Question (a) The issue is whether there are grounds available to Rajah to petition for a divorce against his

wife, Sinniah. There are three grounds for divorce;(1) conversion to Islam, (2) dissolution by mutual consent and (3) breakdown of marriage. The first ground available to Rajah is under breakdown of marriage. Section 53(1) of Law reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 stated that either party to a marriage may petition for a divorce on the ground that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Section 53(2) stated that it is duty of the court to enquire into the facts alleged and the circumstances must be just and reasonable in order for the marriage to be dissolved. Section 54(1)(a) is on the grounds of breakdown of marriage where the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. In Clarkson v Clarkson (1930), adultery can be defined as voluntary sexual intercourse between a man and woman who are not married to each other but one of whom is at least a married person. There are two views with regard to this aspect. The first view is the word and interpreted as or. In Goodrich v Goodrich (1971),1 the principle of the case is the petitioner must satisfy that the respondent has committed adultery and that the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. It is not necessary to show that he finds it intolerable to live with the respondent in consequence of the adultery but it is sufficient if the petitioner genuinely finds it intolerable to do so for whatever reason. Goodrich decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Clearly v Clearly (1974),2 where the principle is a petitioner cannot rely on his own adultery as leading him to find intolerable to live with the respondent. The fact of this case is the wife committed adultery and after a few weeks come to husband. However, after a while left her husband and live with her mother and took their two children along. Her husband petition under irretrievable breakdown of marriage on the reason that she committed adultery and refuse to live with him. The husband also claim that he tried to save the marriage for sake of the children. The wife still keeps in touch with the man and went out with the man and her husband feel intolerable to live with the wife. Here, the court look at separate ground and interpreted and as or.

1 2

2 All ER 1340 1 WLR 73

The second view is the word and interpreted as and. In Roper v Roper (1972),3 the principle is as consequence of the adultery, the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. This principle is applied in Malaysia. In applying to this situation, it is clearly stated that in the middle of 2000, Sinniah had indulged extra marital relations with Muniandy where her children often witnessed that Muniandy used to visit their home when their father, Rajah was at work and that during those visits she and the other children were asked to leave the flat while Muniandy and Sinniah stayed there for about an hour and so. She also constantly absence from the matrimonial home. Therefore, with regard to this situation, any right thinking person will assume that Sinniah and Muniandy commit adultery because they were alone in the flat while her husband away. Furthermore, the children also were asked to leave the flat. In conclusion, Rajah may petition for a divorce under the ground of adultery under section 54(1)(a) and by virtue of Roper case where in consequence of the adultery, Rajah finds it intolerable to live with Sinniah. This principle is applied in Malaysia. Moreover, Rajah may claim damages for adultery against co-respondent, Muniandy provided that the allegation of adultery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. This is clearly mentioned in section 58(1). Further, section 59(3) stated that whenever in any petition presented by a husband, the alleged adultery has been established against the co-respondent, the court may order the co-respondent to pay the whole or any part of the costs of the proceeding. In Leow Kooi Wah v Ng Kok Seng Philip & Anor (1995)4 the husband had committed adultery and his wife claim damages from the co-respondent. In this case, the co-respondent knew that the petitioner had married with the respondent but she still commit adultery with the respondent, therefore the court granted the damages. In Kang Ka Heng v Ng Mooi Tee & Anor (2001)5 the husband claimed that he filed for divorce under the ground of breakdown of marriage and the wife file to dismiss the husband petition. During the petition, the husband admitted that he had affair with another woman. The court allowed the wife petition to claim damages from other party provided that the allegation of adultery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
3 4

