Ajp - 01 (C) Allied Joint Operation

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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AJP-01(C)
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AJP-01(C)
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE
MARCH 2007
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NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
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RECORD OF CHANGES
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PREFACE
0001. The successful planning, execution and support of military operations requires a clearly understood and widely accepted doctrine, and this is especially important when operations are to be conducted by Allied, multinational or coalition forces. The primary objective of Allied Joint Publication-01(C) (AJP-01(C)) Allied Joint Doctrine is to provide capstone doctrine for the planning, execution and support of Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01(C) is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO, Partners, non-NATO nations and other organisations. 0002. This edition reflects the changes to the Alliance following the Prague (Nov 2002) and Istanbul (Jun 2004) summits, the implementation of new NATO command structures and the NATO Reaction Force concept, the impact of transformation on Alliance military capabilities and nascent thinking on an effects-based approach to operations. The revision also acknowledges the population of subordinate levels of the Allied joint doctrine hierarchy, resulting in the removal of chapters covering the functional warfare and support areas. 0003. AJP-01(C) is intended for use primarily by commanders and staffs at the operational level, but could be used at any level as a reference. It explains the principles that underpin the planning and conduct of Alliance campaigns and operations by giving commanders the strategic context for such operations, identifying the challenges to commanders and their staffs at the operational level and providing the commander in particular with tools and strategies to direct successful campaigns. 0004. It is not the intention that AJP-01(C) should restrict the authority of a Joint Force Commander. Subject to the constraints and restraints imposed by the directives issued by higher authority, he will be expected to organize the forces assigned to him and to plan and execute operations in a manner he deems appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his mission. 0005. If it is to be useful, AJP-01(C) has to be a living document and be amended accordingly. Therefore, the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG) will review the contents on a 3-yearly cycle, unless changes in NATO policy require urgent amendment to published doctrine. As a capstone document requiring consensus between all Alliance member nations, the AJODWG is determined to restrict future amendment to the minimum. As a result, the reader will find AJP-01(C) more generic and abstract in nature than its predecessor, focusing on the underlying philosophy and fundamentals of joint operations at the operational level while referring to subordinate publications, in particular AJP-3(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Operations and AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning.
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Key themes of this approach are: a. A Single Doctrine for Operations. The Alliance has a single doctrine for operations: there is no difference in doctrine at the level of philosophy and principles due to differing mandates or types of operation. Such differences may become evident at the lower doctrinal levels of practices and procedures, but these are below the level of this publication. AJP-01(C) provides a framework of understanding for the approach to all Allied operations; after this Preface no distinction is made between types of operation unless important. The Deployed Nature of Operations. Deployed operations occur both within and outside the NATO area. From an individual member nations perspective, a deployment to the periphery of NATO is no different to a deployment outside; the fact remains that its forces are deployed and require logistic support and therefore the ability of its forces to deploy, deployability, is an important characteristic. It is rare that a member nation does not have to deploy its forces to some extent in support of a NATO operation, and the expeditionary nature of NATO operations is likely to increase. The Operational Environment is Complex. All military planning must be coherent with other non-military and potentially multinational and nongovernmental initiatives intended to stabilise and create a self-sustaining secure environment. A NATO military response must therefore be integrated into a wider overall framework or a collective strategy. In taking these and other security factors into account there is no fundamental difference in the planning and execution of any operation across the full range of NATOs military capabilities. Operations are Operations. All operations can fundamentally be approached in the same manner because NATO forces must expect to perform a wide range of potentially simultaneous activities across a spectrum of conflict, from combat action to humanitarian aid, within short timeframes and in close proximity. What will vary will be the mandates, constraints and drivers that will be factors in the commanders mission analysis; campaign plan development, selection and execution; and the force generation process where members can elect to participate in a Non-Article 5 operation.
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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AJP-01(C)

CONTENTS
Page Cover NSA Letter of Promulgation National Letter of Promulgation Record of Changes Preface Contents Chapter 1 - The Global Security Environment Strategic Trends Implications for the Use of Alliance Armed Forces Annex 1A - The North Atlantic Treaty Chapter 2 - The Purpose of NATO and its Doctrine The Purpose of the Alliance Alliance Forces Introducing Alliance Doctrine The Essential Elements of Alliance Doctrine Chapter 3 - Strategic Decision-Making The Political-Military Interface NATOs Approach to Crisis Management Chapter 4 - The Operational Level Multinational Joint Operations The Operational Level Campaigning Chapter 5 - Command at the Operational Level A Command Philosophy The Nature of Operational Level Command Command Relationships Decision-Making at the Operational Level The Mechanics of Command i iii v vii ix xi
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2-1 2-10 2-17 2-23 3-1 3-3 4-1 4-10 4-15 5-1 5-6 5-9 5-10 5-12
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Chapter 6 - Campaign Planning and Execution Introduction Orientation Concept development Plan development Plan Execution Termination Lexicon Part I Terms and Definitions Part II Acronyms and Abbreviations Reference Publications List of Effective Pages (for promulgation version only)
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CHAPTER 1 THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Section I Strategic Trends

Introduction 0101. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and that largescale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer-term remains. However, the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks that are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and regional instability. The resulting tensions determine a wide spectrum of conflict, ranging from humanitarian emergency to armed conflict that could affect Euro-Atlantic stability. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could affect the security of other states. 0102. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor, which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained. The proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons and devices and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. Despite welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major proliferation challenges remain. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliances growing reliance on information and information systems through Information Operations (Info Ops). They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATOs superiority in traditional weaponry. 0103. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.1 However, Alliance security, should also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism,
See Annex 1A for the full text of The North Atlantic Treaty.
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sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly because of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. The Alliance is an important forum for the discussion of members mutual security issues under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind. The Evolving Strategic Environment 0104. Alliance doctrine should take into account the changing context in which armed forces are used. It is notoriously difficult to predict the future with any certainty. However comprehensive the research or deep the analysis might be, the likelihood remains of conflict occurring in an unexpected location or in unforeseen circumstances. 0105. The strategic environment will become increasingly dynamic and complex. There will be a number of factors that directly influence or cause change, as well as discernible patterns in that change; i.e. drivers and trends. There are key strategic drivers of change: globalization of society, political geometry, demographic and environmental change, and the impact of technology. Given these strategic drivers, and from an examination of the military dimension, certain major trends in the defence and security arena can be identified. The Strategic Drivers of Change 0106. Globalization. The process of globalization has been gathering momentum over the past half-century and shows no sign of decreasing. The intensity and breadth of external influences on all cultures may be even more visible. While Western culture will continue to export its model and to exert its influence, some other cultures are spreading and pervading the Western one. This may provoke a backlash in areas of the world where cultures and values collide; action by anti-capitalists and religious extremists are two examples of such reactions. 24-hour news media will ensure that the results of globalization, including global inequality, are visible to most. Terrorists and extremists can use the media and information networks to foster unrest and discontent through targeted information campaigns that exert pressure on the Alliance. 0107. Political Geometry. Notwithstanding the effects of globalization, nation states will remain key geopolitical players and most will retain armed forces. However, the way in which state sovereignty is exercised may change. a. There is likely to be greater interdependence between states, and a shift in power from states to transnational networks such as the European Union (EU), multinational corporations, but also extremist organizations.
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Alliance members are likely to become more open as societies and will be more dependent on broad stability elsewhere in the world, particularly with key trading partners in Europe, North America and, increasingly, Asia. This greater interdependence of states may have many positive benefits. Increased interaction is, for example, likely to advance understanding and tolerance in many societies, potentially reducing the backlashes mentioned earlier. Globalization may also serve to penalize poor governance and discourage interstate conflict. It is possible, however, that failing states may become a more persistent and pervasive threat to global security; non-state actors2 may exploit the vacuum caused by their deterioration and in turn increase weapon proliferation. These non-state actors have the potential to undermine the security of the Alliance in a world where concern for personal and collective security is gaining prominence over traditional defence of territory against conventional attack. Thus, failed states that have little significance in the traditional sense of strategic resources or geographical location can take on strategic importance by virtue of the potential base for operations that they offer to non-state actors. The Alliance may therefore choose, or be called upon, to intervene more frequently to stabilize dangerous situations in ungoverned territory. Unresolved conflicts in several areas of the world can generate support for extremist groups; the complexity of such conflicts may continue to require the political, and potentially military, involvement of Alliance nations. The technical and economic strengths of western states make it difficult for many other states or parties to challenge them in conventional ways, including the use of military means. This encourages alternative ways to achieve political objectives, including the unconventional use of armed violence. Action to face such threats and challenges should be coordinated across all instruments of state power,3 and this may give rise to an increasingly important role for multilateral networks and organizations.
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0108. Demographic and Environmental Change. Demographic differences related to the differences in life span and population growth between the developing and developed world may continue. This condition may lead to significant migratory pressures from one to the other, thus increasing ethnic tensions and putting stress on employment and welfare systems. a. Competition for scarcer resources is likely to continue, and global demand for energy resources, in particular, may increase significantly. Although oil and gas reserves may still be plentiful in the near future, the location of these
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Such as groups supporting transnational terrorism and organised crime. See Chapter 2.
reserves, and transport routes from them, may be major security factors for developed and developing nations alike. Food and water too may be plentiful in the developed world, but starvation and water scarcity may remain a significant problem for sections of the developing world, particularly subSaharan Africa, the situation being exacerbated in the medium-term by climate change. b. Impoverishment and inequitable distribution of these resources fosters grievances, provokes extremists and offers an opportunity for organized crime to threaten further security. Poverty, hunger and disease prevail in much of the developing world and contribute to the increasing stress in the security environment. Poor resource distribution and poor governance in areas affected by demographic and environmental change may serve only to compound this problem. This, in turn, is likely to lead to the above-mentioned significant migratory pressures, internal instability and a rise in calls for humanitarian intervention.
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0109. Impact of Technology. Technology will be a key driver of change that will pose both new threats and new opportunities. As access to current and emerging technology becomes more widespread, there will be greater opportunities for potential adversaries to develop effective unconventional means for direct and indirect attack on Alliance nations. This approach provides adversaries with new avenues to pursue their causes, especially when some are prepared to undertake suicide attacks. The proliferation of technologies such as information and communications, biotechnology and nanotechnology will be led by industry rather than the military and, because of globalization, will be more widespread than hitherto. Consequently, it will be easier for a range of state and non-state actors to gain access to such technologies, enabling them to use greater lethal power for disproportionate effect, including CBRN weapons. Trends within the Military Dimension 0110. The Future Balance of Military Power. The future balance of military power will be affected largely by 3 issues: a. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery will proliferate significantly unless successfully controlled. A limited number of countries may develop a nuclear weapons capability in the absence of external intervention, and a greater number could potentially acquire biological weapons. Ballistic delivery systems may proliferate and extend in range; non-ballistic systems, including cruise
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) missiles and non-military delivery mechanisms,4 may become more prevalent. Certain non-state actors are likely to acquire WMD and may be much harder to deter than state proliferators, making this a key security threat. Non state-actors could possibly employ them, aiming to achieve a limited local effect, but with potentially strategic implications. Delayed lethality and non-lethal weapons such as electromagnetic pulse weapons, radiological and carcinogenic chemical weapons are likely to offer new threats. When considering this issue, it is of fundamental importance to view the weapons as part of a wider system, and to think of WMD in terms of both will and capability. b. Posture and Alliances. While alliance members continue to depend on NATO to guard against any strategic threat to Europe, a conventional threat is unlikely to arise. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, Alliance nuclear deterrence, and potentially missile defence, will be key in preventing coercion by states armed with WMD. Many allies will concentrate on niche capability areas, pooling resources to achieve operational and fiscal efficiency in specialist roles. Activities will normally be in coalition, will typically be reactive (rather than pre-emptive) and expeditionary, and may occur over wider geographic areas than Europe and its periphery. Adversaries. A wide range of potential state and non-state adversaries exist, for example: authoritarian regimes, extreme political/religious factions, revolutionaries, insurgents, and WMD proliferators. Faced with the Alliances conventional military strengths, states and non-state actors may contest the Alliance in non-traditional ways, seeking to offset the Alliances military advantages while attacking its weaknesses. This may manifest itself in the targeting of civilians and vital interests in state homelands in order to coerce or destroy their state opponents. They may avoid defeat rather than seek victory, and action may not be through large-scale engagement with military forces they may also choose to employ a long-term strategy to achieve lasting change rather than immediate objectives.
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0111. The Potential Adversary. Potential adversaries are expected to be drawn from 3 broad categories of protagonists: nations, factions within a state and non-state actors. a. Nations. The ability to engage in armed conflict is likely to remain the ultimate instrument of state power. However, 3 factors dictate that the occurrence of interstate conflict is likely to reduce. Firstly, there is unlikely to be, in the near term, renewed bipolar competition or the surrogate wars generated between the superpowers in the Cold War. Secondly, Alliance
For example, civilian aircraft, ships, or sleeper devices.
conventional military superiority is likely to discourage conventional strategic attacks on it, or those areas where it has strategic interests, including for example NATOs Partner nations. Thirdly, the risks for protagonists are increasing due to the cost and lethality of weapon systems, the consequential effect to regional and global stability, and the strengthening international presumption against war and the associated penalties to those conducting it. However, wars will still occur and might be more dangerous due to the increasing lethality of weapon systems and the widening impact of conflict as globalization spreads interdependencies. b. Factions within a State. Intrastate conflict will probably become more frequent as globalization increases cultural conflict, penalizes ineffective governance and increases the ease with which destabilising groups can operate. Factions may attempt to prevent international engagement, or actively encourage it if the faction believes this may enhance its chances of success. Use of proxy forces is likely to become a common factor in discretionary wars of choice, although these forces can prove difficult to manage in reconstruction activities, particularly when reforming indigenous armed services and police forces (i.e. Security Sector Reform). Non-State Actors. There may be more conflict between states militaries and law enforcement agencies and a range of non-state actors, particularly terrorists, as the will and capability of such actors to seek strategic effect and to act internationally increases. State militaries are likely to have an increased role in engaging adversaries employing terrorism,5 both domestically within their own overseas territories and abroad, seeking to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations and prevent, through support to diplomacy, or interrupt, by military means state assistance to them, such action being conducted in support of state law enforcement agencies. State militaries may also tackle a range of other non-state actors; in particular those involved in organized crime, as this grows in sophistication, scope and scale and adopts paramilitary style techniques and capabilities.
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Nature of Conflict 0112. The term war is widely and often imprecisely used, and has itself become an unhelpful expression. Neither peace nor war exists in extreme form: perfect peace is utopian; absolute war is a theoretical construct with no restraint on violence. Instead, it is useful to place these extreme forms at either end of a spectrum that expresses the wide variety of continually evolving conditions that exist between states. The term war also has a complex legal aspect to it with International Law regulating the circumstances in which states may resort to the use of armed force
For a NATO perspective, see MC 472, The Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.
(traditionally termed jus ad bellum) and the way in which armed force is actually used (jus in bello, or as more frequently known, the law of armed conflict). 0113. Traditional definitions of war have focused on armed conflict between states, frequently involving one or both parties fighting for national survival. This may come close to absolute war, a condition calling for the mobilization of all national resources. Despite a general acceptance that there is a decreasing likelihood of wars of this sort, especially involving democratic countries, the Alliances armed forces should be able to respond to such a situation. 0114. War is a social as well as a military phenomenon and therefore the use of force, and the various constraints6 and restraints upon it, will be rooted in wider issues than simply military capability or the lack of it. Social groups compete over resources, identity, religion, or emotional release; states fight over material interests or values. In general terms, wars end in annihilation, by mutual exhaustion, compromise, defeat, capitulation, or simply pause before the next stage. 0115. Opponents to NATO forces will rarely take on an adversary of superior military strength according to established rules. By using unconventional, perhaps illegal under International Law, methods and irregular forces they will seek ways to negate advantage and undermine the Alliances cohesion, will, credibility, and influence by the application of non-military forces, means, and methods. The threat that such adversaries can pose to both the military forces and civil societies of the Alliance member nations is termed asymmetric because it is not possible for the Alliance to counter it in an equal way or by equal methods. This asymmetric threat is mainly based on: a. b. The nature of an adversary himself, he may be difficult to recognize, discriminate, identify and target, or even negotiate with. The incompatible nature of an adversarys ideals, culture and/or objectives which are at variance to the Alliance members own values, beliefs, priorities, and legal and moral constraints. The unconventional methods that an adversary may employ to counter a qualitative and quantitative advantage.
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0116. Warfare, the application of force using a range of techniques and military capabilities, is generally the domain of nations armed forces, although the margin between them and law-enforcement agencies is becoming increasingly blurred. The Alliance recognizes the importance of coherent action and a unifying strategy for the employment of all instruments of state power by contributing nations.
For example, public acceptance of, or the mandate for, an operation could all impose restrictions on potential courses of action, both military and non-military.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) A Wider Overall Framework7 - A Collective Strategy 0117. In the present political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliances role in preserving peace and preventing war depends, even more than in the past, on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and on the successful management of crises affecting security. The political, economic, social and environmental elements of security and stability are thus taking on increasing importance.8 NATOs Strategic Concept9 describes how the assets of member nations are to be coordinated and focused to achieve security goals using diplomatic and military instruments of power. It also recognizes the desirability of coherent economic policies,10 but that it is dependent, for example, on the international community setting goals,11 where possible, from within a wider overall framework or a collective strategy to fund reconstruction and development. 0118. A collective strategy seeks to create a self-sustaining secure environment that requires adequate governance, a viable economy, security mechanisms and responsive social and human networks. The international community therefore seeks to influence all these domains, with each organization focusing on its own area of responsibility and expertise. NATO advises on options that include a military response, and how that military response can be integrated into an overall strategic framework, a framework such that short term and emergency interventions, key structural and systematic reforms and national development programmes can be identified and prioritized.12 0119. To play a full role in framework discussions with representatives of the international community, or with those of the internal security forces, an understanding is required of the societal domains, their interdependencies and the way in which they influence each other, positively or negatively:13 a. Governance. Governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage the nations affairs at all levels. It comprises all the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which the
NATO Secretary General, Jakob Gijsbert (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer, Cambridge Union Society, UK 2 February 2005: We need to integrate any NATO military response into a wider overall framework that will include political, as well as perhaps financial and judicial measures. 8 NATO Handbook, 2001 page 56. 9 C-M(99)21 The Alliances Strategic Concept, 29 April 1999. 10 North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2. 11 MC 327/2, NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, paragraph 39. 12 MC 327/2, NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, paragraph 39. 13 Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward (Afghanistan: A Government/International Agency report, 2004):Without an adequate level of security, a society will fail to achieve key national goals for economic stability, political normalization, national reconciliation, reconstruction and social development. However, reducing societal violence and attaining an adequate level of security may only be possible if there are improvements in the economic and political domains.
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights and obligations and mediate their differences. Governance is not the sole domain of government but it transcends government to encompass the business sector and civil society. b. Economy (Inclusive of Infrastructure). The economy is the system of production, distribution and consumption. Infrastructure is the physical structures that form the foundation for development, it is a societys skeleton, e.g., bridges, roads, reservoirs, cables, pipes, railways, schools, healthcare. Social and Human Capital. Social capital is the fabric of networks, relationships, norms and institutions that bind a society together and enable it to function and grow dynamically. Human capital refers to the acquired knowledge, skills and capacities that allow individuals to operate within this fabric. Security. Security is the provision of a basic level of safety to maintain or enable a return to normality in the political, economic and social spheres. The elements of security are considered further below.
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0120. Post-conflict security issues can become the main constraint to stabilization. In its absence, the initiation or resumption of large-scale conflict becomes more likely. Figure 1.1 illustrates the role effective security mechanisms play in ensuring the rule of law and how their degradation can lead to a collapse of governance.14 The population needs to develop confidence in the authority of the state by accountability mechanisms that seek to combat a culture of impunity within unreformed security agencies. Components of security are: a. National Security Institutions. Civil primacy and fiscal transparency are required to coordinate and regulate the activities of the ministries, institutions and donor states. National security institutions are responsible for intelligence, investigation and interdiction. Regional Security Framework. A framework to enable good security relations with neighbouring states and to encourage stability within the region is needed. Destabilising external support from sub-state actors, parties, tribes or warlords should be countered. Law. Law is the collection of rules imposed by authority that in principle are followed by every member and ruler of a society. The Judiciary is a pillar of a civil state with power to resolve legal conflicts, interpret and apply the law. The rule of law provides an enabling environment for development and economic investment and builds confidence in the political framework.
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Securing Afghanistans Future, page79.
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Police. The police (and other governmental organizations such as customs, border, coast guards etc) are a necessary component of an effective internal security structure. They are an agency that maintains order, prevents and detects crime and enforces the law. The police are required to conform to international standards and inspire the trust and respect of the populace.
(-) Negative Effectiveness of internal security mechanisms to protect civilians from attack Positive (+)
Collapse of governance
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Figure 1.1 - Effectiveness of Internal Security Mechanisms15 e. f. Penal System. The penal system consists of justice mechanisms, correction facilities, magistrates, defence lawyers and prison warders. Armed Forces. Armed forces can counter or neutralize significant armed groupings e.g., militia, insurgents, terrorists or opposing national armed forces. Of note, operational activities may include leading or supporting: Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR); de-mining; international criminal tribunals, counter-organized crime and narcotic programmes. Their activities should support and be synchronized with police agencies. In this regard, the use of a Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU)16 to establish a safe environment for the population by providing security, public order and law enforcement may be appropriate.
0121. Security is a natural focus for a diplomatic and military alliance such as NATO. However, NATO is not resourced to address all of the elements of the security
Countering Terrorism, The UK Approach to the Military Contribution Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) UK, 2003 and PHQ ARRC Joint Effects Board products. 16 A police force with military status, typically used to maintain public order and combat organized crime and terrorism with dedicated investigative tools to analyze subversive and criminal organizations structures and formed from Alliance resources such as the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri or Spanish Guardia Civil.
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domain and must therefore interface with local internal security mechanisms (e.g. police17 and judiciary) and the international community (e.g. United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other organizations). The arrival of a NATO joint force will immediately affect the regional or societal balance of power and the way in which violence is used; an understanding of violent conflict is therefore required. An acceptable security end state is approached when the rule of law is established, internal security mechanisms regain control, and the level of violence is within societal norms. 0122. A collective strategy uses a framework to comprehend the interdependencies of the security, governance, economic, social and human societal domains and to chart the long-term coordinated action agreed by the key stakeholders, local government and the international community. The approach seeks to stabilize and create a selfsustaining secure environment by providing a broad framework for consultation, cooperation, coordination and coherency of action. The international community will use different language to describe what they assess as critical milestones or steps. Discussions must not be inhibited by terminology; flexibility, work rounds and compromises are required to generate a common understanding. An Effects Based Approach to Operations 0123. Complex and uncertain challenges in the strategic environment will demand new ways of thinking, planning and acting. Driven by political constraints, legal influences, and with the availability of new technological capabilities, the Alliances focus will increasingly be on ensuring that operations contribute to creating the effects to achieve strategic campaign objectives. An effect is described as the result of an action, set of actions or another effect. An effects-based approach to operations should enhance Alliance forces capabilities by focusing operations on achieving results that will contribute to attaining objectives and the strategic end state. An effects-based approach to operations involves the comprehensive integrated application of all means of Alliance power, both military and non-military, to create effects which will achieve desired outcomes. The main drivers for its adoption are: a. An improved understanding of the need for integration of activities by all instruments of power at all levels of operations in a complex operational environment. Improved visibility of the relationship between cause and effect, brought about by increasing, and eventually network-enabled, shared situational awareness and knowledge bases.
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Improved precision, reducing the number of undesired effects and thereby enhancing the accuracy of planning.
0124. An effects-based approach is not new, rather it is a philosophical change in the way to view, plan, conduct and assess operations that places emphasis on achieving desired outcomes and mitigating undesired ones. An effects-based approach does not change currently accepted planning methodologies - it refocuses them. Operations are still executed in the time-tested manner, applying operational art, design and management. Targeting processes, seeking to analyze an adversary and then direct activity to defeat or neutralize him are still paramount and seek to integrate recent developments in, for example, Info Ops with more traditional methods. It involves the coherent planning execution and assessment of actions by all involved organizations together with the use of modern technology. This approach is primarily applicable at the strategic and operational levels of command in planning and assessment of operations across the spectrum of conflict. At the strategic level, it would involve the application of military capabilities in conjunction with all instruments of Alliance power - diplomatic, military and coordinated economic18 and other multinational organizations interagency and nongovernmental actors in a collective strategy. 0125. At the operational level, an effects based approach involves the selective combination of actions, coordinated with the activities of other organizations, to create lethal and non-lethal effects in order to achieve operational objectives in support of a strategic end state. In a combat environment for example, an effectsbased approach to operations focuses on the creation of effects that reduce an adversarys operational coherence, neutralize his capabilities, shape his perceptions and break his will to fight. The adversary is viewed from as many perspectives as possible to identify key vulnerabilities in order to engage them by the most appropriate means. Under this construct, the emphasis is not on numbers, but on quality forces achieving overmatching power through the combination of knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality applied in a joint context. Upon execution of the operation, an integral part of an effects-based approach is effects assessment to determine if the desired effect has been created or remedial action is required, as well as to recommend future actions. 0126. The achievement of coherent effects is supported by the coordination of processes that bring all instruments of power into focus. In an alliance this requires multinational organizational collaboration and civil-military cooperation to produce a collective strategy. Enhanced interoperability throughout a military force structure that is organizationally flexible is required, with components that will be increasingly comprised of flexible and ready, deployable forces able to perform combined and
As a political-military alliance, NATO does not possess an economic lever of power. However, its members can coordinate economic activity through the Alliances Economic Committee.
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joint manoeuvre. To enhance further these forces, the ability to integrate the partners and members of coalitions will be important, as will a mechanism for the Alliance to extend military cooperation and consultation to areas of possible conflict.
Section II Implications for the Use of Alliance Armed Forces

