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A VOLUME IN THE ROUTLEDGE PHYSICAL

ENVIRONMENT SERIES
Edited by Keith Richards
UniDcysity of Cmnbridge
The Routledge Physical Environment Series presents autboritative reviews
of signiticant issues in pbysical geography and the emironmental sciences.
Tbe series aims to become a complete text library, covering a range of
themes in pbysical geography and environmental science, including specitic
processes and environments, environmental cbange on a variety of scales,
policy and management issues, as well as developments in methodology,
techniques and pbilosophy.
Other titles in the series:
WATER RESOURCES IN THE ARID REALM
E. Anderson and C. Agnew
ICE AGE EARTH: LATE QUATERNARY GEOLOGY AND
CLIMATE
A. Dawson
MOUNTAIN WEATHER AND CLIMATE, 2ND EDITION
R.e. Barry
Forthcoming:
THE GEOMORPHOLOGY OF DESERT DUNES
N. Ltmcaster
GLACIATED LANDSCAPES
M. Sharp
HUMID TROPICAL ENVIRONMENTS AND LANDSCAPES
R. Walsh
SOILS AND ENVIRONMENT
S. E!lis and A. Mellor
PROCESS, ENVIRONMENT AND LANDFORMS: APPROACHES
TO GEOMORPHOLOGY
K. Richards
ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS
Assessing risk and reducing disaster
Keith Smith
I ~
London and N ew York
UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA
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A VOLUME IN THE ROUTLEDGE PHYSICAL
ENVIRONMENT SERIES
Edited by Keith Richards
Uni'venit)' o/ Cambridge
The Routledge Physical Environment Series presents authoritative reviews
of significant issues in physical geography and the environmental sciences.
The series aims to bccome a complete ten librar)', covering a range of
themes in physical geography and environmental science, including specific
processes and environments, environmental change on a variety of scales,
policy and management issues, as well as developments in methodology,
techniques and philosophy.
Otha Litles in the series:
WATER RESOURCES IN THE ARID REALM
E. Anderson and C. Agnew
ICE AGE EARTH: LATE QUATERNARY CEOLOGY AND
CLIMATE
A. Dawson
MOUNTAIN WEATHER AND CLIMATE, 2ND EDITION
R.e. Ban)'
Forthcoming:
THE GEOMORPHOLOGY OF DESERT DUNES
N. Lancaster
GLACIATED LANDSCAPES
M. Sharp
HUMID TROPICAL ENVIRONMENTS AND LANDSCAPES
R. Walsh
SOILS AND ENVIRONMENT
S. Ellis and A. Mellor
PROCESS, ENVIRONMENT AND LANDFORMS: APPROACHES
TO GEOMORPHOLOGY
K. Richards
ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS
Assessing risk and reducing disaster
Keith Smith

London and N ew York
UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA
BIBLIOTECA
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1
HAZARD IN THE
ENVIRONMENT
11
'1
AWARENESS OF HAZARD
So-called 'natural hazards' have always been a pan oE human history. But,
in the modern world, there is an increasing paradox between the outstand
achievements in science and medicine, which make life safer and
healthier, and the continuing death and destruction associated with the
extremes of nature. The paradox is complicated by the fact that science
itself is not without hazard and has led to the comparatively recent emerg
enee of 'man-made' threats which arise from the misapplication and failure
of technology. People are now at risk not only from geophysical events,
as earthquakes and floods, but also from industrial explosions, 1
of toxic substances and major transpon accidents. A growing 1,
11
awareness of hazard is funher encouraged because al! disasters make news.
The graphic results of hazards, both natural and man-made, feature repeat
1
1I
1
11
1
on television screens throughout the world and seem to make ever
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more frequent headlines. 11
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What, then, is the reality? Is the world becoming a more dangerous
place? Why do we scem unable to use the available scientific knowledge
11
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1
to reduce hazards? Is the frequency and/or magnitude of natural hazard
II!
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increasing? What is the added risk from the newer technological hazards?
11
1
, 1 Is human society becoming somehow more vulnerable to the same inci '
dence of hazard? On the other hand, with the progressive improvement
11,
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in global communications, is it simply that disasters are reponed more ,1,
efficientiy than before and, to that extent, are largely a media invention? 1
1
'
More subtly, perhaps the concern for hazards is confined to the wealthy,
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1
developed nations who have eliminated so many threats, such as bubonic
1
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11 11
lems? In any case, how can we define an acceptable level of risk and how
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plague or tuberculosis, that they now worry about less immediate prob
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does this vary between different communities across the globe? Is it
11 :
realistic ro look forward to a world from which environmental hazard has 1
been eliminated?
11
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1
At the present time, we lack definitive answers ro most of these
1
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1,
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1 1
THE NATURE OF HAZARD HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
quesrions. This is partIy because scienrific inreresr in environmental haz
ards is of fairly recenr origino Exrreme natural events have attracred atten
rion for hundreds of years. Attemprs to defend individual buildings againsr
earthquakes dare back ar leasr 2,000 years. Bur sysrematic, policy-orienred
research into hazard assessmenr, and hazard reducrion, really began wirh
rhe work of Gilbert Whire (1936; 1945), who was rhe firsr to recognise
rhar engineering schemes were nor rhe only way to rackle flood problems
in rhe USA. He and his colleagues conrinued to research alternarive srrar
egies for flood hazards unril, in 1967, a collaborarive programme of invesri
garion was mounred ar rhe Universiry of Chicago (larer rransferred to rhe
Universi ry of Colorado), Clark Universiry and rhe Universi ry of Toronro
to apply rhe findings to orher geophysical hazards and to settings orher
rhan North America. Ar about rhe same time, hazard-relared research was
becoming esrablished in a wide variery of academic disciplines ranging
from geology to sociology.
The pace quickened in rhe 1970s for several reasons. FirstIy, exrreme
natural evenrs suddenly became more prominent. In large parr rhis was
due to rhe climaric flucruarions of rhar decade which produced rhe Sahelian
droughr, rhe failure of rhe Peruvian anchovy harvesr, rhe 1975-6 droughr
in north-wesr 'Europe and rhe severe Norrh American winrers of 1976-7
and 1977-8. These evenrs exposed rhe vulnerabiliry of many counrries,
including advanced narions, to climaric variabiliry. Ar rhe same rime,
neocarasrrophism became fashionable amongsr physical geographers. This
concepr was firsr inrroduced by palaeontologisrs concerned wirh rhe rapid
exrincrion of life forms and was rhen adopred by rhose geomorphologisrs
anxious to acknowledge rhe significance of large, rare evenrs in moulding
rhe landscape. Secondly, many physical geographers saw a need to make
rheir work more relevanr to human affairs, and natural hazards became a
srrong focus for rhe srudy of rhe relarionships berween narure and sociery.
This approach was greatIy facilirared by rhe view of hazards as occurring
ar rhe inrerface berween rhe natural processes of rhe environmenr and
people seeking a living rhrough rheir use of rhe earth and irs narural
resources. Thirdly, rhere was a growing belief rhar sorne of rhe apparenr
inabiliry to cope wirh hazards lay in differences berween rhe 'real' world
and how ir was viewed in pracrice by managers and decision-makers. In
turn, rhis gave momentum ro rhe research on environmental hazard percep
rion already begun by sorne human geographers.
