Jiabs 8-2

THE JOURNAL
Of THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A.K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
fL.M.joshi
Punjabi University
Patiala, India
Alexander W. Macdonald
Universite de Paris X
Nanterre, France
Bardwell Smith
Carleton College
Northfield, Minnesota, USA
EDITORS
Ernst Steinkellner
University of Vienna
Wien, Austria
jikido Takasaki
University of Tokyo
Tokyo,japan
Robert Thurman
Amherst College
Amherst, Massachusetts, USA
ASSISTANT EDITOR
Volume 8
Roger jackson
Fairfield University
Fairfield, Connecticut, USA
1985 Number 2
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Alidd Bllrl'llll (FraIlCl') JO.Il'jJ/i i'vl. Ki/llgllIt'1l (USA)
!vI .N. /)e.llij)(lIIdl' (Ilidill)
R. GIlI'I/ (USA) Hlljillle NII/mlllllra (flljJlIll)
B.G. Go/dude (USA) Jolill Rosl'lljidd (USA)
P.S. Jailli (USA) f)m1id SIII'/fgrlJ1l (' (U.K.)
.J. W. de JOllg (Alls/ra/ill) E. ZlIl'clin (Ne/lin/IlIlri.I)
The Editor wishes to thank Ms. Rena Haggarty for her invaluable
help in the preparation of this issue.
Copyright The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1985
ISSN: 0193-600X
Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wis-
consin, Madison.
Composition by Publications Division, Grote Deutsch & Co., Madison, WI 53704.
Printing by Thomson-Shore, Inc., Dexter, MI 48130.
CONTENTS
I. ARTICLES
l.
Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas, by Michael Broido 7
2.
"N 0-Thought" in Pao Tang Ch'an and Early Ati-Yoga,
by A. W. Hanson-Barber 61
3.
W6nhyo (Yuan Hsiao) on the NirvaI).a School:
Summation Under the "One Mind" Doctrine,
by WhalenLai 75
4. The Bodhisattva Ideal ofTheravada, by Shanta
Ratnayaka 85
5. Nature in Dagen's Philosophy and Poetry, by
Miranda Shaw 111
II. BOOK REVIEWS
l. Buddhism in Life: The Anthropological Study of Religion
and the Sinhalese Practice of Buddhism, by Martin
Southwold
(George D. Bond) 133
2. Dhamma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddhist
Interpretations: A Study of a Religious Concept,
by John Ross Carter
(Harry M. Buck) 135
3. Matrix of Mystery: Scientific and Humanistic Aspects of
rDzogs-Chen Thought, by Herbert V. Guenther
(A.W. Hanson-Barber) 138
4. The Sutra of the Contemplation of the Buddha ofImmeas-
ureable Life, by the Ryukoku University Trans-
lation Center
(Minoru Kiyota) 140
5. The Sutra of the Wise and the Foolish (mdo bdzans blun), or,
the Ocean of Narratives (uliger -un dalai), translated
by Stanley Frye
Gohn R. Krueger) 143
6. Tibetan Buddhist Medicine and Psychiatry: The
Diamond Healing, by Terry Clifford
(Todd Fenner) 145
OBITUARIES 149
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 157
Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas
by Michael Broido
1. Introduction
The interests of the Oral Transmission traditions of Tibet-
the bKa'-brgyud-pas---centred on the Vajrayana, and their early
representatives such as Mi-la-ras-pa (1040-1123) and sGam-po-
pa bSod-nams Rin-chen (1079-1153) did not try to develop a
. unified philosophical view (darsana, lta-ba) systematically ex-
posed in scholarly treatises (sastra, bstan-bcos); nor did theycon-
tribute much to the development of such analytical subjects as
Madhyamaka (dbu-ma) or pramiir],a (tshad-ma). They expressed
their experiences in mystical songs (vajragfti, rdo-rje'i mgur), in
stories which went into their song-books (mgur-'bum) or their
hagiographies (rnam-thar), in collections of instructions (zhal-
gdams, man-ngag) and of questions and answers (zhus-lan), in
compihltions of doctrinal and meditational observations for the
yogin in retreat (ri-chos) and so forth. These works were on the
whole written in an easy style and in popular language, making
a direct connection b ~ t w e e n the experiences of ordinary people
and those of yogins (rnal-'byor-pa) and rtogs-ldan; but one would
be mistaken in supposing for those reasons that their authors
were ignorant of Buddhist thought. 1
In spite of this, bKa' -brgyud doctrinal notions such as the
dgongs-pa gcig-pa of the 'Bri-gung-pas
2
and the dkar-po chig-thub
3
drew severe fire from Sa-skya PaI).c;lita Kun-dga rGyal-mtshan
(1182-1251) in his sDom gsum rab-dbye. Especially after the time
of Tsong-kha-pa (1357-1419), the bKa'-brgyud-pas were often
subject to charges of philosophical confusion and incoherence.
They responded fairly slowly, but by the middle of the 16th
century such writers as Karma-pa Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1507-54),
sGam-po-pa bKra-shis rNam-rgyal (1512-87) and 'Brug-pa
7
8 JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
Padma dKar-po (1527-92) were reacting not only with defences
of bKa'-brgyud positions and attitudes, but also with attacks on
those of the Sa-skya, Jo-nang, dGe-Iugs and other traditions.
(The rNying-ma-pas do not seem to have been much involved
in these exchanges.) Since the traditional concerns of the bKa'-
brgyud-pas had been with meditative and religious practices
grounded in the Vajrayana, it is not surprising that these writers'
views on analysis should have been coloured by their interest
in Vajrayana.
Padma dKar-po is one of the most interesting bKa'-brgyud
writers, but his prose style is obscure, his treatment of most
topics is very compressed, he rarely makes direct comparisons
between his own views and those of others, and his writings are
not "elementary." The other two writers mentioned are easier
to read, and often discuss others' views at length. Perhaps for
such reasons the attention of scholars has recently been drawn
to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's very extensive commentary4 on Can-
drak"irti's Madhyamakiivatara. During the lABS conference at
Oxford in 1982, Paul Williams presented a papers summarizing
some of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa, while
I tried to place these and other writers on Madhyamaka in a
typological framework based on their views on the two satyas.
6
Recently, David Seyford Ruegg has pointed our? that the intro-
duction to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work contains interesting ma-
terials on the lineages through which the conception of
Madhyamaka underlying the whole work descended to its au-
thor. In this paper I shall use this work, the Dwags-brgyud grub-
pa'i shing-rta, mainly as a source of background information.
bKa' -brgyud writings of all periods show a great interest in
the relation between Madhyamaka and Vajrayana. The intro-
duction to the Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta is largely or-
ganized around this relation. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje gives his own
view of it, that of various opposed schools and writers, and his
refutations of their views. The result is a valuable general picture
of the situation at the time he was writing.
In Padma dKar-po's main Madhyamaka work, the dBu-ma'i
gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, the
connection between Madhyamaka and Vajrayana is built into
the structure of Padma dKar-po's own exposition: he uses Vaj-
rayana terms (especially zung-'jug, yuganaddha) to characterize
THE TWO SA TYAS 9
and classify the main Madhyamaka categories, such as the
ground, path and goal of Madhyamaka. Because of the impor-
tance of Vajrayana notions for our authors, then, we will have
to spend some time setting out their views on the relation be-'
tween Madhyamaka and the tantras.
Unfortunately this is not a simple matter. Vajrayana is a
much more complex topic than Madhyamaka, and at the schol-
arly level we know relatively little about it. In this paper, the
relation between Madhyamaka and Vajrayana will be dealt with
in two sections. The first will be about the early bKa'-brgyud-pas,
mainly sGam-po-pa, as he is authoritative for all the bKa'-brgyud
traditions.
s
The second will revolve about the Vajrayana
categories of lta-ba, sgom-pa, and 'bras-bu (very roughly: point of
view, practice and goal), as these were seen by Padma dKar-po
and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje. (Here Madhyamaka as a philosophical
system is coqnected mainly with the lta-ba part.)
The central topic of this paper is of course Padma dKar-po's
view of the two satyas, and my discussion of it will be based in
principle on the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta. However, this work
involves special difficulties of its own. It is not possible to proceed
simply by quoting and translating key passages. Padma dKar-po
expresses his views mainly by giving strings of quotations (not
usually acknowledged as such or marked off from his own com-
ments). But quite apart from the propositional content of what
is actually said, the choice and arrangement of the quoted ma-
terials is of the greatest possible importance. Here my discussion
will begin with some remarks on the structure of the Nges-don
grub-pa'i shing-rta; this structure strongly reflects Padma dKar-
po's view of the connection of Madhyamaka and the tantras.
Then I will deal with some of the key passages from Candraklrti
which are quoted by Padma dKar-po, clarifying some of the
presuppositions apparently carried by them (in Padma dKar-
po's eyes). This section is called "Padma dKar-po as an interpre-
ter of Candraklrti." The remainder of the paper will examine
these issues by using other (mainly Vajrayana) works of Padma
dKar-po.
The two satyas are rather general notions.
9
For the bKa'-
brgyud-pas, they provide a link between the general theoretical
concepts of the Madhyamaka and the more specific, practice-
oriented concepts of the tantras. Thus Padma dKar-po says: 10
10 JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
As regards their point, the sutras and tantras have one intention;
but there is a difference as regards the way their content is taken:
the sutras are brief, while the tantras are detailed.
Thus, in Madhyamaka there is a single theoretical scheme which
is differently instantiated in the different kinds of tantra. For
instance, the same passage gives the following correspondences:
stong-pa
snymg-rJe
TABLE I
father-tantra
(e.g., Guhyasamiija)
'od-gsal (prabhiisvara)
sgyu-lus (mayadeha)
mother-tantra
(e.g., Hevajra)
bde-ba chen-po (mahiisukha)
stong-nyid rnam-par kun-ldan I Oa
(sarviikiiravaropetasunyatii)
Here, the entire first row corresponds (in Madhyamaka) to pra-
jiia and paramartha, while the entire second row corresponds to
upaya and sa1'lJvr:ti. The causal relations which are said to hold
in Madhyamaka between these sets of notions, are also said in
Vajrayana to hold between the items in each column. When the
goal is reached, the items in each column are said to stand in
the relation of zung-Jug (yuganaddha), and for Padma dKar-po
this relation holds also between the satyas themselves, even in
Madhyamaka. Finally, both Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-
rje are very insistent that neither of the two satyas can be estab-
lished (grub) by itself, even conventionally (tha-snyad-du). They
always arise together (sahaja, lhan-cig skyes-pa), and may never
be separated for the purposes of analysis. Our authors criticize
their opponents vigorously on this score. Similarly, the pair
'od-gsal and sgyu-lus (the radiant light and the illusory body) and
the pair bde-ba chen-po and stong-nyid rnam-pa kun-ldan arise to-
gether. Now both of the notions yuganaddha and sahaja originate
in the tantras and not in the sutra or Madhyamaka literature.
One could hardly ask for a more dramatic demonstration that
for these authors, the tantras influenced the fundamental
character of the concepts they employed in Madhyamaka. Thus,
Vajrayana considerations will enter almost every aspect of our
discussion. Especially in Padma dKar-po, one looks in vain for
the kind of detailed analysis which is so common in the
Madhyamaka works of the Sa-skya and dGe-lugs traditions.
THE TWO SATYAS
11
Though Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work is detailed and analytic in this
way, it is also firmly grounded in the Vajrayana notions just
mentioned. I hope to give an account of his full and interesting
.exposition of the two satyas elsewhere.
Here, my main concern will be to exhibit general features
of Padma dKar-po's thought. The evidence for what I say will
be references and quotations (see especially the three Appen-
dices). In choosing these I have to find appropriate illustrations
of these general themes; and in interpreting them as such illus-
trations, I have had to give the context of each its due weight.
This attention to the context is connected with our duty to make
sense of what our authors write. The notion of "fidelity to the
text" is a complex one, but it is not well served by writing non-
sense in English. Somehow or other the sense must be repro-
duced, as well as the words. So I have kept to the surface form
of the Tibetan sentence only where I could find a similar English
form which, as an English sentence, reproduced what seemed to
me to be the point of Padma dKar-po's words. I make no claim
to incorrigibility. On the contrary, it is certain that what is done
here can be improved (and will be).
Though this paper draws mainly on primary sources, it
seems right to say something about the relation of my work with
that of Prof. H.V. Guenther, whose books (e.g., Guenther 1963,
1972, 1977) make so much use of Padma dKar-po's writings.
Nobody who has studied Padma dKar-po's works himself can
fail to appreciate the importance of the problems to which
Guenther has drawn Western attention for the first time.
Though the importance for Padma dKar-po of yuganaddha
(zung-'jug) leaps at us out of the texts and hardly needs discovery,
and though I believe much of what Guenther says about it will
have to be revised,11 his priority must be acknowledged. The
similar importance of sahaja (lhan-skyes) is far less obvious, and
here I believe that the picture offered by Guenther, sketchy
though it is, is basically right, and so is the translation by "co-
emergent" (though I do not use this word because it is
philosophically loaded in the wrong way). On the other hand,
I see little basis for the existentialist slant of his writing on Padma
dKar-po. In my view, to make use of Western philosophical
notions in order to clarify what we are saying about an Eastern
writer's views is one thing; to impute those notions to him is
something different.
12
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
Guenther does not seem to have treated the role of sahaja
in distinguishing the views of the bKa' -brgyud-pas from those
of their opponents, and he has surely not given a systematic
treatment of Padma dKar-po's views on the two satyas. But there
will be .other places where my treatment has been influenced
by his writings, and since it is not easy to acknowledge every
case individually, I should like to make this general acknowledg-
ment here.
II. The Early bKa'-Brgyud-pas on the Difference Between Sutra
and Mantra
In his Blue Annals (Deb-ther sngon-po), 'Gos gZhon-nu-dpal
(1392-1481) concludes his chapter on the bKa'-brgyud tradi-
tions (the longest in the book) with the remarks: 12
Thus this famous Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud is not a lineage trans-
mitting merely the words, it is a lineage transmitting the real
point [of the Buddha's teaching], this point being a stainless
understanding of mahiimudrii. It is said that the bla-ma from whom
one obtains an understanding of mahiimudrii is the rtsa-ba'i bla-
ma.
I3
Now at the time of Mar-pa and Mi-la-ras-pa this under-
standing of mahiimudrii was ascribed to the sampannakrama, for
an awareness corresponding to the inner heat was produced first,
and by virtue of this an understanding of mahiimudrii was pro-
duced later. Dwags-po Rin-po-che caused an understanding of
mahiimudrii to arise also in those beginners who had not received
and this is the paramita 14 method. But he also said to
Phag-mo Gru-pa: 'Our mahiimudrii text is the Mahiiyiina-ut-
taratantra-siistra by the Jina Maitreya.' Phag-mo Gru-pa 15 said the
same to 'Bri-khung-pa
I6
and so in the tradition descending from
him and his pupils there are many explanations of the Ut-
taratantra. On this, though Chos-rje Sa-skya-pa
I7
said that the
paramita method was not to be called mahiimudrii, since any aware-
ness 18 of mahiimudrii arises solely from [he was mistaken,
and indeed] the acarya J nanaklrti says in his Tattviivatiira that
even at the stage of an ordinary person,19 one who has a sharp
intellect
20
and who, in the paramita system, practice's samatha
and vipasyanii, since he can understand mahiimudrii properly and
with certainty, can attain an irreversible understanding. How-
ever, in Sahajavajra's commentary on the TattvadaSaka we find:
'The essence is the paramitas, mantra is a later adjustment. This
THE TWO SATYAS 13
is called mahiimudrii and is clearly explained as an awareness
which understands suchness having three specific features.'2!
Accordingly, rGod-tshang-pa
22
has explained that the paramita
method of sGam-po-pa is just what was put forward
23
by Maitripa.
However it is certain that sGam-po-pa taught his own personal
pupils a mahiimudrii whose path is mantra.
The quotations in this passage show a slight divergence between
Jiianaklrti and Sahajavajra. The first says that in the paramita
method one can attain an irreversible understanding, but does
not mention suchness or buddhahood, while the second men-
tions suchness but perhaps only associates it with the mantras.
We will see later a similar difference between Padma dKar-po
and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje. Now I want to show how such differ-
ences appear in the writings of sGam-po-pa himself. sCam-po-
pa's general tendency was to insist that different people use
words in different ways and so there can be no rigidly fixed
definitions. In the Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, a collection of his answers
to questions posed by Phag-mo Cru-pa, he is at pains to correct
his pupil's demands for over-clear definitions and distinctions.
Sometimes he seems ironic; sometimes he gives many different
answers (e.g., on the darsanamarga, 5a4); often he refuses to say
that things are the same or different (e.g., on snang-ba and sems
and onsems-nyid and chos-nyid, 17a); sometimes he seems to treat
the question as stupid (e.g., on whether mahamudra and
sahajayoga are the same or not, 4b4). Other answers are quite
straightforward. In this and in the similar Dus-gsum mKhyen-pa'i
zhus-lan nothing seems to have been further from sGam-po-pa's
mind than propagating a single unified theory about something.
Accordingly, we are not surprised to find different expres-
sions of the relation between the sutras and the mantras. For
instance, on one occasion they appear to differ only in the path,
and to be similar in cause (rgyu) and effect (,bras-bu):24
In the paramitas, the cause is rig-pa and bodhicitta, the path is
the six paramitas, and the effect is the three buddhakiiyas. In the
mantras, the cause is rig-pa and bodhicitta, the path is the utpatti-
and sampannakramas, and the effect is the three buddhakiiyas.
On another occasion, there appears to be a difference in the
effect:
25
in the paramita case it is the dharmakaya and the
14
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
rilpakaya, while in the mantra case it is the mahiisukhakaya. Else-
where,26 sGam-po-pa says that even a rim-gyis-pa
27
of sharp or
medium senses can attain an awareness which understands the
essential after a good deal of samatha or one'moment of clear
vipasyana. These two versions are roughly parallel to the two
opinions of Sahajavajra and Jilanak"irti quoted above by 'Gos.
'Gos, writing in the 15th century, only hints through his
quotations that the early bKa'-brgyud-pas expressed various
views on the relations between the sutras and the mantras. But
since sGam-po-pa himself was not wholly consistent on the mat-
ter, we will not be surprised to see clearer divergences among
the more analytically minded bKa'-brgyd-pa writers of the 16th
century. They also had a rather different way of expressing
their views, to which I will now turn.
III. Madhyamaka-dadana and Mahamudra-dadana: Padma
dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rJe on lta-ba
Tibetan Vajrayana thought is often organised around the
quadruple lta-ba, sgom-pa, spyod-pa, and 'bras-bu. Roughly speak-
ing, lta-ba is the general attitude or outlook with which some
system of Dharma is viewed or approached; while sgom-pa
(bhiivana) is the cultivation of this attitude or outlook by means
of specific practices (often called sgom-pa too). sPyod-pa literally
means "action:" in the Vajrayana, often the performance of
fearful rites (drag-po'i las, etc.). 'Bras-bu (phala, liL, "effect") is
the goal: buddhahood in some form, yuganaddha, etc.
It may be worth considering the correlation between Ti-
betan, Sanskrit and English as regards lta-ba. In English there
exist various concepts expressing a mixture of theory and experi-
ence: dogma, theory, attitude, point of view, outlook, insight,
etc. Both the Sanskrit words darsana and dnti belong somewhere
here; both words derive from d,(s-, to see, but both can be applied
also to philosophical points of view, indeed to the same view
depending on what one thinks of it. If one is orthodox, the view
that there are atmans is a darsana; for a Buddhist, it is a d r ~ t i .
Both are translated into Tibetan by lta-ba, and only the context
will tell us whether we have a dogma or a viewpoint. However,
when the component of insight predominates, darsana may be
THE TWO SATYAS 15
translated otherwise, as in darsanamarga, mthong-lam. (This is
relevant here, since it is contrasted with bhavanamarga, sgom-lam).
sGam-po-pa has summed up the lta-balsgom-pa distinction
h
28 .
in an ap onsm:
lta-ba ma-bcos-pa gnyug-ma'i shes-pa / sgom-pa mi-rtog-pa tha-mal-gyi
shes-pa /
lta-ba is non-contingent,29 resting cognition; sgom-pa is natural,
non-discursive cognition.
3o
Clearly, lta-ba here is not "theory," indeed it is something
more like the absence of any theory. No doubt this was why
Madhyamaka appealed to sGam-po-pa (who would probably
not have called himself a Madhyamika):
Phag-mo Gru-pa asked: by what is the essential (ngo-bo) attained?
sGam-po-pa replied: it is attained by the adhi.s(hiina of the teacher,
by one's own interest and devotion, and by the power of practice,
nothing else. It is not known to learned men and scholars, it is
not understood by prajfla, it is nota matter for argument. It
arises by itself and is beyond what is an object for the discursive
mind.
3
! The essential is not to be postulated,32 as Nagarjuna and
other wise men have said.
33
The context makes it clear that this passage is intended to
apply to the Vajrayana as well as the Paramitayana.
Padma dKar-po organises some of his most important works
around the lta-balsgom-pal'bras-bu distinction. Typical items
which fall under these headings in the sutra- and mantra-yanas
are found in Table 2:
TABLE 2
lta-ha sgom-pa 'hras-hu
sutralevel bden-gnyis thabs-shes zung-}ug sku-gnyis
(Madhyamaka)34 zung-}ug (6 paramitas) zung-}ug
tantra level phyag-rgya Nii-ra chas-drug, etc. sku-gnyis
(bsre- 'pha )35
chen-po zung-}ug
lam-rim stage darsanamiirga bhiivaniimiirga aiaikJamiirga
Table 2 contains the first appearance of the two satyas in
this paper, and the first row shows how Padma dKar-po saw
them as the basis for the lta-ba of Madhyamaka as a complete
system, of theory and practice. With regard td the first column,
one might think that the lta-ba in the sutras and tantras was
here indicated as different. This is a verbal trap. The term
mahamudra is complex, and stands for different kinds of things,
but as lta-ba it is identical with the lta-ba of the sutras and of
Madhyamaka.
Padma dKar-po's views on the relation between lta-ba, sgom-
pa and spyod-pa are found (inter alia) in the introduction to the
'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad. In the sutras and mantras, the view
(lta-ba) , the content (brjod-bya) , and the purpose (don) are said
to be the same. We find such phrases as don-gcig,36 lta-ba don-
gcig, 37 dgongs-pa-gcig,38 and lta-ba'isgo-nas khyad-med. 39 The sutra
and mantra methods are said to differ mainly in speed (the
mantras bringing quick results
40
), in the character of the expla-
nations (the mantras being more detailed
41
), and in the choice
of methods available (richer in the mantras
42
). Clearly, then, it
is the path and the sgom-pa which differ. On the sameness of
the content (brjod-bya) , he says:43
In the Kalacakratantra it is said that to distinguish between the
sutras and the mantras in respect of their content is to commit
the root-downfall of denigrating the Dharma.
Similarly on the lta-ba:
44
Mi-la-ras-pa has said: on lta-ba there is no distinction, but in the
secret mantras there are special methods.
Table 2 already makes it clear that, like sGam-po-pa, Padma
dKar-po held that the goal ('bras-bu) is the same for sutras and
mantras. In the Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad he confirms this,
saying that it is the view of Naropa.
45
He rejects a view of
Maitripa, according to which the Paramitayana is only a stage
affording entry to the Mantrayana.
46
The reader might now reasonably hope that I would spell
out what particular view (lta-ba) Padma dKar-po himself held.
But this will have to wait until the end of the paper, for the
phrase bden-gnyis zung-'jug (satya-dvaya-yuganaddha) is his clearest
THE TWO SA TYAS 17
descriptive phrase for it, so we will have to say what the two
satyas were, and what was the relation called yuganaddha. (On
the latter point, only an outline will be possible here.)
In the introduction to his Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta,
Mi-bskyod rDo-rje treats the relation between the siitras and
the mantras at some length. He gives first his own views,47 then
those of a ]0-nang-pa,48 of Sakya mChog-ldan (1428-1507),49
of a Bo-dong-pa,50 and of Tsong-kha-pa.
51
These statements
have recently been translated by Ruegg (1983).52 They are fol-
lowed by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's attempts to refute the views of
the other traditions.
53
As regards the path and its practice, the
differences between Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and the others seem
unimportant beside the obvious similarities: in the Vajrayana
there is a b h i ~ e k a and the upaya-marga, which are lacking in the
Paramitayana.
More interesting are the differences at the level of the
ground (gzhi) and the general point of view (lta-ba, darsana). Of
all the authors mentioned, only Mi-bskyod rDo-rje himself seems
to hold that the lta-ba is different in siitras and mantras. He
says that in the mantras, 54 the lta-ba is that of a spontaneous
and non-discursive siinyata endowed with all excellent qual-
ities.
55
At the siitra level this is not present, 56 though there is
no difference on the side of non-discursiveness, in that when
all attachment to opinions and discursiveness has been re-
pudiated, there is no need to establish anything at all as having
any (epistemic) status. 57 This last point, with which Padma dKar-
po would certainly have agreed, is the source of all Mi-bskyod
rDo-rje's main criticisms of the other authors. (By contrast the
point about the difference of lta-ba is more a matter of nomen-
clature than of substance.)] o-nang-pa's lta-ba is based on siinyata
endowed with all excellent qualities both in siitras and mantras.
This siinyata is paramartha-satya and is permanent and
asa'f(lskr:ta.
58
Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's main criticism is that this view
entails eternalism.
59
Sakya mChog-ldan says that in both siitras
and tantras the lta-ba repudiates the origination of any dharma
by any of the four alternatives of existence, non-existence etc.,60
but then goes on to say that as applied to the siitras, this becomes
the rnam-brdzun dbu-ma set out in the later works of Maitreya;61
and here, one should not take the dharmadhatu to be mere
negation, as do the nifJ,svabhavavadins, but rather as the radiant
18
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
light, the nature of mind, since our concern here is with ye-shes,
the paramiirtha aspect of mind, and not rnam-shes, the sar/Jvr:ti
aspect. This is criticised as a confusion between mere cognition
(shes-pa) and awareness (ye-shes); for the arrogance of claiming
to have established what is really paramiirtha by making such
verbal claims has been said by Manjusrl to be just the failure to
understand gnas-lugs.
62
(This is only one point in Mi-bskyod
rDo-rje's long and detailed criticism of Sakya mChog-ldan.) Bo-
dong-pa expresses a familiar negative lta-ba for both sutras and
mantras, but considers that it applies only to the person who
analyses things thoroughly.63 Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticism is
directed mainly at the claims related to the lower levels of
analysis, which he says show an incorrect understanding of the
satyas, and will lead to a Sarpkhya view of causation.
64
Tsong-kha-pa's lta-ba for both sutras and mantras is based
on a sunyata lacking in an object truly established in itself and
imputed to be external by the discursive mind.
65
Mi-bskyod
rDo-rje's criticism starts by claiming that here there is too much
attachment to satya;66 it is pointless to establish, in a conventional
sense,67 the status of something which is later to be refuted.
The result would be that one would be stuck with entities whose
existence was purely nominal, like the of the Hindus.
Here there could be no proper sahaja, but only a kind of iitma-
dnti-sahaja which would be inconsistent with what one sees. Such
a sunyata is not a suitable basis for mok:ia. (This last aspect of
Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's view of Tsong-kha-pa was already noticed
by Williams (1983.
IV. Padma dKar-po as an Interpreter of Candrakirti
Like Tsong-kha-pa and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Padma dKar-po
was a Prasangika, and commented on the works of Candraklrti.
Unlike Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Padma dKar-po was not an argumen-
tative writer and rarely criticized the views of others; and unlike
Tsong-kha-pa, he did not differentiate sharply between the
Prasangika position which he mainly followed, and the views of
the Svatantrikas, some of which he incorporated into his own
work. Such differences show all three authors developing and
adapting what they learnt from Indian Madhyamaka. In a sense,
THE TWO SATYAS 19
they all did Indian philosophy, but each brought his own flavour
to it.
Of Padma dKar-po's Madhyamaka works, the one contain-
ing the most philosophy is the dBu-ma'i gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar
'byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, "The vehicle which estab-
lishes nitiirtha, clarifying the three sources of Madhyamaka." I
shall use the ornamental part of this title, Nges-don grub-pa'i
shing-rta, as an abbreviation for the whole.
68
The three sources
are Candrakirti'sPrasannapadii and Mahyamakiivatiira, and Mi-la-
ras-pa's dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa. The Nges-don grub-pa'i
shing-rta is really a complete summary of Tibetan Buddhism at
the sutra level, containing brief accounts of the three turnings
of the wheel of the Dharma, the different Hindu and Buddhist
siddhiinta, the nitiirthalneyartha distinction and other matters (see
the sa-bead given as Appendix C). The Madhyamaka section
reviews briefly the varieties of the Svatantrika "school" before
moving onto the Prasangikas. The three divisions of this section
(cf. table 2 as well as Appendix C), are really concerned with
Madhyamaka as philosophy, with the path (the six paramitas
and the ten bhumis) , and with buddhahood. In this way, the
connection of Madhyamaka thought with much of the rest of
sutra-Ievel Buddhism is made very explicit. However the connec-
tion with the tantras still has to be supplied.
In another respect, the work is very inexplicit. It contains
a large number of quotations, usually not acknowledged. It is
not only that Padma dKar-po often does not make the point in
his own words. Many important points are made in complete
silence, by the organization of the subject-matter. Formally, the
work is a commentary on the dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa, but
each section of comment is very long and the sections are not
organized around the order of topics of the other gzhung at all.
On the contrary, passages of Candraklrti are broken up and
re-formed in a very complex way. For these reasons, it is almost
impossible to use quotation from the Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta
to establish Padma dKar-po's views (as against those of other
interpreters of Candraklrti). Instead, I shall draw on the re-
lationships between the two satyas and other concepts, relation-
ships upon which attention is focussed by the arrangement of
the work. This arrangement is summarized in Appendix C.
Then I shall then make use of these relationships to illustrate
20 1IABS VOL. 8 NO.2
the functions of the two satyas in other areas ofPadma dKar-po'S
thought. Thus, the meanings of the two satyas for Padma dKar-
po will emerge indirectly and, as it were, structurally. I should
stress that I use this indirect method because I find myself forced
to, not on any philosophical grounds.
In Madhyamaka, the two satyas are neither items contained
in a world external to the observer, nor purely subjective items
dependent upon capriciously varying mental states. Since at the
goal the satyas are related in a certain way,69 they must vary
. systematically with the level of attainment of the subject. We
can see roughly how this variation will go from Candraklrti's
own comment to MMV VI.23. This difficult and confusing pas-
sage has received numerous interpretations in Tibet, but Padma
dKar-po typically does not give any explanation when quoting
it. 70 In order to examine the use he made of it, it may be helpful
to supply a very crude translation:
Thus the buddhas cognize (mkhyen-pa) without error the
svarupa (rang-gi ngo-bo) of the two satyas, pointing out (nye-bar
bstan-te) that all inner and outer things such as sarpskaras and
sprouts have these two svarupas. They are these: san:tvr:ti and
paramartha.
As for paramartha, it is a self-nature (bdag-gi ngo-bo) grasped
by the particular yul of those who have a properly cogniz-
ing awareness/I but it is not established (grub-pa) by means of
such a nature (rang-gi bdag-nyid). This is one nature (ngo-bo). As
for the other, an ordinary person grasps (rnyed-pa) a self-existing
thing (bdag-gi yod-pa) through the power of a vision covered with
infinite films due to un-knowing. Now this yul of childish persons
is also not established as a svabhiiva (rang-bzhin) by means of a
self-nature (rang-gi ngo-bos). Because of this, all things possess
these two svabhavas. Of these two, suchness 72 is the real yul of
seeing, and that is the point (don) of saying "this is paramartha-
satya," What the svarupa of this is, remains to be explained. The
yul of delusive seeing is san:tvr:ti-satya. Thus, having set out the
two satyas, we must further explain how for those whose vision
is deceptive, there is a further duality of veridical and delusive
in of the object to be grasped and of the knowing.
The Sanskrit word satya has been used as an ontological
category ("reality"), as a property of statements or propositions
("true," "truth"), and perhaps as an axiological category
THE TWO SATYAS 21
("genuine"). Here it is none of these .. It obviously expresses
some property or feature of sensory cognition. Both in the
verse
73
and in the commentary it is opposed to mna (brdzun-pa)
in relation to seeing (dr:s-, mthong-ba). Now mna (brdzun-pa)
means "delusive"; the opposite of this is "veridical." It is only
with a very great sense of strain that an English-speaker can say
of a visual object or experience that it is true or false.
74
A good
example is found in Nagarjuna's RatnavalZ:
75
dntasrutiidyam muninii na satyart;t na /
The Muni did not say that visibles, audibles and so forth are
either veridical or delusive.
It would be wholly pointless to say that they are neither true
nor false. The Buddha was not trying to draw attention to an
elementary category-error.
For the ordinary ignorant person, the pr:thagjana, there is
no satya.
76
For the Buddha there is no point in distinguishing
between two satyas.
77
Accordingly, interest in a distinction be-
tween two satyas is mainly at the level of the arya or the
bodhisattva.
78
Now there is an important Mahayana tradition according
to which paramartha-satya is something unvarying, not changing.
with the individual who experiences it. This tradition is as-
sociated with the thought "whether tathagatas appear in the
world or not, the dharmata of dharmas continues the same for
ever." Variants on this theme are scattered profusely through
the sutras and sastras.
79
It is illustrated in the Lankavatara by
comparing the dharmata of dharmas with a road leading out of
a forest in which the seeker is wandering. "Now do you think,
o Mahamati, that the passage-way leading to that city .... [was]
constructed by that man?" "No, Blessed One.,,80 (This theme
deserves a study of its own.)
As a result, the burden of variation during the bodhisattva-
stages is thrown upon san:tvr:ti-satya. In this sense, while the
characterization of san:tvr:ti-satya in general may be a philosophical
matter, the specification of what it consists of in particular cases
is not a philosophical matter at all, but rather a soteriological
one. Perhaps it is for this reason that Padma dKar-po indignantly
repudiates any attempt to pin down the Madhyamika to any
general proposition specifying what san:tvr:ti-satya is.
81
In any case, the satyas have something to do veridical
sensory cognition. Now we can ask: are they concerned with
two different kinds of veridical cognition, or only one? Do the
satyas get their veridical character from the same source, or two
different sources? Or ontologically: do we live in two different
(perhaps interpenetrating) universes? There seems to have been
a good deal of disagreement in Tibet over the answers to these
questions. When we come to deal with the Vajrayana aspects
properly we will see that in Padma dKar-po's view there was
only one source of satya and that the two satyas are so tightly
bound together that they are in effect different facets of one
thing. For now we may note that even in the Madhyamaka there
are references to the idea that really (vastutas) there is only one
satya, viz. paramartha;82 but this seems to have got mixed up
with the idea that ultimately (don-dam-par, paramarthatas) there
is only one satya. And if there is sometimes only one satya, one
may ask where the second comes from.
This brings us to the very difficult question. of the word yul
in the commentary to MMV VI.23. In many contexts
this word is correctly translated by "object." But here this will
not do, because in the definition of paramartha the yul grasps
something (yul-nyid-kyis . ... rnyed-pa
83
). Evidently paramartha-
satya has something to do with the subject in cognition. We will
see later that this is certainly Padma dKar-po's view, especially
as regards the Vajrayana.
A more fundamental difficulty affecting the word yul is that
the notion of paramartha is supposed to apply to buddhas and
other advanced beings who possess a non-dualistic cognition.
We therefore need a vocabulary general enough to embrace
talk both of ordinary dualistic cognition and of non-dualistic
cognition. Since here we are concerned especially with the non-
duality of subject and object (gzung-'dzin gnyis-med) we want a
word (or more precisely, an attitude towards some word or
words) which generalizes the notions of subject and object and
which reduces to one of them when language is being used in
the ordinary dualistic way. The following proposal is motivated
partly by Strawson's notion of a feature-placing language: 84 a level
of language more primitive than our own, in which there are
no reidentifiable particulars, indeed
85
no objective particulars
at all. I suggest that we should think of the artificial word "*fea-
THE TWO SA TYAS 23
wre"as a word in a feature-placing language, which specialises
to "subject" or "object" (or to "feature" without the asterisk, e.g.,
gold, snow, etc.) when we return to our normal (dualistic) use
. of language. Then in the context of MMV VI.23, yul ( v i ~ a y a )
can be translated by "*feature" without doing violence either to
our conceptual scheme (in English) or to Candrakirti's text. (For
some commentators on Candrakirti, perhaps including Tsong-
kha-pa, this device may be redundant. But even if it is redundant,
it does no harm.)
In the Vajrayana, its non-redundancy seems almost too ob-
vious to need argument. There, ''paramartha-satya'' describes
things (!!) such as the radiant light (,od-gsal) , "mind-as-such"
(sems-nyid) , and great bliss (bde-ba chen-po, mahasukha). Even
viewed dualistically, it is obvious that these are not particulars
but features, and that they belong to the subjective rather than
the objective pole in cognition. Elsewhere I have given reasons
for thinking that this is an important and general feature of
Padma dKar-po's thought. 86
There does seem to be some evidence that Tsong-kha-pa
took paramartha-satya (i.e., for him, sunyata) in a somewhat more
"objective" sense than do our bKa'-brgyud-pa authors.
87
If this
is right, then it makes the critique by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje much
easier to follow.
88
It also means that the translation of yul uni-
formly by "object" will be easier to maintain in connection with
Tsong-kha-pa than with Mi-bskyod rDo-rje or Padma dKar-po.
There should be nothing especially surprising about this unless
one believes that the Tibetans did nothing but reproduce what
they inherited from India.
In the commentary to MMV VI.23, the word ngo-bo
89
and
its many relatives give rise to difficult problems to which I offer
no systematic solution. My impression is that Candrakirti was
confused in the use of these words. Tsong-kha-pa,9o Mi-bskyod
rDo-rje
91
and Padma dKar-po92 all seem to have found the
matter frustrating.
Still on MMV VI.23, Candrakirti says that the two satyas
pertain to everything; they are svarupas connected with every-
thing. Yet the capacity to be aware of the two satyas is not the
same for all individuals, as we have noticed already. We might
say that it is fully active only in a buddha; in a bodhisattva it is
partially activated; in a pr:thagjana it is merely latent. (We need
some such language as this to distinguish between the non-con-
tingency of the relationship between the satyas, as svarupas or
svabhavas, and the things of which they are the svarupas, in
contrast to the contingency of their relationship with persons.
In this language the tathagatagarbha theory becomes the claim
that all beings possess a latent disposition to become aware of
the two satyas.)
The picture is filled in a bit more in those passages where
Candrakirti deals with the causal connection between the two
satyas. Here the locus classicus is MMV VI.SO. The verse contrasts
vyavahiiralparamartha as upayalupeya, i.e., as means and what re-
sults from the means. This is clarified in the commentary, which
says that here upeyabhutarIJ (thabs-las byung-bar gyur-pa) is the
effect ('bras-bu), or what is to be attained (thob-par bya-ba) or what
is to be understood (rtogs-par bya-ba). It is obvious that these
passages are not solely about objects and their dispositions to be
cognised; they are about actual episodes of cognition on the
part of cognising subjects, governed by the contingency just
mentioned. We will soon see this tension between the two verses
reflected in Vajrayana usage.
V. The Two Satyas in Vajrayana
Both in the N ges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta and in his more
advanced Vajrayana works (see Table 1 and its footnotes),
Padma dKar-po seems to be working with a concept of causation
which includes the one just mentioned in connection with MMV
VI.SO, but is richer. Guenther
93
has called this "circular causa-
tion." The ground and the goal mutually reinforce each other;
each acts as the cause of the other, so to speak. This conception
goes back at least to the Guhyasamajatantra.
94
We already mentioned in the Introduction that, according
to Padma dKar-po, the Vajrayana provides us with particular
instances of what is discussed in general terms in Madhyamaka.
Let us see how this applies to the two satyas, first individually
and then in relation to each other. Paramartha-satya is relatively
straightforward: it is great bliss (mahiisukha) , it is the radiant
light, it is gnas-lugs.
95
All these are feature-universals.
"SarIJvrti-satya" applies mainly to items: the items which fall
THE TWO SATYAS 25
under dngos-po'i gnas-lugs. It especially includes such things as
the illusory bod
y
96 and the vajra-body97 together with the
ma1).<;lalas which surround them. Now, most of these specific
terms are familiar mainly from the meditation practices of the
Vajrayana;for instance "illusory body" is the name of one of
the six topics of Naropa. Here, however, we are not talking of
the practices themselves, but of the clarified (dwangs) appear-
ances which form the basis for the practices. Indeed, dwangs-ma
is often used as a sortal universal to refer to specific appearances
which partake of san:tvr:ti-satya, while the feature-universal dwangs
is closely related to gdangs, a word whose use in connection with
san:tvr:ti-satya has already been noted by Guenther
98
and will be .
further discussed in a moment.
Now, the relationshi p between the two satyas. The dwangs-ma
partake of san:tvr:ti-satya in any case; and it is because they are
non-delusive that they partake also of paramartha-satya. 99 This
relationship between the two satyas is the basis of their
yuganaddha. At first sight the connection seems to be non-contin-
gent. This non-contingency is related to the tension observed
at the end of the last section, between the Madhymakiivatara
verses VI.23 and VI.80, and in order to understand it better we
need to return to those verses in more detail, keeping in mind
the application to clarified appearances.
