes; and

g. Co-ordinating, in partnership with the J4 Log staff, HSS agreements with allies or other third parties. 2810. PLANNING OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. Effective and timely HSS planning and co-ordination are essential to ensuring adequate and sustainable HSS in the AO. HSS planning is a complex process, and HSS planners must remain responsive to the demands for support based on changing operational requirements. Proper planning permits a systematic examination of all HSS aspects of the operation and ensures critical requirements are met, including the following: a. HSS must conform to the OPLAN; b. HSS must be flexible and consistent with the TF strength and risks involved, identified through casualty estimates; c. HSS units and personnel must be at the same state of readiness and availability as the TF elements they support;

d. HSS units must be as strategically and tactically mobile as the TF elements they support; and e. HSS units should be sited so that attacks against legitimate targets cannot imperil their safety. 2. The mission of the TF, health and operational threat assessments, the TF evacuation policy, and evacuation and hospitalization requirements largely determines the organization of HSS. 3. Procedures and techniques for planning of HSS to CF operations are provided in B-GJ-005-410/FP000, Health Services Support to CF Operations. 2811. 1. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT A typical arrangement for C2 of HSS to deployed operations is illustrated in Figure 28-1. 28-10 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

2. Tactical-level HSS resources will normally be assigned to TF tactical components and Force Troops under an appropriate C2 relationship, likely Operational Control (OPCON) where appropriate. Tactical-level HSS resources assigned to each tactical component will include a suitably qualified Senior Medical Officer who will be designated as the Component Surgeon. Operational Command (OPCOM) of the TF H Svcs Unit is transferred to the TFC/CNC upon its arrival in the AO in accordance with Transfer of Authority (TOA) procedure. The TFC/CNC may in turn assign the TF H Svcs Unit under an appropriate C2 relationship to the TF Support Group. HSS resources in Canada remain under command of Commander CF H Svcs Gp. Certain issues such as flight safety are residual authorities vested, as appropriate, in the Environmental Chiefs of Staff. 3. Military strategic level professional technical guidance on clinical aspects of medical and dental support is provided by, respectively, the CF Surgeon General and CF H Svcs Gp HQ DCOS Dental through the TF Surgeon.

CANADA
CDS

THEATRE

TFC DCDS TF Sigs Element

J-Staff

TFHQ

TF Surg J3 MP J1 J3 Engr J4 J4 HSS J4 LEMS J8 Fin

TF Support Unit

H Svcs Unit

NDMCC

NDLCC

NDFCC Maritime Land Air Component Component Component SOF* Component

Full Command OPCOM Tech/Prof Guidance * If Assigned. Note: SOF elms may remain under DCDS vice TFC depending on OpPlan

Figure 28-1. Command and Control Arrangement for HSS in Deployed Operations

28 - 11 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

28-12 Ch 2 2005-08-15

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 29 SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES

Under Development

29-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

29 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 30 CF SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Under Development

30-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

30 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 31 LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Under Development

31-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

31 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 32 MOVEMENT 3201. INTRODUCTION

1. The military definition of Movement is the change in location of personnel and materiel (equipment and stocks) as part of a military operation. Movement requires the supporting capabilities of transport, infrastructure and movement control (Mov Con). 2. Movement is classified as either strategic or operational. Strategic movement is between areas of normal location, or support areas, (normally within Canada) and an area of operations, or between widely separated areas of operations. Operational movement occurs within an area of operations. 3. Movement is further categorized by Mode of Transport (MOT) as surface, air or sea. Surface transport is normally more economical than air transport, although surface transport is relatively slow. However, in certain circumstances, e.g. where land and sea Lines of Communication (LOC) are limited, or insecure, the requirement for timely movement can only be met through the use of air transport. For an operation abroad, sea transport is an essential requirement. Sea transport is capable of moving large numbers of personnel and large amounts of materiel over long distances to an area of operations. 3202. 1. PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT The planning, control and co-ordination of movement support are guided by the following principles: a. centralized control; b. regulated movement; c. fluid and flexible movement; and

d. maximum utilization of carrying capacity. 2. Centralized Control. Successful military movement is achieved through centralized control at the highest practical level. Only through centralized control can optimum use of scarce resources be achieved, maximum flexibility be gained, priorities be assessed accurately, and time and effort be employed most effectively. 3. Regulated Movement. Movement must be regulated to avoid congestion, or breakdown, in the system, thus achieving an even flow. Generally, materiel consignments are called forward only when transport and terminal capacity is sufficient to cope with them. 4. Fluid and Flexible Movement. Personnel and materiel should be moved forward in an even flow. There must, however be enough flexibility to allow for occasional demands of special urgency to be met. To retain flexibility and to ensure a continual even flow, potential congestion points must be identified and, where practical, eliminated. Where this is not possible, contingency plans must be made. 5. Maximum Utilization of Carrying Capacity. Economic movement depends on accurate planning, correct loading, minimization of turn-around times, and optimum use of the carrying capability of available transportation resources consistent with operational requirements. 3203. MOVEMENT RESOURCES

1. The CF must be able to deploy from areas of normal location or support areas to an area of operations in a timely manner. This is accomplished using a combination of CF, commercial and/or allied airlift and sealift capabilities.