0127. The Alliance has adopted a holistic approach that deals with a full range of military operations mounted within a spectrum of conflict from crisis prevention to humanitarian operations and major combat.19 This reinforces the need for a rigorous and coordinated diplomatic, military, and economic approach a collective strategy. The military forces of the Alliance will operate alongside forces of other countries in close cooperation and coordination with a wide array of international, national and non-governmental organizations. Future military operations linked to other informational, economic, social, legal and diplomatic initiatives will need to be implemented in a measured, coordinated and cooperative fashion. 0128. Although large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is unlikely, the possibility of such a demanding threat emerging over the longer term cannot be discounted. The Alliance also may choose to respond to attacks on security interests outside the Euro-Atlantic region or intercede in conflicts between nations requiring the conduct of high intensity operations. Therefore, although asymmetric threats from state and non-state actors may constitute the most immediate security risk, the Alliance should retain the capability to conduct major combat operations in order to cope with more demanding conventional threats. 0129. A broad and multi-dimensional view of security has military implications that go well beyond traditional preoccupations with territorial defence, and places an increasing focus on roles such as conflict prevention, crisis management, consequence management, counter insurgency, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and support to peacebuilding, peacemaking, disaster response and humanitarian assistance. This will enable the Alliance to take an increasingly active role in crisis management. Intrastate conflicts can expand rapidly into wider conflagrations that threaten the security interests of the Alliance. Because the complexity of developing security threats only increases with time, efforts to anticipate impending crises and timely actions taken to prevent or avoid crises will improve the Alliances ability to respond effectively. 0130. Intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination and sharing will be critical to anticipating and, possibly, preventing or containing conflicts. Intelligence processes will include agencies not traditionally associated with military operations, for example those of law-enforcement agencies, and non-traditional sources, such as
19
Several operations within this range may be present simultaneously in a joint operational area Krulaks 3 block war.
informal contacts with non-governmental actors. A full understanding of the operational environment and a proactive approach in the earliest stages of emerging crises will be required, a key purpose being early derivation of critical intelligence requirements.20 This assessment will support increased situational awareness for decision-makers and will be supported by a secure information network for enhanced intelligence sharing and collaboration in rapidly evolving situations. Improvements in all aspects of the decision cycle will be necessary so that the time between the anticipation of a risk or threat, and the definition and execution of a course of action can be shortened. 0131. A growing public awareness and impatience brought about by the greater accessibility of information, coupled with the political necessity of maintaining public support, have led to mounting political constraints on military operations, while simultaneously increasing the need to achieve rapid success. Thus, these factors and their legal codification will increasingly influence the militarys application of force and its ability to act, reinforcing the need for accountability and proportionality. Within this context, the military forces of the Alliance should be capable of operating under media and public scrutiny taking into account the needs of operational security. 0132. The Alliances military posture will adapt to respond to challenges with speed, precision and flexibility, so that forces can be deployed effectively wherever they are needed. The posture will provide the Alliance with a broad set of capabilities that will enable the projection of stability, assure nations and Partners, dissuade adversaries, deter aggression and, if necessary, defeat an adversary across the spectrum of conflict. In particular, the Alliance should be capable, in concert with other organizations, of countering weapons proliferation and terrorist threats.21 The Alliance should structure for the most likely operations and adapt these structures for the most demanding. The command and force structure should be deployable and sustainable in character and design, able to conduct a number of smaller, concurrent operations at some distance from home bases as well as sustaining operations over long periods. A greater proportion of Alliance forces will have to be deployable and usable, and have the flexibility to transition rapidly between, for example, combat and humanitarian assistance activities within an operation. Types of Operations 0133. The strategic drivers and trends identified in the previous section emphasize the complexity of the modern operational environment. Within a campaign, joint forces may conduct a wide variety of activities, including combat, humanitarian assistance, enforcing order, managing confrontation, and security sector reform. These activities must be coordinated with those of other organizations - for some the
20 21
AJP-2.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures. MC 472, NATO Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism.
military may play a relatively minor part. Experience demonstrates that a wide range of military activities is required simultaneously, rather than a single focus or sequential progression. Campaign success is therefore likely to depend on understanding such simultaneity, how it evolves through the campaign, and how it affects the planning and execution of operations. 0134. Activities occur across a spectrum of conflict, which was described in Section I. No conflict will be at just one point on this spectrum. At any particular time there may be a humanitarian crisis in one place, an insurgency in another, and intense fighting between armoured forces nearby, while at any one location there may be house-tohouse fighting one day, collection of forensic evidence the next day, and restoration of electricity and water supplies the day after, or a return to fighting. 0135. States of peace, tension, conflict and combat may be local or widespread, as well as transient or prolonged. The character of any particular campaign may be difficult to define precisely and is likely to change over time. It will probably consist of a wide variety of activities across the spectrum of conflict, changing over time; nevertheless, it is possible to describe identifiable predominant themes22 at the operational level. The character of the campaign varies according to the theme: for example, major combat is identifiably different from counter-insurgency. They demand different intellectual approaches and require different force packages, although some tactical activities (such as ambushes or convoys) are common to both. It is possible to discriminate between campaign themes by the following: a. Political Risk. The level of acceptable risk, including risk of casualties, is a measure of the political importance of the campaign, proportional to the threat to the member nations or national interests. Effect Sought. The strategic end-state sought will often determine the character of a campaign and the effect sought: defeat of a hostile state will demand a different approach than separation of warring factions. Character of Combat. Combat can be characterized by prevalence, scale, and intensity. Prevalence is a measure of its frequency. Scale describes the level of combat, which can be measured by the level at which forces integrate their activities in combat. For example, in major combat, battles may be fought at unit and formation level but in counter-insurgency, they will be more usual at platoon and company level. Intensity describes the degree of concentration of combat, measurable by the rate of consumption of resources. Type of Adversary. The nature and number of adversaries, or potential adversaries, will have a major influence on the character of the conflict,
b.
c.
d.
22
Major combat, counter-insurgency, peace support and peacetime military engagement.
ranging from sophisticated networked forces to tribesmen. This is not constant because adversaries are adaptive: for example, once a regular army has been defeated, it may mutate into an irregular force and change the character of the conflict; alternatively a successful insurgent group may evolve into a regular army. The Enduring Aspects of Conflict 0136. Whereas technology and globalization, for example, have altered the face of conflict, its enduring nature remains unchanged. a. Friction. Friction is the force that frustrates action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be mental indecision over what to do next. It may be physical the effects of intense enemy fire. It may be externally imposed by the action of an adversary or the weather. It may be self-induced by a poor plan or clashes of personality. It will be present even in the absence of an adversary and is a key factor in the difference between a plan on paper and the reality when it is executed. Chaos. Because it is a human activity, conflict is uncertain and chaotic. Incomplete, inaccurate or contradictory information creates a fog of war, which limits perceptions and causes confusion. An adversary may attempt deliberately to deceive and deny understanding of his intentions and his actions, greatly increasing the state of chaos in the battlespace. The commander should exploit chaos by imposing it on his adversary, yet bringing greater order to his own schemes than those of his adversary. Understanding the nature of his adversary, how he thinks, and how he might act and react, is a prerequisite to gaining this advantage. Because armed conflict is essentially chaotic, the exact outcome is uncertain in all but the most trivial cases. As a result, chance is likely to play a role. Danger. Force, whether applied or threatened, is the likely means by which a commander compels an adversary to do what he wants, although force tends to have a greater effect on a conventional foe. The application of force, or its threat, brings danger and with it fear. To a greater or lesser degree, all men and women feel fear, and the commander has an important role to play in helping those whom he commands to have the necessary courage to overcome their fear, and thereby ensure success. Human Stress. Combat is a stressful activity. The effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, loneliness and privation affect, to a varying degree, the willpower of all those involved, although if managed correctly stress can be a catalyst for better performance. To defeat an enemy militarily it is necessary to erode
b.
c.
d.
the willpower of the enemy commander and the forces under his command, whilst maintaining the willpower and morale of ones own forces. 0137. All these factors underscore the importance of the service personnel who take part in such operations, and the need for effective selection and high quality training and education, to give them the skills and confidence to be successful.
ANNEX 1A THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington D.C. USA - 4 April 1949 The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:
Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 1A-1 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article 61
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,2 on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such
The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951 (www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bta1.htm). 2 On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 3 July 1962.
1
1A-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.3
Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
Article 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.
The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.
CHAPTER 2 THE PURPOSE OF NATO AND ITS DOCTRINE

Section I The Purpose of the Alliance
0201. NATOs essential and enduring purpose, set out in the North Atlantic Treaty,1 is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the UN Charter. It embodies the transatlantic link that binds Europe and North America in a defence and security alliance. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, NATO has provided for the collective defence of its members since its foundation in 1949. 0202. To achieve this, the Alliance uses both its political influence and its military capacity, depending on the nature of the security challenges facing Alliance member states. As the strategic environment has changed, so too has the way in which the Alliance responds to security challenges. It continues to preserve stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and is evolving to meet new threats such as terrorism and other security challenges beyond its traditional area of responsibility. 0203. NATO is one of the key structures through which Alliance members implement their security goals. It is an intergovernmental, rather than supranational, organization in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence, and serves as a forum in which they consult together and take decisions on matters affecting their security. NATOs structures facilitate continuous consultation, coordination and cooperation between members on political, military, economic and other aspects of security, as well as cooperation in non-military fields such as science, information, the environment and disaster relief. Collective Defence 0204. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. The Alliance works on the principle that the security of each member country depends on the security of them all. If the security of any one is threatened, all are affected. In signing the North Atlantic Treaty, every member state makes a commitment to each other to respect this principle, sharing the risks and responsibilities as well as the advantages of collective defence. This also means that many aspects of the defence planning and preparations that each country had previously undertaken alone are undertaken together. The costs of providing the facilities needed for their military forces to train and work effectively together are also shared. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence,
See Annex 1A.
the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realize their essential national security objectives 0205. Each country remains independent and free to make its own decisions, but by planning together and sharing resources, they can enjoy collectively a level of security far higher than any could achieve alone. This remains the fundamental principle of security cooperation within NATO. Fundamental Security Tasks 0206. The Alliances Strategic Concept,2 an authoritative statement of the Alliances objectives and fundamental security tasks, provides guidance on the political and military means to be used in undertaking them. It describes the security risks faced by the Alliance as multi-directional and difficult to predict. The Alliances fundamental security tasks are defined as: a. b. c. d. e. Acting as a foundation for stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Serving as a forum for Allied consultation on security issues, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. Deterring and defending against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state. Contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management. Promoting wide-ranging partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.
0207. With the end of the Cold War, the Alliance assumed new fundamental tasks, including building security partnerships with democracies across Europe, through the Caucasus and into Central Asia and with some North African and Middle Eastern countries too. In response to changes in the overall security environment, the Alliance has taken on additional responsibilities. These include addressing both instability caused by regional and ethnic conflicts within Europe and threats emanating from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Currently, the Alliance is engaged in an increasingly broad range of activities, designed to promote cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and other countries outside NATO and to confront proactively new security challenges, such as those posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to remain effective in defending and promoting security in this new and rapidly changing security environment, the Alliance is engaged in a transformation affecting all aspects of its
C-M(99)21 The Alliances Strategic Concept, 29 April 1999.
agenda, with new missions, new members, new capabilities, new partnerships, and new ways of doing business.
Alliance Structures 0208. One of the keys to the Alliances durability is the solidarity guaranteed by a consensual decision-making process requiring that all decisions be unanimous. This often necessitates protracted consultation and discussion to attain unanimity3 before an important decision can be taken. Although this appears to be a slow and unwieldy system, it has 2 major advantages in application: the sovereignty and independence of each member nation is respected and secondly, when a decision has been made, it has the full backing of all member countries and their commitment to implement it. 0209. National Delegations. To facilitate consultation, each member country is represented by a permanent delegation at NATOs political headquarters in Brussels, consisting of a Permanent Representative, with Ambassador rank, who is the head of the delegation, and a Military Representative. Each of them is supported by a staff of civilian and military advisers, who represent their countries on different NATO committees. 0210. North Atlantic Council. Separate civilian and military structures have been established within NATO to deal with the political and military dimensions of Alliance work. Both structures support the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATOs highest decision-making body and the only NATO body established by the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council itself was given responsibility under the Treaty for setting up subsidiary bodies. Committees and planning groups have since been created to support the work of the Council or to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning, nuclear planning and military matters. At whatever level it meets, its decisions have the same authority and reflect the views of each government. Normally, it meets to discuss issues of common concern or issues requiring collective decisions but there are no restrictions on subjects that the Council may discuss. 0211. The NAC provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation between member governments on all issues affecting their security. All member countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views and retain complete sovereignty and responsibility for their own decisions. Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments based on unanimity.
As unamity is required, a positive Yes is required from all member nations. Simple consensus is insufficient and an abstention inappropriate. Decisions are often made under Silence procedure where members silence is taken to be a Yes until a nation breaks silence. If this occurs, no decision can be taken until that nation agrees to vote Yes, if changes are made then the issue must be submitted to the procedure anew.
0212. Consultation takes place across the entire spectrum of Alliance activities, such as the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces, public diplomacy, the Alliances scientific activities and environmental programmes. Other committees and groups, such as the Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace, help develop and oversee cooperation with Partner countries. Consultations are undertaken in the appropriate forums such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Similarly, Mediterranean Dialogue4 activities are discussed with participating countries in the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. 0213. Political consultation among the members of the Alliance is not limited to events taking place within the NATO Treaty area, or to political issues. Increasingly, events outside the geographical area covered by the Treaty have security implications for the Alliance and therefore require the attention of the Council and subordinate committees. The consultative machinery of NATO is readily available and extensively used by the member nations in such circumstances, taking advantage of the collocation of national delegations, even if NATO as an Alliance may not be directly involved. By consulting together they are able to identify at an early stage areas where, in the interests of security and stability, coordinated action may be taken as part of a collective strategy. The major committees involved in this process are the Political Committee at senior (Deputy Permanent Representative) or other level and the Policy Coordination Group (Deputy Permanent Representative and Military Representatives). 0214. NATO Secretary General. NATO is headed by a Secretary General who is appointed for approximately 4 years. A senior international statesman from one of the member countries, the Secretary General chairs meetings of the NAC and other important NATO bodies and helps to build consensus among the member nations. In managing day-to-day activities of the Alliance, the Secretary General is supported by an international staff of experts and officials from all NATO countries. 0215. Defence Planning Committee.5 The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) deals with most defence matters and subjects related to collective defence planning. It provides guidance to NATOs military authorities and has the same authority as the Council on matters within its competence.
NATOs Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum established in 1994 for political consultations and practical cooperation involving countries of the Mediterranean area (as at 2005, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). This has recently been extended by the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) intended to promote practical cooperation on a bilateral basis with interested countries (by early 2006, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) in the broader region of the Middle East. 5 France, which is not part of NATOs integrated military structure, does not participate in either the Defence Planning Committee or the Nuclear Planning Group.
0216. Nuclear Planning Group. Defence ministers also meet regularly in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which keeps the Alliances nuclear policy under review and discusses a broad range of specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces and wider concerns such as nuclear arms control and proliferation. 0217. Military Committee. NATOs military structure is overseen by the Military Committee (MC), which is the highest military authority in the Alliance but remains under the political authority of the NAC, DPC and NPG. The MC is composed of member states Chiefs of Defence, who are represented by senior military officers who serve as national Military Representatives to NATO and as members of the MC in permanent session, under the leadership of an elected Chairman. 0218. The Committee is responsible for recommending to NATOs political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area. Its principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. It provides guidance on military matters to the NATO Strategic Commanders, whose representatives attend its meetings, and is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance under the authority of the Council, as well as for the efficient operation of MC agencies. The Committee assists in developing overall strategic concepts for the Alliance. Its additional responsibilities in times of crises, tension or war are to advise the Council and DPC of the military situation and to make recommendations on the use of military force, the implementation of contingency plans and the development of appropriate rules of engagement. 0219. In the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP), the MC meets regularly with EAPC/PfP Partner countries at the level of national Military Representatives and at Chief of Defence (CHOD) level to deal with military cooperation issues. There are similar meetings of the MC with Russia and with Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and the European Union (EU). 0220. International Military Staff. The MC is supported by the International Military Staff (IMS). The IMS is headed by a Director selected by the MC from candidates nominated by member nations. The IMS is responsible for planning, assessing and recommending policy on military matters for consideration by the MC, as well as ensuring that the policies and decisions of the Committee are implemented. 0221. The IMS consists of military personnel who have been sent by their nations to take up staff appointments at NATO Headquarters, to work in an international capacity for the common interest of the Alliance rather than on behalf of their nation. 0222. The NATO Situation Centre assists the NAC, the DPC and the MC in fulfilling their respective functions in the field of consultation. It serves as the focal point within the Alliance for the receipt, exchange and dissemination of political, military and economic information.
Transformation 0223. The Prague Summit of November 2002 set in motion a modernization process to ensure that NATO is able to deal effectively with the security challenges of the 21st century. In Prague, NATO leaders, as well as initiatives regarding enlargement of the Alliance and initiatives with Partners, agreed to improve military capabilities a process that came to be known as transformation. 0224. The Alliance adopted a series of measures in Prague aimed at ensuring that NATO is equipped for the full spectrum of modern military missions, recognising that the traditional, more static forces of the Cold War were no longer valid. This meant NATO creating forces able to move faster and further afield, to apply military force more effectively, and to sustain themselves in combat. To this end, NATO leaders approved a 3-pronged approach to improving Alliance defence capabilities: a. b. c. A new capabilities initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment. Creating a NATO Response Force. Streamlining NATOs military command structure.
0225. Prague Capabilities Commitment. The Prague Capabilities Commitment differs from its predecessor, the Defence Capabilities Initiative,6 in that individual Allies made commitments, subject to political approval, to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precisionguided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. The Prague Capabilities Commitment and the EUs efforts to develop military capabilities are intended to be mutually reinforcing. This commitment was reinforced at the Istanbul Summit (June 2004) by members commitment to making their forces more usable by being able at all times to deploy and sustain a larger proportion of their armed forces on Alliance operations. 0226. NATO Response Force.7 The NATO Response Force (NRF) was created to be a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed. It has 2 distinct but mutually reinforcing purposes: a. A high-readiness force able to move quickly to wherever it may be required to participate in the full range of Alliance missions.
6 7
Agreed at the Washington Summit Apr 1999. More detail in Section II.
b.
A catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliances military capabilities and, more generally, for their continuing transformation to meet evolving security challenges.
NATO Command Structure 0227. The NATO Command Structure (NCS)8 has 2 Strategic Commands (SC), one operational focused on the planning and execution of NATO operations, and one functional focused on transformation of NATO military capabilities over the full range of Alliance military missions. The operational command has 3 subordinate standing operational-level commands. Each operational-level headquarters can be assigned appropriate component headquarters except Joint HQ (JHQ) Lisbon. 0228. Strategic Commands. There are 2 SCs: a. Allied Command Operations. Allied Command Operations is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)9 whose headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),10 is based near Mons, Belgium. Following appropriate political decisions, SACEUR will provide, if required, an Operational Headquarters capability, open to the participation of all Allies, for EU-led operations from within SHAPE based on the NATO-EU framework agreement. Allied Command Transformation. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)11 whose headquarters, HQ SACT, is based in Norfolk, Virginia, USA, although it has a presence in Europe.12
b.
0229. Operational Commands. There are 3 operational-level commands subordinate to SACEUR, 2 Joint Force Command (JFC) HQs and a third robust but more limited Joint HQ (JHQ). a. Joint Force Command Headquarters. Each of the 2 Joint Force Command HQs, Joint Force Commands Brunssum, Netherlands and Naples, Italy, has
As outlined in MC 324/1, The NATO Military Command Structure. SACEUR is dual-hatted as the Commander of US European Command. 10 This historic acronym Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) continues to be used despite recent changes to the NATO military command structure. 11 To maintain a strong transatlantic link and ensure access to US transformational initiatives SACT is dual-hatted as commander of US Joint Forces Command. 12 Including an ACT Staff Element in Belgium, the Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger NOR, the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz POL, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto PRT, and the Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, ITA.
9
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) the capability to command a Major Joint Operation (MJO),13 or an operation larger than a MJO in the initial stage, from their static location. In addition, the 2 Joint Force Commands can provide one land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQ for the initial and sustainment phase, with either acting as Parent HQ, or mount the land or sea based Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) HQ for NRF operations. b. Joint Headquarters. The third, robust but more limited, JHQ Lisbon, Portugal is responsible for mounting the sea-based CJTF HQ in the initial phase, or the land or sea based DJTF HQ for NRF operations. It has appropriate links to component command and capabilities, although it has no permanent operational command (OPCOM) responsibilities.
0230. Component Commands. The 2 JFCs have subordinate land, maritime and air Component Commands (CCs). To meet operational requirements, the CCs can be tasked by SACEUR to provide a Command and Control (C2) capability under the command of any of the 2 JFCs or the JHQ. a. Component Command-Land. The NCS has 2 CC-Land HQs: CC-Land HQ Heidelberg, Germany and CC-Land HQ Madrid, Spain. The CC-Land HQs within the NCS are normally deployed as Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) HQs to command a land operation larger than a MJO in the initial stage, whilst drawing from the same set of deployable commonly funded equipment. Should the circumstances require, the NCS Land Component Command HQs offer an alternative for the JFLCC for CJTF operations. Additionally, an augmented NCS LCC HQ can relieve a CJTF HQ in the sustainment phase if the intensity of the operation has scaled down. Component Command-Air. The NCS has 2 static CC-Air HQs: CC-Air HQ Ramstein, Germany and CC-Air HQ Izmir, Turkey. Each of the 2 CC-Air HQs has the capability to command the air component of a MJO, or an operation larger than a MJO in the initial stage, as a Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC) HQ from their static location. In addition the 2 CC-Air HQs can provide one deployed JFACC HQ with either acting as Parent HQ, drawing from one set of deployable equipment. To fulfil their functions, these HQs are supported by 6 Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOC), 4 static and 2
b.
Ministerial Guidance 2003 defines an MJO as an operation that could exceed 2 years in length and meets the following criteria: a land component capable of planning and executing corps-sized combat operations, with combat support and combat service support and a deployable Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and staff, with appropriate C2 capabilities; a maritime component capable of planning and executing operations at NATO Task Force level with logistic support and a deployable Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and staff, with appropriate C2 capabilities; air component capable of planning and executing up to 1000 combat and support sorties per day with logistic support and a deployable Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and staff, supported by a deployable Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC). Depending on the mission, component capabilities required could be less than stipulated above. At least one component must meet the full criteria for the operation to be considered a MJO.
13
deployable (DCAOC). The CAOCs linked to CC-Air HQ Ramstein are CAOC Uedem, Germany, DCAOC Uedem, Germany and CAOC Finderup, Denmark. The CAOCs linked to CC-Air HQ Izmir are CAOC Poggio Renatico, Italy, DCAOC Poggio Renatico, Italy and CAOC Larissa, Greece. c. Component Command-Maritime. The NCS has 2 static CC-Maritime HQs: CC-Maritime HQ Northwood, Great Britain and CC-Maritime HQ Naples, Italy. Each of the 2 CC-Maritime HQs have the capability to command a maritime component as a Joint Forces Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) from their static location and, in addition, activities in support of operations outside the Joint Operations Area (JOA) . To fulfil their functions, the CC-Maritime HQs are supported by specialized entities for C2 of submarine operations and maritime air operations (COMSUBSOUTH and COMAIRSOUTH for CC-Mar Naples and COMSUBNORTH and COMAIRNORTH for CC-Mar Northwood).
0231. Area of Responsibility. SACEUR has a permanently assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR). This area generally includes all the territory of the Alliance with the exception of Canada and the United States.14 0232. Area of Interest. SACEUR has responsibility for Areas of Interest (AOI),15 which are areas beyond NATOs territory in which NATO military commanders monitor and analyse regional instabilities, military capabilities, the military aspects of transnational issues, in order to identify their potential military consequences, which may directly or indirectly influence NATOs security interests.16 0233. Joint Operations Areas. SACEUR, or other designated commander, will plan and conduct military operations within a JOA17 that will be established to accomplish a specific mission. A JOA is defined in coordination with nations and approved by the NAC or the MC as appropriate, in accordance with NATOs Operational Planning Process.18 A JOA and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of mission and geographic area, are contingency or mission specific and may overlap AORs.
Should the need arise for operations in the territory of Canada or the United States, SACEUR will liaise directly with the military authorities of these countries. 15 The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. 16 AOIs can be defined by SACEUR and are approved by the MC or NAC/DPC. 17 A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency - or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. AAP-6. 18 See MC 133/3, NATOs Operational Planning System and Chapter 3.
14
0234. Area of Operation. Within a JOA, a joint commander may designate Areas of Operations (AOO)19 in which component commanders would conduct operations.20 NATO Force Structure 0235. NATO has, apart from the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, no armed forces of its own. Most forces available to NATO remain under full national command and control until they are assigned by the member countries to a NATO mission. NATOs political and military structures provide for the advance planning required to enable national forces to carry out these tasks, as well as the organizational arrangements needed for their joint command, control, training and exercising. 0236. In order to reflect the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions, a pool of deployable HQs and forces with the necessary flexibility for effective planning and force generation/activation and with graduated readiness levels is required. The NATO Force Structure (NFS)21 is composed of Allied, national and multinational forces, as well as their associated HQs, placed at the Alliances disposal on a permanent or temporary basis under specified readiness criteria. National contributions are made available to the Alliance under both the agreed mechanisms for the Transfer of Authority (TOA)22 and by coordination and cooperation agreements, supplemented by common assets for specific capabilities and scenarios. 0237. Whilst the NATO Command Structure is primarily intended to enable C2 of the Alliances joint operations, the NFS will provide additional C2 capabilities at the single environment level.
Section II Alliance Forces