In connection with VI.23, we saw the satyas described as
svabhiivas or svarupas; and these are defined (say, at MK. XV
2-3, and PSP on it) as belonging non-contingently (akr:trima,
ma-beos, etc.) to the things to which they pertain. Yet it is obvi-
ously a contingent matter whether any particular person cognises
things in either of the satya-modes. It is for this reason that
VI.23, if construed as a claim about dispositions of persons,
cannot be more than a claim about latent dispositions. VI.23
tells us nothing about episodes of cognition; they are rather the
province ofVI.80, which, it seems, has to be construed as saying
that one or more episodes of san:twti-satya cause or bring about
one or more episodes of paramartha-satya. We may say that in
VI.80, the extent to which the latent dispositions of VI.23 have
been actualised is not specified, but that there is a presupposition
that they have been actualised to some extent. In this rather
special sense, then, VI.23 is concerned with dispositions, while
VI.80 is concerned with episodes.
In his Vajrayana works, Padma dKar-po very often uses the
phrases kun-rdzob thabs sa 'am rgyu, and don-dam thabs-byungnga 'am
'bras-bu, etc.; this is the language ofVI.80 and is concerned with
episodes. By contrast, the terms gshis and gdangs are used for
the corresponding dispositions of objects, e.g., at phyag-chen gan-
mdzod (see note lOa) we have the two satyas, described exactly
in this language of VI.80, manifesting by the power of gshis and
gdangs. The contrast is even clearer in Appendix A, where it is
said that the gshis is lacking in satya. Of course don-dam is the
very epitome of satya, of the veridical; but the disposition of things
to be seen in don-dam is neither veridical nor delusive. The
availability of the gshislgdangs language perhaps explains the
rarity of references, in Padma dKar-po's Vajrayana works, to
VI.23, in contrast to the frequency of reference to VI.80. And
if gshis and gdangs literally were the two satyas, then one would
expect to see the phrase gshis-gdangs zung-'jug, in parallel with
bden-gnyis zung-'jug. The former is not found; and if my analysis
is right, it would be illogical, for zung-'jug is a form of samadhi
in which the satyas actually occur; it has nothing to do with the
mere disposition towards them.
Roughly speaking, yuganaddha (zung-'jug) describes two
things which are united or closely bound together. The most
important Indian source for this word is the last krama of the
(tantric) Nagarjuna's Pancakrama, called Yuganaddhakrama.
100
Padma dKar-po's conception ofyuganaddha is complex, and here
I will give a sketch only. Earlier, we mentioned the illusory body
as a standard example of dwangs-ma. Here the illusory body is
the topic of the while the radiant light is the
topic of the abhisambodhikrama. The purification of the illusory
body takes place in the and the agent of this
purification is the radiant light.
101
Thus, it is the presence of
the radiant light which gives the illusory body its satya-quality.
Padma dKar-po simply says that the illusory body is self-
purified; 102 this further illustrates not only the inseparability of
the two satyas, but what looks like the non-contingency of that
inseparability. These are further illustrated in the course of his
criticism
103
of Tsong-kha-pa's view of yuganaddha. If in the
sViidh4thiinakrama there is no radiant light and in the abhisam-
bodhikrama there is no illusory body, then the two can have no
causal connection, and in the yuganaddhakrama they are merely
THE TWO SA TYAS 27
placed together like the two horns of an ox; 104 surely this cannot
be yuganaddha.
Since this line of argument is so central to bKa'-brgyud-pa
. thought, it may be worth clarifying the notion of non-con-
tingency in use. I have chosen the word "non-contingent" be-
cause it is close to the Sanskrit ak1:trima, which is important in
Madhyamaka texts, and because it expresses the logical structure
of the connection better than such words as "inseparable" (dbyer-
med, much more common in Vajrayana texts). The point is that
the illusory body depends on the radiant light for its identity as
the illusory body; were the radiant light absent (says Padma dKar-
pa) there would be an appearance but it would not qualify as
the illusory body. More generally, nothing qualifies as san:z,vr:ti-
satya at all unless accompanied by paramartha-satya; it is so to
speak paramartha-satya which gives it its identity as (san:z,vr:ti- )satya.
And now we are back once more with the old idea that really
there is only one satya, one source of the veridicaL
In a sense, the non-contingencyis just a fact about language,
about the meaning of "san:z,vr:ti-satya" and the cognate terms; yet
in another sense, it is also a fact about the world, in that
paramartha-satya and its cognates are not just logical constructs,
but are features of experience.
Padma dKar-po's favoured method of developing these dis-
tinctions rests on two different descriptions (not conceptions)
of mahi'imudra: gnas-Iugs phyag-chen and 'khrul-Iugs phyag-chen.
The first corresponds roughly to a feature-placing use of lan-
guage (as sketched in the preceding section). The two satyas
become one identical *feature. gNas-Iugs phyag-chen is often de-
scribed by a stream of metaphors, as by rGyal-dbang-rje: 105
Thus all the dharmas of sarpsara and nirvaI)a are nothing more
than the suchness of mind, which has always been pure, which
is self-created since no-one has made it, which contains no differ-
ences since it is inseparable from everything, and which is not
defiled by postulating or negating existence or non-existence; it
is unstained by subject and object, it is not a *feature of any
action of the mind such as proof or refutation, it is beyond all
thought or speech of the eternal or the momentary, it is the
essential abode of all the teachings expressing the intentions of
the buddhas; it is called sahajajiiiina or dharmakaya but is not
obscured by these good names; it is a resting cognition, an ever-
lasting cognition, a natural cognition, an original cognition; and
it is the content of all the older scriptures explaining mahiimudrii.
Since in it appearances are incessant it is the foundation of
dependent origination, since nothing has to be established it is
the foundation of voidness, since it is not the abode of differences
it is the foundation of yuganaddha, and since it is impartial it is
. the foundation of that which embraces everything ..
'Khrul-lugs phyag-chen describes the same state of affairs,
where however one "wanders" or "strays" (,khrul-ba) into dualis-
tic distinctions (i.e., one uses language normally). Yet it does
not have to be mistaken. Padma dKar-po says of 'khrul-lugs phyag-
chen: 106
On the objective side there are changing shapes which are as-
cribed to lus-kyi gnas-Iugs and to san:tVfti-satya, while on the side
of unchanging seeing there is sems-kyi gnas-Iugs which is ascribed
to paramiirtha-satya. The ground may acquire changing shapes,
but that is not bad; and at the time of understanding it may
become unchanging, but that is not good. Because this remains
itself there is no need to separate the two satyas, and so they are
said to be inseparable.
More technically but perhaps more clearly, we have: 107
dNgos-po'i gnas-Iugs is divided into two: Ius and sems dngos-po'i
gnas-lugs. Lus-kyi gnas-Iugs is ascribed to the errant side, for it has
adventitious defilements, while sems-kyi gnas-Iugs is pure from the
beginning, is purity; often it is said to be pure by nature. Now
"adventitious" means that these defilements are not established
as gshis or gdangs, but they are said to appear as gshis or gdangs,
as on a thang-ka small hard bumps of paint appear to stick out,
or as a white conch-shell appears yellow to a man with jaundice.
This yellow is not established as the gshis or gdangs of the shell,
but for the man with jaundice it arises as appearance; this is
consistent with the illness gradually wearing off and the yellow
colour disappearing. It would be unintelligible to ascribe yellow
to the gshis or gdangs of the shell, since then healthy people would
see iL
I08
Their not seeing it may not be understood by the sick
person, in which case we have a delusion (,khrul-snang) , or he
may understand, in which case it rises as dharmakaya.
THE TWO SATY AS 29
Thus according to Padma dKar-po, 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen as
it were contains appearances and (dualistic) distinctions, but if
these are understood for what they are, there is no harm in
. them; they "rise as dharmakaya." But if they are not understood
and if one begins to accept and reject them, there is a fall away
from paramartha-satya or from the radiant light. This is the be-
ginning of the process which culminates in rebirth.109 In this
sense 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen may be said to be the source of
sarpsara; here some authors have even spoken of lhan-cig skyes-
pa'i ma-rig-pa. llO But for Padma dKar-po, this is not an essential
feature of 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen, which does not have to be some-
thing wrong or mistaken.
At the doctrinal level, an absolutely capital point for Padma
dKar-po is that one should regardgnas-lugs phyag-chen and 'khrul-
lugs phyag-chen as expressions of one and the same state of affairs.
Especially, one should resist the natural temptation to associate
gnas-lugs phyag-chen with paramartha-satya and 'khrul-lugs phyag-
chen with sa1(tvr:ti-satya. He seems to have thought that this mis-
take was made by both the Jo-nang-pas (rather grossly) and by
the dGe-Iugs-pas (more subtly). In both cases his argument has
the following shape. In gnas-lugs phyag-chen the question of a
distinction between the two satyas does not really arise. In 'khrul-
lugs phyag-chen if either satya has a status or is established (grub),
independently of the other, there is not and never can be sahaja
or yuganaddha because the relation between the satyas is merely contin-
gent (bcos-pa) in the sense sketched above.
In a long summary of the Jo-nang-pa position on matters
related to this line of thought, III we find such observations as: 112
The great parinirvana is an uninterrupted anasrava-mahasukha 113
which has really transcended all dulJlJ,ha and its associated causes.
Vijiiana is dark, like thick black darkness, and is to be given up;
it is sa'TlJ,vrti and rang-stong; while spontaneou.s jiiana (rang-byung
ye-shes) is light with the quality of voidness or like nectar, not to ,
be renounced; it is paramartha and gzhan-stong.
Padma dKar-po's objection to this is that it rejects 'khrul-Iugs
phyag-chen as something intrinsically bad, thus destroying the
non-contingent relationship of the satyas. Specifically, it is unac-
ceptable that paramYirtha-satya is no longer impartial, becoming
a form. of eternalism, while at the same time saT(tVfti-satya be-
comes a form of nihilism.114 The difficulties of constructing a
coherent notion of yuganaddha on the Jo-nang-pa view are so
obvious that Padma dKar-po has not mentioned them specifi-
cally.
One argument against the dGe-lugs-pas has been men-
tioned already. Another related argument concerns what Padma
dKar-po seems to consider to be the dGe-Iugs-pas' incorrect
conception of sahaja: 115
According to dGe-Idan-pa, if there were no rang-bzhin, then at
the paramiirtha level it would be like the barren woman's son,
while at the sa17J,vr:ti level existing things could never go out of
existence. Because of this, by appearance one is freed from the
extreme of non-existence, and by voidness one is freed from the
extreme of existence. [Padma dKar-po replies:] But to say this
is to fall into eternalism and nihilism: paramiirtha becomes
nihilism and sa17J,vr:ti becomes eternalism, because unless the two
saiyas are based on a single foundation they can never free any-
body from partiality.
This exchange occurs in the middle of a passage about the
notion of sahaja (lhan-skyes) and its connection with yuganaddha
(zung-'jug); see Appendix A. Padma dKar-po quotes
1l6
a verse
from the Hevajra-tantra, which says (inter alia) that the self-nature
(svabhiiva, rang-bzhin) is to be born together (sahaja), and he then
begins his explanation by saying that the nitartha of this has
been variously expressed by such phrases as snang-stong lhan-
skyes, etc. The exchange quoted above then follows. Later on
Padma dKar-po says:1l7
A mountain of evils is dispersed by the Paficakrama versesYs
"When one renounces the notions of sarpsara and nirvaI).a, and
they become a single thing, this is said to be yuganaddha," and
"When the separate aspects of sa17J,vr:ti and paramiirtha are cognised
and they are then thoroughly mixed together, this is said to be
yuganaddha." On the whole, the Sa-skya and dKar-brgyud tradi-
tions say that gshis is not veridical, while gdangs is not delusive;
and when the two satyas are inseparable like ice and water, void-
ness is like appearance and appearance is like voidness and there
is snang-stong zung-Jug.
THE TWO SATYAS 31
The passage in Appendix A gives us that part of Padma
dKar-po's conception of yuganaddha needed for our present pur-
poses. To summarize his full conception: first, it is a samadhi
.(in the usual sense arid perhaps in the sense of the
second, it is divided into ground, path and goal, following
Naropa; third, it has a siitra and a mantra aspect, as in the
general treatment of this distinction above; and fourth, it has a
logical aspect, uniting the two satyas and other pairs. It is this
fourth, logical aspect which is so closely related to sahaja. This
word, literally "born together," means that the two items never
appear singly, always together; we have here the causal aspect
of the connection which we called "non-contingent." Sahaja is
a term of the mother-tantras, and indicates a stronger degree
of connection than the terms "mixing" or "inseparable" typically
used in the Guhyasamaja literature (e.g., in the Paficakrama, as
we just saw). Because of the importance of the full notion of
sahaja and the associated non-contingency for the bKa' -brgyud-
pas, Padma dKar-po says that a father-tantra explanation of
yuganaddha is inadequateY9 This point is closely related to Mi-
bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa, both those briefly
reviewed above and those to be mentioned below.
Thus, both PadmadKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje thought
that Tsong-kha-pa'sconception of the twosatyas was insufficient,
inter alia, because their connection was not akr:trima in the right
way, did not have the right sahaja. But of course to say this is
merely to state a problem, not to solve one; we want to know
why these bKa'-brgyud-pa writers held the view that they did.
Paul Williams (1983, p. 134) notes that according to Mi-bskyod
rDo-rje:
... the emptiness ofTsong kha pa is different from, not as spiritu-
ally mature as, whatever notion of madhyamaka emptiness the
Karmapa is operating with.
Williams goes on to defend Tsong-kha-pa against some of the
specific attacks of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, and I do not want to com-
ment on this defence; for it seems to me that he has missed
both the main point of Mi:..bskyod rDo-rje's attack, arid one of
the most important lines of defence available to Tsong-kha-pa.
It may make it easier to see the point of the attack if we
consider two imaginary writers, say *Tsong-kha-pa and *Mi-
bskyod rDo-rje, with views simpler than those of the real writers.
For both our fictitious authors, the gist of the notion of sunyata
is svabhava-funyata, the absence of self-essences; but they differ
in the status of that which lacks such an essence. *Tsong-kha-pa
thinks that the objects of ordinary cognition mUst have some
status at the conventional level, must indeed be established con-
ventionally (tha-snyad-du). Objects thus established can be seen
to be lacking in self-essence, and as thus seen, they are (or
possess) sarlJvr:ti-satya. Paramartha-satya is the lack of the self-es-
sences (or the apprehension of this lack). According to *Mi-
bskyod rDo-rje, this gets the whole thing upside-down. The
point is to get away from (attachment to) the idea of anything
having a status. Paramartha-satya (or the radiant light, etc.) is
just seeing objects without a status or a foundation of some
kind. Objects thus seen (or purified appearances, dwangs-ma)
are sarlJvr:ti-satya; but this must not be taken as another status
of some kind, raising again the epistemic question of how it is
to be established (grub-pa).
N ow the self-essences are linguistic entities and their ab-
sence is a linguistic fact. But *Tsong-kha-pa stresses the
psychological importance of this absence. Without them, the world
seems quite different; so different that it is not clear that we can
speak of the same world at all, and in the absence of such a
world, the distinction between linguistic facts and facts about
the world becomes quite hazy. So for *Tsong-kha-pa, there is
no contradiction in saying that one can see paramartha-satya or
in taking the connection between the two satyas as contingent,
in spite of the apparently linguistic character of paramartha-satya.
*Mi-bskyod rDo-rje does not attach the same importance
to sunyata as does *Tsong-kha-pa. However, he is much more
inclined to accept a world (without ontological status, of course)
and with itthe distinction (not pressed too far) between linguistic
and non-linguistic facts. For him, it is a contingent fact that there
is paramartha-satya at all (Buddhas might not have appeared in
the world, there might not be nirodha-satya, etc.). It is also a
contingent fact that paramartha-satya is experienced in the way
it is (as the radiant light, etc.). This makes the connection be-
tween the two satyas rather complex. As far as the senses of the
two terms are concerned, it is a mere fact of language that the
THE TWO SA TYAS 33
tWO appear together (sahaja). However, it is contingent that the
tWO satyas appear together taking the forms they do take, i.e., that
their referents appear together.
The writings of the actual Mi-bskyod rDo-rje give the im-
pression of a perhaps somewhat Kantian striving after a fact
about the two satyas which is a fact about the world and not
merely one about language, but is non-contingent in the sense
of not depending on any other particular fact about the world.
They become easier to follow if one thinks of the senselreference
distinction and drops the notion of contingency (but it seems
unlikely that he attained this perspective himself). Seen in the
forms it actually takes, paramiirtha-satya is called the radiant light
or great bliss (cf. Table 1); sunyata, which had dropped out of
the picture, comes back as just one more *feature in cognition,
sunyata-endowed-with-all-good-qualities (stong-nyid rnam-pa
kun-ldan, Table 1). This sunyata is connected with the svabhiiva-
sunyatii of the Madhyamaka, but plays a different role in the
structure; Mi-bskyod rDo-rje can tolerate this tension because
for him, sunyata does not have the logically fundamental charac-
ter which it has for Tsong-kha-pa.
This discussion is of course simplified, but any comparison
of our two authors' views in this area leads straight to the two
satyas; we need to say something about the function of the notion
of sunyata, and the satyas provide us with the concepts which
we need for this. Here, unfortunately, Williams has misun-
derstood Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1981, p. 7):
For Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Candrakirti's conventional truth is sim-
ply, and only, what is held to be in pre-critical, non-philosophical
worldly commerce.
In fact, his view was quite different from this (Dwags-brgyud
grub-pa'i shing-rta, 137a3 ff.). The pr:thagjana sees sa11J,vr:ti-miitra
(mere sa11J,vr:ti ), while strictly speaking the arya sees only
paramiirtha-satya; however, conventionally (tha-snyad-du) one
speaks of two satyas for him. At first glance it is easy to misun-
derstand Mi-bskyod rDo-rje on this point, partly because of
CandrakIrti's own equivocation in VI.23 (say, in relation to
VI.24-8). As we have seen with Padma dKar-po, the point is
easier to understand in Vajrayana: the arya sees the illusory
body and the radiant light arising together (sahaja) , and only
conventionally can one speak of them separately; and this was
just the foundation of Padma dKar-po's own criticism ofTsong-
kha-pa.
Returning to the Madhyamakavatara, recall that the verse
VI.23 (see note 73) says that a certain delusive cognition is called
sarlJVfti-satya. When giving his own views (l39b-145a), which he
claims were shared by the earlier bKa'-gdams-pas, Mi-bskyod
rDo-rje treats the distinction introduced by Candraklrti at VI.23
as the distinction betweensarlJv-rti and paramartha, with only second-
ary concern for whether they are satyas or not. Here he often uses
the phrase don-dam bden-pa (so taking it for granted that
paramartha is satya) but it is hard to find an instance of kun-rdzob
qualified as bden-pa (satya): 120 .
A thing such as a pot is just one thing, but fools speak of a
ngo-bo-nyid and specifically ascribe various features which are
attained and [all this is] kun-rdzob; while the aryas do not see this
at all, and, seeing as though not seeing, it is said that they see
don-dam. Only conventionally are there two satyas, for there is
no difference of reference [i.e., one pot!], the difference is
whether it is seen by an errant or a non-errant mind .... the
aryas do not see the two satyas as two.
Throughout this discussion, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje insists on the
importance of a cognition which is spros-bral and
we shall have much to say about this term later. We have seen
also that Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje both held that
sarlJv-rti-satya (as distinct from mere sarlJv-rti) is a matter mainly
for the arya. Our bKa' -brgyud writers were not in dispute with
Tsong-kha-pa on these points. The difference was over what was
happening when the arya had a moment of or of
SarlJVfti-satya. It will be easier to understand these differences
and the reasons for them from a certain theoretical perspective
which was carefully developed by Padma dKar-po, but which
(if I have not missed something) Mi-bskyod rDo-rje only hints
at now and then, while Tsong-kha-pa seems to have ignored it.
I will develop this perspective with some care, since it enables
us to focus on the critical point at which the p-rthagjana becomes
an arya, of which so much is made in some forms of Chinese
and Japanese Buddhism. In terms of the lam-rim, we are con-
THE TWO SA TYAS 35
cerned with the transition from the prayoga-marga to the darsana-
marga. Since we are to speak of the arising of (non-discursive)
understanding, some Tibetan textslabel this topicrtogs-pa'i 'char-
tshul; but Padma dKar-po treats it in a much broader perspective
and does not use this phrase.
VI. Padma dKar-po on the Four Yogas and on
The 'Brug-pa bKa'-brgyud tradition makes much of a dis-
tinction according to which different people move along the
path at different speeds. Roughly, the cig-car-ba is the "sudden"
and the rim-gyis-pa the "gradual" type of person familiar from
other forms of Buddhism. For certain purposes they also recog-
nised an intermediate type, the thod-rgal-ba, for whom there was
a certain structuring of mahamudra practice (or more exactly, of
rtogs-pa'i 'char-rshul) called the "four yogas" (rnal-'byor bzhi). One
of these four yogas is called precisely spros-bral
Since this word is used also for the goal in Madhyamaka, we
might hope that Padma dKar-po's treatment of the four yo gas
would throw some light on our present concerns. This hope is
indeed rewarded; but in order to make it clear what Padma
dKar-po is talking about, a certain number of historical and
doctrinal preliminaries must be disposed of. These are somewhat
complex because the bKa'-brgyud-pas worked with two different
of the relation between mahamudra and the upaya-
marga, to which we will now turn.
As a teacher, Mi-la-ras-pa used mainly the methods of the
upaya-marga. People who were not mature enough to receive
did not practice meditation with him. So in the tradition
descending from his pupil Ras-chung rDo-rje-grags (1083-
1161), the entire path of practice is structured according to the
stages of the upaya-marga. Here, the word mahamudra is used
mainly for the goal (phala, 'bras-bu). The word Ras-chung snyan-
brgyud is used both of the practices as thus structured, and of
the lineage which propagated them. They came into the 'Brug-
pa tradition quite early, because Gling-ras, before going to Phag-
mo Gru-pa, was a pupil of Lo and Sum-pa, who had learnt the
snyan-brgyud from Ras-chung's pupil Khyung-tshang Ras-pa. 121
In contrast with this, Mi-la-ras-pa's other famous pupil,
36
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
sGam-po-pa, had practiced Madhyamaka to a high level with
his bKa'-gdams-pa teachers before meeting Mi-Ia-ras-pa, from
whom he therefore learnt only the advanced stages of the upaya-
marga. We have already seen how sGam-po-pa was willing to
teach a sutra- or paramita-based mahiimudra to beginners, while
reserving the upaya-marga for the most advanced. So here the
path is structured according to the different stages of mahamudra
attainment, with the upaya-marga coming in only at the end or
for the very gifted. The structuring of the upaya-marga suitable
for such people is found in the bsre-'Pho works of Pad rna dKar-po.
Here the upaya-marga is sgom-pa, the corresponding lta-ba being
ground-mahamudra, especially the method of sahaja-yoga (lhan-
cig skyes-sbyor).122 Thus, the main Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud used
a functional relationship between mahiimudra and the upaya-
marga almost the opposite of that used in the Ras-chung snyan-
brgyud.
In connection with the upaya-marga, Padma dKar-po worked
mainly with the two-fold distinction of cig-car-ba and rim-gyis-pa,
the corresponding structures being given in the bsre- 'Pho cycle
and in the yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum of the snyan-brgyud. 123 But
where the structuring relates to the level of mahamudra practice,
three different kinds of person appear: cig-car-ba, thod-rgal-ba,
and rim-gyis-pa. These are not correlated with the yid-bzhin nor-bu
skor-gsum at all, 124 and their mahamudra practices are respectively
sahajayoga, the "four yogas," and the paramita methods of the
lam-rim.
Padma dKar-po's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa relate mainly
to the most advanced stages of the path,125 and so to the two
higher types; he had no doubt that such people occur.
126
If
Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, when stressing the need for sahaja, is speak-
ing of the cig-car-ba then no doubt he is right; but then in
criticising Tsong-kha-pa he may well be beating the air, since it
is not clear that Tsong-kha-pa wrote for such persons or believed
that there are any.
From a bKa'-brgyud-pa point of view, it seems more reason-
able to suppose that Tsong-kha-pa was writing mainly for the
rim-gyis-pa. After all, this type takes the path in graded stages
not unlike those of the lam-rim and sngags-rim. The bKa' -brgyud-
pas too have a lam-rim, based on the Dwags-po chos-bzhi; 127 in
the end both types of/am-rim go back to Atisa, of course. Now
THE TWO SATYAS 37
it is not clear that Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms are relevant to
this level; the rim-gyis-pa on the sambhara-marga or the prayoga-
rnarga cannot be expected to experience sahaja. OJ course when
the bKa'-brgyud-pas teach samatha and vipasyana to beginners
they are taught separately; and it is not in respect of these
methods that Mi-bskyod rDo-rje claims that Tsong-kha-pa's con-
cept of sunyata is inadequate as abasis for mok.<;a. 128 So we must
look at the darsana-marga, or rather at what happens or what
changes on passage from the prayoga-marga to the darsana-marga.
In focussing on this particular point, the cig-car-ba is of little
interest, since with him "everything happens at once," while the
divisions for the rim-gyis-pa seem pointlessly detailed and schol-
astic. The interesting case is the intermediate one, the thod-rgal-
ba. His practices are structured according to the "four yogas,"
viz. rtse-gcig (ekagrata), spros-bral ro-gcig (ekarasa)
and sgom-med. What is characteristic of the thod-rgal-ba is just
the division into four; the cig-car-ba takes them all together,
while the rim-gyis-pa divides them more finely. 129 The four yogas
have a complex history and have been traced back to such Indian
works as the Vimalaprabha (by Padma dKar-po) and Naropa's
Phyag-chen tshig-bsdus (by Si-tu bsTan-pa'i Nyin-byed). I am not
clear that as a single recognisable genre in mahamudra they go
back beyond gTsang-pa rGya-ras, though quotations on the
individual "yogas" are often attributed to earlier writers such as
sGam-po-pa, sGom-chung, Zhang Tshal-pa, Phag-mo Gru-pa
and others. The individual yogas (rnal-'byor) are not themselves
particular methods of practice, in spite of the name, but rather
aspects of the experiences associated with a range of practices
at certain levels; the practices themselves may be taken either
from the sutras or the tantras, though sometimes the first two
yo gas are more associated with the sutras and the last two with
the tantras.
The thod-rgal-ba who practices the four yogas is assumed to
have completed the sambhara-marga. Roughly speaking, rtse-gcig
corresponds to the (end of the) prayoga-marga, spros-bral to the
darsana-marga, ro-gcig to "the bhavana-marga, and sgom-med to the
aSaik.<;a-marga. 130 There is also a correlation with the bodhisattva-
bhiimis.
133
The spros-bral stage is of especial interest since this
word is a name of the goal in Madhyamaka,132 but in a sense
ro-gcig is simply the stabilizing of what has been reached for the
first time in spros-bral Gust as suggested by the names of the
margas, darfana- and bhavana-). Thus, some ofPadma dKar-po's
most interesting remarks on spros-bral will be found under the
heading of ro-gcig.
Williams (l9S0) has rightly remarked that in Madhyamaka
there is a close relation between vikalpa (rnam-par rtog-pa) and
prapaiica (spros-pa). Padma dKar-po does not seem to distinguish
clearly between these two terms, which is why I have tended to
render both by "discursiveness." Though Williams' observations
are based on a wide range of Indian sources and not all are
congenial to Padma dKar-po, the following seems helpful (p.
30):
... prapaiica ... creates its own referent and thereby introduces
the distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate referents. All
prapaiicas require referents, but necessarily the referents cannot
be ultimate. It follows from this distinction that, regardless of
the Madhyamaka position as stated in its texts, the absence of
ultimate referents is not in itself sufficient to destroy prapaiicas.
What it does do is show the absurdity, the arbitrariness of being
caught in a net which creates its own possibilities and which lacks
any ultimate foundation. It is this absurdity which creates the
tension leading to soteriological rather than discursive intellectual
activity and which thereby requires the cessation of prapaiicas.
Here, the word "referent" must not be taken too objectively, as
Williams recognises later in the same passage by the use of the
word "craving" (for mngon-par zhen-pa, a word also used by
Padma dKar-po in this connection). Indeed one might say: it is
because of this craving that the mere absence of the referents is
not enough: one can perfectly well crave for something non-exis-
tent. The phrase "net of prapaiicas" (prapaiicajalan;) is used by
Candraklrti,133 and we will see Padma dKar-po similarly speak-
ing of a "net of kalpana" dra-ba), and of the lack of
foundation (gzhi) or root (rtsa-ba) of the errancy Ckhrul-pa) as-
sociated with such kalpana.
Padma dKar-po's rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs gives a very
traditional view of the "four yogas" and is written for persons
of "low intelligence.,,134 It associates rtse-gcig with samatha and
vipasyana; one can see from the Phyag-chen zin-bris, a much more
sophisticated work, that he had qualms about this because of
THE TWO SATY AS 39
the obvious link between vipasyana and but I cannot
go into all this here. I shall give his summaries of the four yogas
and extracts on spros-bral. Letters A, B ... , a, b ... in the margin
facilitate reference to the Tibetan transcribed in Appendix B.
A: Though nges-don (nZtartha) is experience and is impover-
ished by mere words, these words must now be spoken.13S
B: The fleeting is truly known in the stationary; and if the
stationary is firmly rooted in the fleeting, it is called fall-
ing into the gap between the stationary and the fleeting,
and this is the true explanation ofrtse-gcig.
C: Confidence in freedom is attained in errancy; and if in
freedom the evil hidden in errancy is recognised, it is
called falling into the gap between errancy and freedom,
and this is the true explanation of spros-bral.
D: The presence of mind is recognised in appearance; and if
in mind the arising of appearance is recognised, it is
called falling into the gap between mind and appearance,
and this is the true explanation of ro-gcig.
E: does not move away from the sphere (ngang)
of dharmata; and if in samahita the relaxation of compas-
sion appears, it is called falling into the gap betweensama-
hita and and this is the true explanation of
sgom-med.
In these passages, "true" and "truly" translate rang ngo five
times; "errancy" translates 'khrul-ba, "recognise" translates rig-
pa, and "fleeting" (for 'gyu-ba) and "stationary" (for gnas-pa) are
. borrowed from Guenther.
136
The phrase bar-lag 'gyel-ba occur-
ring in each of B-E does seem to mean literally, "to fall into
the gap," though Guenther has twice
137
rendered 'gyel-ba in B
by "to bridge." Be that as it may, the phrase bar-lag 'gyel-ba is
here surely a metaphor, and the doctrinal point is surely that
. rtse-gcig is something between or connecting the stationary and the
fleeting; similarly for the other definitions. Now, some of Pad rna
dKar-po's remarks on spros-bral: 138
a: Second, spros-bral: confidence of freedom is attained in
errancy; and if in freedom the evil hidden in errancy is
recognised, it is called falling into the gap between er-'
40 jIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
rancy and freedom, and this is the true explanation of
spros-bral.
139
b: Whatever errancy arises, is cognised as lacking any root
or foundation, and so one says that confidence of free-
dom is attained in errancy. Now an errant thing, differ-
ent from what is cognised as lacking any root or founda-
tion, is not attained, and so one says that in freedom the
evil hidden in errancy is recognised.
c: When one intuitively understands the gnas-lugs of every-
thing, all understanding by mere entia rationis
140
and all
doubts have been destroyed where they stand; and so one
says that all imputations have been cut off from within.
d: Further, in all the defiled things of errancy there is no ex-
perience of something existing; then understanding that
errancy has no foundation is called understanding the
gnas-lugs of errancy.
e: Now if there is no errancy, there is no reason to free any-
body from it, and so there is no attainment of nirval)a;
and thus there is nothing called errancy and freedom or
sarpsara and nirval)a to be analysed, nor any analysis.
f: Thus, since the gnas-lugs of all things from rupa to sar-
vajna is not established by means of a self-nature, they are
not non-void; so analysing from the point of view of the
non-void [the Satyadvayavatara says that] voidness is not
established even a little by the failure to establish non-
voidness. Accordingly it is impossible to give an analysis
into anything, and this point of view (lta-ba) is said not to
postulate anything.
g: The explanation of tha-mal-gyi shes-pa is this: nowadays,
through many failures of understanding, people think
that tha-mal-gyi shes-pa turns the mind to evil or to suffer-
ing or to the destruction of suffering. This is a great fault
which would be avoided merely by paying attention to
the science of grammar.
h: [For the Sanskrit] word prakr:ta becomes rang-bzhin or tha-
mal [and so tha-mal-gyi shes-pa] is equivalent to rang-bzhin-
gyishes-pa [i.e., "natural cognition"]'
J: This natural cognition has been given many names, such
as prakr:ti-prabhiisvara and "ground-mahamudra"; and in
works on the tantras it is known as svabhava-sahaja [cf. Ap-
pendixA].
THE TWO SATY AS 41
k: Some people explain this by saying that [this natural cog-
nition] has sunyata for its object and prakr:ti-prabhasvara
for the owner of the object and that these two rise to-
gether (sahaja). But in the language of experience [which
I prefer, natural cognition is] a free-rising awareness
(thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa) which just cognises clearly without in-
terrupting the understanding. If this in turn is misunder-
stood (ngo ma-shes-pa) there is sarpsara, while if it is under-
stood there is nirva:oa; but in itself it is quite impartial. Its
basis (ngo-bo) is mahiisukha, while the owner of the object is
sarvakaravaropeta.sunyata, these two being [ related in]
yuganaddha.
1: Thus [natural cognition] becomes the foundation of both
sarpsara and nirva:oa. The Hevajra-tantra says [II.iv.
32,34] "This is sarpsara, this is nirva:oa," and " ... it has
the form of sarpsara since it is obscured, but without ob-
scuration sarpsara is purified."
m: So this [natural cognition] is what is explained to be the
common referent (mtshan-gzhi) of sarpsara and nirva:oa.
n: But might it not be thought to be wrong to explain na-
tural cognition (tha-mal-gyi shes-pa) in terms of a free-
rising awareness (thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa)?
p: This free-rising awareness is not something which arises
(byung-ba) newly [on each occasion]. The previous kal-
pana (rtog-pa) has subsided, and before the next one arises
(skyes-pa), this awareness can rise (shar-ba) and that is why
it is called a [free-rising awareness]. It rises continuously
(shar shar-ba) at all times, but generally it is not manifest
because it is obscured by the net of kalpana.
This important p;:tssage offers considerable difficulties
in translation. The last phrase reads rtogs-pa'i dra-bas in
all editions, which needs amendment to rtog-pa'i dra-bas
in order to make sense. I have translated the causal terms
skye-ba and byung-ba by "arise," but shar-ba" literally by
"rise," except that in thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa I have taken
Padma dKar-po's explanation into account, following
Guenther, in translating skyes by "rising."
q: Before gnas-lugs is understood, the mind (blo, mati) af-
fects everything and there is no firmness. Whengnas-lugs
has been understood, the point (don) is not inconsistent
with the bare words. If it is claimed that now the view (lta-
ba) has been established in accordance with things as they
are (ji--lta-ba bzhin), it may be replied that there should be
an intuitive (mngon-sum) understanding, with view and
understanding [ appropriately] connected.
r: But the really important point is that the view should be
understood without reference to any scripture or logic;
for it is said specifically to rise (shar-ba) from within.
The last of these remarks by Padma-dKar-po explains why
he pays so little attention to the status of the obscurations and
why he calls them (more or less indifferently, it seems) rtog-pa
(kalpana) , rnam-par rtog-pa (vikalpa) and sometimes spros-pa
(prapaiica). He is concerned with the epistemic status only in
that they lack any root or foundation [b]; so it would be a step
backwards to give them a status of some kind, even provisionally
(drang-don-du) or conventionally (tha-snyad-du), which establishes
them as being something or other [cf. r]. On this model the arya
is a person who can see through the gaps between the obscura-
tions (Padma dKar-po frequently141 uses the analogy of the sun
shining through gaps in the douds). The prthagjana has so many
obscurations that he cannot see through them at all. On this
model it is easy to see why the first moment of insight (darsana)
is so important for various traditions of Buddhism.
Following spros-bral, the next stage of the "four yogas" is
ro-gcig, defined in passage D above. This stage stabilises the
experience of spros-bral as just discussed.
142
A quick glimpse at
the ro-gcig stage will enable us connect the "four yogas" more
firmly with the main topics of this paper. Padma dKar-po says: 143
How does one practice ro-gcig? At the time of spros-bral, all appear-
ances either were or were not understood as mind-as-such.
144
If
they were so understood, then there is no difference between
ro-gcig and this practice of spros-bral . ... At the time of ro-gcig,
appearance ... and mind both have the same taste (ro), or one
says that appearance has risen in meditation. However, this mix-
ing of mind and appearance is not like the dissolution of salt in
water ... Further, at the time of mere appearance nothing is
established, and whatever is not established rises as mere appear-
ance. This is snang-stong zung-jug or snang-stong lhan-skyes [cf.
Appendix A] ... gdangs or rtsal or what has attained the status
THE TWO SA TYAS 43
of the illusory body is sar[!vr:ti-satya, while not moving away from
gshis or pr:akrti-prabhiisvara is paramartha-satya. The point of zung-
jug (yuganaddha) is that these two can never be cognised sepa-
rately. This is the zung-jug or the inseparability of the two satyas,
while teaching the "white" Dharma of charity and so forth out
of the sphere (ngang) of sunyati or animitta is called thabs-shes
zung-jug.
While it is easy to understand Padma dKar-po's discussion of
spros-bral without dependence on Vajrayana terms, that is not
possible with this passage. In this sense, the topic of spros-bral
can be seen as a bridge between Madhyamaka and Vajrayana
or between the more theoretical or philosophical and the more
practical or meditational or strictly religious. The further pursuit
of this connection will demand a more careful analysis of the
Vajrayana terms for their own sake than is possible here. This
paper will have achieved one of its main aims if the reader is
now persuaded that in Tibet, Madhyamaka and Vajrayana go
together. The exact way in which they do so varies among the
different schools; what is presented here, of course, is mainly
the point of view of the bKa'-brgyud-pas,145 and the way the
bKa'-brgyud-pas saw their opponents. The detailed views of the
other schools themselves must be pursued elsewhere.
APPENDIX A
The following passage is found in the Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, 49b4-50b6:
b4 Ide'i phyir snang-sems gnyis-su 'byed mi-shes-pa snang-sems dbyer-med-kyi don-
nol I gnas 'di-la dgongs-nas brtag-gnyis-sul (RT Lx.41-2)
lhan-cig skyes-pa gang skyes-paillhan-cig skyes-pa de brjod-byal
lrang-bzhin lhan-cig skyes zhes brjodllrnam-pa thams-cadsdom-pa gcigl
Iphyag-rgya rgyu dang bral-ba-lasllyo-gi snying-rje thabs-su 'gyurl
Izhes gsungs-pa'i rkang-pa dang-po gnyis-kyi don ni ji-ltar sna-tshogs-su smras-
pa'i nges-donl snang (50a) stongl gsal-stongl bde-stongl rig-stong sogs-te snang-
ba dang stong-pa lhan-cig-tu skyes-pa'i phyir snang-stong lhan-skyes-sogs-su
bzhag-pa'ol I'di'i don-la zhib-mor dpyad-pa gnad-du che'ol
a2 Ide yang dge-ldan-pal rang-bzhin-med-pa'i don-gyis don-dam-par cang med mo
gsham-gyi bu lta-bu dangl rang-bzhin med-pa'i don-gyis kun-rdzob-tu dngos-po
thams-cad med-par nam yang mi-'gyur-ba zhig stel de'i rgyu-mtshan gyis snang-
bas yod-mtha dangl stong-pas med-mtha sel-lo zhes-zer-rol I'di ni rtag-chad gnyis-
44 jIABSVOL.8NO.2
ka'i phyogs-su lhung-ba stel don-dam chad-pa dangl kun-rdzob rtag-ltar song
zhing phyogs gnyis-su gzung rung bsdad-pas gzhi gcig-gi steng-du phyogs-lhung
sel ma-shes-sol
a4 Ide-tsam legs-ldan chen-po tshangs-pa'i glu-las kyang,byung stel
dngos-pos bden-pa yod ma-yinllmi-bden dngos-pormed ma-yinl
Ide-dag gnyis-kyi mtha mthong-ballde ni nga-nyid mthong-ba'ol
Izhes dangl gzhi tha-dad-pa'i rtag-chad sel-ba ni 'jig-rten-pa'i yang-dag-pa'i lta-
ba-la yang yod stel las-'bras yod-par bltas-pas rgyang- phen-la-sogs-pa'i phyogs
bsal-bal (50b) bdag rtag-pa shes rig sogs-su mi-smra-bas rtag-pa'i phyogs bsal-ba
yin-nol phyi-ma nil 'jug-pari (MMV VI.25)
mi-shes gnyid-kyis rab-bskyod mu-stegs-canl
Imams-kyis bdag-nyid ji-bzhin btags-pa dangl
Isgyu-ma smig-sgyu-sogs-la btags-pa gangl
Ide-dag 'jig-rten-las kyangyod min nyidllces-pas-sol
b2 Ide'i phyir de-tsam dbu-mar mi-'gyur-lal de'i bden-pa gnyis-su'ang rang-bzhin
med-pa'i phyirl Ide-dag rtag-pa ma-yin chad-pa minllzhes dangl rim-lnga'il (PK
VI.2 and VI. 13)
'khor-ba dang ni mya-ngan-'dasllrtog-pa gnyis-po spangs-nas nil
I gang-du dngos-po gcig gyur -lallzung -du 'jug ces de-La bshadl
Icesdangl
kun-rdzob dang ni don-dam-dagl Iso-so'i cha ni shes gyur-nasl
I gang-du yang-dag 'dres gyur-pallzung-du 'jug ces de-la bshadl
Ices gnod-pa'i ri bsnyil-lol
b5 Isa dkar phal-mo-chel gshis bden-pa dang bral-zhingl gdangs rdzun-pa dang
bral-bas bden-gnyis dbyer-med dangl khyag-rom dang chu bzhin snang bzhin-du
stong stong bzhin-du snang-bas snang-stong zung-'jug zer-rol
APPENDIX B
The following passages are taken from the rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs.