32 - 1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 2. The CF's strategic lift resources for contingency operations are limited to a relatively small number of transport aircraft. There is no dedicated CF sealift available, although auxiliary oil and replenishment (AOR) ships can provide some emergency sealift. 3. Some CF movement requirements may be met through agreements with allies for the use of allied military transport. The Integrated Lines of Communication (ILOC) agreement with the United States, for example, can provide Canada with access to US airlift and sealift capability when both forces are operating in the same theatre. 4. In practical terms CF's current strategic movement structure relies on international commercial transportation carriers. The immediate availability of commercial transportation in times of crisis, however, cannot always be assured. Thus CF planners can often be at the mercy of external factors when planning the deployment phase of a contingency operation. 3204. ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. J4 Mat is responsible to the CDS for planning, routing, scheduling and controlling movement by all MOT along the LOC within Canada, between Canada and an area of operations, and between areas of operations. J4 Mat tasks this responsibility to J4 Mov, who exercises authority through the National Defence Movement Coordination Centre (NDMCC). 2. Movement control (Mov Con) is defined as both the planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and materiel movements over the LOC; and an organisation responsible for these functions. Strategic Mov Con is the function of 4 CFMCU. This unit is under the OPCOM of J4 Mat and the OPCON of J4 Mov. 4 CFMCU is a small unit that may well require augmentation whenever a large scale military operation involving strategic movement of personnel and materiel is initiated. 3. Details regarding C2 relationships, movement doctrine, movement planning, movement co-ordination, movement control and movement control organisations are contained in B-GJ-005-404/FP-000, Movement Doctrine For Canadian Forces Operations and are expanded in the supporting B-GJ-005-404/FP-0X0 series: Sea (010), Rail (020), Road (030), Air (040) and Glossary (050). The OPI for these publications is J4 Mov.

32 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

CHAPTER 33 PERSONNEL SUPPORT 3301. INTRODUCTION

1. Personnel support consists of the administrative control of military personnel and those matters which affect them as individuals. Personnel support is a command responsibility carried out in accordance with applicable regulations and orders. 2. NDHQ J1 is the strategic level authority for all personnel support to operations. Authority for approval of operational task establishments and their modification is subject to NDHQ J3 control. Direction of personnel support is carried out strictly according to the chain of command with NDHQ J1 in direct communication with operational level pers staff. Personnel support is included in the broad category of administration. 3. Headquarters Defence Plan (HQDP) 101 - Personnel Support to Operations is the authoritative reference for all natures of policy and procedure relevant to this subject. HQDP 101 is published under the authority of the ADM (Per) at NDHQ. 3302. 1. PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL SUPPORT Personnel support to operations is based on the following principles: a. operational necessity; b. foresight; c. economy;

d. simplicity; e. flexibility; f. precision; and

g. maintenance of well-being and morale. 3303. CONCEPT OF PERSONNEL SUPPORT

1. For the purposes of personnel support, an operation is defined as: "Deployment of an expeditionary formation or unit to an area of operations in or beyond Canada for purposes other than military training or administration and subject to orders from the strategic and/or operational level." Personnel support is devised in accordance with the appropriate forecast of operations. 2. The objective of strategic direction of personnel support is to ensure that provision and maintenance of effective manpower in the area of operations is commensurate with the operational requirement. 3. Personnel support to operations is implemented in five escalating and cumulative levels. Levels 2 - 5 relate to planning stages devised for application to the crisis spectrum up to and including mobilization as outlined in the (1994) Defence Policy of the Government of Canada. Personnel support levels are: a. Level 1 - continuous monitoring of current operations with adjustments in support as required; b. Level 2 - (corresponding to the Force Generation stage) - measures to prepare a formation or unit(s) to meet an expeditionary requirement. Manning is achieved through augmentation with Reserve 33-1

Orig

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Force volunteers. Optimal readiness of the standing CF would accrue in the process of Force Generation - Level 2. Under normal circumstances, personnel support would revert to Level 1 after completion of the initial deployment c. Level 3 - (corresponding to the Force Enhancement stage) - application of the objective capability of the total force up to a state of maximum readiness of the standing CF to undertake operations of increasing scope and a more rapid tempo. Level 3 could involve the designation and maintenance of a strategic reserve.

d. Level 4 - (corresponding to the Force Expansion stage) - prompted by a requirement to significantly increase beyond the extant structure of the CF and DND and equating to the commencement of mobilization. It is anticipated that placement of the Reserve Force on active service would be initiated early in Level 4 (if not prior) and the CF Special Force (CFSF) activated to include all standing elements; and e. Level 5 - (National Mobilization stage) - To meet the requirements of general war or a radically increased threat to the security of Canada. It is assumed that a two year period of strategic warning will precede the necessity for Level 5 measures. 3304. 1. ELEMENTS OF PERSONNEL SUPPORT Personnel support to operations includes the following: a. Operational Personnel Management (OPM); b. Personnel Services (Pers Svcs); and c. 3305. Health Services Support (HSS). OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. OPM is defined as: "Distribution of effective manpower in accordance with operational priority." Administrative control of manpower is exercised by personnel staffs at all levels on behalf of respective commanders. 2. OPM consists of: a. determination of personnel requirements and development of the operational task establishment for J3 approval; b. personnel accounting including strength reporting; and c. manpower distribution including casualty replacements.

