DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC LAW

Private law is also known as civil law. It involves relationships between individuals, or private relationships between citizens and companies.

Public law is a theory of law that governs the relationship between the state and the individual, who is considered to be either a company or a citizen.

They both aim to create social order, but have a number of distinct differences. Within public law, different categories exist. These include criminal law, constitutional law, administrative law, social welfare law and all deal with matters relating to the whole country. Private law is concerned with the law enforced between individuals. This can include contract law, family law and other areas which deal with intellectual property rights (copyrights, designs and patents), land law (and the way in which it is transferred), probate (dealing with wills and how property is distributed after someone dies) and company law (which deals with the ways in which companies are created and rules regulating how they operate their business).

A. PRIVATE LAW

1. CIVIL LAW

Civil law is the branch of law dealing with disputes between individuals or organizations, in which compensation may be awarded to the victim. It seeks to resolve non-criminal disputes such as disagreements over the meaning of contracts, property ownership, divorce, child custody, and damages for personal and property damage.

a. Persons and Family Relations is one of the subjects covered in Civil Law. It mainly deals with the issues of Family Matters such as Marriage, Annulment and

Voiding of Marriages, Adoption, Property Settlements between Spouses, Parental Authority, Support for Spouses and Children, Emancipation, Legitimes (inheritance) of children from their parents and between relatives.

Legal Provisions:

1.

Article 1 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Marriage is a special

contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. 2. Article 10 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Marriages between

Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or viceconsul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. 3. Article 17 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The local civil registrar

shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the period of publication. 4. Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines. All marriages solemnized

outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country

where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. 5. Article 28 of the Family Code of the Philippines. If the residence of either

party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

Case: Provision No. 4 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par. 2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

b. Property is anything that is owned by a person or entity. Property is divided into two types: "real property" which is any interest in land, real estate, growing plants or the improvements on it, and "personal property" (sometimes called "personalty") which is everything else or any right or interest that an individual has in movable things.

Legal Provisions:

1.

Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Real property as well as

personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the

person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. 2. Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The following things are

property of public dominion: (1) hose intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. 3. Article 423 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The property of provinces,

cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. 4. Article 424 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Property for public use, in

the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. 5. Article 425 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Property of private

ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.

Case: Provision No. 2 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR., Respondent. G.R. No. 172011, March 07, 2011

Facts: On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration of a parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706, located in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957 square meters. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 22206 for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.

Issue: Whether or not his application should be granted.

Ruling: No because Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessor have been in possession of the land since 12 June 1945. Neither can be qualify under the 30year prescription period rule since the land was declared alienable less than 30 years from the date of his application. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

c. Succession is the statutory rules of inheritance of a dead person's estate when the property is not given by the terms of a will.

Legal Provisions:

1.

Article 712 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ownership is acquired by

occupation and by intellectual creation. Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition. They may also be acquired by means of prescription. 2. Article 843 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The testator shall

designate the heir by his name and surname, and when there are two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the instituted heir may be known. Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he designate him in such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the institution shall be valid.

3.

Article 888 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The legitime of legitimate

children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. 4. Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The ascendant who

inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. 5. Article 902 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The rights of illegitimate

children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Case: Provision No. 3 REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, Petitioners, vs. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, Respondent G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001

Facts: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay

Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were

in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. 1983, Gregorio executed a Thus, on August 15, whereby for

Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan,

P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to the same. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery. In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. In time, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court. The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because: First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in

1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991. As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto. Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank

of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club. Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income. We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land. The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void. Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was

executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.

Issue: Whether or not a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children.

Ruling: According to Article 888, Civil Code: The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir cannot be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

d. Obligations and Contracts. Any legally binding agreement such as contracts

voluntarily entered into by two or more parties that places an obligation on each party to do or not do something for one or more of the other parties and that gives each party the right to demand the performance of whatever is promised to them by the other parties. To be valid, all parties must be legally competent to enter a

contract, neither the objective nor any of the obligations or promised performances may be illegal, mutuality of the agreement and of its obligations must exist, and there must be consideration.

Legal Provisions:

1.

Article 1159 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Obligations arising from

contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. 2. Article 1163 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Every person obliged to

give something is also obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of the parties requires another standard of care. 3. Article 1167 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. If a person obliged to do

something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost. This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone. 4. Article 1170 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Those who in the

performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. 5. Article 1177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The creditors, after

having pursued the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy their claims, may exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the same purpose, save those which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn the acts which the debtor may have done to defraud them.