Passages A-E open the work; passages a-r are taken from the spros-bral section.
A: Inges-pa'i don nyams-su myong yanglltshig-tsam-gyis phongs-pa de-dag-la
'di-skad-du smra-bar bya '01 (1 b 1)
B: Ignas-thog-tu 'gyu-ba'i rang ngo shesl I'gyu-thog-tu gnas-pa'i rang so
tshugs-na, gnas-'gyu'i bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya stel rtse-gcig-gi rang ngo- phrod-
pa yin-nol (1 b2)
C: I'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs myedl Igrol-thog-tu 'khrul-pa'i mtshang
rig-na, 'khrul-grol-gyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya stel spros-bral-gi rang ngo-
'phrod-pa yin-nol (1 b3)
D: Isnang-thog-tu sems-kyi 'dug-tshul rigl Isems-thog-tu snang-ba'i 'char-tshul
rtogs-na, snang-sems-kyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya stel ro-gcig-gi rang ngo-
'phrod-pa yin-nol (l b4)
E: Irjes-thob chos-nyid-kyi ngang-las mi-g.yol Imnyam-gzhag-tu thugs-rje'i
klong brdol-nal mnyam-rjes-kyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya stel sgom-med-kyi rang
ngo-'phrod-payin-nol (lb5)
a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
f:
g:
h:
J
k:
1:
m:
n:
p:
THE TWO SATYAS
45
/gnyis-pa 'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed/ etc. as in C. (9a3-4)
/'khrul-pa gang shar-gyi thog-tu de-nyid gzhi-med rtsa-bral-du shes-pas/
'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed-pa zhes-bya/ gzhi-med rtsa-bral-du shes-pa
de-las phyin-chad 'khrul-pa'i chos gtan mi-rnyed-pa ni, grol-thog-tu 'khrul-pa'i
mtshangrig-pazhes-bya'o/ (9a4-5)
/chos thams-cad-kyi gnas-lugs mngon-sum-du rtogs-pas/ don-spyi-tsam-
gyis go-ba dangl the-tshom thams-cad rang-sar zhig-pas sgro-'dogs nang-nas
chod-pazhes-bya'ol (10a4-5)
I gzhan yang 'khrul-pa kun-nas nyon-mongs-kyi chos thams-cad 'ga yang yod
ma myong-bas 'khrul-pa gzhi-med-du rtogs-pa-la 'khrul-pa'i gnas-lugs rtogs-pa
zhes-byal (1 Oa6)
'khrul-pa med-na de-las grol rgyu ci yod-del med-pas mya-ngan-las-'das-
pa'i chos ci yang mi-rnyedl de-nas 'khrul-pa dang grol-ba' ami 'khor -ba dang mya-
ngan-las-'das-pa zhes bzhag-bya 'jog-byed dang bral-ba de yin-no/ (1 Ob 1)
Ide-ltar gzugs-nas rnam-pa-thams-cad-mkhyen-pa'i bar-gyi chos thams-
cad-kyi gnas-lugs rang-bzhin-gyis ma-grub-pa'i phyir mi-stong-pa ma-yin/ stong-
pa yang stong-pa-ma-yin-pa-la bltos-nas bzhag-pa'i phyirl mi-stong-pa cung-zad
ma-grub-pasl stong-pa-nyid ces-bya-ba cung-zad ma-grub/ de-bas-na gang-du
yang 'jog ma-nus-pa de-la lta-ba khas-len dang bral-ba zhes btags-pa yin-nol
(lOb4-6)
/tha-mal-gyi shes-pa zhes-bya-ba-lal deng-sang ma-go-ba mang-pos ngan-
pa sdug sdug-zhig-la blo gtod-kyi 'dug ste/ de-'dra sgra rig-pa'i phyogs-tsam-la
yang ma-phyin-pa 'i skyon chen-po yin-tel ( 11 a3-4)
prakr:ta zhes-pa rang-bzhin na'am tha-mal-la 'jug-pasl rang-bzhin-gyi shes-
pa zhes-bya-ba yin-nol (11 a4-5)
tha-mal shes-pa de-la 'ga'-zhig-tu rang-bzhin 'od-gsallla-lar gzhi phyag-
rgya chen-po-sogs ming mtha-yas modi de-nyid sngags-gzhung-du rang-bzhin
lhan-skyes zhes-bya-bar grags-sol (11 a6-b 1)
Ide ni yul stong-nyid dangl yul-can rang-bzhin 'od-gsallhan-cig skyes-pa-la
bshad kyandl myong-ba'i skad-nal shes-pa gsal-la go-ma-'gags-tsam-gyi thol-
skyes-kyi rig-pa 'di-nyid yin-lal de ngo ma-shes-pa 'khor-ba/ shes-pa myang-
'dasl kho-rang ni gangcgi phyogs-su yang-ma-chadl ngo-bo bde-ba chen-pol yul-
can rnam-pa-kun-gyi mchog dang ldan-pa'i stong-pa-nyid dang zung-du 'jug-pa
yin-no/ Ide-tsam-las tshig-tu brjod mi-nus-tel (11 b 1-3)
de-bas-na 'di ni 'khor-'das gnyis-ka'i gzhir gyur-parl brtag-gnyis-las/ (HT
II.iv.32,34)
'di-nyid 'khor-ba zhes-byastell'di-nyid mya-ngan-'das-pa-yinllzhes dangl
rmongs-phyir 'khor-ba'i gzugs-can-tellrmongs-med 'khor-ba dag-pa yin/
(1lb4-5)
Ides 'khor-'das mtshan-gzhi gcig-tu bshad-pa'i mtshan-gzhi de ni 'di yin-
nol (llb5)
lo-na rang-bzhin-gyi shes-pa de-la thol-skyes-kyi rig-par bshad-pa rigs-pa
ma-yin-no, snyam-na/ (11 b5-6)
thol-skyes zhes gsar-du byung-ba ma-yin kyang/ rtog-pa snga-ma 'gagsl
phyi-ma ma-skyes-pa'i bar-du sgrib-med-du shar-bas de skad-du brjod-cing/ de-
nyid dus thams-cad-du shar shar-ba yin kyangl phal-cher rtogs (read: rtog) pa'i
dra-bas bsgribs-pas ma mngon-pa ste/ (11 b6-12a 1)
q: gnas-lugs ma-rtogs bar-du ni thams-cad blos byas 'ba'-zhig yin-pas glad mi-
thub/ gnas-lugs rtogs-na ni tshig-tsam-las don-la mi-inthun-pa mi-sridllta-ba ji-
lta-ba bzhin gtan-la phebs-par 'dod-na nil mngon-sum-du rtogs dgos-pas lta-ba
dangrtogs-pa 'brel-ba zhes-zer-ba dang/ (l2b4-5) ,
r: lta-ba lung rigs-la ma-bltos-par rtogs-pa nang-nas shar-ba'i khyad-par zhes
gsungs-pa shin-tu gnad che-ba yin-no/ (12b5-6)
APPENDIXC
STRUCTURE OF THE NGES-DON GRUB-PA'I SHING-RTA
(principal headings only)
(gzung- 'dzin gnyis-su med-pa) rang-lugs bzhag-pa-la bzhi
dam-pa'i chas-kyi 'khor-lo ngos-gzung, 6b6
de spyod-pa'i gnyen-por bskor-ba'i tshul bstan-pa-la-gsum
drang-don-du drang-nges thams-cad-du gsungs-tshul, 7b4
nges-don-du ci yang ma-gsungs-pa'i tshul, I1b3
yang-dag-par na de gnyis mi-'gal-bar bstan-pa, 12bl
bshar-ba yang theg-pa gsum dang gnas-pa bzhir phye-ba-la gnyis
theg-pa gsum, 13a6
gnas-pa bzhi
bye-brag-tu smra-ba, 16a6
mdo-sde-pa, 17b3
sems-tsam-pa, 19b5
dbu-ma-pa-la gnyis
sgyu-ma lta-bu, 21 b5
rab-tu mi-gnas-pa-la gnyis
rang-rgyud-pa, 23a6
thal-'gyur-pa, 25a6
de-las shabs-hyi bshad-bya dbu-ma gtan-la phab-pa-la gsum
GZHI DBU-MA BDEN-GNYIS ZUNG-JUG-TU THAG-BGAD la gsum
gzhi bden-pa gnyis-su gnas-pa'i tshul, 29b5
gnas-pa ltar gnyis-su phye-ba'i dgos-pa, 33a6
dgos-pa-can-gyi bden-pa gnyis so-sor gtan-la phab-pa-la gsum
kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa, 35b6
don-dam-pa'i bden-pa, 41bl (not divided)
de gnyis zung-'jug-tu gtan-la phab-pa, 66a6
LAM DBU-MA THABS-SHES ZUNG-JUG-TU NYAMS-SU BLANG-BA-la gsum
rten-cing 'brei-bar 'byung-ba dbu-ma'i lam-du bstan, 68a3
de yang-dag-pa'i gdams-ngag-gi nyams-su bstan-tshul, 69a3
des mngon-par rtags-pa'i sa roam-par phye-ba, 75b6
'BRAS-BU DBU-MA SKU-GNYIS ZUNG-JUG MNGON-DU BYA-BA, 99a4
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BCAP: Paiijika on BCA by Prajnakaramati, ed. Vaidya
THE TWO SATYAS
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Lank.: Lankavatarasutra, ed. Vaidya '
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47
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Khrid-yig by Padma dKar-po: Jo-bo Na-ro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'Pho'i khrid rdo-rje'i
theg-pa bgrod-pa'i shing-rta chen-po, rTsi-bri ed.
dGongs-pa rab-gsal by Tsong-kha-pa (commentary on MMV)
Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta by Padma dKar-po: dBu-ma gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-
bar byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, gsung-'bum vol. 9
Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta by Mi-bskyod rDo-Ije: dBu-rna-la Jug-pa'i rnam-
bshad dpal-ldan duS-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhal-lung dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-
rta (commentary on MMV)
rNal-'byor bzhi'i lta-mig by Padma dKar-po: Phyag-rgya chen-po rnal-'byor bzhi'i
bshad-pa nges-don lta-ba'i mig, gsung-'bum vol. 21
rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs by Padma dKar-po: rNal-'byor bzhi'i bshad-pa don-
dam mdzub-tshugs-su bstan-pa, gsungs-'bum vol. 21
Dus-gsum-mkhyen-pa'i zhal-lung by sGam-po-pa, rTsi-bri ed.
Phag-gru'i zhus-lan by sGam-po-pa, rTsi-bri ed.
Phyag-chen gan-mdzod by Padma dKar-po: Phyag-rgya chen-po man-ngag-gi bshad-
sbyar rgyal-ba'i gan-mdzod, gsung-'bum vol. 21
dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa by Mi-la-ras-pa, printed with the Nges-don grub-
pa'i shing-rta, q.v.
rTsi-bri: rTsi-bri (s)Par-ma, edited during the 1920's by 'Khrul-zhig Padma
Chos-rgyal
gZhung-'grel by Padma dKar-po: Jo-bo Na-ro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'Pho'i gzhung-
'grel rdo-rje-'chang gi dgongs-pa gsal-bar byed-pa, rTsi-bri ed.
Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho by Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan
Lam-bsdu by Padma dKar-po: collection of short works on bsre-'Pho topics, of
which the first is called bsre-'Pho lam dbye-bsdu; rTsi-bri ed.
gSang-'dus-rgyan by Padma dKar-po:gSang-ba 'dus-pa'irgyanzhes-bya-bamar-lugs
thun-mong ma-yin pa'i bshad-pa, gsung-'bum vol. 16
iN estern Works
Aris (1981): M. Aris and A.S.S. Kui (eds.): Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh
Richardson (Proceedings of the 1979 Oxford conference) [Warminster:
Aris and Phillips, 1981]
Broido (1979): M.M. Broido, The term dngos-po'i gnas-lugs as used in Padma
dKar-po's gzhung-'grel (in Aris (1981
Broido (1983): M.M. Broido, Abhipriya and implication in 'Tibetan Linguis-
tics,]. Ind. Phil. 12 1-33 (1984) .
Broido (1984): M .M. Broido, Ground, Path and Goal in the Vajrayina,J. Tib.
Soc. (to appear)
Guenther (1963): H.V. Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Naropa [Oxford:
Clarendon 1963] .
Guenther (1972): H.V. Guenther, The Tantric View of Life [Berkeley and Lon-
don: Shambala 1972]
Guenther (1977): H.V. Guenther, Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective
[Emeryville: Dharma 1977]
Ruegg (1981): D. Seyfort Ruegg, On the Thesis and Assertion in Madhyamaka
(in Steinkellner (1983
Ruegg (1983): D. Seyfort Ruegg, A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages
and genealogical traditions of the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka, to appear
in the Tucci Festschrift [Rome: ISMEO]
Steinkellner (1983): E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.): Proceedings of
the 1981 Csoma de Koros Symposium [Vienna: Wiener Studien zur
Tibetologie u. Buddhismuskunde, 1983]
Williams (1979): P.M. Williams, Tsong-kha-pa on kun-rdzob bden-pa (in Aris
(1981
Williams (1980): P.M. Williams, Some Aspects of language and construction
in the Madhyamaka,]. Ind. Phil. 8 p. 1 (1980)
Williams (1981): P.M. Williams, Silence and Truth: Some Aspects of the
Madhyamaka Philosophy in Tibet, Tibet Journal (1981), pp. 67-80
Williams (1983): P.M. Williams, A Note on Some Aspects of Mi-bskyod rDo-
rje's Critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka,j. Ind. Phil. 11 p. 125 (1983)
NOTES
1. For example, Mi-la-ras-pa is a writer of more philosophical interest
and acuity than is sometimes thought. After all, philosophy is not only analysis.
As a stylist, he is both a good and a popular writer, and even his most informal
writings show a nice grasp of technical Buddhist terms. It is not surprising
that PadmadKar-po used one of his works as agzhung for the Nges-don grub-pa'i
shing-rta. The interaction between philosophy and popular culture is some-
thing which we do not yet understand well, even in the Western case. If such
questions are ever studied in the Tibetan context, Mi-la-ras-pa is likely to be
an interesting subject.
THE TWO SAD' AS 49
. 2. The main root-text of the dgongs-gcig yig-cha cycle is the rTsa-tshig
rdo-rje'i gsung brgya lnga-bcu-pa, essentially by 'Jig-rten mGon-po. Together
with a number of other short root-texts, it is found both in the gDams-ngag-
mdzod (vol. 9) and in the yig-cha itself (reprinted, e.g., Bir 1975, tracing from
. the 16th Cent. 'Bri-gung blockprints). According to BA 604-7, the main com-
mentatorial part of the yig-cha and the reduction of 'Jig-rten mGon-po's orig-
inal 190 aphorisms to 150 are the work of his pupil (not nephew) dBon
Shes-rab 'byung-gnas (1187-1241) who was abbot of 'Bri-gung in 1222-34;
the texts were written down in 1226.
3. The standard source of the dKar-po chig-thub idea in mahamudrii is
no doubt the Phyag-chen lam-mchog mthar-thug of Zhang brTson-'grus Darma-
grags (1123-93), reprinted in both the rTsi-bri Par-ma and in the gDams-ngag-
mdzod, vol. 8. Padma dKar-po shows how the dKar-po chig-thub rests on Indian
sources, at the same time refuting Sa-skya PaI).dita, in Phyag-chen gan-mdzod
40b3 ff.
4. Full and abbreviated titles of Tibetan works mentioned frequently
in the text may be found in the bibliography.
5. Williams (1983).
6. This was an ancestor of the present paper.
7. Ruegg (1983).
8. This remark is meant to be tautologous. I am using "bKa'-brgyud"
to mean just "Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud."
9. This is so even for Candraklrti. It is hard to find specific instances
of saT(tvr:ti-satya in the Prasannapadii, and though paramiirtha-satya is there closely
related to sunyata and to pratUyasamutpiida, these are themselves very general
notions.
10. 'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad, 5b5: don mdo-sngags dgongs-pa gcigl
dngos zin-la khyad yod-de, mdor-bstan rgyas-bshad lta-bul.
lOa. In Table 1 and the remarks following it, we see that in the mother-
tantras great bliss (mahiisukha) is taken as paramiirtha-satya, while voidness e n ~
dowed with all qualities (sarviikiiravaropeta-sunyatii) is taken as saT(tvr:ti-satya,
according to Padma dKar-po. There can be no doubt at all that this was' his
view, e. g., (Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 4 7b): des-na gshis-kyi dbang-du byas-nas 'gyur-ba-
med-pa'i bde-ba-chen-po bzhagl I gdangs-kyi dbang-du byas-nas rnam-pa'i mchog thams-
cad-dang-ldan-pa'i stong-pa-nyid bzhaglldang-po don-daml gnyis-pa kun-rdzobl des-
na kun-rdzob rgyu'am thabsl don-dam 'bras-bu'am thabs-byungl . .. That Padma
dKar-po held this view has been correctly pointed out at least twice by
Guenther, in his essays "The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism" and
"The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism" [see Guenther (1977) pp. 57
and 66], in both cases on the basis of this very passage. See also Lam-bdsu
97b6, 101a2. The idea is fundamental in Padma dKar-po's thought, and is
entwined with his views on the role of the two satyas in the Kiilacakratantra.
See his mChog-gi dang-po'i sangs-rgyas rnam-par phye-ba gsang-ba thams-cad bshad-
pa'i mdzod, especially 145b--155a.
11. Since this paper does not offer a full account of yuganaddha (or
even of Padma dKar-po's view of it), it would be vexatious to go into the
details of Guenther's account. He has tried to explain yuganaddha independ-
ently of Madhyamaka notions. I have found this impossible, and I believe the
matters dealt with in this paper are an essential preliminary to a full treatment
of Padma dKar-po's conception of yuganaddha, which I will give elsewhere
(see Broido (1984.
12. Deb-ther sngon-po 141b3, quoted up to here by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje,
Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rtaI763Ide-ltar dpal dwags-po bka-brgyud ces grags-pa
'di ni tshig-gi brgyud-pama-yin-gyi, don-gyi brgyud-pa yin-lal donyang phyag-rgya
chen-po dri-ma-med-pa'i rtogs-pa'i brgyud-payin-tel bfa-ma gang-las phyag-rgya chen-
po'i rtogs-pa thob-pa de-la rtsa-ba'i bla-ma'o zhes rnam-par 'jog gol Most of the topics
mentioned by 'Gos gZhon-nu-dpal in the remainder of this passage are also
taken up by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, but with some important changes. Roerich's
translation (BA 724-5) is adequate (apart from the misidentification of the
Theg-pa chen-po rgyud bla-ma'i bstan-bcos as a tantra).
13. rtsa-ba'i bfa-ma, mulaguru, root-guru.
14. pha-rol-tu-phyin-pa'i lugs.
15. Phag-mo Gru-pa rDo-rje rGyal-po (1110-1170) was the principal
disciple of sGam-po-pa.
16. 'Bri-gung sKyob-pa 'Jig-rten mGon-po (1143-1217), the founder
of the 'Bri-gung tradition of the bKa'-brgyud, was among Phag-mo Gru-pa's
principal disciples.
17. The reference is probably to Sa-skya Pal)Qita Kun-dga' rGyal-
mtshan (1182-1251).
18. ye-shes.
19. so-so'i skye-bo, pr:thagjana.
20. dbang-po rab: the text frequently distinguishes among sharp, average
and poor (rab, 'bring, tha-ma) intellect or senses.
21. khyad-par gsum-dang-ldan-pa'i de-bzhin-nyid. The three features are
probably bde-ba (happiness), gsal-ba (clarity), and mi-rtog-pa (absence of discur-
siveness).
22. See note 7.
23. bzhed-pa.
24. Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 81a4.
25. Ibid., 31l::r--32a.
26. Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, 3b2.
27. sGam-po-pa's view of the cig-car-balrim-gyis-pa distinction is based
on differences in the degree of purification (Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, 3a3); see also
Broido (1979).
28. Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 82a4. sGam-po-pa's very interesting
views on the lta-balsgom-pa distinction are developed at more length at 77b 1 ff.
29. Part of the point of ma-bcos-pa goes beyond "non-contingent"; cf.
Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 77b6: bcos-na rtog-pa yin-pas, ma-bcos-pa gal-chelde'i
ngang-las rtog-pa byung-na mi-spangl.
30. Cognition (shes-pa) is contrasted with awareness (ye-shes); the Skt.
for both isjiiana. These English equivalents are quite rough and pre-analytical.
3l. blo'i yul-las 'das-pa (cf. BCA IX.2).
32. khas-len-dang-bral-ba (from the verb khas-len-pa, Skt. abhyupagam-).
33. Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, 4a2 ff., extracts. The passage also quotes HT
THE TWO SATY AS 51
I.viii.36 and Lv.ll. Cf. rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs, 10b4 (passage f of Appen-
dix B).
34. This row gives the main divisions of the Prasangika section of the
Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta (cf. Appendix C).
35. This row gives the main divisions of the cig-car-ba section of the
gzhung-'grel.
36. 'Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad, 5b4 and 8a3 (lit. "one artha").
37. Ibid. 5b4 (lit. "a view with one artha").
38. Ibid. 5b5 and 8a4 (lit. "one intention"; here more comparable with
Skt. prayojana than say abhipriiya; cf. Broido (1983)).
39. Ibid. 6a3.
40. Ibid. 6a1.
41. Ibid. 5b5.
42. Ibid. 5b4.
43. Ibid. 8b 1; cf. Kiilacakratantra IlL 1 00 ff.
44. Ibid. 6a3.
45. Ibid. 5b3, 6a3.
46. Ibid. 5a5, 6a3. However Mi-bskyod rDo-rje appears to accept what
Padma dKar-po rejects, even quoting the same verse by Maitripa (Dwags-brgyud
grub-pa'i shing-rta, 5ab). This appearance of disagreement is another trap;
Padma dKar-po is here concerned with the claim that the bla-ma's instruction
(really: the Vajrayana) is essential, while Mi-bskyod rDo-rje wishes to uphold
the amanasikiira writings of Maitripa. For Padma dKar-po on these writings,
see Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 16a3 ff. where they are also listed and classified.
However, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje does not seem to say clearly that the goal-concep-
tion is the same in sutras and mantras 'or that one does in fact reach the same
goal.
47. Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta, 9b5.
48. Ibid. 10a3; probably Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan (1292-
1361).
49. Ibid. 10a6.
50. Ibid. llal: Bo-dong-pa chen-po (Rin-chen rTse-mo? Phyogs-Ias
rNam-rgyal?).
51. Ibid. lla4.
52. Seyfort Ruegg's interesting paper (Ruegg 1983) concentrates
mainly on the lineages, and is less concerned with Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's doctrinal
summary or with his attempts to refute the competing views of the sutra/man-
tra relation in the introduction to the Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta.
53. Refutation of Jo-nang-pa, ibid. Ilb2-13b3; of Sakya mchog-Idan,
13b3-27b4; of Bo-dong-pa 27b4-30b6; of Tsong-kha-pa, 30b6-32b5.
54. Strictly speaking, this should apply in the mother-tantras.
55. Ibid. 9b6: rang-byung-du spros-bral rnam-kun-mchog-ldan-gyi stong-
nyid-kyi lta-ba,
56. Ibid. 9b4-6.
57. Ibid. 9b5: mtha'-'dzin dang spros-'dzin-gyi dgag-bya bkag-nas, bsgrub-bya
ci yang mi-sgrub-pa'i spros-bral-gyi cha-nas khyad-par-med.
58, These words are scattered through ibid. lOa3-6, but the position
is well-known from other quotations and from the Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho.
60. Ibid. lOa6.
61. Ibid. 10b2.
62. Cf. ibid. 16b5; gzung- 'dzin-gyi don-gyi ngo khyad 'dzin-pa-med-pas,
mam-shes sa'am rig-pa'i don-la zhugs-pas shes-tsam de-la ye-shes-su btags-nas, de
don-dam bden-grub-tu rlom-pa des 'jam-dpal-te gnas-lugs-kyi don ma-rtogs-pa-nyid-du
gsungs-sol.
63. Ibid. Ilal.
64. Ibid. 29b2 and b6.
65. Ibid. 11a4: blo rtog-pas phar bzhag-min-pa'i yul rang ngo-nas grub-pa'i
bden-grub-kyis stong-pa'i stong-nyid-la mdo-sngags-kyi dbu-ma'i lta-ba.
66. Ibid.3Ial.
67. tha-snyad tshad-grub, ibid.
68. In "Nges-dOri grub-pa'i shing-rta," "nges-don" may be a comment on
the title of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work (Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta).
69. yuganaddha (zung-'jug) has been differently interpreted. See below.
70. Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, 30b5.
71. don-dam-pa ni yang-dag-par gzigs-pa-mams-kyi ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-gyi
yul-nyid-kyis bdag-gi ngo-bo myed-par yin-gyi ... Exactly this form is found in
the sDe-dge ed. of MMV (34a6); in Poussin's ed. (p. 102); and in the Nges-don
grub-pa'i shing-rta (for once expressly signalled as a quotation, 33a5). In Tsong-
kha-pa's Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho the corresponding passage is again expressly sig-
nalled as a quotation, and differs only by the phrase rang-gi bdag-gi ngo-bo for
bdag-gi ngo-bo (242a4).
72. de-nyid (tattva in the verse).
73. The Sanskrit of MMV VI.23 is quoted in BCAP (174):
samyagmr:s.iidarsanalabdhabhiivarlJ
. rilpadvayarlJ bibhrati sar-vabhaviil! /
samyagdr:s.iirlJ yo vis.ayah sa tattvarlJ
mr:s.iidr:s.iim sarlJvr:tisatyam uktam / /
74. J.R. Searle, Intentionality, (Cambridge, C. D.P., 1983), p. 43.
75. RatnavalZ IIAa, quoted and discussed in Ruegg (1981).
76. MMV VI.28 and bhii!iya on it, quoted at length in Nges-don grub-pa'i
shing-rta, 36b6 ff. As Williams (1979) has pointed out, this absence of satya in
the case of the prthagjana has been emphasized by Tsong-kha-pa; but it holds
equally good for the bKa'-brgyud-pas.
77. MK XXIV.8 and PSP on it, quoted Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta 30b2.
Padma dKar-po (ibid.) emphasizes that Mi-Ia-ras-pa makes the same point
(op. cit. 3a3 ff.).
78. Compare Table 2, which relates to the darsana-marga and levels
above it.
79. Candraklrti on MMVVLI8I-2 quotes asiitra thus: gang-gidbang-du
mdzad-nas bcom-ldan 'das-kyis de-bzhin-gshegs-pa-mams byung yang rung/ ma-byung
.yang rung/ chos-rnams-kyi chos-nyid 'di ni gnas-pa-nyid-do zhes rgyas-par gsungs-pa
chos-nyid ces-bya-ba ni yod-do/ Cf. Lank. 58.26: utpiidad va tathiigatanam anutpadad
THE TWO SATYAS 53
va tathagatanartJ dharmanartJ dharmata dharmasthitita dharmaniyamatal
80. Lank., ibid. What is important in all these passages is the insistence
that certain features of experience persist through the changing states of the
. experiencing subject. Later we will see that the bKa'-brgyud-pas held that a
similar kind of persistence can hold for the objects of experience (such as a
pot). Now in a general sort of way it is this kind of persistence which is the
necessary ground for a distinction between facts of experience or facts about
the world, and other kinds of facts (say facts of language). We wln see that a
distinction of this type, even though expressed unclearly and in quite unfamil-
iar language, is an important feature of bKa'-brgyud-pa thought.
81. Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, 42b3. The repudiation of these claims
is there said to be found in MMV, but I do not know where.
82. BCAP 175.21 :vastutastu paramartha eva ekam sat yam ... (and, quot-
ing a sutra:) ekameva paramaT[! sat yam yaduta nirvaTJam,
etc. (This is not quite the same as the passage atPSP 41.4.) In the same vein, Padma
dKar-po says that ultimately (paramarthatas) there are not two satyas (don-dam-par
bden-pa gnyis yod-pa ma-yin-te, etc.: Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta, 34al; he ascribes
this to PSP too).
83. See note 71. This passage appears in note 17 of Williams (1981)
and there seems to be ascribed to Tsong-kha-pa. This does not matter very
much, since in the dGongs-pa rab-gsal on MMV VI.23 we find (107b3): ... don-
dam nil yang-dag-pa'i don mngon-sum-du mthong-ba-rnams-kyi ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-
gyi yul-nyid-kyis bdag-gi rang-gi ngo-bo rnyed-pa yin-gyil ... This is Tsong-kha-pa's
own observation and not a quotation. What is important is that in all four
versions of the quotation from Candraklrti (see note 71) and even in Tsong-kha-
pa's own adaptation of the quotation, the instrumental yul-nyid-kyis persists. See
note 87.
84. P.F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1964), ch. 7.
85. Ibid. ch. 3; also pp. 207-8. It seems possible that the notion of a
feature-placing language might enable us to describe intelligibly a number of
puzzling features of Buddhist thought. Whereas our ordinary conceptual
framework commits us to objective particulars, the retreat to a feature-placing
language removes this commitment. Yet the feature-placing language does
not commit us to the absence of objective particulars either; since it contains
the basis for their (re-)introduction (p. 207).
86. Broido (1979), pp. 63--4.
87. See the opening pages of Williams (1981). (However he translates
yul by "sphere"). Though Williams quotes the critical passage with the instru-
mental particle (yul-nyid-kyis, see notes 71 and 83), that instrumental has dis-
appeared in his translation (p. 69, middle). In the same passage he translates
chos-can (i.e., dharmin, the mind or cognition which owns dharmas [e.g., Dus-
gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 55b5]) by dharma (i.e., roughly yul, as sGam-po-pa
himself points out [Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, ibid.]). The general effect
of these changes made by Williams is to make Tsong-kha-pa's text seem more
"objective" than would otherwise be the case. I have not studied Tsong-kha-pa
much and if experts say so, I am prepared to accept that the general slant of
his thought supports this "objective" interpretation; but this interpretation is not
supported by these particular passages. This is a very complex problem and prob-
ably demands detailed study comparing the works of several writers of different
schools.
88. See the end of the previous section. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's continual
references to sahaja (lhan-skyes), e.g., Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta 31 aI, a2
(twice), a4, a5, a6, bl (twice), b2, b4 (twice) etc. ... always refer back to sGam-
po-pa's famous lines (e.g., Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan 81b4):
sems-nyid lhan-cig skyes-pa chos-kyi sku/
/snang-ba lhan-cig skyes-pa chos-sku'i 'od/
which are the traditional starting-point (gzhung) for almost everybKa'-brgyud-
pa account of sahajayoga-mahiimudra (phyag-rgya chen-po lhan-cig skyes-sbyor) and
of which Guenther has rightly made so much (e.g., Guenther 1972, pp. 17,
24, etc.). Mind and appearance are here taken to be inseparable, like sandal-
wood and its smell, or the sur and its light (sGam-po-pa, ibid.). Here sems-nyid
(corresponding to paramiitha-satya) is not the object of anything, but is the
nature of mind (sGam-po-pa, ibid.) or is awareness lye-shes, ibid. 55b4); while
snang-ba, appearance, is also not an object but is the vikalpa which arises from
mind (ibid. 81 b5) and corresponds to sa7lJ.V1:ti-satya. Since they arise together,
neither can be established (grub-pa) as a basis for the other (cf. bhiis.ya on MMV
VI.23). MMV VI.80, discussed below, treats sa7lJ.vrti as the cause of paramiirtha.
One may wonder how vikalpa can be the cause of the dharmakaya; Padma
dKar-po's description of this process will be dealt with later in this paper,
while sGam-po-pa treats it at Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan 78bl.
89. The Sanskrit for ngo-bo here is rupa (see note 73). In the bhiis.ya,
the Sanskrit for rang-gi ngo-bo was perhaps svarupa.
90. In thedGongs-pa rab-gsal on MMVVI.23 (cf. note 83), Tsong-kha-pa
repeats Candraklrti's point that the two satyas are two ngo-bo's, but later says
that they have a single ngo-bo: ngo-bo gcig-la ldog-pa tha-dad-pa byas-pa dang
mi-rtag-pa lta-bu-ste/, etc. In his valuable "Identity and referential opacity in
Tibetan Buddhist Logic" (presented at the lABS conference in Oxford, 1982),
Dr. T. Tillemans points out that the phrase ngo-bo gcig ldog-pa tha-dad is a
technical term found in dGe-lugs works on pramii:rJa. He also pointed out to
me its appearance in the dGongs-pa rab-gsal.
91. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje claims that it is futile to speculate about whether
the two satyas have one ngo-bo or two: bden-gnyis ngo-bo gcig dang tha-dad gang-
du 'ang rtog-pa ga-la byed, Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta on MMV VI.2 3, 144b 1.
He attributes to Tsong-kha-pa the view that they have only one ngo-bo (ibid.
143a 1), and criticizes this view at some length.
92. Padma dKar-po's Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta contains a long section
on the sense in which the satyas, as foundation (gzhi) are two: gzhi bden-pa
gnyis-su gnas-pa'i tshul, 30a6 ff. (cf. Appendix C). He discusses their ngo-bo at
some length (based, e.g., on the classical sources MK XV 2-3 and PSP on
them), without committing himself to any view on whether there are one or
two ngo-bo's. He probably thought, like Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, that the question
has no clear answer.
THE TWO SATYAS
55
93. Guenther (1963), p. 189; cf. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, 36a6 ff.
94. In spite of its title, Naropa's Sekoddda(fka is a commentary not on
the Sekoddda, but on the of the Kiilacakratantra. Even so, the
verse quoted by Guenther from the Sekodddat'ikii (see note 93) is found in the
Sekoddesa (49.7 in the Lokesh Chandra ed.), but originated in the
Guhyasamiijatantra (XVIII. 78).
95. gZhung-'grel14bl, Khrid-yig 7a6. Here, gnas-lugs as paramiirtha-satya
is to be distinguished from dngos-po'i gnas-lugs which includes both satyas; see
below and Broido (1979).
96. miiyiideha, sgyu-lus.
97. vajrakiiya, rdo-rje'i lus, especially regarded as containing the system
of niir/i's through which move viiyu and bindu.
98. Guenther (1977), p. 67. Here he is right in correlating gshis and
gdangs with the two satyas. I find his use of the words "being," "reality," "true,"
"false," "refer," "item," "thing," etc., in this and similar contexts totally confus-
ing.
99. E.g., Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 66b5: Iyang-dag-pa'i kun-rdzob nil gnyug-
ma lhan-cig skyes-pa 'gro-ba-thams-cad-kyi rgyud-la rang-chas-su gnas-pa yin-tel de
yang 'gro-ba kun-gyi lus-la gzung-'dzin-gyi 'khrul-pa mi-'char-zhingl mi-rtog-pa rang-
babs-su gnas-pa'i rtsa dbu-ma zhes-pal dwangs-shing thogs-pa-med-pa'i 'od-kyi rang-
bzhin-du gyur-pa'i rtsa rkyen gang-gis kyang gzhom-du-med-pal gtso-bor spyi gtsug-nas
gsang-gnas-kyi bar-du khyab-cing/, etc. "samyaksa7IJV1:ti: in itself it is at rest, it is
sahaja, it abides in the santiina of all beings; then in the body of all beings the
straying into subject and object does not rise, and this is called the central
channel which abides in non-discursiveness and letting go (lit. falling by itself,
rang-babs). This channel which is clear and which has the nature of unimpeded
light and is not conquered by any pratyiiya, penetrates right from the top of
the head to the secret place, etc." Later in the same passage: "these three
dwangs-ma are called 'the middle' or 'at rest' because they have not fallen into
the extremes of nihilism or eternalism or of subject and object, and because
in the end they are non-deceptive they are called samyag or paramiirtha." In
the oral tradition I have heard this samyaksa7IJvr:ti explained as an obscured
paramiirtha (bsgribs-pa'i dondam).
100. The notion of yuganaddha in the tantras derives from the
Guhyasamaja cycle; though it does not seem to appear in the main tantra or
its uttaratantra, it is common in the iikhya-tantras such as theJiiiinavajrasamuccaya
and the Vajramiilii. As Wayman points out in his Yoga of the Guhyasamiijatantra,
the Vajramiilii is probably the original source for the five kramas whose theory
is systematized in Nagarjuna's Paiicakrama; they are vajrajiipa, cittavisuddhi,
abhisambodhi, and yuganaddha. (Poussin has confused matters by
starting his ed. of the Paiicakrama with the pin,q,ikr:tasiidhana, which is a separate
work.) Various Indian views on the naming and numbering of the kramas are
reviewed in detail in Tsong-kha-pa's Rim-lnga rab-gsal sgron-me (79a2) and
briefly in Padma dKar-po's gSang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyan (16a3).
101. Paiicakrama II.5-6, V.20, 26, all quoted Phyag-chengan-mdzod 157a6
ff. Here bhutako(i (yang-dag-mtha) stands for the radiant light.
102. Ibid. 157b6.
56
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
103. Ibid. 155a5 ff.
104. Cf. ibid. 156b2: glang-la rwa-co lta-bu ya gnyis 'dus-pas zung-jug-gol
Ide yang kun-rdzob bden-pa-la slob-pa-nas ya dang-po byung-ste phyi-ma medl mngon-
byang-gi dus gnyis-pa byung ste dang-po medl zung-jug-gi dus gnyis-po rong langs-pas!
de gnyis gcig-tu bshad kyang don tha-dad-par lus-sol Contrast this with rGyal-dbang-
rje's remark (see note 105): tha-dad-du mi-gnas zung-jug-gi gzhil.
105. Padma dKar-po quotes this passage at Phyag-chen gan-mdzod S4a6
and says himself that it is on gnas-lugs phyag-chen.
106. Ibid. 93a4.
107. Ibid. 92a5.
lOS. Guenther seems to have had this passage in mind when discussing
the gshis and gdangs of a conch-shell (1977, p. 69 and fnn.). Unfortunately,
his explanation operates with a very confused notion of sensa.
109. gZhung-'grel, 24a5 ff. But even here it is important not to give
"appearance" and "rebirth" any ontological status. A person who, in the bar-do
between death and rebirth, cannot rise straight into the dharmakaya (ibid.
2S4a4) or less directly into the sambhogakaya (ibid. 2S7b6) but who is still
capable of recognising appearances for what they are, can pass through the
rebirth process without getting tangled up in it and can be reborn in the
nirmal)akaya (sprul-sku) state (ibid. 2SSb4). These observations ofPadma dKar-
po are perhaps the doctrinal foundation for Guenther's apparently bizarre
translation of nirmal)akaya by "authentic being-in-the-world" (e.g., 1963, p.
47 n.5). One might put it this way: the three buddhakiiya's are
associated with the two satyas in the way described by Padma-dKar-po, and
the latter have an axiological component which I think is evident to many
Buddhologists, thought it does not seem clear how to "get it out of the texts."
There is something "genuine" or "authentic" about the satyas. (I am indebted
to David Seyfort Ruegg for a conversation on this important but rather con-
fusing topic.)
110. Yang-dgon-pa, Ri-chos yon-tan kun-'byung, sec. sha, sa. Now at lam-
bsdu 10 la3, Padma dKar-po attributes the distinction between gnas-lugs phyag-
chen and 'khrul-lugs phyag-chen to Yang dgon-pa, and Guenther, in reference
to this passage, translates these phrases by "authentic" and "inauthentic"
mahiimudrii. From the Ri-chos yon-tan kun-'byung one can see that these transla-
tions are not wrong for Yang-dgon-pa himself, but they miss the point of the
distinction as made by Padma dKar-po. Roughly speaking, while Yang-dgon-
pa concentrates on the "errant" aspect of 'khrul-lugs phyag"chen, Padma dKar-po
recognises it as the source of both authenticity and inauthenticity (in
Guenther's terms). This point is quite clear in the Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, but
it is possible to miss it in the lam-bsdu, especially if one does not have Yang-dgon-
pa's own account to hand. Thus in Broido (1979, p. 62 and fnn. 6.2, 6.3),
while realising that Guenther's translation is not consistent with the gan-mdzod
account, I offered a version which was still confused by the failure to distinguish
properly between Padma dKar-po's view and that of Yang-dgon-pa.
Ill. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, 84b6-91 al.
112. Ibid. 85a4.
THE TWO SATYAS 57
113. zag-pa med-pa'i bde-ba chen-po. Here "zag-pa med-pa" (anasrava) begs
just the question which concerns Padma dKar-po.