Role of Alliance Forces 0238. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliances forces should therefore be able to deter and defeat adversaries, defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Alliance nations and, in case of conflict, to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw.
19
An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire JOA of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. AAP-6. 20 The JFACC is normally responsible for the coordination of all air operations throughout a JOA. 21 For more information see MC 317/1, The NATO Force Structure. 22 See MC133/3 Annex C paragraph 11.
0239. To maintain the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, an important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises that jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability or could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliances military forces may be called upon to conduct operations outside the NATO area. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organizations (such as the UN), complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security. 0240. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliances forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational government agencies and ensure that its strategic military policies and activities complement those of other international and regional organizations, particularly the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU). The common objectives of peace and stability will be attained more rapidly by maximising the effective use of the diplomatic, military and economic strengths of each organization. This will require that military operations are conducted under a sound legal basis and enjoy widespread legitimacy within the international community. The potential involvement of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations would add valuable elements of NATOs contribution to managing crises that affect EuroAtlantic security. The Alliance will have to ensure close cooperation and coordination between the Alliance and international organizations in all phases of operations. Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, based on separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the EU or as otherwise agreed. 0241. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability, during Peacetime Military Engagement, throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the PfP as well as those organized to deepen NATOs relationships with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and Middle Eastern countries through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those that enhance transparency and improve communication, as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations. 2-11 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
Interoperability 0242. The effectiveness of Allied forces in peace, crisis or in conflict, depends on the ability of the forces provided to operate together effectively and efficiently. Allied joint operations should be prepared for, planned and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative strengths and capabilities of the participating countries and the forces they offer for the operation. A common doctrine supported by standardization of equipment and procedures, validated through participation in joint and multinational training exercises, provides the basis for the interoperability of formations and units of a joint and multinational force. At the operational level, emphasis should be placed on the integration of the contributing nations forces and the synergy that can be attained. This will have a significant effect on the ability of a joint force to achieve the commanders objectives. Types of Alliance Forces 0243. The NFS consists of a single set of HQs and forces comprising In-Place Forces (IPF) and a pool of Deployable Forces (DF). Both elements are held at graduated readiness levels in order to afford a high degree of flexibility in meeting any requirement to conduct and sustain operations. a. Deployable Forces. DF are available for the full range of NATO missions, fully deployable throughout Alliance territory and beyond, composed primarily of multinational HQs and forces and held at the appropriate readiness level. They are organized into a pool of national and multinational HQs/forces and provide the capability for rapid reaction and reinforcement of IPF in case of any collective defence operation as well as for rapid reaction and HQ/force rotation for other missions. In-Place Forces. IPF are predominantly required for collective defence within or near the territory of the nation providing them. Therefore, those HQs/forces need not be fully deployable but are also held at appropriate readiness levels. Their High-Readiness Force (HRF) portion provides the initial response to emerging threats to Alliance territory. Based on their tactical mobility they may also contribute to other missions in their vicinity. They are primarily sourced by individual nations.
b.
0244. Readiness Levels. In order both to provide flexibility for conducting the full range of missions and to denote the availability of HQs/forces to NATO commanders, IPF and DF are sub-divided into 3 types of forces to reflect their readiness level: HRF, Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR) and Long-Term Build-Up Forces (LTBF). Together, HRF and FLR form the Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF). a. High Readiness Forces. HRF are a limited but significant proportion of land, air and maritime forces, capable of responding rapidly, and immediately if
necessary, to the full range of Alliance missions, including a short-notice attack on any ally. b. Forces of Lower Readiness. FLR provide the bulk of the forces required for collective defence, for further reinforcement of a particular region, and for rotation of forces to sustain other operations. Long-Term Build-Up Forces. LTBF provide the Alliance with an augmentation capability for the worst-case scenario of large-scale defence operations, thereby enabling the Alliance to build-up larger forces, both for limited requirements and in response to any fundamental change in the security environment.
c.
0245. National Assignment of Forces. In peacetime, there are 4 Force Designation Categories (FDC) under which HQs/forces are declared available, or potentially available, to Allied formations by Alliance members. FDC declaration is made in conjunction with the type of force (IPF/DF) and readiness level (HRF/FLR/LTBF). In summary: a. b. NATO Command Forces. HQs/forces in being which nations have placed under the OPCOM or operational control (OPCON) of a NATO commander. Assigned Forces. HQs/forces which nations agree to place under the OPCOM or OPCON of a NATO Commander, in accordance with the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), or as specified in special agreements such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or when requested by the SC through an Activation Order (ACTORD) on the basis of a NAC-agreed OPLAN and Execution Directive. Earmarked Forces. HQs/forces which nations agree to place under the OPCOM or OPCON of a NATO commander at some future time. Other Forces for NATO. HQs/forces which might be placed under the OPCOM or the OPCON of a NATO commander, including other forces which might cooperate with NATO forces, in circumstances which should be specified.
c. d.
Combined Joint Task Force 0246. A CJTF consists of forces and HQs drawn from the NCS, NFS, member states and Partners. A CJTF is a multinational (combined) and multi-Service (joint) deployable task force, tailored to the mission and formed for the full range of the Alliances military missions, which is commanded from a CJTF HQ, a deployable, nonpermanent combined and joint HQ of variable size, tailored to the mission. A CJTF consists of 3 layers: the CJTF HQ, subordinated CC HQs and forces assigned for the
operation. It may include elements from non-NATO Contributing Nations (NNCN). The purpose of creating an Alliance CJTF capability is to: a. Generate a CJTFHQ able to carry out C2 of the full range of military operations up to the size of a MJO that require deployable C2 capabilities, including C2 of the NRF. Within the full range of Alliance military operations: (1) (2) Conduct operations in concert with Partners and other non-NATO nations in situations not related to collective defence. Support the development of NATO-EU relations and the implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements by enabling the Alliance to provide a CJTFHQ and associated capabilities or elements for operations under the political control and strategic direction of the EU.23
b.
0247. Formation of a Combined Joint Task Force. NATOs Operational Planning System,24 including force activation and deployment procedures will be utilized for the activation of a CJTF HQ and its associated forces. Details are in AJP-3 and AJP5. 0248. Selection of a Combined Joint Task Force Commander. In cases where the Alliance has decided to activate a CJTF, simultaneously a Commander of the CJTF needs to be proposed by the SC, approved by the MC and noted by the NAC. The commanders of the 2 JFCs are responsible for mounting and sustaining the landbased CJTF HQ, while JHQ Lisbon is responsible for mounting the sea-based CJTF HQ in the initial phase. A commander of a NCS CC, or his deputy, could act as Commander CJTF (COMCJTF) in the sustainment phase. 0249. Combined Joint Task Force Parent Headquarters. The CJTF HQ consists of preidentified personnel from one of the 3 Parent HQs, able to cover the J1 through J9 disciplines. It includes the DJTF HQ staff element and is augmented by predesignated personnel. For the sea-based HQ a forward staff element was created. Each CJTF Parent HQ25 is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of its CJTF HQ26 core staff, its equipment and the core of a CJTF HQ support unit. In addition, the CJTF Parent HQs conduct their part of the required training and exercise activities for core staff, augmentation personnel and support modules to
23
SG(2003)0355, Exchange of Letters between NATO and the EU on the Compilation of the Results of the Work on NATO-EU Relations 17 March 2003. 24 MC133/3. 25 Joint Force Command Brunssum or Naples for land-based CJTF HQs, JHQ Lisbon for sea-based CJTF. 26 Further details on the staff and organization of the CJTFHQ core staff and the subsequent augmentation to generate the full CJTF HQ are in AJP-3(A).
ensure the formation of an efficient CJTF HQ within the given readiness requirements. 0250. Forces assigned to a CJTF will, to the extent possible, be expected to use standard NATO agreed doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. To achieve this, some education and training may be necessary. In addition, one of the early tasks of a COMCJTF would be to ascertain the degree of interoperability between the equipment and procedures of Alliance and other forces to make necessary arrangements to integrate fully the efforts of all participating units. NATO Response Force 0251. The NRF is a joint, trained and certified force package, held at high readiness that will be tailored for an assigned mission. The NRF is capable of performing certain missions on its own, as well as participating in an operation as part of a larger force, or serving as an initial-entry force that prepares the JOA for follow-on forces. However, the NRF is limited in size, composition and capabilities, thus it is not always the solution to emerging crises. 0252. NATO Response Force Composition. To be responsive to rapidly developing crises, the NRF relies on NATO27 and national procedures for the political decision making process and for the preparations for NRF employment. The NRF is able to deploy as and when decided by the NAC, starting to deploy after 5 days notice and operate as a stand-alone force for up to 30 days using embedded logistic capabilities, or longer if resupplied. When it reaches its full operational capability,28 the NRF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) will consist of a brigade-size land component with a forced-entry capability, a naval task force composed of one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, an air component capable of 200 combat sorties a day, and a Special Operations Forces (SOF) component. Combat support and combat service support capabilities are integral parts of the NRF. These include CBRN defence and medical units, as well as supporting air and naval units, MSU and logistics, communications, intelligence and whatever else is required to make it a credible and capable fighting force. Taking into account that some of the contributing nations, who are members of both NATO and the EU, have a single set of forces and the necessity to avoid duplication of efforts or double-tasking, the NRF and the related work of the EU should be mutually reinforcing.
27
The NAC may invoke NATOs fast-track decision-making process to enable a timely implementation of a NAC decision for the deployment of rapidly deployable forces such as the NRF. See MC 133-3 Corrigendum 3 Annex E and AJP-5 for details. 28 The NRF prototype numbering 9,500 troops was officially inaugurated on 15 October 2003 at Joint Force Command, Brunssum. The NRF achieved an initial operational capability in October 2004, with 17,000 troops, and will grow to 25,000 when it reaches its planned full operational capability by October 2006.
0253. NATO Response Forces and Command and Control. Forces comprising the NRF are deployable high readiness forces drawn from the entire NFS, as well as from other forces offered by NATO nations, on the basis that they meet the high readiness criteria set by SACEUR. C2 of the NRF is based on the principles and structures of the NFS,29 NCS30 and CJTF.31 Thus, the joint NRF C2 is embedded in NATOs 3level C2 structure (SC HQ, JHQ/JFC HQs and CC HQs), with the NRF operationallevel commander being a JFC, or a JFC-based CJTF. Given the nature of the NRF, C2 elements at second and third levels must be able to deploy. When the JFC/JHQ deploys, it will be in accordance with the CJTF concept and whilst the deployable air component command HQ will be drawn from the NCS, the deployable land and maritime component command HQs will be drawn normally from the HRF(L) and HRF(M) HQs. 0254. Training, Certification and Transformation. The aim of the NRF training and combat readiness certification process is to produce a combat-ready joint force capable of contributing to the full range of NATO operations. The NRF is trained and certified to standards set by the SC for Operations and approved by the MC. The NRF is also designed to be a catalyst for transformation of capabilities in the Alliance. The rotation of units through the NRF readiness windows will assist in disseminating enhanced capabilities and experience in joint operations into a broad segment of Alliance forces. Command Organizations 0255. Within the integrated military structure of NATO there are 3 basic models for the command and organization of forces with varying degrees of multinationality. These basic models are flexible and can be used for different command organizations; they are also suitable for operations led by an international organization. a. Fully Integrated. Fully integrated forces are based on a proportional shares bi- or multinational basis with national components and a fully integrated headquarters. The working language and procedures are agreed by the contributing nations. Commanders of such multinational formations are usually appointed on a rotational basis. Lead Nation. One nation assumes responsibility for the planning and execution of an operation. The commanding officer, staff, Command, Control, Communications and Information (C3I) structure, doctrine and logistic32 coordination of the force will normally be provided by one nation (the lead
b.
29 30
MC 317/1. MC 324/1. 31 MC 389/2 MC Policy on NATOs Combined Joint Task Force. 32 According to AJP-4, a Lead Nation models logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.
nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and fill staff positions in the lead nations staff. c. Framework Nation. One nation provides the framework for the required command structure and forces. The key elements of the staff and the headquarters support come from the framework nation. The working language and procedures however are based on Alliance standards.
0256. Methods of Control of Forces.33 Commanders are able to command and control resources more effectively with assistance from joint staffs. Specialist or liaison/staff officers, as well as the commanders of subordinate, supporting or higher elements may provide military advice. Political-military advice may also be provided by the respective national component commanders appropriate to their force contribution or contingent capabilities. There are 2 models commonly employed in NATO operations: a. Component Method. For most Allied Joint operations, force elements provided by nations would be grouped under component commanders subordinate to the Joint JFC34 who would exercise authority over these elements through CCs. Direct Method. For small-scale operations, a JFC may exercise command authority directly. When he does so, he should be provided with an appropriate multinational joint staff.
b.
Section III Introducing Alliance Doctrine

The Purpose of Doctrine 0257. Doctrine is defined as: fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.35 The principal purpose of doctrine, therefore, is to provide Alliance Armed Forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It is about how those operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. It is not, therefore, about the past nor is it about the medium or longer-term future. It is about today and the immediate future. It is dynamic and constantly reviewed for relevance. It describes how Alliance Armed
See AJP-3(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations for detail. Throughout this publication Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed. The commander himself may also be the commander of a Joint Force Command, depending on the situation. To avoid confusion, the term Joint Force Command, unabbreviated, is used when referring to the 2 joint commands Brunssum and Naples. 35 AAP-6.
34
33
Forces go about military activities but not about why they do what they do, which is the realm of policy. 0258. Relationship between Policy and Doctrine.36 Policy is developed in response to changing circumstances in the political-military strategic environment, agreed political guidance, practical lessons learned or new technology and is essentially prescriptive. While other factors influence the development of doctrine, it primarily evolves in response to changes in policy, warfighting capabilities and/or force employment considerations. Thus, it is recognized that policy, as agreed by the highest National Authorities, normally leads and directs doctrine. 0259. Policy and Doctrine Mutual Dependency. Some doctrine addresses fundamental principles and has an enduring nature, which makes it less susceptible to short-term changes in the development of policy. Consequently, such applicable ratified doctrine should be considered during policy development. Ultimately, policy and doctrine should strive to be consistent and mutually supportive. 0260. Doctrine and Interoperability. Without a common doctrine, national forces will not be able to operate together. A common NATO doctrine is essential to achieve interoperability, both at the philosophical level, allowing commanders from different nations to have a common approach to operations, and at the procedural level so, for example, land forces from one nation can request and direct air support from another. 0261. Key Doctrine Documents. Some documents have a closer relationship to NATO policy than others. Doctrine documents are developed for use by different audiences, with various requirements and purposes. These documents vary from overarching documents to those that describe procedures and tactical or technical standardization issues applicable to the lowest levels. Key military37 doctrine documents normally have as their target audience the NCS, and are seen as overarching doctrine documents. Because of their scope and close relation with policy documents, the development and approval of military doctrine documents, requires consensus for implementation and execution at the appropriate NATO Military Command level to ensure that consistency with policy is safeguarded. The Instruments of Alliance Strategy 0262. Alliance Strategy. Politics concerns the capacity to influence the behaviour of others. The conduct of international politics concerns the application of national
36 37
MCM-077-00 Military Committee Guidance on the Relationship between NATO Policy and Military Doctrine. Capstone and Keystone documents are currently AJP-01, AJP-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence & Security, AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations, AJP-4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning and AJP-9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation.
power, within the international political system, in support of national and collective interest, usually in conjunction with allies and partners. The objectives being pursued, combined with the manner of their pursuit, constitutes a nations grand strategy. As the Alliance operates by consensus, Alliance Strategy is determined by the extent of the collective will of Alliance members. The Alliance strategic position is a reflection of the realities of power as exercised within the international political system by an alliance of nations. Central to it is an understanding of the essential trinity of diplomacy, economic power and military power, each of which equates to an instrument of national power.38 NATO, as a political-military alliance, can only coordinate individual members economic actions. However, once a collective decision has been made in the NAC, individual nations diplomatic and military power can be employed as one. 0263. The Diplomatic Instrument. The diplomatic power of persuasion results from a wide range of attributes: the ability to negotiate, to broker agreements, to massage relationships between ones allies and potential partners and generally to succeed by force of argument rather than by resort to purely economic or military means. Effective diplomacy relies on a combination of reputation, integrity and both economic and military substance backing up the skills necessary to turn them into influence. The diplomatic instrument is constantly in use, including during war when the need to apply influence on allies and neutrals is as essential as the need to apply military force against ones adversaries in physical defence of a nations interests. The public face of the Alliances collective diplomatic instrument is the NATO Secretary General. 0264. The Economic Instrument.39 Overseas investments and the flux of capital and trade provide scope for the exercise of economic influence. As with all instruments of policy, economic action has to be used appropriately and in appropriate circumstances. One aspect is the imposition of economic sanctions, which is invariably controversial, as it is seldom prompt and precise in its effect within the globalized economy and because success is difficult to gauge. In extreme circumstances the economic instrument may require the application of military force to give effect to it, for example, through embargo operations to enforce economic sanctions. 0265. The Military Instrument. Military power can be used in conjunction with the other instruments in a wide variety of circumstances; these include conflict prevention,
38 39
See paragraph 0266 for an alternative view of the instruments that includes information as a fourth instrument. NATOs Economic Committee was established to promote cooperation in this field. Recognising that in many respects the purposes and principles of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty are pursued and implemented by other organizations and international forums specifically concerned with economic cooperation, NATO avoids duplication of work carried out elsewhere but reinforces collaboration between its members whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved, particularly to those that have security and defence implications. The Alliance therefore acts as a forum in which different and interrelated aspects of political, military and economic questions can be examined.
disaster relief, and security operations as well as conflict. It can be regarded as an instrument that is used when others fail, although early integration of the military instrument into a collective strategy before failure can often assist in preventing such failure in the first place. The Alliance should therefore use military means in ways best suited to the desired strategic end, and the ways other instruments of power are employed. 0266. The Information Instrument. There is consensus on the 3 instruments of state power described above. An alternative view proposes Information as a fourth instrument. This instrument recognizes that: a. b. Information is required to support the application of the other instruments. Friendly information must be protected for national security and individual privacy reasons as well as to deny an adversary information essential for the successful application of his strategy. Controlled information release is also necessary for other reasons, for example public and media access to information.
c.
The information instrument is therefore focused on affecting adversary information and information systems, while defending the Alliances information and information systems and is therefore associated with activities coordinated by Information Operations (Info Ops). Those nations not subscribing to this view suggest that information is an embedded enabler to the 3 instruments given that each needs information to be used effectively. 0267. The Essence of Alliance Strategy. The key to the successful conduct of the Alliances external relations is the considered use of the most appropriate mix of instruments in the circumstances. The members instruments each have to be used in relation to the others with a coordinated Alliance information campaign to enhance their effectiveness. Although diplomatic means are always employed, they often require economic or military actions to support and enhance their effect. Indeed, it will very often be the case that diplomatic means are only successful because they are backed up with an implicit or declared threat to use other means if diplomacy fails. Any threat, no matter how it is communicated, must be credible and must be capable of being carried out if the conditions warrant it. To be an effective instrument of Alliance strategy, the collective military instrument should be maintained and developed in a manner consistent with the demands that are likely to be placed upon it. Where possible it will not operate in isolation, but only as part of a fully synchronized and coherent collective strategy in which the collective diplomatic and coordinated economic instruments of the member nations will be as important as the Alliance military forces and the military strategy supporting them.
Levels of Operations 0268. Levels of Operations. From a national perspective the strategic level concerns the application of the full range of national resources, across all instruments of power, to achieve policy objectives and is the domain of the Head of Government and ministers. Within the Alliance the strategic level concerns the application of Alliance resources to achieve strategic objectives set out by the NAC. Operations by Allied joint forces are directed, planned and executed at three levels. They are directed at the military-strategic level and planned and executed at the operational and tactical levels. Actions are defined as military-strategic, operational or tactical based on their intended effect or contribution to achieving the specified objectives. The relationship between the three levels is illustrated in Figure 2.1, indicating that they are not directly linked to a particular level of command, size of unit, equipment or type of force and its components:
Alliance Political Security Objectives and Guidelines and Strategic Military Direction
Military Strategic
Campaign Objectives Campaign Plan & Operations Battles, Engagem ents, Activities
Operational Tactical
Figure 2.1 - The Levels of Military Operations 0269. The Military Strategic Level. At the military strategic level, armed forces are deployed and employed within an overarching political framework and where possible in a synchronized fashion with other non-military initiatives (for example, diplomatic or economic) as part of a collective strategy in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance. The MC considers the realistic contribution that military force can make to the achievement of Alliance objectives and provides potential Military Response Options (MROs) to the appropriate political committee or group for consideration. In forming these MROs, the MC would have consulted with SACEUR to: a. b. Identify the broad mission statement, strategic and military goals, and define the campaign objectives/end state that would constitute success. Recognize any political, financial or legal constraints and restraints on the use of force, with particular regard to Alliance partners.
c. d. e.
Define the force capabilities and the need for a strategic reserve. Establish the outline command and financial arrangements. Analyze the military risks.
Should the NAC decide on a requirement for military intervention, it would issue a NAC Initiating Directive (NAC political guidance) to enable detailed operational planning to commence. The MC is responsible for translating NAC political guidance into strategic military direction for the SC. SACEUR is responsible for the development of an operational-level Operation Plan (OPLAN), Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) or Standing Defence Plan (SDP) outlining the mission, command and financial arrangements plus command and control responsibilities. When endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, this plan would be provided to the operational commander for development.40 Thereafter, SACEUR would monitor the operational level planning and execution of the campaign. 0270. The Operational Level. The operational level is the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.41 Operational art the skilful employment of forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and conduct of campaigns or major operations links military strategy to tactics. It does this by establishing operational objectives, initiating actions and applying resources to ensure the success of the campaign. These activities are normally the responsibility of the JFC and of the COMJTF if deployed to the JOA where the campaign takes place. For single environmentcentric operations, especially in the sustainment phase, a Commander of an augmented CC HQ from the NCS or NFS could act as the JFC. 0271. At the operational level and within a designated JOA, armed forces are deployed and employed in accordance with the campaign strategy to achieve military strategic goals. Normally this would imply sustained operations with simultaneous and/or sequential actions by committed forces. It is at the operational level that tactical successes achieved in engagements and operations are combined to achieve strategic objectives. To that end, an operational level commander would refine the OPLAN approved by the initiating authority, issue operation orders and direct operations. He would be responsible for: a. Deciding what operational objectives are necessary to achieve strategic objectives. These decisions will be taken with due regard to political considerations.
40 41
See AJP-5, Chapter 4 for detail, and alternative processes that might be followed. AAP-6.
b. c. d. e.
Deciding in what sequence these operational objectives should be achieved. Allocating forces and resources as necessary for subordinate commanders to be able to achieve their operational missions. Determining logistic requirements and setting priorities, in consultation with nations, for the provision of logistic support to sustain operations. Directing the activities of those formations or units not delegated to subordinate commanders, especially those earmarked as operational reserves. Coordinating and integrating operations with the other instruments of power.
f.
0272. The Tactical Level. At the tactical level, forces are employed to conduct military tasks and gain military objectives. Successful accomplishment of these objectives is designed to contribute to success at the operational and strategic levels. 0273. Distinguishing Levels of Joint Operations. The distinction between the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of joint operations will seldom be tidy. This is because even if a force is only of small tactical value, its employment will have a political context in relation to the nation that provides it, and, therefore, the force commander will have an operational component in mind when considering the tactical level. In the present security environment, traditional responsibilities are blurred, and the different levels of operations merge because even a small tactical incident could be considered politically sensitive (and thus its conduct under strict supervision at the strategic level). The key to delineation is that normally a strategic authority allocates objectives and resources, whilst setting necessary limitations. At the operational level, the commander orders the activities of the assigned formations in order to achieve the established campaign objectives. At the tactical level, commanders employ units on activities to achieve the operational objectives. 0274. The objectives to be attained by the employment of a joint force and the resulting mission are the foundations on which a JFC should base his OPLAN and execution of the operation. Objectives should be clear and unequivocal, and they should define clearly the desired end state. The National and NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) concerned should ensure that a JFC receives the resources and command authority required to achieve the objectives, while allowing him sufficient flexibility and freedom of action to adjust plans to match conditions in his assigned JOA. 0275. Both national and NMAs have a collective responsibility for the planning and execution of NATOs operations. The responsibilities of NMAs should include the definition and interpretation of political objectives in such a way as to facilitate the development of military-strategic objectives and measures necessary to sustain the Allied joint forces operations. NMAs should also prepare contingency plans to cover possible changes in the political and military-strategic situation. 2-23 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
Section IV - The Essential Elements of Alliance Doctrine