Thus, rhe 1970s saw rhe publicarion of several importanr books,
especially by rhe North American research school inspired by Whire
(Whire, 1974; Whire and Haas, 1975; Burton et al., 1978). These works
represenr a plareau of achievemenr which, in rhe 1980s, was modified by
rhree major changes in perspecrive. Firstly, more emphasis was given to
rhe relarionships berween natural hazards and economic underdevelopment
in rhe Third World, in particular rhe exrenr to which economic dependency
4
exacerbares rhe effecrs of geophysical events. Secondly, following impor
ranr signals of rechnological hazard in rhe 1970s - such as rhe Flixborough
(UK) explosion in 1974, rhe release of dioxin ar Seveso (Italy) in 1976 and
rhe nuclear incident ar Three Mile Island (USA) in 1979 - so-called 'man
made' hazards began to receive more arrenrion. The year 1984 was a clear
rurning poinr wirh several major indusrrial accidents, including rhe release
of merhyl isocyanare ar Bhopal (India), which alone claimed well over
2,000 immediare dearhs. Thirdly, rhe multidisciplinary narure of hazard
research has widened to rhe poinr where earlier disrincrions berween
'narural' and 'man-made' hazards are ever more difficulr to susrain.
In rhe lare rwentierh century, awareness of environmental hazard has
never been grearer. The idea of a cooperarive international programme to
reduce rhe losses from natural hazards was firsr proposed by Dr Frank
Press, president of rhe US N arional Academy of Sciences, in 1984 (Hous
ner, 1987). Following several years of prepararion, rhe Unired Narions
General Assembly in December 1989 finally adopred Resolution 44/236
proclaiming rhe 1990s as rhe Inrernarional Decade for N arural Disasrer
Reducrion (IDNDR). The objecrive of rhe Decade, as srared in rhe annexe
to Resolurion 44/236, is:
to reduce rhrough concerted internarional acrion, especially in
developing countries, rhe loss of life, property damage, and social and
economic disruprion caused by natural disasrers, such as earthquakes,
windstorms, rsunamis, floods, landslides, volcanic eruprions, wild
fires, grasshopper and locusr infesrarions, droughr and deserrificarion
and orher calamiries of narural origino
Ar rhe inrernarional level, rhe arrangemenrs involve a Special High Level
Council, a Scienrific and Technical Commirree and a Secrerariar for rhe
IDNDR. This framework relies heavily on measures to be raken ar narional
level and all governments are called upon to formulare narional disasrer
mitigarion programmes. Today, rherefore, rhe srudy of hazards is very
relevanr ro public policy in many countries. Ar rhe same rime, ir is equally
difficult to forecasr rhe degree of success rhar rhe Decade will have achieved
in reducing hazards worldwide by rhe year 2000. This is because rhe
IDNDR is a conrinuously evolving programme rhar reflecrs rhe rensions
and conflicrs rhar will always surround rhe assessment of risk and rhe
reduction of hazard in rhe environment.
HAZARO ANO RI5K
Hazard is an ever-presenr, inescapable part of life. Each day we all face
Sorne degree of personal risk, wherher ir be to life and limb in a road
accidenr, to our possessions from rhefr or carelessness or to our immediare
surroundings from noise or orher rypes of pollurion. No one can live in
5
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THE NATURE OF HAZARD
a tatally risk-free cnvironment and a concern for risk can be traccd back
to the earliest recorded times (Covello and Mumpower, 1985). Moreover,
it is expectcd that public concern about risk will cominue to increase in
the future despite the fact that most people are enjoying longer, healthier
livcs.
Risk is sometimes taken as synonymous with hazard but risk has the
additional implication of the chance of a particular hazard actually occur
ringo Thus, we may define hazard as 'a potemial threat ro humans and
their welfare' and risk as 'thc probability of hazard occurrence'. The
distinction was neatly illustrated by Okrent (1980), who considered two
people crossing an ocean, one in a liner and the other in a rowing boato
The hazard (death by drowning) is the same in both cases but the risk
(probability of drowning) is very different. If the drowning actually
occurred, it could be called a disaster. So a disaster may be seen as 'the
realisation of hazard'.
Clearly, hazard, risk and disaster operate on varying scales. In terms of
decreasing hazard severity, we can recognisc the following threats:
1 hazards to people - dearh, injury, disease, stress
2 hazards to goods - property damage, economic loss
3 hazards to environment - loss of flora and fauna, pollution, loss of
amenity.
Just as hazard can bc ranked, so the probability of an event can be placed
on a theoretical scale from zero to ccrtainty (O to 1). The relationship
between a hazard and its probability can then be used to determine the
overall degree of risk, as shown in Fig. 1.1. Whilst damage to goods and
thc environment can be extremely costly in economic and social terms, it
is normally accepted that a direct threat to life is the most serious hazard
faced by humans.
Given this framework, what is the risk from environmental hazard in a
typical developed coumry (DC)? Taking the UK as an example, Grist (1978)
has shown that about 640,000 deaths occur each year from all causes in the
total population of sorne 54 million. This yields a figure of 1.2 x 10-
2
as
the individual risk of death per year averaged over the population. Table
1.1 shows that thc risk is strongly age-dependent. Ir is high during the first
four years of life, drops markedly for the 5 to 9 age group and then rises
steadily so that, at age 70, individuals are exposed to a risk approximately
ten times that of the youngest children. This pattern reflects the imponance
of degenerative diseases in the Western world. About 90 per cent of al1
deaths are due to familiar medical disorders (heart di sease, cancers, rcspirat
ory ailments). Accidental death constitutcs less than 3 per cent of the overal1
risk and is mostly attributable to common events, such as road accidents.
Therefore, the high media profile for rapid-onset environmental disasters
is not matched by the actualloss of life in the DCs.
6

Hazard
-
low
--
high
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N
I
environment
::;:::==
goods
:::>'
life

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c:
Cl3
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Figure 1.1 Theoretica1 relarionships between the severity of environmenral hazard,
probability and risk. Hazards to human life are rated more highly rhan damage to
economic goods or the environment.
Source: After Moore (1983)
rabIe 1.1 Individual risk of dearh (aH causes) according ro age
for the UK
Age group
Individual risk per year
(x 10 3)
0-4
3.3
5-9
0.3
10-14
0.3
15-19
0.6
20-24
0.7
25-34
0.8
35-44
1.8
45-54
5.8
55-64
14.8
65-74
36.7
75-84
87.7
85 plus
205.2
Source: After Grist (1978)
7
THE NATURE OF HAZARD
Table 1.2 Majar disasters that hit the headlines in the USA
(Magnitude refers to deaths per event)
Event type Time period Magnitude
lv!aximum Average
FrequenC)'
(events/year)
Air crashes 1965-1969 155 78 6.00
Earthquakes 1920-1970
Explosions 1950-1968
Majar fires 1960-1968
Flaads (tidal 1887-1969
waves)
Hurricanes 1888-1969
Major rai1 1950-1966
crashes
180,000
100
322
900,000
11,000
79
25,000
26
35
28,000
1,105
30
0.50
2.00
0.67
0.54
0.41
1.00
Majar marine 1965-1969
accidents
-
300 61 6.00
Source: After Starr (1979)
The main reason is that, although major disasters may be important
incidents for group deaths, they occur relatively infrequent1y. Table 1.2,
abridged from Starr (1979), details sorne natural and man-made disasters
which made headlines in the United States press. Ir can be seen that the
event frequency (last column based on differing runs of years) is low. On
the other hand, the fatal consequences, especially for certain natural haz
ards events, can be very high. An inventory compiled for involuntary (i.e.
accidental) risks by Dinman (1980) and presented in Table 1.3 shows that
the threat in the USA from sorne natural hazards (flood, earthquake,
tornado) is likely ro be larger than that associated with sorne man-made
and technological accidents (releases from an aromic power station).
Although environmental hazards are not an everyday cause of death or
damage, it is their potential for unexpected catastrophic loss which not
only ensures that they make news but also gives them their distinctive
character.