114. Ibid. 91b2-3.
115. Ibid.50al (see Appendix A: Ide yang dge-ldan-pal ... ).
116. Ibid. 49b5 (see Appendix A: ... brtag-gnyis-sul ... ).
117. Ibid. 50b3 (see Appendix A, rim-lnga'il ... )
118. PK VI.2 and 13. With minor variations these verses appear also in
the bKa' yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma and so receive considerable commentary in the
gZhung-'grel, 370b4 and 375a3.
119. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, 156b2. The connection between sahaja and
akr:tima was appreciated by the early dGe-lugs-pas, as one can see from extracts
from the sNgags-rim chen-mo ofTsong-kha-pa and the rGyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag
of mKhas-grub-rje, printed by D. Seyfort Ruegg in his Life of Bu ston Rin-po-che
(Rome: ISMEO 1966), p. 62 etc. Padma dKar-po's point is that they did not
make the connection between sahaja and yuganaddha; this is certainly born
out by the (quite extensive) extracts on yuganaddha printed by Seyfort Ruegg.
Similar remarks apply to the extracts from Tsong-kha-pa's mchan-'grel on PPD
printed by Wayman in his Yoga of the Guhyasami'ijatantra. On the other hand,
Thu'u-bkvan Blo-bzang Chos-kyi Nyi-ma (1732-1802) was certainly aware of
the sahajalyuganaddha relation (Ruegg, op. cit., p. 59), but in connection with
the Sa-skya tradition.
121. According to some sources (BA 660-1; 'Brug-pa'i chos-'byung 283ab;
Phyag-chen gan-mdzod (23b2), Gling-ras went first to Khyung-tshang Ras-pa,
but his real teachers for the snyan-brgyud were the latter's pupils Lo and
Sum-pa. Other sources such as Padma dKar-po's gsan-yig and the mss. of the
Yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum give a different picture. The complexities of the
early transmission history of the snyan-brgyud would repay independent study.
Among the specialities of the snyan-brgyud are the 13- and 62-deity-
mal)<;lalas of Cakrasarnvara; these did not come to the 'Brug-pas till later
(gsan-yig 51a3). The root-text for the snyan-brgyud practices is Naropa's
KarfJatantravajrapada, with its sa-bead and commentaries by both gTsang-smyon
and Padma dKar-po. Padma dKar-po taught the snyan-brgyud widely, and his
sNyan-brgyud yid-bzhin nor-bu legs-bshad rgyal-mtshan-gyi rtser bton-pa dngos-grub-
kyi char-'bebs was the subject of subcommentary by 'Jam-dpal dPa-bo (c. 1780:
sNyan-brgyud yid-bzhin nor-bu'i rnam-bshad yang-gsal-gyi zin-bris, 2 vols., twice
republished recently). Many of the snyan-brgyud practices are still followed
today in Bhutan, Ladakh, etc.
122. Phyag-chen gan-mdzod, 21b3 ff.
123. gZhung-'grel 176b-179b; Khrid-yig 19b4. See also Broido (1979), p.
6l.
124. gZhung-'grel 179al, khrid-yig 20a2.
125. At Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 96b5 ff., Padma dKar-po criticises at some
length Tsong-kha-pa's claims to teach a sgom-rim which will reach nges-don
(nZti'irtha). [The difference here is a matter of substance, and not merely of
differing interpretations of the word nges-don, on which Tsong-kha-pa and
Padma dKar-po were fairly much in agreement, as against, say, Bu-ston. For
Bu-ston on the niitarthalneyartha distinction, see his bDe-gshegs snying-po mdzes-
rgyan (e.g., 11b2) as regards the sutras. The three authors were more in
agreement in regard to the tantras. For detailed referenj:es, see Broido (1983 ).]
126. Padma dKar-po describes Gling-ras as a cig-car-ba and rGya-ras as
a thod-rgal-ba (Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 23b4, 24a1); other examples are found
in his chos-'byung.
127. As bibliographical terms, the phrases Dwags-po chos-bzhi and Lam-gyi
mchog rin-po-che'i phreng-ba, while not identical, seem to overlap a good deal.
See vol. 11-12 of Padma dKar-po's gsung-'bum. However, the collection of
aphorisms in 28 sections, also called lam-mchog-gi rin-po-che'i phreng-ba, has
nothing to do with the Dwags-po chos-bzhi.
128. Williams (1953) as quoted above (referring to Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i
shing-rta 67b4 ff., quoted extensively in his note 17). All Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's
opponents are there said to be working with concepts that cannot lead to
moks.a: ,,]o-nang-pa dang Shiikya mchog-ldan-sogs bod phal-cher ... thar-lam-las log-
par zhugs-pa ... " .
129. rNal-'byor bzhi'i lta-mig, 7ab.
130. See Padma dKar-po's rNal-'byor bzhi'i re'u mig, a I-folio chart sum-
marizing the divisions of the "four yogas," printed together with the mdzub-
tshugs in all the usual editions.
131. See the Phyag-chen zin-bris, and Si-tu bStan-pa'i Nyin-byed's Phyag-
chen smon-lam 'grel-pa, 45b--47a.
132. Part of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticism of Tsong-kha-pa's notion of
the two satyas is formulated in terms of the claim that Tsong-kha-pa's
paramartha-satya is not spros-bral (ni!iprapaiica): see Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-
rta, 138b 1 ff.
133. PSP on MK 18.5 (quoted by Williams (1980), note 135). Also for
Parma-dKar-po, this is the most important Indian Madhyamaka source on
ni!iprapaiica.
134.blo dman-pa mams: rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs, 17b3.
135. In this remark, the word nftartha connects the subject-matter with
paramartha-satya, probably with ni!iparyaya-paramartha, a connection made
explicit in the parallel passage Phyag-chen gan-mdzod 96b5. See note 125. For
Padma dKar-po's use of the term mam-grangs ma-yin-pa'i don-dam and similar
terms, see Broido (1983).
136. Guenther (1977), p. 75.
137. Guenther (1963) p. 70 n.2, and (1977) p. 75.
138. A portion of this has also been covered by Guenther (1977, pp.
77-8). However, the passage on his p. 77 comes from the Ita-mig (not the
mdzub-tshugs). The passage on his p. 78 translates passage k: of Appendix B
(up to ... zung-du 'jug-pa yin-no/). Some of Guenther's renderings of individual
terms are very idiosyncratic, e.g., "conateness" for lhan-cig skyes-pa; "forbid
every formulation by concept or by speech" for spros-bral; "unique kind of
whole" for rtse-gcig, etc. For reasons given below, I also think his translation
of tha-mal-gyi shes-pa by "primordial knowledge" does not pay enough attention
to what Padma dKar-po himself says about this phrase in this very context.
THE TWO SATYAS 59
In spite of these details, however, Guenther seems to have got the gist of what
Padma dKar-po was saying.
139. Very unusually, Padma dKar-po has given the definitions B-E in
the sa-bcad and then repeated each at the beginning of the relevant section;
I have followed him for the case of spras-bral.
140. don spyi. This really means a mental object postulated purely to
serve as the referent for an otherwise non-referring term, as T. Tillemans
has shown (in his paper mentioned in note 90).
141. E.g., rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs, 12a1.
142. Ibid. 13bl.
143. Ibid. 13b--14a (extracts).
144. spros-bral-gyi dus-su snang-ba thams-cad sems-nyid-du rtogs sa'am/ ma-
rtogs/, etc. Of course, this use of sems-nyid is not ontological in any way and
does not commit Padma dKar-po to some kind of mentalism. The bKa' -brgyud-
pas thought that mind and mental processes are important. That is another
matter from being a mentalist. Guenther recognizes this distinction in his
essay "Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy" (1977 pp. 162-177)
and yet sweepingly ascribes a mentalistic position to the bKa'-brgyud-pas in
general (top of p. 166) on the basis of just such quotations (from the Phyag-chen
zla-zer) as support merely the view that mind and mental events are important.
He is right in saying that the bKa'-brgyud-pas usedsems-nyid in a different
sense from the rNying-ma-pas, but mistaken in saying that the later bKa'-
brgyud-pas did not distinguish between sems and sems-nyid. (On the other hand
there appears to be some mentalism in the thought of the early bKa'-brgyud-
pas).
145. dBang-phyug rdo-rje's account is mainly directed to the rim-gyis-pa.
It contains (140b6) the following summary, which may be compared with
passages B-E of Appendix B: zhi-lhag zung-du 'brel-ba'i rgyun-la rtse gcig-tu
gnas-pa de rtse-gcig/ /sems-kyis sems-nyid skye-med-du gsal sing-gi shar-ba de'i rang-
ngos-nas 'khar gsum-gyi spros-pa dang bral-ba spras-brall /snang-ba sna-tshags-su
snang yang rang-gi sems-nyid-du ro gcig cing bdag-gzhan 'khor-'das-sogs gnyis chos
thams-cad ro gcig-tu gyur-pa ro-gcig/ /yin-min phan-tshun gang-du bltas kyangrang-gi
sems-nyid de'ang bsgom-bya sgom-byed-la-sags-la gang-du'ang ma-grub-par 'od-gsal-
du cham-cham 'char-basgam-med-kyi mal-'byar zhes-bya'o/ Roughly speaking, these
remarks explain the references of the four terms for one who already knows
their senses, while in B-E of Appendix B, Padma dKar-po explains their
references without making use of their senses.
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"No-Thought" in Pao-T'ang Ch'an and
Early Ati-Yoga
by A.W. Hanson-Barber
The notion of no-thought is found in both the Pao-Tang
school of Ch'an
1
and the early Ati-Yoga system
2
now preserved
in the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism.
3
Some authors
have stated that Ch'an thought and the Ati-Yoga thought are,
in fact, the same in many aspects. Some have even suggested
that the Ati-Yoga has incorporated Ch'an at an early stage of
its development or implied that the Ati-Yoga is a tantricized
form of Ch'an.
4
It would seem likely that in part these authors
have formulated their theories based on the fact that the notion
of no-thought appears in both schools. However, as will be seen
below, the notion of no-thought has a completely different con-
notation for these two schools of thought.
There is good reason here to select the Pao-T'ang school
from among the various schools of Ch'an. Primarily, a strong
argument could be made that the now infamous Hwa Shang
Mahayana (the representative of the Ch'an school at the debate
of bSam yas or Lhasa) was at least in part a representative of
this school, especially in his theory of no-thought. This argument
is not only based on the information gathered from the undoubt-
edly exaggerated Tibetan sources about the council, but aJso is
available from Chinese sources found at Tun Huang.
5
There-
fore, it seems likely that if there were any connection between
Hwa shang's thought and the notion of no-thought in Ch'an,
it would be with the more radical version of this notion found
in the Pao-Tang school. The Tibetans had easy access to this
school and it had obviously become popular enough for one of
its spokesmen to have been chosen for the debate.
61
In this brief paper, I will present a description of both the
actual doctrinal position that the Pao-Tang school took on the
notion of no-thought and how this position developed within
the Ch'an school. Secondly, I will present a description of the
doctrinal position of this same notion as found in the early
Ati-Yoga. However, a history of its development within that
school is at present not possible to reconstruct, due to a lack of
any critical study based on the material available.
I. The Development of the Notion of No-Thought in China
According to Whalen W. Lai,6 the notion of no-thought
(Ch. wu-nien) cannot be separated from the nien complex found
in the Han tradition. He has argued that the notion of no-
thought can be used to determine the origin of The Awakening
of Faith in the Mahiiyana, the first Buddhist work wherein one
encounters the notion of no-thought. However, the notion of
no-thought and its exact meaning within this work are problem-
atic; not only is an English rendering difficult, but the notion
is difficult to contend with even for the alleged translation made
by
Be that as it may, within the Ch'an tradition one first finds
the notion of no-thought being put forth by the Southern school
to counter the notion of "detachment from thought" (Ch.li-nien)
of the Northern school. The very use of the term no-thought
is even found in the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch. One can
surmise it was one of the key issues that divided the two branches
of Ch'an. Whether or not the Southern school understood cor-
rectly the implications of li-nien is still undetermined.
7
Although
this question is important to Buddhologists, the Southern school
did finally gain the hearts of the Chinese, as Suzuki has noted:
... as time went on (the Southern school) proved to be the winner
as being in better accord with the thought and psychology of the
Chinese people.
8
From this beginning, Wu Chu, one of the founders of the
Pao-Tang school, developed the notion of no-thought to its
radical, although logical, conclusion. The notion put forth by
"NO-THOUGHT" 63
Wu Chu can be found in the Li Tai Fa Paa Chi,9 a document
found at Tun-Huang.
II. The Ch'a1J, Doctrine of No-Thought
The notion of no-thought has to be seen within a context
of philosophical notions before the fuller implications of its
meaning can be ascertained. This context consists of three parts:
1) definition of enlightenment; 2) sudden enlightenment; and
3) the notion of no-thought proper.
As is well known, the Ch'an school, basing itself on the
statements in the Larikavatara Sidra and elsewhere, basically de-
fines enlightenment as sva-citta. As Hui Neng explains:
To know our mind is to obtain liberation. To obtain liberation
is to attain Samadhi of Prajna, which is "thoughtlessness." What
is "thoughtlessness?" "Thoughtlessness" is to see and to know all
Dharmas (things) with the mind free from attachment. When in
use it pervades everywhere, and yet it sticks nowhere. What we
have to do is to purify our mind so that the six gates will neither
be defiled by nor attached to the six sense-objects. When our
mind works freely without any hindrance, and is at liberty to
"come" or to "go," we attain Samadhi of Prajna or liberation.
lo
Thus, as will be seen below, this position of defining enlighten-
ment as sva-citta is necessarily implied in the philosophical po-
sition of the Pao-Tang school. Therefore, there is no difference
between the Southern school and the Pao-Tang school on this
point and the above statement by Hui Neng would be accepted
by the Pao-Tang.
As for point three above, one can ascertain Wu Chu's po-
sition on this from a statement in the Li Tai Fa Pao Chi: "When
there is truly no-thought, then no-thought itself does not
exist."ll By this is meant that when there really is no discrimi-
nation, then one can not even speak of a thing called no discrimi-
nation. This is further elaborated by a criticism brought against
this school by Tsung Mi:
... Their idea is that the cycle of birth and death is due to the
arising of thought (ch'i hsin
a
): when thought arises there is delu-
64 JIABS VOL 8 NO.2
sion (wang
b
); when no thought, either good or evil, arises there
is truth.
12
He further goes on to criticize the Pao-T'ang along the same
lines that Hwa Shang Mahayana was criticized in Tibet. Finally,
he concludes:
Thus, their practice is not (concerned with) right or wrong, but
only values no mind (wu hsin
C
) as the profound ultimate (miao
chid) ... Y
Further, as noted above, there is no way to understand the
implication of the Pao-T'ang position other than within the
stream of sudden enlightenment. That is, when the discrimina-
tions have been completely s t o p p ~ d , enlightenment must come
suddenly. This is further corroborated by the criticisms brought
against this school by Shen Sh'ing in the Pei Shan LU.
14
Therefore, the notion of no-thought is seen as the goal.
When one can stay within the realm of no-thought without
straying from it, one has arrived. This can also be ascertained
from the unusual practices of the Pao-T'ang. They did not make
offerings ~ o the Buddhas, practice compassionate activity, follow
even the standard etiquette of the time, or have the standard
ceremonies of ordination of monks and nuns. All of these cus-
toms were seen to be nothing more than discriminations and
therefore on the side of sarp.sara.
Thus, it has been shown that the Pao-T'ang school under-
stood enlightenment as sva-citta, accepted the theory of sudden
enlightenment, and saw no-thought as the goal.
III. No-Thought in the Ati-Yoga
As mentioned above, a history of the development of the
notion of no-thought in the Ati-Yoga is at present impossible.
This is primarily because most of the materials for a critical
study have only become available to the West in the past few
years and as of yet no one has intensively studied the earliest
material of this system. A study of such material is, of course,
crucial for the history and doctrine of the rather cloudy early
"NO-THOUGHT" 65
tantric period. However, lacking this, I have presented below
material drawn from the individual perhaps most responsible
for the transmission of Ati-Yoga to Tibet: Sri Sirpha, who was
the teacher of both Vairocana and Vimalamitra, who in turn
transmitted the Ati-Yoga system that they learned from Sri
Sirp.ha into Tibet during the first propagation period;
For this paper, I have drawn on the teachings of Sri Sirpha
that were translated into Tibetan by Vairocana. In this section
of the investigation I again will use the three categories men-
tioned above to try to gain a comprehensive understanding of
the notion of no-thought in the Ati-Yoga system.
IV. Definition of Enlightenment in Ati-Yoga
Unlike the Ch'an school position on the definition of en-
lightenment presented above, the Ati-Yoga position is that en-
lightenment is defined as bodhicitta. This is understood within
the general context of the tantras; the multi-level meaning of
bodhicitta found within the tantric literature is accepted by this
school in toto. Here, then, is the Ati-Yoga school's understanding
of enlightenment as bodhicitta and then its understanding of
what bodhicitta means:
The Bhagavan arose from the midst of his profound meditation
without appearances (i.e., thought constructs), and spoke: "The
~ u p r e m e vehicle, which is peerless, by whatever mounting on
this great vehicle [that one undertakes] one certainly arises from
sarpsara. Since [sarpsara] is the place [wherein one] depends upon
other vehicles, it is proper to meditate upon this [supreme] ve-
hicle. Whoever meditates on this great vehicle is similar to the
Jina-Buddhas. Since the great vehicle is bodhicitta . ... 15
... from all the spheres of the complete pure ocean [like]
skywomb which is the completely pure bodhicitta thig le of all
appearances there arises that very pure awareness from that
sphere ... From both the pure awareness and the sphere one
realizes (that) characteristics and characteristiclessness are iden-
tical. Since meat, religious articles, and the mar:H;lala of the gods
and goddesses are realized as not being separate (from the non-
dual pure awareness sphere), it is Anuyoga.
16
66
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
Thus, enlightenment is understood in Ati-Yoga as bodhicitta.
In the second quotation what is being presented is an explana-
tion of how to understand the Anuyoga tantric level from the
Ati-Yoga perspective. This is an interesting feature of this system
that needs further investigation; however, here what must be
pointed out is that the quotation does show that the understand-
ing of bodhicitta is within the usual context of the tantras.
V. Sudden Enlightenment in Ati-Yoga
Within the Ati-Yoga system, enlightenment is seen as Occur-
ring in an instant. This is so because the non-attraction to or
non-aversion from thoughts can only happen suddenly. That
is when one neither tries to stop or start thoughts, but rests in
the state of pure awareness (Tb. rig pa); the act of attachment
to or aversion from thoughts is stopped in an instant. There is
no middle ground; either one is in the mode of attachment/aver-
sion or one is not. In the Root Tantra Without Birth Being the
Great Sky Like Vajrasattva, it says:
As for fulfilling the conditioned minds of all sentient beings,
because of persevering, one is called brave; the body of all
Tathagatas manifests from the five-bodhi meditation; not by
stages but in an instant. In an instant (one becomes) the son of
a good family (i.e., a Bodhisattva). 17
The term that is here rendered as "instant" (Tb. cig car) has
been brought into question by R.A. Stein. He has maintained
that the Tibetan should be understood as "simultaneous" and
not "instantaneous." 18 However, the material that he was using
was primarily from the Mahamudra teachings and does not
apply to the Ati-Yoga system. This is so because of the fact that
in the texts investigated, the sudden break-through is more
often spoken of as "spontaneously arisen" (Tb. [hun grub) or
"existing spontaneously arisen" (Tb. lhun gyis grub pa yin) instead
of "instantaneous" (Tb. cig car). Therefore, the Tibetan term
cig car should be translated in this material as "instantaneous,"
and the comments that Professor Stein has given on this term
do not apply in this case.
"NO-THOUGHT" 67
Be that as it may, one must then read the terms "spontane-
ous arising" and "existing spontaneously arisen" as synonymous
with "sudden" or "instantaneous." Therefore, in the Precious
Wheel of Disputation the discussion of how enlightenment is ex-
perienced is framed by this terminology:
The great fruit is not sought after but exists spontaneously arisen.
It merges with the non-sought sphere and without effort the
great meaning arises. Without wandering the great earth has
been passed.
19
VI. No-Thought in Ati-Yoga
The first thing to note in this context is that there is not a
single term that expresses this basic notion, as with the Chinese
wu-nien. In the Ati-Yoga system there are two basic sets of expres-
sions that can mean no-thought. These are "no-movement" and
"no-thought" proper.
First, within the Ati-Yoga one speaks of "no-movement"
(Tb. mi gyu pa). By this term is meant both no movement of
thoughts and no movement from the pure awareness (Tb. rig
pa). In the Root Tantra Without Birth Being the Great Sky Like
Vajrasattva, it says:
Various movements are the things of sarpsara; not thinking, not
moving is enlightenment.
2o
As one can see from the first line, "movements" here can be
understood as movement from pure awareness because "no-
thought" is mentioned in the second line, leaving "movement"
to mean something else. In regard to this pure awareness, the
Precious Wheel of Disputation says:
The way in which the [pure] awareness abides is [that it is] clarity,
unmoved, and not falling into extremes.
21
Further, being in the state of pure awareness automatically im-
plies that there are no discriminative thoughts arising. Thus,
the two terms are mutually exclusive. But this is at the highest
68
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
level, of pure awareness. At slightly lower levels one can be
purely aware of thoughts; that is, one is abiding in a state that
has no attachment to or aversion from the thought projections.
This can be seen from the fact that the terril "pure awareness"
(Tb. rig pa) can act as both a verb, meaning "purely aware," and
as a noun, meaning "pure awareness."
However, the pure awareness is far more important to this
system than that implied above for it is in fact the very goal of
the meditation. This can be seen from the selections presented
below:
As for the pure view, because of [that] nature, (i.e., emptiness)
[one] enters right into the meaning. Moreover, the meaning of
"pure" is the emptiness of thatness. "Emptiness" means an emp-
tiness of attending [to] objects; it is not like being without some-
thing. The emptiness of a thing is the essence of pure awareness,
and so forth.
22
... all the dharmatiis of dharmas, the bodhicitta foundation-from
the beginning one realizes [them] due to the pure awareness
which is unarisen, unproduced, and without birth and death.
23
In the first quotation, pure awareness is defined as empti-
ness. This is called the pure view, which means here the highest
view. In the second, the unarisen, unproduced, and non-
sarpsaric pure awareness is the foundation of bodhicitta and the
dharmatas of dharmas. Here, as mentioned before, bodhicitta is
a definition of enlightenment. Therefore, enlightenment's
foundation is realizable by pure awareness. However, the pure
awareness does not cause enlightenment, because this would
mean that the two terms stand in a cause and effect relationship.
This could not be the case, because the pure awareness is un-
arisen and unproduced. Therefore, enlightenment must come
about in a natural spontaneous flash, for how can something
that is unproduced produce something else? Therefore, as seen
above and from the quotation below, enlightenment just spon-
taneously exists.
Sarpsara and nirvaI).a both cannot be distinguished. As there is
no duality, it is separated from fault and is excellent. From the
beginning without beginning it is unspeakable and separate from
"NO-THOUGHT"
69
words. In essence it is the spontaneously sprung nature. The
arising of realization and non-realization: when it is realized,
[one] is a Buddha, and when it is not, [one] is an [ordinary]
sentient being.24
With regard to the expression of no-thought proper, again
one should note that there is no specific technical term that has
the same weight as the Chinese wu-nien. There are several terms
that in general can be interpreted as meaning "no-thought"
These are: dmigs pa med pa, mi dmigs, sems pa med pa, and mi sems
pa. The first is translated as: without imagining, without
thought, and without apprehending. The translation "without
apprehending" is probably more technically accurate, and has
been determined from reading various passages in the texts
surveyed. However, the meaning "without thought" (i.e., no-
thought) is also correct, but in a more general sense. The second,
mi dmigs, having the same basic operative word as the above, is
technically "no apprehension" or "no thought" in a general
sense.
Finally sems pa med pa can be translated as: without thought,
without imagining, or without intellectual activity. Also, mi sems
pa can be translated as no-thought, no imagining, or no intellec-
tual activity. The first translation of these two terms seems to
be the more technically correct. This can be determined from
the fact that for the Ati-Yoga system the term sems is understood
as "constructing mind." This is a mind that is involved in the
fundamental process of fabricating sarpsara. Thus, sems pa has
to be understood as something more basic than intellectual ac-
tivity, for this exists on a sophisticated level. Although "imagin-
ing" has a constructive element to it, in English it seems to carry
a notion of being something that is completey developed in a
framework of illusion. Although one can say that sarpsara is
illusionary on the ultimate level, it does appear real on the
conventional level. Imagining appears unreal on the conven-
tionallevel, so within this context translating sems pa as imagining
would be unacceptable. This leaves one with translating this
term as no-thought. The word "thought" seems to contain
enough flexibility to encompass more basic levels of the mental
process as well as the more sophisticated, and at the same time
contains a constructive element.
The etymology having been determined, the question can
now be raised: What status does the notion of no-thought proper
have within the Ati-Yoga system?
As has been seen above, the goal of meditation in this system
is to arrive at a state of pure awareness. Since this pure awareness
can be understood as being both dynamic and all-encompassing,
it must be seen as being beyond the conceptual framework of
the notion of no-thought. It is determined as dynamic because
it is a positive statement that is open-ended about the experience
of meditation. It is all-encompassing because one can be both
in a state of pure awareness and purely aware of something.
This something has been explained as the thatness of objects
or thought projections.
If pure awareness is the goal of the meditation, then no-
thought has to be seen as having another relationship to the
process. This relationship, it seems, is that of a by-product of
the meditation. When one is following the prescribed proce-
dures of Ati-Yoga, then the flow of thoughts gradually slows
and finally stops. One is not to try to stop the flow of thoughts,
nor is one to try to increase it. The idea is to allow the thoughts
to come or go without attachment or aversion, but at the same
time to be aware of the flow itself. The flow of thoughts finally
stopping of their own accord is spoken of as "liberated in their
own place":
What does it mean to understand Buddhahood in this way? [It
means] everything is completed in this body, so that is pure rDzogs
Chen (i.e., Ati-Yoga). Everything is complete in speech, so that
is pure rDzogs Chen. Everything is completed in the object, so
that is pure rDzogs Chen. Not entering the extensive vehicle of
transmigration is the pure rDzogs Chen. The designation "being
liberated in its own place" is the pure instruction. Cutting off
hope and fear in the conditioned mind is the pure instruction.
Gaining confidence in oneself is the pure instruction. So it is
said .... 25
Thus, the use of the various terms that can be rendered as
no-thought within this system must be understood as the use
of a by-product to indicate the actual occurrence of something
else, and in this case that is pure awareness. This is like pointing
out the smoke to indicate the fire.
"NO-THOUGHT" 71
VII. Conclusion
I have presented a brief study of the notion of no-thought
in Pao-Tang Ch'an and early Ati-Yoga, systematized under
three headings for each school. The first heading is "sudden
enlightenment." Both schools maintain as their basic position
that enlightenment comes about suddenly. This is not at all
surprising, given the fact that both schools' philosophical foun-
dation is the theory of Tathag4tagarbha.
Under the second heading, that of definition of enlighten-
ment, it was noted that the Ch'an school can basically be deter-
mined to define enlightenment as sva-citta, while the Ati-Yoga
system defines it as bodhicitta. This is a considerable difference,
because in its development, the Ch'an school has started with
the Lmiaki'ivatara Sidra. It maintained a sutra level understanding
of enlightenment and although this particular development is
seasoned by the theories put forth in the Lanka and other similar
sutras, it does not go beyond what can be understood on the
sutra level. However, with the Ati-Yoga definition of enlighten-
ment bodhicitta, one has entered the realm of the tantras. Here
there is a completely different understanding of the mind, en-
lightenment, and the process for arriving at this exalted state.
Therefore, the basic line of developmental differences between
these two can be stated as the differences between the sutras
and the tantras.
Finally, the last heading was the notion of no-thought itself.
It was determined that the Ch'an school under investigation
had the basic notion that if there was thought, then there was
sarp.sara; while if there was no-thought, then there was nirvaI).a.
Thus for the Pao-Tang school, no-thought became the goal.
Within Ati-Yoga, the notion of no-thought itself is not presented
as the goal. The goal, accordingly, is to arrive at a state of pure
awareness. This then would relegate the notion of no-thought
to a secondary role. This role is more than likely that of a
by-product. That is, when one is in the state of pure awareness,
the thought process has a tendency to decrease and finally sub-
side. Thus, when the texts of this tradition speak of no-thought,
they are pointing out the state by using a by-product of that
state as a sign.
72
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
NOTES
1. Because the Ch'an school of Buddhism has been the subject of a
considerable amount of investigation, in this brief paper I have only outlined
major points and elucidated some of the differences between the Pao-T'ang
and other schools of Ch'an.
2. Because Atl-Yoga does not now exist as a separate school of Bud-
dhism, and historically from the advent of the Nyingma school this branch
has been present, I have called it a "system."
3. From the hagiography ofVairocana we know that the Ati-Yoga was
propagated in Khotan. Also, because the early Indian and Tibetan teachers,
after propagating this system in Tibet, departed for Wu Tai Shan, it may
have been propagated there, although the identification of the "five peaked
mountain" mentioned in the texts with Wu Tai Shan in China is not certain.
However, I have only been able to gain information on this from Tibetan
sources. As in other studies of higher tantric practice in China, information
and research by other scholars seems to be lacking.
4. E.g., Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts II. Seria Orientale Roma, Roma,
1958, pp. 21, 64 and 115; W.Y. Evans-Wentz, The Tibetan Book of the Great
Liberation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 74; H.B. Guenther,
Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective, Boulder: Shambhala, 1976, pp. 140
ff.; Eva Dargyey, The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet. Delhi: Motilal Banar-
sidass, 1977, p. 9.
5. Hwa Shang Mahayana (Ch. Ma Ho Yen), seems to have held the
teachings of several Ch'an schools. The doctrinal affiliation of his teachings
and the teachings of the Pao-T'ang school have been demonstrated by
Hironobu Obata based on the Tun wu ta ch'eng cheng li chueh: see "The Study
of Tibetan Ch'an Manuscripts Recovered from Tun huang," by Daishun
Ueyana in Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series,
1983, p. 338. The teachings of Hwa Shang as recorded in various Tibetan
sources in particular are easily comparable with the Pao-T'ang teachings in
the Li Tai Fa Pao Chi, especially on the question of "No-Thought." Also the
Blon po bKa'i Thang Yig, a Nyingma text, cites the lineage of the Ch'an masters
according to the Li Tai Fa Pao Chi and ends the list with Hwa Shang. See
Daishun Ueyana, ibid., p. 335.
6. Journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies, 1980, vol. 3, no.
1, p. 34.
7. See Robert B. Zeuschner, "The Concept of Li nien ... " in Early Ch'an,
p. 131.
8. D.T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books,
1956, pp. 157-8.
9. See Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo (2075, 174-196), vol. 51. For further
bibliographical information see Yanagida Seizan, "The Li Tai Fa Pao Chi" in
Early Ch'an, p. 44 ff.
10. Price, and Mou-Lan. The Diamond Sutra and the Sutra of Hui Neng.
Berkeley: The Clear Light Series, 1969, p. 32.
II. Yanagida Seizan, "The Li Tai Fa Pao Chi," p. 30.
"NO-THOUGHT" 73
12: Ibid.,p. 3l.
13. Ibid., p. 32.
14. Ibid., p. 32.
IS. Taken from The Root Tantra Without Birth Being the Great Sky Like
Vajrasattva (Tb: rDo rJe Sems dPa Nam Kha' rTse rGyud sKye Ba. Med
Pa.) in Hanson-Barber, A.W. The Life and Teachmgs oJVazrocana (unpubhshed
dissertation, Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison, 19S4), p. 196. Tb. text, Vairo rGyud
'Bum. Leh: 1971, vol. 1, p. 293.
16 .. Also taken from The Root Tantra Without Birth . .. , p. 201; Tb. text,
p.297.
17. Ibid., p. 211; Tb. text, p. 305.
IS. Stein, R.A., "Illumination Subite ou Saisie Simaltanee," in Revue de
l'Histoire des Religious, vol. 179, 1971.
19. The Precious Wheel oj Disputation (Tb. Rin po che rTsad pa'i 'Khor 10
bZhugs.) PTT Peking ed. no. 5S41, p. 121, plt.l. Hanson-Barber, p. 25S.
20. Ibid., p.196, Tb. text, p. 294.
21. Ibid., p. 230, Tb. text, p. 117, plt.5.
22. From the A Tantric Commentary to the Heart Sutra in Hanson-Barber,
p. IS3 (Tb. Sher sNying 'Grel pa sNgags su 'Grel pa bZhugs) PTT Peking ed. no.
54S0, p. 113, plt.5.
23. From Root Tantra ... , p. 204, Tb. text, p. 299.
24. From The Precious Wheel of Disputation; p. 236; Tb. text, p. lIS, plt.3.
25. Ibid., p. 257; Tb. text, lIS, pitA.
Chinese characters
a.

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~ W 6 n h y o (Yuan Hsiao) on the Nirval).a
School: Summation Under the "One Mind"
Doctnne
by Whalen Lai
The NirvaI).a School was an important Chinese Buddhist
. tradition that flourished during the Southern Dynasties (430-
589).1 The school later was eclipsed as an independent tradition.
Three retrospective summaries of the positions held by members
of this school exist. They serve to recall but, more importantly,
.. to criticize the NirvaI).a school. The translation below is from
the one made by the Korean monk Wonhyoa (617-686). Though
not as important as the pioneering effort of Chi-tsang
b
of the
San-Iun
c
(Madhyamika) school in Sui, or as thorough as the one
made by the monk Chun-cheng,2d Wonhyo's short summation
is nonetheless noteworthy; This is because whereas Chi-tsang's
prasanga (negative dialectics) deliberately exposed the fallacy of
the NirvaI).a School and stressed the emptiness of prajna as the
true Buddha-nature, Wonhyo was more interested in subsuming
the various opinions of this school as partial truths under the
positive doctrine of the One Mind. This doctrine has been es-
poused by the Awakening of Faith as follows:
The revelation of the true meaning [of the principle of
Mahayana can be achieved] by [unfolding the doctrine] that the
principle of One Mind has two aspects. One is the aspect of Mind
in terms of the Absolute (tathata; Suchness), and the other is the
aspect of Mind in terms of phenomena (salPsara; birth and
death) ....
The Mind in terms of the Absolute is the one World of
Reality (dharmadhiitu) and the essence of all phases of existence
75
76
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
in their totality. (Suchness is then seen as being both empty and
not-empty) ....
The Mind as phenomena (sarp.sara) is grounded on the
tathagatagarbha. What is called the Storehouse Consciousness is
that in which "neither birth nor death (nirva.Q.a)" diffuses har-
moniously with "birth and death (sarp.sara)," and yet in which
both are neither identical nor different. This Consciousness has
two aspects ...
(These are the enlightened and the nonenlightened aspect;
under the former are found original or a priori enlightenment
and incipient enlightenment-in the end though, these too are
not two either) .... 3
Since, as is well known, Wonhyo's readin
p
of the Awakening of
Faith influenced Fa-tsang
e
of the Hua-yen school, his summary
of the Nirv3.I)a school deserves our attention.
4
I. Translation From the Nieh-pan tsung-yao
g
of Wonhy05
There had been in the past various interpretations (of what
Buddha-nature is). Although these theories criss-cross and over-
lap with one another, basically there are not more than six
positions.
6
The master of the first school locates the substance of
Buddha -nature in men's eventual enlightenment. Now the Lion's
Roar chapter of the Mahiiparinirva:rja Sutra has said that although
the icchantika (earlier said to be destitute of the seed of enlighten-
mentf are at present without the good (roots, kusala-mula, con-
ducive to enlightenment), now the Buddha says:
As they are (nonetheless) destined for future enlightenment,
they are therefore replete with Buddha-nature .... It is only that
their mental defilements are such that they now lack the good
roots. By virtue of their future enlightenability, these good roots
will eventually sprout.
8
Because of that, it is said that the basis of Buddha-nature lies
in such existent potential for future enlightenment. Why? Be-
THE NIRVANA SCHOOL 77
caUse -the arousing of the thought of ignorance notwithstanding,
there is a priori the (pure) mind.
9
This mind is the basis of future
enlightenment. Therefore one should cultivate good deeds in
. order to eradicate the present ignorance and thereupon nurture
the fruition to come; Potential enlightenment is then said to be
the cause (of actual enlightenment).lo This option is held by the
Dharma master Aih of the White Horse temple following in the
footsteps of Tao-sheng
i
himself.
The master of the second school says that sentient beings
as such are Buddha-nature. Why? Because its role is to oversee
the mind and its nature is to take on form everywhere. There-
fore, sentient beings are themselves the root cause of enlighten-
ment. The Lion's Roar chapter says, "The Buddha-nature of
sentient beings has two aspects; the causal aspect is sentient
beings themselves."ll This is the opinion of Dharma master
[Seng-mingy of the Chuang-yen
k
temple.
The master of the third school says that, since the mind of
sentient beings is unlike wood or stone, it would desire bliss and
abhor suffering.
12
On the basis of this aspiration, a person who
cultivates various good deeds will attain the bliss of supreme
enlightenment. Thus the (same) siitra says, "All sentient beings
possess mind. Beings with mind will in time attain the highest
enlightenment (samyaksambodhi).,,13 Here the Srimiilii Sidra con-
curs, "If there is no tathagatagarbha (embryonic Buddha), there
would not be the desire to seek nirvaI).a or the abhorrence of
pain and pleasure (in sarpsara).,,14 This is the opinion of master
(Fa-)yun
1
of Kuang-tse
ffi
temple.
The master of the fourth school says that the mind has the
immortal spirit. The immortal spirit is in the body and is unlike
nonsentient wood or stone. From this the fruit of enlightenment
would evolve. Therefore the psychic spirit is the substance of
the root cause (of enlightenment). The Buddha-nature chapter
in the siitra says, "The self (atman) is what is meant by the
tathagatagarbha. (The dictum that) all sentient beings possess
Buddha-nature is what is meant by the self.,,15 The Lion's Roar
chapter says, "Things devoid of Buddha-nature are nonsentient
things like tiles and stones. Aside from such, all beings have
Buddha-nature." 16 This is the opinion of Emperor Hsiao(-yen)n
of the LiangO dynasty.17
The master of the fifth school says that the seeds (bijas)IS
affiliated with the good dharmas within the storehouse con-
sciousness, alayavijnana, are the substance of B'.lddha-nature.
The sutra says, "By Buddha-nature is meant the seeds (gotra)
of the highest enlightenment into the Middle Path.,,19 The Yoga-
cara Sastra says, "The a priori seed (prakr:tistha-gotra)2o is the six
faculties of a superior quality which possesses the form of Such-
ness transmitted from beginningless time in compliance with
the nature of Dharma (dharmata)."21 This is the opinion of the
new masters [of the Wei-shih
P
school].22
The master of the sixth school says that the untainted con-
sciousness, the amala-vijnana, and the liberated Such ness essence
form the substance of Buddha-nature.
23
The sutra says,
"Buddha-nature is the emptiness as of the highest truth'
(paramartha-satya) , which is also known as wisdom (prajna).,,24
The Ratnagotra Vibhaga says, "The Suchness essence as taught
by the Sutra of the Six Faculties
25
says: 'The six faculties are
transmitted from beginningless time, being ultimately of the
nature of the various dharmas.,,,26
The above are the six schools. In evaluating them, I find
them to be both right and wrong. Why? Because Buddha-nature
is neither thus nor not thus. As it is not thus, all six positions
are flawed. As it is not not-thus, all of them are correct.
What does that mean?
It means that the six masters' opinions can be further sub-
sumed under two headings. The first master emphasizes the
"ought in the future," or de jure enlightenment, while the other
five underline the present de facto given as the root cause of
enlightenment. Within the latter, there are also two sub-groups.
The sixth master addresses himself to the highest truth or the
absolute aspect. The other four rest content with the worldly
or the relative truth (san;vr:ti-satya). Within that latter group,
there are those who discourse from the standpoint of the person
and those who elaborate upon the finer elements (within that
person). The second master holds the idea that the person as
such (is Buddha-nature); the other three locate the same in the
finer elements. Among the latter, their differences may be a
matter of degrees. The (fifth master) selects the seed (in the
mind) as Buddha-nature; the other two focus on the mind as
such. Within the latter, they are divided over the matter of
emphasis. One (the fourth master) would underline the sub-
stance (i.e., the spirit) while the other (the third master) its
function (in aspiring after bliss).
The truth is this: the substance of Buddha-nature is the
One Mind. This One Mind avoids all extremes. Because it does,
it cannot be identified with anyone of the six positions. Being
not confined by anyone, it can accommodate all.
If we discourse on the Mind in itself, it is neither cause nor
effect, neither absolute nor relative, neither subject nor object,
neither substance nor function. If we discourse on the Mind in
its causal mode, then it is both origination and cessation, both
subject and object, both absolute and relative, both cause and
effect. Because the Mind is said to be neither one nor the other,
the six schools are all neither right nor wrong. This Middle Path
notwithstanding, there are distinctions (that can still be made).
There are two aspects to the One Mind. It is "tainted and
yet not tainted, not tainted and yet tainted."27 "Tainted and yet
not tainted" is saying that it is passive and above change; "Not
tainted and yet tainted" is saying that it is involved in the six
paths of rebirth. The sutra has said, "The herb of the one taste
manifests itself in many tastes depending on where it is grown,
but the real one taste rests in the mountain.,,28 The Srfmiilii Sidra
says, "The innately pure mind is incomprehensibly mysterious.