1 WLR 73 1 MLJ 852 5 3 MLJ 331

Similarly, in the case of Karen Cheong Yuen Yee v Phua Cheng Chuen (2004)6 the court decided that for an allegation of adultery, the standard of proof should be beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the fact of this case, the court held that the petitioner had failed to prove that the husband has committed the act of adultery. The second ground available is also under breakdown of marriage under section 54(1)(b) where the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. In Katz v Katz (1972)7the court held that behaviour is something more than a mere state of affairs or a state of mind. It is an action or conduct by one which affects the others. There are two views in this aspect. The first view is the sole test to be prescribed as the nature of behaviour is that it must be such as to justify a finding that a petitioner cannot be reasonably expected to live with the respondent. In Thurlow v Thurlow (1975)8, the court held that only behaviour of one party of the marriage has to be considered. However, in other cases as will be mentioned later, the test was held to be objective. The second view is in determining whether the petitioner can or cannot reasonably be expected to live with respondent, the court must take into account the character, personality, disposition and behaviour of the petitioner and the respondent as alleged and establish in evidence. There are three objective tests that can be applied to prove breakdown of marriage. Firstly is reasonable mans test. Dunn J formulated this test in Livingstone Stallard v Livingstone Stallard (1974)9 that would any right-thinking person come to the conclusion that this husband has behaved in such a way that this wife cannot reasonably be expected to live with him, taking into account the whole world of circumstances and the characters and personalities of parties. Secondly is the behaviour test whereby the behaviour of both parties must be considered. In Ash v Ash (1972)10, Bagnall J held that the court must not consider only on the

6 7

291 MLJU 1 3 All ER 219 8 2 All ER 979 9 2 All ER 766 10 1 All ER 582

behaviour of the respondent but also the character, personality, disposition, as well as the behaviour of the petitioner. Lastly is whether there is a breach of the obligation between both parties as applied in Pheasant v Pheasant (1972)11. In this case, the petitioner husband alleged that the wife had not given him the spontaneous demonstrative affection, which his nature demanded and for which he claimed that it caused the marriage to be irretrievably broken down. It was held that it was nothing in the wifes behaviour which could be regarded as a breach on her part of any of the obligations of the marriage or effectively contributing to breakdown of the marriage. The husbands petition for divorce was dismissed. These tests were followed in the Malaysian case of Joseph Jeganathan v Rosaline Joseph (1989)12, where KC Vohrah J referred to the test formulated in the case of Livingstone Stallard in assessing what is reasonable in context of section 54(1)(b) of the LRA, before granting a decree nisi. In this case, the husband seeking the dissolution of the marriage, alleging that the marriage had broken down irretrievably in that the respondent had behaved in such a way that he could not reasonably be expected to live with her. The evidence adduced showed that the matrimonial home was filled with the bitterness, strive, suspicion, and tension, generated by frequent violent quarrels. There were virtually daily absences of several hours by the respondent from the matrimonial home and at times for period up to 70 to 80 days. Efforts of reconciliation had been a failure. The court held that the test which can be applied is whether a right-thinking man would come to the conclusion that the respondent had behaved in such a way that the petitioner could not reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. The court had to consider the whole circumstances and the characters as well as personalities of the parties. The court in this case granted the decree nisi to the petitioner and held that the marriage had in this matter, irretrievably broken down. In other words, it shows that the court must assess the impact and effect of the respondents conduct or behaviour on the petitioner on the light of their marriage and their relationship and also consider the petitioners behaviour.

11 12

1 All ER 587 3 MLJ 106

Similarly, in Hariram Jayaram v Saraswathy Rajahram (1990)13, the court has adopted the decision in Katz v Katz and Pheasant v Pheasant on the question of standard behaviour in section 54(1)(b) of the LRA. In applying to this situation, there are several circumstances in the fact that shows on the bad character on part of Sinniah where Rajah or any right-thinking person cannot reasonably be expected to live with her. Firstly in the middle of 2000, Sinniah had indulged in extra marital relations with Muniandy. Moreover, Sinniah had constantly absence from the matrimonial home had inflicted on the traumatic wound upon Rajahs mind until it reached a stage beyond endurance. To worsen the situation, in 2003 she again left the matrimonial home for 10 months. Further, she finally left from the matrimonial home. Here, the constant leaving on part of Sinniah has shown that she is no longer interested in continuing the marriage and Rajah or even any right-thinking person would come to the conclusion that Sinniah has behaved in such a way that Rajah cannot reasonably be expected to live with her. The fact also has shown that Sinniahs acts or behaviours of constantly absence from the home had inflicted a traumatic wound upon Rajahs mind until it reach a stage beyond endurance. Hence, the reasonable mans test applied. Therefore, Rajah may petition for divorce under section 54(1)(b) if he can proved that a right-thinking man in all the circumstances would conclude that his wife had behaved in such a way that he could not be reasonably expected to live with his wife after considering the whole circumstances and the characters as well as personalities of the parties. In conclusion, the best ground for divorce could be breakdown of marriage by virtue of section 54(1)(b) on the ground of behaviour since Sinniahs acts or behaviours of constantly absence from the home had inflicted a traumatic wound upon Rajahs mind until it reach a stage beyond endurance. Hence, the reasonable mans test applied. It is undeniable that there is a possibility on the allegation of adultery. However, Rajah was away for work, he may not know that his wife had committed adultery with another man, Muniandy and the allegation of adultery must be proved to the satisfaction of the court and beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, since Rajah was away, their children were asked to leave the flat while Muniandy and Sinniah were alone in the flat and no other witnesses it is hard to prove the adultery had been committed by Sinniah.
13