WHAT ARE ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS?
The definition of environmental hazards is difficult. Most previous atten
tion has been given ro natural hazards, defined by Burton and Kates
(1964a) as 'those elements of the physical environment harmful ro Man
and caused by forces extraneous ro him'. Traditionally, natural hazards
have also been seen as 'Acts of God'. This perspective has not been helpful
because it suggests that humans have no pan ro play in creating these
hazards and have even less hope of mitigating them. However, with chang
ing ideas of cause and effect, the concept of hazard has also changed. As
human influence - both deliberate and inadvertent - has spread over the
8
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
Table 1.3 Risk of death from involuntary hazards
Involuntary risk
Risk 01 death/person/year
Struck by automobile (USA) 1 in 20,000
Struck by automobile (UK) 1 in 16,600
Floods (USA) 1 in 455,000
Earthquake (California) 1 in 588,000
Tornadoes (Midwest) 1 in 455,000
Lightning (UK) 1 in 10 mil1ion
Fal1ing aircraft (USA) 1 in 10 mil1ion
Fal1ing aircraft (UK) 1 in 50 million
Explosion, pressure vessel (USA) 1 in 20 mil1ion
Release fram atomic power station
At site baundary (USA) 1 in 10 mil1ion
At 1 km (UK) 1 in 10 million
Flooding of dike (Netherlands) 1 in 10 mil1ion
Bites of venomous creatures (UK) 1 in 5 mil1ion
Leukaemia 1 in 12,500
Influenza 1 in 5,000
Meteorite 1 in 100 billion
Source: After Dinman (1980)
globe, it has become progressively more difficult (and point1ess) to attempt
a rigid distinction between Acts of God and Acts of Man. For example,
flood problems may be exacerbated both by natural fluctuations in climate
and by human activities such as land drainage, river channelisation and
deforestation. Equally, most hazards have both natural and technological
components. The impact of a tropical cyclone can be great1y reduced by
means of a warning message derived from moniroring by satellites and
weather radar. The impact of a nuclear accident will be heavily influenced
by the prevailing weather conditions controlling the downwind path and
the rate of fallout from the radioactive plumeo
Natural hazards are best seen in an ecological framework (Fig. 1.2). This
distinguishes between natural events and their interpretation as natural
hazards (or resources). Since the Earth is a highly dynamic planet, most
natural events show a wide range of variation through time in the use of
energy and materials for environmental processes. The outer limits of this
behaviour we call extremes and cenain statistical measures, notably magni
tude-frequency relationships, are used to describe such extremes. But
extreme natural events are not considered hazards unless they cause death
?r damage ro humans. Asevere earthquake in a remote, unpopulated region
IS an extreme natural event, of interest to seismologists, and no more.
Natural hazards, therefore, result from the conflict of geophysical pro
cesses with people and they lie at the interface between what has been
called the natural events system and the human use system. This interpret
ation of natural hazards gives humans a central role. First1y, through
9
THE NATURE Of HAZARD
lesources
I
Hazards
resources Response I
Natural events
system
II


Human use
I
system
t
Figure 1.2 Environmental hazards exist at the interface between the natural events and
human use systems. Human responses to hazards can modify both the natural events
in, and the human use of, the environment.
Source: After Burton, Kates and White (1978)
location, because it is only when people and their possessions get in the
way of natural processes that hazards existo Secondly, through perception,
because humans place value judgements on natural processes as pan of a
general environmental appraisal whenever they settle and use land. In other
words, hazardous events merely represent the extremes of a distribution of
processes that, in a slightly different context, would often be regarded as
a resource (Kates, 1971).
This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1.3 (Hewitt and Bunon, 1971). The
shaded zone represents an acceptable range of variation for the magnitude
of the physical variable which is bounded by upper and lower damage
thresholds. The physical variable can be any environmental element rele
vant ro human survival, such as rainfal!. Most social and economic activities
are geared to sorne expectation of the 'average' conditions. As long as the
variation of the environmental element remains fairly close ro this expected
performance, insignificant damage occurs and the element will be perceived
as beneficia!. However, when the variability exceeds sorne threshold
beyond the normal band of tolerance, the same variable starts to impose
a stress on society and becomes a hazard. Thus, very high or very low
rainfall will be deemed ro create a flood or drought respectively. The
exceedance of a damage threshold immediately enables two basic dimen
sions of a hazard ro be identified. First1y, the hazard intensity is determined
by the peak deviation beyond the threshold on the vertical scale. Secondly,
10
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
.... Upper extreme
e Hazards

Q)
Resources
tQ
..-.?SmswIr..'
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o
OamagethreshoICiJ .
>
Lower extreme

Hazards
a.
Time
Average
Band of tolerance
Figure 1.3 Sensitivity to environmental hazard expressed as a function of the
variability of geophysical elements and the degree of socio-economic tolerance.
Within the band of tolerance, events are perceived as resources; beyond the damage
thresholds they are perceived as hazards.
Source: Modified from Hewitt and Burton (1971)
the hazard duration is determined by the length of time the threshold is
exceeded on the horizontal scale.
In practice, there is only a fine line between resources and hazards, e.g.
between water Out of control (flood hazard) and water under control
(reservoir resource). Snow is a resource if it falls on the ski slopes but is
a hazard if it falls a few hundred metres away on the access roads. The
atmosphere is considered 'benign' when it produces holiday sunshine but
'hostile' when it produces damaging storms. In reality, the environment
is neither benign nor hostile. Ir is 'neutral' and it is only human location,
actions and perception which identify resources and hazards within the
range of natural events (Burton et al., 1978). Thus, human sensitivity to
environmental hazards represents a combination of:
1 physical exposure - reflecting the range of natural and technological
events and their statistical variability at a particular location, and
2 human vulnerability - reflecting the breadth of social and economic
tolerance available at the same site.
Ir follo
ws
that the risk from a specific hazard may vary through time
according to changes in either (or both) physical exposure or human
vulnerability. Sorne possibilities which give rise to increased risk are shown
schematically in Fig. 1.4. Case A represents a constant band of tolerance
Constant variability but a decline in the mean value (perhaps a decrease
1ll temperature). Case B represenrs a constanr band of tolerance and con
mean but an increased variability (perhaps a trend ro greater fluctu
atlOns in annual rainfall). Final1y, in case C the physical variable does not
11
8
A
e
- ~
Figure 1.4 A schematic illustration of changes in human sensitivity to environmental
hazard due to variations in physical events and socio-economic tolerance. In each case
the risk of disaster increases through time.
Source: After de Vries (1985)
change but the social band of tolerance narrows (perhaps because popu
lation growth places more people at risk).
Human populations are most vulnerable on the margins of tolerance
where small physical changes may create large socio-economic impacts.
However, the threshold may well be a narrow transition zone rather than a
sharp boundary and it is most unlikely that the relationships between event
intensity and hazard impact will be linear once the damage threshold has
been crossed. Over a long period of time, frequent but unpredictable low
level variability around a very critical threshold may well be more significant
than the occurrence of either isolated, or more predictable, extremes. For
example, weather thresholds of economic and social significance can occur
in the middle of a range of variation. Thus, QOC is a critical threshold because
of the freezing of water at that temperature. In turn, ice on highways is most
slippery around QOC when the skid resistance may be lowered by a layer of
lubricating water, and more road accident deaths are likely to occur in this
marginal situation than in much lower temperatures. But, in most mid
latitude winters, such a value could hardly be described as extreme.