3. Personnel administration is an enabling element of OPM. This includes records keeping, promotion, personnel evaluation, casualty reporting and notification of next-of-kin. 4. Although not strictly relevant to operations, recruiting and individual training are adjuncts to personnel management at the strategic level. These complementary functions are carried out to meet manning targets derived from projection of the consolidated operational requirement. 3306. PERSONNEL SERVICES

1. Pers Svcs are provided to help sustain the individual sailor, soldier and airman and assist commanders in the maintenance of morale. Without prejudice to operations, comprehensive pers svcs can alleviate hardships encountered by members of an expeditionary force and enkindle greater attention to duty 33-2

Orig

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 and skill-at-arms. 2. Pers Svcs include: a. Chaplaincy; b. welfare and amenities; c. fitness and recreation;

d. dress and ceremonial; e. honours and awards; f. compensation and benefits (entitlements);

g. leave; h. messes and institutes; and i. 3307. graves registration. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. HSS includes CFMS and CFDS participation in and support to operations. Strategic level Health Services are directed by Director General of Health Services (DGHS) and the discipline is integral to NDHQ J1 (J1 HS). The appointment of Surgeon General (Surg Gen) is retained as the professional title for the senior CF clinician. 2. The senior medical officer (SMO) at every level is the medical advisor to the commander with right of access and right of consultation with higher medical authority. Surg Gen functions as medical advisor to the CDS. 3. 3308. 1. Detail on Health Services is provided at Chapter 28. ASSOCIATED TASKS Disciplinary standards and enforcement are a command responsibility.

2. A number of functions complement or supplement personnel support but are carried out under authorities other that personnel staff: a. pay services (J4 Fin); b. postal services (J4 Mov); c. quartering (J4 Log);

d. transportation booking (J4 Mov); e. legal/judicial (advisory/J5 Leg); and f. Military Police (J3 SAMP).

33-3

Orig

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

3309.

PERSONNEL SUPPORT PLANNING SEQUENCE

1. Development of task-specific personnel support commences at the outset of operational planning. OPM is devised in accordance with the forecast of operations and based on one of three methods: a. implementation of a COP with integral personnel establishments for designated units modified as required; b. non-forecast tasking of existing HQs and units with personnel establishments modified as required; or c. development of task establishments intended to meet the specific requirements of a given operation.

2. NDHQ J3 is responsible for the manpower ceiling imposed for each operation and final approval of personnel establishment and changes. Modification of existing/contingency establishments and development of specific task establishments may be undertaken by NDHQ J1 in response to direction from J3. More commonly, the environmental staff most closely associated with the forecast operation (or primary force generator) or a subordinate HQ designated as the TFHQ may be directed by J3 to develop an establishment model. The model can be subsequently validated and transposed into establishment format for approval by J3 and entered in the Establishment Management Information System (EMIS) by NDHQ J1. 3. The Task Force Management Control System (TFMCS) is the OPM derivative of the Integrated Personnel Data System (IPDS). TFMCS is controlled by NDHQ J1. Outstations on the TFMCS data network include NDHQ manning agencies, environmental staffs and the designated JFHQ (1 Cdn Div HQ). TFMCS provides establishment modeling and manpower accounting applications. Subordinate pers staff will employ TFMC as directed by NDHQ J1. 4. Details of personnel support for respective operations should be promulgated in the appropriate administrative order. Otherwise, NDHQ J1 will issue a task-specific Pers Sp Instr. 3310. SUMMARY

1. Personnel support to operations combines the varied aspects of personnel matters into one arena, to ensure the focus is directed to the achievement of operational requirements. Personnel support itself develops in conjunction with the operational needs as they increase in size and complexity. The purpose remains the provision and maintenance of effective manpower in areas of operation, commensurate with their operational requirements.