1 MLJ 114

Question (b) The issue is whether Rajah could get custody over his three children aged twelve, eleven and nine. According to Section 5(1) of Guardianship of Infants Act 1961, parents must be given equal rights of guardianship over their children. Section 11 of the same Act states court shall have regard primarily to the welfare of the infant. Section 88(1) of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) states that the court may at any time make an order of custody. It means that an application for custody could be made without a petition for divorce. Section 88(2) of the same Act states that in deciding custody of child, welfare of the child should be given paramount consideration. Apart from wishes of the parents of the child14, wishes of the child who of an age to express independent opinion also need to be considered15. In the case of Re Satpal Singh, An Infant16 which referred to English case, Re Thain17, the court held that welfare of the child as a whole must be considered. It is more than merely a question of whether or not the child would be happier in one place compared to another place but his general well-being. Welfare has been defined as physical as well as moral welfare in the case of Allen v Allen18. In the case of Goh Kim Hua v KhooSweeHuah (1986), the court recognised that there was immoral upbringing when the father brought mistress home. Even so, custody of son was granted to the father based on wishes of the son himself who wanted to stay with his father since he was in the age to express independent opinion. In Winnie Yong v William Lee Say Beng (1990), court had granted custody to the father even though he had brought mistress home because he contended that his wife refused to give divorce thus caused him to have mistress.

S 88 (2)(a) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 S 88 (2)(b) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 16 [1958] MLJ 283 17 [1926] Ch 676 18 [1951] All ER 724
15

14

Judgment of Laura Dorris a/p Laurence v Thuraisingam a/l James (1995) was in favour of the father when the mother was having free lifestyle and adopt adultery as a way of life. In the case of Wakeham v Wakeham19, the husband was granted a divorce on the ground of desertion by the wife and the father, an innocent party, had been given the custody of the children. Referring to the case beforehand, Rajah has 7 children where 4 of the children are living with him while the other 3 are living with the mother. As according Section 88(1) of LRA, Rajah can make application of custody even though there is no petition of divorce yet. Welfare of the children aged 12, 11 and 9 will be given paramount consideration by court in delivering judgement as according the case of Re Satpal Singh,20Section 11 of Guardianship of Infants Act as well as Section 88(2) of LRA. Physical and also mental well-being of the children plays an important factor in deciding custody as in the case of Allen v Allen21. In this case, Sinniah had constantly leaving the 3 children and the matrimonial home when she found the moment propitious. It can be assumed that Sinniah is an irresponsible mother since she was not reluctant to leave the children unattended at home. Besides, she is living in immoral lifestyle since it can be assumed that she had committed adultery when she brought Muniandy home while Rajah was at work and she also asked the children to leave the house. Furthermore, it was immoral upbringing since Sinniah had brought Muniandy home and the children knew about this since they were asked them to leave the house while they stayed there about an hour and so. This immoral upbringing had been acknowledged in the case of Goh Kim Hua v KhooSweeHuah (1986) since the father had brought mistress home. This will affect the upbringing of the children as they will be nurtured with bad moral values since there are all still young and not mature enough to differentiate good and bad things. In applying Allen v Allen22, it can be said that the moral welfare of the child is badly affected by Sinniahs behaviour. She should not give a bad example to her children since she is the mother who responsible to paint the childrens attitude. In giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the children as a whole, as according to Re Satpal Singh23, custody should be
19 20