Case: Provision No. 4 JOSEPH SALUDAGA, Petitioner, vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU, Respondents. G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008

Facts: It is the obligation of any college institution to provide a safe and secure environment for every student. As for the students, they have the obligation to give back the respect for their respective colleges and to excel and do well with the institutions goals. Far Eastern University failed to comply with their obligation when a student of theirs, whose name is Joseph Saludaga was shot inside the campus by their security guard named Alejandro Rosete. The victim petitioned a case against FEU and Edilberto C. De Jesus, president of FEU. The University also failed to check the qualifications of the security guards hired through Galaxy, the third party which hires security guards for the university. From there, there are also complaints for Galaxy being the first employers of Rosete. It is also said that the safety of the university should not only be within the hands of the security guards. Damages are taken by Saludaga by surprised including physical and moral damages obtained from the said accidental shooting by Rosete who claimed that it was an accident.

Issues: Whether Far Eastern University failed to comply with their obligation in implementing a safe and secure learning environment.

Ruling: Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach

of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. The court dismissed the petitioners complaints for Edilberto C. De Jesus as well as the counterclaims of the respondents. The Regional Trial Court of Manila found FEU to be liable for the damages and a breach of their obligation to the petitioner. FEU was ordered to pay actual damage of 35,298.25, plus 6%interest per annum from the filing of the case until the finality of decision. After the execution, the rate shall be 12& per annum until its satisfaction. FEU was ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00. Moral damage for P100,000.00, attorneys fees and litigation expense for 50,000.00. Galaxy was and its presidents were ordered to jointly and severely pay the respondent FEU damages equivalent to the amount awarded to Saludaga.

e. Special Contracts is a contract that is signed and has the (wax) seal of the signer attached. Special contracts encompass several classes of contracts

as sales, agency, and partnership.

Legal Provisions:

1.

Article 1471 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. If the price is simulated,

the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
2.

Article 1475 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The contract of sale is

perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. 3. Article 1915 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. If two or more persons

have appointed an agent for a common transaction or undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of the agency. 4. Article 1916 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. When two persons

contract with regard to the same thing, one of them with the agent and the other with the principal, and the two contracts are incompatible with each other, that of prior date shall be preferred, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1544. 5. Article 1920 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The principal may revoke

the agency at will, and compel the agent to return the document evidencing the agency. Such revocation may be express or implied.

Case: Provision No. 3 CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE CASTRO, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO ARTIGO, Respondents. G.R. No. 115838. July 18, 2002

Facts: Appellants were co-owners of four (4) lots located at EDSA corner New York and Denver Streets in Cubao, Quezon City. In a letter dated January 24, 1984 (Exhibit "A-1, p. 144, Records), appellee was authorized by appellants to act as real estate broker in the sale of these properties for the amount of P23,000,000.00, five percent (5%) of which will be given to the agent as commission. It was appellee who first found Times Transit Corporation, represented by its president Mr. Rondaris, as prospective buyer which desired to buy two (2) lots only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually, sometime in May of 1985, the sale of

lots 14 and 15 was consummated. Appellee received from appellants P48,893.76 as commission. It was then that the rift between the contending parties soon emerged. Appellee apparently felt short changed because according to him, his total commission should be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%) of the agreed

price ofP7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to appellants for the two (2) lots, and that it was he who introduced the buyer to appellants to the

and unceasingly

facilitated

the negotiation

which ultimately

led

consummation of the sale. Hence, he sued below to collect the balance of P303,606.24 after having received P48,893.76in advance. On the other hand, appellants completely traverse appellee's claims

and essentially argue that appellee is selfishly asking for more than what he truly deserved as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were more instrumental in the consummation of the sale. Although appellants readily concede that it was appellee who first introduced Times Transit Corp. to them, appellee was not designated by them as their exclusive real estate agent but that in fact there were more or less eighteen (18) others whose collective efforts in the long run dwarfed those of appellee's, considering that the first negotiation for the sale where appellee took active participation failed and it was these other agents who successfully brokered in the second negotiation. But despite this and out of appellants' "pure

liberality, beneficence and magnanimity", appellee nevertheless was given the largest cut in the commission (P48,893.76), although on the principle of quantum meruit he would have certainly been entitled to less. So appellee should not have been heard to complain of getting only a pittance when he actually got the lion's share of the commission and worse, he should not have been allowed to get the entire commission. Furthermore, the purchase price for the two lots was only P3.6 million as appearing in the deed of sale and not P7.05 million as

alleged by appellee. Thus, even assuming that appellee is entitled to the entire commission, he would only be getting5% of the P3.6 million, or P180,000.00. Private respondent Francisco Artigo ("Artigo" for brevity) sued petitioners

Constante A. De Castro ("Constante" for brevity) and Corazon A. De Castro ("Corazon" for brevity) to collect the unpaid balance of his broker's commission from the De Castros. The Trial Court finds defendants Constante and Corazon Amor de Castro jointly and solidarily liable to plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the complaint merits dismissal for failure to implead other co-owners as indispensable parties.

Ruling: The De Castros argue that Artigo's complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead all the co-owners of the two lots. The De Castros claim that Artigo always knew that the two lots were co-owned by Constante and Corazon with their other siblings Jose and Carmela whom Constante merely

represented. The De Castros contend that failure to implead such indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo, as agent of all the four co-owners, would be paid with funds co-owned by the four co-owners. The De Castros' contentions are devoid of legal basis. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party. However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case.