Orig

33-4

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 CHAPTER 34 MILITARY POLICE

To Be Written

34-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

This Page Intentionally Blank

34 - 2 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY
Administration (AAP-6) The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management. Administrative Control (AAP-6) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Aid of the Civil Power (NDA) Armed assistance by the CF provided to provincial authorities following an appropriate request in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace is beyond the powers of civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with. Airspace Control (AAP-6) A service provided in the combat zone to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to permit greater flexibility of operations, while authority to approve or deny combat operations is vested only in the operational commander. Airspace Control Area (AAP-6) Airspace which is laterally defined by the boundaries of the area of operations. The airspace control area may be subdivided into airspace control sub-areas. Airspace Control Authority (AAP-6) The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Airspace Control System (AAP-6) An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures and facilities required to perform airspace control functions. Air Corridor A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established to prevent engagement by friendly forces. Air Defence Action Area An air defence action area and the airspace above it is an area within which friendly aircraft or surface-toair weapons are normally given preference to conduct air defence operations except under specific conditions. Air Defence Area An air defence area is a specifically defined airspace for which air defence must be planned and provided. Air Defence Identification Zone An air defence identification zone (ADIZ) is airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required. Air Defence Operations Area Description. An air defence operations area and the airspace above it is an area within which air defence procedures are specified. It may include the designation of one or more of the following: air defence action area, air defence area, air defence identification zone, and/or firepower umbrella. Air Refuelling Area An air refuelling area is airspace defined by lateral and altitude limits for the purpose of conducting aerial refuelling operations. Also known as a refuelling track, refuelling orbit or refuelling anchor. GL-1 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Alliance (FM100-5 modified) The result of formal agreements between two or more sovereign nations for broad, long term objectives. Area of Influence (AAP-6) A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command and control. Area of Intelligence Interest That area concerning which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future operations. Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AAP-6) An area allocated to a commander in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence within the means at his disposal. Area of Interest (AAP-6) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations, and areas occupied by the enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Area of Operations (AAP-6) That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations. Assigned Forces Forces in being that have been placed in an organization, or under the command authority of a commander, where such placement is relatively permanent. Attached Forces Forces in being that have been placed in an organization, or under the command authority of a commander, where such placement is relatively temporary. Base Defence Zone A base defence zone (BDZ) is an air defence zone established around an air base and limited to the engagement envelope of short-range air defence weapon systems defending that base. BDZs have specific entry, exit, and identification friend or foe procedures established. Campaign A series of military operations in one theatre of operations designed to achieve a specific strategic objective. Campaign Plan (US Joint Pub 1-02) A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a specific strategic objective, normally within a given time and space. Canadian Forces (NDA) The Armed Forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consisting of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces. Canadian Forces Operation The deployment of an element or elements of the CF to perform a specific mission. Capability The state of having sufficient power, skills and ability to carry out a military activity or operation.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

GL-2

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Capacity The ability to execute a military activity or operation. Chain of Command (AAP-6) The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Civil-Military Cooperation All actions and measures undertaken by a military commander which concern the relationship between a military force and the government, civil agencies or civilian population in the areas where the military force is stationed or employed. Coalition (FM 100-5 modified) An ad hoc agreement between two or more sovereign nations for a common action. Coalition Commander A commander authorized to exercise operational command or operational control over a coalition of forces. Combined (AAP-6) An adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. See also joint. Command (AAP-6) The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. Command, Control and Information System (AAP-6) An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment facilities and communications which provides authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct, and control their activities. Communications The science and practice of transmitting information especially by electronic or mechanical means (Canadian Oxford Dictionary) Communications and Information System (AAP-6) The assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organized so as to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions. Component Command A subordinate command of a task force consisting of the commander and all individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations that have been placed under the command, by the authority establishing the component command. Concept (AAP-6) A notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure. Concept of Operations (AAP-6) A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. Conflict A struggle or clash between alliances, individual states or factions within a state to achieve political objectives. When military force is used, the conflict becomes an armed conflict.

GL-3 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Contingency An unforecasted or chance situation which may require a military response. Contingency Operation Plan An operation plan for contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in a specific geographic area. Control (AAP-6) That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. Co-ordinating Altitude A co-ordinating altitude is a procedural method to separate fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. It may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations and extend from the forward edge of the communications zone to the forward line of own troops. The co-ordinating altitude does not restrict either fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft when operating against or in the immediate vicinity of enemy ground forces. Fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft planning extended penetration of this altitude will notify the appropriate airspace control facility. However, approval acknowledgment is not required prior to fixed-wing aircraft operating below the co-ordinating altitude or rotary-wing aircraft operating above the co-ordinating altitude. Coordinating Authority The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, or two or more subordinate elements of the same Service. It includes the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but not to compel agreement. Matters are referred to appropriate higher authority in cases of disagreement that cannot be resolved through discussion. Course of Action An option that would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of a mission. Crisis An incident or situation involving a threat to Canada, its territories, citizens, military forces and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political or military importance that commitment of Canadian military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. Delegation of Authority (AAP-6) The action by which a commander assigns part of his authority commensurate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the authority delegated must be clearly stated. Demining (AAP-19) Activities to remove the hazard of all mines and unexploded munitions from a defined area. Directive (AAP-6) (1) A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (2) A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises. (3) Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or procedure.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