[1954] 1 WLR 366 [1958] MLJ 283 21 [1951] All ER 724 22 ibid 23 [1958] MLJ 283

given to Rajah. In contrast with Winnie Yong v William Lee Say Beng (1990), there is nothing to justify the act of Sinniah to bring Muniandy home since Rajah is an innocent party as there is nowhere stated negative conduct on Rajahs part. To conclude, Rajah could get custody over his three children aged twelve, eleven and nine since according to Dorris a/p Laurence v Thuraisingam a/l James, the mother who makes adultery as a way of life and having a free lifestyle should not be granted custody. Sinniah can be said to commit adultery more than once because she is pregnant of Muniandys child. The assumption that she is pregnant of Muniandys child is made because she had carried out abortion as she might be afraid if one day Rajah could discover about her pregnancy. Rajah might get suspicious that Sinniah had had sexual intercourse with someone else since she had left the matrimonial home more than the age of her pregnancy. However, it must be noted, inter alia, the order of custody will depends on the wishes of the 3 children because they are of an age to express their own independent opinions.

Question (c) The first issue in this problem is whether Rajah has obligation to continue paying maintenance to Sinniah in the event that he failed in his claim for a divorce. Due to this situation, it can be inferred that the marriage is still subsisting and Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 will be applicable to his situation. According to the general rule, section 3(1) in this act states that the court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife if he neglects or refuses to do so. In the case of Raquiza v Raquiza (1947), Justice Brown stated that it is a common law a duty of the husband to maintain his wife and honest is upon him to prove that some good reasons for him not to perform his duty. Some illustrations for good reasons can be made are if the wife is living in adultery or refuses to live with the husband without any sufficient reason. It is strengthened by section 5(2) whereby no wife shall be entitled to receive any allowance from her husband if she is living in adultery or she refuses to live with her husband without any sufficient reason. In applying to the situation, the court may order Rajah to pay maintenance to his wife if he refuses to do so as under Section 3(1) mentioned above. However, the fact states that Sinniah had indulged in extra marital relations with Muniandy shows Sinniah had committed adultery and as the reason she refused to live with Rajah because of stress and strain of their relationship as a wife and a husband did not justified a sufficient reason to invoke section 5(2). In addition, it must be identified as to the act of adultery is sufficient with a single act or it must be done continuously. In Fries v Fries (1951), it was held that a single action of adultery is sufficient and the husband has right not to pay maintenance to his wife. On the contrary, in JalendraNath Mohan Banerjee v GauriBala Devi, it was held that it cannot be held from a single act of adultery unless there is continuity of conduct that the wife is living in adultery. Accordingly, in the Malaysias case of Raja Lakshmi, the court dismissed the wifes maintenance because of her act of adultery and left home without sufficient reason. Since the application of Section 5(2) would be a continuous act of adultery, it seems that when Sinniahs children often witnessed Muniandy used to visit their home and during those visits the children were asked to leave the flat while Muniandy and Sinniah stayed there or about an hour and so, there is a continuous act of adultery and Rajah can fulfill the element in section 5(2) that he can deny to pay maintenance to his wife.

On the other hand, if the court still orders Rajah to pay maintenance to his wife, Section 4 of the act24 should not be overlooked. It provides that if the husband willfully neglects to comply the order to pay maintenance to his wife, he can be fined or be sentenced to imprisonment. So, if Rajah failed to prove continuous act of adultery on part of Sinniah and the reason Sinniah refused to live with him is sufficient, Rajah can be punished accordingly. Yet, the court may order him to pay fine only instead of imprisonment based on the case of Yap KeeSwee v KuaTiang Lai whereby the court refused to send the husband to prison but have to pay fine only because they are still in marriage relationship. Therefore, since Rajah failed in his claim for divorce so that he and Sinniah still a husband and wife, what he can do is to rely on Section 5(2) if he refuses to continue paying maintenance to Sinniah. As the facts clearly showSinniahs act of adultery is continuous and she refused to live with Rajah without sufficient reason, Rajah has right not to continue paying maintenance to Sinniah. The other issue is whether Rajah is in obligation to continue paying maintenance to Sinniah in the event where there is a divorce between him and Sinniah. Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 will be applicable for this situation as there is a petition for divorce. Specifically, it will fall under section 77(1)(b) whereby the court may order a man to pay maintenance to his former wife subsequent to the grant of a decree of divorce. Furthermore, the assessment of maintenance will be in Section 78 whereby the husband is liable to pay maintenance of his ex-spouse according to the means and needs of the parties. In Koay Cheng Eng v Linda HerawatiSantoso25, the court took into account the standard of living of the parties, the duration of the marriage, whether they were any children of the marriage and so on. In this problem, since this couple has 7 children, the basic needs would be higher than other ordinary family. Plus, as they live in the flat, the court should consider Rajahs earning capabilities before determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by Rajah to Sinniah. It can be presumed that Rajah earned low income since they only afford to live in flat so the