Principles of Allied Joint and Multinational Operations 0276. An understanding and knowledge of key principles for joint and multinational operations, which have proved successful in past conflicts, is the start point in doctrine development. These principles are not absolute and nations may place greater emphasis on some rather than others, but there is common agreement on their importance and relevance. The operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some of them rather than others, for example, the principles of surprise and concentration of force may have a different connotation in a Peace Support Operation (PSO) than their application in the context of a full-scale combat operation. Aspects of command are covered in Chapter 5. a. Definition of Objectives. Joint multinational operations should be directed towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end state. The mission and objectives should be defined with absolute clarity before operations begin. When an objective has been identified as the main effort, all joint activity should be directed towards its achievement. Four key questions should be considered in the process of defining the objectives and the end state: (1) (2) (3) (4) b. What is the mission purpose? What criteria constitute mission accomplishment? What are the exit criteria? Who declares success or victory?
Unity of Effort. Operations depend on cooperation in order to coordinate all activities to realize the maximum combined effort. Military forces achieve this principally through unity of command, which provides the necessary cohesion for planning and execution of operations. It is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and coordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander. In a complex operational environment the commander is also striving to achieve coordination with the other instruments of power. Unity of command is rarely possible when dealing with non-military agencies, so unity of purpose is more appropriate where goodwill, a common purpose, clear and agreed division of responsibilities, and an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of others, are essential elements of achieving unity of purpose and achieving the maximum collective effort. Sustainment. Planning for sustainment encompasses strategy and tactics as well as making all administrative arrangements necessary for the successful implementation of the operation plan, including logistic and personnel support. 2-24 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
c.
Ensuring a sound administrative baseline should be part of operational planning from the outset. Logistics will often be one of the most important factors in the development and selection of courses of action (COAs). d. Concentration of Force. Combat power should be concentrated at the decisive time and place to achieve decisive results. Superior force is not just a matter of numbers but also of fighting skills, cohesion, morale, timing, selection of the objectives and the employment of advanced technology. Economy of Effort. In the absence of unlimited resources, it will be necessary to take risks in those areas that do not meet the primary objectives. The principle of economy of effort recognizes that, if decisive strength is to be applied in the areas where it will have most effect, achievement of those objectives cannot be compromised by diversions to areas of lower priority. Thus economy of effort implies the employment of resources in such a manner that a commanders primary objectives can be achieved. Flexibility. Plans should be sufficiently flexible to allow for the unexpected and to allow commanders freedom of action to respond to changing circumstances. This requires: an understanding of the superior commanders intentions, flexibility of mind, rapid decision-making, good organization and good communications. Flexibility also demands physical mobility to allow forces to concentrate quickly at decisive times and places. Initiative. Initiative can be developed and fostered through trust and mutual understanding and by training. It is about recognizing and seizing opportunities and solving problems in an original manner. For a climate of initiative to flourish, a commander should be given the freedom to use initiative, and should in turn encourage subordinates to use theirs. Commanders should be encouraged to take the initiative without fearing the consequences of failure. This requires a training and operational culture that promotes an attitude of risk taking in order to win rather than to prevent defeat. Maintenance of Morale. Commanders should give their command an identity, promote self-esteem, inspire it with a sense of common purpose and unity of effort, and give it achievable aims. High morale depends on good leadership, which instils courage, energy, determination and care for the personnel entrusted. Surprise. Surprise is built on speed, secrecy and deception and is fundamental to the shattering of an adversarys cohesion achieving results that are disproportionate to the effort expended. Security. Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. Active and passive security measures help to 2-25 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
deny critical information to an adversary. They assist deception and help counter offensive actions. k. l. Simplicity. Simple plans and clear orders minimize misunderstandings and confusion. Multinationality. NATO is, at its heart, an alliance of nations; its forces and command structures are therefore considered multinational. NATO forces may also find themselves operating in a coalition in concert with forces from outside the Alliance. Such coalitions are also often referred to as multinational. Multinational forces require commanders to have an attitude of mind that is international in viewpoint and able to understand the differing national perspectives and goals that have united in a common purpose.
0277. Other Principles of Operations. In addition to the Principles identified above, which apply to all operations, predominate campaign themes such as peace support42 also require the consideration of a number of other principles:43 a. b. Impartiality. A PSO 44 should be conducted impartially, in accordance with its mandate, and without favour or prejudice to any party. Consent. The degree of acquiescence to the presence of a force charged with a PSO mission. Consent will vary in time and space horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict. Restraint in the Use of Force. Commanders and their forces use a measured and proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective. Constraints and restraints on the circumstances in which, and the ways and means by which, force may be used may be established in the mandate as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers and, in certain circumstances, Host Nation law. Perseverance/Long-term View. The achievement of the political end state in PSO will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives. Legitimacy. The legitimacy of the PSO and the wider perception of that legitimacy will increase support within the international community,
c.
d. e.
42
This is also true of other predominant themes such as Counter Insurgency. These principles, where different, will be included in future editions of this document when the relevant NATO doctrine has been promulgated. 43 See AJP 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations for a detailed explanation. 44 An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations. AAP-6
contributing nations, and the involved parties, including the civil community in the JOA. f. Credibility. For a PSO to be effective, it should be credible and perceived as such by all parties. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties assessment of the forces capability to accomplish the mission. Mutual Respect. The respect in which a PSO is held will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the parties to a conflict and the local population. Transparency. The PSFs mission and concept of operations should be easily understood and obvious to all parties. Failure to achieve common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility. Freedom of Movement. Freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any PSO; the PSF should be free at all times to perform its duties throughout the designated JOA.
g.
h.
i.
The Components of Fighting Power 0278. Fighting power defines armed forces ability to fight and achieve success in operations. In an Alliance context it is made up of an essential mix of 3 inter-related components: physical, moral and perceptual45 based on a fourth, the doctrinal component, depicted in Figure 2.2. None is invariably more important than the others; it matters not how advanced the Alliances platforms, weapons and sensors are if the people manning them lack motivation, training or adequate leadership. The 3 components are not independent and will overlap. For example, the physical component will influence the moral and perceptual components during power projection. The moral component will be influenced by a military show of force (physical component), while the force disposition to achieve the show of force will influence the decision-making processes (moral and perceptual component) of an adversary.
45
These components link to the coordination of activities within Info Ops intended to create desired effects on an adversarys will, capability and understanding.
Doctrinal
Moral ral
Physical
Perceptual
Figure 2.2 Components of Fighting Power 0279. The Moral Component. Ultimately, it is humans that realize fighting power. Alliance forces require time, effort and resources if they are to be developed, maintained and employed to the Alliances advantage. The moral component of fighting power concerns persuading Alliance forces to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that the Alliances purpose is morally and ethically sound; thus promoting an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim. Maximising the moral component requires motivation, leadership and management 0280. The Perceptual46 Component. This component focuses on the observation and perception of the operating environment by an individual, commander or organization. Decisions made on wrong or manipulated information, another perception of the reality or on incorrect information on own capabilities will lead to ineffective use of the other components of fighting power. Therefore, even if the will and the ability to fight are well developed, deficits in this component will lead to ineffective or counterproductive use of fighting power.
46
Also referred to as the Psychological Component by some nations.
0281. The Physical Component. The physical component of fighting power is the means to fight. It has 5 elements: manpower, equipment, collective performance, readiness and sustainability. It is, therefore, a combination of the ships, land vehicles, aircraft, associated weapons and sensors, and other equipments, the people that man them and the training they undergo to fight, both as individuals and as members of operational units, in order that they can be deployed in good time and sustained to achieve the tasks assigned by their governments. 0282. The Doctrinal47 Component. The binding factor of these 3 components is doctrine. This is the formal expression of military thought applicable in a certain time frame. It comprises lessons from the past and thinking about how the Armed Forces can best operate today and in the immediate future. Doctrine is general in nature and describes basic principles, accepted concepts, constrains and restraints for operations at all levels. It is the combination of those principles, concepts, constrains and restraints, applied with imagination and initiative by their commanders, that provides the intellectual force driving the Alliances fighting power in current operations. The doctrinal component is the canvas upon which the other components combine to achieve fighting power. In an Alliance force, the principles of operations are outlined in this document, with the Allied Joint Doctrine hierarchy providing the body of doctrine that enables an Alliance force to work in concert.
Some nations use the term conceptual component to indicate that the component consists of current practice, expressed in terms of the principles of operations and the body of published doctrine, combined with an element that assists with the development of fighting power into the future. It is concerned with innovation and ideas for developing future capabilities and better ways of operating in a continually fluctuating strategic environment. In AJP-01(C) these ideas have been incorporated as trends in Chapter 1 as the process for developing Alliance concepts is still in its infancy.
47
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C)
CHAPTER 3 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING

Section I The Political-Military Interface
0301. The Relevance of the Levels of Operations. Despite developments such as improved global communication, which have apparently compressed the levels of operations, the levels still have utility. Their value remains in providing a general framework for the planning and execution of operations, and as a useful tool for organising and considering political/military activity. The key difference between military commanders at the strategic and operational levels is that the military strategic authority, the NATO Military Committee (MC), is concerned with allocating objectives and resources and setting necessary limitations by translating guidance from the appropriate political committee or group, with the operational level commander ordering the activities of his assigned forces in pursuit of the campaign plan. Strategy 0302. Grand or National Strategy. A successful national strategy sets out a path using all instruments of power to maintain political independence, achieve the long-term aims of the nation and/or protect its vital interests. The strategy should be integrated from the outset, to encompass a number of components but not separate and distinct strategies. 0303. Collective Strategy. The success of the Alliances role in preserving peace and preventing war depends on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and on the successful management of crises affecting security. The political, economic, social and environmental elements of security and stability are thus taking on increasing importance.1 NATOs Strategic Concept 2 describes how the assets of member nations are to be coordinated and focused to achieve security goals using diplomatic and military instruments of power. It also recognizes that coherence of economic components of strategy between member nations is key.3 The increasing frequency with which the Alliances military response to a crisis is integrated into an overall strategic framework, a collective strategy, was a trend identified in Chapter 1 and is likely to increase. . The Military Component of Strategy 0304. Military Strategy. Military strategy is that component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and
1 2
NATO Handbook page156. C-M(99)21 The Alliances Strategic Concept, 29 April 1999. 3 North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.4 Documents setting out a military strategy must contain an explanation of how the military strategy is to be integrated with other non-military elements of the strategy, and how the achievement of military strategic objectives relates to the achievement of the strategic end state. 0305. The Relationship between Political and Military Objectives. There will be times when military considerations will shape policy. The nature of the political objectives will in turn shape the nature of the conflict. The greater the endeavour where there is much at stake and a clear legitimacy for armed action is present the more the conflict will appear military in nature. 0306. The Role of Military Force. The role of military force in achieving the strategic end state must be very carefully considered and be understood by those directing the strategy, and by the operational level commander. In essence, the military is responsible for creating and maintaining the conditions needed by other agencies to achieve the strategic end state; it is extremely unlikely that this will be achieved by military activity alone. As part of a collective strategy it is important to include those measures, such as diplomatic and economic, that are to exploit military success in the plan from the outset, otherwise the strategic initiative is lost. 0307. Ends, Ways and Means. A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of Ends (objectives), Ways (strategic guidance) and Means (resources). Having decided on the strategic Ends and the role of military force in achieving it, the Means are allocated and the Way they are to be used decided. a. Ends. The identification of a clear and unambiguous objective is the core issue. However, at the strategic level, identifying a fixed and enduring objective is not always possible. When strategic objectives are not clearly defined initial planning may have to be conducted against broad guidance. There is also a difference between end states and exit strategies; they are not the same either in nature or timescale. Politicians will want an exit strategy (connected to political risk), while the military looks for end states. In some cases, nations in support of the Alliance may enter after the conflict has started and once certain conditions have been met, or leave a conflict before the coalition goal has been achieved. Ways. Given the objective and the forces available, a plan is developed to make best use of the available Means including guidance on the application of force in pursuit of the strategic objectives detailed, for example Rules of Engagement. Planning should take into account the likelihood of changes to either Ends or Means, and contingencies prepared.
b.
4 AAP-6,NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) c. Means. The Means at a commanders disposal will be those forces or capabilities allocated to him following the force generation process and preparation of a Statement of Requirement (SOR)5, although additional forces will be requested by a commander if he feels they are necessary. These Means should be employed in ways that will not contradict the strategic objectives within the given political framework, even if this might not be the most efficient way of using them.
Modern Politics and the Political/Military Interface 0308. Building and maintaining mutual trust and confidence between political decisionmakers and military commanders is critical, especially in times of crisis or war. Both politics and war concern human interaction and it is important that military staffs provide intelligible and apolitical professional military advice, and receive, as far as possible, clear and unambiguous political direction in return. Open and honest communication is the key. 0309. Political leaders in previous centuries conducted business with a small staff that was capable of having a firm grasp on the details of the issues at hand. Modern governments require a large body of experts and consultants to support the political figures and decision-makers within them. To know how to take such advice, on what will invariably be complex issues, make effective decisions based on this advice and then convey it to non-specialist leaders, and to the more general population and the international community, is a daunting challenge. The politician today operates in an environment of often-intense media interest where situations can change rapidly and must therefore be agile, although this agility can sometimes be at the expense of consistency. In trying to keep governments together, maintain a steady course and satisfy the demands of public opinion, while constantly buffeted by many forces, the tensions at the political level are evident.
Section II NATOs Approach to Crisis Management