That it is somehow tainted by mental defilements is equally
beyond our ken.,,29 The Awakening of Faith addresses itself to
this (ambivalence). This is the position of Paramartha (the al-
leged translator and leader of the She-lun
q
school).
Thus, the sixth master is the one who realizes the Suchness
Buddha-nature and intuits the "tainted and yet untainted" as-
pect (of the One Mind), while the others see only the tainted
aspect. But why (would the pure be tainted by activity)? Because
the mind once tainted cannot sustain any longer its original
purity. When confronted with the conditions (of phenomena)
it would look naturally ahead to the result and thereby bring
the changes upon itself. In its ability to sprout (pure seeds) prior
to its being perfumed (by the defilements), it generates the seeds
(in the storehouse consciousness) which are rooted in the nature
of things. This is the position of the fifth master. Now although
80
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
the mind is tainted by defilements and is involved in sarpsara,
it can still retain a sublime and spirited wisdom that would
promote the return to the (nirvaI).ic) origin. This is the position
of the fourth master. Now the mind has been thoroughly tainted.
Yet it can count on the "internal perfuming" (by Suchness upon
avidya)30 to produce two types of karmic causes: the desire for
bliss and the abhorrence of suffering. These two are rooted in
the (mind's) pointing back to the ultimate goal. So stated, this
is the opinion of the third master. As the One Mind further
turns- (transforms), then depending on where it may end up [in
the six paths of rebirth], it will take hold of reality and incorpo-
rate sentient existence.
31
The result is what is the opinion of
the second master. Finally, according to the doctrine of a priori
enlightenment (pen-chiieh),r all such sentient beings will one day
attain or regain enlightenment. To so speak of the present po-
tentiality in terms of its future end is the aim of the first master.
Thus, we see how the six masters all fail in understanding
fully what Buddha-nature is. They can see only one part of it.
Thus we read, "How similar it is to the blind men (groping to
comprehend what an elephant is). They do not know what it is
like but what they say (it is like) is not unrelated (to the truth)
either.,,32 The six masters' opinions are comparable to the blind
men's. Ultimately, Buddha-nature is neither in nor not in the
six dharmas (the five skandhas plus the false whole, pudgala,
i.e., the constituents of reality). The six schools are as such
seemingly full of contradictions.
End of Discourse on Locating
the Whereabouts of the Buddha-Nature
II. Analysis
What W6nhyo did, in so summarizing the six positions, is to
subsume all of them under the emanation of the "One Mind"
into sentient existence. Each of the six positions then falls some-
where in that spectrum, depending on how intensive or exten-
sive it perceives the Buddha-nature to be. The following is a
diagram summary of this technique.
Diagram Summary of The Structure of W6nhyo's Thesis
::::::::::::===============================================================================::==============::===
posItlon on The person
Buddha-nature holding it
Position analyzed subjectively
and objectively
===================:.=====================================================================================
Buddha-nature
She-Iun P ARAMARTHA : pen-yuS
isamala
Paramartha Such ness One Mind
. seeds in
New school SAIyiVRTI -SATYA: shih-yu t
thealaya
HSiian-tsang Tainted Mind with pure seeds
the immortal
EmperorWu Substance: seeds of spirited
soul
of Liang wisdom within the mind
the desire
Fa-yung Function: the mind with the
fornirvar;ta
of Liang perfumed aspirations
sentient
Seng-ming Experiency of the body/self
beings
of Liang or the assumption oflife
future enlight- Master Ai SAIyiVRTI (cont.): dejure
enability
(Tao-sheng) temporal delay added
=::::==================================================::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Arranged from the One Mind "downward", we have this:
The Emanation of the One Mind
==========================================================:::=========================::===================
The One Mind both absolute and relative
in the Awakening ofF aith in Mahayana
1) The absolute or pure aspect,
the amalavijiiana in She-Iun
2-i) The relative or tainted aspect
a) with pure seeds: Hsiian-tsang
b) with spirited wisdom: Liang Wu
c) with desire for bliss: Fa-yun
d) with sentient life: Seng-ming
2-ii) to be achieved: Master Ai
substance and
function as one
paramartha-satya
substance
sa7IJvr:ti, de facto
of seminal mind
of mind
of mental hope
of body
sa7IJvr:ti, de jure
==========================:::=============================================================================
This extremely neat attempt to categorize all six options under
the emanation of the One Mind led to a kind of philosophical
monism. In so doing, Wonhyo brought the original Indian con-
cept of Buddha-nature one step closer to the traditional Taoist
conception of the One as the basis (pen: root) of the All as the
ends (moll: tips of branches).
NOTES
1. An older classic study on this is Tokiwa Daijo, BusshO no Kenkyu
(Kyoto: Meiji, 1944); the most thorough historical, analysis is Fuse Kogaku,
Nehanshu no Kenkyu in two vol. (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1976 reissue). In
English, the Madhyamika critique of the NirvaI,la School is presented in most
detail by Aaron Koseki in his doctoral dissertation (University of Wisconsin,
Madison, 1977), "Chi-tsang's Ta-ch'eng hsiian-lun: The Two Truths and
Buddha-nature." See his essay, "Prajnaparamita and the Buddhahood of the
Non-sentient World: The San-lun Assimilation of Buddha-nature and the
Middle Path ,"Joumal of the IntemationalAssociation of Buddhist Studies 2.1 (1980),
pp. 1.6-33. My own attempt is in "Sinitic Speculation on Buddha-nature: The
NirvaI,la School," Philosophy East and West 32.2 (1982), pp. 135-149. I am
especially thankful to comments and corrections from the JIABS reviewer
and from Liu Ming-Wood (University of Hong Kong), who is working on this
tradition and will for some time; see his "The Doctrine ofthe Buddha-Nature
in the Mahayana Mahiiparinirvii7Ja-Sutra," J oumal of the Intemational Association
of Buddhist Studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (1982), pp. 63-94.
2. Tang Yung-t'ung, in his Han-Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-chao Fo-chiao-
shih (Peking: Chung-hua reissue, 1955), makes good use of the latter on pp.
677-717; Hirai Shun'ei analyzed Chi-tsang's in his Chugoku hanya shisoshi ny
kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1976); see Koseki, op. cit.
3. Yoshito Hakeda, The Awakening of Faith attributed to Asvaghosa (New
York: Columbia University, 1967), pp. 31--46. The text, incidentally, never
uses the expression fo-hsing (Buddha-nature).
4. On a future occasion, I will translate Fa-tsang's summation of the
Buddha-nature doctrine (from his Wu-chiao-chang [Treatise on the Five Teach-
ings]). Fa-tsang's review is supposed to be the "last word" on this issue.
5. "Essentials of the Nirval).a School," from the Taisho Daizokyo (hence-
forth T.), vol. 38, p. 249.
6. The identification of the figures behind the six schools targeted by
Wonhyo is indebted to Tang Yung-t'ung's reconstruction of the authors of
such opinions in his Han- Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-cha Fo-chiao-shih, ibid.
7. T. 12, pp. 425bc--426a.
8. T. 12, p. 491b; also pp. 493b--494a, 505e.
9. So says the Awakening of Faith concerning the wu-ming wang-nien
V
(the deluded thought of ignorance) and the pen-chueh (original enlightenment)
of the Suchness Mind; Hakeda's trans., pp. 55-56.
10. Pen-chueh and shih-chueh W (incipient enlightenment) are ultimately
nondual; Hakeda's trans., p. 38.
II. T. 12, p. 530e.
12. T. 12, p. 581a.
13. T. 12, p. 524b.
14. T. 12, p. 222b; in English, see the translation by Alex and Hideko
Wayman, The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimiilii (N ew York: Columbia, 1974), p. 108.
15. T. 12, p. 407b.
16. T. 12, p. 581a.
17. On this, see my "Emperor Wu of Liang on the Immortal Soul,"
Journal of the American Society 101.2 (!981), pp. 167-175. ._
18. The biJa theory IS III the Yogacara; It was not known to the Nlrval)a
School of the Six Dynasties. However, the same Chinese word for bija was
used to translate gotra such that there might be a confusion or free cross-ref-
erence made here.
19. It is not that we are as such Buddhas; it is only that we may in time
become so. T. 12, p. 523c.
20. Hsing chung-hsing
X
(seed-nature that is innate), as contrated with
hsing [for practice] chung-hsing,Y which is acquired a posteriori through cultiva-
tion.
21. Specific source unknown.
22. The "new" school referred then to Hsiian-tsang's.
23. The amala consciousness is often called the "ninth consciousness,"
following an exegetical tradition of the She-lun (Sarp.graha) schooL On this,
see Diana Paul's Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China, (Stanford: Stanford
University, 1984).
24. T. 12, p. 523b.
25. T. 31, p. 835c.
26. This is the same phrase as the one in the Yogiiciira Siistra, the interpre-
tation of which divided the iilayavijiiiina strand from the tathagatagrabha
strand.
27. A Chinese paraphrase of the "innately Pure Mind that is adventitious-
ly polluted," i.e., the tathagatagarbha, in the Sr'imiilii Sidra. W6nhyo might be
the first so to paraphrase it (see T. 12, p. 222b). The expression is often used
by Fa-tsang.
28. A metaphor describing the unity of the Dharma and the multiple
manifestations of upiiya.
29. T. 12, p. 222b; Waymans, op. cit." p. 108.
30. The term is again an innovation apparently of W6nhyo.
31. This refers to the tathagatagarbha as the basis of all births in sarp.sara.
32. A well known analogy; source unknown to me.
Chinese Terms
b. s ;?,.,
c. :::..
d. ttl Jf..
e. 3f, i\
f. tAt
g. ;1
h. 'i ;{; &1'
i. ;ij ':L
j. 1t 't.
k. Jf:l
m.Tu
n. :i
o.
*
p.
ott gilt
q.
air
r.
;f-
WI
1[,
S.
4-- 'if
t.
-1z:-'Q
11
u.
1-
v. SA
--?= /.;:----
-v::- t""'
w.-I;:'O
X. ,1,, tt fl.
y. n' -ft +1_
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The Ideal of Theravada*
by Shanta Ratnayaka
Many detailed accounts of the bodhisattva (Pali: bodhisatta)
ideal of the Mahayana have been published by students of
Buddhism. Most of these writers are so fascinated with the
Mahayana model of the bodhisattva ideal that they pay no atten-
tion to the Theravada teaching on this point. Sometimes they
contrast bodhisattvas with arahants (arhat or arahat) and se-
verely criticize the latter. Such a criticism is possible, from my
point of view, only if the critic is either biased towards the
Mahayana tradition, or has misinterpreted the Theravada, or
has misunderstood Buddhism altogether.
In this article, I will present the Theravada concept of the
bodhisattva ideal, and then try to correct some misunderstand-
ings on the issue and show the unfairness of certain criticisms
that have been directed towards the Theravada position. Part I
of this paper distinguishes the Theravada from the Hinayana,
Part II examines the bodhisattva ideal in the Theravada texts,
Part III observes the actual practice of the ideal among the
Theravadins, and Part IV clarifies bodhisattvahood and arahant-
hood and places them in relation to the Buddhahood and bodhi
(enlightenment). Through this exposition most of the criticisms
that are based on misunderstandings will be swept away. My
further reflections will form Part V, the Conclusion, of this essay.
I. Theraviida Cannot be Hinayiina
The Cullavagga records that soon after tpe Buddha's demise
his Elderly Disciples (Theras) met at Rajagaha (Rajagrha) to
form the First Council. 1 Headed by Mahakasyapa, Ananda, and
85
U pali, all five hundred Theras of the Council agreed unani-
mously on the collection of the Buddha's teachings (the Dhamma
or Dharma and the Vinaya), which were authoritatively chanted
at this meeting. For five hundred years,2 the Dharma and the
Vinaya were preserved through daily chanting by successive
groups of Theras, generation after generation; therefore, this
earliest Buddhist tradition is called the Theravada.
A century after the First Council, the Second Council of
the Theravada was held at Vaisali in order to maintain the
authenticity of the teachings. During this first century of Bud-
dhism some non-Theravada views had been growing up within
the Buddhist community. The Second Council created a chance
for those who held non-Theravada views to convene. Since the
latter group could not be known as Theras, they claimed the
title sangha (community). In the historical accounts they were
referred to as the Mahasanghikas.
3
Over a two hundred year
period, the Mahasanghikas developed into the Mahayana
branch of Buddhism.
The Theravadins held their last Indian council "at
Pataliputra under the aegis of the celebrated Buddhist monarch,
Priyadarsi As6ka." It was their last effort in India to protect the
purity of the doctrines. Immediately after this Third Council
the Theravadins laid their foundations elsewhere outside India.
4
Thera Mahinda, the son of Emperor Asoka, converted the king
of Sri Lanka and his subjects to Buddhism, and introduced the
Pali Trip#aka and its commentaries into the island. From that
day, Theravada Buddhism was the most valued treasure of the
kings of Sri Lanka. It was a treasure they extended to all the
Southeast Asian countries: Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos;
sometimes it was extended even further.
Meanwhile, the Mahasanghikas had multiplied their sub-
sectarian divisions, into eighteen or even more groups. Some
of these minor sects were ridiculed by the Mahayanists, who
used the name "Hlnayana," which means the "Lower Vehicle,"
while they themselves were distinguished as the Mahayana or
the "Greater Vehicle." When the Mahayanists held their first
council in about 100 A.D. under the auspices of King K a n i ~ k a
of northwest India, and wrote down the Mahayana siitras, they
attacked the beliefs and practices of the Hlnayanists. Had this
abuse been aimed at the Theravadins, they certainly would have
THERA V ADA BODHISATTVA IDEAL
87
replied to the Mahayanists. But the Pali literature and the other
writings of the Theravadins mention neither the Mahayana nor
the Hinayana. The obvious reason for this is that on the one
hand the abusive name of Hinayana did not fall upon the
Theravada, and on the other hand that the contact between the
Mahayana and the Theravada by that time was non-existent, as
the latter had taken firm root in Sri Lanka, which was to them
the "Dharmadvzpa" (the Island of Dharma).
The Hinayanists were criticized by the Mahayanists for not
having the bodhisattva ideal. The Hinayanists may have lacked
it, but the Theravadins were the first Buddhists to teach the
bodhisattva ideal. Further, they always followed it, and they
always maintained the distinction between bodhisattvas and
arahants. The mistaken practice of identifying the Theravada
with the Hinayana results in undue criticism of the former. The
following description of the bodhisattva doctrine held by the
Theravada will alone suffice to distinguish the Theravada from
the Hinayana.
II. From the Theravada Texts
a. Anyone Can Become a Bodhisattva
The unique being for any Buddhist is neither the
bodhisattva, nor the arahant, nor the pacceka-buddha, but the
Buddha himself. The Ariguttaranikiiya of the Theravada teaches
that a Buddha alone is omniscient and a Buddha alone has the
excellent attributes unique to himself.5 Besides another omnis-
cient Buddha, no one, including the other enlightened ones,
i.e., arahants and pacceka-buddhas, can fully comprehend an om-
niscient Buddha. Comparatively few of the Buddha's excellences
were fathomable even to the wisest of the arahants, Sariputra.
It is said that if the whole world can be filled with pacceka-buddhas
and if they all together think of the Buddha, still the Buddha
is far beyond their measures.
6
As such texts vividly show, the
Theravadins' "Supreme Being" is the Buddha.
Many attained Buddahhood in the past and many will still
attain Buddhahood in the future. Gautama (Pali: Gotama) is
the Buddha of the present era, but by no means is the only
Buddha. In the Sampasadaniya Sutta, Gautama Buddha has
88
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
acknowledged that there were and there will be Buddhas equal
to himself in enlightenment.
7
The Theravada texts mention
many hundreds and thousands of Buddhas of the past.
s
Twenty-
seven of them, beginning from TaI)hankara, have been iden-
tified by name in a sequence up to Gautama Buddha. Often,
Maitreya is added to this lineage as the immediate Buddha of
the future.
9
In explaining the life stories of twenty-five Buddhas,
the Buddhavamsa, a book of the Tripitaka itself, brings us the
message that there was not only a single Buddha, but a lineage
of them which runs from the past to the future.
The important point here is that there are as many
bodhisattvas as Buddhas, since only bodhisattvas can become
Buddhas. The Theravadins do not believe in many incarnations
of the same Adibuddha, or the same Supreme Being, as several
Buddhas. Before his enlightenment, any Buddha is called a
bodhisattva.
1O
In brief, the Theravadins believe that as there
were innumerable Buddhas in the past and as there will be
innumerable Buddhas in the future, there were, there are, and
there will be innumerable bodhisattvas as well. Furthermore,
anyone can become a bodhisattva if he is willing to undertake
the hardship of fulfilling the ten perfections of the bodhisattva
path.
b. Giving up of One's Own Enlightenment in Order to Save Others
For the Theravadins, the life story of Gautama Buddha,
and his bodhisattva career, serves as the best example of sacrific-
ing one's own enlightenment to save others. Gautama the
bodhisattva could have attained nirvaI)a as an arahant at his
encounter with Dipankara Buddha many aeons ago, but he gave
it up and remained in sarhsara to become a Buddha and save
many beings. At the time of Dipankara Buddha, our bodhisattva
was named Sumedha, and his self-giving thought is mentioned
in the text:
If I wish to do so, I can burn my defilements [become a holy
one] today itself. But what is the use of realizing the Dharma
here in a solitary form? . . . Why should a courageous person
like me save myself alone? I will become a Buddha so that I will
save many persons, including [even] divine beings.11
THERA V ADA BODHISATTVA IDEAL 89
Hence he remained in samsara, showing the bodhisattva
example to the world and improving himself in the bodhisattva
perfections. The Pali Jataka and its Commentary alone narrate
.. five hundred and fifty life stories from his long career.
c. The Bodhisattva Perfections
In the Tripitaka we find a book entitled the Cariyapitaka,
which is completely dedicated to teaching the ten perfections
(dasa paramz). Each and every bodhisattva must fulfill the perfec-
tions to the highest degree in order to become a Buddha. In
the Cariyapitaka, the examples are drawn. from Gautama the
bodhisattva, but the perfections are common to all the
bodhisattvasY Therefore, it may be proper to say that the
Cariyapitaka is a Bodhisattva-Pitaka in the Theravada Tripitaka.
The ten perfections are: I) perfection of giving (dana), 2)
perfection of morality (sZla), 3) pefection of renunciation (nek-
khamma), 4) perfection of wisdom (panna), 5) perfection of e x e r ~
tion (viriya), 6) perfection of patience (khanti), 7) perfection of
truth (sacca), 8) perfection of resolution (adhiUhana), 9) perfec-
tion of loving kindness (metta), IO)perfection of equanimity (uP-
ekkhii). 13.
A bodhisattva begins his progress in the perfections from
the day he makes "the wish to become a Buddha"
(katabhinzhiirena mahiisattena). 14 Therefore, this wish (abhinzhara)
is the turning point for an ordinary being to become a "bodhi-
being." It is said that this wish is the "foundation of the perfec-
tions," and when one has laid this foundation, he carries out
"observing, stabilizing, and accomplishing" the perfections. 15
Each perfection has 'three stages: the ordinary level, the
medium level, and the highest level. For instance in practicing
the first perfection, dana, giving only one's external belongings
is but of the ordinary level (dana paramZ). A bodhisattva may
sacrifice his eye for a blind person, or his leg for a lame person.
(The Pali literature refers to some surgical performances that
took place, as well as certain medical healing processes). Still,
this is but of the medium level of giving (dana upa paramZ). The
highest stage of dana is the giving of one's life for the benefit
of others (dana paramattha paramZ). Like dana, each of the other
nine perfections can' be practiced in the same three stages.
90 JIABSVOL. 8NO.2
Therefore, at times the perfections are enumerated as being
thirty instead of ten. Further, the Theravada teaching sums up
that all the Buddhas must have fulfilled all thirty perfections,
without any exceptions, during their bodhisattva careers. 16
d. Priority of 'Wisdom and Compassion
The entire career of a bodhisattva is governed by two m ~ o r
characteristics; wisdom (panna or prajna) and compassion
(karurpa). Buddahood is accomplished by wisdom, but the act of
becoming a Buddha is accomplished by compassion. A
bodhisattva's own liberation is achieved through wisdom, but
his goal of liberating others is achieved through compassion.
With wisdom he recognizes others' suffering and with compas-
sion he eliminates it. Due to his wisdom, he becomes disentan-
gled from samsara, but due to his compassion he remains in it.
Owing to his wisdom, the bodhisattva remains unattached to
the world, but with his compassion he embraces the world. Be-
cause of wisdom he does not become conceited; because of
compassion he does not become discouraged. Wisdom brings
him control over himself; compassion brings him control over
others. Wisdom brings self advancement, and compassion brings
others' advancement. More than all else, wisdom brings him the
lordship of the Dharma, and compassion brings him the lordship
of the world.
17
Wisdom and compassion are the major spiritual forces that
run through all the ten perfections; therefore these two are not
exclusively confined to the perfection of wisdom and perfection
of loving kindness.
It is said that wisdom is like the life of the body of the
perfections. For instance, an act of giving can become a perfec-
tion only when it is accompanied by wisdom. Again, in order
to emphasize the special place of wisdom, it is said that the act
of giving is like the eye and wisdom is like consciousness. Without
consciousness, one's eye is of no use; similarly, a mere act is of
l i t t l ~ value if wisdom is missing. To cite another example, when
morality is not accompanied by wisdom, it becomes stained with
worldly desire or conceit, and it does not become a perfection.
So, wisdom acts as the purifier of all the perfections. IS
As far as the enlightenment itself is concerned, the perfec-
tion of wisdom excels the rest. Even if a bodhisattva constantly
performs the of the o.ther perfections t? their
highest level wIthout the perfectlOn of wIsdom, he remams un-
enlightened, because the latter is the fulfiller of them al1.
19
Nevertheless, it is because of his unwavering and equal love
for the whole world that the bodhisattva has undertaken the
task of becoming a Buddha. Hence, he feels like the father of
the whole world and looks upon all the beings as his own chil-
dren. It is to comfort them and to liberate them that the
bodhisattva walks the path of the perfections. Therefore, com-
passion is the cause, the root, and the ground for each and
1: 20
every penectlOn.
e. Very Close to Buddahood
The epithet, "mahiisattva" (Pali: mahasatta), which means the
"great being," is often used alternatively for the term
"bodhisattva." Examples are innumerable in the PaliJiitaka and
elsewhere. This synonym is not limited in application to one
particular bodhisattva; in reference to many bodhisattvas, the
plural term "mahiisattvas bodhisattvas" is used.
21
In another con-
text, the two epithets have been combined into one in the term
"mahabodhisattva." The bodhisattva is the "great being" because
he is the Buddha-to-be, because he is now becoming perfect
through practicing the perfections.
As a "great being," he has the greatest courage. His heroism
has been described through several imaginary similes. If the
whole world were to become an ocean, and the bodhisattva were
asked to swim across to reach Buddhahood, he would do so
without the slightest hesitation. To cite another simile, if the
whole world were to become a thick forest of thorny bamboo,
and if he were asked to cut across to achieve Buddhahood, he
would not hesitate to do SO.22 SO great is a bodhisattva's effort,
with which he serves the world and keeps his own spirit on the
upgrade.
Whatever state a bodhisattva is born to, by his nature he
becomes an example to all other beings. In the Jataka stories
of the Pali Tripitaka, Gautama the bodhisattva repeatedly ap-
pears as a king, a minister, a social leader, an ordinary person
of various occupations, and sometimes as a divine being, and
even as an animal; but, all the time, he remains the savior of
others and the moral example to the mass. Although the Jiitaka
narrates the life stories of Gautama the bodhisattva, it often
refers to bodhisattvas in general. The following are some re-
marks made by the Pali Jataka about bodhisattvas in common:
"The conduct of bodhisattvas is not mixed with craving."
"Bodhisattvas are very alert."
"The hopes of bodhisattvas are fulfilled."
"Because of their great intelligence, bodhisattvas succeed in all
matters.
"The expectations of bodhisattvas will be accomplished."
"Wise thoughts of bodhisattvas never fail."23
The success of the thought and deed of a bodhisattva is
thus assured because he is equipped with the powerful instru-
ment of upaya, which has been translated into English as "skillful
means." Upaya is means; but in the Pali accounts a bodhisattva's
upaya is usually associated with kosalla (skill) as upayakosalla.
Therefore, "skillful means" or rather "skill in means" is a correct
rendering of the complete Pali phrase upayakosalla.
This phrase is used repeatedly in connection with the per-
fections.
24
A bodhisattva's practice of giving is solely governed
by his skillful means, as is his perfection of morality, perfection
of renunciation, perfection of wisdom, and all the rest. There-
fore, any action that he performs in practicing the perfections
is also directed or governed by his skillful means. Thus, upaya
or upayakosalla (skillful means) is the reason behind the
bodhisattva's success in all matters.
The Theravadins believe that it is the routine of every
bodhisattva to complete five extraordinary givings, to be born
in the T u ~ i t a heaven, and to remain there until the suitable time
comes for his last birth.
The five uncommon givings are that of his own 1) children,
2) wife, 3) physical members, 4) greatest treasures, and 5) king-
dom. The Jataka provides accounts of this sort of giving. When
he was born as King Sivi, Gautama the bodhisattva endowed
THERA V ADA BODHISATTVA iDEAL 93
his eyes; when he was born as King Vessantara, he donated his
children, kingdom, etc.
Bodhisattvas' customary prolonged stay in T u ~ i t a heaven is
possible only at the final stage of their careers. Until then, they
. do not remain in the heavens of very long life, such as T u ~ i t a ,
for the obvious reason that they prefer to stay among suffering
beings in order to be of help to the needy ones. Even if a
bodhisattva is born in a heaven of long life, he does not remain
there for the whole lifespan that particular heaven would pro-
. 25
vide hIm.
:1JI. From the Theraviida Practices
The previous section of this article revealed that the
Theravadins' scriptures bear heavy witness to their teachings of
the bodhisattva ideal. Even after this has become evident to
. some Mahayana scholars, they believe that that ideal is limited
.. only to the Theravadins' books but is not put into practice. The
following criticism is directed to the Therq.vadins, although the
critic mistakenly calls them Hinayanists:
... .let a Buddha or Bodhisattva attempt it while we may rest
with a profound confidence in him and in his work. Thoughts
somewhat like these must have been going about in the minds
of the Hlnayanists, when their Mahayana brethren were making
bold to strive after Buddhahood, themselves. . . . .Sumedha,
one of the Buddha's former incarnations, expresses his resolve
to be a Buddha, [which] may just as well be considered as that
of Mahayanist himself, while the Hlnayanists would not dare to
make this wish their own.
26
This may be true with the Hinayanists, but not with the
.' Theravadins. Although a Buddha is capable of enlightening
others, all the beings of the world are not able to attain nirvaI).a
during the time of one single Buddha. Therefore, as we saw
above, many bodhisattvas will become Buddhas; and certainly
many Theravadins strive for Buddhahood, as we will see below.
Nevertheless, according to the Theravada tradition a
. bodhisattva, like any other spiritual person, does not exhibit his
goal or his progress. Very seldom does a necessity arise for a
bodhisattva to reveal his bodhisattvahood. On the other hand,
Buddhas are rare; and so are the Buddhas-to-be. For these
reasons, it may not be easy to recognize bbdhisattvas on a mass
scale.
At this stage of our discussion many rulers of the Theravada
countries come to our view. The author of Religion and Politics
in Burma states: "Many Burmese kings were firinly believed to
be Bodhisattvas; one of them stated in an eighteenth-century
inscription 'In virtue of this my good deed, may I become a
Buddha .... an omniscient one.' ,,27 Similarly, another author
w r i t ~ s : "Thus in Thailand it is generally assumed that the reign-
ing monarch will become a Buddha in his next, or a very proxi-
mate, rebirth.',28 In Sri Lanka, King Siri Sarigabo the
Bodhisattva, of the fourth century A.D., sacrificed his own head
as a practice of the first perfection. Later in the history, Kings
Vijayaba and Perakumba proclaimed that they were
bodhisattvas. Several other kings appeared as incarnations of
bodhisattvas. Gradually, an opinion grew that every king of Sri
Lanka must be a bodhisattva. However, this notion did not die
with the monarchy. Very recently, when S.W.R.D. Ban-
daranayake and Dudley Senanayake were Prime Ministers in
turn, their respective followers claimed in public that each was
a bodhisattva.
Besides political leaders, there were and there are many
others considered bodhisattvas in Theravada countries. To cite
a few examples from the recent history of Sri Lanka, Anagarika
Dharmapala,-Asaral)asaral)a Saral)arikara Sarigharaja, and Hik-
kaduwe Sri Sumarhgala are often called bodhisattvas. The re-
markable story29 of a meditation teacher, Doratiyawe by name,
reveals that he refused to practice a certain method of yoga in
the year of 1900, because he was on the path to the Buddhahood
but not on the path of arahanthood. Occasionally, a Mahayanist
has witnessed the presence of bodhisattvas among the Therava-
dins. For instance, Seikan Hasegawa writes:
During my stay in a Thailand temple as a training monk, I saw
there were many great Bodhisattvas, and in Japan I can find
many Hinayana Buddhists. If some priest speaks of the Hinayana
in reference to Southern Buddhism, he is only proving he is not
THERA V ADA BODfnSATTV A IDEAL 95
qualified as a Mahayana Buddhist. Furthermore, for designating
Southern Buddhism now we have the correct name which is
Theravada Buddhism.
30
The native literary works of the Theravada countries give
abundant evidence of their adherence to the bodhisattva path.
The Jataka stories have been the most popular form ofliterature
in their languages. The Jataka is read at gatherings of their
pious on religi?us days. Their outstanding p ~ e m s are ?ased on
the Jataka stones. A few examples from the Smhalese lIterature
are the Kavsi(umi1J,a, Muvadevdavata, Sasadavata, Kavyasekharaya,
and the Guttilaya. As does the Jataka, the Maitree Var1J,a1J,ava
attracts the common audience, because it tells the story of the
immediate Buddha to come. The stories of both past and future
. Buddhas promulgate the bodhisattva career with the hope that
others will follow the pattern. As a result, in some other literary
works, certain individuals' wish for becoming a Buddha has
been mentioned directly and publicly. Two examples of the
latter are the Pujavaliya and Budugu1J,alamkaraya.
The Dasa Bodhisattuppatti Katha,31 which is written in Pali,
the scriptural language of Theravada, should be mentioned
here. This book narrates the stories of ten bodhisattvas who will
become Buddhas after the era of Gautama Buddha. The first
of them, Maitreya, is mentioned above. The other nine
bodhisattvas are Rama, Dhammaraja, Dhammasami, Narada,
Ramsimuni, Devadeva, Naraslha, Tissa, and Sumangala. It is
stated that these ten bodhisattvas had met Gautama Buddha
and that they are destined to attain Buddahood in succession.
The practice of worshipping bodhisattvas is not uncommon
among Theravadins. Bodhisattva images are often found at their
ruined temples, and this alone indicates the long history of
bodhisattva-worship. In Sri Lanka, the bodhisattva Maitreya and
the bodhisattva Natha have been equally worshipped. Because
ofthe popularity of Natha, historians suggest that the Mahayana
bodhisattva Avalokitesvara has taken the form of Natha; but
there is little evidence for identifying Natha with AvalokiteSvara.
Whether he is another form of A valokiteSvara or not, it is clear
that the Theravadins have long respected bodhisattvas. Like
Natha, the bodhisattva Saman of Sri Pada has been glorified.
Therefore, it is unfair for any scholar to say that the Theravadins
Ignore the bodhisattvas "with the solitary exception of Mait-
reya.,,32
The admiration of bodhisattvas is, in fact, quite common
among Theravadins. When someone is' compassionately and
courageously engaged in good work, his neighbors begin to
describe him as a bodhisattva. Naturally, the more difficult tasks
he undertakes, the higher is the status of bodhisattvahood attri-
buted to him. We must note that the higher a bodhisattva goes
the closer he gets to the Buddhahood; and he becomes more
capable of performing outstanding tasks as well. Although to
designate the best of people as bodhisattvas is very common
today, this practice is not new. In the 5th century A.D. the
Theras of the Great Monastery of Anuradhapura proclaimed
that Buddhaghosa was, without any doubt, an incarnation of
the Bodhisattva Maitreya. Buddhaghosa came to the Great
Monastery in search of orthodox commentaries of the
Before having the commentaries placed at his disposal, Bud-
dhaghosa was examined by the most authoritative of the Theras,
and the result was that Buddhaghosa received the highest hon-
our: being named as an incarnation of Maitreya Bodhisattva.
33
This tendency of recognizing some individuals as bodhisattvas
still remains the same.
What is the highest moral conduct (sUa) to the Theravadins?
Since the time of the Second Council, mentioned above, the
Theravadins have been criticized for trying to follow the code
of ethics (vinaya) to the letter, for being satisfied with discipline
alone, and for being too emphatic about the moral side of the
Dharma. Such critics may be surprised to learn that the greatest
sUa the Theravadins advocate is that of a great bodhisattva (maha
bodhisatta sUa). 34
In order to conclude this section, I would like to discuss
one more practice of the Theravadins, i.e., transferring merits
(purfrfyanumodana). At the end of any meritorious deed, Therava-
dins transfer their merits to all beings. Meritorious work is some-
times done in order to transfer the resulting merit to a particular
person or group of beings. But after this first transfer is com-
pleted, the merit is transferred to all beings without exception
and the wish "Mayall beings attain nirvaI).a!" is made. Some-
times, the formula is extended to "Mayall beings be happy,
healthy, free from suffering, and attain nirvaI).a!" This offering
is practiced by the Theravadins in both the meditation of love
(rnaitree bhiivanii) and in the transfer of merits (purpl-yiinumodanii).
Not realizing that this practice is found among all Therava-
dins, D.T. Suzuki states: "The doctrine of turning over
(parivarta) of one's own merits to others is a great departure
from that which seems to have been the teaching of 'primitive
Buddhism.' In fact it is more than a departure ... "35 But all
Theravadins do practice parivarta. Therefore, it is wrong to
categorize the Theravada as "primitive Buddhism" on the basis
of parivarta. Rather, the "great departure" of which this critic
speaks must be attributed to something else, perhaps the
Hinayana. In fact, if the transfer of merit is necessarily an act
of bodhisattva, then all the Theravadins are bodhisattvas.
IV. Bodhisattva Versus Arahant
a. What Matters is not Yiina but Bodhi
We have now examined the bodhisattva ideal in the Thera-
vadins' scriptures and their practices. But this essay will not be
complete unless we juxtapose the Theravadins' ideal of arahant-
hood with their ideal of bodhisattva hood. Arahanthood is highly
esteemed by the Theravadins, but it has been vulgarized by
some of the late Mahayana writings. Arahanthood remains in
its original venerated position among the Theravadins, and
many modern writers have noticed only the arahant ideal but
not the bodhisattva ideal of the Theravadins. Due to such partial
studies of Theravada, one critic has said: "The most obvious
difference between the Hinayana and Mahayana schemes lies
in that the first map (sic) out the stages leading to Arhatship,
the second those which lead a Bodhisattva to Buddhahood."36
Such contrasts are made over and over again, necessitating an
explanation of arahanthood as well as a comparison of the two
ideals.
Regardless of the different names "Mahayana,"
"Theravada," or "Hinayana," all Buddhists agree that the object
of their religious life is enlightenment (bodhi).37 At his enlighten-
ment, a bodhisattva becomes a Buddha. With the help of the
Buddha; many others become enlightened ones. To enlighten
others has been the bodhisattva's wish from the beginning of
his career. The disciples (sravakas, or savakas) who gain en-
lightenment after the Buddha are called "arahants." Both the
Buddha and the arahant have attained nirvaJ)a. Therefore, in
order to distinguish the master from the disciple the former is
called a "samma-sam-Buddha" and the latter an "arahanta-
Buddha." If an individual attains enlightenment without the gui-
dance of a samma-sam-Buddha yet does not enlighten others as
a samma-sam-Buddha does, he is called a "paccekabuddha." Thus
the fully enlightened ones are three in kind: Buddha, pac-
cekabuddha and arahant. Theravadins are consistent on this
point. Some Mahayana sutras, too, recognize these three kinds
of enlightened ones, as Edward Conze, in explaining the Vajrac-
chedika Prajfiaparamita, points out: " .. .in these Sutras it is always
assumed that salvation can be won in different ways, or by dif-
ferent paths. Usually three such 'vehicles' are distinguished-
that of the Arhats, that of the Pratyekabuddhas, that of the
Bodhisattvas.,,38
The means to enlightenment is yana, i.e., vehicle. One who
wishes to become enlightened as a samma-sam-Buddha must take
the "maha-bodhi-yana." Likewise, one who wishes to become a
paccekabuddha must take the ''pacceka-bodhi-yana'', and one who
wishes to become an arahant, the "arahanta-bodhi-yana." As arah-
ants are the disciples of a "samma-sam-Buddha, the arahanta-bodhi-
yana is sometimes called the "sravaka-bodhi-yana."
To be a disciple of the Buddha is great; to become an
arahant is sacred. Therefore, the sravaka-bodhi-yana or the
Sravakayana is never looked down upon by the Theravadins.
Although they recognize that the vehicle taken by the master
is "great" they never call the vehicle of the disciple "Lower
Vehicle," because by the sravaka-bodhi-yana or the Sravakayana
one reaches the same nirval).a that the Buddha attained. If one's
disciples do not attain the same nirvaJ)a, one's Buddhahood and
one's whole effort in becoming a Buddha has no meaning. It is
well known that a bodhisattva's long career is directed toward
saving others by making them enlightened. And his mahii-bodhi-
yana or the Mahayana fails to be the Bodhisattvayana if the
Buddha cannot make his followers fully enlightened. The
Buddha and his disciples make a joint effort to attain nirval).a.
Thus, the Bodhisattvayana and the Sravakayana are not con-
tradictory but complementary to one another in the Theravada
viewpoint.
The emphasis of the Theravada is not on the path itself,
but on the achievement. It is true that the Buddha has under-
taken greater tasks in treading the bodhisattva path than those
of an arahant, but the latter also has fulfilled the same requisites.
For instance, instead of giving his own sons, he may give all of
his wealth; instead of giving his own eye, he may perform eye
surgery on the blind. That is how an arahant-to-be walks his
path. From these examples, it must be clear that the Buddha
and his disciple arahant have followed the same path and have
achieved the same Goal, nirvaI).a. Because of the Buddha's mas-
tery over the path and his skillful means, his path can be distin-
guished from that o ~ the arahant, b ~ t by no means is his
Bodhisattvayana detnmental to the Sravakayana. In other
words, the path of enlightenment is the same for the Buddhas
as for the arahants. The scriptures state thus:
In what sense is this the path? In the sense that it is leading to
nirvalJ.a, and that it is sought after by those who search for
nirvalJ.a .... Including many samma-sam-Buddhas, from
TalJ.hankara, Medhankara, SaralJ.ankara, and Dipankara, who
were born in one single aeon one hundred thousand and four
immeasurable aeons before the present era, up to Sakyamuni
[Gautama], and also several hundred paccekabuddhas, and also
innumerable noble sravakas-all these beings, by this path itself,
washed their defilements and attained the supreme holiness.
39
b. The Buddha and the Arahants
40
It is obvious that Buddha, the master, excels his disciple
arahants in many ways, e.g., in his skillful means in disciplining
others. But as far as bodhi (enlightenment) is concerned, they
are alike; a Buddha is an arahant and an arahant is a Buddha.
As we saw above, one who attains arahanta-bodhi is an arahant-
Buddha. On the other hand, the Buddha says about himself to
Up aka Ajlvaka, "I am an arahant in the world.,,41 In the sutras,
the epithet "arahant" often goes along with the title "sammii-sam-
Buddha" to denote one and the same person.
Nevertheless, there is a vast difference between the Buddha
and the arahant. The Buddha discovers the path to nirvaI).a,
while the arahant has learned it from the discoverer. The
Buddha is omnisicient, while the arahant has realised nirvaI).a
and only the most essential dharmas. The Buddha gains all the
miraculous powers at once, while the arahant has to develop
them gradually. The Buddha can remember any of his past
existences immediately, while the arahant has to trace them by
going through, one by one, each of his past existences. The
Buddha is unsurpassable by the arahant, while the arahant is
surpassable by the Buddha. After all, there is no competition
between the two; the former remains a Buddha while the latter
remains an arahant. It is like the relation between a king and
his ministers: on the one hand, without the Buddha there cannot
be the arahants and, on the other hand, without bringing up
arahants there is no purpose in the Buddha's enlightenment.
In a similar fashion, both the Buddha's arahanthood and
the arahant's enlightenment are carried on to some of the
Mahayana sutras. The Vajracchedikii Prajniipiiramitii Sidra adds
the epithet "arahant" to the Buddha with a phrase which paral-
lels that of the Pali suttas.