GL-4

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Doctrine (AAP-6) Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. Domestic Operations CF activities to provide assistance during civil emergencies, support national development goals or support and/or restore the maintenance of public order and security. Emergencies Act An act to authorize the Governor in Council to issue a proclamation declaring one of the following national emergencies: (a) public welfare emergency; (b) public order emergency; (c) international emergency; or (d) war emergency. Upon declaring one of these emergencies, the Governor in Council is empowered to pass regulations in specified areas so as to enable the taking of special temporary measures necessary to deal with the national emergency. Fighter Engagement Zone Fighter engagement zones (FEZ) normally will be established in those areas where no effective surfaceto-air capability is deployed. These operations usually take place in airspace above and beyond the engagement ranges of surface-based (land and sea), short-range air defence systems, and are an alternative type of engagement operation if the detailed control aspects of joint engagement operations cannot be met. A FEZ is an air defence control measure. Firepower Umbrella Firepower umbrella is an area of specified dimensions defining the boundaries of the airspace over a naval force at sea within which the fire of a ships antiaircraft weapons can endanger aircraft and within which special procedures have been established for the identification and operation of friendly aircraft. Full Command (AAP-6) The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no alliance or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to an alliance or coalition, assign only operational command or operational control. High-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone Normally applied to long-range surface-to-air missiles, a high-altitude missile engagement zone (HIMEZ) will limit the volume of airspace within which these weapons may conduct engagements without specific direction of the AADC. A HIMEZ is an air defence control measure. High-Density Airspace Control Zone A high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) is an area where there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. A HIDACZ has defined dimensions that usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. Access to an air defence weapons status within this zone is normally approved by the appropriate commander. Host-Nation Support (AAP-6) GL-5 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peace, times of crisis or armed conflict based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. Information That which informs or has the potential to inform. Meaning communicated or received. A combination of content and meaning represented by symbols and media or conduit, used or useable in a particular context. (DND Terminology Bank). Information Management (IM) This is the process of planning, co-ordinating and controlling the acquisition, analysis, processing, integration, distribution, transmission, use and safeguarding of information in all its forms and its associated technology and supporting resources. (DAOD 6000-0). Information Operations Actions taken in support of national objectives that influence an adversarys decision makers by affecting others information and/or information systems while exploiting and protecting ones own information and/or information systems and those of our friends and allies. Information Technology (IT) This is the set of computers, communications, systems software, utility programs, and management tools which support the automation of IM throughout an organization. (IMD 100). Intensity The level of effort assigned in support of a commitment commensurate with its overall importance. Joint Engagement Zone A joint engagement zone (JEZ) is airspace of specified dimensions within which multiple air defence weapon systems (i.e., surface-to-air missiles and fighters) of one or more Service components are simultaneously employed and operated Joint An adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (When all services are not involved, the participating services shall be identified). See also combined. Levels of Force Directions issued by competent military authority for the application of military force in the enforcement of national laws and legally binding resolutions and decisions, in ascending order of severity, against any individuals or objects that pose a threat, although not a traditional military threat. Low-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone A low-altitude missile engagement zone (LOMEZ) is a volume of airspace established to control engagements of low-to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Subject to weapon system capabilities, a LOMEZ normally will extend beyond the forward edge of the battle area. Low-Level Transit Route A low-level transit route (LLTR) is a temporary, bi-directional corridor of defined dimensions that facilitates the low-level passage of friendly aircraft through friendly air defences and controlled or restricted airspace. LLTR currently is used only by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Military Strategy (AAP-6) That component of national or multi-national strategy that presents the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

GL-6

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Minimum Risk Route A minimum-risk route (MRR) is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions recommended for use by highspeed, fixed-wing aircraft that presents the minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft transiting the combat zone. These routes are established considering the threat, friendly operations, known restrictions, known fire support locations, and terrain. National Command A command that is organized by and functions under the authority of a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under an alliance or coalition commander. National Commander A commander who has national responsibilities. For large scale commitments of CF elements, the national commander will not normally be part of the alliance or coalition chain of command, but will represent national interests and concerns to the coalition commander. For smaller scale operations, the national commander may be part of the chain of command. National Emergency (R.S.C. 1985 c E-4.5) An urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that (a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (NDHQ Policy Directive P6/93) The process and functions that enable general purpose, combat capable forces to survive and operate in a NBC environment. It entails the methods, plans and procedures involved in establishing and exercising defensive measures against the effects of an attack utilizing NBC weapons. Further, it encompasses both the training for and the implementation of these methods, plans and procedures. Operational Art The skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Operational Command (AAP-6) The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. Operational Control (AAP-6) The authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. Operational Level of War (US Joint Pub 1-02) The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Operational Personnel Management (HQDP 101) The distribution of effective manpower in accordance with operational priority.