The tendency towards admitting more human responsibility for 'natural'
hazard is due to several factors. One factor has been the increased attention
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
given to all forms of environmental pollution which was described as a
'quasi-natural' hazard by Burton and Kates (1964a). Another factor has been
the radical reinterpretation of natural hazard in the Third World, which is
explored more fully in Chapter 2. Most important of all, it is recognised that
technological hazards constitute a new kind of threat. Early concern was
associated with the nuclear and space programmes in the developed world
but the risks now extend to less developed countries (LDCs) as technology
transfer grows. Ir is conventional to see this threat as originating in sorne
failure of technology, often associated with an element of 'human error'.
Miller and Fowlkes (1984) have challenged this view, arguing that the term
'technological disaster' renders such events impersonal in origin in a way
analogous to the now out-dated concept of 'natural disaster'. They believe
that such 'accidents' are due mainly to an excessive priority with industrial
profits and advocate the term 'man-made disaster'.
The term 'environmental hazard' has the advantage of including both
natural and human dimensions. It also implies a spectrum of hazard types,
as indicated in Fig. 1.5. This shows that hazard origins range from largely
Natural
Manmade
Involuntary
earthquake
Intense
tsunami
cyclone
volcanic eruption
tornado
avalanche
flood
drought
bushlire
transport accidents
industrial explosions
water pollution
radioactive lallout
civil riot
lood additives
smoking
Voluntary I mountaineering I
12 13
I
I
I1
,
,
THE NATURE OF HAZARD
natural to largely man-made. Sorne attempt can also be made to scale the
range of hazards according to whether the impacts are intense and local,
or diffuse and widespread within society. The extent to which hazards are
voluntary or involuntary is very important. The voluntary nature of
hazard, expressed in terms of the degree of individual human responsi
bility, increases greatly from the essentially accidental, geophysical hazards
(earthquake, tsunami) to the largely self-induced social hazards (smoking,
mountaineering).
The great breadth of possible hazard identification has led to sorne
impossibly wide definitions of environmental hazard, e.g. 'the threat poten
tial posed to man or nature by events originating in, or transmitted by,
the natural or built environment' (Kates, 1978). This definition can include
both long-term environmental deterioration (acidification of soils, build
up of atmospheric carbon dioxide) and all the social hazards, both involun
tary and communal (crime, terrorism) as well as voluntary and personal
hazards (drug abuse, mountain climbing). Table 1.4 provides a checklist
of the many potentially hazardous environmental agencies or processes
which may affect society. These hazards have such different origins and
impacts that a more focused and manageable definition is required.
In this book, environmental hazard will be mainly restricted to events !
which directly threaten human life by means of acute physical or chemical 1,
trauma. As indicated by Sagan (1984), the deaths and injuries associated!
with acute trauma are treated primarily as safety issues. This means that
they produce quite different responses from human illnesses resulting from
chronic low-dose exposures to toxins, which are treated as health issues.
Acute bodily trauma, plus any related damage to property or the environ
ment, usually follows the sudden release of energy or materials in concen- I
trations which are greatly in excess of normal background levels. Such
releases may come from a natural source, like a volcano, or from a man
made source, such as a chemical factory.
Any manageable definition of environmental hazards will be both arbi
trary and contentious. But, despite their diverse sources, most acute trauma 'i
hazards have a number of common features:
1 The origin of the damaging event is clear and produces characteristic
effects, e.g. a flood causes death by drowning.
2 The warning time is normally short, i.e. the hazards are often known',
as rapid-onset events, although drought is an important exception.
3 Most of the losses, whether to life or property, are suffered very shortly
after the evento
4 The risk of exposure is largely involuntary, normally due to the location
of people in a hazardous area.
5 The resulting disaster occurs with an intensity and scale that justifies an
emergency response.
14
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
Table 1.4 Potentially hazardous environmental agencies or processes
Atmospheric
Single element Compound hazards
Rain
Rain and wind storms
Freezing rain ('glaze') 'Glaze' storms
Hail
Thunderstorms
Snow
Tornadic storms and tornadoes
Wind
Hurricanes
Lightning Blizzards
Temperature: 'heat wave', 'Whiteout'
'cold spell', frost
Fog
Drought
Hydrologic
Flooding: Riverine (rain, snowmelt, natural dam-burst floods)
Lake and sea-shore wave action
Waterlogging
Sea-ice and icebergs
Runoff drought
Glacier advance
Geologic
Mass-movemems: landslides, avalanches, mudflows, subsidence, etc.
Erosion (foundations, soils, etc.)
Silting (dikes, rivers, harbours, farmland)
Earthquakes
Volcanic eruptions
Shifting sands
Biologic
Severe epidemics in humans
Severe epidemics in plams
Severe epidemics in domestic and wild animals
Animal and plant invasions (e.g. locusts)
Forest and grassland fires
Technologie
Transpon accidents
Industrial explosions and fires
Accidental releases of toxic gas
N ~ c l e a r power plam failures
Fallures of public buildings or other structures
Genn or nuclear warfare
Source: Modified after Hewitt and Burton (1971)
!he approach adopted here is not meant to imply that other environmental
problems, which are influenced by human activity and are sometimes
15
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
THE NATURE Of HAZARD
regarded as hazards, such as deforestation, desertification, depletion of the
stratospheric ozone layer and rising sea levels resulting from the green
house effect, are unimportant. But these are comparatively long-term
issues, sometimes of obscure origin and consequence. Environmental pol
lution rarely poses an immediate threat to human life on a catastrophic
scale. Smets (1987) c1aimed that, apart from three industrial disasters
involving the concentrated release of very toxic substances (mercury at
Minamata, ]apan, in 1956; methyl isocyanate at Bhopal, India, in 1984
and radioactive material at Chernobyl, USSR, n 1986) no nstance of
accidental pol1ution had so far direet/y caused more than 50 deaths any
where in the world.
From this broad distinction between environmental hazards and environ
mental problems, it is possble to derive the fol1owing working definiton
of environmental hazards:
extreme geophysical events and major technological accidents, charac
terised by concentrated releases of energy or materals, whch pose
an unexpected threat to human life and can cause significant damage
to goods and the environment.
Sorne links between rapid onset and longer-term threats cannot be denied.
For example, earthquakes and landsldes are preceded by the slow buld
up of stress in rocks and ground surface materials. Equally, sorne of the
longer-term trends towards envronmental deterioration will exacerbate
the damage potential of sorne existing hazards. Thus, it is predicted that
global warming during the next few decades, driven by radiatively active
gases in the atmosphere, will raise sea surface temperatures. In turn, this
'greenhouse effect' may increase the disaster threat from tropical cyc1ones.
According to Emanuel (1987), the enhanced sea surface temperatures
associated with a doubling of the present atmospheric concentrations of
COz could raise the maximum destructive potental of these storms by as
much as 60 per cent in sorne parts of the world. Rising sea levels, also
associated with global warming, wil1 increase the catastrophe potential for
storm surge in low-lying coastal communities. Desertification and unwise
land use contribute already to the impact of drought. In addition, the
effects of environmental hazards in the LDCs are often greatly com
pounded by prolonged economic and social difficulties.
It must also be admitted that certain disasters are so complex in origin,
and compound in their effects, that they defy categorisation. For instance,
the famine of 1979-81 in the Karamoja region of U ganda was widely
attributed to drought. Yet the semi-nomads of this area have survived
periodic droughts in the past rather well through a variety of traditional
adjustments. In this incident a failure of the rains was greatly complicated
by the collapse of the Ugandan economy, including the destruction of the
rural marketing and distribution network, civil strfe, which was magnified
16
by the unusual availability of automatic weapons, and a major outbreak
of cholera.