24 25

Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950. [2004] 6 MLJ 395.

assessment amount of maintenance should be accordance to the means and need of Rajah and Sinniah. The second ambit of Section 78 is then about the effect of breakdown of marriage. It provides that if the other party to the marriage causes the breakdown of the marriage, the amount of maintenance would be affected. It is supported by the principle in the case of Lee Yu Lan v Lim ThainChye26where the court took into account the responsibility on the part of respondent husband or the breakdown of the marriage before arriving at an appropriate sum of maintenance. With regard to this situation, since it is obviously stated that Sinniahs act of adultery with Muniandy is the causes for breakdown of marriage, the amount of maintenance she could get will be lesser than the amount of maintenance she get before she committed adultery. In conclusion, Rajahs obligation to continue paying maintenance to Sinniah will not be ceased upon the petition of divorce between him and Sinniah but it only affected the amount of maintenance to Sinniah. It will become lesser because ofSinniah who causes the breakdown of marriage. If there is arrear of maintenance by Rajah due more than 3 years before the petition of divorce due to his doubtful of his obligation to continue pay maintenance to Sinniah, Sinniahcan only claim the amount due within 3 years before the divorce was granted by the court. It is clearly stated in section 86(3) of the act27.

26 27

[1984] 1 MLJ 56 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976

Question (d) Under the law, maintenance of the spouse and child are provided separately, the spouse under Part VII of the LRA and the child under Part VIII of the said Act. Besides, Section 3 of Married Woman Act states that court may make order for maintenance of wife and children in proportion to the means of such person, as to the court seems reasonable. It is a general duty of a parent to maintain the children as clearly stated under Section 92 of the LRA. Further, in Section 93, it is power of the court to order maintenance for benefit of child which supplementary explained in subsection (1)(a) until (d) that in situation where parent neglected child, desertion circumstances, during pendency of any matrimonial proceeding and at the time of making decision determining custody. Section 93(3) also highlighted that the court may order payment be made to the person having custody or care of the child. However, it must be noted that the maintenance of children also contained an expiration order as stated under Section 95. The provision indicated that the duty to maintain child shall expire upon two circumstances namely, on the attainment of 18 years old or the ceasing of childs physical and mental disability. This principle was illustrated in the case of Karunai Rajah a/l Rasiah v Punithambigai a/p Puniah (2004)2 CLJ 365. The petitioner and the respondent's marriage was dissolved in 1997. They had three children from the marriage. Pursuant to a consent order dated 30 January 1997, the respondent made monthly maintenance payments for all the three children (at RM 1,400 per child) until April 1998. In May 1998, the respondent indicated that he would cease payment for the eldest child, Anitha a/p Karunairajah, as she had attained the age of 18 years. The consent order, however, did not stipulate that the maintenance payments should cease upon the child attaining the age of 18 years. Thus, the petitioner sought an order from the court to compel the respondent to continue making maintenance payments to Anitha, and by necessary implication to the other two children until the completion of their tertiary education. The issue before the Court was whether the involuntary financial dependence of a child of the marriage for the purposes of pursuing and/or completing tertiary education in order to obtain a first degree came within the exception of physical disability under section 95 of the LRA so as to entitle the child to maintenance beyond the age of 18 years.