Background 0310. The Alliances Strategic Concept6 identifies crisis management as a fundamental security task and commits the Alliance to stand ready, case-by-case, and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management. To this end, the Alliance has developed robust consultation procedures, crisis management arrangements, military capabilities, and civil emergency planning preparations. 0311. An increasingly important part of the effectiveness of NATOs crisis management tasks is its distinct contribution to efforts by the wider international community to
5 6
See AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations and AJP-4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics for detail. C-M(99)21.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) preserve or restore peace, and prevent conflict. In this context, NATO has offered to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the United Nations (UN) Security Council or the responsibility of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. 0312. In August 2001, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved policy guidelines7 with a view to developing a single, fully integrated NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS). The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 brought new urgency to this task and a new dimension to NATOs crisis management framework under the heading of collective defence. In June 2002, the Council provided the political guidance8 for the development by the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) of a Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.9 The NAC has also approved NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) roles10 in support of operational contingencies and in case of civil emergencies or disasters including the management of consequences resulting from the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) devices.11 The NATO Crisis Response System 0313. Components of the NATO Crisis Response System. The NCRS consists of complementary components that are not related to any predetermined succession of events. a. Preventive Options. The Preventive Options are broad orientations or courses of action, for consideration by the senior NATO committees with designated crisis management responsibilities.12 Crisis Response Measures. Crisis Response Measures (CRMs) are detailed actions, which are available to be immediately implemented at the appropriate levels. Counter Surprise. Counter Surprise comprises those defensive military and civil actions that must be taken quickly to ensure safety of forces, populations and/or key installations, both military and civilian, in case of attack or imminent attack with limited warning.
b.
c.
7 8
C-M(2001)63, NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS): Policy Guidelines. SG(2002)0572, Guidance for The Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. 9 MC 472, The Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. 10 PO(2000)30-REV2, Role of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO. 11 SG(2001)1242, Protection of Civilian Populations Against Consequences of WMD Attacks; C-R(2001)101, Summary Record on the Council Meeting on 24 October 2001. 12 Political Committee (PC), Policy Coordination Group (PCG), Military Committee (MC), Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC).
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) d. NATO Security Alert States. Security Alert States are those counterterrorist and counter-sabotage measures that may be adopted by NATO commands and member states to counter those threats. Counter Aggression. Counter Aggression comprises actions designed for Article 5 operations. It marks the transition from a condition of preparation and development of readiness to one of authorization for the employment of NATO forces against states, non-state actors, or forces that are conducting or actively supporting aggression against NATO territory and/or forces.
e.
0314. The NATO Crisis Response System Manual. The aim of the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM) is to provide a compendium of the NCRS components and to describe, in detail, the procedures for their use in times of crisis. The NCRSM also serves as a basis for Alliance member states to develop parallel national systems and for NATO headquarters at the operational level of the NATO Command Structure to produce their supplements to the NCRSM. 0315. NCRS Links with the NATO Intelligence Warning System, the NATO Operational Planning System and NATO Civil Emergency Planning. The NCRS may be used at any stage of a crisis but offers most benefit in the early period of a developing situation or in managing consequences immediately after a sudden event or attack. It is therefore of utmost importance that national and NATO authorities are notified at the earliest possible stages of developing risks or threats that could impact on the security interests of the Alliance or of events, which could justify a coordinated NATO response. 0316. NATO Intelligence Warning System. A fundamental precept of the operation of the NCRS is its linkage with the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS). NIWS information is based on national assessments and analytic judgement and is meant to provide warning as early as possible with the least ambiguity. 0317. Operational Planning System. For operations in which Alliance military forces participate, the NATO Operational Planning System13 and NCRS are complementary. 0318. Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) supports the Councils efforts in crisis management. For that purpose the SCEPC has developed specific CEP crisis management arrangements aiming at providing civil support for Alliance military operations, support for national authorities in civil emergencies and support for national authorities in the protection of the populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NATOs Crisis Management Process
13
MC 133/3, NATOs Operational Planning System.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) 0319. The NATO Crisis Management Process is a 5-phase consultation and decisionmaking process in crises. It is designed to facilitate political decisions early in an emerging crisis in order to give sufficient time to the Senior NATO Committees to coordinate their work and to submit any advice to the Council in a timely and compelling way. It should also allow SACEUR to undertake some preparatory planning activities in light of a developing or actual crisis in a reasonable timeframe. 0320. In an emerging crisis calling for possible Alliance Operations, NATOs crisis management process generically consists of the following successive phases: a. b. c. d. e. Phase 1. Indications and Warning (I&W) of a potential or actual crisis. Phase 2. Assessment of the developing crisis situation, and of its potential or actual implications for Alliance security. Phase 3. Development of recommended response options to guide Council decision-making. Phase 4. Planning and execution of Council decisions and directives. Phase 5. Return to stability.
Phase 1 - Indications and Warning 0321. The NIWS provides strategic warning of any developing concern, risk or threat that could affect the security interests of the Alliance. It is underpinned by a rigorous warning methodology that addresses the spectrum of potential warning indicators. 0322. Once the I&W report is brought to its attention, the Council would decide on the way ahead. There are 3 options that the Council could follow: first, to decide that there is no need for further consideration; second, to direct the provision of focused NATO vigilance and more information for the Council; third, to accept the I&W on the developing crisis/conflict as relevant for the Alliance and decide to initiate a full assessment of the crisis situation. Phase 2 - Assessment of the Crisis Situation 0323. Normally, before the Council can consider the suitability of pursuing particular courses of action in a crisis, including implementation of specific preventive, precautionary or response steps set out in the NCRS, a Political-Military Estimate (PME) covering all political, military and civil emergency planning aspects of the crisis is prepared. The process of preparing the PME extends through Phase 2 and 3. Nevertheless, at this phase SACEUR has the authority to declare pre-authorized CRMs without further involvement of the NAC. This authority allows some time for preparations thereby decreasing reaction times for possible military options.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) 0324. The PME process linked to Phase 2 is essentially descriptive in nature, designed to inform the Council of the particular characteristics of the crisis at hand and the range of actual or potential implications for the Alliance taking into account national assessments. Should the situation require a NATO response, the Council would task the relevant committees to initiate Phase 3 for developing response options to achieve the agreed strategic objective(s). 0325. If the circumstances of a particular crisis so warrant, Phase 2 and 3 might merge together in the interest of time and crisis management effectiveness. During these phases, NATO may use the consultation possibilities in the framework of EAPC/PfP, NATO-Russia, NATO-Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO may also consult with other International Organizations such as the UN and OSCE. Phase 3 - Development of Response Options14 0326. In contrast with the preceding phases, Phase 3 is prescriptive in purpose. It aims at developing a response strategy for the Alliance in dealing with the crisis at hand. The potential response steps are not preordained and may extend from the implementation of a few measures of deliberately limited scope, such as diplomatic dmarches, to more ambitious steps involving the activation of Alliance forces. Complex emergencies are generally multi-dimensional. To ensure unity of effort in a multi-disciplinary planning process, it is essential to define precisely the Alliances strategic objectives and end state. Therefore, the overall assessment of the crisis situation should ideally have included recommendations by the relevant crisis management committees with regard to the objectives and desired end state. The goal of this phase is to generate a NAC Initiating Directive (NID)15 based on the inputs of the various committees, as the baseline for Council decision-making and, possibly, the initiation of operational planning and/or the activation of Civil Emergency Planning crisis management arrangements. 0327. Taking into account SACEURs own Military Assessment, the MC would develop its Strategic Military Advice (SMA) in which the NMAs offer the Council their recommendations. During this part of the PME process, political and other considerations of a non-military nature, developed by the PC, the Policy Coordination Group (PCG), the SCEPC and other committees as appropriate, would be developed in parallel and brought together in a document. This PME document may take into account both strategic political direction and considerations developed by the committees involved in crisis management, and identify a range of potential responses for dealing with an emerging crisis. The PCG would be tasked by the Council to add integrating advice to the various committees assessment and/or to draft the NID for consideration by the Council.
14 15
Response Options includes all components of the NCRS. The NAC Initiating Directive is multi-disciplinary and includes military and non-military tasks.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) 0328. Through the NID, the NMAs and relevant committees, as appropriate, are tasked to initiate planning. Operational planning would be conducted by the NMAs in accordance with the AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning procedures, while other NATO bodies might take appropriate measures of a nonmilitary nature. The NID should clearly set the Alliances strategic (political) objectives, including the desired end state, and a definition of the missions and tasks, selected response options, as well as political limitations/assumptions. 0329. The NCRS is closely tied to the Operational Planning Process (OPP). In the course of the PME process, the Council may select one or more military options from those submitted by the MC for its consideration. These options may incorporate the implementation of selected CRMs, in order to increase the readiness of particular Alliance military formations with a view to their possible deployment and employment, which will influence operational planning downstream. This would also apply to Alliance assets and capabilities that are made available to another international organization or to a coalition led by one or several Allies following a NAC decision as required. A NID will be written and issued directing the transition to Phase 4. Phase 4 - Planning and Execution 0330. At this stage, the focus of NATOs crisis management process would shift to operational planning and/or civil emergency planning, as appropriate. For the NMAs, execution of the NID would take the form of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), followed by an OPLAN in accordance with AJP-5. For the non-military disciplines this may be a series of steps per discipline, for instance, execution of the CEP Crisis Management arrangements if not already implemented. 0331. The Council has to approve the OPLANs and/or civil emergency planning measures before they can be implemented. As required, the Council may give further guidance for the implementation of such actions. This may include delegation of daily oversight to the appropriate senior NATO committees. During the whole process, the PCG16 would coordinate military planning and political/military considerations, if tasked by the Council and provide the Council with a consolidated set of recommendations. Phase 5 Return to Stability 0332. Phase 5 may be reached without necessarily involving Phases 3 and 4. During Phase 5, progress towards the achievement of the end state will be carefully assessed. Possible recurrence of the crisis situation may require the NAC to reconsider previous de-escalating measures. Once the political end state of the operation is reached, the authorization to declare CRMs is automatically withdrawn. Declared pre-authorized CRMs are cancelled at SACEURs discretion.
16
PO(96)64(Revised), Framework for Alliance Politico-Military Coordination.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) Purpose of Planning within NATO 0333. NATO Operational Planning is the process by which NATO initiates, develops, approves, executes, reviews, revises and cancels all categories of Alliance operational plans, specifies force activation and deployment procedures and includes necessary CRM for the execution of all NATO military operations. Planning Categories17 0334. In order for the Alliance to be able to undertake the full range of its roles and missions, 2 operational planning categories and one future force requirements planning category are identified: Advance Planning, Crisis Response Planning and Defence Planning. 0335. Advance Planning. Advance planning is conducted with a view to preparing the Alliance to deal with possible future security risks and, calls for 2 distinct types of plan, a Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) and a Standing Defence Plan (SDP). a. Contingency Plan. A CONPLAN is designed to cater for a possible future security risk, and would normally be based on one or more of the Planning Situations (PS) identified in the Bi-SC Defence Requirements Review (DRR). Should a foreseen crisis materialize, the appropriate CONPLAN would then require review and further development to take account of actual circumstances. To this end, a CONPLAN should address potential future force and capability requirements necessary for the conduct of the mission, out to the planning horizon. In this way, CONPLANs will be able to assist in the refinement of the defence planning process. SACEUR will also develop generic CONPLANs, in advance, that can be applied to a variety of mission types and that would facilitate a rapid adaptation to a specific situation in time of emerging crisis. Generic CONPLANS will eventually cover most situations for rapid deployment forces, such as the NATO Response Force (NRF). Such plans are being prepared with a corresponding draft Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR). Standing Defence Plan. A SDP is designed to cater for a long-term, short/no-notice collective defence security risk. The purpose of a SDP requires that it be a fully developed operational plan capable of execution, with command forces assigned and execution authority delegated to the appropriate level of command.
b.
0336. Crisis Response Planning. Crisis response planning is conducted in response to an actual, or developing, crisis and results in the development of an Operation Plan (OPLAN). An OPLAN is designed to counter an actual or developing crisis. If a crisis was foreseen the OPLAN might be developed from an appropriate CONPLAN;
17
See AJP-5 for detail.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) if the crisis was not foreseen the OPLAN must be developed in response to the prevailing circumstances. An OPLAN is a detailed and comprehensive plan capable of execution, which has forces assigned and all necessary preparations undertaken for successful execution of the assigned mission. 0337. Supporting Plan. Depending on circumstances, such as the complexity of an operational plan (CONPLAN/SDP/OPLAN) and/or the requirement to provide support to concurrent multiple operations, it may be necessary to develop a single or series of supporting plans (SUPLAN(s)) to the main plan in order to address all aspects of operations at an appropriate level of detail. 0338. Defence Planning. Defence planning, through the Force Planning process, identifies the forces, force capabilities and force structures required to respond to the most demanding situations, usually expressed as a combination of PS occurring concurrently. Force Planning looks to the medium-term future, addressing the requirements for the next 10 years. The results of the DRR process are briefed to the MC/Defence Review Committee (DRC) early in odd years for notation and, subsequently, serve as the primary input for the next years Force Goals.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C) Crisis Activity in Practice 0339. Strategic Decision-Making. The organizations and processes described above provide the top-level framework for the management of crises. However, effective strategic decision-making cannot be achieved by simply using a process. The nature of the crisis and the interaction of key personalities affect the precise way in which policy and strategy is compiled and updated. 0340. Policy and Strategy. Irrespective of the circumstances, policy must be identified first. The MC plays a key role in shaping this policy at the political/military strategic level. Once policy is established these key questions need to be answered to formulate strategy: what and why; with whom; scale and risk; for how long; where and when; concurrent with; against whom; and, at what cost?
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP 01(C)
CHAPTER 4 THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Section I Multinational Joint Operations
Levels of Operations 0401. The levels of operations are explained in Chapter 2. In addition, tactical level activity can have strategic and operational effect and consequence, and vice versa. Conversely, the pursuit of strategic objectives will not, in all cases, require the deployment of large and heavily equipped forces. Furthermore, not all military assets engaged within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) will necessarily be commanded or controlled by the commander of a task force. Some assets, such as forces held in reserve for strategic attack and Special Operations Forces, may be controlled at the strategic level. 0402. The complexity of Command and Control (C2) increases during operations when there is a significant presence of non-military participants who are reluctant, even hostile, to accept a unified chain of command, particularly one with military leadership. In all circumstances, the commander of a joint force is placed at the centre of a three-dimensional web that extends upward to the strategic level, downward to the tactical level and laterally to a range of military and civilian groupings and organizations. 0403. The principles for joint and multinational1 operations are described in Chapter 2. Although there is a common agreement on the importance and relevance of the principles, they are not absolute and the operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some of them rather than others - the predominant campaign themes described in Chapter 1. For commanders the principles are important guidelines in forming and selecting a course of action at the operational level and in the conduct of operations. The Joint Approach to Operations 0404. NATO recognises that military success relies on a joint effort, usually with components and other force elements brought together under a unified command structure. Few modern operations are carried out by one component alone. The essential point is that a successful joint campaign requires a holistic approach to maximise the overall operational effect of the joint force, making best use of the complete range of capabilities.2, 3 It is not simply about separate operations in stovepipes organised under a single point of command.
The term combined rather than multinational is often used in other NATO publications, for the purposes of this Chapter they can be regarded as synonymous. 2 Capability (plural Capabilities) is defined as power or ability to do something Concise Oxford Dictionary (COD) 11th Edition. 3 Capabilities are related to the execution of the NAC assigned mission and the requirements detailed by the SOR produced during the Force Generation process.
1
0405. In the force generation process, the capabilities needed for the operation are selected for those components based on national capabilities and agreements to provide specific forces (for example commitments to the NATO Response Force). The contributions of the components and other force elements to joint operations, and the force generation process are described in detail in AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations. Stages of a Joint Operation 0406. A joint operation normally consists of a number of stages some of which occur at the military strategic level (for example force generation). Typical stages at the operational level, which may overlap depending on the situation and mission, are: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Development of a campaign plan/Operation Plan (OPLAN). Force preparation, including build-up, assembly and pre-mission training. Build-up of logistic support, including host nation support and transit of nonparticipating nations. Deployment to the area where operations are to be conducted or the reinforcement of in-place forces. Execution of operations. Operation (Mission) termination and transition. Re-deployment of forces. Campaign analysis - doctrine evaluation and lessons learned.
0407. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) should have, within the constraints imposed by the initiating authority, the greatest possible freedom of action in the planning and execution of operations in a designated JOA. Joint Functions 0408. Joint Functions need to be considered by the JFC in determining the capabilities required for a Joint Force. Although not exhaustive, the principal joint functions are listed below with a detailed description in AJP-3.4 a. Command and Control. C2 should include all forces contributing to the operation and take into account coordination and cooperation with civil and non-governmental organizations. Operations should normally be characterized by centralized direction to achieve unity of effort, whereas
AJP-3 Chapter 1.
authority for execution should be decentralized, i.e. delegated to the lowest level appropriate for the most effective use of forces. b. Intelligence. The joint intelligence process should support the planning, execution and support of military operations by provision of timely, tailored and accurate intelligence in accordance with the commanders mission. Planning. During joint operations the integration of numerous planning cycles at various levels requires careful coordination. The purpose of joint planning is to draw expertise from a wide range of military and non-military disciplines in order to produce a coherent view of the situation, identifying the military role in achieving the strategic objectives and produce plans coordinated with other instruments of power. AJP-5 provides detailed guidance on the planning process and the coordination of plan development. Manoeuvre and Fires. Ultimately, the JFC and his forces must be capable of attacking the adversary, either directly or indirectly, by the application of physical or cognitive effects, and be able to sustain such operations for as long as is necessary to achieve operational objectives. The principal method by which this capability is delivered is through the combination of joint manoeuvre and joint fires in conjunction with, where appropriate, other operational capabilities and a range of mechanisms and control measures. Joint Targeting.5 Targeting is the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commanders objectives, identifying the actions necessary to achieve the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritizing specific and the synchronization of fires with other military capabilities and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness in achieving the commanders objectives, taking remedial action if necessary. It is both an operational- and component-level command function. The targeting process is crucial to the application of joint fires. Force Protection.6 Force protection encompasses all preventive measures to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel and activities to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and contributing to mission success. Information Operations.7 Information Operations (Info Ops) are coordinated and synchronized actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC-approved parties in support of the Alliance overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
5 6
See AJP 3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (under development) for detail. See AJP-3.14 Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection (under development) for detail. 7 See AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, for detail.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) protecting ones own.8 Info Ops involve the integrated employment of a range of capabilities, tools and techniques to achieve specific effects in support of operations. Info Ops occur at all levels of Alliance operations and will be applied across the full range of NATO missions, based on political guidance from the NAC following NATO military authorities advice and consistent with the NATO Information Strategy. Info Ops activities are also aimed at protecting the Alliance decision-making process and capabilities from both existing and potential external influence. h. Civil Military Co-operation.9 CIMIC 10 can be a central part of the mission, as in the case of disaster or humanitarian relief. The joint force may be partially dependent on the civilian population for resources and information, and rely on the civil authorities to provide security in certain areas. It may even be impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without their cooperation. However, merely establishing good relations might be enough to deny the same advantages to hostile or potentially hostile forces. The aim of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full cooperation of the civilian population and institutions in order to create civil-military conditions that offer the commander the greatest possible moral, material, environmental and tactical advantages. Implicit in this aim is the denial of such advantages to an adversary. CIMIC requires the comprehensive integrated application of all means of Alliance power, both military and non-military, to create effects that support the desired outcome. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of a lasting solution to the crisis. Besides these considerations, commanders have a moral and legal responsibility towards the civilian populations in their area that can only be met by cooperating with the civil government and international bodies. Public Information. The role of Public Information (PI) is to increase knowledge and promote further understanding of the mission among all key audiences, both within and beyond the JOA. The operation could attract intense international media interest, although this may ebb and flow in response to operational tempo and the general situation. The media are likely to be already present within the JOA before the deployment of NATO troops, and the style and nature of their reporting will have a predominant effect upon public perceptions and the utility of such forces. Sustainment. Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistics and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. It includes:
i.
j.
8 9
MC 422/2, NATO Policy on Information Operations. See AJP-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, for detail. 10 The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. AAP-6
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) Engineering.11 Joint engineering is a multifaceted activity undertaken by all CCs, and is a force multiplier across the full range of operations. It includes the delivery of essential military and civil engineering support to all phases of an operation. Logistics.12 Nations and NATO have a collective responsibility for logistic support in operations. This should encourage them to cooperatively share the provision and use of logistic capabilities and resources to support the force effectively and efficiently. Standardization, cooperation and multinationality in logistics build together the base for flexible and efficient use of logistic support. Nations are ultimately responsible for the provision of resources to support their forces. Financial. Effective acquisition of financial resources is critical to the success of any campaign. It is important to ensure adequate provision of financial resources before the mission is commenced. Budgets should be devised, credits should be granted and a financial element in the organization be inserted to handle this part of the operation and provide advice to the Commander. Medical and Health Support.13 Medical and Health Support encompasses the full range of medical planning and provision of medical assets to maintain the forces strength through prevention, evacuation, and rapid treatment of the diseased, injured, and wounded. Medical capabilities should be commensurate with the JF strength and the assessed risks to the deployed forces, operational risk management being conducted in consultation with the relevant medical authorities.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Multinational Cooperation 0409. Multinationality is the reality at the operational level because it reflects the political necessity of seeking international consensus and legitimacy for military action. NATO should always be prepared to operate with traditional members and partners, but should also be capable of operating with other, less familiar, forces in a coalition. Mutual confidence is essential when working in a multinational environment. This confidence stems from the following elements: a. Rapport. Senior officers should strive to achieve a sympathetic rapport with each other. The personal relationships amongst military leaders will influence every aspect of multinational cooperation.
11 12
See AJP-3.12 Allied Joint Doctrine for Engineering for detail. See AJP-4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics for detail. 13 See AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical & Health Support for detail.
b.
Respect and Trust. Mutual trust in the professional ability, and respect for the culture, history, religion, customs and values, of participants, which will serve to strengthen relationships. Knowledge of Partners. In multinational operations, it is important to be as knowledgeable about friendly forces as about those of the adversary. Time taken to understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends during joint operations. Patience. Effective cooperation may take time to develop. Differences of opinion and perspective will require patience to achieve a focused and unified approach.
c.
d.
0410. Advantages of Multinational Cooperation. Whilst the reasons may vary for establishing a commitment to a common military goal, the aim is usually to accomplish an objective that a nation could not achieve unilaterally, or to achieve through multinationality a more efficient result. Depending on the circumstance, there are differing degrees of national interest at stake and upon this depends the strength and nature of the contribution to the multinational operation. Nations participating in multinational operations do so for reasons that are viewed as nationally advantageous in political and military terms. Contributions should therefore be judged not only on the capability of the forces provided, but also by the full range of political and military benefits they bring to the multinational alliance or coalition operation. The political advantages of multinational cooperation include sharing political risks, demonstrating economic, diplomatic, military or political support to other regions and influencing national and international opinion. The military advantages are that cooperation adds both depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities) to a force as well as providing, in certain circumstances, access to high value information and intelligence products. Finally it enables an efficient use of logistic resources. 0411. Challenges of Multinational Cooperation. However well a force is organized, multinationality poses a number of key challenges whose resolution is crucial to military effectiveness and hence the success of the campaign. These include the formation of an effective command system, an intelligence system that can draw and share data from a number of multinational and national sources, the existence of national caveats on employment that may affect the utility of force elements, and a logistic system that acknowledges national responsibilities for support but also caters for multinational needs. Multinational command may lead to slower response times than purely national command arrangements, and the speed of decision-making may become adversely affected. Such detrimental effects can be minimized through the adoption of common doctrine and procedures plus realistic training. Multinational command requires an attitude of mind that is international in perspective. Differences in force capabilities and operating procedures may impact on a multinational forces ability to operate effectively. Some of the challenges that may need to be addressed are:
a.
Mission Creep. Mission creep is the adoption of additional tasks to a mission that may not conform to the original purpose. In such situations there is a danger of disconnection between strategic objectives and the realities in the JOA resulting in poorly defined or unrealistic or inappropriate missions. Interoperability. The complexity of an operation will determine the appropriate level of interoperability and the composition of the force will determine the interoperability standards that are to apply. A lack of interoperability in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities is likely to have a negative effect on force cohesion and capability: (1) Procedural and tactical differences present the force with situations where units from different Services and/or nations may not be able to work effectively together. Language differences present communications problems that may result in differences in interpretation of the mission or assigned tasks. Technical difficulties can cause a lack of system compatibility. Inability to exchange information, intelligence, technical data, or communications can result from a lack of interoperability and national security concerns. Inability to use common sources may degrade logistic capabilities and thus affect the efficiency of logistic arrangements. Joint and multinational forces should have interoperable combat identification procedures and capabilities to minimise the risk of fratricide and enhance operational efficiency.
b.
(2) (3) (4)
(5) (6)
c.
Force Protection. Nations have differing Force Protection philosophies, policies, and priorities. Essentially the differences focus on the ultimate reason for Force Protection: the physical protection of a national contingent itself plus supporting elements, or enabling the force to conduct its mission unimpeded by the actions of an adversary. In a multinational force these differences should be reconciled into an overall joint force protection14 policy; otherwise an adversary can exploit them.
Factors and Considerations in Multinational Joint Operations 0412. Although factors and considerations in multinational joint operations vary with the nature of the operation, they will become evident in each operation and their identification will assist in the planning and the execution of operations.
14
See AJP-3.14. Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection (under development) for details.
0413. Political Military Interface. The MC, as the interface between the civil and military levels of NATO, provides military advice upward and converts policy and political guidance into military direction downwards. It is at this level that strategic political objectives are converted into supporting strategic military objectives, with a desired military end state. In a purely NATO context these issues should be covered in the Initiating Directive. It then becomes the head of mission or strategic commanders responsibility, with the assistance of all the major involved bodies, including those of the host nation when appropriate, to develop the political/military planning for the operation. 0414. Military authorities should prepare Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) to cover possible changes in the political and military strategic situation. Military activity at the strategic and operational level will clearly be influenced, and ultimately directed by political considerations, including national caveats. Less obviously, military activity at all levels may adversely affect the local or international political situation. The need to consider the political dimension applies equally across the range of operations. With this in mind, a commander at the operational level may well require political advice, which could be provided either by a nominated adviser on the spot or by strategic guidance provided through the chain of command. 0415. Civil-Military Interface. Joint forces will usually conduct joint operations in cooperation with governmental and non-governmental agencies. Some of the conditions for military success can be achieved without force, or the threat of force, by harmonizing the military commanders aims and methods with those of the civilian population and institutions in the area as part of a collective strategy. In a large and complex operation involving major civilian elements and a civilian political head of mission, the military campaign plan or OPLAN will be one of several functional plans in the wider multifunctional planning. Complex crises tend to engage a wide range of political bodies and civilian agencies, typically International Organizations (IOs) and non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) will be engaged. The Alliance will need to coordinate its intended activities with the civilian agencies already working in the JOA. In a hostile environment or a high intensity conflict it may be impossible to achieve harmony between the civilian considerations of IO/NGOs and the requirements of the military mission. In these situations, CIMIC will still be a major consideration because of the need to obtain local resources and facilitate eventual transition to civilian government. 0416. Media. Joint forces will deal with the media at all levels, implementing a NATO Information Strategy. Supportive media coverage will play a key role in maintaining public support and the endorsement of the international community, which is an important contributor to maintaining the morale and cohesion of the joint force. It is possible for joint force activities reported by media, whether formally attached to Alliance forces or independent, to have a detrimental impact on the overall NATO Information Strategy, a consideration that should be borne in mind at all times. The media have a powerful influence on public opinion within the international community, on an adversary and at home. A proactive well-managed approach to the media will 4-8 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
therefore be an important factor in multinational and joint operations. International news media interest will be intense during all phases of an operation. The number of press in the JOA will be dependent in part on accessibility, the degree of potential interest, the intensity of violence and separate, concurrent stories. This media presence requires a Press Information Centre (PIC) which is a properly established organization to manage, register, brief, transport and escort them. 0417. Strategic Objectives. The employment of the whole force through the conception, planning and execution of campaigns and operations is addressed at the operational level. Operational level activity must contribute directly towards achieving previously defined military strategic objectives, which are themselves drawn from the overarching political aims of the operation. Tactical activity cannot take place purposefully outside this context. 0418. Freedom of Action. The operational level commander is required to conceive, plan and orchestrate all military activities that are needed to gain and retain the initiative, in pursuit of the military strategic objectives. The commander will thereby dictate the nature of operations, battles and engagements. For the conduct of such a campaign, and to anticipate unforeseen situations or exploit emerging opportunities, freedom of action to deploy reserves, set priorities and allocate maritime, ground, air, space and support assets is of critical importance. However, the degree of freedom at the operational level will depend upon the nature of the conflict, the interaction of military and non-military lines of operation within the overall collective strategy, and the extent to which Alliance interests are threatened. While recognising these constraints, the commander will convey a clear statement of intent, which outlines his concept of operations and establishes the objectives to be achieved by subordinate commanders, thus enabling freedom of action at lower levels. 0419. Application of Resources. The resources a commander is given to fulfil the operational objectives may be tangible, such as ships, land and air formations or support assets, or intangible, such as delegated authority over the time allocated to achieve the given objectives. Resources should be held at the level that ensures their most effective use. Diplomatic activity will be necessary to allow the commander to have the use of local resources such as services, facilities and materiel. Within the NATO area, these host nation arrangements have already been agreed. However, in deployed operations outside the NATO area expeditious negotiations will be required and will be predicated on timely NATO to government or bilateral agreements. The principle of concentration of force, together with its corollary economy of effort, is of particular importance at the operational level. As the commander is unlikely to have a surfeit of resources, the accurate identification of where he can be economical will be vital in order to permit concentration of resources where they will have the greatest effect. The operational commander has to marshal the forces and resources allocated to him, to fight and sustain his intended battles and engagements in order to achieve his objectives. These forces and resources include personnel of varying skills; the operational commander is responsible for their morale, physical condition, and for ensuring that the logistic force structure is capable of supporting them and their fighting equipment during the operation. 4-9 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
0420. Legal Aspects. The conduct of Allied military operations is controlled by international customary and conventional law, and the domestic law of the participating nations. Within this framework NATO sets out the parameters within which its military forces can operate. Legal considerations play a key role in the decision making process and during the conduct of an operation. The legitimacy of an operation and its conduct will depend on its compliance with applicable law, including international law. It is desirable that all nations participating in a military operation have a clear understanding of the legal grounds of an operation and that it is also understood at all levels of the participating forces. This is particularly important at the operational level where campaigns are designed and directed. International law provides limitations and opportunities for operations as a whole as well as for individuals. These include neutrality, use of weapons, targeting, war crimes, self-defence, non-combatants, immunity and environmental limitations. 0421. Rules of Engagement.15 Military actions are controlled by Rules of Engagement (ROE), which are authorized by the NAC on approval of the OPLAN. Subsequent changes to the ROE profile for whatever reason will need to be proposed to higher command by the operational level commander for NAC approval. ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled. Conformity of any action within any ROE profile in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commanders responsibility to use only that force which is necessary and proportionate under the prevailing circumstances.
15
See MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement for detail.
Section II The Operational Level