There is no dispute that Constante appointed Artigo in a handwritten note dated January 24, 1984 to sell the properties of the De Castros for P23 million at a 5 percent commission. The authority was on a first come, first serve basis. Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other co-owners. Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante's individual or representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties. The De Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of agency, citing Article 1915 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1915. If two or more persons have appointed an agent for a common transaction or undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of the agency. The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros' theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable parties. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may

be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in this case.

f. Torts and Damages. Tort is a term applied to a miscellaneous and more or less unconnected group of civil wrongs, other than breach of contract, for which a court of law will afford a remedy in the form of an action for damages. The law of torts is concerned with the compensation of losses suffered by private individuals in their legally protected interests, through conduct of others which is regarded as socially unreasonable.

Legal Provisions:

1.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Whoever by act or omission

causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 2. Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Responsibility for fault or

negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. 3. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The obligation imposed by

article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 4. Article 2181 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Whoever pays for the

damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. 5. Article 2182 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. If the minor or insane

person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.

Case: Provision No. 3 DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC., Respondent G.R. No. 156034, October 1, 2003

Facts: C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas reclamation Area in Tondo, Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing Authority though it was completed in1994. On 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express receive a report that that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after eight (8) hours. At 8:35 a.m., he tried to seek shelter but it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet. The ship was dragged by the wind toward the Napocor power barge. Capt. Jusep ordered

a full stop of the vessel to avoid the collision but when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector wall constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged cause by the incident. C & A construction demanded payment of the damages from Capt. Jusep but the latter refused to pay due to the cause of the incident was by a fortuitous event. The trial court ruled that Captain Jusep was not guilty of negligence in applying the emergency rule because it had taken necessary precautions to avoid accident. The Court of Appeals reversed & set aside the decision of the trial court. Captain Jusep was found guilty of negligence in transferring the vessel only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and held liable for damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transferring the vessel to sought shelter.

Issues: (1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent. (2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for Quasi-Delict.

Held: (1) The court finds Captain Jusep guilty of negligence, the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances, despite the knowledge that there is typhoon but he waited for the lapse of eight (8) hours instead. Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation.The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule because the danger where Captain Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence. (2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage to another, it instantly arise a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the care and diligence of supervision of his employee. In

Fabre , Jr. vs. Court of Appeals held that due diligence requires consistent compliance of rules & regulations for the guidance and actual implementation of rules. But the petitioner fails to give any evidence that its rule are strictly implemented and monitored in compliance therewith petitioner is therefore liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27 due earn 6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the decision.

B. PUBLIC LAW

a. Constitutional Law is a body of law dealing with the distribution and exercise of government power. More particularly, it is the sum of the interpretations of constitutional questions rendered by the Supreme Court and subsidiary courts in their written and published decisions.

Extradition Treaty

An extradition treaty is an international agreement in which the Requested State agrees, at the request of the Requesting State and under specified conditions, to turn over persons who are within its jurisdiction and who are charged with crimes against, or are fugitives from, the Requesting State.

Case:

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents. G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011

Facts: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.

Held: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply

shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC. The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles. The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

b. Administrative Law is a body of law that governs the activities of administrative agencies of the government. It ensures that justice is done between the state and the individual by restraining arbitrary or wrong decision making by the state.

Administrative Code of 1987

Administrative Code incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance and provides optimum benefit to the people and Government officers and employees as it embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people.

Case: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010

Facts: Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondents claim for refund/credit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed.

The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period 2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an administrative claim, and violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

Ruling: 1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar

months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondents administrative claim was timely filed. 2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature. Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit], within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales. The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT. The premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.

c. Criminal Law is the body of law that relates to crime. It might be defined as the body of rules that defines conduct that is not allowed because it is held to threaten, harm or endanger the safety and welfare of people, and that sets out the punishment to be imposed on people who do not obey these laws.

Revised Penal Code of the Philippines

The Revised Penal Code contains the general penal laws of the Philippines. First enacted in 1930, it remains in effect today, despite several amendments thereto. It does not comprise a comprehensive compendium of all Philippine penal laws. The Revised Penal Code itself was enacted as Act No. 3815, and some Philippine criminal laws have been enacted outside of the Revised Penal Code as separate Republic Acts.

Case:

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculams regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136,

post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latters account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may

be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any

active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

d. International Law is the set of rules generally regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states and nations.

Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)

Visiting Forces Agreement is an agreement between a country and a foreign nation having military forces visiting in that country.

Case:

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, Respondents. G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009

Facts: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith is a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty b/n the US and RP, the US embassy was granted custody of Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

Issue: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

Ruling: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial. The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA are not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.