42
This epithet is not an exception for
one particular Buddha, because elsewhere the Mahayana consid-
ers all the past, present, and future Buddhas to be "arahants."43
To give one example on the reverse side, the Karu'YJiipu'YJqarzka
Sidra adds a long list of adjectives describing the disciple ara-
hants, and this list
44
corresponds word-for-word to that of the
Pali suttas. There is no difference between the former list and
the latter list; the arahant of the former reference and the ara-
hant of the latter reference are the same.
c. The Buddha-to-be and the Arahant-to-be
Both the Buddha-to-be and the arahant-to-be are bodhi-be-
ings, as they are going to be enlightened ones. Therefore, both
of them are bodhisattvas; one is the Buddha-bodhisattva and the
other is the arahanta-bodhisattva. The Theravada texts make a
distinction between the two as mahiibodhisatta and siivaka-
bodhisatta. A mahiibodhisattva is occasionally mentioned as "sabban-
nu-bodhisatta" (omniscient-Buddha-to-be). 45
We observed above how the Buddha excels the arahant. In
the same pattern, i.e., quantitatively but not qualitatively, the
mahiibodhisattva exceeds the sriivakabodhisattva. The Cariyii-
pitakaHhakathii mentions three fields in which the mahiibodhisattva
surpasses the latter: penetrating wisdom, conduct and skillful-
ness. Both the bodhisattvas improve in wisdom; but the mahiibod-
hisattva's wisdom is capable of realizing nirvaJ)a without a
teacher, whereas the sriivakabodhisattva's wisdom is capable of
THERAVADABODHISATTVAIDEAL 101
realizing nirvaI).a only when he has been taught. A maha-
bodhisattva can help the whole world without limit, yet the other's
capacity is provincial. A mahiibodhisattva's skillful means has been
discussed in this paper in relation to the perfections. While he
is equipped. with an unsurpassed skill, the latter acts with a
provisional skill. The important point, though, is that the srii-
vakabodhisattva is also improving in the same perfections and
other characteristics that the mahabodhisattva has, but in a differ-
d
46
ent egree.
As the mahabodhisattva improves himself through a long
series of lives, so does the sriivakabodhisattva. The difference
between their two careers is seen mainly in the length of time
involved. As examples: the arahanta-bodhisattvas, Sariputra and
Maudgalyayana, had trodden their paths since the time of
Anomadassi Buddha, while Gautama the bodhisattva had al-
ready been following his path since meeting Dipankara Buddha.
To cite a few more examples of the arahanta-bodhisattvas,
Mahakasyapa had been on this path since the time ofPadumut-
tara Buddha, Anuruddha since the time of Sumedha Buddha,
Sop aka since the time of Siddhartha Buddha, Sukka since the
time ofVipassi Buddha, and Ambapali since the time of Ph us sa
Buddha. Gautama the bodhisattva met Dipankara Buddha and
began his mahabodhisattva career long before all of these other
meetings took place, and he took a much much longer time
. than the others.
47
d. Bodhisattvas are not Buddhas
G.R. Welbon has made this remark concerning two inter-
preters of nirvaI).a: "The important point in the Mahayana doc-
trine that the Bodhisattvas have not yet entered nirvaI).a is lost
to both.,,48 In fact, this important point is lost to many other
interpreters of Buddhism as well. When mahabodhisattvas give
up earlier chances of becoming enlightened in order to be Bud-
dhas, they do so without attaining enlightenment, and until they
become Buddhas they remain Buddhas-to-be, regardless of how
close they get to the Buddhahood. A dialogue from the Praj-
niipiiramitii can be shown here as an example:
Subhuti replied: "There is not any dharma by which the
Tathagata [Buddha], when he was with the Tathagata Dipankara,
',I
has fully known the utmost, right and perfect enlightenment."_
The Lord said: "It is for this reason that the Tathagata Dipankara
then predicted of me: 'You, young Brahmin, will be in a future
period a Tathagata, Arhat, fully Enlightened, by the name of
Shakyamuni!,,49
Therefore, a bodhisattva is not a Buddha; a.bodhisattva has
not yet attained enlightenment. But an arahant is an enlightened
one; he is an arahanta-Buddha. When the comparison between
the Theravadins' arahant and the Mahayanins' bodhisattva is
made, it is a matter of comparing an enlightened one with an
unenlightened one. It is a comparison which cannot be justified.
An unenlightened being is not worthy of being compared to an
enlightened one. .
According to Suzuki "As f ~ r as the enlightenment goes,
both the bodhisattva and the Sravaka may be on the same
level.,,5Q This is true only if he, by "Sravaka," means the unen- .
lightened disciple. All the sravakas are not arahants. Therefore,
on the basis of our long discussion it must be clear _that the
bodhisattva is comparable with the disciple but not with the
arahant. We saw that as far as enlightenment itself is concerned,
the Buddha and the arahant are equal. They cannot be com-:
pared to an unenlightened sravaka or to a bodhisattva of any :
level.
The two following examples from the Mahayana siitras suf-
fice to keep the bodhisattva and the arahant in their respective
places. The KarurJ,iipurpjarfka Sutra begins with the reference to
the Buddha and immediately to 1,200 arahants. Only after the
preference is given to the arahants, does this siitra bring 80,000
bodhisattvas onto the scene.
51
Having thus recognized the due'
place of the bodhisattvas, we now see through these two stanzas
of the Avatamsaka Sutra how the bodhisattvas worship arahants:
So in this way all the bodhisattvas
During the course of infinite ages
With earnest mind constantly cultivate
Each and every rudiment of goodness,
Worshipping innumerable Buddhas,
Solitary buddhas, and arahants,
In order to profit living beings.
52
e. Criticisms against Arahants .
Quite contrary to the above cited Mahayana siitra, bodhisatt-
has been placed above arahanthood by some later
';'Mahayana writings. Both the siitras and the followers of the
"Theravada, like those of the Mahayana, are critical about re-
in ordinary sravakahood. Arahants as well as the ad-
v,mced bodhisattvas have long passed the ordinary' state of
Therefore, the criticisms aimed at ordinary
;,ravakas are not valid as far as the arahants are concerned, since
r'fue arahants have become unfathomable. But several modern
critics have mistaken the arahants for ordinary disciples; hence,
: their effort to contrast the bodhisattvas with the arahants has
no grounds whatsoever.
" Although there are many unfair criticisms against the ara-
Lhants, a short essay like this cannot discuss all of them. To take
':"fhe strongest criticism, the arahants have been seen as selfish
in contrast to the bodhisattvas, who unselfishly work
:for others. One critic believes that the arahants "are uncon-
about the possible Enlightenment of others.,,53 Another
1iritic states: "The idea of Arhatship, however, was considered
Mahayanists cold, impassionate, and hard-hearted for the
l:saint calmly reviews the sight of the suffering masses.,,54 In the
;'eyes of another critic, the arahants are "narrow minded,"
!{fcrabbed," and "undisciplined." He adds: "The 'selfish' en-
Wghtened persons are first the Arhants or 'Disciples,' who are
<aid to represent the ideal of the Hinayana, and who are aloof
ifrom the concerns of the world, intent on their own private
fsalvation alone.,,55 .
;,. As far as the Theravadins' arahant is concerned, none of
,these remarks.is true. As an enlightened one, an arahant makes
effort to share his enlightenment with others. He is calm;
;but his calmness does not oppose his loving kindness and com-
'passion, which have been developed with the other perfections.
,.His discipline is second only to that of the Buddha. No en-
lightened one is narrow minded or crabbed. He is already saved,
and he no longer has to be concerned with his own salvation at
,all. He does not experience even the slightest selfishness, because
selfishness has been completely destroyed at his realization of
,nirvana. Therefore, to talk of a "selfish arahant" is nonsense. I
will let A.K. Coomaraswarny speak on this point: "But the
Mahayanists.:...-not to speak of Christian critics of the Hlnayana_
do not sufficiently realize that a selfish b,eing could not possibly
become an Arahat, who must be free from even the conception
of an ego, and stillmore from every form of ego assertion."56
The Kara'Y}fyametta sutta, one of the discourses on all-embrac-
ing loving kindness, is chanted and practiced every day by the
Theravadins. Even unenlightened disciples on the way to
arahanthood are not, by any means, "aloof from the concerns
of the world." Pali suttas teach that one's progress in morality,
courage, meditation, wisdom, and realization of nirva1)a can be
expected when one has good friends (kalya'Y}a mitta).57 On one
occasion, Ananda said that half of one's religious life depends
on good friends. Immediately, the Buddha corrected Ananda
by saying that not only one half but the whole of religious life
depends on good friends, since it is one who has good friends
that makes progress in the path of enlightenment. 58 All the
arahants are good friends and the rest of the world looks up to
them to be led on the path.
It is a grave mistake of the critics to say that the arahants
are unconcerned about others' enlightenment. At the beginning
of the Buddha's dispensation itself, when the number of ara-
hants grew to sixty, they were asked to travel across the country
compassionately preaching the Dharma for the benefit and hap-
piness of the multitude. Further, each of the arahants had been
instructed to take a separate path, so that people in all directions
would receive the message, and many would become en-
lightened.
59
Ever since, this instruction has been followed by
the arahants. Like PU1)1)a, who volunteered to live among the
fierce people in order to make them realize the Dharma, ara-
hants have been tolerant of abuse and mistreatment by ignorant
people, and have accomplished their mission with kindness.
6o
According to the Mahiiparinibbiina, the Buddha had determined.
that before his demise he should educate monks, nuns, and lay
disciples in such a way that they could preach, establish, and,
reestablish his teaching in the world.
In the dialogue with Brahmin Sela, the Buddha claimed
that he was the universal emperor in the Dharma (cakravartin
dharmaraja). Then Sela asked who was his commander-in-chief.
The Buddha said that arahant Sariputra was his commander-in-
chief, -and it was Sariputra who propelled the "Wheel of
Dharma" after the Buddha ~ e t it forth.51 All the other arahants
followed the chief disciple, Sariputra, in continuing to turn the
wheel. To cite a single example, when Sariputra preached the
Cha Chakka Sutta, sixty disciples attained arahantship. Similarly,
when Maudgalyayana and each of the eighty main sravakas
preached the same sutta, in each turn, sixty attained arahantship.
Much later, in Sri Lanka, when the arahant Maliyadeva alone
preached it at sixty different locations, sixty diffeent groups of
sixty people attained arahanthood. When the same sutta was
preached by Cullanaga, one thousand monks and innumerable
others attained enlightenment.
52
This altruistic character of arahants is not missing altogether
in the Mahayana sutras. For example, the Buddha charges in
the Surangama Sutra: "I now command Bodhisattvas and Arhats
to appear, in the Dharma ending age after my nirval).a, in all
appropriate transformation bodies to save those caught in the
wheel of sarhsara. ,,53 There is no evidence that the arahants ever
disobeyed this command. Instead, they have faithfully kept up
the command of the Buddha.
V. Conclusion
In the first part of this paper, we distinguished the
Theravada from the Hlnayana. Although some scholars believe
that the bodhisattva ideal is exclusively Mahayana, the
Theravada is rich in the bodhisattva doctrine. The second part
of this paper examined Theravada texts and saw that an elabo-
rate bodhisattva path is present there. In the third part, we
observed the actual practice of the bodhisattva ideal among the
Theravadins. Finally, in the fourth part, some of the criticisms
raised against the Theravada point of view were taken into
consideration. As a result the Buddha, bodhisattva, arahant,
and sravaka were seen in relation to each other, and the prevail-
ing misunderstandings concerning arahants were clarified. By
way of concluding our discussion, I would like to add three
reflections.
The first is on "the Big Raft and the Little Raft." Some
writers state that because the Mahayana transports many to
106
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
salvation while the Theravada a few, the former is called the
"Big Raft" and the latter the "Little Raft.,,64 Buddhahood alone
is salvation to the Mahayana. The Mahayanist himself says:
"However, it had long been accepted that two buddhas do not
exist in one world simultaneously.,,65 Besides Gautama Buddha,
no one else has become a Buddha since the 6th century B.C. A
Buddha is very rare. But the Theravadins teach that due to one
single Buddha, an innumerable number of beings become fully
enlightened, and they are called arahants. Gautama Buddha
and the countless arahants of the present Buddha-era illustrate
this phenomenon. As we noted before, to make others en-
lightened is the sole purpose of one's attaining Buddhahood.
When the two schemes have been observed in this light, the
Mahayana offers salvation only to a few while the Theravada
to many. Consequently the Theravada becomes the Big Raft
while the Mahayana the Little Raft.
The second reflection is on the Mahayana bodhisattva's
practice of remaining in sarhsara until the last being attains
nirVal)a. This is one of the bodhisattva-vows. As the Sukhavati
Vyuha Sutra states, bodhisattvas swear not to become a Buddha
until this vow has been fulfilled.
66
The Vimalak'irti Nirdefa Sutra
asserts "he keeps from slipping into nirval)a; this is Bodhisattva
conduct.,,67
Everyone is a bodhisattva. If everyone waits till everyone
else attains nirval)a, no one will attain nirval)a. So, this principle
of bodhisattvahood is unpracticable. If it is practiced totally, all
beings will remain in sarhsara. And sarhsara is not the Goal of
the Buddhist Path.
The third reflection is a reconciliation between the two: the
bodhisattva path and the arahant path. In this paper, we ob-
served on one hand bodhisattvas in the Theravada scripture
and practice, and on the other hand arahants in the Mahayana
scripture and practice. Despite the fact that the Mahayanists
have presented themselves as "Big" and the others as "Little,"
Mahayana sutras teach that "The Bodhisattva mind and the
sravaka mind are a duality. If the mind is looked into as void
and illusory, there is neither Bodhisattva mind nor sravaka
mind; this is initiation into the non-dual Dharma.,,6s A leading
Buddhist of our time in the West, Christmas Humphreys, has
arrived at a similar decision:
In brief, we must all be Arhats, working diligently at the dull
and tedious task of removing faults to make way for virtues, and
steadily gaining control of a mind new purified. At the same
time we must all be Bodhisattvas, steadily expanding the heart
with true compassion, 'feeling with' those forms of life whose
need is equal to our own. Both ideas are needed; neither alone
is true.
59
In the Theravada system, nonduality is vivid. The Buddha
himself is an arahant and arahant is (an arahanta-) Buddha.
Both the Buddhas and arahants have been bodhisattvas, the
former as mahabodhisattva and the latter as sriivakabodhisattva,
until they attained enlightenment. Thus the three ideals,
Buddha, bodhisattva and arahant, are not contradictory, but
complementary to each other.
NOTES
* It has belatedly come to my attention that a version of this article was
published by Singapore University in a collection entitled One Vehicle (1984).
1. "atha kho therii bhikkhil Riijagaham agamamsu dhammaii. ca vinayaii. ca
sarhgiiyitum." Cullavagga XLI.5. See The Vinaya PitakarIJ, Vols. I-V, ed. by
Hermann Oldenberg (2nd-4th edd.; London: Pali Text Society, 1969, 1964),
Vol. II, p. 286.
2. After the recording of the Dharma and the Vinaya in textual form,
the tradition of daily chanting by the Theras gradually declined.
3. Joumal of the Pali Text Society, ed. by T.W. Rhys Davids (London:
Pali Text Society, 1889), p. 35.
4. Mahiivamsa 12: 1-20:56. See The Mahiivamsa; ed. by Wilhelm Geiger
(2nd ed.; London: Pali Text Society, 1958), pp. 94-163.
5. Anguttara Nikiiya 1. 13.1-7. See also The Book of the Gradual Sayings,
Vols, I-V, trans. by F.L. Woodward, et al. (2nd-4th edd.; London: Pali Text
Society, 1960-1973), Vol. I, pp. 14-15.
6. The Sumangala-Viliisini, Vols. II, III, ed. by W. Stede (2nd ed.; Lon-
don: Pali Text Society, 1971), Vol. III, pp. 873-77.
7. The Digha Nikiiya, Vols, II, III, ed. by T.W. Rhys Davids, et al. (3rd,
4th edd.; London: Pali Text Society, 1960, 1966), Vol. III, pp. 99-116.
8. The Commentary on the Dhammapada, Vol. I, ed. by H.C. Norman (2nd
ed.; London: Pali Text Society, 1970), p. II.
9. The Sumangala-Viliisini, Vol. II, p. 41I.
10. See for instance The Digha Nikiiya, Vol. II, pp. 30-35.; The MaJjhima-
108
JIABS VOL. 8NO. 2
Nikiiya, Vols. I, III, ed. by V. Trenckner, et al. (3rd ed.; London: Pali Text
Society, 1964, 1960), Vol. I, p. 92.
11. My translation of the following stanzas:. " ... Icchamiino aham ayja
kilese jhiipaye mama. Kim me anniitaka vesena dhamrriam sacchikaten'idha, ... Kim
me ekena tirJrJena purisena thiimadassinii? Sabbannutam piipurJitvii santiiressam
sadevake." The fiitaka, Vols. I-VII, ed. by V. Fausb0ll (2nd ed.; London: Pali
Text Society, 1962-1964), Vol. I, p. 14.
12. The Sumangala-Viliisinz, Vol. II, p. 427.
13. Diinam sUam ca nekkhammam, / Pannii viriyena pancamam, / Khanti sacca'
madhitthiinam, / Mettu' pekkhiiti' me dasa. Note that generally Mahayana perfec-
tions are six: 1) diina, 2) sUa, 3} ~ i i n t i , 4) vzrya, 5) dhyiina, and 6) prajnii.
14. The Commentary to the Cariyiipitaka, ed. by K. Devarakkhita, Simon
Hewavitarne Bequest Series, Vol. XXVI (Colombo: The Tripitaka Publication
Press, 1929), pp. 212, 220, 249 .
. 15. Ibid., p. 220.
17. The Commentary to the Cariyiipitaka, pp. 226-27.
18. Ibid., pp. 232-33.
19. Ibid., p. 259.
20. Ibid., pp. 219, 222, 235, 260.
21. Ibid., pp. 16, 216. The special context of the "mahiibodhisattva" will
be discussed later.
22. Ibid., pp. 221-22.
23. The fiitaka, Vol. III, pp. 282-83, 425.; Vol. V, pp. 282, 358.; Vol.
VI, pp. 401, 405, 431. Translations by the author.
24. The Commentary to the Cariyiipi(aka, p. 219.
26. D.T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (New York: Schocken
Books Inc., 1963), pp. 280-81. See Ibid., pp. 2-3 for Suzuki's definition of
Hlnayana. Hereinafter referred to as Mahayana Buddhism.
27. Donald E. Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965), pp. 22-23.
28. Winston L. King, A Thousand Lives Away: Buddhism in Contemporary
Burma (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer Publishers Ltd., 1964), p. 82.
29. Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, Bollingen Series LVI
(2nd ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 194.
30. Seikan Hasegawa, The Cave of Poison Grass (Arlington, Virginia: Great
Ocean Publishers, 1975), p. 21.
31. Dasa Bodhisattuppatti Kathii (Ambatenna, Sri Lanka: D.R. Perera,
1926).
32. Edward Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays (Colum-
bia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 38. See Ibid., p. 48 for
Conze's inclusion of Theravada in Hlnayana.
33. Mahiivamsa 37: 215-46. See also the Culavamsa, Part I, trans. by
Wilhelm Geiger (Colombo: The Ceylon Government Information Depart-
ment, 1953), pp. 22-26.
34. Dhammapala, Visuddhimagga Tikii, ed. by M. Dhammananda (Co-
lombo: Mahabodhi Press, 1928), p. 29.
35. Suzuki, Mahayana Buddhism, p. 283.
36. Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (3rd ed.; Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1973), p. 234. See footnote 32.
37. See Chinese Buddhist Verse, trans. by Richard Robinson (London: John
Murray Pub. Ltd., 1954), p. xv.; D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, in The
Complete Works of D.T. Suzuki, ed. by Christmas III, (3rd ed.;
London: Rider and Company, 1958), p. 164. Hereinafter referred to as Essays
in Zen.
38. Buddhist Wisdom Books: The Diamond Sutra and the Heart Sutra, trans.
by Edward Conze (2nd ed.; London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), p.
24. Hereinafter referred to as Wisdom Books.
39. The Sumangala- Viliisini, Vol. III, pp. 745--46. Translation and em-
phasis by the author.
40. I have not met a single Buddhist who \\,ishes to become a pacceka
buddha. As it is such an undesired mode of enlightenment, I will not afford
much space to the discussion of the paccekabuddhahood.
4l. "Aham hi arahii lake." The Majjhima-Nikiiya, Vol. I, p. 17l.
. 42. Wisdom Books, p. 22.
43. KaTUTJiipuTJqarika, Vols. I, II, ed. by Isshi Yamada (London: Luzac
& Company Ltd., 1968), Vol. II, Part 2, p. 15.
44. Ibid., Vol. II, Part 1, pp. 1-2.
45. TheJiitaka, Vol. VI, p. 225.; The Sumangala-Viliisini, Vol. II, p. 412.;
Dhammapala, Visuddhimagga Tikii, p. 29.; The Commentary to the Cariyiipitaka,
pp. 16, 224. In the same line the pacceka-Buddha-to-be is designated as "pacceka-
bodhisattva. "
46. The Commentary to the Cariyiipitaka, pp. 14, 224.
47. Apadiina Piili, I, ed. by W. Somaloka Tissa, Simon Hewavitarne Be-
quest Series, Vol. VIn (Colombo: The Tripitaka Publication Press, 1957), pp.
16-63.; ApadiinaPiili, II, ed. by Buddhadatta (Colombo: The Ceylon Stationers
Ltd., 1930), pp. 473-79. The twenty-four Buddhas in sequence are DIpari.kara,
KOI).<;iaiiiia, Mari.gala, Sumana, Revata, Sobhita, Anomadassi, Paduma, Narada,
Padumuttara, Sumedha, Sujata, Piyadassi, Atthadassi, Dhammadassi, Sid-
dhattha, Tissa, Phussa, Vipassi, Sikhl, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, KOI).agamana,
and Kassapa.
48. G.R. Welbon, The Buddhist NirviiTJa and its Western Interpreters
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 97. Here Welbon refers
to Philippe Edouard Foucaux and Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire.
49. Wisdom Books, p. 58. Shakyamuni is Gautama Buddha.
50. Suzuki, Essays in Zen, p. 294.
51. KaruTJiipuTJqarika, Vol. II, p. 2ff.
52. Chinese Buddhist Verse, p. 54.
53. Richard A. Gard, ed., Buddhism, (3rd ed. New York: George Braziller,
1962), p. 28.
54. Suzuki, Mahayana Buddhism, p. 288.
110
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
55. Edward Conze, Buddhism: Its Essence and Development (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959), p. 128.; Buddhist Thought in India, p. 197.;
Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays, p. 60.
56. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and'the Gospel of Buddhism (2nd
ed.; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 229.
57. Anguttara Nikiiya IX.I.3, See also The Book of the Gradual Sayings, IV,
pp. 236-37. ,
58. Samyutta Nikiiya III. 2,8. See also The Book of the Kindred Sayings, Part
I, trans. by Mrs. Rhys Davids (3rd ed.; London: Pali Text Society,. 1971), pp.
112-15.
5 9 ~ "caratha bhikkhave ciirikam bahujana hitiiya . . .. " Mahiivagga 1.11.1,
See The Vinaya Pi(akaT(!, Vo!' I, p. 21.
60. The Majjhima-Nikiiya, Vo!' III, pp. 267-70.
61. Sutta Nipiita 556-57. See The Sutta-Nipiita, ed. by D. Andersen et al.
(3rd ed.; London: Pali Text Society, 1965), p. 109.
62. MaJjhima-Nikiiya((hakathii, Part IV, ed. by Paiiiiasara, Simon,
Hewavitarne Bequest Series, Vo!' XLIX (Colombo: Tripitaka Publication
Press, 1952), pp. 218-19.
63. The Siirangama Sidra, trans. by Charles Luk (3rd ed.; London: Rider
& Company, 1973), p. 156.
64. Huston Smith, The Religions of Man (2nd ed.; New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1965), p, 134.
65. Karurtiipun4ar'ika, Vo!' I, p. 130.
66. Chinese Buddhist Verse, p. 44 ..
67. The Vimalak'irti Nirdesa Sutra, trans. by Charles Luk (Berkeley: Sham-
bala, 1972), p. 60.
68. Ibid., p. 93.
69. Christmas Humphreys, Exploring Buddhism (Wheaton, Ill: The
Theosophical Publishing House, 1974), p, 91.
Nature In Dagen's Philosophy and Poetry
by Miranda Shaw
1. Introduction
References to the natural world abound in the writings of
Dagen Kigen Zenshi (1200-1253). He drew examples from nat-
ural phenomena to illustrate philosophical points and specified
how his key philosophical positions applied to natural
phenomena.
1
Dagen's views on nature can be placed in the
context of a Buddhist debate that began in China in the sixth
century, namely, the controversy surrounding the status of non-
sentient beings in Mahayana Buddhist soteriology. This was a
burning theological issue in East Asia for many centuries. Dagen
is not usually discussed as a participant in this debate, although
his career fell within its geographical and temporal parameters
and he clearly participated in it. After a brief summary of this
debate up to t h ~ eve of Dagen's career, a presentation of the
Zen master's views on Buddha-nature insofar as they relate to
this debate will clarify his attitudes toward nature.
2
The distinc-
tiveness of his philosophical stance can better be understood
when viewed against this background of a range of positions
that were articulated. In order to explore some concrete expres-
sions of his views about nature and to introduce some of Dagen's
poetry, the body of this article is a philosophical exegesis of four
of Dagen's thirty-one syllable poems (waka
a
) in terms of what
they reveal about his attitudes toward and experiences of na-
ture.
3
II. Controversy Surrounding the Religious Status of Plants and Trees
A brief summary of the debate on whether natural
III
phenomena like plants and trees possess Buddha-nature (bus-
shab) should be helpful in showing where Dagen falls on the
spectrum of theories that were advanced. The general origin
of the debate is the conflict posed by two' of the central claims
of Mahayana Buddhism: the expansive promise of enlighten-
ment to all sentient beings and the doctrine of the universality
of Buddha-nature. If Buddha-nature represents the potential
for enlightenment, then what special relationship does it bear
to the category of "sentient beings" earmarked for enlighten-
ment? Did the Mahayana texts consider "sentient being" to refer
to transmigration in the six realms of rebirth, or could it be
extended to include natural phenomena or even to include all
phenomena?
A. The Debate in China
The motive spurring the debate in China was a desire for
logical consistency. The three main contributors to the debate
on Chinese soil were Chi-t'sang, Fa-ts'ang, and Chan-jan. Chi-
t'sang (549-623) of the San-Iun school was the first to use the
phrase "attainment of Buddhahood by plants and trees.,,4 On
the basis of the premise that Buddha-nature resides in non-sen-
tient beings (like plants and trees) as well as in sentient beings,
he concluded that non-sentient beings theoretically can attain
enlightenment. However, this was a theoretical possibility only;
in actuality non-sentient beings do not have a mind with which
to experience Buddhahood.
5
Fa-ts'ang (643-712) criticized Chi-
t'sang from the standpoint of Hua-yen metaphysics. He felt that
the vision of universal interdependence and mutual identity of
all phenomena in the Avatar(lsaka-sutra necessitated the conclu-
sion that Buddha-nature, and therefore potential enlighten-
ment, is held in common by all things, even land.
6
The pos-
sibilities of this line of argumentation were not explored until
Kukai took it up again in ninth-century Japan.
The thought of Chan-jan (711-782), a T'ien-t'ai patriarch,
represents the culmination of this line of thought in China.
While some before him had excluded non-sentient beings from
the sphere of enlightenment because of a belief that they lack
the requisite mind with which to experience it, Chan-jan offered
a classically idealist solution. He contended that all things mani-
DOGEN 113
fest the immutable mind-nature of the Buddhas. Because all
things without exception possess Buddha-nature, there is no
basis for a distinction between animate and inanimate entities:
Therefore we may know that the single mind of a single particle
of dust comprises the mind-nature of all sentient beings and
Buddhas .... Therefore when we speak of all things, why should
exception be made in the case of a tiny particle of dust? Why
should the substance of the Bhutatathata pertain exclusively to
"us" rather than to "others"? ... there is only one undifferen-
tiated nature.
7
(Chin-kang Pi)
For Chan-jan, Buddha-nature is the immutable mind at the base
of all phenomena. To say that it is present in some things but
not in others is a logical contradiction. Therefore, one can only
conclude that all things possess the prerequisite for enlighten-
ment:
Within the Assembly of the Lotus, all are present without division.
In the case of grass, trees, and the soil (from which they grow),
what difference is there between the four kinds of atoms? [The
minutest components of things, perceptible by sight, smell, taste,
and touch] By snapping their fingers and joining their palms,
they will all achieve the causation for Buddhahood .... How can
it still be said today that inanimate things are devoid (of the
Buddha-nature)?8
The preceding quotations show that Chan-jan was concerned
with the logical implications of the universality of Buddha-
nature. Further, he was concerned with the mundane world as
a whole, not just vegetation per se. He wanted to demonstrate
that Buddha-nature is present in the tiniest mote of dust, as
well as in plants and trees.
B. The Debate in Japan
In their continuation of this controversy, Japanese scholars
were concerned almost exclusively with the religious status of
nature in Buddhist soteriology. A reverent regard for nature as
the locus of religious meaning had been part of Japan's indigen-
ous worldview since prehistoric times. While the Chinese were
114
. JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
motivated by a desire to establish an absolutistic metaphysics,
the Japanese were prompted to discover whether "plants and
trees" (somuku
C
) could attain Buddhahood Uobutsu
d
). The debate
took several interesting turns on Japanese soil. Kukai (774-835)
was the first to enter into the debate. However, I would like to
discuss his views last in order to compare them with Dagen's.
Annen (841-884) held a view similar to that of Chan-jan:
since Buddha-nature is common to all beings, it follows that
both sentient and non-sentient beings can attain Buddhahood.
9
Ryagen (912-985), a Tendai scholar, retained the distinction
between sentient and non-sentient beings, but brought the dis-
cussion to a new level by arguing for the inclusion of vegetation
in the category of the sentient. He likened the organic growth-
cycle of a plant to the stages of Buddhist practice:
budding
growmg
fruiting
dying
aspiration
training
enlightenment
nirvaI).a
According to his theory, the completion of a plant's natural
life-cycle constituted its attainment of Buddhahood. Implicitly
excluded were natural phenomena without such a life-cycle, like
mountains and rivers. 10
A slightly later Tendai scholar, Chujin (1065-1138), broke
yet new ground by putting forth a theory of the innate enlighten-
ment of plants and trees, in accordance with the increasing
emphasis of the Tendai sect upon "original enlightenment" (hon-
gaku
e
);
Trees and plants are in possession of Buddha-nature (busshO or
Buddhata). "Buddha" means "enlightenment." The inner (or mys-
terious) principle of the Buddha-nature is a purity of original
enlightenment (hongaku) .... This is something which plants and
trees are in possession of.
As for trees and plants, there is no need for them to have or
show the thirty-two marks (of Buddhahood); in their present
form-that is, by having roots, stems, branches, and leaves, each
in its own way has Buddhahood,lI
DOGEN 115
Chujln went a step further than Ryagen by dispensing with an
anthropocentric model of Buddhahood. For him, the enlighten-
ment of the natural world is an actuality, not just a potentiality,
and it manifests this enlightenment in its own unique way.12
Despite these advances, the issue was not laid to rest in the
twelfth century. Echoing the seventh-century sentiments of Chi-
t'sang, Shashin (1189-1204) put forth reasons why plants and
trees, like other non-sentient beings, cannot attain Buddhahood:
Trees and plants cannot be transformed into sentient beings, or
transmigrate into other worlds. Therefore, they have no chance
of attaining Buddhahood. Trees and plants cannot train them-
selves, because they have no mind. Therefore, they cannot attain
Buddhahood. If they had a mind, we would be unable to differen-
tiate them from sentient beings .... Trees and plants do not
possess the external conditions necessary for attaining Buddha-
hood.
13
Further, Shashin conservatively pointed out that no sutra or
sastra specifies that plants and trees can attain enlightenment. 14
Naturally, other scholars found his view to be inconsistent with
Tendai doctrines, but his expression of it stands witness to the
fact that the religious status of the plant world was still highly
controversial and a matter of deep concern for twelfth-century
Japanese Buddhists on the eve of Dagen's career.
Kukai (774-835), the founder of the Shingon sect in Japan,
figures last in this brief chronicle because in many ways his views
were the most radical and therefore closest to those of Dagen.
Utilizing the categories provided by his esoteric metaphysics
and Hua-yen philosophy, Kukai found a way to forge an identity
between the phenomenal world and the Absolute, the Absolute
for Kukai being Mahavairocana. He expressed this identity as
"the eternal harmony of the six great elements," i.e. earth, water,
fire, wind, space, and mind or consciousness, the elements that
comprise all Buddhas, sentient beings, and material worlds. 15
Therefore, plants, trees, and even non-sentient beings have a
mind, the prerequisite for Buddhahood. While retaining the
categories of sentient and non-sentient, Kukai effectively dis-
solved the basis of distinction between them.
116
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
In the Shingon master's scheme, like many Chinese formu-
lations, there are two distinct types of phenomena: conditioned
and unconditioned. "The objects of forms, and
movements-[i.e. sentient and non-sentient beings] ... are the
products of the unconditioned; in other words, they are the
manifestations of the Body and Mind of the Dharmakaya
Buddha.';]6 The undifferentiated Dharmakaya manifests itself
in the form of four mandalas ("spheres" of physical extension
and communication). The body-, speech-, mind-, and action-
mandalas form the realms of phenomena and experience.
17
Non-sentient beings are regarded as the mind-mandala. Since
the four mandalas interpenetrate one another, there is in fact
no distinction between the creating principle (Dharmakaya or
Mahavairocana) and the created phenomena. 18
Kukai's concept of identity was embedded in the metaphysi-
cal categories of his mikkyil doctrines. His equation of Buddha-
nature and phenomena was virtually lost amidst the elaborate
theories he constructed around it. In addition, he upheld the
dualities of phenomenal/noumenal, conditioned/uncondi-
tioned, and sentient/non-sentient in the structure of his argu-
ments. Nonetheless, Kukai formulated a strong argument for
the full Buddhahood of plants, trees, and all phenomena that
foreshadowed Dagen's conception in its radicalness, although
he preceded the Sata master by four centuries.
III. Dagen'S Views on Buddha-Nature and Sentience
The diachronic discussion of the previous section was in-
cluded in order to highlight and to contextualize the importance
and uniqueness of Dagen's contribution to the debate. All the
views described therein share a dualistic and absolutistic view
of Buddha-nature, albeit with varying degrees of explicitness.
That is, they share the ontological presupposition that Buddha-
nature is an eternal, unchanging essence underlying all permu-
tations and immanent in some or all phenomena. Mahayana
scriptural sources like the SaddharmapuTJrjarfka-siitra and the
MahiiparinirvaTJa-siitra had left no doubt that Buddha-nature is
present in all beings and that, by virtue of their possession of
it, all sentient beings will attain enlightenment. Therefore, the
DOGEN
117
ensuing discussion focused on establishing the parameters of
the category "sentient beings" and on whether potential Bud-
dhahood in each case was merely theoretically possible or prac-
tically realizable. The two most radical opinions were Ryagen's
and Kukai's. Ryagen, who had argued for the innate enlighten- ..
ment of plants and trees, had maintained that Buddha-nature
was something that they possessed. Even Kukai's identification
of Dharmakaya and concrete phenomena achieved a formal
identity at best. In his own words, the transcendent Dharmakaya
Buddha "is analogous to great space; he is eternal, being un-
obstructed, and embraces in himself all phenomena.,,19 There-
fore, Kukai's concept of identity was one of "eternal harmony"
between two distinct orders of reality.
The Kamakura reformer went beyond the transcendental
and immanental viewpoints that bound these Buddhist scholars
to varying degrees of idealism. His unde.fstanding of the re-
lationship between Buddha-nature and concrete phenomena
was thoroughgoingly nondualistic. In Dagen's ShObogenzo,
Buddha-nature is not an eternal or invisible essence hidden
within, possessed by, or manifested by perceptible phenomena:
From the beginningless past, many foolish people identified con-
sciousness and spirituality as the Buddha-nature. How laughable
it is that they were called the enlightened people! If I were to
explain the Buddha-nature without getting too involved, [I would
say that it is] fences, walls, roof tiles, and pebbles.
2o
(ShOb.-BusshO)
Here, Dagen directly contradicts a statement that occurs in the
Mahaparinirvarj,asutra: "Those which have not the Buddha-
nature are fences, walls, tiles, stones, and other non-sentient
beings.'m This positing of an ontological hierarchy was
anathema to his philosophy.
Dagen's fundamental ontological premise was that Buddha-
nature is none other than concrete phenomena. That is to say,
"all things," i.e. concrete phenomena, provides an exhaustive
definition of Buddha-nature. "In the entire universe there is
not even a single object alien from Buddha-nature, nor is there
any second existence other than this universe here and now."22
(Shob.-BusshO) Even to speak of a relationship between Buddha-
nature and phenomena is incorrect, because they are not two
separate entItles that can interrelate, however close one con-
ceives their relationship to be. Rather, Buddha-nature and "all
things" are identical. This is not a mere fOI;mal, logical identity,
like the identity between "the one" and "the many" or between
"essence" and "manifestation" posited by idealistic metaphysics.
"The principle of dharmata is not like that. It completely goes
beyond ideas of difference and identity, separation and unity
between this phenomenal world and dharmata."23 (Shob.-Hossho)
This identity is simple, uncompounded equivalence; not A ===
B, but A = A:
We do not say "all sentient beings are the Buddha-nature" (issai-
shujo soku bussha) [for even "are" smacks of a dualistic thinking],
but instead "all-sentient-beings-the-Buddha-nature-of-exis-
tence" (issai-shujo-u-bussha).24 (Shab. -Bussha)
Clearly, Dagen believed that to draw even the minutest distinc-
tion was to fall into the snare of dualism.
The distinction between sentient and non-sentient beings
had become irrelevant. Since Buddha-nature is the temporal
flux of reality, from which nothing is excluded, Dagen upheld
the equivalence of all existences, sentient beings, and Buddha-
nature:
"The word 'all existences' refers to sentient beings or all things.
That is, all existences are the Buddha-nature, and the totality of
all existences is called sentient beings.,,25 (Shob.-Bussha)
For Dagen there is no differentiation between living and non-liv-
ing beings or between beings with and without mind. These
categories had been invoked by other philosophers in order to
define the sphere of potential enlightenment, and it usually
resulted in a hierarchy of beings, as seen in the thought of
Ryagen and Shashin. Dagen rejected this line of thinking when
he rejected absolutistic metaphysics and reasserted the universal-
ity of impermanence and dependent origination.
Dagen used the term "Buddha-nature"
with "impermanence" (mujog) , sunyatii (ku
h
), tathatii (shinnyo\
and dharmatii (hossho j). He had sought for an understanding of
Buddha-nature in the Buddhist doctrines of impermanence
(anitya) , universal conditionality (sar!Jskr:ta), and non-self (aniit-
DOGEN
119
man), all three of which converge at the conclusion that there
is no permanent, unchanging entity anywhere in the universe.
From these premises, Dagen inferred that Buddha-nature itself
cannot be exempt from universal impermanence. He concluded
that Buddha-nature is nothing other than the impermanence
of all things, inseparable either logically or concretely from the
momentary arising and perishing of evanescent phenomenality:
The impermanence of grass, trees, and forests is verily the
Buddha-nature. The impermanence of the person's body and
mind is verily the Buddha-nature. The impermanence of the
land, country, and scenery is verily the Buddha-nature.
26
(ShOb.-
Bussho) .
Because Buddha-nature is impermanence, one should not
look anywhere else for it except in concrete reality. "Thus to
see mountains and rivers is tantamount to experiencing the
Buddha-nature. To behold the Buddha-nature is to observe a
donkey'S jaw and a horse's mouth.,,27 (ShOb.-BusshO) Dagen some-
times stated his definition of Buddha-nature as an abstract prop-
osition, such as "All things themselves are ultimate reality,,,28 or
"Impermanence is Buddha-nature.,,29 (ShOb.-ShOji) However, be-
cause Buddha-nature is equivalent to concrete particulars, more
often he listed concrete examples to demonstrate the principle:
The real aspect [dharmata] is all things ... this wind and this rain,
this sequence of daily living ... this study and practice, this ever-
green pine and ever unbreakable bamboo.,,30 (Shob.-Shoho-jisso)
Impermanence, for Dagen, was the key concept. To express
the idea that nothing is static or immutable, Dagen sometimes
used phrases like "the blue mountain always walks" or "the
eastern mountain floats on water.,,31 (Shob.-Sansuikyo) In other
words, even things that appear to be immovable or nonliving
display the creative dynamism of impermanence/Buddha-
nature. Within this conceptual framework, enlightenment could
never be portrayed as an escape from impermanence or as a
permanent attainment. "Since supreme enlightenment is the
Buddha-nature, it is impermanent. The perfect quietude of
nirval)a is momentary and thereby the Buddha-nature.,,32 (Shob.-
Bussho) Dagen conceived enlightenment to be the experience
120
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
of all-inclusive impermanence and the realization that the im-
permanence of "all things," including oneself, is Buddha-
nature.
IV. Dagen's Views on Nature: Four Waka
The frequent references to nature throughout Dagen's
philosophical writings show that nature and its religious value
were never far from his mind. As a way to focus more closely
on the Zen master's views on nature, I would like to analyze
some.ofhis poems in terms of how they express his philosophy,
by applying a thematic rather than a literary mode of analysis.