The Federal Court's decision in the present case has limited the interpretation given by the High Court and the Court of Appeal to the phrase "physical or mental disability" in section 95 of the LRA. It was held that the respective husband need not to continue pay the maintenance because the court follows strictly the intention of the Act. Whatever Act has decided, the Court will not go to interpret further. The word disability only invokes to physical and mental disability but not including financial difficulty. Therefore, the judgment was given on behalf of the respondent. Nevertheless, this case must be distinguished with the case of Ching Sing Woah v Lim Shook Lin [1997] 1 MLJ 109, where the father had took oath to his two daughters to pay the maintenance until they completing tertiary education in order to obtain a first degree. The court in this case held that eventhough the involuntary financial dependence of a child of the marriage for the purposes of pursuing and/or completing tertiary education in order to obtain a first degree does not came within the exception of physical disability under section 95 of the LRA so as to entitle the child to maintenance beyond the age of 18 years, but the father has moral obligation to fulfilled his promise made to his daughters. Therefore, the father must continue pay maintenance regardless the children have attained beyond the age of 18 years old. To apply in the situation before hand, the fact of the question is silent on whether the two sons are still pursuing their education. Besides, the fact also does not state whether Rajah had made any promise to them nor the sons were suffering any physical or mental disability. Therefore, based on the general rule in Section 95 and the case of Karunai Rajah, it can be assumed that Rajahs duty to maintain the two sons shall expire since the sons already attained the age of 19 and 20 years old respectively.

Question (e) The issue is whether Rajah can claim a share in the matrimonial house since it was a wedding gift from Sinniahs mother. Section 76(1) of Law reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 stated that the court shall have power, when granting a decree of divorce or judicial separation to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them during the marriage either by their joint efforts or the sale of any such assets and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale. Section 76(2) (a)-(c) stated that the court may order for the division of the property based on the extent of the contributions made by each party, debts owing by either party which were contracted for their joint benefit, and the needs of the minor children. Section 76(3) and section 76(4) are on the sole effort where if the asset is acquired by the sole effort of one party, the party by whose effort the assets were acquired shall receive a greater proportion. The court will look into the extent of contribution by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or caring for the family. In Lee Yu Lan v Lim Thian Chye (1984)28 the principle of the case is if the asset is acquired by the sole effort of one party, the party by whose effort the assets were acquired shall receive a greater proportion. The court will look into the extent of contribution by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or caring for the family. In this case, the wife had claimed that she had contributed to the matrimonial home by caring and rearing the children at home and other general duties attended by her as a housewife. The house was worth RM 191,000 and the court granted the wife RM 60,000 which was one third of the proceeds of sale. In Lim Bee Cheng v Christopher Lee Joo Peng (1996), the court held that if the property obtained by sole effort of respondent, it is mandatory that it should be given a greater proportion of it to him. This is because section 76(4) mention that in any case, the party by whose effort the asset is acquires shall receive a greater proportion.

28

1 MLJ 56

Further, in Ching Seng Woah v Lim Shook Lin (1997)29 the husband together with his mother bought property and later his mother transfer all her share to her son and this has made him as sole owner of the house. His wife looks after the house and bought furniture. Here, Justice Shankar stated that house was not a home without furniture therefore the wife was given half of the undivided share from the house. In applying to this situation, since the matrimonial house was a wedding gift from Sinniahs mother this is the property of Sinniah. Here, Rajah had made necessary extension on the house after their marriage. By virtue of section 76(4)(a), Rajah may claim for the house even though it was a wedding gift from Sinniahs mother because he had made a necessary extension on the house after their marriage. In an ordinary event, the extension of a house will increase the value of the house itself. Hence, in this situation it can be presumed that the extension of the house will give rise to the value of the house and the court may order for share of the matrimonial house to Rajah based on his contribution to the extension of the house that had raised the value of the house. This can be clearly seen in the case of Shirley Khoo v Kenneth Mok Kong Chua (1989) where the wife in this case had cared for the house so well and caused the value of the house from RM 29,000 appreciated to RM 175,000. Therefore, the court granted her one third of RM 175,000. Moreover, the fact that Rajah only earns RM 800 every month and has the obligation to maintain the children are another reason for the court to consider in order to grant share in the matrimonial house to Rajah by virtue of section 76(4)(b). In conclusion, Rajah may get a share in the matrimonial house by virtue of section 76(4) and the case of Lee Yu Lan and Shirley Khoo.

29

1 MLJ 125