Sorne choices in this book were arbitrary. Thus, hail and frost hazards
are inc1uded, although they rarely create major loss of life, largely because
of the substantial economic damages which resulto In this context it should
be remembered that drought, which appears such a self-evident environ
mental hazard, is not a life-threatening event in the developed world. In
view of the balance of previous work, and the availability of lterature,
the emphasis will be on the impact of geophysical events and their manage
ment. Those readers wishing a definitive treatment of the physcal aspects
of such events, which draws heavily on theoretical mechanics and prob
ability, are referred to Scheidegger (1975).
A TYPOLOGY OF HAZARD AND DISASTER
Most previous c1assifications of hazard have been dominated by geophysi
cal processes. It has also been usual to identify the impact of single
elements, such as windspeed or rainfall, because this is relatively easy to
do. In practice, most severe hazards arise from compound or synergistic
effects, as when wind combines with snow to produce a blizzard or
earthquakes set off landslides in steep terrain. The volcanic eruption of
Mount St Helens, USA, in 1980 led to earthquakes, ashfalls, landslides,
floods and wildfires. Alternatively, natural hazards can be divided into
those of endogenous origin (such as earthquakes and volcanic hazards),
those of exogenous origin (such as floods, droughts and avalanches) and
those of largely amhropogenous origin (such as floods caused by dam
failure). Such classifications have advantages for the traditional organisation
of scientific research but they are less useful for hazard studies.
Hazards can be grouped according to many other characteristics. For
example, Hewitt and Burton (1971) considered a variety of factors relating
to damaging geophysical events which were not process-specific including:
1 areal extent of damage zone
2 intensity of impact at a point
3 duration of impact at a point
4 rate of onset of the event
5 predictablity of the evento
Although such c1assifications depend on rather poorly defined criteria,
they have potentially more to offer than the causally-based c1assifications
fo
r
modelling human response and organising hazard management.
More recently, Hohenemser et al., (1983) have viewed technological
hazards as a sequence of events leading from human needs and wants to
the selection of a particular technology through to harmful consequences.
This chain of technological hazard evolution can be employed more
17
THE NATURE Of HAZARD
INITIAT
...OtcEOF
fiNGe; TECH

CROP
RAIN FEO 15.>.
I
\'" FAllURE GRAIN
AGRJe
-::-BlOCK.:. r.:': "BLOCK
.:,' .............-..- ... .
EMER
FOREIGN GOVERN GENCY BUllO INSTAlL CHANGE fOCO MENT MEDICAL UP IRRIG
LIF' A1D ACIION A1D IRESERVES
ATlON STYlE
I 'in...
Figure 1.6 Schematic illustration of the causal chain of hazard development. The stages
are expressed generical1y at the top of each box and in terms of a sample drought
disaster in the lower segmento Six potential control phases, designed to reduce disaster,
are linked to pathways between hazard stages by vertical arrows.
Source: Modif1ed from Hohenemser, Kates and Slovic (1983)
widely, as il1ustrated for drought in Fig. 1.6. The top line indicates seven
stages of hazard development. The stages are identified generically at the
top of each box and in terms of a sample development of hazard in the
bottom. The stages are linked by causal pathways denoted by triangles.
Six control stages are linked to pathways between hazard states by vertical
arrows. Each is described generically as well as by specific control actions
designed to eliminate or reduce the evolving hazard.
Concentrated releases of energy or materials are likely to have complex
consequences for both environmental and human systems. Rarely does a '
straightforward cause and effect situation apply. It is more usual to have a
cascade of impacts through environmental and social systems, e.g. from
biophysical through to economic impacts. Using the eruption of Mount St
Helens again, this not only physical1y devastated an area of more than 500
km2 but also had an ordered sequence of impacts on forestry (ranging
through thrown trees, additional production costs and reduced income),
and also impacted widely through Washington State affecting recreation,
construction, retailing, insurance etc. This type of impact model should be
seen in the context of the more general interactive hazard model (Fig. 1.2).
Disasters are usually assessed on sorne quantitative criteria of death and
damage. Sheehan and Hewitt (1969), working with global natural disasters" 1,
defined a major disaster as causing:
at least 100 people dead ar
at least 100 people injured ar
at least $1 mil1ion damage
This type of definition, stil1 in common use, is confined to losses and
provides a threshold rather than a scale. Despite its apparent precision, it
has important weaknesses. Although most people may be killed outright
18
lp, I
b? ATlON
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
by an event, other deaths may result much later from disease or famine.
Even if direct damage alone is considered, it is often impossible to cost
economic loss accurately and al10wances always have to be made for price
inflation through time. Great spatial differences in the wealth exposed to
damage between the LDCs and the DCs mean that the arbitrary value of
$1 mil1ion can represent very different levels of physical impacto For
example, a $1 million loss would be caused by a much lower magnitude
event in - say - California compared to Bangladesh. At the same time,
California would be much more likely to have the resources to recover
from such a disaster. In the LDCs many disasters recur regularly simply
because the underlying lack of resources precludes the necessary invest
ment to introduce lasting solutions.
UNDRO (1984) defined a disaster more qualitatively as:
an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a community
undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and
physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the
fulfilment of al1 or sorne of the essential functions of the society is
prevented.
This type of definition conveys a better idea of the social stress created
by a disaster, although no threshold or scale is given. It too concentrates on
losses and implies a major incident requiring the mobilisation of emergency
services. In sorne highly localised incidents, such as a transport accident,
the ratio of emergency service personnel to members of the public may
wel1 exceed one. For a more widespread event, such as a hurricane, helpers
wil1 be outnumbered by victims and the effective response of the victims
themselves, rather than the performance of the emergency services, is likely
to be the critical factor in mitigating loss.
Although community loss is the major characteristic of disasters, al1
these definitions ignore the fact that, in virtual1y every disaster, sorne gains
also arise. Therefore, it has become conventional to categorise hazard
impacts, not only into gains and lasses, but also into other effects (Fig.
1.7). Direct effects are those first order consequences which occur immedi
ately after an event, such as the deaths and damage caused by the throwing
down of buildings in an earthquake. Indirect effects may emerge much
later and may be much less easy to attribute directly to the evento These
include factors such as mental il1ness resulting from shock, bereavement
and evacuation. Tangible effects are those to which it is possible to assign
reasonably reliable monetary values, such as the replacement of damaged
property. Intangible effects cannot be satisfactorily assessed in monetary
terms. The loss of human life, for example, has proved notoriously difficult
to assess financial1y.
Direct lasses are the most visible consequence of disasters. They may be
comparatively easy to measure but they are not always the most significant
19
Physical
Dama,e ta
Praperty
/r----- -R-E-C-T------' '-----1N-O-I-R-E-C-T----.'
OI
G
A
Depasits af hcatian
Recunstructian
Danated Aid
Buildin,
Grants
Fertile I
Ash/Silt land
N
5
., Tangible
I Intangible
Figure 1.7 The potential impact of environmental hazards in terms of losses and gains,
both direct and indirect, with an indication of sorne tangible and intangible effects.
outcorne. They are caused by the immediate damage done to humans,
goods and the environment.
Direct gains represent the consequential benefits which may flow to
surviving residents in the area after a disaster. These can include various
forms of aid and even some longer-term enhancement of the environment,
perhaps associated with fertile deposits from volcanic eruptions or river
flood processes. For example, on the Icelandic island of Heimaey, the
volcanic ash cleared from the town of Vestmannaeyjar was used as foun- '
dation material to extend the runway at the island's airport and to level
out an old lava flow for a new settlement to replace the houses destroyed
during the eruption in 1973.
lndirect losses arise mainly through the second-order consequences of
disaster, such as the disruption of economic and social activities in a
community or the onset of ill-health amongst disaster victims. These effects
often outlast those of the direct losses by months or even years and can
be highly intangible. There is a growing realisation that ill-health, both
mental and physical, is a major indirect effect of disaster.
lndirect gains are even less well understood. They are normally highly
intangible and represent the very long-term benefits enjoyed by a com
munity as a result of its hazard-prone location. Very little systematic
research has been undertaken, for example, into the balance between the '
continuing advantages of a riverside site (flat building land, good communi- 'i
cations, water supply and amenity) compared with the occasional losses l'
suffered during periodic flooding.