In both prose and poetry, Dagen used the nature images
that recur in Japanese literature (mountains, the moon, rain,
bamboo, etc.), but, according to Hee-Jin Kim, used "these quite
common words or metaphors in a unique way, so that their
ordinary meanings are not extended or expanded to describe
extraordinary events other than themselves, but instead their
ordinary meanings are radicalized."33 In this sense, he wrote
about nature without sentimentality. Dagen felt that one should
not apply human standards to natural phenomena, so his valori-
zation of the natural world was an affirmation of nature qua
nature and as Buddha-nature:
The Buddha's way consists in the form that exists and the condi-
tions that exist. The bloom of flowers and the fall of leaves are
the conditions that exist. And yet unwise people think that in
the world of essence there should be no bloom of flowers and
no fall of leaves.
34
(Shob.-HosshO)
Hajime Nakamura points out that Dagen displays two indige-
nously Japanese ways of thinking in his "acceptance of actuality
in the phenomenal world as absolute" and in his close involve-
ment with the landscape as the focal point of religious and poetic
imagination.
35
Throughout history, there have been a diversity
of ways in which the Japanese have viewed nature as soteric. 36
In Dagen's case, the basis of his affirmation of the full-fledged
ontological and religious status of nature was the reappropria-
tion of what he regarded as Buddhism's original, radical mes-
DOGEN 121
sage. Thus, it represents a confluence of his Japanese cultural
background and his Buddhist philosophy.
Since the Sata master's sensitivity to nature was coupled
. with his nondualistic Buddhist ontology, his poems are quite
different in tone from earlier and contemporaneous works. He
wrote without the romanticism, anthropomorphism, and sense
of pathos that one often finds in the poetry of preceding eras.
In addition, he rarely evoked the popular poetic moods, like
desolate solitude (wabi
k
).37 A brief comparison with the poetry
of Saigya (1118-1190), a slightly earlier Buddhist poet who be-
came extremely renowned as a classical bard of Japanese sen-
. sibilities, may help to highlight what is distinctive in Dagen's
verse. Saigya's poetry was infused with Kukai's metaphysics, and
William LaFleur claims that he portrays nature as if it itself is
the Tathagata.
38
However, when one examines Saigya's poetry,
one finds that the soteric value of nature portrayed therein is
its roles as companion and teacher. Personified nature grieves,
has a healing "power" (iryoku\ and yields a sense of peace and
consolation. The predominant tone is the lamentation of imper-
manence. For example:
39
Gazing at them,
these blossoms have grown
so much a part of me,
to part with them when they fall
seems bitter indeed!
Nowhere does one find the one-to-one correspondence between
natural phenomena and "the Absolute" (per Kukai's onfology)
or Buddha-nature that one finds in Dagen's poetry.
In light of the preceding introduction, one can predict that
Dagen did not exalt or venerate nature in the same way as did
his predecessors. He had his own way of expressing the religious
value of nature. This is evident in a waka that was inspired by
a Chinese enlightenment poem:
40
Minenoiro
T ani no hibiki mo
Minanagara
Waga Shakamuni
Koe to sugata to
Mountain colors,
Valley echoes,
Everything as it is-
The voice and body
Of my beloved Sakyamuni.
Here, Dagen expresses his conviction that the forms of nature
do not manifest Buddha-nature; they are Buddha-nature.
Buddha-nature is expressed as a concrete particular,
"Sakyamuni's voice and body," in keeping with Dagen's predilec-
tion for concrete imagery. Since the essential feature of a
Buddha is enlightenment, which is actualized at all times and
places, "the universe is proclaiming the actual body of
Buddha."4! (Shob.-Keiseisanshoku) This directly opposes Kukai's
dualistic view that phenomena are "the manifestations of the
Body and Mind of the Dharmakaya Buddha.,,42 Dagen denied
the dualism of essence and manifestation. He maintained that
"there is no expression (setsu) that is not essence (sha).,,43 (Shab.-
Sesshin-sessha)
The central line of the waka is the conceptual focal point,
providing a pivotal link between the other pairs of lines. Nagara
signifies the continuation of an action or a state of being. When
it refers to a state of being, it can mean "remaining thus" or "as
it is," conveying the Buddhist notion of thusness (tathata). This
affirms that the value of nature is intrinsic and not predicated
upon its ability to point to something beyond itself. At the same
time, this intrinsic value is not simply the appearance or experi-
ence of nature. "It is regrettable that many only appreciate the
superficial aspects of sound and color. They can neither perceive
nor experience Buddha's shape, form and voice in a land-
scape. ,,44 (Shab.-Keis.)
Therefore, Dagen is affirming the specifically religious
value of nature, which is its very emptiness or impermanence.
This emptiness is realizable by the enlightened. "The real form
of mountains, rivers, and the green earth is rooted in en-
lightened vision ... "45 (Shob.-Ganzei) Thus, it is enlightened vis-
ion, the "wisdom eye," that reveals the nondual oneness of one-
self, the landscape, and Sakyamuni. This is the underlying theme
of Dagen's visionary poem. When one casts off mind and body,
one meets the Buddha everywhere, and one "can hear the 84,000
hymns of praise coming from the valley streams and the moun-
tains .... (These) will never hold back their teaching of the
Buddhist Way.,,46 (Shob.-Keis.)
This points to another of Dagen's views on nature, namely,
his belief in nature's ability to preach the Buddhist Dharma,
i.e., to be the "voice of Sakyamuni." Dagen called this enlighten-
DOGEN 123
ing communication "the discourse of non-sentient beings" (mujo-
seppom). This concept was one of the concrete illustrations he
c
used
to eliminate the distinction between sentient and non-sen-
tient beings. If one can think only in terms of human characteris-
. tics, it is easy to conclude that various entities of nature like
animals and plants, much less so-called non-living entities like
mountains and rivers, cannot preach the Dharma. Dagen in-
sisted that "non-sentient beings" do expound Buddhist truths:
The way insentient beings expound Dharma should not be under-
stood to be necessarily like the way sentient beings expound
Dharma ... .it is contrary to the Buddha-way to usurp the voices
of the living and conjecture about those of the non-living in
terms of them ... 47 (Shob.-Mujo-seppo)
"Non-sentient beings" may not communicate in the same way
human beings do, but they do possess the ability to give voice
to the Buddhist Way (dotoku
n
).
Illustrative of Dagen's conviction in this matter is the follow-
ing waka:
48
Tani ni hibiki
Mine ni naku sam
Taedaeni
Tada kono kyo 0
Toku tokoso kike
Monkey's cries from the
mountaintops,
Echoing mysteriously in the
valley:
I listen only
to the preaching of this sidra.
Dagen equates the monkey's cries with a discourse on Dharma.
One can find a clue to the content of this sidra in the third line
of the waka, which is a play on words. Tae dae
o
means "mysteri-
ously," suggesting the haunting quality of the monkey's cries.
One imagines that they are piercing the night air. The mysteri-
ousness could also be the ineffable "thusness" of momentary
events, which must be experienced in order to be fathomed.
However, the pronunciation of tae dae means "intermittently."
If the monkey cries out at intervals, the intermittent sound
would serve to remind one that Buddha-nature is eternally rising
and perishing, moment-by-moment. The concept of emptiness
is also evoked by the poetic image of the echo. An echo is
. explicitly empty in-and-of-itself, for it is dependent upon a cer-
, I,":
1 ~ 4 JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
tain conjunction of sound, surface, and ear. To listen to an echo
is to be reminded of the dependent co-arising of all phenomena.
Therefore, metaphorically and literally, the monkey is delivering
a profound discourse on impermanence and dependent origina_
tion.
As in the previous waka, Dagen writes from the standpoint
of enlightened vision. When one is awakened, everything reveals
the true meaning of the sutras.
This sutra is the sutra of the entire universe-mountains, rivers,
earth, grass, trees, self, and others .... When we study the way
based on those respective sutras, countless sutras are revealed.
49
(Shab. -Jishazammai)
If one is to be illumined by the monkey's sutra, one must "drop
body and mind" (shinjin datsuraku
P
) and become one with it.
Dagen felt that non dual awareness is the key to the liberating
and liberated vision that allows one to discover the true meaning
of the sutras in all things. He taught that the way to achieve
nondual awareness is to focus completely on one thing at a time.
That is why he listens "only to this sutra."
Nondual awareness is beautifully expressed in the following
poem:
50
Kikumamani
Mata kokoro naki
Ma ni shi areba
Onore narikeri
N oki no mizu.
As I listened,
I became
The sound of rain
On the eaves.
The listener in the first line and the rain in the fifth line are
bridged by three lines expressing their oneness. Kokoro na ki,
literally "without my heart," is a Japanese expression for an
experience of harmony with nature. Taken together, the fourth
andfifth lines mean "I myself became the rain." The profundity
of experience he describes is more than deep aesthetic appreci-
ation, and it goes beyond the definition of an object in terms
of any or all possible intellectual categories, including "Buddha-
nature." It is to experience its thusness. To fathom the sound
of the rain is to experience rain-ness, is to become rain. In the
DOGEN 125
same -way, to fathom the impermanence of Buddha-nature is
to meet the Buddha, is to become enlightened.
The image of raindrops is highly evocative of imp erma-
.nence and emptiness, for it is the spaces between them that
create the pattern of sOlmd, just as it is emptiness that makes
form possible. Similarly, it is the "gaps" in the self, the lack of
fIxed boundaries between "self' and "other," that make this
unitary awareness attainable. Thus, nondual awareness presup-
poses and dependent origination. Because
\()f dependent ongmatlOn, each phenomenon (such as a human
peing) is coextensive with the entire situation of which it is a
part at each moment (in this case, rainfall). Clearly, imperma-
;nence/emptiness has a positive value for Dagen. It underlies
.this liberative visionary mode, making enlightenment possible.
A poem by Saigya on the subject of rain provides an interest-
ing contrast:
51
Who lives here
Must know what sadness means-
mountain village,
rain drenching down
from the evening sky.
Here, the rapport between man and environment is a different
kind of concord. The rainfall is an .occasion for sadness. A sense
of impermanence is conveyed by the image of a small mountain
village dwarfed by the mountainside and pitiably drenched by
a downpour. The realization of its impermanence causes the
poet to lament the fragility of humankind's creations and the
transience of life itself. In Saigya's waka, nature symbolizes his
mood in a subtle humanization. In contrast, Dagen allows nature
to be just what it is. Be portrays its impermanence as liberative
rather than pathetic. Bee-Jin Kim explains that Dagen's interest
in impermanence is in part a cultural trait, while his philosophi-
cal-and, by extension, aesthetic-rendition of it is unique:
As he probed into the ethos of impermanence, thoroughly indi-
genized by the medieval Japanese mirid, Dagen did not indulge
in aesthetic dilettantism and sentimentalism as a way to escape
from the fleeting fates of life, but, instead, examined the nature
of impermanence and its ultimate companion, death, unflinch_
ingly, and attempted to realize liberation in and through this
inexorable scheme of things.
52
Therefore, in Dagen's poem, the rain doesn't mirror his mOod;
Dagen harmonizes his mind with the rain, accepts its imperma_
nence, and experiences it as it is, in its thusness.
The Sata master accomplished this nondualistic mode of
awareness by focusing his mind on a particular event or object,
a process that he called "the total exertion of a single thing"
(iPpo-gujin
q
). "This total exertion is the choosing of one thing
at a time to live it in its total thusness."53 The following waka
epitomizes "total exertion" and its metaphysical underpin-
nings:
54
Haruwahana
N atsu hototogisu
Akiwatsuki
F uyuyuki saete
Suzushi karikeri
Spring is a flower
Summer is a cuckoo
Autumn is the moon
And in winter the snow
is cold and clear.
Dagen appropriates a traditional set of images and presents
them in a new light, a practice common among Japanese poets.
An earlier Chinese poem serves to contrast Dagen's treatment
of the theme:
55
Various flowers bloom in the spring,
the moon shines in autumn,
cool wind blows in summer
and snow falls in winter.
How nice and pleasant the seasons
are for man!
The Chinese poem lists the beauties of nature associated with
each season and extols their ornamental enhancement of
humankind's existence. Each image-flowers, the moon, etc.-
had come to symbolize a particular season in the course of
literary history. On the other hand, in Dagen's poem, these
objects don't symbolize their respective seasons; they are the
seasons. Since spring is a flower, one can experience the whole
of spring by totally experiencing a single flower. Since winter
DOGEN 127
:issno
w
, one. can experience the totality of winter by total exertion
~ ~ p o n snow's utter coldness.
Philosophically, this series of images expresses Dagen's con-
viction that one can realize the totality of the universe in a single
event or mqment of thusness. In his own words, "He who knows
a single object comprehends the entire universe; he who pene-
,}trates a single dharma exhausts all dharmas.,,56 (ShOb.-Shoaku-
'makusa) On this point, Dagen's philosophy partook of Hua-yen
irn
eta
physics,57 according to which all universes and times are
<present in a single moment of thought, due to the mutual inter-
ipenetration and nonobstruction of all phenomena. In the words
of Fa-ts'ang, the Chinese Hua-yen patriarch:
Since a single moment has no substance of its own, it becomes
interchangeable with 'the great aeons. Because the great aeons
have no substance, they also embrace the single moment ....
Hence all the universes that are far away or near by, all the
Buddhas and sentient beings, and all things and events in the
three times [past, present, and future] vividly appear within one
moment. 58
Similarly, the Zen master concluded that "Entire being, the en-
tire world, exists in the time of each and every now. ,,59 (ShOb. -Uji)
This concept is inextricably linked with Dagen's philosophy
'of time, a subject that he explored at great length. Rejecting
the normative conception of time as a linear flow, Dagen under-
stood time to be a succession of discrete moments. Each moment
is spatial as well as temporal, because time is inseparable from
concrete, momentary events. That is, "activity is time, and time
is activity.,,60 Therefore, a flower, a minute spatial and temporal
component of spring, is the spring. Spring cannot be found
apart from the momentary events that comprise it. It is not an
eternal essence underlying the blossoming of flowers and bud-
ding of trees, any more than Buddha-nature is an eternal essence
underlying all things. Spring, then, becomes the matrix or con-
figuration of dependent origination in which a flower appears.
The flower, in turn, is a full expression and actualization of the
situation of which it is a part. When a flower appears, "the world
unfolds itself with the flowering.,,61 (Shob.-Baika)
The existential dimension of this complex of ideas sub-
sumed by "total exertion" is that one should focus one's attention
"
"':1
upon the present moment, upon each "here-now" (genJokoan
r
).
"Unless [one] puts forth the utmost exertion and lives time now,
not a single thing will be realized."62 (ShOb.-UJi) By applying
oneself with total exertion, one will fully experience a flower,
the sound of raindrops, snow's utter coldness, the reality of birth '
and death, and the universality of impermanence-in a word,
enlightenment.
v. Conclusion
Dagen's view of the radical non-duality of phenomena and
Buddha-nature lends itself to reflection upon the parameters
of two terms that pervade religious-historical writings: "tran-
scendence" and "immanence." The usefulness of these terms as
cross-cultural categories rightfully has been called into ques-
tion.
53
The applicability of either term within a given system of
thought must be narrowly specified and broadly contextualized,
and once this has been accomplished, it becomes clear that that
exact use of the term would not apply in any other context.
54
My discussion of Dagen highlights a specific dimension of
the concept of transcendence that rarely is invoked and that
therefore may enlarge our understanding of the potential appli-
cations of the term. It amply has been demonstrated that tran-
scendence has no place in Dagen's ontology. He rejected any
attempt to place Buddha-nature and enlightenment beyond the
sphere of momentary, concrete phenomena. One may therefore
be tempted to label Dagen as a "radical immanentalist," and
one imagines that he would have been pleased with the term.
However, transcendence is present in his thought as an expe-
riential category. In order to experience an event in itsthushess,
one has to experience a breakthrough of awareness. One has
to transcend the illusory boundaries of one's ego, "dropping
body and mind," in order to attain the unitary mode of vision
described in Dagen's poetry and sermons.
Therefore, in addition to the vertical transcendence derived
from western monotheism, in which an entity who is above and
beyond the world created and rules the world, there may be
said to be a horizontal transcendence, in which one moves beyond
the limits of a former situation and attains a new perspective
DOGEN 129
" "
understanding, perhaps even on a universal scale. It is the
;'difference between an ontological transcendent and experiential
Uranscendence. This latter type of transcendence rarely is cited as
'aform of religious transcendence or a metaphysical category,
: but hopefully it increasingly will be, as scholars cease to measure
':eastern religion against pre-established definitions and instead
-allow eastern examples to expand our concepts and categories
; and, in the process, our understanding of what it means to be
'human.
1. Insightful discussions of Dagen's use of nature imagery in his
::philosophical writings occur in Hee-Jin Kim, Dogen Kigen-Mystical Realist
(The Association for Asian Studies Monograph No. XXIX. Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1980), pp. 97ff., 147ff., and 253ff.
. 2. For lengthy articles devoted solely to Dagen's philosophical stance
:'regarding Buddha-nature, see Abe Masao, "Dagen on Buddha-Nature," East-
em Buddhist Vol. 4, No.1 (May 1971): 28-71 and Takashi James Kodera,
'.''The Buddha-nature in Dagen's ShObogenzo," Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies Vol. 4; No.4 (Dec. 1977):267-292.
"; '. 3. In the organization of this paper, I am indebted to William R. Le-
:Fleur, who used a similar format for his lucid study ofSaigya's poetry, "Saigya
;and the Buddhist Value of Nature," History of Religions Vol. 13, No.2 (Nov.
93-128 and Vot 13, No.3 (Feb. 1974): 227-248.
" 4. LaFleur, 1973, p. 95. My summary of this debate, except of the
posItions of Kiikai and Dagen, relies on those which occur in LaFleur, 1973,
and Yukio Sakamoto, "On the 'Attainment of Buddhahood by Trees and
Plant'," Proceedings of the IXth International Congress for the History of Religions
.(1958) (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1960): 415-422.
," 5. Sakamoto, 1960, pp.415-416. Hui Yuan (523-592) put forth a similar
"1rgument, saying that there are two types of Buddha-nature: the "known" or
theoretical Buddha-nature, possessed by sentient and non-sentient beings
alike, and the "knowing" or practical Buddha-nature, possessed by sentient
beings who have a mind with which to aspire for enlightenment.
6. Sakamoto, 1960, p. 416.
7. Chan-jan's Chin-kang Pi (TT no. 1932, p. 782), quoted by Yu-lan
Fung in A History of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1953), p. 385.
8. TT no. 1932, p. 786, quoted by Yu-Ian Fung, 1953, p. 386.
9. Sakamoto, 1960, p. 417.
10. LaFleur, 1973, pp. 102, 104.
II. Ryagen's KankO Ruijo (Dai Nihon Bukkyo Zensho, 40: 68-69), translated
and quoted by LaFleur, 1973, pp. 105, 107.
12. LaFleur, 1973, p. llO.
13. Shashin's Shikan-shiki, translated and quoted by Sakamoto, 1960, pp.
418-419.
14. Sakamoto, 1960, pp. 418-419.
15. Yukio S. Hakeda, Kukai: Major Works (New York: Columbia Univer_
sity Press, 1972), p. 89.
16. Kiikai's ShOji jisso gi, translated by Hakeda, 1972, p. 245.
17. Hakeda, 1972, pp. 96-97.
18. Hakeda, 1972, pp. 229-230.
19. Kiikai's Sokushin jobutso gi, translated by Hakeda, 1972, p. 226.
20. Cited and translated by Kodera, 1977, p. 286.
21. Translated and cited in another context by Sakamoto, 1960, p. 419.
22. Translated and quoted by Kim, 1980, p. 163.
23. Translated by Kosen Nishima and John Stevens, ShObogenzo (Sendai,
Japan: Daihokkaikaku Pub. Co., 1975), Vol. 2, p. 64.
24. Cited and translated by Kim, 1980, p. 169.
25. Cited and translated by Kim, 1980, p. 165. Cf. also p. 257.
26. Translated by Hajime N akam ura in Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples
(Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964), p. 352.
27. Translated and quoted by Kim, 1980, pp. 162-163.
29. Translated by Nakamura, 1964, p. 352.
30. Translated by Kodera, 1977, pp. 280-281.
31. Translated by Kim, 1980, p. 182.
32. Translated by Kim, 1980, pp. 181-182.
33. Kim, 1980, p. 256. One of the unifying characteristics of Japanese
poetry, from the earliest anthology (the Manyoshu, 8th c.) down to the present
day, is the depiction of some aspect of nature and the emotion or insight
which it inspired. What varies in each case is the response or insight. Often
there are veiled references to previous Chinese or Japanese poems about the
same subject, and each image has its own literary history and evokes a particular
season and/or time of day. Therefore, what distinguishes Dagen's waka is not
the images contained therein, but the attitudes which they express.
34. Translated in Hajime Nakamura, A History of the Development of
japanese Thought From 592 to 1868 (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, 1967),
p.97.
35. Nakamura, 1967, p. 92.
36. On this topic, LaFleur cites an important monograph by Ienaga
Sabura entitled Nihon Shishoshi ni okeru Shukyoteki no Tenkai [The Development
of a Religious View of Nature in the History of Japanese Thought] (Tokyo,
1944). Cf. LaFleur, p. 228, n. 2. La Fleur provides a helpful summary of
Ienaga's conclusions on pp. 228-233.
37. Aside from a lack of exposure, this may explain in part why Dagen's
poetry has not attained much popularity in Japan. Even Koryii Oyama, who
published a critical edition of Dagen'S waka in 1971 (see my n. 40), apologizes
that the poetry isn't very good.
38. LaFleur, 1973, p. 236.
DOGEN 131
39. Translated by Hiroaki Sato and Burton Watson, From the Country of
JEight Islands (Seattle: of 1981), p. 171. . _
.. ' 40. Dagen's waka occur In the fortIeth chapter of Dagen Zenshz Zenshu,
,"Vol. 2 (Okubo D6shu, Tokyo, 1969). My translations are from the anthol-
.()gy compiled by Koryu Oyama: Kusa Ha: Dagen Zenshi Shu' (Tokyo:
'Sotashu Shumucho, 1971); ThIS one IS on p. 27. I would hke to thank Prof.
,'Edwin Cranston for his helpful suggestions regarding the translation of these
'poems. Any remaining infelicities are my own. '
i 41. Translated by Nishiyama and Stevens, Vol. 1, p. 92.
42. Hakeda, 1972, p. 245, translated Kukai's Shaji jissa gi.
44. Translated by Nishiyama and Stevens, Vol. 1, p. 92. Like another
great Buddhist reformer, Nagarjuna, Dagen upheld the equivalence of nirvaI;1a'
and salTlsara:
As for mountains and rivers, then, though we say they are samsara, it is not so
easy to say what this means. For samsara cannot be pinned down to birth and
death. It is this, yet it is free from birth and death. All dharmas are conditioned
being, but a conditioned being has no nature of its own .... it is empty. Being
empty it is free from itself and free from birth and death. Therefore, these very
mountains and rivers of the present are the mountains and rivers of nirvana.
(Trans. and quoted in Bellah, pp. 6-7)
45. Trans. by Nishiyama and Stevens, Vol. 2, p. 99.
46. Trans. by Nishiyama and Stevens, Vol. 1, pp. 98-99.
47. Trans. and quoted by Kim, 1980, pp. 253-254.
48. My translation, from Oyama's anthology, waka no. 4, p. 25.
50. My translation from Oyama's anthology, waka no. 56, p. 112.
51. Translated by Sato, p. 176.
52. Kim, 1980, p. 183.
53. Kim, 1980, p. 257.
54. Oyama's anthology, waka no. 14, p. 42. Dr. Masatoshi Nagatomi's
class lecture on this poem was helpful in forming this analysis and, in addition,
suggested the idea for this paper. (Course on "Buddhism in East Asia" taught
,at Harvard Univ., Spring Semester 1981/82)
55. Trans. by Nakamura in Ways, p. 280. From Wu-men-kuan, Ch. 1.
56. Trans. by Kim, 1980, p. 201.
57. Kim, 1980, p. 201.
58. Trans. by Carma C.C. Chang, in Buddhist Teaching of Totality (Univer-
sity Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1974), p. 160.
From the Hua-yen i-hai pai-men.
60. Trans. by Kim, 1980, p. 212.
61. Trans. by Kim, 1980, p. 260.
62. Trans. by Kim, 1980, p. 197.
63. Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion (New York: Random House,
1970), pp. 30-31.
132
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
64. Part of the obstacle to tidy categorization of these terms and of
systems in light of them is the complementarity of the concepts themselves.
Something that is totally transcendent becomes irrelevant to human life and
ungraspable by human minds or experience. S9me degree of immanence
must be posited in order for the so-called transcendent to be given a realm
of potency and to be accessible to reverence and reason. Therefore, a definition
of a transcendent entity becomes in effect a specification of the nature and
degree of its immanence.
japanese Terms
a. 1'0 -t:C -l'(
b. if ,/1:-
c. f ;r:-
d1iv fllJ
e.1- 1:
f. :E'
g
'JJiJ ,
. '''' ;p

i. fj LD
><:
j. ;f; +1-
k.f't
1. it
m.J!lf. '$ it
'n. it 1'1-
o. -ky- *1-
p. -#t ''', ;,&-
q. 1% l
r. .,iL A ,:; 1t-
s. if 1u fiii g;p fo %Z *-
II. REVIEWS
Buddhism in Life: The Anthropological Study of Religion and the
Sinhalese Practice of Buddhism, by Martin Southwold. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1983. 232 pp.
Buddhism in Life is an interesting though slightly eccentric
study of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka. The author's basic
intention is to prove that the contrast often drawn between village
Buddhism and "true Buddhism," or doctrinal Buddhism, is not
viable. Southwold, who did field research during 1974 and 1975,
spends much of the book searching for the meaning of these
two kinds of Buddhism. Thus the Theravada Buddhists, who
are the subjects of the study, at times are eclipsed by his discus-
sions of questions such as how religious traditions should be
studied and whether theology has any bearing on our under-
standing of Buddhism (it does). The author contends that "village
Buddhism" is authentic and should not be compared to any other
kind of Buddhism. Not to the Western deviation called "true
Buddhism," not to the teaching of the Buddha "which is insuffi-
ciently knowable," and especially not to the scriptures which rep-
resent "the ambiguous compositions of peculiar people."
After defending "village Buddhism" vigorously for over a
hundred years, the author expands his definition of it to include
the practice of most Sinhalese, whether urban or rural, because
he finds (seemingly in mid-book) that the general practice of
Buddhism is largely similar to "village Buddhism." At this point
he begins to contrast this expanded "village Buddhism" which
he labels, "ministry Buddhism," with Buddhist modernism,
termed "meditation Buddhism." The "ministry Buddhists" follow
the village bhikkus or gramavasins and have little interest in either
meditation or the forest bhikkhus who meditate, the araiiiiaviisins.
"Ministry Buddhism," like its predecessor, "village Buddhism,"
has little relation to the high doctrines or scriptures ofTheravada.
It is "practised mainly by people other than the learned clerics,
and transmitted by means other than scriptures." "Ministry
Buddhism" represents a truer form of Buddhism than Buddhist
modernism.
On the positive side, by adopting Robertson Smith's dictum
that one should study religion by investigating practice rather
than belief, Southwold offers a useful correction to the dominant
133
Western tendency. He shows that this method allows one to arrive
at new and deeper understandings of the religion, and even of
its beliefs. For example, when the author examines the practice
of village Theravada he sees that "it is rooted in a sense of respon-
sibility for the affairs of the world and recognition of the need
to help other people" (p. 124). This observation, understood as
true by anyone who has spent any time among Theravada Bud-
dhists, provides a necessary balance to the traditional criticism-
based on Theravada doctrine-that this religion is self-centered
and lacking compassion. Southwold has similar important in-
sights about the practical implications of both the concept of
rebirth and ethics.
In many ways this book elucidates OUT understanding of the
Theravada tradition in Sri Lanka. It also stimulates our reflection
on important questions of methodology in studying Buddhism.
Southwold's approach, however, is not without shortcom-
ings. One of the basic problems with the book is that the author,
intent on upholding the validity and viability of "village Bud-
dhism," divides Theravada into too many separate segments, and
repeats, in a new way, the mistake of the nineteenth century
Buddhologists who sought "true Buddhism." If he had recog-
nized that the central dynamic in the Theravada tradition, since
at least the time of Asoka and the commentarial writings, has
been t h ~ gradual path to enlightenment, then he might have
been less interested in contrasting various aspects of the tradition
and more interested in perceiving the interconnections. He could
profit from Steven Collins' explanation of the "soteriological
strategy" in Theravada that permits teachings and practices to
have different meanings and applications to people at different
levels of the path (Steven Collins, Selfless Persons: Imagery and
Thought in Theravada Buddhism. Cambridge, 1982). Southwold's
"Ministry Buddhism" represents the traditional Theravada of
the laity, known in this form since the time of Asoka and the
Pali Commentaries. His description of it is useful, except that it
does not exist apart from the scriptures or from the scholar
monks (the elitists, as he says), nor does it even stand distinct
from the great saints of the tradition, the arahants, whose attain-
ments he doubts. If he wishes to explain Buddhism as Buddhists
see it, as he says he does, then he needs to take account of the
Buddhist notion of levels of attainment and wisdom. Village
Buddhists understand and practice Buddhism in one way,
meditators in another and the great arahants in another. All are
true Buddhists; all are on the path to Nibbana, according to the
REVIEWS 135
Theravada tradition. For example, Southwold is impressed with
the depth of insight that the villagers display in stating that the
essential point of Buddhism is not to kill animals. To be sure,
this ide.a has significance and d ~ n o t e s for villagers more than it
might seem at first; however, it is not the case that this is the
only meaning of Buddhism or that people at different places on
the path, such as the meditators or the scholar monks he dis-
credits, cannot have other insights into the truth of Buddhism.
Just as he misses the synchronic connections of the gradual
path, so the author also misses the diachronic development of
the tradition that led to this concept of the path. He does not
explain properly the historical relation between Asoka Bud-
dhism, traditional Theravada as established at Anuradhapura
and the traditional village Buddhism that he investigated. Village
Buddhism as South wold depicts it, is cut off from all of the
sources: the historical tradition, the scriptures, and even the
Buddha. The result, therefore, is that the book provides some
interesting glimpses of village Buddhism but gives the reader
something less than a comprehensive understanding of village
Buddhism as an expression of the dynamics of the Theravada
Buddhist tradition.
George D. Bond
Dhamma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddhist Interpretations:
A Study of a Religious Concept, by John Ross Carter. Tokyo: The
Hokuseido Press, 1978. x + 202 pp., Bibliography and index.
I begin my review by quoting the author's concluding state-
ment:
The Buddha has been remembered by Buddhists because he re-
discovered salvific Truth and through preaching it enabled men
and women to hold it in mind, in heart, and through their living
it to be held by it in the process of transcending, of salvation.
'Dhamma: because it holds, supports"-"dhareti ti dhammo.'
When the Buddha set in motion the dhammacakka, he released a
force that has literally run through the world with saving power.
The dhamma has assumed many forms-Theravada, Mahayana,
Tantrayana, and many others-but the Threefold Refuge (tis-
araTfa) has persisted wherever it went.
What better way to enter into the heart of the Buddhist
tradition than by the Triple Gem:
BuddharlJ sara1]arlJ gacchami
DhammarlJ sarar.WrlJ gacchami
SamgharlJ sara1]arlJ gacchami
I go to the Buddha for refuge
I go to the Dhamma for refuge
I go to the Sangha for refuge.
And what better starting place than the second jewel of the Triple
Gem, the hard-to-understand term dhamma?
This 212-page volume is a thorough study of a narrowly
defined topic, the meaning of dhamma in the Theravada tradition
as seen by Western scholars; in Theravada literature, ancient
and modern; and by contemporary Sinhalese Buddhists. Such
an undertaking makes two demands. One must search diligently
through Pali, Sinhalese, and Western literature in order to
catalogue, display, and understand how the term dhamma has
been used in both a Sinhalese context and by Western students
of Buddhism. Even if this task is performed fully and flawlessly,
however, it is no guarantee that the scholar will feel the compul-.
sion of the path of the Buddha which has attracted myriads of
men and women for more than two millenia. To discern the
second refuge and its ability to transform life requires more than
textual analysis.
Few writers succeed in both of these demands. Even fewer
Ph.D. candidates can break out of the shackles that chain them
to textual analysis. We feel comfortable when we can bolster our
conclusions with copious references to written materials. This
book, based on the author's doctoral dissertation at Harvard Uni-
versity in 1972, succeeds admirably in the first task. Two of his
six chapters deal directly with "Dhamma in the Pali Suttas and
Commentaries" and "Recollection of Dhamma in the Visuddhi-
magga." Another surveys "Dhamma in Sinhalese Buddhist Litera-
ture Prior to the Nineteenth Century." Lists and tables abound,
cataloguing definitions and usages with sufficient thoroughness
to provide future researchers with much of their basic material.
Similar classifications are made in the chapter on "Dhamma
in the Western Academic Tradition" and "Dhamma in the Con-
tinuing [Sinhalese] Tradition." The former chapter, which begins
the book, furnishes a valuable summary of Buddhist scholarship
in the West, beginning with Eugene Burnouf (1844) who saw
dhamma as La Loi, and concluding with perceptive contemporary
. scholars like Slater, Smith, and King, to mention just a few.
Unfortunately, many significant quotations from primary source
REVIEWS 137
material are left untranslated, and the convoluted style of writing
makes unnecessary demands on a reader. Such writing may im-
press Ph.D. committees, but a publisher should insist on giving
such material a thorough stenographic bath before letting it out
to the public. Despite such difficulties, however, the book suc-
ceeds in the first task, a thorough analysis of the important literary
materials.
Carter is sensitive to the second demand. Buried in his
analysis of "Dhamma in the Pali Suttas and Commentaries," is the
observation that "the Buddha did not penetrate the doctrine of
the four truths; rather, he is seen as having penetrated dhamma
that is the four truths" (p. 73). He recognizes that "what a man
says it not the most important part of his communication but
rather what he assumes, what he takes for granted ... " (p. 66).
He maintains that "the task at hand ... is to discern the way
dhamma made a difference religiously for men and women who
became Buddhists, who decided that they would live according
to dhamma" (p. 56). I am particularly drawn to his statement that
to define a term is, by definition, to limit it. Defining the term
dhamma-how it is used, what it means-is an interesting undertak-
ing. Discerning a perspective for life-how it is to be lived, what
it means-is of far greater import, more momentous, of cosmic
consequence. Buddhists have been and are concerned with the
meaning of dhamma not primarily as a means to facilitate textual
translations but as a means to transform life" (p. 64 f.).
This reviewer would have been pleased if, in addition to reading
these statements he could have felt their impact more fully
throughout the book.
This book, then, belongs in serious research collections on
Buddhology. It does for the term dhamma what Guy Welbon's
study The Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1968) did for the term nirvafLa.
It will remain a valuable compendium of research materials for
many years.
Harry M. Buck
Matrix of Mystery. Scientific and Humanistic Aspects of rDzogs-chen
Thought, by Herbert V. Guenther. Boulder: Shambhala, 1984.
317 p.
Matrix of Mystery is divided into nine chapters: Introduction
to the Scope of Being, The. Problem Situation, The Recognition
of the Problem Situation as the Evolutionary Zero Point, Inter-
lude, In-Depth Appraisals and Configurational Processes, The
Aesthetics of the Virtual Patterns, Fury of Being, Optimum At-
tainments Standards as Pre programs, and In Praise of Wholeness.
In addition, there are footnotes, a bibliography and three indexes.
Finally, the work has many graphs and charts that are most
helpful in understanding some of the difficult points.
The book is not written for beginners. That is, it is not for
either beginners in Buddhist Studies or those who are not fully
initiated into Professor Guenther's works. I do not wish here to
entertain any criticism of the professor's unique way of translating
Tibetan texts or his creative use of the English language; suffice
it to say that this work is primarily written for experts.
There is much in Matrix of Mystery that an expert in ontology,
epistemology or other disciplines might wish to investigate. As
the title indicates, Professor Guenther presents a scientific and
humanistic explanation of rDzogs-chen. He accomplishes this
primarily by using models taken from physics (a methodology
previously employed by him), as well as from research in artificial
intelligence (i.e., computer terminology) and from more tradi-
tional philosophy.
, The combination of these models and methods of evaluation
is extremely interesting, and it truly does shed new light on this
little explored field of study. Prof. Guenther's explanations, al-
though idiosyncratic, do seem to present an accurate picture of
rDzogs chen thought-given the limitation of the methods utilized.
His explanations do not resemble those that a Nyingma lama
would ever "transmit" to a student-not that this latter should
necessarily be used as a standard. I mention it here only to draw
a distinction between the two approaches and thus arrive at a
more accurate picture for those interested in reading this work.
In general, I have only one major criticism of this work:
that there is insufficient information on and evaluation of the
Mahayoga level of this tantra.
The Matrix of Mystery is, of course, the major Nyingma
Mahayoga Tantra (Tb. gSang ba'i sNying po, Skt. Guhyagarbha).
Although little studied presently by native scholars because it
REVIEWS 139
has been usurped by the later gTer ma, it is not altogether forgot-
ten. Like the Guhyasamiija, it is primarily directed to the develop-
ment stage of the tantric path.
Prof. Guenther has provided neither a translation nor, really,
a study .of the text; primarily,. he presents his version of the
interpretations of such later Nyingma scholars as kLong chen
pa. rDzogs chen has been present in the Nyingma since the very
beginning, and one can certainly apply a rDzogs chen explanation
to the lower tantras, as noted in the rDo rJe Sems dPa' Nam Kha'
ehe rTse Ba'i rGyudsKye BaMed Pa, translated by Vairocana (Vairo
rGyud 'Bum, vol. 1). However, the Guhyagarbha, being a Mahayoga
tantra, does have its own Mahayoga level of explanation. This
level of explanation is not brought out sufficiently. It is not, of
course, Prof. Guenther's intention to bring out the Mahayoga
aspects of the work, but I feel that the inclusion of this level of
explanation would have done more justice to the basic text, and
provided a greater basis for understanding the text, as well as
the later "rDzogs chen" overlays placed upon the text.
I do find Prof. Guenther's presentation of the rDzogs chen
explanation of the mal)Qala outstanding. Some of this material
is scattered throughout the work, but most of it is found in the
chapter entitled "The Aesthetics of the Virtual Patterns." There
is much of interest here, not only on the rDzogs chen understand-
ing of mal)Qalas, but on the mal)Qala in general. This section
should be read by anyone interested in mal)Qala interpretation,
and is a welcome addition to other works on this topic.
I wish that Professor Guenther had not relied so heavily on
his own personal library. That is, in his bibliography, he often
cites works without the necessary dates and places of publication.
I assume these works are part of his personal collection. Even
though it is unavoidable in the field of Tibetan studies to make
such omissions because of the unorthodox manner in which some
of these manuscripts are "published," many of them are published
in a more orthodox manner at a later date. Such information,
of course, is crucial for scholars who wish to check certain pas-
sages, since a difference in editions may lead to a difference in
conclusions. I might add, on a more positive note, there do seem
to be fewer such omissions than in previous works.
In conclusion then, Matrix of Mystery, although not for a
beginner in the field, is an accurate evaluation and explanation
of the rDzogs chen understanding of this important Mahayoga
tantra. Even though this explanation is limited, one will find that
the utilization of models taken from physics and artificial intel-
What better way to enter into the heart of the Buddhist
tradition than by the Triple Gem:
Buddharr;. saraTjarr;. gacchiimi
Dhammarr;. sararj,arr;. gacchiimi
Samgharr;. saraTjarr;. gacchiimi
I go to the Buddha for refuge
I go to the Dhamma for refuge
I go to the Sangha for refuge.
And what better starting place than the second jewel of the Triple
Gem, the hard-to-understand term dhamma?
This 212-page volume is a thorough study of a narrowly
defined topic, the meaning of dhamma in the Theravada tradition
as seen by Western scholars; in Theravada literature, ancient
and modern; and by contemporary Sinhalese Buddhists. Such
an undertaking makes two demands. One must search diligently
through Pali, Sinhalese, and Western literature in order to
catalogue, display, and understand how the term dhamma has
been used in both a Sinhalese context and by Western students
of Buddhism. Even if this task is performed fully and flawlessly,
however, it is no guarantee that the scholar will feel the compul-,
sion of the path of the Buddha which has attracted myriads of
men and women for more than two millenia. To discern the
second refuge and its ability to transform life requires more than
textual analysis.
Few writers succeed in both of these demands. Even fewer
Ph.D. candidates can break out of the shackles that chain them
to textual analysis. We feel comfortable when we can bolster our
conclusions with copious references to written materials. This
book, based on the author's doctoral dissertation at Harvard Uni-
versity in. 1972, succeeds admirably in the first task. Two of his
six chapters deal directly with "Dhamma in the Pali Suttas and
Commentaries" and "Recollection of Dhamma in the Visuddhi-
magga." Another surveys "Dhamma in Sinhalese Buddhist Litera-
ture Prior to the Nineteenth Century." Lists and tables abound,
cataloguing definitions and usages with sufficient thoroughness
to provide future researchers with much of their basic material.
Similar classifications are made in the chapter on "Dhamma
in the Western Academic Tradition" and "Dhamma in the Con-
tinuing [Sinhalese] Tradition." The former chapter, which begins
the.book, furnishes a valuable summary of Buddhist scholarship
in the West, beginning with Eugene Burnouf (1844) who saw
. dhamma as La Loi, and concluding with perceptive contemporary
scholars like Slater, Smith, and King, to mention just a few.