Definition 0422. The operational level is the level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.16 The operational level provides the vital link, between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions will lead to the achievement of the operational (and therefore strategic) end state. So not only must appropriate actions be linked by the operational level to the aims of the overall strategy but the strategy should also be linked through the operational level to what is tactically realistic. Of prime importance is for the operational level commander to understand clearly how his activities mesh with other strategic lines of operation. The Operational Level Framework 0423. It is often difficult for a commander to bound mentally the entirety of an assigned mission, allowing him to focus on where he can best spend his time in assessing options and guiding his staff. There are four key aspects of the operational level, which considered together form a framework for operations; they assist the commander in both execution and visualisation. The four aspects are: shape the operational environment, attack the adversarys will and cohesion, protect Alliance force cohesion, and exploit opportunity. They help to visualise how major operations, battles and engagements relate to one another, within the overall campaign. They should not be viewed as sequential or separate and distinct phases; the key is to maintain a clear focus on success, balancing the need to be bold and decisive with the constraints and limitations of modern operations. Implicit in this approach is the need to understand fully the nature of the problem, which is a key pre-condition to successful operational design. The four ways are essentially different viewpoints from which the commander can view the problem. 0424. Shape The Operational Environment. This viewpoint focuses on manipulating the operational environment to the Alliances advantage and to the disadvantage of an adversary. This includes identifying those areas where Alliance strengths can be capitalised on and information superiority attained while the adversarys strengths are minimised. Threatening an adversary, or appearing to threaten him, throughout his depth, and never allowing him to feel secure anywhere, while using coordinated Info Ops within a NATO Information Strategy can seriously undermine his understanding of the environment and reduce his freedom of action. Simultaneously, and acting within the wider political context, the legitimacy and justification for the use of force should be conveyed in order to build and maintain support for own actions in home and other audiences. The difficulties of doing this should not be underestimated and illustrate the importance of a true understanding of the nature of the problem.
16
Amended definition from AAP-6.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) 0425. Attack the Adversarys Will and Cohesion.17 All attacks against a adversary must comply with international law; in particular, attacks may only be made against military objectives. The decisive element of a campaign will usually involve some form of offensive action against the will and cohesion of adversaries. By breaking an adversarys cohesion, he is unable to coordinate and organise military and other actions; usually it is then much easier to defeat him piecemeal. By undermining his will, an adversary will be less able to motivate his forces to take risky action, and may be more willing to accept political or other compromise. Will and cohesion are interconnected: if an adversarys will is undermined his force will be less cohesive; if his cohesion is shattered his will to continue is likely to be reduced. It may be difficult to determine how to attack the cohesion of non-traditional military forces such as dispersed insurgent groups; nevertheless there will normally be some form of organization, however loose knit and dispersed. Understanding the organization of such groups, and how they adapt to survive, is the key to attacking their cohesion. Will and cohesion can be attacked through: a. Synchronization18 of Fires and Manoeuvre. Although they can achieve a significant effect on their own, the synchronized use of fires and manoeuvre has devastating potential. (1) Firepower destroys, neutralizes, suppresses and demoralizes. Firepower effects are the sum of volume, accuracy, lethality, suddenness and unpredictability, and these are magnified by synchronising joint firepower in time and space. The effects of firepower must be exploited by manoeuvre if the results are to be more than transitory. Operational manoeuvre seeks to place the adversary at a disadvantage and may be physical or conceptual in nature. In the physical sense the psychological effect may be so great as to render fighting unnecessary. In the conceptual sense, manoeuvre pressure may be applied in such a way to present the adversary with a choice of unattractive options that force him to concede.
(2)
b.
Tempo and Simultaneity. Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity of operations, relative to the adversary. (1) Tempo comprises three elements: speed of decision; speed of execution; and speed of transition from one activity to the next. Greater tempo will overload the adversarys decision-making process at critical levels and is likely to cause paralysis, inaction and a breakdown of resistance to the point where he loses the cohesion needed to continue the fight. This can be achieved by speeding up or slowing down, or changing the type of activity.
17
In a situation where there is no clear adversary, this might be the object of the mission, i.e. the thing which provides the greatest resistance to the mission and in this sense is Affect rather than Attack. 18 Synchronization is discussed in detail in AJP-3.
(2)
Simultaneity seeks to overload the adversary by attacking or threatening him from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time, or even establish priorities between them. He faces menacing dilemmas about how and where to react, he is torn in different directions and even if he is not paralysed, he finds it hard to respond coherently. Simultaneity should be seen through the eyes of the adversary and its use judged by the effect on his cohesion.
If the effect of simultaneity and tempo is repeated concurrently against a number of levels of command, a cumulative effect on cohesion is felt throughout the adversary force. By using the full range of friendly capabilities, the adversarys problems are compounded, his response to one form of attack either making him vulnerable to another, or exacerbating a different problem. c. Surprise. Surprise is built on speed, security and deception and is fundamental to the shattering of an adversarys cohesion. As with tempo, time is the key factor. It is not essential that the adversary is taken unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. Absolute surprise may totally paralyse the adversary, but partial surprise will also degrade his reaction. Surprise involves identifying, creating and exploiting opportunities, which may be fleeting. It means doing the unexpected or reacting in an unexpected manner, playing on the adversarys perceptions and expectations. Information Operations. Exploitation of the other methods of attacking will and cohesion is may also be accomplished by the use of Info Ops. Military or other success can have a much greater impact if the Info Ops staff understands the motivations and psychology of the target audience to ensure that will is actually undermined, rather than building their spirit of resistance. Relative Advantage. In joint operations the aim of a commander should always to achieve a relative advantage of capabilities in his favour. This can be achieved by: (1) (2) (3) Overwhelming force. Decision superiority. A favourable shaping of the battle space.
d.
e.
Exploiting an opponents weakness is fundamental to success, just as is the identification of the own forces weaknesses that an opponent might potentially be able to exploit. 0426. Protect Alliance Force Cohesion. At the same time as attacking the adversarys cohesion, that of the Alliance force must be protected. Cohesion of multinational operations poses a particular challenge, especially in the case of ad hoc coalitions.
Contributing nations may have differing agendas and provide forces with varied degrees of fighting power, including different doctrine and incompatible equipment. Personalities and political influence are likely to have a disproportionate affect on the cohesion of a multinational force. Cohesion is maintained through: a. Maintenance of Morale. The adversary will make every effort to identify and attack weaknesses in the Alliance force, to reduce morale and thus erode cohesion. In multinational operations, the adversary may try to inflict disproportionate casualties on one particular nations forces, or exploit religious or cultural differences. The commander should attempt to mask these vulnerabilities and focus the force on the maintenance of the aim, whilst ensuring a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to Force Protection,19 based upon risk management and a measured assessment of the threat. Unity of Purpose. Unity of Effort was discussed in Chapter 2; a key contributor is Unity of Purpose where, in concert with the other instruments of power, the effective employment of military forces requires them to be directed relentlessly towards the achievement of a common aim or mission. Commanders play a key role in focusing their commands on achieving the mission and in generating a common sense of purpose by developing a clear concise commanders intent. Within multinational operations, individual goals and interests will need to be harmonized to ensure a common purpose, and consensus will need to be maintained to ensure political and military cohesion.
b.
0427. Exploit Opportunity. The commander should be prepared to exploit opportunities to achieve a better position relative to the prevailing circumstances or the adversary. This involves identifying or creating opportunities; having or obtaining the means and will to exploit them; and achieving a higher tempo relative to the adversary. a. The use of manoeuvre and offensive action is fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative, which is the key to being able to exploit opportunities. Mission Command20 allows Component Commanders (CCs) or subordinates to exploit opportunities that present themselves, providing they are within the overall intent. The ability to do this successfully relies on continuous planning, including accurate risk analysis and management. Both subjective and objective risk analysis is required and intuition has a role to play. The commander should promote a culture that is risk-aware, rather than risk-averse. This approach requires that commanders at all levels are able to identify those areas where significant risk lies and then choose to accept, avoid or militate against them. The commander that analyses, assesses and actively manages risk is frequently able to seize opportunities and take bold decisions. Key events or effects are identified in each phase of the Course of Action (CoA) that are judged to be: of significant operational concern; could provide a potential
b.
19 20
See AJP-3.14. See Chapter 5.
opportunity for exploitation; or of unknown quantity whose outcome could be significant.
Section III Campaigning

OPERATIONAL ART The essence of Operational Art is to identify beforehand what is going to be decisive, and the shaping operations needed for success. OPERATIONAL DESIGN Operational Design refines and develops the Operational Ideas and is the way in which the JFC expresses his vision of how he sees the operation unfolding.
Campaign Design Concepts
Operational Ideas COG Analysis Campaign Fulcrum Decisive Act
COG End state Decisive Points Lines of Operation Sequencing & Phases Contingency Planning Operational Pause Culminating Point Termination
The Operational Estimate The Campaign Plan
OPERATIONAL COMMAND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT Operational Management seeks to achieve the greatest possible synergy, the required level of tempo, as well as maintaining a clear focus, and judging the effect of actions on achieving the end state Synchronization & Coordination Supporting/supported Commanders Monitoring Progress Managing Lines of Operation Campaign Rhythm
Figure 4.1 The Relationship between Operational Art, Design, Management and Command 0428. Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship between Operational Art, Operational Design and Operational Management as the three main subsets of Campaigning, highlighting the pivotal role played by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in directing a Joint Force. As the top part of the diagram shows, the Campaign Design Concepts (CDCs), although relevant across the campaign planning process, have particular utility in certain areas. In this sense the CDCs can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design; more campaigning concepts than simply planning tools. Centre of Gravity (COG) Analysis, Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act are particularly pertinent to the identification of what will be decisive; the essence of Operational Art. Operational Design is used to lay out the way in which the operation might unfold. Lines of Operation and Decisive Points (DPs) map out the common 4-16 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
threads and stepping stones required to unlock the adversary COG. Sequencing, Contingency Planning (Branches and Sequels) and Operational Pauses are ways of structuring the application of resources to ensure that force is concentrated at the right time and place, while retaining the initiative. Operational Management is essentially the use of a series of control measures to ensure the campaign plan remains on track. Operational Art 0429. Operational Art can be described as the the employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, operations and battles. It comprises the skills, imagination, creativity and intuition to plan and conduct the deployment and employment of joint multinational forces and capabilities, co-ordinated with nonmilitary assets and activities, in a series of related operations over time and space to set military conditions that achieve the objective and the end state. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art. In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where and for what purpose forces will conduct operations. Operational Art especially comes to the fore in the operational planning process. 0430. Most military campaigns and operations are designed to wrest the initiative from an adversary. This requires a thorough understanding of the adversarys system and psychology: such understanding may be difficult to gain; it is likely to come only after engagement and may take time. Once such understanding has been gained, it should be possible to maintain and exploit the initiative through a sense of urgency and determination to outwit the adversary. To achieve this, the commander should consider the manner in which the end state can be achieved. The major tools that he will use when planning his campaign or operation are described below. 21 However, the commander should continue to use the operational framework described earlier both before and during the conduct of the campaign. 0431. Operational art indicates considerations at the operational level which should reflect more than just the employment of procedures and techniques based on knowledge of doctrines and manuals. It should be applied with a broad knowledge and understanding of the complicated relationships between all the factors influencing the planning and execution of a campaign: a. It includes the effective use of campaign planning tools and seeks to ensure that commanders use forces, space, time and information effectively through the design of campaigns and operations. Such a design provides a framework to help commanders order their thoughts and understand the conditions for success.
21
See AJP-3 for more detail.
b.
It should take account of the full range of potentially simultaneous military operations, across the spectrum of conflict with predominant campaign themes shifting over time.22 This aids commanders and staffs in understanding that: (1) (2) (3) All major operations are combinations of tasks executed simultaneously. Operations change over time. Operations conducted over one phase of a campaign directly impact on subsequent phases.
c.
It also requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends and an understanding of the inherent and effective synergy that flows from properly coordinated joint operations.
0432. Operational art is applied during the operational planning process, in: a. b. c. d. Formulating the overarching idea and intent for an operation and envisaging how operations will unfold. Determining necessary links between the tactical employment of forces and the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. Establishing critical lines of operations as a basis for sequencing and synchronising actions and effects. Designing ways to achieve the end state with appropriate means.
0433. Ends, Ways and Means. Operational art seeks to match ends, ways, and means in planning and conducting operations. It requires that a commander and his staff appreciate the strategic context and answer: a. Ends. What conditions should be attained in the operational area to achieve the strategic objectives? If the political objective changes, as it sometimes will, over time or in response to changing events, that new objective will invariably create a requirement for a change in the plan or even a new campaign plan. Ways. What broad approaches will establish these conditions? Which instruments of power combine within these approaches? Means. What capabilities and other resources are available and should be applied, within established limitations, to produce these conditions? How are the military and non-military instruments integrated to achieve these
b. c.
22
Covered in detail at Chapter 1.
conditions? The commander considers the nature of the force, what objectives are within its grasp, and the nature of the risks, and their possible mitigation, inherent in pursuing that objective with the given force. 0434. Operational Ideas. Operational Art demands creative and innovative thought to find broad solutions to operational problems, solutions that might be termed Operational Ideas. Its output is the source of the Commanders Intent and subsequent Concept of Operations. The output represents the basis of the Campaign Plan and is further refined by the process of Operational Design. As such it is the domain of the commander and the foundation of a command-led staff system. There are three closely linked concepts which are especially useful in the formulation of Operational Ideas: Centre of Gravity (COG) Analysis, Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act. The key to Operational Art is to identify beforehand what is going to be decisive in bringing about the downfall of the adversary. Identifying that decisive act comes from an analysis of COG. a. Centre of Gravity Analysis. The concept of COG 23 originates from the interpreters of the Napoleonic system. Clausewitz, for example, in explaining what constitutes defeat, suggested that the COG was the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends the point at which all our energies should be directed. What is clear from common usage, and indeed from history, is that a COG is a strength. There is, however, an apparent contradiction in that the manoeuvrist approach advocates a strong focus on avoiding strengths and attacking weakness. But even strengths, within themselves, have certain weaknesses that can be exploited, provided they can be accurately identified. COG Analysis is a systematic process for identifying COGs and analyzing them in terms of their critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities.24 Military force alone is unlikely to defeat an adversarys strategic COG in isolation so an important relationship exists between the strategic COG and the military COG at the operational level. Alliance strategy should harness all available assets and activities across the instruments of power and focus them on undermining the adversarys resistance; his strategic COG. It is possible that at the strategic level the COG might be something physical, but is more likely to be a moral entity related to a leader, a ruling elite or strong-willed population: it is an adversarys moral strength to resist the Alliances end state, and such moral resistance needs to be undermined, neutralized or defeated for a lasting peace. At the operational level, a COG will normally be something tangible, something real that can be attacked; the key then is to find some element of the adversarys system upon which his plans depend. As well as identifying an adversarys COG, and determining ways of attacking it, the commander should also assess his own COG in order that he can protect it.
23
Ideally, there would be only one COG at the strategic and operational levels. This may prove simplistic when an adversary may have a number of sources of strength, and it is not immediately obvious which is the most critical. 24 For a detailed description of this process, see AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, Chapter 3.
b.
Campaign Fulcrum. There is a stage in every contested campaign where one side starts losing and the other starts winning, where the tide turns and the initiative switches irreversibly. This will be caused by a number of issues acting in combination and, although difficult to predict in advance with any certainty, there is value in attempting to identify it to permit exploiting its potential. In a negative sense, it might be the result of, for example: a higher than planned consumption of critical and irreplaceable resources, a series of tactical reverses, and a change in political context. Successful commanders achieve the end state before there is a risk of reaching this state, or plan in order to avoid it. Intelligence, operations and logistic staffs need to liaise closely to identify, then plan to exploit, delay the onset, or minimise the effects of, campaign fulcrum. The Decisive Act. Closely linked to the idea of campaign fulcrum is an associated concept, that of the decisive act or the decisive operation. In Clausewitzian terms this was the idea of a single, decisive battle; how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point. Battles, engagements and activities are now viewed as steps towards a higher goal, but it is still important to try to find something, or a series of linked events, that will be decisive within a campaign (although not necessarily immediate in impact), that which causes an opponent to forever lose the initiative, and the sequence of actions that, together, will bring this about - shaping operations leading to a decisive operation.
c.
Operational Design 0435. The Principal Elements of Operational Design. The application of operational art requires a sound understanding of many different operational design concepts and tools. They are useful in analysing strategic and operational factors, understanding operational requirements, enhancing creativity and imagination, and ensuring a logical relationship and balance between ends, ways and means. Operational Design is a process which further develops and refines Operational Ideas. Three things together comprise the principal elements of Operational Design: the Campaign Design Concepts (CDCs), the Operational Estimate, and the Campaign Plan. The Campaign Plan, which articulates the operational level commanders overall scheme for operations, results from the Operational Estimate and is largely constructed using a number of theoretical building blocks collectively known as the Campaign Design Concepts. Campaign Design Concepts 0436. Campaign Design Concepts. The CDCs are used to build the structure within which operations take place, and can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design. In seeking to conduct operations, battles and engagements in pursuit of the strategic objective, the operational level commander will design the plan of campaign around the CDCs, described below and their use in detail in AJP-5, 4-20 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
which help him visualise how the campaign will unfold and manage the development of operations. The commander uses them to articulate a vision or concept of operational design, a statement of intent for the campaign plan and a command structure for executing the plan. In broad terms, the CDCs serve three purposes: to focus effort during the Operational Estimate, to help describe in campaign plans and directives what is required to be achieved, and to assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign or major operation. a. End state. The end state is The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.25 It is the political and/or military situation that needs to exist when an operation has been terminated on favourable terms and should be established before execution. An understanding of the end state is a crucial element of any plan for without it there is no focus for campaign planning. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the end state. Objectives. Joint multinational operations should be directed towards a clearly defined and commonly understood objective that contributes to the achievement of the desired end state. In simplest terms an objective is an aim to be achieved. Commanders establish objectives at their level to focus the actions of subordinates and to provide a clear purpose for their tasks. Objectives are therefore established at each level of operations. It is likely that at the operational level, objectives will require action from multiple instruments simultaneously, for example establishing a secure environment might require both military action and civil reconstruction. It is a primary responsibility of joint commanders to coordinate military activity with that of other organizations, seeking unity of purpose in achievement of the objective. Centre of Gravity. The COG is that element of the adversarys overall capability or system that most resists the achievement of the Alliances end state and which, if defeated or neutralised, will lead inevitably to the achievement of our objectives. A COG is defined as those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.26 COGs exist at all levels of operations, and there may be more than one at any level. As well as determining COGs of adversary forces, it is also necessary to determine Alliance COGs and assess their vulnerability to attack by opposing forces in order to provide for their protection. The initial analysis27 of friendly and adversary COGs requires constant re-appraisal both during the planning and execution phases of an operation, as does the protection of friendly COGs.
b.
c.
25 26
AAP-6. AAP-6. 27 See AJP-5 for principles and advice on COG Analysis.
d.
Decisive Point. While it may be possible to defeat or neutralise the adversarys COG, it is more likely that a series of coordinated actions will be required; such actions are described as DPs: A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.28 DPs are the keys to unlocking COGs and can be attacked directly by the commander designating the most important decisive points as objectives and allocating resources to protect, control, destroy or neutralise them. DPs are logically determined from the COG analysis process. DPs are arranged along Lines of Operation leading to the adversarys COG. A DP can be a place, a precise moment or a distinctive characteristic or quality upon which a COG depends to maintain its freedom of action and power. They need not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance. The ability to establish favourable conditions at decisive points allows the commander to retain freedom of action, maintain momentum and gain or retain the initiative. Line of Operation. In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.29 Lines of Operation establish the relationship, in time and space, between DPs and the COG and can be functional or environmental. Commanders use them to focus the instruments of power toward a desired end state, applying force throughout the three dimensions of space, over time and in a logical design that integrates all the military capabilities of a joint force in order to converge upon and defeat the COG of adversary forces. Sequencing. Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the defeat or neutralization of an adversarys COG. It usually is best to undertake simultaneous operations on multiple lines of operation to achieve synergy across all instruments of power and to overwhelm an adversarys ability to resist; but within those lines of operation some operations will depend on the successful conclusion of others before they can be initiated. For example, forward operating bases may need to be secured before initiating offensive operations. A commander may also wish to sequence his operation due to lack of resources or capability, or to limit the risk. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, the commander may choose to divide his campaign into phases. Phases. Phasing is a method of describing where an operation cannot be developed until set activities are complete or a change to task organization is required. Phases are sequential but may overlap, particularly in peace support operations. In some cases the beginning of a phase may be contingent on the successful completion of a preceding phase. The aim in
e.
f.
g.
28 29
AAP-6. AAP-6.
phasing an operation or campaign is to maintain continuity and tempo and to avoid unnecessary operational pauses. h. Contingency Planning (Branches and Sequels). For every action there are a range of possible outcomes that may or may not achieve conditions or effects desired. Outcomes that are more favourable than expected may present opportunities that can be exploited while outcomes that are worse than expected may pose risks that can be mitigated. However, the ability to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks depends first on anticipating such situations and second on developing contingency options for effectively dealing with them. Commanders should anticipate possible outcomes and ensure that options are provided in their operational planning in order to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances and to allow them to keep the initiative despite the actions of the enemy. There are two broad approaches to contingency planning, branches and sequels, which are developed both during initial campaign planning and during the execution of the plan. (1) Branches are contingency options within a particular phase, planned and executed in response to an anticipated opportunity or a reversal within that phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative. Sequels are options for the next phase, one of which may be the next pre-planned phase. They are planned based on the likely outcome of the current operation or phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or enhance operational tempo.
(2)
i.
Operational Pause. An operational pause is a temporary cessation of certain activities during the course of an operation to avoid the risk of culmination and to be able to regenerate the combat power required to proceed with the next stage of the operation. As activities cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses, while initiative is retained in other ways, perhaps in other environments and it is sometimes necessary to pause on one Line of Operation in order to concentrate activity on another. Ideally, the Operational Pause should be planned in order to minimise any overall loss of tempo. Implicit in the term pause is the ability to re-activate the Line of Operation in order to maintain momentum and the initiative. Culminating Point. Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications. In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and location when the attackers combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender and the attacking force should transition to the defence or risk counter attack and defeat. A defending force reaches its culminating point 4-23 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
j.
when it no longer has the capability to mount a counter offensive or defend successfully and is forced to disengage or withdraw or face defeat. Identification of the Culminating Point allows full exploitation of the event, or the planning of Operational Pauses in order to avoid it. Sequencing and phasing should be designed to ensure that operations by opposing forces culminate well before they can achieve their objective while ensuring that friendly operations achieve their objective well before any culmination. k. Termination30 and Transition. The term termination in this context is really more about transition than traditional notions of cease fires and victory parades. Instead the commander seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end state has been achieved - how to preserve that which has been gained, how to make it enduring. As military objectives may be achieved well before the strategic end state is realised (particularly in a peace support operation), a follow-on force may be required. This has been particularly true of the Alliances recent experience, with an Alliance operation terminating and being followed by another operation conducted by the EU or UN. Direct or Indirect Approach. While it may be possible to defeat the opposing COG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of operations at DPs will be required to neutralise it. There are two alternative approaches for dealing with opposing COGs: (1) Direct Approach. The direct approach is a linear, uninterrupted approach against an adversarys COG, often by way of decisive points. This approach may mean engaging the adversarys strengths (the protection of his COG and decisive points). The direct approach is appropriate when a force has superior strength compared to the opposing force and the risk is acceptable. Indirect Approach. The manoeuvrist approach described in Chapter 5 is an example of an indirect approach. The indirect approach seeks to exploit adversary force physical and moral vulnerabilities, while avoiding its strengths. The indirect approach is appropriate when a force is insufficient to operate directly against opposing COGs or critical strengths in a single operation, and instead should concentrate on exploiting the adversarys critical vulnerabilities in a series of operations that eventually lead to the defeat of the COG.
l.
(2)
30
Termination is more than just conflict termination, although conflict termination is one example. An example is NATOs involvement in Bosnia Herzegovina. The 1995 Implementation Force (IFOR) NATO-led mission under the UNSC 1031 mandate terminated and was replaced by a NATO-led multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR) under a revised UNSC mandate 1088 in 1996. SFOR in turn terminated in 2004 and was replaced by an EU-led force under a new UNSC mandate 1575.
m.
Criteria for Success. For each objective the commander establishes criteria for success that provide measurable or observable requirements with respect to the essential conditions or effects that should be achieved, as well as any conditions or effects that cannot exist for the objective to be successfully accomplished.
0437. The Operational Estimate.31 The Operational Estimate is a military problem solving process which is applied to ill-structured problems in uncertain and dynamic environments against shifting, competing or ill defined goals, often in high stake, time-pressured situations. It combines objective, rational analysis with the power of intuition (a combination of experience and intelligence) and its output is a decision about a course of action. Guided and energised by the commander, the Operational Estimate is a mechanism designed to draw together a vast amount of information necessary for the thorough analysis of a set of circumstances, in order to allow the development of feasible courses of action and the subsequent translation of a selected option into a winning plan. It is, essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action. 0438. The Campaign Plan. A campaign is defined as: a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.32 The Campaign Plan, the practical expression of Operational Art, conveys the operational level commanders vision for how he sees the operation unfolding and is translated into actionable detail by operations orders and directives. It is essential in providing the crucial common understanding across the joint force of the Commanders Intent and his overall Conduct of Operations. 0439. Concept of Operations. The CONOPS is at the heart of the Campaign Plan and belongs to the JFC. His mind should be focused on forming the essence of the Campaign Plan, and then communicating it to his subordinates. The ultimate test being that subordinate commanders can act independently as though they were directly ordered by the JFC. A CONOPS has 5 main elements: a. Situation. A description of the circumstances that have led to a requirement for the CONOPS. Where appropriate it would also include details of political objectives, limitations and assumptions. Mission. A clear, concise definition of the purpose and nature of the operation, the responsible military commander, the operations location and likely execution timeframe. The JFC should write his CCs missions personally. A mission should contain a clear, concise statement of the task and its purpose and be expressed in terms of: Who (the subordinate
b.
31 32
See AJP-5 for detail. AAP-6.
command), What (what the command is to achieve), When and Where (the parameters) and Why (the purpose). Mission statements should always have a unifying purpose (i.e. the in order to) and these should fall logically out of the concept of operations. The unifying purposes of subordinates missions should, when collectively achieved, enable the JFC to achieve his own mission. c. Execution. A description of the commanders view of how the operation will be executed, detailing: (1) (2) (3) Planning assumptions. A summary of the key elements of the mission analysis. A summary of the commanders intent and purpose of the plan including military objectives, desired military end state and the criteria for success. The commanders intent should focus on the overall effect the force is to have on the adversary. It should be a concise and precise statement of how the JFC intends to achieve the operational end state by defeating the adversarys COG, and should not be a synopsis of the operation. In effect it provides the driving logic behind the whole campaign plan. A description of how operations will be conducted and any phases envisaged. A description of military key and supporting tasks. A summary of force and capability requirements. Identification of any coordination requirements with other operations.
(4) (5) (6) (7) d.
Service Support. A description of the support requirements necessary for mission accomplishment, including outline concepts for logistics, CIS, movements, medical and host nation support. Command Arrangements. A description of command arrangements.
e.
Operational Management 0440. Modern joint operations are complex and require careful organization. A number of control mechanisms exist that are used to order activities in time and space, and to
ensure that priorities are clearly understood. AJP-3 describes in detail the integration, coordination and synchronization of operations. The following paragraphs concentrate on those areas in which the operational level commander should play a significant role. 0441. Supported and Supporting Commanders. The supported/supporting principle described in Chapter 5 is fundamental to joint operations. It is the principal means by which the JFC designates cross component support and makes clear his resource priorities (within the overall assignment process). Successful management of these relationships will allow the JFC to shift support for a particular phase, or element of an operation, and maintain operational tempo. 0442. Sustainability. The JFC should plan to organise his command and conduct his campaign to ensure he obtains the optimum fighting power with the greatest reach from his forces and resources with the least expenditure and waste. In doing so, the principles of logistics33 provide the framework, but while making these plans the JFC should bear in mind that the business of supply, maintenance and administration are not the problem, they are part of the solution to the problem. Such plans are vital to the success of a campaign, but without the JFCs leadership and direction from the outset, they are unlikely to be as effective as they need to be, and under pressure risk collapse and hazard the force. 0443. Monitoring Campaign Progress.34 The measurement of success is a fundamental aspect of military operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander. The JFC will have specified criteria for success in his CONOPS and OPLAN; these must be achievable and measurable. The aim is to take a broad view of the campaign and determine if the required effects, as envisaged in the campaign plan, are being achieved. This monitoring is much wider than observing whether an individual target has been destroyed. It is particularly relevant in activities where the emphasis is on changing the attitudes of the adversary rather than on his physical destruction. Whatever the nature of the campaign, the JFC should ensure that a monitoring and assessment process is rigorously conducted and that his staff does not get distracted by tactical level events and so lose sight of the operational end state. If correctly assessed, this process will allow the JFC to make judgments on: a. b. Apportionment. The process should assess the likelihood of achieving individual DPs and so inform the JFCs apportionment of effort between CCs. Contingency Planning. The process should be able to gauge whether the campaign plan is on track and so identify the need for contingency plans, in the form of branches and sequels.
33 34
See AJP-4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics for an explanation of these principles. See AJP-3 for advice on the assessment process and AJP-5 for advice on reviewing plans.
c.
Confirming Adversary Centre(s) of Gravity. The process should confirm that the correct COG(s) and associated critical vulnerabilities (CV) have been selected. The JFC should be alert to the possibility that new CVs may be exposed, or that previously identified CVs may be too well protected to be attacked. Thus COG analysis should be an iterative process for planning staff and the COG(s) should be reviewed periodically.
0444. Managing Lines of Operation. Lines of operation show the interrelationship between decisive points and as such, they are a way of visualizing the overall activity within a force, and coordinating and deconflicting component activities. Careful management of lines of operation allows the realization of the full potential of the force. Two tools, 35 which can assist in this, are the Campaign Plan Schematic and the Synchronization Matrix. The Campaign Plan Schematic enables the overall plan to be visualized at a glance and can be used to monitor its progress. The Synchronization Matrix is the method for planning the coordination of activity between components, in time and space, along the path to the objective. 0445. Campaign Rhythm. Where a commander can consistently decide and act quicker than his opponent, he will generate greater tempo and gain a significant advantage. Campaign rhythm should therefore be focused on enabling effective and timely decision-making within and between headquarters. It is the principal means by which time, information and activity are managed and directed at providing the right information at the right time so that the right decision can be made. It should never become a self-fulfilling prophesy, it is a means to an end not an end in its own right. Campaign rhythm is key to creating a Command Advantage, i.e. orders and directives that are designed to seek tactical opportunity plus a command structure that has a clear and common view of the situation can communicate quickly and direct operations.
35
See AJP-5.
CHAPTER 5 COMMAND AND CONTROL AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Section I A Command Philosophy
0501. Effective employment and support of military forces is dependent on the Command and Control (C2) arrangements established, from the highest to the lowest levels of authority. This Chapter describes the principles on which the C2 of Allied joint operations are based. Command and Control Terminology 0502. The terms command and control are closely related and regularly used together; however, they are not synonymous: a. Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual by the Alliance to direct, coordinate or control armed forces. It can be described (but not defined)1 as the process by which a commander impresses his/her will and intentions on subordinates to achieve particular objectives. It encompasses the authority and responsibility for deploying and assigning forces to fulfil their missions. Control. Control is the authority exercised by a commander. It can be described (but not defined)2 as the process through which a commander, assisted by the staff, organizes, directs and coordinates the activities of the forces assigned to implement orders and directives.
b.
0503. To exercise C2 authority in joint operations, a joint force commander (JFC) and staff should use standardized procedures3 and the Alliances Communications and Information System (CIS). Together, these procedures and the CIS form a C2 system that the JFC, the joint staff and their subordinates use to plan, direct, coordinate, control and support operations. Principles of Joint and Multinational Command 0504. Unity of Command. At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, a fundamental tenet of C2 is unity of command, which provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of operations; this was identified earlier as a significant part of a principle of operations unity of effort. Command
See the Lexicon for the AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions definition. See Lexicon. 3 The various degrees of command (Operational Command (OPCOM), Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Command (TACOM) and Tactical Control (TACON)) and delegated authority at different levels are defined in AAP-6 and described fully in AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations.
2 1
relationships, by which this authority is achieved, will be determined when a joint force is established. These relationships will acknowledge the constraints that may be placed on the use of national force components and supporting national assets and the extent of military activities of other authorities in a designated Joint Operations Area (JOA). As a minimum, a JFC would normally have Operational Control (OPCON) over all NATO or attached forces within a JOA. When unity of command (for forces or agencies outside the Joint Force) cannot totally be achieved, unity of effort has to be assured by establishing clear coordination arrangements. 0505. Continuity of Command. Unity of command is further enhanced by the continuity of command for the duration of a campaign or major operation. In principle, he who plans should execute; however, circumstances may not permit this. Command should be continuous throughout a campaign. The higher command authority, in consultation with a JFC, should arrange a succession of command; a JFC should arrange an alternate HQ to meet operational contingencies. 0506. Clear Chain of Command. The structure of a C2 system is hierarchical and should be defined and understood by all levels of command, so that at every level there is a complete understanding of command responsibilities up and down the hierarchy. Where necessary and appropriate, direction and orders to a subordinate commander may include tasks for specific force elements, subject to any limitations imposed by nations. 0507. Integration of Command. The command structure should ensure that the capabilities of the nations, or those of several nations, can be brought to bear decisively to achieve the JFCs operational objectives in the most effective way. Component commands, to which national contingents contribute, are normally environmental or functional, but the specific task organization will be tailored to each operation by the higher command. Integration between components is strengthened by a clear chain of command. If separate single national contingent headquarters are required, they should be established to complement the joint force chain of command. An efficient and comprehensive liaison structure, linking the Joint Force HQ, all force elements and other organizations, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations (IOs), is an essential element of the C2 structure. 0508. The Manoeuvrist Approach. The Manoeuvrist Approach focuses on shattering the adversarys overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel. It is an indirect approach, which emphasizes targeting the enemys moral component of his fighting power rather than the physical. The approach involves a combination of lethal and non-lethal means to achieve effects, which shape an adversarys understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion. It aims to apply strength against identified vulnerabilities. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility, which in combination lead to shock and surprise. It calls for an 5-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a relentless determination to succeed. It is applicable to all types of military activities across the spectrum of conflict. It: a. Emphasizes defeat and disruption of the adversary rather than, for example, taking ground for its own sake and depends on the precise application of force against identified points of weakness. Aims to defeat the adversarys will and desire to continue by seizing the initiative, and applying constant and unexpected pressure at times and places which the adversary least expects.
b.
In combat, the Manoeuvrist Approach invariably includes elements of movement, firepower and positional defence. There will usually be a requirement to fix the adversary, to deny him access to routes and objectives, and secure vital ground and key points. However, any such defensive measures should only be seen as part of the means to the end, which is the adversarys defeat. The Manoeuvrist Approach is underpinned by centralized planning and decentralized execution that promotes freedom of action and initiative - Mission Command. 0509. Mission Command. A JFCs responsibility for mission accomplishment is indivisible, but delegation of authority to subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher commanders intentions are included in the principle of decentralization. Through mission command, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise and exploit favourable opportunities. Mission command encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making. Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide sufficient forces, resources and authority required to accomplish their assigned tasks. Although the emphasis given to a mission command style in the doctrine and practice of different services and nations may differ, JFCs and their staffs should employ the principle of mission command. Successful mission command has the following prerequisites: a. b. Commanders and staffs should concern themselves primarily with joint operational matters, taking account of component issues only as necessary. The subordinate commander must understand fully the JFCs intentions and what he is required to achieve, and be free to exercise initiatives based on that understanding, within a minimal level of control imposed from the higher level of command. There should be an active involvement in the doctrine development process by the nations and a common understanding of the operational doctrine
c.
governing the employment of forces. The latter can be achieved through peacetime training and exercises. d. Trust, total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another, is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams. Trust expands the commanders options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. Trust is based on the mutual confidence that results from the demonstrated competence of each member of the team. The opportunity to observe each members capabilities in training builds trust and confidence in a Joint Force.
0510. Without unity of effort and the necessary trust to plan and execute a joint and multinational campaign or major operation, there can be little chance of success. A mutual understanding of strengths and weaknesses provides the foundation of cooperation and trust, which is vital in the planning and successful execution of joint and multinational operations. This should stem from the highest levels. Mutual understanding also rests on a common application of joint doctrine. Familiarity with the procedures of each service and nation is best achieved through joint and multinational training. A common approach should be inherent in thought and practice; joint and multinational training should be undertaken whenever possible, but it is particularly important, should time be available, prior to any operation. The greater the degree of standardization (in terms of both equipment and doctrine), the better the prospects are for fruitful cooperation, mutual understanding, and ultimately, for success. Command and Control Responsibilities 0511. Allied Command Authority. SACEUR will always be in the chain of command for a NATO-led operation. The actual operational chain of command best suited for the planned mission and the specific force structure will be approved by the appropriate political level. SACEUR would be held ultimately responsible for all operational matters, coordinating logistics support, rotation of units and manpower for extended deployments and for providing the operational interface at the political/military level in NATO HQ. When developing the military-strategic OPLAN, SACEUR should: a. Recommend to the Military Committee (MC) the most appropriate command structure/arrangement to satisfy the operational requirement. In doing so, SACEUR might nominate a Joint Force Command/Joint HQ, or Joint Force Command/Joint HQ-based CJTF HQ to lead the operation as JFC (in which case some of the tasks that follow might be delegated) and appropriate Component Commanders (CC). Propose a JFC and specify his command authority to the MC. Define a JOA for approval through the MC.
b. c.
d.
Issue, after the approval of the strategic CONOPS, Commanders Planning Guidance to the JFC. This should specify the tasks to be accomplished, the scope of action to be taken and the degree of authority granted to him as a supported commander. Establish an intelligence architecture linking NATO HQs with national intelligence centres to provide the JFC with a common, timely and accurate picture of the situation during all phases of the campaign.4 Recommend to the MC, based on the JFCs needs and the development of the operation, the appropriate force and C2 architecture to accomplish the mission. In consultation with HQ NATO, develop sustainment requirements and request support from national authorities and international entities to support the joint force by sending Activation Warning and Activation Request messages for action by nations. Following receipt of national responses, coordinate the force balancing process with nations and establish the supporting deployment architecture. Recommend to NATO authorities the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to be used, based on the JFCs needs and the development of the operation. Obtain and promulgate diplomatic clearances. Establish a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Host Nations as appropriate.5 Establish an integrated CIS linking Allied Command authorities, the JFC, national, environmental and functional components and supporting commanders/authorities. The Command and Control Communication System (C2CS) should provide timely, reliable, interoperable and secure communications for planning, direction and control of the activities of the joint force. Establish liaison as required for the conduct of operations. Monitor the development of the situation and the JFCs campaign and provide the MC with appropriate information. Formulate an Information Operations (Info Ops) policy for the joint force based on the North Atlantic Council (NAC)-agreed NATO Information Strategy.
e.
f.
g. h. i. j.
k. l. m.
4 5
See AJP-2.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures. See AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations, for detail.
n.
Formulate a Public Information (PI) policy, based on the NAC-agreed NATO Information Strategy, including Master Media Messages and tasks, for the joint force.
0512. The Joint Force Commander. The nominated JFC will: a. Exercise the command and control (normally OPCON), as delegated by SACEUR/Joint Force Command HQ, over all force components provided to him. The JFC should also exercise coordinating authority over all forces remaining under national control that are operating in or transiting a JOA. Coordinating authority should be granted for, as a minimum, security, positioning and reporting, logistics, movement control and ROE. Determine, in coordination with the providing commands and authorities, the joint command organization that is best suited to undertake the campaign (i.e., the need for the establishment of CCs, supporting boards, agencies etc). Assign, within the limits of his C2 authority, tasks to CCs as required to accomplish their objectives and approve their CONOPS. Establish liaison with the commands and authorities operating in support of the campaign or independently in a JOA, as well as between the components of the force.
b.
c. d.
0513. Supported/Supporting Relationships in Joint Operations. With the wide range of operational requirements to be covered with minimal assets, the execution of NATO military operations will often be guided by supported/supporting relationships when one organization should aid, protect, complement or sustain another force. This key relationship provides the establishing authority with an effective means of weighting the phases and sub-phases of operations with a subordinate commander typically receiving support from, and providing support to, other commanders. The number and importance of these relationships, in particular that support provided to a supported commander tasked with achieving the JFCs primary objectives in an operation, require the close attention of the JFC and his subordinate commanders in the planning and execution of operations. 0514. The supported/supporting relationship principle allows the strengths and capabilities of the headquarters and forces of the military command structure to complement each other to best overall effect. Within a force, components or elements can support, or be supported for the achievement of a particular task. Subordinate commanders may be supported and act as supporting commanders concurrently. The supported/supporting relationship is not a command relationship, but is a JFCdirected relationship through which the mission requirements of supported commanders are met.
0515. A subordinated commander will normally be assigned responsibility for achieving the primary objectives or for a specific phase of an operation, and thus may be the designated supported commander for all mission elements. He then has the primary responsibility for execution of the military tasks assigned by the JFC, and the authority for the general direction of the supporting effort. At the operational level, it may be more appropriate to designate different supported commanders for different mission areas.
Section II The Nature of Operational Level Command