20
THE NATURE OF HAZARD
L
lass af lite
o hss af
Destructian af
5
Business ar
Archaeala,ical
5
Praductian
Site
E
,5 ,
Stress
Incanvenience
Past-Recavery
IIIness
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
HAZARD ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE
Any logical attempt to reduce environmental hazards depends on a
sequence of steps being taken by the relevant decision-makers. The first
rational step must be to identify the hazard and to estimate the risks based
on how often the event occurs and the likely consequences. This recog
nition phase rarely happens before at least one damaging event has
occurred. Once the hazard has been identified, it is possible to adopt
response strategies which may range from doing nothing at all to attempt
ing complete control over the hazardous process. In practice, most strat
egies involve a mix of different responses aimed at some intermediate
position. If a hazard-reduction strategy is selected, it then has to be
implemented. Ideally, its effectiveness should then be monitored over time.
Comprehensive hazard management, which involves both assessment
and response, can be seen to involve four chronological stages, although
the stages often over-lap. These stages operate as a closed loop because a
major aim of hazard management is to learn from experience and feedback.
Pre-disaster planning This covers a wide range of activities such as the
construction of defensive engineering works, land use planning and the
formulation, dissemination and maintenance of evacuation plans.
2 Preparedness This stage reflects the degree of alertness immediately
before the onset of the hazard; for example, arrangements for emergency
warnings to be issued and the effectiveness with which public officials
can mobilise an evacuation plan.
3 Response Another broad category dealing with events immediately
before and after they have happened, including reaction to warnings
and emergency relief activities.
4 Recovery and reconstruction These are much longer-term actlvltles
which attempt to return an area to normality after severe devastation.
Such devastation can occur even in those areas apparently well prepared
for disaster after a major evento
Stages 3 and 4 are often the most visible and can be illustrated in Fig. 1.8.
The relief period covers the first few hours or days after the impacto After
the initial rescue of survivors, it is concerned with the importation of basic
supplies (food, water, clothing, shelter, medical care) to ensure no further
loss of life. The rehabilitation phase involves the following few weeks or
months during which the priority is to encourage the area to begin to
function again, if only on a temporary basis. Temporary housing may be
erected and the injured will be taken to regular hospitals as field hospitals
~ l o s e down. Finally, reconstruction, often taking many years, occurs. This
~ s designed to put things back together permanently, if possible in an
Improved formo For example, it might include the construction of a new
flood control reservoir or the installation of a warning system.
21
THE NATURE OF HAZARD
; ~ h
4
~
.- " ~
~
Cl
Figure 1.8 5tages in the progressive restoratian of nonnality in an area following a
disaster strike through rdief, rehabilitation and reeonstruetion aetivities.
Source: After White and Haas (1975)
The learning benefits of experience for future hazard reduction strategy
will be nullified if the level of human vulnerability to disaster continues
to rise fas ter than the degree of protection which can be offered. The
concept of vulnerability implies a measure of risk combined with the level
of social and economic ability to cope with the resulting event in order
to resist major disruption or loss (Timmerman, 1981). In other words,
vulnerability is the liability of a community to suffer stress, or the conse
quence of the failure of any protective devices, and may be defined as 'the
degree to which a system, or part of a system, may react adversely to the
occurrence of a hazardous event'. Societies can take many different atti
tudes to reduce vulnerability but these can often be seen as expressions
of either resilience or reliability.
Resilience is a measure of the rate of recovery from a stressful experience.
It can be defined as 'a measure of a system's, or part of a system's,
capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous event'.
Traditionally, resilience has been the main weapon against hazard in the
less developed countries (LDCs) where disaster is often accepted as a
recurrent fact of life. Thus, nomadic herdsmen in semi-arid areas have
tended to accumulate cattle during years with good pasture as an insurance
against drought. But increasing environmental degradation is creating a
much more fragile way of life for millions of such poor people.
Reliability, on the other hand, reflects the frequency with which protec
tive devices against hazard fail. It may be defined as 'a measure of a
system's, or part of a system's, ability to shield itself from the occurrence
of a hazardous event'. This attitude is more applicable to the industrialised
countries (DCs) where there is a view that, through investment, techno
logical advance and engineering design, the advanced nations have proofed
22
HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENT
themselves against environmental hazard. This belief exists largely because
the high day-to-day reliability of most urban services conveys a false sense
of security about the fundamental lifelines for food, water and energy
supplies.
But extreme stress, for example from an earthquake, can easily disrupt
road networks, electric power lines or water pipes. This has very damaging
consequences because, when such systems fail, there is frequently no
alternative source of supply. Unfortunately, the mistaken belief that com
modities like communications, electricity and water will always be avail
able, even in seismically active areas, means that programmes designed to
improve the hazard-prone reliability of such supply systems are widely
perceived to be unnecessary.
One further problem inherent in all responses to environmental fluctu
ations is that, the more a protective buffer is created against the smaller,
shorter-term fluctuations, the more likely is this to sow the seeds of
disaster when larger, longer-term fluctuations arise. Climatic variability
and the Aswan High Dam in Egypt is a case in point. This structure has
proved to be an effective shield against year-on-year fluctuations in rainfall
and a large population in Egypt has become dependent on it for irrigation
and power supplies. But, during a period of long-term decrease in rainfall,
all the climate-sensitive activity that has grown up around the dam will
be threatened. In hazard mitigation, protection against the frequent, small
magnitude event holds no guarantees against the rarer, larger hazards.
23
DIMEN5ION5 Of DI5A5TER
Social expectations
Other problems ensue because of rising social expectations, particularly in
the DCs. People have become much more mobile in recent years and'!
expect to be transported around the world in the minimum elapsed time
irrespective of adverse environmental conditions, such as severe weather.
The same absolute security of service is expected by consumers from most
weather-dependent enterprises such as energy supply or water supply.
Frequently the drive for efficiency and greater competition in commerce
and industry has resulted in reduced manning and smal1er operating mar
gins. In turn, these al10w less scope for an effective corporate response to
environmental hazard.
Growing interdependence
Final1y, it is c1ear that the growing interdependence of individuals, com
munities and nations means that disasters can affect others far outside the
immediate area of impacto Major disasters, such as the Sahelian drought,
not only disrupt local economies, but also can bring shortages in neigh
bouring regions, create floods of international refugees and stimulate aid
programmes to the extent that the repercussions of environmental hazard
are now truly worldwide.
PARADIGMS OF HAZARD
The current unprecedented awareness of environmental hazard has exposed "
sorne fundamental differences in hazard interpretation. Since about 1975
a split has been apparent between the traditional 'behavioural' view
of hazard, which owes its origins to the influential North American
school of hazardologists, and the more recent 'structural' interpretation,
which typical1y derives from workers with field experience in the Third
World.