Unfortunately, many significant quotations from primary source
REVIEWS 137
material are left untranslated, and the convoluted style of writing
makes unnecessary demands on a reader. Such writing may im-
press Ph.D. committees, but a publisher should insist on giving
such material a thorough stenographic bath before letting it out
to the public. Despite such difficulties, however, the book suc-
ceeds in the first task, a thorough analysis of the important literary
materials.
Carter is sensitive to the second demand. Buried in his
analysis of "Dhamma in the Pali Suttas and Commentaries," is the
observation that "the Buddha did not penetrate the doctrine of
the four truths; rather, he is seen as having penetrated dhamma
that is the four truths" (p. 73). He recognizes that "what a man
says it not the most important part of his communication but
rather what he assumes, what he takes for granted ... " (p. 66).
He maintains that "the task at hand ... is to discern the way
dhamma made a difference religiously for men and women who
became Buddhists, who decided that they would live according
todhamma" (p. 56). I am particularly drawn to his statement that
to define a term is, by definition, to limit it. Defining the term
dhamma-how it is used, what it means-is an interesting undertak-
ing. Discerning a perspective for life-how it is to be lived, what
it means-is of far greater import, more momentous, of cosmic
consequence. Buddhists have been and are concerned with the
meaning of dhamma not primarily as a means to facilitate textual
translations but as a means to transform life" (p. 64 f.).
This reviewer would have been pleased if, in addition to reading
these statements he could have felt their impact more fully
throughout the book.
This book, then, belongs in serious research collections on
Buddhology. It does for the term dhamma what Guy Welbon's
study The Buddhist Nirviina and its Western Fnterpreters (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1968) did for the term nirvii'(la.
It will remain a valuable compendium of research materials for
many years.
Harry M. Buck
Matrix of Mystery. Scientific and Humanistic Aspects of rDzogs-chen
Thought, by Herbert V. Guenther. Boulder: Shambhala, 1984.
317 p.
Matrix of Mystery is divided into nine chapters: Introduction
to the Scope of Being, The. Problem Situation, The Recognition
of the Problem Situation as the Evolutionary Zero Point, Inter-
lude, In-Depth Appraisals and Configurational Processes, The
Aesthetics of the Virtual Patterns, Fury of Being, Optimum At-
tainments Standards as Preprograms, and In Praise of Wholeness.
In addition, there are footnotes, a bibliography and three indexes.
Finally, the work has many graphs and charts that are most
helpful in understanding some of the difficult points.
The book is not written for beginners. That is, it is not for
either beginners in Buddhist Studies or those who are not fully
initiated into Professor Guenther's works. I do not wish here to
entertain any criticism of the professor's unique way of translating
Tibetan texts or his creative use of the English language; suffice
it to say that this work is primarily written for experts.
There is much in Matrix of Mystery that an expert in ontology,
epistemology or other disciplines might wish to investigate. As
the title indicates, Professor Guenther presents a scientific and
humanistic explanation of rDzogs-chen. He accomplishes this
primarily by using models taken from physics (a methodology
previously employed by him), as well as from research in artificial
intelligence (i.e., computer terminology) and from more tradi-
tional philosophy.
The combination of these models and methods of evaluation
is extremely interesting, and it truly does shed new light on this
little explored field of study. Prof. Guenther's explanations, al-
though idiosyncratic, do seem to present an accurate picture of
rDzogs chen thought-given the limitation of the methods utilized.
His explanations do not resemble those that a N yingma lama
would ever "transmit" to a student-not that this latter should
necessarily be used as a standard. I mention it here only to draw
a distinction between the two approaches and thus arrive at a
more accurate picture for those interested in reading this work.
In general, I have only one major criticism of this work:
that there is insufficient information on and evaluation of the
Mahayoga level of this tantra.
The Matrix of Mystery is, of course, the major Nyingma
Mahayoga Tantra (Tb. gSang ba'i sNying po, Skt. Guhyagarbha).
Although little studied presently by native scholars because it
REVIEWS 139
has been usurped by the later gTer ma, it is not altogether forgot-
ten. Like the Guhyasamaja, it is primarily directed to the develop-
ment stage of the tantric path.
Prof. Guenther has provided neither a translation nor, really,
a study .of the text; primarily, he presents his version of the
interpretations of such later Nyingma scholars as kLong chen
pa. rDzogs chen has been present in the Nyingma since the very
beginning, and one can certainly apply a rDzogs chen explanation
to the lower tantras, as noted in the rDo rJe Sems dPa' Nam Kha'
ehe rTse Ba'i rGyudsKye Ba Med Pa, translated by Vairocana (Vairo
rGyud 'Bum, vol. 1). However, the Guhyagarbha, being a Mahayoga
tantra, does have its own Mahayoga level of explanation. This
level of explanation is not brought out sufficiently. It is not, of
course, Prof. Guenther's intention to bring out the Mahayoga
aspects of the work, but I feel that the inclusion of this level of
explanation would have done more justice to the basic text, and
provided a greater basis for understanding the text, as well as
the later "rDzogs chen" overlays placed upon the text.
I do find Prof. Guenther's presentation of the rDzogs chen
explanation of the maI,lQala outstanding. Some of this material
is scattered throughout the work, but most of it is found in the
chapter entitled "The Aesthetics of the Virtual Patterns." There
is much of interest here, not only on the rDzogs chen understand-
ing of maI,lQalas, but on the mar;tQala in general. This section
should be read by anyone interested in maI,lQala interpretation,
and is a welcome addition to other works on this topic.
I wish that Professor Guenther had not relied so heavily on
his own personal library. That is, in his bibliography, he often
cites works without the necessary dates and places of publication.
I assume these works are part of his personal collection. Even
though it is unavoidable in the field of Tibetan studies to make
such omissions because of the unorthodox manner in which some
of these manuscripts are "published," many of them are published
in a more orthodox manner at a later date. Such information,
of course, is crucial for scholars who wish to check certain pas-
sages, since a difference in editions may lead to a difference in
conclusions. I might add, on a more positive note, there do seem
to be fewer such omissions than in previous works.
In conclusion then, Matrix of Mystery, although not for a
beginner in the field, is an accurate evaluation and explanation
of the rDzogs chen understanding of this important Mahayoga
tantra. Even though this explanation is limited, one will find that
the utilization of models taken from physics and artificial intel-
ligence, for example, reveals new levels of understanding of
the rDzogs chen system. Moreover, there is much information
that helps explain rDzogs chen in its own right, and experts in
other fields of inquiry will find here useful information on
epistemology, etc.
A.W. Hanson-Barber
The Sutra of Contemplation of the Buddha of Immeasurable Life. Kyoto:
Ryukoku University Translation Center, 1984. XL + 169 pp.,
appendices.
This is a translation and a study of what is commonly referred
to as the Amitayur-dhyana-sutra or Meditation Sutra, a Mahayana
devotional text. In this work the text is identified as the KMK,
the abbreviation of the Japanese reading (Kan-muryoju-kyo) of the
text. The KMK, together with the Larger- and Smaller
Sukhiivatzvyuha-sutra, constitute the Triple Pure Land Sutra in the
Japanese Pure Land tradition. The KMK is in Chinese. There is
no Sanskrit text and no Tibetan translation. This work consists
of a comprehensive introduction, an annotated translation, and
appendices.
The introduction identifies the KMK as a Buddhist devo-
tional text of a unique kind-the chanting of the name of Buddha
Amitayus rather than bodhisattva practices to realize salvation,
indicating a switch from monastic Buddhism to lay Buddhism.
It speculates on the place of origin of the text (Central Asia or
China) and the period of compilation (5th century) by making
reference to a variety of textual sources, both classical and mod-
ern. It provides bibliographical information of the translator
(Kalayasas) and the historical circumstances surrounding the
translation of the text. It also provides an excellent structural
and content analysis, the basis on which it speculates on the
purpose for which the text was written. Finally, the introduction
describes the impact this text has had in Central Asia, China,
and in particular, Japan.
The translation was initially accomplished by Meiji Yamada,
an Indologist-Buddhologist, and Ronald Takemota, a J a p a n e s e ~
American scholar, both affiliated with Nishi Hongwanji. The
translation was then reexamined meticulously and revised by the
members of the Ryukoku University Translation Center. In-
REVIEWS
141
eluded were eminent scholars, such as Gadjin Nagao, as well as
those whose native language is English. The translation is pre-
sented side-by-side with the original Chinese and Japanese read-
ing. Footnotes, rather than endnotes, are provided for easy refer-
ence.
The appendices include an index to locate the sixteen forms
of !=ontemplation-the central theme of the KMK-in the trans-
lation; supplementary notes, which consist of an interpretation
of key terms and concepts cited in the translation; abibliography,
including English and Japanese translations of the Chinese and
Uigur versions of the text, classical commentarial works on this
text composed in China, Korea and Japan, as well as modern
critical studies (both books and essays) related to the text in Eng-
lish and Japanese; a comparison of key Chinese characters in
the Taisho and Korean editions of the text arranged by strokes;
a list of Chinese proper nouns with characters and their
ror'nanized form; and indexes to the text, first in Sanskrit and
English, then in Chinese, arranged by stroke with definitions
added.
In reviewing a work of this sort, a great portion of which is
the translation, it is meaningless to cite one's preference of an
English term over one made by another, provided that the latter
does not diverge too much from the original. After all, as far as
the English translation of Buddhist texts is concerned, we are
still in the ko-i (matching concept) period. The translation pro-
vided in this work, however, has certainly contributed to stan-
dardizing Buddhist technical terms, particularly Pure Land tech-
nical terms. The Ryukoku translation committee has made seri-
ous attempts to reconstruct, whenever possible, the Sanskrit term
and interpret it within the larger context of Mahayana thought.
Thus, the translation is free of sectarian slants. I have no major
criticism of terminological translation. Further, the story of Vai-
dehi is rendered in readable modern English, but the sections
on "contemplations" are rather stiff. Perhaps this is not the fault
of the translation committee but the fault of the literary style of
the text itself. This raises a technical question: should a translation
excel in prose style, like Kumarajiva's translation, or excel in
accuracy, like Hsiian-tsang's translation? No matter what method
one follows, the fact remains that a translation is an art more
than a science. The difficulties involved in the translation of
Buddhist texts can be appreciated only by those who are capable
of reading the texts in the original, understand the fastidious
manner in which a text expresses itself, and who have had some
experience in rendering a readable translation. A competent
translator needs to be a philologist, historian and philosopher,
who has insights into ancient Indian religious modes of expres-
sion. The members of the translation committee meet these qual-
ifications, as attested by the quality of translation they have pro-
duced.
I have three minor criticisms to make. First, this work con-
sistently speaks of Amida Buddha, a method of expression com-
monly used by the Japanese. It would be better to say "Buddha
Amida" in a translation. After all, the work refers to Bodhisattva
Avalokitesvara, not AvalokiteSvara Bodhisattva. Second, though
this work has provided various views on the origin of the KMK
and endorses the generally accepted one, (that it was compiled
or composed in either Central Asia or China), it would have been
better if it had added the views of Akira Hirakawa and Kyosho
Hayashima, who claim that the contemplation (kammatthi.ina) de-
scribed in this text is traceable to Pili Buddhism. I say this because
even though these two men are not Pure Land specialists, they
are, nevertheless, established scholars, and their views certainly
warrant attention, whether one endorses their view or not. Third,
we have said that the English translation of the text is presented
side-by-side with the Chinese original and the Japanese reading.
1 would presume that this work is designed primarily for the
English-reading audience, rather than the Japanese. If this is so,
I see no reason why the Japanese reading needs to be provided.
Even though Japanese scholarship requires the Japanese reading
of Chinese as evidence for understanding a Chinese text, the
fact remains that those in the West translate Chinese directly
into English, not through the medium of Japanese.
In spite of these minor criticisms, this work represents a
marked improvement over other translation of the KMK in terms
of style, accuracy of conteQt, and interpretation. The translation
was accomplished meticulously, consuming several years, I would
presume, by a team of translators including Sanskritists,
Sinologists, and those whose native language is English. The
introduction and apendices add to the scholarly accomplishment
of this work. It is the best work on the KMK published to date.
It has my highest recommendation and should be considered
one of the indispensible works by those contemplating serious
studies of Pure Land thought.
Minoru Kiyota
REVIEWS 143
The Sutra of the Wise and the Foolish (rndo bdzans blun), or, The Ocean
of Narratives (uliger-un dalai), translated from the Mongolian by
Stanley Frye. Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and
Archives, 1981. ix + 245 pp.
The "Sea of Stories" (a title so reminiscent of the Sanskrit
Kathiisaritsagara) or "Sutra of the Wise and the Foolish" (i.e.,
knowing the distinction between wise and foolish things), is the
first monument of Tibetan literature to be translated into a West-
ern language, as 1.]. Schmidt, the Russo-Dutch scholar of Mon-
golian, made an edition and German translation of the Tibetan
text in 1843 (2 vols.) and also gave close attention to the Mongo-
lian version. It contains jatakas and avadanas, the birth-stories
and hero-stories of the Buddha in former existences told to his
circle of disciples to illustrate some religious principle, in reply
to their queries. Many of these tales are found in other works of
Buddhist literature, though the present sutra is perhaps the most
popular of such collections. The early history of the text goes
far back into Central Asia, stemming from early visits by Chinese
monks, but for our purposes we may simply regard the Tibetan
cycle as the original. It is part of the Kanjur, occurring in volume
hu of mDo, amidst other jatakas and avadanas.
Consequently, no apology need be made for issuing this
nicely-done English version of such an important work, which
has been prepared by Dr. Stanley N. Frye, a graduate of Indiana
University with a long-time interest in Tibetan and Mongolian.
The translator's main goal was to make the signal content of
these tales available to a wide circle of readers, particularly those
of Buddhist leanings. He provides a brief introduction to set the
stage and give some explanation. Aside from similar versions of
these stories in other sutras, a few chapters have been given in
other works, such as Antoinette K. Gordon's Tibetan Tales (Lon-
don, 1953, six stories), and by such academic writers as S.
Yoshitake (ch. 5, BSOAS, 1928-30), W. Baruch (ch. 7 in Toung
Pao, 1955), part of ch. 24 and all of ch. 3.4 (by myself in a
Mongolia Society Occasional Paper), and F. W. Cleaves (ch. 43
in HJAS, 1975). This list could be expanded.
On the whole, I think the translator has succeeded well in
presenting this sacred classic in a fresh and readable English
version for the general public. As a result, the book is free of
burdensome footnotes, justifications, variations, remarks about
differences and parallels-all those things so dear to the heart
144
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
of the specialist. Nonetheless, it is just those experts who will
disagree most with some of the too facile observations in the
preface. By no means does the Mongolian translation differ from
the Tibetan original "in only a few minor details"; gracious!
There are several Mongolian versions, including more than one
Oirat scansion, which do not agree among themselves as to what
the Tibetan meant. As a result, certain difficulties in the Mongo-
lian will only be explained as mis-translations of the Tibetan, but
when and not until all this comparative work is done. New Tes-
tament exegesis does not arise from reading one Gospel. I still
puzzle about Dr. Frye's contention that he used the 1714 xylo-
graph, as sent him from the MPR by Prof. Luvsanvandan, because
I have also the same 1714 version (my copy made from the
original boards in China in 1939 at the behest of my late teacher,
K. Gr0nbech); I remain unclear how identical printings can pro-
duce such discrepant results; we two must compare our xylo-
graphs some day to clarify this, I fear. I am delighted, for instance,
to see handy equations given throughout the translation in the
Sanskrit forms of proper names for kings, countries and so on;
but frankly, rve been searching for years for some of these names,
and would like to have a little documentation for these equiva-
lences before I will believe all of them.
Taking Chapter 34 as an example, because this happens to
be one which I have used for some decades as basic reading
material for instruction in Classical Mongolian, I find three or
four instances of several dropped lines, and at least one case
where I cannot confirm Dr. Frye's phrase or any equivalent from
the Mongolian text. However, none of these in the given case
particularly harms the progress or distorts the rendition of the
narrative. Therefore, I think my basic discomfort with this book
is simply that my specialist desires and wishes are too far from
the generalist goals and aims of the translator. It would be mar-
velous to have a scientifically accurate version, with little footnotes
telling us every time a different word or phrase is used in another
manuscript, along with clever comments about the reading in
Tibetan, or the parallel text in Oirat. To prepare such a work
will, I fear, take either a team of specialists, or one scholar who
is equipped to handle a bewildering array of diverse tongues and
subjects. Consequently, the translator was right to present the
material as he did, and those small carpings I proffer detract not
a whit from the obvious merits of this book.
On the nuts-and-bolts level of spelling and typographical
errors, always to be expected in a trans-continental, indeed trans-
REVIEWS
145
Asian, printing assignment, the general outcome is excellent,
and only in a few cases are there slips which baffle-I mention
those which caught my eye, some also sent me by my long-time
friend Dr. Frye. Page 77 ends, "my hurt is ready to burst" (my
heart);p. 102 end, "It is unquestionably our" (read "our child");
p. 117 mid, "a ready riverbed" (read "a reedy riverbed"), p. 169
end, "we would be deviled" (read "defiled").
The volume, one in a series of the Library of Tibetan Works
and Archives, is their first translation from Mongolian, and the
editors hold out the hope that this store of material might provide
future volumes. With such encouragement, let Dr. Frye andother
Mongolists find useful parallel works to supplement this
praiseworthy beginning!
John R. Krueger
Tibetan Buddhist Medicine and Psychiatry: The Diamond Healing, by
Terry Clifford. York Beach, ME: Samuel Weiser Inc., 1984. xx
+ 268 p. $15.95.
Terry Clifford's book is not the best book I have seen on
the different systems of Asian medicine, but it is one of the best
on the subject of Tibetan medicine. Unfortunately, much of what
has been written on the subject lacks scholarly rigor: the books
that have come out have been incomplete, redundant (virtually
everybody repeats an analysis of the rGyud bZhi that was first
done by Csoma di Korosi), poorly organized, apologetic and
sometimes downright silly.
Dr. Clifford's book, while showing a strong strain of apology
and critical shortcomings, is nonetheless well organized, and quite
complete in fulfilling her stated intentions. She wants to intro-
duce us to psychiatry as seen through the rGyud bZhi and Tibetan
Buddhism, and she does. Further, she does so in a lucid and
comprehensive way.
The book itself is divided into two main parts, plus appen-
dices. Part One gives a general view of the medicine of Tibet, its
relationship to Dharma and tantra and some general comments
on its history, ayurveda, and Tibetan somatic medicine. Part Two
deals with the title subject: Tibetan medical psychiatry. Included
here is a translation of chapters 77-79 of the rGyud bZhi. These
three chapters are not very long, covering less than seven Tibetan
pages in all, and they are written in a very straightforward man-
ner. The three chapters comprise a classification list of various
types of spirits thought to cause mental illness, the humors af-
fected, and general remedies.
Put together, the two parts of Dr. Clifford's book give a
good overview of how a Tibetan Buddhist doctor sees mental
illness. Mental illness, indeed any illness, has to be viewed within
the structure of Buddhist assumptions about suffering. All be-
ings, according to Buddhism, can be said to be ill. They all have
a primal fault, ignorance, which can be said to be the downfall
of us all. From ignorance breed attraction and aversion, and
from these arise the karma that brings about all our travails.
Ignorance, then, is like a germ that needs to be destroyed, and
it is the mission of every Buddha to destroy that germ. While
the Judeo-Christian tradition uses a more or less legal and familial
model to explain our suffering and redemption, Buddhism has
almost always used a medical model. In the JudeocChristian-Is-
lamic tradition, our suffering is due to our disobedience of our
Heavenly Father or Creator. Our salvation consists in recognizing
this crime and returning to an obedient state. In Buddhism, our
suffering is due to the fact that we are sick. The Buddhas are
our physicians; the Dharma is our medicine; the Sangha are the
nurses and other health-care professionals. Laws in Buddhism
have the character of health prescriptions rather than administra-
tive regulations. To extend the metaphors: disobeying a law in
Buddhism has the effect of running in the rain when your doctor
has told you to stay home inbed, rather than the effect of cheating
on your taxes and being caught by the IRS.
Viewed this way, the ultimate cure for any disease is Buddha-
hood, and the fighting of any disease, physical or mental, is an
extension of the work of the Buddhas. Thus, medicine and reli-
gion are inextricably mixed. Religious practices, such as attending
pujas and saying mantras, ultimately are as important to health
care as taking a pill prescribed by the physician. It is to Terry
Clifford's great credit that she brings this out in her book. Keep-
ing this in mind explains also the whole host of interrelationships
between the mind and the body found in Buddhism, particularly
in its tantric form.
While I did not see it in Dr. Clifford's book, the three
poisons-ignorance, attraction, aversion-are considered to be
the root causes of the three humors-phlegm, wind, bile-the
imbalance of which is the efficient cause of both physical and
mental disorder. In the tantras, where the physiology of the body
REVIEWS 147
is explored by means of yoga and speculation to a great depth,
we find the body and the mind to be inseparably related. Dr.
Clifford touches on this when she writes about the winds in the
body and the different veins involved in the support of different
types of consciousness. She does not go beyond an introduction
to this point, but she does mention it.
Mental illness, then, is not seen as being dif-
ferent in nature from physical illness. The three chapters of the
rGyud bZhi which deal specifically with mental illness prescribe
physical remedies for it, i.e., medicine. Along with listing spirits
as a possible cause of forgetfulness, chapter 79 also lists imbal-
ances of the three humors. Chapter 78 speaks of demons as
"secondary causes" (rkyen) to the primary cause of excessive think-
ing, bad diet, etc.
The book does have shortcomings. Particularly irksome is
the author's constant use of the words "madness" and "insanity"
for mental illness. It makes it sound as if the book was written
in the 1930's instead of in the 1970's. While once used by the
psychiatric profession, the terms are now regarded as archaic
and not suitable as technical psychological terminology. The word
"insane," particularly, presently exists only as a legal, and not a
psychological term. Even on the chance that these terms were
used by her informants or by others from another country, they
should not have been used here. Her citation of W.H. Sheldon's
classification of "ectomorph," "mesomorph," and "endomorph"
also seems archaic in a section on parallels to modern psychiatry.
While these shortcomings are serious, they are easily correct-
able, and I hope they will be amended in subsequent editions.
The book over all is good, and while not strong when dealing
with psychological issues from a Western perspective, it does
afford the reader an opportunity to glean an overall understand-
ing of Tibetan Buddhist medicine.
Todd Fenner
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OBITUARIES
David Friedman (1903-1984)
David Friedman, Reader in Indian Philosophy in the University of Lon-
don from 1959 until 1970 and a noted Buddhologist, died in London on April
11, 1984, at the age of 81.
Born on February 25,1903, in Amsterdam, where he also w e n ~ to school,
he was endowed with linguistic acumen and outstanding intellectual curiosity
which enabled him to benefit most from a classical education. A keen interest
in the history of ideas led him into the field of research in Buddhist philosophy,
in respect of which he was awarded the degree of D.Litt. et Phil. at Leiden
in 1937. His published thesis, a study of Sthiramati's Madhyantavibhagatika
(ch.I.), was the culmination of his earlier studies under Professors W. Caland
at Utrecht, and].Ph. Vogel and N.]. Krom at Leiden. Having spent a further
year on a post-doctoral course of study in Buddhist Sanskrit under Prof. E.H.
Johnston at Oxford, he was appointed lecturer at Leiden, where he taught
Pali, Buddhist Sanskrit and history of Buddhism (and Indian Philosophy) in
India and Asia.
His academic career was interrupted, when in November, 1940, he was
dismissed by the German occupying authorities. He, however, continued his
lectures secretly until August 1941, when he left Holland with his family for
New York. There, he joined the war effort, working for the Dutch Government
. Information Service, disseminating information on the conditions of life in
Holland under the occupation. He lectured and wrote on this from personal
experience.
In 1946 Dr. Friedman was appointed full professor at the University of
Jakarta inJava, where he helped to develop the teaching of Sanskrit, Buddhist
philosophy and the cultural history and art of India. In addition he taught
History of Art in Asia at the Bandung Institute of Technology.
In 1950 he joined the School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London, as Lecturer and later Reader. He thus belonged to the distinguished
group of European Orientalists who, having been uprooted from their home
countries by the German occupation, were available to take part in the post-war
expansion of Oriental studies in Britain, and the creation in British universities
of centers of excellence in their respective fields. Friedman's scholarly interest
149
!"
was centered on Buddhist thought, in particular on textual studies in the field
of the Yogacara school of Mahayana Buddhism. But a major part of his
endeavor was devoted to conveying, both in the classroom and in a variety of
extra-mural activities, the richness and diversity of Indian culture. Even after
his retirement in 1970 he was persuaded to return and lecture in an honorary
senior capacity at King's College, University of London.
David Friedman was an avid reader, his mind a treasure house of wide-
ranging Western and Eastern cultures. From his early childhood to his last
days he had a taste for the beautiful in music and the visual arts, both European
and A,'lian. This aesthetic interest and sensitivity added a special dimension
to the quality of his teaching. His approach to Buddhism may be characterized
by his article entitled "The creative force of Buddhism" (in The Buddhist,
XXVIII, 2, p. 116, Colombo, June 1957), where he wrote: "Whatever the real
character of Buddhism was and is-and scholars are still steeped in controversy
about the meaning and purport of its complex philosophical theories-one
thing is certain. It was not only a highly original religious-philosophical doc-
trine and ethico-psychological discipline. It also became a civilization inspired
by truly creative ideas, purifying and ennobling the lives of the peoples who
embraced the Sad-dharma."
Among his many students were foreign postgraduate youngsters, notably
from India and Sri Lanka, who not infrequently were lonely or stranded. In
their teacher they found not only a patiently devoted guide and supervisor
for their research work but also an immensely caring friend. They, as well as
his colleagues, remember him gratefully for his boundless metta, the Buddhist
quality of friendly compassion.
Tuvia Gelblum
I Etienne Lamotte (1903-1983)
In May of 1983 Monseigneur Etienne Lamotte passed away. Professor
Lamotte was acknowledged to be the greatest living authority on Buddhism
in the Western world. With his death, we have lost one ofthe greatest scholars
of our time, and those who had the privilege to know him personally, have
lost a most amiable friend and colleague.
Etienne Lamotte was born in Dinant, Belgium, on November 21, 1903,
where his father, Georges Lamotte, had been appointed president of the
court. At the same time, Georges Lamotte was a distinguished scholar in the
field of History. In 1915-1920, Etienne studied at the College Notre-Dame
de Belle-Vue a Dinant, and, later on, evidently under the influence of his
family, he decided to join the roman-catholic clergy. He continued his educa-
tion in philosophy, theology, and classical philology at the Universite
Catholique in Louvain (Leuven) and at the Theological Seminary in Mechelen.
From the university he obtained the degree of Candidat en Philosophie de
S. Thomas in 1923. Later on, he extended the scope of his interest to the
field of Oriental Studies, and particularly Indian Studies. In 1925, Etienne
Lamotte was awarded the degree of Licencie in Oriental Languages. Thereaf-
ter he spent the year of 1927 for studies at the U niversita della Sapienza in
Rome. In 1928-1930, Etienne Lamotte worked as a teacher at the College
Saint-Pierre in Louvain, but, at the same time, he continued his studies in the
field of Indology and Buddhology at the University of Louvain. In 1929,
Lamotte obtained the degree of Doctor Linguarum Orientalium, and sub-
sequently, in 1930 after submitting his doctoral thesis "N otes sur la Bhagavad-
gita," he was promoted Docteur en Philosophie et Lettres. He was also awarded
the first Laureat des Concours U niversitaires 1928-30 in the field of Oriental
languages together with a travel grant for higher education in Paris which
happened to be the most important center of Western Buddhology at that
time. Here, he pursued studies with the most famous Buddhologists of this
period, Paul Demieville, Alfred Foucher, Marcelle Lalour, Sylvain Levi and
Jean Przyluski.
Returning to Belgium in 1930, Etienne Lamotte became the foremost
disciple of Louis de La Vallee Poussin (1869-1938). Louis de La Vallee Poussin
had been appointed professor at the University of Gent in 1894, but, on
151
152
JIABS VOL. 8 NO.2
account of the language controversy in Belgium, he was forced to cease teach_
ingin 1929. Consequently he had the opportunity to fully concentrate on his
research. He accepted Lamotte as his personal disciple, and both regularly
worked together during the following years.
In 1932, Etienne Lamotte was appointed reader and in 1937 Professor
Ordinarius at the University of Louvain. For some years, he was obliged to
teach Greek literature in addition to his Indological and Buddhological lec-
tures, and he was elected for several offices at the university, most notably as
the President of the Oriental Institute in 1950-1952 and as the Dean of the
Faculte de Philosophie et Lettres in 1952.
The Academie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de
Belgique elected Etienne Lamotte Corresponding Member in 1951 and Ordi-
nary Member in 1959. At the Royal Academy he continued the tradition of
Buddhist Studies which had been initiated by Louis de La Vallee Poussin
many years ago. In recognition of his extraordinary achievements as a scholar,
Etienne Lamotte has been awarded many honors, and some of them may be
mentioned here: 1952 Honorary Member of the Ecole Fran<;:ais d'Extreme-
Orient (Paris), 1960 Honorary Member of the Societe Asiatique (Paris), 1967
Honorary Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain (London), 1976
Honorary Fellow of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. He
was elected Member of the Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres in
Paris in 1959, Academician of the China Academy (Taipei) in 1968, Fellow
of the British Academy in 1970, and Member of the Akademie der Wis-
senschaften in G6ttingen in 1972. Etienne Lamotte was also awarded honorary
doctorates in Gent (Belgium), in Rome and in Kelaniya (Sri Lanka).
Lamotte's importance as a scholar in general and his contribution for
the improvement of the mutual understanding between Buddhists and Chris-
tians has also been acknowledged by the ecclesiastic authorities of the roman-
catholic church. In 1941 he was awarded the dignity of Canonicus Honoris
Causae of the Metropolitan Church in Mechelen. In 1954 Pope Paul VI made
him Correspondent of the Papal Secretariate for the Non-Christians, and in
1964 the dignity of Praelatus Domesticus of H.H. the Pope was conferred on
him.
Etienne Lamotte drew his information on the world of Buddhism exclu-
sively from literary sources and from personal contacts with a small number
of visitors from the Buddhist countries, until he travelled to Japan, already
at the age of 73. He was invited by the Japan Foundation for a lecture tour
in October, 1977. The Buddhists ofJ apan arranged a truly triumphal reception
for Etienne Lamotte whom they respected as one of the foremost authorities
for the knowledge of Indian Buddhism. When I visited Japan five years later,
it was still reported in detail where had had given his lectures and where he
has stayed.
By his work, Etienne Lamotte has fundamentally changed the state of
OBITUARIES
153
i:Buddhological research like very few others before him. Of his major publi-
cations, only his already mentioned dissertation of 1929 CN otes sur la
Bhagavadgita") dealt with a theme of Hindu philosophy which had been a
:. focuS of his interest in those early years. His second book was already dedicated
'. to the theme around which his work was centered for the rest of his life: the
profound understanding and evaluation of the texts of classical Indian
',' Mahayana and their philological and philosophical basis in early Buddhism.
: His first great work which is to be named here is L'Explication des Mysteres
'(SaT(Ldhinirmocanasutra), published by the Universite de Louvain, 1935. Here
,the Tibetan text of this siitra of the Yogacara school of Indian is
;presented together with a The Sanskrit original of the San;tdhinir-
. mocanasutra has been lost. Consequently, Lamotte's work is based on the Tibe-
as well as on the five surviving Chinese translations of the text. This
" translation is, like all works of this great scholar, characterized by an extraor-
,"dinary degree of trustworthiness and accuracy, and it is supplemented by a
detailed commentary with an overwhelming richness of information. With
'the French equivalents of philosophical and dogmatical terms are given, again
'like in all his later translations, the underlying Sanskrit words. By this method,
, an exact determination of the meaning of these terms remains independent
the so far not finally established translation of Buddhist technical terms.
'.' Already in the following year, Lamotte published his translation of Kar-
masiddhiprakaraTJa, entitled "Le Traite de I'Acte de Vasubandhu" (in: Melanges
Chinoises et Bouddhiques, vol. IV, 1936, pp. 1-144). This treatise deals with
various theories concerning the doctrine of karma as proposed by different
'schools of early Buddhism. It is a work of the great philosopher Vasubandhu
whose main work had been the subject of the magnum opus of Lamotte's
teacher Louis de La Vallee Poussin. The KarmasiddhiprakaraTJa was agiin trans-
,bted on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese versions, because the Sanskrit
original has been lost. This also applies to Lamotte's third great work written
in this period, viz. La Somme du Grand Vehicule (Mahiiyanasan;tgraha) d'Asanga
(2 vols., Louvain, 1938-39), being one of the main treatises of the great master
of Yoga car a, Asanga (4th cent. A.D.).
In 1944 the first volume of Le Traite de la Grand Vertu de Sagesse de
Nagarjuna (Mahiiprajnaparamitasastra) was published. It is a translation of the
Mahaprajiiaparamitasutropadesa (Exposition of the great Siitra of the Perfection
of Wisdom). Five volumes with altogether 2451 pages of text and 151 of pages
introductory matter have been published (I, 1944; II, 1949; III, 1970; IV,
1976; V, 1980), and Lamotte himself considered this work as his magnum
opus. His rendering is based on the Chinese version of Kumarajlva (404-406
A.D.). Though Kumarajlva attributed it to the famous philosopher Nagarjuna,
Lamotte has shown that the Upadesa-as he used to quote its title in its short
form- has been the work of another author who lived in the northwestern
parts of India in the 4th century A.D. It is a very conprehensive exposition
of classical Indian Mahayana Buddhism in contrast with the teachings of
Sravakayana (Hlnayana) which are interpreted here in accordance with the
traditions and the philosophy of the Sarvastivada. Thus, the Upadesa represents
a real encyclopedia of Buddhism in which the doctrine of ancient Buddhism
and the scholasticism of Abhidharma philosophy is presented in great detail,
even more prolific than its refutation from the point of view of Mahayana
which was propagated by the author of the UpadeSa himself. No doubt it is
not by mere coincidence that Etienne Lamotte with his unprecedented encyc-
lopedic knowledge of Buddhism has selected the task of exploring this work.
The five volumes contain many thousands of comprehensive notes and thereby
'form a marvelous source of information on early and classical Buddhism.
Many of these notes represent small monographs on particular doctrines,
terms, legends and other traditions of Indian Buddhism. Etienne Lamotte
has made the most extensive use of Western as well as of Japanese works of
Buddhology, and he has evaluated a very large number of primary sources
in Indian languages as well as from the Tibetan and Chinese Tripitaka.
Lamotte was not permitted to see this work completed. The final part, together
with an index, is being prepared now in the Institut du Hobogirin in Kyoto
under the care of Lamotte's disciple, Hubert Durt.
Lamotte's most famous work is the Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, des
Origines Ii L'Ere Saka (Louvain, 1958). Only Eugene Burnoufs Introduction Ii
L'Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien of 1844, which is considered as the first compen-
dium of scientific Buddhology, and Hermann Oldenberg's Buddha: Sein Leben,
Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde, which marks the beginning of modern Buddhist
studies, may be said to have been of similar importance for this field of research
as Lamotte's Histoire. The history, the scriptures and traditions of early Indian
Buddhism are dealt with in a most comprehensive way, taking into consider-
ation Western as well as East Asian research. The importance of Lamotte's
work has not yet been fully understood by all scholars, particularly because
there is no English translation available yet. Fortunately, the publication of
an English translation of Lamotte's book has now been projected for the
foreseeable future. In any case, no serious research in the field of early Buddh-
ism is possible any more without reference to Lamotte's work.
It was only three years later that Etienne Lamotte completed his transla-
tion of Vimalak'irtinirdeSa (L'Enseignement de Vimalakzrti, Louvain, 1962), which
is one of the fundamental texts of Indian Mahayana. An English translation
of this work has been published in 1976 by the Pali Text Society under the
following title: The Teaching of Vimalak'irti, Annotated Translation. In 1965,
Lamotte's translation of the SilrallJgamasamiidhisiltra (La Concentration de la
Manhe Heroique), another famous text of the Madhyamaka school, appeared
in Bruxelles.
Apart from these voluminous works Etienne Lamotte has written a
number of important essays on central problems of Buddhology. Only a few
OBITUARIES 155
of them which have had a particularly great impact on the progress of research
may be mentioned here. Buddhist Hermeneutics are dealt with in "La Critique
d'Authenicite dans Ie Bouddhisme" (India Antiqua, Leiden, 1947, pp. 213-222).
I should also list here Lamotte's study on the origins of Mahayana Buddhism
("Sur la Forrpation du Mahayana," Asiatica, Festschrift F. Weller, Leipzig,
1954, pp. 377-396), his study "Le Bouddhisme des Lalcs" (Studies in Indology
and Buddhology presented in honour of Professor S. Yamaguchi, Ry6t6, 1955,
pp. 73-89) and the monographs on "Maiijusrl" (T'oung Pao, vol. 48, 1960, pp.
1-96) and on "VajrapaI).i en Inde" (Melanges de Sinologie offerts Ii M. Paul
Demieville, Paris, 1966, pp. 113-159).
As mentioned above, Lamotte has been appointed a scientific advisor to
the papal Secretariatus pro non-Christianis. However, he has commented on
the problem of the relation of Buddhism and Christianity only in few publi-
cations. In the lecture on "La Bienveillance Bouddhique" which he delivered
before the Royal Academy in 1952 (Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres ... , vo!' 38,
pp. 381-403) he dealt with the similarity and dissimilarity of the concepts of
the Buddhist maitrf and the Christian charity. He does not believe in an
ideological comparison as it is usually found in theological writing, but he
stresses the necessity of understanding these concepts within the context of
the systems of thought of Buddhism and of Christianity. By this way, the
reader is provided with the information which is necessary for arriving at his
own judgement. Similarly, Lamotte avoids the syncretistic tendencies which
characterize much of the modern inter-religious dialogue. In "Suggestions
Concerning Contact with the Buddhists" (Bulletin of the Secretariatus pro non-
Christianis, 1966, No.3, pp. 127-137) he stresses that "rather than because
they are radically opposed on religious or mystical ground, the Buddhist and
the Christian religions differ because they have a different religious basis."
These differences, he adds, "are not obstacles to those feelings of esteem and
cordiality which men of goodwill naturally feel towards one another." On the
other hand, one should clearly see the different religious basis which is
exemplified by (1) different opinions regarding God, (2) the Buddhist wisdom
which "penetrates the general characteristic of things and is aware of their
impermanence, their painful nature, and above all their impersonality," (3)
the Buddhist concept of Nirvana which "is neither a form of existence nor of
non-existence," (4) the Buddhist way of meditation, and (5) the fact that "the
Buddha is not truth, but he has discovered truth, and particularly the
mechanism of production and the destruction of dependent phenomena."
In 1959 Etienne Lamotte delivered three lectures on ancient Buddhism
at the invitation of the F ondazione Giorgi Cini in Venzia which were published
under the title "Lo Spirito del Buddhismo Anticl'" in 1959 (English edition:
"The Spirit of Ancient Buddhism", 1961). The same subject-matter was again
dealt with in "Le Bouddhisme de Sakyamuni" (Nachrichten der Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Gottingen 1983, No.4) on which is based Lamotte's contribu-
tion "The Buddha, His Teachings and His Sangha" in The World of Buddhism
(ed. by Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich, London, 1984, pp. 41-58)
which was supplemented there by an essay on the fundamentals of Mahayana
Buddhism (pp. 90-93). I do not know of any better, more concise or more
exact summary of the Buddha's teachings.
At the occasion of Etienne Lamotte's 70th birthday, his friends and
disciples published Notice sur Mgr. E. Lamotte (Louvain, 1972) with biographical
documents and a comprehensive bibliography of his work. This bibliography
was updated in the congratulatory volume of 1980 (Indianisme et Bouddhisme,
Melanges Offerts a Mgr. Etienne Lamotte, Louvain-Ia-Neuve, 1980). A list of the
more recent publications may be found in the obituary "In Memoriam Etienne
Lamotte" in Numen (vol. 32, 1985, pp. 119-129).
Etienne Lamotte has bequested his large Buddhological library to the
Institut du Hobogirin in Kyoto. His most important bequest to the world of
learning is his published work which provides us with an unsurpassed richness
of knowledge and insight into the nature of the Buddhist religion. In his
personal life, he always tended to stand back behind his work. He was a
modest, amiable and generous man who has lived up to the highest ideais of
the two great religious to which he was bound by vocation and by inclination.
Heinz Bechert
CONTRIB UTORS
Heinz Bechert
Seminar Fues Indologie und Bud-
dhismuskunde
. Der Univers.itaet G;oettingen
Hainbundstrasse 21
D-34 Goettingen
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Department of History and Liter-
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USA
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Oxford University
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Scholarly Books on
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HOUSTON. G.W. Ed.
MORGAN. KENNETH W. Ed.
VERDU.ALFONSO
DEVADHAR. C.R.
STAAL.J.F.
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Transcription - Sanskrit, Pali and Other South Asian Languages: For
.Sanskrit and Pali use the standard system given in A.L. Basham, The Wonder
thal Was India, Appendix X; for other South Asian languages use any avail-
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