0516. The Personal Dimension. Command at the operational level, where the stakes are high, requires a combination of cerebral, moral and physical qualities. Command is personal and different types of commanders are required for different circumstances; there is no unique formula or right combination of qualities. Important though a commanders personal qualities may be, it is by his actions that he will invariably be judged. It is important, therefore, that strategic level commanders have a choice of whom they select for operational level command to fit the circumstances. To be effective, an operational level commander should have at least the confidence of his superiors and subordinates and his allies to get the job done. In other circumstances trust, the ability to build or contribute to a disparate coalition may be more valuable. Ideally, a combination of trust and confidence is required. These difficult considerations may also affect the tasks an operational level commander gives his subordinates and are especially sensitive in a multinational context. 0517. The Alliance approach to command described in Section I emphasizes initiative and determination to succeed. These themes relate directly to command at the operational level and are worthy of emphasis: a. The commander who endeavours to outwit his opponent is the one most likely to achieve success on operations, remembering always that he is seeking to surprise and confuse the adversary, not his own command. The use of imagination and innovation, to be unpredictable, has enormous potential benefits, but is completely reliant on a true understanding of the opponent. He should be calm and cool-headed when the situation is confused and the effects of friction are at their greatest. High personal morale and a spirit that triumphs in the face of adversity are valuable qualities. The ability to think quickly and take difficult decisions is the mark of a strong commander and rests on the ability to cut to the essentials, plus a timely recognition of the circumstances and moment demanding a new decision. Although judgement when to make a quick decision is important, so is recognising when not to. 5-7 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
d.
The approach requires commanders who seek the initiative, who act boldly, identifying and exploiting fleeting opportunities while balancing the potential pay-off with the risk involved. Once engaged, his focus must be on achieving his object come what may. In a confused and highly charged situation, the will to win calls for determination and relentlessness: an ability to drive through difficulties, to be strong willed, but not stubborn. Important as slick and effective operational procedures and clear doctrine are, fundamental is the generation and fostering of fighting spirit.
e.
0518. Joint and National Considerations. Having spent the majority of his career in a single Service, it is inevitable that the operational level commander will be conditioned by the ethos and culture of his own Service and nation. His leadership style will have been adapted to the particular needs of his Service and his understanding of one of the components will be greater. His training and education, although increasingly joint at later stages, will have been focused on enabling him to be an effective member of his own national Service, for nations recognize that for an officer to be effective in the joint environment requires professionalism in his parent Service. Under stress, he may revert to familiar patterns or language (the comfort zone), which may be unfamiliar to others and cause some misunderstanding. The commander should recognize this, as should his subordinate commanders and his staff, and adjust accordingly. This is not a difficult or complicated issue, simply an aspect of command relationships in a joint environment that should be recognized and taken into account. 0519. The Multinational Dimension. It is very difficult to lead another nations forces. Welding together the elements of a multinational force into an effective team is the responsibility of the operational level commander and requires political acumen, patience and tact. Allies will often have a different reason for being there and there is no place for prejudice or preconceptions. a. An understanding of relative strengths and weaknesses (contingent capabilities) and national political objectives and perspectives is essential, as well as a deeper feeling for the effect of previous wars and operations on national ethos and culture, to understand the deeper reasons behind national caveats.6 The commander should balance the capabilities of his force elements and play to their strengths, consistent with national constraints. At the same time, he should balance the burden and risk sharing in order to ensure that no one nation either sustains a disproportionate loss of life or, conversely, receives disproportionate credit, both of which may weaken the cohesion of the alliance or coalition.
National caveats are essentially vetoes over possible or actual aspects of the operation in which a nation will not agree to participate.
b.
The approach to this problem will depend largely upon personalities, but success is more likely if, within the coalition, all problems are addressed within the context of the military strategic objectives and, specifically, the campaign plan. If it can be established that although political problems may exist, the real task of the commander and his allied subordinates is to produce a military solution to a military problem, cooperation will be put on a sound basis without offending national sensitivities. Cooperation is enhanced through knowledge, trust, mutual understanding and respect, the seeds of which are sown by contacts, liaison and exchange postings before the operation. Moreover, the operational level commander should do all he can to discuss military problems on an individual basis with Ministers and senior officers from contributing nations who visit the JOA.
c.
0520. The National Contingent Commander. In an Alliance force, the JFC would have to take note of the views of the National Contingent Commanders (NCC). The NCC is a fighting commander, indeed he may occupy a key position in the overall command hierarchy, but he is a key decision-maker and plays a pivotal role alongside the JFC in building the coalition. Although the NCC does not share the same command responsibility or authority within the force as the JFC, he should understand the operation to the same extent in order to provide effective advice and support. a. In general terms,7 the role of the NCC is to integrate his own national contingent8 into the Alliance force, promoting cohesion, trust and understanding while implementing his own nations policies and caveats. He would also act as a national figurehead; a conduit back to his nation on tactical incidents and operational developments; matters of support to, and force protection of, his contingent; and media issues. The NCC will implement national caveats, although he will usually delegate elements to his national commanders within each component so that issues can be resolved early at lower levels, thus minimizing the overall impact on coalition cohesion. Any issues that are likely to cause friction should be identified beforehand and discussed with the JFC in an effort to resolve the problem.
b.
Section III Command Relationships

0521. Military. In essence, the role of the JFC is to ensure, wherever and whenever possible, that subordinate commanders are not distracted from their role in the
Details in AJP-3(A). National approaches to the nomination and role of the NCC differ. Some nations appoint a separate NCC outside the force C2 structure, others dual-hat.
8 7
planning and execution of the campaign or operation. This relies on mutual trust and complete frankness between the two. This relationship should be based on professional trust and mutual understanding between commanders to ensure unity of effort. A superior commander should not see his subordinates as a set and should ensure that each has the necessary access to him and that he displays no national or single-Service preference. Subordinate commanders should be involved fully in the campaign planning process and allocated the necessary resources and freedom of action to achieve their mission. Subordinates should be confident in their superior commanders decisions and follow his direction in the understanding of its spirit. A clear grasp of the capabilities, strengths and weaknesses of each component and its constituents, and fostering a spirit of mutual understanding and trust, is critical to achieving success, and is a key task for the JFC. 0522. The Supported Regime. Where a JFCs mission is in support of another government, the JFC will have a close relationship with the political and military elements of that regime. In some instances, these regimes will be fractured and unstable, or established by a peace agreement, and one of his key roles will be to support and empower them. This may require the establishment of liaison with various civilian factions, warlords and other paramilitary groups as well as NGOs that may be present on humanitarian or other missions. As such, it will be critical that he fully understands the political context in which he operates, for which he should draw on political advisers, legal advisers and CCs with relevant experience. In these circumstances, this is likely to be his primary focus and take up the majority of his time. 0523. Political. NATO may be invited to act in support of an internationally recognized organization such as the United Nations (UN) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In exceptional circumstances, the NAC may decide to take unilateral action. That authority will issue a mandate, for example a UN Security Council resolution, which provides direction and authority to the participants. If NATO agrees to support a mission under the auspices of another organization, the NAC retains the direction and authority for the deployment of NATO forces. The international organization will nominate a senior political authority in the JOA. In the case of the UN, this individual will normally be designated as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), while in the case of the OSCE the designation will be Head of Mission (HOM) and in other cases a High Representative. The senior political authority will coordinate with the activities of all elements in theatre to achieve coherent progress towards the political end state. NATO forces will be one of those elements, with a military strategic objective and OPLAN approved by the NAC, which contributes towards achievement of the political end state. While the NAC always remains the political authority for NATO forces, the JFC will need to liaise closely with the senior political authority to ensure unity of effort for the overall mission.
Section IV Decision-Making at the Operational Level

0524. Effective decisions are critical to operational success. The JFC alone makes the decisions and his focus should be on the quality, timing, and the understanding of that decision by subordinates and staff, rather than the method used to reach the decision. 0525. The Decision-Making Process. Even when a very rapid decision is required, some method in the decision-making process is essential. Commonly understood decision-making tools enable commanders and staffs to work together effectively, in particular when headquarters are assembled at short notice. The 4 stages of the decisionmaking process are: a. Direction. The operational level commanders first act should be to determine the nature of the decision required and the time available to him in which to make it. He then needs to issue sufficient planning guidance to his staff and subordinates to set in hand all the action required to enable him subsequently to arrive at his decision in an orderly and timely fashion. b. Consultation. In the second stage, if time allows, consultation occurs at 3 levels: (1) Upwards to the strategic level commander to seek guidance if required and to ensure he is kept abreast of the operational level commanders intentions and vice-versa. (2) Sideways, in particular to senior national representatives and diplomatic staff, other organizations and his own specialist advisers and senior staff. (3) Downwards to his CCs to ensure that they understand his decision, have the opportunity to contribute to it and feel a sense of ownership of it. c. Consideration. Before reaching his decision, the JFC should consider the contributions of his CCs and the work of his staff from the direction stage, and then apply his judgement, influenced by any consultation upwards that has been possible. d. Decision and Execution. The JFC should make decisions personally and express these decisions clearly and succinctly; this is the cornerstone of effective command. Thereafter, he should ensure that his direction is disseminated in the manner he requires and that his decision is executed correctly. 0526. The Process in Practice. Consultation, consideration and decision-making will frequently be compressed and activities undertaken concurrently rather than consecutively. The time by which a decision has to be taken may be self-evident from the circumstances but, if not, it should be clearly established during the direction stage. 5-11 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
Consultation and consideration may become inseparably blended, leading to decisions being taken on the spot. Reaching a decision will invariably involve the JFC exercising his own judgement on incomplete information. Risk cannot be avoided; to wait in hopeful anticipation of complete clarification will result in paralysis. The risk can be reduced if critical information requirements are identified early in contingency planning in both peacetime and the lead-up to conflict and regularly refined by the operational level commander. Commanders should possess the judgement to know what to delegate and to whom. They should be clear that whilst they may delegate their authority, they always retain responsibility. 0527. Decision-Making in a Multinational Environment. Effective decisions in a multinational environment can be viewed as a combination of quality thinking and acceptance. In a situation where many nations are present, the importance of acceptance and the difficulty of performing quality thinking quickly are obvious, particularly in a headquarters that may be ad hoc or inexperienced. The key is not to wait until the decision has been made before working on acceptance, but to obtain early agreement by as much collaborative planning as is possible. 0528. Understanding the Nature of the Problem. It is only by understanding the true nature of the problem that the commander will be able to make the high quality decisions required of him. Strategic guidance, the operational estimate and the result of the intelligence process will help the commander in this respect. However, a true understanding of the intangible and wider factors surrounding the issue will come only from research, study, visits and discussions with key military and non-military people. Some of this will come from previous experience but this insight should be developed rapidly from the moment the JFC is appointed and continues throughout the campaign. Developing an instinctive awareness of the operational environment will help the commander in deciding when to make decisions and in the making of those decisions.
Section V The Mechanics of Command