GL-7 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Operation Planning Process A coordinated staff process used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone A positive identification radar advisory zone is a designated area within which Navy ships (usually naval tactical data systems equipped) separate friendly from hostile aircraft. Propaganda Any information, ideas, doctrine or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. Psychological Operations Planned activities designed to influence the attitudes and behaviours, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. Public Affairs PA is a distinctive function within the CF that helps establish and maintain mutual lines of communications, understanding, acceptance and co-operation between the organization and its audiences. Public Order Emergency (R.S.C. 1985 c E-4.5) An emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada and that is so serious as to be a national emergency. Public Welfare Emergency (R.S.C. 1985 c E-4.5) An emergency that is caused by a real or imminent (a) fire, flood, draught, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon, (b) disease in human beings, animals or plants, or (c) accident or pollution and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources so serious as to be a national emergency. Reach The range to which forces can be massed and employed decisively. Restricted Operations Area A restricted operation area is airspace of defined dimensions created in response to specific operational situations or requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. Also known as a restricted operations zone. Residual responsibility When forces are assigned from an Environmental command to an operational level force, a level of responsibility less than Full Command will remain with the Environmental commander (designated a supporting commander of the forces assigned from him to the TFC). The authority which the TFC exercises over the TF represents a portion of Full Command, while the responsibilities retained by the supporting commander and other agencies are collectively referred to as residual responsibilities. Residual responsibility plus the authority and responsibility that has been transferred to the TFC equals Full Command. Resource. Information shall be managed as a corporate resource of strategic value throughout its lifecycle. Operational considerations shall take precedence in all Information Management (IM) processes, functions GL-8

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
and activities. (DAOD 6000-0). Rules of Engagement Directions issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations within which armed force may be applied to achieve military objectives in furtherance of national policy. Short-Range Air Defence Engagement Zone Areas of short-range air defence engagement zone (SHORAD) deployment may fall within a LOMEZ or HIMEZ. It is possible that SHORAD assets may solely defend some areas. A SHORAD engagement zone (SHORADEZ) can be established to define the airspace within which these assets will operate. Because centralized control over SHORAD weapons may not be possible, these areas must be clearly defined and disseminated so friendly aircraft can avoid them. Special Use Airspace Special use airspace is a term used to define airspace for a specific purpose. It may also designate airspace in which no flight activity is authorized. General subdivisions (regions, sectors, and AOA) are not special use airspace. Strategic Level of War (US Joint Pub 1-02) The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Strategic Mobility (B-GG-005-004/AF-000) The capability to move forces and their associated logistic support effectively and when practical, efficiently, and can be between theatres (inter-theatre), or between regions (inter-regional) and out of area. Strategic Reserve A reinforcing reserve of personnel and material that is not committed in advance to a specific operation but that can be deployed to a theatre or area of operations for a mission decided at the time by the strategic level commander. Support (AAP-6) The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. Supported Commander The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of an operation. Supporting Commander A commander who provides forces and other support to a supported commander. Supporting Plan A stand-alone planning document that supports another plan by providing specific and detailed direction and information on a particular aspect of that plan. Sustainment The requirement for a military force to maintain its operational capability for the duration required to achieve its objectives. Sustainment consists of the continued supply of consumables, and the replacement of combat losses and non-combat attrition of equipment and personnel. Synchronization The arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum combat power at a decisive place and time. Tactical Command (AAP-6) The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. GL-9 Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000

GLOSSARY (Cont)
Tactical Control (AAP-6) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvre necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical Level of War (US Joint Pub 1-02) The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Task (B-GL-303-002/JX-Z03) An activity which contributes to the achievement of a mission. Task Force (AAP-6) A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. Technical Control The control applied largely to administrative or technical procedures and exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction. It parallels command channels but is restricted to control within certain specialized areas such as legal, medical or communications. Operational commanders may override this type of control any time its application is seen to jeopardize the mission or the military force. Theatre of Operations That area within a theatre of war within which operations are directed toward a common strategic objective. Theatre of War The continental territory, including adjoining sea areas and corresponding air space, in which a war is conducted. Operations in a theatre of war are invariably joint and usually combined. A theatre of war normally comprises several theatres of operations. Transfer of Authority The formal transfer of a specified degree of authority over forces assigned to an operation between commanders of supporting commands and the supported commander. Weapons Engagement Zone In air defence, a weapons engagement zone (WEZ) is airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement normally rests with a particular weapon system. These include FEZ, HIMEZ, LOMEZ, SHORADEZ, and JEZ. Weapons-Free Zone A weapons-free zone is an air defence zone established for the protection of key assets or facilities, other than air bases, where weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively recognized as friendly.