The behavioural paradigm
Sorne evaluation of natural hazard predates the seminal work of Gilbert
White. For example, Marsh (1864) demonstrated how human actions were
adversely changing the environment and showed how cnservation might
help to limit the damage. This fundamental1y ecological viewpoint was re
discovered in the USA in the 1920s by writers such as Barrows (1923)
and was then applied in the 1930s by a generation newly aware of the
40
peril
s
of soil erosion and floods. In 1936 the US Congress passed an
important Flood Control Act which designated the Army Corps of Engin
eers as the agency to carry out large-scale watershed management. This
organisation commenced an ambitious programme of engineering works
t control flood waters and protect floodplain property, of which the
Tennessee Val1ey Authority scheme became one of the best known exam
pIes. The approach which began here characterised attitudes to environ
mental hazards for the next fifty years. ,
The behavioural view starts from the premise that geophysical extremes
are the main cause of disaster. Since the blame was assumed to lie with
nature, it appeared logical that the control and prediction of natural events
would provide an effective cure. Such goals appeared to be both attainable
and desirable in countries like the United States during the 1930s and
1940s because of the confidence associated with the rapid growth in rele
vant scientific fields (meteorology, hydrology), demands for greater devel
opment of natural resources and the availability of capital for major engin
eering projects. The paradigm also recognised the exacerbating role played
by the victims themselves. In the DCs behavioural faults were attributed
to the poor perception of hazards by both the responsible authorities and
the victims which, for example, al10wed settlement on floodplains to take
place. Within the LDCs it was felt that disasters were compounded by
irrational, il1-informed behaviour, such as deforestation for firewood or
the over-grazing of land to exhaustion. It was further believed that the
universal consequence of disaster was a disruption of normallife reflected
in a breakdown of economic production and a failure of the social system.
This lack of order was seen as a temporary interruption of stability in the
DCs but regarded mainly as a function of the inherent lack of a stable,
Western-style, system in much of the developing world.
Based on this rather paternalistic diagnosis, a solution was sought in the
power of applied science and technology. A 'technical fix' approach was
often advocated, especial1y in the more advanced Western countries, whilst,
in the ful1ness of time, it was thought that the transfer of the appropriate
technology to the LDCs would eventually solve their problems too. Inevi
tably, the emphasis on high technology led to a rather authoritarian organis
ational pattern. Gnly government-backed institutions had the financial
resources and technical expertise needed to apply science on the scale
deemed necessary and had the power to reimpose order and rationality
after a major disaster. The United Nations, in particular, sprouted a number
of agencies with interests in disaster mitigation inc1uding the UN Develop
ment Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the
office of the UN Disaster Re1ief Coordinator (UNDRO).
This dominant paradigm has been characterised by three thrusts (Hewitt,
1983):
41
THE NATURE OF HAZARD
DIMEN5ION5 OF DI5A5TER
An emphasis on field monitoring and the scientific explanation of geo
physical processes. This was aimed at the modelling and prediction Of\1
damaging events and has employed advanced technical tools such as'
radar and telemetry. 11
!'
2 A commitm.ent to physical and control has been
Often the aIm has been to contam nature through envIronmental engm-I'
eering works such as flood embankments or avalanche sheds. Ji
3 Another clear strand has been the formulation of disaster plans and':
emergency measures. This role has often been given to the armed forces, l
mainly on the assumption that only a military-style organisation can 1
function properIy in a disaster area, but also because it underpins the'
"
notion of the state reimposing order on a devastated community.
It has since been recognised that this paradigm, which still represents the i,
dominant view, is an essentially Western interpretation of environmental
hazard which is rooted in materialismo It has been described by its critics
as an optimistic, deterministic evaluation which reflects undue faith in
technology and capitalismo The dominant view has also been criticised
because it over-exaggerates the role of the individual in hazards, either as
a decision-maker or as a victim.
The structural paradigm
Since the mid-1970s an alternative interpretation has been gaining ground.
This view can be termed structuralist in approach because, contrary to the ,
dominant hazard paradigm, it emphasises the constraints which are placed
on individual action by broader and more powerful institutional forces.
There is little doubt that an alternative philosophy was sought because'
the earIier approach had not proved wholly successful in reducing disaster,
impact, especially in the LDCs. Indeed, the structuralist view has beenl
largely developed by social scientists with first-hand experience in the
Third WorId (Waddell, 1983).
This view forges a link between environmental disasters and the under
development and economic dependency of the Third WorId. It originates
in the belief that disasters in the LDCs arise more from the workings of
the global economy, from the spread of capitalism and the marginalisation
of poor people than from the effects of geophysical events. Consequently,
the proponents of this view argue for a clearer distinction between what ,]
they see as the geophysical 'triggers' of natural disaster and the continuing,
economic, social and political problems of these nations. It is a radical,
Marxist interpretation of disaster which envisages solutions based on the
redistribution of wealth rather than on the application of science and
technology.
42
The alternative view challenges the behavioural paradigm at several key
points:
It asserts that even natural hazards are not uniquely dependent on
geophysical processes. In the LDCs especially, it is argued that growing
poverty has created greater vulnerability for the population either as a
rural proletariat (dispossessed of land and compelled to grow cash crops
rather than subsistence food) or as an urban proletariat (forced into
shanty towns in the most dangerous built-up areas). Thus, the severity
of disaster impact is related more to the scale of human exploitation
than to the stresses imposed by nature.
2 It queries the assumption that disasters are such unusual phenomena in
a Third WorId contexto This point stems from the fact that many
disasters occur in areas experiencing rapid environmental and social
change. It is argued that physical processes creating cyclones or droughts
have existed for much longer than human activities, such as urbanisation,
and more truly reflect the nature of such regions. That disasters regularIy
recur in poor countries is increasingly linked to the fact that the range
of responses to combat them is severely limited.
3 Given a belief that disasters in the Third WorId are characteristic r2.!her
than accidental, and that their roots lie in the everyday social order, it
follows that the mitigation of hazard depends on structural change
taking place in society. In particular, such change should ensure that
local knowledge is tapped and eventually replaces a reliance on imported
technology. Mitigation is best achieved from within, by changing the
prevailing social and economic contexts, rather than by external appli
cations. Technical aid and disaster relief, particularIy beyond the emer
gency relief phases, are perceived as often increasing, rather than reduc
ing, vulnerability by making a short-term, local problem semi-permanent
through additional dependency.
4 It asserts that disaster victims are not to blame for their own misfor
tunes. They do not necessarily lack adequate perception or engage in
irrational, hazard-inducing behaviour, but - especially in the Third
WorId - they do lack the time to prepare for emergency action and
the resources to recover from disaster. Again, over-population and the
attendant rise of hazard-prone primate cities are interpreted as a symp
tom of capitalism rather than as a cause of environmental disaster.
In summary, the alternative view is based on the theory that underdevelop
ment is not a temporary state but is an ongoing, deliberate process of
Third WorId impoverishment perpetuated by technological dependency
and unequal trading arrangements between rich and poor nations (Susman
et al., 1983). Within the LDCs, it leads to the growing process of marginal
43
THE NATURE OF HAZARD

/ "\
IUNDERDEVElOPING\
________, 1 PDPUlATlON I
DISASTER
:IIIARGINAlISATlDNi x ><
;- INCREASING I ----- \ /---." /
OCCURRENCE
L J ------... I '-_/ \
I DETERIORATlNG I
PHYSICAl I
\
ENVIRDNIIIENT / I
',/
j
--- t
r--- ----,
CDNTlNUED I DEVElOPIIIENT AID' i REINFDRCEIIIENT I
DEVElDPIIIENT I ANO I OF :
I DF I CAPITAL TRANSFERS : STATUS DUO I
t
----------1: INCREASING I
iIllARGINAlISATION:
------ Process
L- .J
Event
Figure 2.5 The process of marginalisation typical of the LDCs and the relationship to
disaster. lncreasing vulnerability is the result of a population suffering from
underdevelopment and a deteriorating physical environment. Relief and development
aid simply reinfbrce the state of underdevelopment that creates the disaster potential in
the first place.