Ch 1 2004-11-05

GL-10

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AADC AAWC ABCA ACA ACC ACE ACINT ACLANT ACM ACO ACP ACP ACS ADC ADCC ADIZ AEW AFC AIR AO AOR AP APIC APOD ASAT ASCC ATC ATO ATP AWACS BDZ Bi-SC BMD BPA BTWC C2 C2IS C3 CML CMO CMOC CMPSR CMRC CMX CNA CNC CNO Area Air Defence Commander Anti-Air Warfare Commander America, Britain, Canada, Australia Airspace Control Authority Air Component Commander Allied Command Europe Acoustic Intelligence Allied Command Atlantic airspace control measures airspace control orders airspace control plan Aid of the Civil Power Airspace Control System air defence commander air defence control centre air defence identification zone Airborne Early Warning Armed Forces Council Area of Intelligence Responsibility Area of Operations Area of Responsibility Assembly Point Allied Public Information Centre Airport of Disembarkation anti-satellite Air Standardization Co-ordinating Committee Air Traffic Control Air Tasking Order Allied Tactical Publication Airborne Warning and Control System base defence zones Bi Strategic Command Battlefield Munitions Disposal Battlefield Psychological Activities Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention command and control command, control and information system command, control and communications civil-military liaison civil-military operations civilian-military operations centre Canadian Military Police Support Regiment civil-military resource control Crisis Management Exercise computer network attack Canadian national commander computer network operations C3CM C3IS CA CAO CATF CAX CC CCG CDA CDS CEP CF CFAD CFC CFCS CFDB CFDS CFEWDB CFHS CFMCU CFMG CFMS CFNCIU CFOO CFPM CFSD CFSF CI CIDA CIMIC CIS CJTL CL CM CM Co-ord CMA CMG COA COG COLPRO COMINT CONOP CONPLAN COS Counter C3 command, control and communications counter measures command, control, communications and information systems civil affairs chief administrative officer Commander, Amphibious Task Force Computer Assisted Exercise Capability Component Canadian Coast Guard Canadian Defence Attach Chief of the Defence Staff civil emergency planning Canadian Forces CF Ammunition Depot combined force commander CF Command System CF Doctrine Board CF Dental Service CF EW data base CF Health Services Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit CF Medical Group CF Medical Service CF National CI Unit CF Organization Order CF Provost Marshal CF Supply Depot CF Special Force counter intelligence Canadian International Development Agency civil-military co-operation communications and information systems Canadian Joint Task List coordination levels civil-military civil-military co-ordination civil-military affairs Canadian Medical Group Course of Action Centre of Gravity collective protection communications intelligence concept of operations contingency operation plan chief of staff counter command control and communications

LA - 1

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont) CPA CPIC CPIO CPKO CPO CPX CRPO CSAR CSG CSO CSS CT CUSRPG CWC D Dent Svcs DAOD DART DATCALS DC DCDS DEB DEM DFAIT DFO DGHS DGPA DI Pol DICRSS DII COE DIRLAUTH DISO DM DMC DND DOCINT DoD DP DPAOT DPC DPMS DPQ Consolidated Psychological Activities Coalition Public Information Centre Chief Public Information Officer Complex Peacekeeping Operation Combat PSYOPS Command Post Exercise Crisis Response PSYOPS Combat Search and Rescue Canadian Support Group Committee of Senior Officials Combat Service Support Counter-Terrorism Canada-United States Regional Planning Group Chemical Weapons Convention Director Dental Services Department Administrative Order and Directive Disaster Assistance Response Team Deployable Air Traffic Control and Landing System Defence Council Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Departmental Emergency Books Daily Executive Meeting Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department of Fisheries and Oceans Director General of Health Services Director General Public Affairs Directorate of International Policy Director Internal Communications Research and Support Services Defence Information Initiative Common Operating Environment direct liaison authorization Defence Information Services Organization Deputy Minister Defence Management Committee Department of National Defence Documentary Intelligence US Department of Defense Defence Plan Director Public Affairs Operations and Training Defence Planning Committee Defence Program Management System Defence Planning Questionnaire DS DS DSU EC ECM ECS EEF EIHH ELIINT EMIS EMS EOB EPC EPM ES ESM ESU EW EWCC EWOSC FACA FEZ FHP FMB FOB FOBS FoIS FP FS GBAD GEB GEOC GPS GS HA HAC HACC HAZMAT HIDACZ HIMEZ HNS HO HQDP HS LA - 2 Disembarkation Site Direct Support Direct Support Unit Evacuation Centre electronic countermeasures Environmental Chiefs of Staff essential elements of friendly intelligence Environmental Industrial Health Hazard electronic intelligence Establishment Management Information System Electro-Magnetic Spectrum electronic order of battle Emergency Preparedness Canada electronic protective measures Embarkation Site electronic support measures Engineer Support Unit electronic warfare EW Coordination Cell EW Operational Support Centre force air control area fighter engagement zone Force Health Protection forward mounting base forward operating base fractional orbit bombardment system foreign intelligence services Force protection functional specialists Ground Based Air Defence Government Emergency Book Government Emergency Operations Coordination Global Positioning System General Support humanitarian assistance humanitarian assistance coordinator humanitarian assistance coordination centre hazardous material high density airspace control zone high altitude missile engagement zone host nation support humanitarian operations Headquarters Defence Plan Health Services