Source: After Susman et al. (1983)
isation, as depicted in Fig. 2.5. Disaster simply reinforces the growing gap ..
between rich and poor. Even in 'normal' times the poorest sections of
society are pressured lO over-use the land and, when disaster strikes, the
conventional responses merely accelerate the continued underdevelopment
and marginalisation. Thus, the differential degree of damage between dif
ferent parts of the city caused by the Guatemala City earthquake in 1976
led to the designation of this event as a 'classquake'.
TOWARD5 A BALANCED VIEW OF DI5A5TER
The structural paradigm is not relevant solely in the Third WorId. Al1
individuals are constrained lO sorne extent by the institutional, economic
and social circumstances in which they find themselves. Most institutions,
whether they be local councils, real estate agents or state legislatures, have
influence which transcends the powers of individuals to exercise free
choice. In turn, the institutions themselves are moulded by macro-scale
economic and political processes, sometimes operating at an international
leve!. At the same time, the behavioural approach offers sorne essential
hazard management techniques. It can be defended on the grounds that it
provides a framework for practical hazard mitigation whereas the structural.
44
DIMEN5ION5 OF DI5A5TER
paradigm is little more than a theoretical perspective with limited real
world application.
Attempts have been made to find a balance between the behavioural
and the structural approaches. For example, Penning-Rowsel1 (1987)
showed how British flood hazard studies in the 1970s were dominated by
previous work in North America and stressed behavioural-type issues
of floodplain encroachment, poor hazard perception and the inadequate
implementation of options other than engineering controls. In the USA
such individual decisions may wel1 be critical for the development of
floodplain land but, in Britain, land use control is more firmly in the
hands of the local planning authority. In England and Wales, urban flood
policy is closely linked to agricultural flood protection and drainage
improvement to enhance food production. Since 1930 this highly central
ised administrative system has been driven by the al1ocation of national
government resources in the form of grant-aid for schemes. In turn, many
of the policy directions reflect the long exercise of power by the land
owners and the agricultural lobby. The scope for individual action is,
therefore, limited.
There is little doubt that institutional inertia and vested interests, at
national and locallevels, have to be recognised in all environmental hazard
appraisa!. Political control can be an important aspect, as can the funding
arrangements, which frequently ensure the selection of one type of hazard
adjustment rather than another. Professional bias exists. For example, the
virtual monopoly of civil engineers in most of the organisations charged
with flood reduction has, not surprisingly, led lO an emphasis on engineer
ing structures as a solution to flood problems. Other forces in society,
such as the influence of landowners or the voice of the environmental
movement al1 help to influence attitudes.
Even more widely, it has to be recognised that al1 hazard mitigation
raises ethical issues too. Paternalism is not confined to the aid culture
established by Western organisations in certain LDCs, but is also reflected
in the moral right that governments assume in order to interfere with the
wishes of sorne people to live and work in environments deemed to be
hazardous (Beatley, 1988). Sorne people may hold that personal risk-taking
is natural, and even desirable, in a free society. If such behaviour does
not affect others, then government has no right to interfere. Others would
argue that the risk-takers rarely fully understand the dangers involved and
may have little real choice in location. In practice, their actions often do
impinge adversely on the well-being of society as a whole. This happens,
for example, when government funds, raised from general taxation, are
used to compensate hazard victims. For these reasons, the consensus view
is usually that government has an ethical responsibility for reducing risks
to a level which is socially acceptable, although an agreed definition of
what is a socially acceptable risk may be hard lO find.
45
3
RISK ASSESSMENT AND
PERCEPTION
THE NATURE OF RI5K
Risk is an integral part of life. Indeed, the Chinese word for risk 'weij
ji' combines the characters meaning 'opportunity' and 'danger' to imply
that uncertainty always involves sorne balance between profit and loss.
Since risk cannot be complete1y e1iminated, the only option is to manage
it. Risk management means reducing the threats to life, property and
the environment posed by hazards whilst simultaneously maximising any :
associated benefits. A necessary first step is to obtain sorne assessment of
the actual risks involved.
Risk assessment, involving a re1iable quantitative measure of risk, should I
ideally underpin all hazard management. In practice, the risk of disaster
has not yet been estimated for many hazards. Even when risk analysis has
been undertaken, great uncertainties usually attach to the estimate
obtained. Risk itse1f is such a complex concept that a single, scientifically
repeatable solution will rare1y satisfy all the political realities of the
decision-making process. Where possible, risk assessment is undertaken
first to find out what the problems are. When this has been done, risk
management - the process of deciding what to do to mitigate the problems
- takes overo It is wide1y accepted that hazard management is a broad
task, involving economics, legal standards and available technology in what
are often fine1y balanced judgements.
Risk assessment cannot be divorced from value judgements and choices
which, in turn, are condi tioned by individual be1iefs and circumstances.
Many people make decisions and take actions regarding hazards based on
their personal perception of the risk rather than on sorne objective1y
derived measure of the threat. Because of this, risk perception also has to
be regarded as a valid component of risk management alongside more "
scientific assessments. Distinctions are frequently drawn between objective
and perceived risks, large1y because people perceive risks very differently
from the predictions made by the more objective assessment mode1s.
Resolving the resulting conflict between the results of technical risk analy-
RISK ASSESSMENT AND PERCEPTION
sis and subjective risk perception is a major factor in most hazard manage
ment stratepes.
The type and degree of risk varies greatly between individuals of the
same age and sex according to personal factors such as location, occupation
and life-style. In view of this, it is common to classify risks into two main
categories: involuntary and voluntary.
Involuntary risks These are risks which are not willingly undertaken.
They are often re1atively rare but typically have a catastrophic potential
impact. The risk may be unknown to the exposed persono If the risk is
perceived, it may not be seen as controllable. Most of the hazards
considered in this book fall into this category and represent the risks
imposed as a result of living in a particular environmental or landscape
settmg.
2 Voluntary risks These are risks which are more willingly accepted by
people through their own actions. Such risks are like1y to be more
common, have less catastrophe potential and be more susceptible to
control. Unlike involuntary risks, they are rated more directly by indi
viduals according to their own judgements and life-style. The greater
scope for control over voluntary risks is seen in either individual
behaviour (stopping smoking or ceasing participation in a dangerous
sport) or sorne form of government action (the introduction of safety
legislation or pollution control). Man-made hazards, including risks
from technology, are sometimes placed in this group.
This division is often less clear than it appears. For example, while cigarette
smoking or mountain climbing are obvious examples of individual volun
tary risk-taking activities, the same cannot be so firmly stated for either
driving a car or certain occupational risks. Driving a c<!r may be essential
to get to work and the alternative to working in a dangerous chemical
factory may be unemployment. In other words, a risk is general1y less
voluntary than another risk if its avoidance is connected with a greater
personal sacrifice on the part of the risk-bearer. Natural hazards are usually
seen as involuntary. But the inundation of sorne very active floodplains is
sufficiently frequent and wel1-publicised to cast doubts on this. Sorne
floodplain dwellers may elect to buy ahorne which is often cheaper than
an equivalent property in a safer area of town and they may then also
feel there is less need for expending money on house maintenance. Viewed
in this light, the locational decision not only is voluntary but also may
be economically rational. Voluntary risk takers are sometimes seen as a
more personally identifiable group of people. But, even if the overall
probability of risk can be estimated fairly accurate1y, as in the case of a
large population of cigarette smokers, it is still not possible to know
exactly which individuals will die from smoking-re1ated diseases.
Despite these problems, people do react differently to voluntary risks
47

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