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont) HSS HUMINT I&W IA IAMSAR ICAO ICSAR IER IFF IGO IHL ILOC IM IMI IMINT IMO IMPLO IMS INFOSEC IO IOCC IPB IPCRC IPDS IPE ISOPREP ISR ISS ISS IT ITIL ITSEC ITW/AA J Staff J5PA CC JEZ NATO NBC NBCD NC3 TA Health Services Support Human Intelligence Indications and Warnings Inter-Agency International Aeronautical and Maritime SAR International Civil Aviation Organization Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue identification friend or foe inter-governmental organisation international humanitarian law Integrated Lines of Communication information management Information Management Infrastructure Imagery Intelligence International Maritime Organisation implementation order International Military Staff Information Security Information Operations Information Operations Coordination Cell Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Interdepartmental Program Coordination and Review Committee Integrated Personnel Data System individual protective equipment Isolated Personnel Report Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance integrated support stations Information Systems Security information technology IT information library IT Security Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment Joint Staff J5PA Co-ordination Centre Joint engagement zone North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear, biological and chemical nuclear, biological and chemical defence NATO C3 Technical Architecture JFACC JFC JFLCC JMETL JOA JOG JRCC JSAT JSST JTF JTFHQ JTF SG LCC LEA LEMS LEP LLR LLTR LOC LOF LOMEZ MASINT MASCAL MC MCA MCC MCDA MILC MIS MJLC MNC MND MOU MP MRR MRSC MSC NA5 CRO NAC NCCIS NDA NDCC LA - 3 Joint Force Air Component Commander Joint Force Commander Joint Force Land Component Commander Joint Mission Essential Task List Joint Operations Area Joint Operations Group Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre Joint Staff Action Team Joint Space Support Team Joint Task Force JTF Headquarters JTF Support Group Land Component Commander Law Enforcement Agencies Land Equipment Management System locally engaged personnel low level radiation low level transit route lines of communications level of force low altitude missile engagement zone Measurement and Signals Intelligence massive casualties Military Committee Military Civic Action Maritime Component Commander military civil defence assets Multinational Integrated Logistics Unit Management Information Systems Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Major NATO commanders Minister of National Defence memoranda (memorandum) of understanding military police minimum risk route Marine Rescue Sub-Centres Major subordinate commanders Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation North Atlantic Council National Command and Control Information System National Defence Act National Defence Command Centre Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont) NDHQ NDIC NDLCC NDMCC NEO NGO NMA NMD NMR NORAD NPG NPS NPT NSE NSS NTP NTWG OA OCE OCIPEP OGD OOTW OPCOM OPCON OPLAN OPM OPP OPSEC OSCE OSOC PA PAG PAO PCO Pers Svcs PG PI PIC PIO PM PME POC PRC PRMNY PSC National Defence Headquarters National Defence Intelligence Centre National Defence Logistic Coordination Centre National Defence Movement Coordination Centre non-combatant evacuation operation non-governmental organization NATO military authorities National Missile Defence National Military Representative North American Air Defence Nuclear Planning Group NATO Precautionary System Non-Proliferation Treaty National Support Element National Search and Rescue Secretariat National Training Plan National Training Working Group Operational Authority officer conducting the exercise Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness other government departments operations other than war operational command operational control operations plan Operational Personnel Management operational planning process operations security Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe on-site operations centre public affairs (Canada, US) Public Affairs Guidance Public Affairs Officer Privy Council Office Personnel Services planning guidance public information (UN, NATO) Public Information Centre Public Information Officer Provost Marshal prime mission equipment point of contact population and resource control Permanent Mission in New York Principal subordinate commanders PSO PSYOPS QOL QRF RCC RFL RISTA ROTA ROE RP SA SACEUR SACLANT SAMP SAR SCA SCIF SCTG SCTP SDP SHAPE SHIRBRIG SHORADEZ SIGINT SILP SLOC SMF SMO SOFA SOLAS SPO SPAO SPOC SPOD SRR SSFA Sub-PSC SUPLAN Surg Gen TA TACON LA - 4 peace support operation psychological operations Quality of Life quick reaction force rescue coordination centre Restricted Frequency List reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition release other than attack rules of engagement reception point Security Authority Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Security and Military Police search and rescue Support to Civil Administration Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility Strategic Collective Training Guidance Strategic Collective Training Plan standing defence plan Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Standing High Readiness Brigade short range air defence engagement zone Signals Intelligence Security Intelligence Liaison Programme sea lines of communication Support to the Military Force senior medical officer status of forces agreement Safety of Life at Sea Strategic PSYOPS Senior PAO Search and Rescue Point of Contact Seaport of Disembarkation Search and Rescue Region secretary of state for foreign affairs subordinate-principal subordinate commanders supporting plan Surgeon General Technical Authority tactical control

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont) TACS TAT TC TCC TCN TECHINT TF TFC TFHQ TFMCS TF PA Plan TIC TIM TMD TOA TOR TPKO TSSU UAV UIO UN UNHCR UNNY UNSC USAF USCG USN VCDS WEZ Theatre Air Control System Theatre Activation Team Transport Canada targeting coordination cell troop contributing nations Technical intelligence Task Force Task Force Commander task force headquarters Task Force Management Control System TF Public Affairs Plan toxic industrial chemical toxic industrial material Theatre Missile Defence Transfer of Authority Terms of Reference Traditional Peacekeeping Operation Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit unmanned aerial vehicles Unit Information Officer United Nations United Nations High Commission for Refugees UN New York United Nations Security Council United States Air Force United States Coast Guard United States Navy Vice Chief of the Defence Staff weapons engagement zone

LA - 5

Ch 1 2004-11-05

B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont)

This Page Intentionally Blank

Ch 1 2004-11-05

LA - 6