0529. Command, Control and Communications Architecture. The Alliances command architecture is explained in AJP-3.9 It sets out the standard arrangements for command and control of joint operations. However, it is only one approach and should not be applied rigidly. The major considerations when deciding on, and subsequently adjusting, the C2 architecture both external to and within a force are detailed in a nonexhaustive list. They are closely interlinked and should be considered as a set. Although the JFC may not have any influence on the arrangements, he should understand the reasoning behind the in-place arrangements. a. The Problem. The JFC should consider the scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation, noting especially that the problem will continue to evolve.
AJP-3(A), Chapter 2.
Concurrency may also be an issue; there may be a number of operations running, at different states of maturity and with different profiles. b. Influence. The identification of the point (or points) where the greatest influence can be brought to bear is vital in a multinational operation. It will not always be self-evident, and it will fluctuate as the operation develops. Once identified, the best approach should be decided, bearing in mind that what works for one level may not be appropriate elsewhere. c. Command. The JFC should decide where and how best to exercise command of the force within the Alliances command philosophy. This philosophy, described in Section I, highlights the importance of Mission Command. d. Communications. Another factor is the capacity of the available CIS assets, including any redundancy. In principle, modern CIS assets enable the implementation of a reach-back capability and will enhance information exchange and support decision superiority. However, even with modern communications there will be occasions where face-to-face discussions are required. Whatever the situation is, communications should enable the exercise of C2 to the maximum possible. 0530. A Commanders Relationship with his Staff. The force of the commanders personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour will have a direct bearing on the morale, sense of direction and performance of his staff. Thus, commanders should: a. Set standards and be clear as to what they expect from the staff.
b. Create and maintain a climate that encourages subordinates to think independently and to take the initiative. Encourage timely action. Ensure that the staffs understand that they serve those subordinate to them. c. Create a climate of mutual loyalty and respect rather than one that is sycophantic and unquestioning, the ability to tolerate loyal opposition. d. Foster a sense of involvement in decision-making and of shared commitment; empower where appropriate. Pay particular attention to the delegated authority and responsibility within the core team (Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Political Adviser, Legal Adviser, Public Information Adviser and the Deputy Commander if one is present). In response, the first duty of the staff, at any level, is to assist the commander in decisionmaking by acquiring, analyzing, and coordinating information, and most importantly, presenting essential information to the commander with a recommendation so that he can make the best decision.
CHAPTER 6 OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Section I Introduction
0601. This chapter is concerned with the commanders decision and implementation of a Course of Action (COA) that will achieve the desired military objectives. It regards the planning and execution of operations from the commanders, rather than his staffs, viewpoint, identifying those stages of an operation where command input will most successfully influence those processes and produce workable plans that achieve the desired end state. It is closely aligned to AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, which should be referred to for detail. Its structure is aligned with the Operational Planning Process to facilitate cross-referencing with relevant documentation.1 Command Focus 0602. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) should be appointed as early as possible so that he can have the greatest influence on the way in which the campaign is constructed. On appointment, he will be given some form of guidance, normally in the form of planning guidance from SACEUR.2 In addition, he will usually receive a series of briefings produced by an Operational Planning Group (OPG)3 as part of the first stage of the NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP). 0603. At this point, he will be the focus of attention and there will be a number of competing demands placed on him. He will be receiving a flood of information from a wide range of sources and there will be some key issues that he must address: a. b. c. d. e. How does he completely analyse this problem so that he fully understands it? Who is dealing with what? What work has been produced and what is in hand? Who are the key personalities? How does he get the right information feeds?
0604. Time, inevitably, will be short and he cannot do everything and be everywhere. His intellectual effort in these early stages is critical and he must do for himself, or control, those activities where his experience and expertise are most relevant. It is
See MC133 NATOs Operational Planning System, the NATO Crisis Response Manual, AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, Allied Command Operations Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). 2 SACEURs Military Assessment, see AJP-5, Chapter 4. 3 A J5-led planning group drawn from the wide range of expertise available in the HQ, together with external expertise drawn from other HQs, including subordinate HQs, operational analysis and agencies. See AJP-5, Chapter 4.
1
imperative that his team is quickly gathered and given clear and early direction, including priorities, to achieve focus and purposeful work. The key actors are the Chief of Staff (COS), Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS), Legal Adviser (LEGAD) and Political Adviser (POLAD). Planning Influences 0605. Planning should be viewed as intellectual activity that drives a process, not a process that drives intellectual activity. The drive in this sense comes from the JFC and comprises a combination of intuition, experience and effective decision-making. 0606. Figure 6.1 shows the fundamental elements of joint operations; it is the essence of the theory contained in Chapters 3 and 4, and is codified for practical implementation in the OPP. It illustrates the principal activities of a commander and his staff in planning and executing a campaign, irrespective of the nature of the problem at hand, the scale of the forces involved, or the technological sophistication of available Communications and Information Systems (CIS). The commander focuses on the identification of that which is likely to prove decisive and chooses a COA that has the greatest chance of success. Working with specific guidance and an understanding of his intent, his staffs develop the details and provide focus for the execution of command responsibilities. Both commander and staff are involved in the detailed management.
The Commander (using Intuition and experience)
Identify what is going to be decisive, and the range of shaping operations needed for decisive success.
Establish what is within the art of the possible
Select a COA that can be
developed into a workable CONOPS and then OPLAN.
Manage the OPLAN through to successful completion
The Staff (using rational/logical process)
Figure 6.1 Planning and Execution Command and Staff Influences 0607. The balance of this Chapter concentrates on 2 key questions for the JFC that emerge from this model. Both can be answered collaboratively and are not 6-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
necessarily solely for him to answer; a balance is required, particularly if time is short. They are: a. b. How to select a successful COA? How to implement effectively that successful COA?
Operational Planning Process 0608. Within NATO, the Operational Art and Design process described in Chapter 4 is codified as the OPP. It is defined in MC133 and detailed in AJP-5, which itself aligns with the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) crisis management process described earlier in Chapter 3. Thus strategic level crisis management is linked to the planning of operations, as depicted in Figure 6.2:
POLITICAL- MILITARY ESTIMATE PROCESS NAC Initiating Directive PHASE 4 Planning & Execution PHASE 5 Return to Stability
PHASE 1 Indications & Warning
PHASE 2
PHASE 3
Assessment
Response Options
OPP
Figure 6.2 - Alignment of NCRS Phases with the Operational Planning Process 0609. MC-133 and AJP-5 Planning Stages. MC-133 describes a 2-stage plan development process consisting of a political-military estimate and plan development. The political-military estimate process in MC-133 equates to the first 3 stages of the OPP Initiation, Orientation and Concept Development. The remaining 2 stages of the OPP Plan Development and Plan Review equate to plan development in MC133. The OPP is depicted in Figure 6.3 and is covered in detail in AJP-5.
P L A N N IN G ST AG E
ST AF F A C T IV IT Y
M ilita r y A s s e s s m e n t2
B R IE F T O CO MMAN D ER
CO M M AN D ERS IN P U T
Asse ss me nt o f O p tio n s
PR OD UC ED DOC U M EN T
M ilita r y Asse ss me nt
R E S U L T IN G 1 D IR E C T IV E
In itia tin g D ir e c tiv e
I
IN IT IAT IO N
II
O R IE N T AT IO N
M is s io n A n a l y s is
M is s io n A n a l y s is B r ie f
Vis i o n & G u id a n c e
C o m m a n d e r s P la n n in g G u id a n c e
Planning Situation change
III
C O N C E PT D E VE L O P M E N T
Own Capability Change
COA D e v e lo p m e n t
COA D e c is io n B r ie f
C O NO P S
COA D e c is io n
SO R
Fo rce A c tiv a tio n D ir e c tiv e
IV
P L AN D E VE L O P M E N T
P la n D e v e lo p m e n t
P la n B r ie f
P la n Approv al
O P L AN
E x e c u tio n D ir e c tiv e
V
P L AN R E VIE W
P la n R e v ie w & E v a lu a tio n
H ig h e r a u th o r itys a p p r o v a l
1
In itia te d b y N AC /M C /S C a c c o r d in g to M C 1 3 3 2 Ap p lic a b le to S C L e v e l O n ly
Fig 6.3 NATO Operational Planning Process Overview
Section II Orientation
The Estimate Process 0610. The estimate process described theoretically in Chapter 4 and practically implemented in AJP-5 is central to the formulation of JFCs OPLAN and subsequent updating of plans in an Allied joint operation. However, the process has an application at all levels of command. The framework of an estimate is standard, comprising a mission analysis, the mission statement, a situation analysis, analysis and comparison of adversary and friendly COA, and selection and refinement of the best friendly COA. 0611. The estimate must lead to a COA that is suitable, feasible and acceptable, leading to the commanders decision and his concept of operations. The weighting given to each aspect during the process will depend on the overall mission, the intelligence assessments and the prevailing circumstances. Mission Analysis4 0612. The mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing, from a superiors order and planning guidance, the specified and implied tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. The commander would establish what constraints and restraints apply and determine, as the campaign planning progresses, whether further guidance is required. As such it is a dynamic process which triggers and then regulates the remainder of the estimate. It is continued thereafter as the situation
4
Detail in AJP-5, Chapter 4.
and the mission are reviewed. The mission analysis is the first step in the process: it includes the determination of the higher command authoritys intent; the analysis of allied security and military-strategic direction, including short and long-term objectives to achieve the end state; pre-conditions for success; time, space, forces and information factors; any restrictions and assumptions made. 0613. Strategic end state objectives describe in broad terms what the Alliance intends to achieve through military action; military objectives describe what has to be accomplished militarily in order to get there. Once the commander determines what set of military conditions exist, then the focus shifts to how the force will, achieve that objective. The mission analysis should also include the specified and implied tasks, and determine priorities where appropriate. Completion of the mission analysis results in a restated mission for the force, i.e., a mission statement. 0614. Mission Statement. The mission analysis, having confirmed an understanding of the operation/mission directive issued by higher authority, and the capability of achieving the mission, leads to a reiteration of the commanders mission statement. The Mission Statement is one of the key outputs of the Mission Analysis. It is formulated to provide a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted (for example, the purpose of the operation). However, the Mission Statement does not state how the operation will be conducted. It is reviewed to ensure that it identifies the commands mission-essential tasks required to achieve the higher authoritys objective and desired end state. The order of the elements of the mission statement may vary; the priority is clarity. 0615. Analysis of the Situation, Adversary and Friendly Forces. An analysis of the factors that affect the mission is conducted before potential COAs are evaluated. These factors are assessed under 3 broad headings:5 a. General Situation. The general situation analysis should consider, in the NATO geostrategic context, the politico-diplomatic short and long-term causes of the conflict. It should also consider political influences; economic, legal and moral constraints; international interests; the characteristics of the operational area; economic and social conditions; and science and technology factors affecting the operational area. It should also ascertain strategic requirements (for example access to territory, territorial waters and airspace) and associated diplomatic, economic and information factors. Completion of the situation analysis has an important influence on the analysis of the adversary and friendly forces. Adversary Forces Situation Analysis. The adversary forces situation analysis should consider the opposing forces location, capabilities and
b.
See AJP-5, Chapter 4 for detail.
NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C) vulnerabilities.6 The analysis should include: an assessment of current and potential COA and their political and military intentions and objectives; the adversary forces military-strategic and operational advantages and limitations by defining its strategic and operational COG; and the adversary forces operational characteristics and assessed combat effectiveness. c. Friendly Situation Analysis. The friendly situation analysis should follow the same pattern as for the adversary force. The commander would normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, intelligence, logistic and medical/health care service support, C2 and communications plus public information estimates. Development of the possible friendly COA is derived from the foregoing analyses, and determines how the mission will be accomplished.
0616. Operational Analysis and Design. The next step is to perform the operational analysis and to develop the operational design. The process is described in detail in AJP-5. The analysis process should focus at this stage on the Campaign Design Concepts described in Chapter 4. 0617. Commanders Critical Information Requirements.7 Properly developed information requirements ensure that subordinate and staff effort is focused, scarce resources are employed efficiently and decisions can be made in a timely manner. The analysis of key factors will typically highlight gaps in information that are essential to planning and the commanders decision making that cannot be covered by assumptions. The Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) identify information on friendly activities, adversary activities, and the environment that the commander deems critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decision-making. Commanders use CCIRs to help them confirm their vision of the battlespace, assess desired effects, and how they will achieve a decision to accomplish their mission or to identify significant deviations from that vision due to, for example, adversary actions. CCIRs must be linked to the critical decisions the commander anticipates making. They focus the commanders subordinate commanders and staffs planning and collection efforts. They are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, flow, and use of information throughout the force. CCIRs should be limited in number to ensure focus, and be continually reviewed to remain relevant. The OPG should manage acquisition of essential planning information by addressing these requirements in Requests for Information (RFI) to higher HQ and other agencies. Critical elements of information that will focus collection efforts should be recommended to the commander for approval for each phase of the operation. CCIRs 8 are divided into 3 categories:
6 7
The commander would normally have available a formal intelligence estimate to which the analyst can refer. See AJP-5, Chapter 4. 8 See AJP 2.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures.
(1)
Priority Intelligence Requirements. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making,9 particularly in selecting a COA; for example the adversarys intentions, or an assessment of the adversarys operational capability. These are further broken down by the staff in sequence to develop a collection plan. 10
b.
Essential Elements of Friendly Information. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) are the critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy discovery. EEFIs can be thought of as key questions that are likely to be asked by adversaries and adversary intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities and activities critical to the ability of the adversary to accomplish their missions, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection. EEFIs determine which activities must be protected by friendly force OPSEC measures. Friendly Force Information Requirements. Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) are information the commander needs to know about his own forces, which might affect the commanders ability to accomplish the mission. This includes: personnel; maintenance; supply; ammunition and petroleum, oils, and lubricants status; host nation and national contingent experience and leadership capabilities; and time to achieve initial and full operational capability.
c.
0618. Initial Force Estimate. An initial estimate of force requirements is developed by conducting a troops-to-task analysis of the mission-essential tasks identified during the mission analysis. This estimate updates the preliminary force estimate made in SACEURs Military Assessment. It should be compared with force planning guidance, especially constraints, established at the political-military level and other estimates, such as those provided through the Defence Requirements Review if the related Planning Situation had been developed. This estimate will be further refined during the Concept Development stage. However, it allows informal inquiries to Nations by SACEUR concerning the potential availability of forces. 0619. Mission Analysis Briefing. The purpose of the Mission Analysis Briefing to the JFC is to review the estimate of the situation, confirm the mission statement, the operational design, as well as to refine the proposed Commanders Planning Guidance (CPG) for own and subordinate HQs use. The briefing brings together all of the analysis developed by the commander and the OPG considered during the
9 10
AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (AAP-6)
Orientation stage and confirms the commanders guidance for concept development. The commanders guidance focuses on his initial intent and may address possible friendly COAs. Based on the briefing and any additional guidance, the staff then finalizes the CPG. 0620. Commanders Planning Guidance. The output of the Orientation stage is the CPG, a formal document that serves to guide further planning by the staff and initiates and orients planning by subordinate HQs. Three key elements of the CPG are the desired end state, mission statement and commanders initial intent. The commanders initial intent reflects his vision of the operation in terms of its purpose and the essential conditions that must be set at decisive points in order to achieve the desired end state. He may articulate his assessment of his adversarys intent as well as risks during the operation and direct specific COAs to be developed or excluded.
Section III Concept Development

0621. Concept Development begins with a review of the CPG as basis for further staff analysis and the development of friendly COAs. COAs are initially described in broad terms and tested for validity. They are refined through analysis, war gaming and comments by subordinate commanders in the spirit of parallel planning. The results of the staff analysis and comparison of the various COAs are presented with a recommendation to the commander in the form of a decision briefing. On the basis of the commanders decision and any further guidance, the staffs refine the selected COA and produce a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and a Statement of Requirements (SOR), which represent the final products of this planning stage.11 0622. Course of Action Comparison.12 Based on the commanders selection criteria the OPG conducts a comparison of the resultant COAs to enable the selection of the most appropriate COA. The comparison includes the following aspects: a. Friendly Versus Adversary Courses of Action. An assessment of the relative effectiveness of each friendly COA against each adversary COA, drawn largely from wargaming. The Commanders Courses of Action Selection Criteria. Guidance that the Commander provides to his staff to assist them in determining which COA best supports the Commanders Intent. Compare Friendly Courses of Action. A comparison of the relative advantages of each friendly COA, based on wargaming, staff estimates and the Commanders COA selection criteria.
b.
c.
11 12
Detail in AJP-5, Chapter 4. Detail in AJP-5, Chapter 4.
0623. Commanders Input to Courses of Action Selection. Often the solution to a problem will be apparent at an early stage to an experienced command team whereupon the JFC will have certainly identified in his own mind a number of potential outline COAs. There will have been a wide range of issues which will have influenced his thinking. Some of the more difficult to balance are: a. Initial Dispositions. There will almost certainly be a political need to get there quickly and do something. In trying to satisfy this imperative there is a danger that later options are collapsed or severely constrained, or the force becomes definitively committed. The character of a campaign will change, sometimes suddenly, and the force structure to deal with the opening phase, may not be right for subsequent operations. At the operational level the initial disposition of a force is a major consideration. This is particularly true for a large land force, which will often be difficult to redeploy within a JOA, and logistic basing, which is a potential limitation to the movement of forces. Air and maritime elements can provide alternatives, including sea basing, and keep options open. Consideration of this issue should not promote an overly cautious approach. In the right circumstances a bold decision can achieve an early effect that can be exploited later. Offence and Defence. All operations should be of a defensive-offensive nature; a static defence is bound to be defeated in due course. Any defensive posture consists of 2 main parts: (1) A system of defence which aims at netting, weakening, slowing up and eventually immobilising an opponent, and a large-scale counter attack designed to defeat or destroy. The JFC should decide which areas are essential to him and which are vital to the success of the opponents offensive. He should then dispose his force to destroy the adversary when he launches attacks against these areas. However, only the offence can be decisive and the defensive phase of an operation should be viewed as transitory.
b.
(2)
Offensive operations should be designed to seize and retain the initiative, and apply unremitting pressure on an adversary. Any offensive plan should set balanced and realistic objectives, be flexible enough to exploit success, robust enough to withstand setbacks, and will rarely be successful without the achievement of at least local air superiority. Adequate time for the training and rehearsals of force elements before major offensive operations is critical, especially in a multinational campaign. c. Risk Analysis and Management. Risk is inherent in military operations therefore risk analysis and management assists commanders at all levels in making informed decisions. Risk management is not compromise it involves
the acceptance of risk in one area to mitigate it in another. The JFC determines the main effort, but in doing so he consciously accepts and manage risks in other areas. d. Concentration of Force and Economy of Effort. These 2 Principles of Operations are of particular relevance to the operational level. Throughout the planning and conduct of the campaign, the JFC will be constantly reflecting on where he can concentrate his force (not the same as massing) to achieve the desired effect. The accurate identification of where he can be economical will be vital in order to permit concentration at the point of greatest impact. Logistics and Administration. Striking a balance between the provision of support to components and national contingents, the location and size of mobile and static stocks, at the same time as preventing over-insurance, is critical. This hinges on giving logistics staff enough knowledge at the right time to allow anticipation, which will in turn generate confidence and prevent over-insurance and an unnecessarily large logistic footprint. Reducing logistic drag, while ensuring support is in the right place at the right time, will affect the ability of a force to seize and exploit opportunities. This requires both static and mobile logistics to be focused on the combat organization, and quickly reorganized if necessary. Logistics capacity is a common thread through all the above issues and is a key determinant in the selection of a winning concept at the operational level. As such the administration and sustainment of the force requires leadership and direction of as high an order as any engagement, and should not be left solely to subordinate logistic and administrative staff.
e.
f.
0624. Course of Action Selection.13 Following presentation of the viable COAs, supported by staff analysis, recommendation and the COA comparison, the JFC will decide on the best friendly COA that meets his operational objectives. This may require the JFC to solicit advice from his subordinate commanders. The JFCs decision may not be a simple selection of one of the offered COAs, he may decide to select a COA with or without modification, or combine various aspects of the various COAs into a new option, or direct that additional COAs be investigated. 0625. Development of the Courses of Action into a Concept of Operations. Following the Commanders COA decision and guidance, the staff develops the chosen COA into a CONOPS.14 0626. Statement of Requirements.15 As part of the CONOPS development process the staff develops a provisional Statement of Requirement (SOR) listing the force
13 14
See AJP-5, Chapter 4 for detail. AJP-5 Chapter 4. 15 See AJP-5, Chapter 4 for detail, AJP-3(A) for details of the force generation process.
elements and capabilities required to implement the CONOPS, including the requirements of subordinate commanders. 0627. Concept of Operations Approval. The JFC forwards his CONOPS for approval to SACEUR together with his contribution to SACEURs provisional SOR. CONOPS approval is required before submitting a fully developed OPLAN. However, the staff may continue with the planning process and begin the Plan Development stage of the OPP. Commanders Intent 0628. Visualization. For every mission, the commander determines what should be achieved and begins to develop plans for the force to accomplish the mission. This visualization embodies the intent for the conduct and outcome of the operation. It is a mental picture of the current situation and intended end state, and how (based on the higher commanders intent, on the information available and on intuition) to move from one to the other. The Commanders Intent, a key part of the CONOPS, should be developed by the commander, expressed in concise language, in order to transmit this vision to subordinates. The Commanders Intent is an expansion and expression of how a mission is to unfold. It is a succinct statement of a missions overall purpose, the desired end state, and any essential information on how to get to that end state; it should be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate preparation of their own OPLANs and/or orders. 0629. Focus on Results. The intent defines the end state in relation to the factors of mission, adversary, operating environment, terrain, forces, time and preparation for future operations. As such, it addresses what results are expected from the operation, how these results anticipate transition to future operations, and how, in broad terms, the commander expects the force to achieve those results. Its focus is on the force as a whole. Additional information on how the force will achieve the desired results is provided only to clarify the commanders intentions. 0630. Unifying Concept. The Commanders Intent is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force as a whole rather than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what makes sense at that time or place. In this way Commanders Intent enables Mission Command.16 0631. Enabling Mission Command. In stating the intent, the issuing commander provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the broader context of the mission, rather than within the restrictions of a particular CONOPS or scheme of manoeuvre. The Commanders Intent provides subordinates with the flexibility to
16
See Chapter 5.
adapt their actions to achieve success. By focusing on the end state rather than sequential events, it allows commanders to operate with increased speed and efficiency in decision-making. This allows subordinate forces, and hence the whole force, to operate faster, and with greater agility, than the adversary. This keeps the adversary off-balance and unable to respond coherently. The end state focus supports the initiative of commanders at all levels by freeing them to focus on the desired results, even when the CONOPS should be adapted to changing events, when communications are disrupted, or additional guidance or directives are lacking. The Commanders Intent provides subordinates with the same opportunity of developing a vision of their end state, as it supports that of the force as a whole. 0632. Command Involvement. Because of its criticality, it is essential that the commander personally prepares and delivers the intent. While time constraints and combat conditions may require the commander to deliver the intent verbally, possibly even by radio or electronic means, it is best when it is articulated to subordinates personally and in written form. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the issuing commander wants, and the provision of a hard copy provides subordinates with the foundation of their own planning. 0633. Summary. The Commanders Intent provides the link between the mission and how the commander plans to accomplish that mission. The intent should be developed by the Commander, expressed in simple sentences that clearly state why the operation is being conducted, the desired military end state and criteria for success, the military objectives and how the force as a whole will achieve the end state.
Section IV Plan Development

0634. Following promulgation of the commanders CONOPS, detailed planning of operations within the campaign is conducted by the staffs.17 The purpose of the Plan Development stage is to identify further the forces required to implement the CONOPS, to provide for their sustainment as well as protection and to organize and coordinate their timely deployment into the JOA. It also includes the further elaboration of details, and requests for any supporting Crisis Response Measures, in each functional area required to ensure the full integration and effective implementation of the CONOPS. 0635. Force Generation/Activation.18 The provisional SOR should be used as the foundation for continued force planning. National identification of forces is outlined in MC 133. For Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) with a lengthy warning time only Representational Forces (type and scale of forces and capabilities) need be identified. For OPLAN development (and Standing Defence Plans (SDPs)/some
17 18
See AJP-5, Chapter 4. See MC133 Annex C and AJP-5, Chapter 4.
CONPLANs) the identification of Real Forces by nations is required together with the development of an Allied Force List (AFL) and an Allied Disposition List (ADL). 0636. Force Deployment.19 Although deployment of forces is a national responsibility, SACEUR plays a leading role in coordinating deployment planning with the contributing nations, as well as the JFC. 0637. Plan Approval.20 All SC-level CONPLANs will normally require MC approval while SC-level OPLANs and SDPs require approval by an appropriate Alliance political committee or group. All subordinate CONPLANs, OPLANs and SUPPLANs require the approval of the initiating authority.
Section V Plan Execution

0638. The Operational Level Framework described in Chapter 4 assists in focusing and visualising a campaign as it progresses. Execution of the chosen plan is covered in detail in AJP-3(A). This section covers a number of areas that require the JFCs personal attention.
The Joint Force Commanders Information Architecture 0639. Information is crucial to the JFC but he should consider information broadly, not just in a narrow J2 sense. He should be clear about what he needs to know and when he needs the information. However, he should also consider who else around him needs information and ensure that they receive it in the right timeframe, matching information flows with decision-making levels. At the same time as considering his own information requirements, he should also consider what he wants the adversary to know or not to know. 0640. However, the JFCs focus is not solely on the gathering of information. There will be occasions when, in order to find out what is not known, it is necessary to do something. By testing and probing the adversarys system, the reaction will often provide insights into a wide range of issues. In this sense it could be said that all operations are, in effect, intelligence gathering operations. Command Approach 0641. Disseminating the Commanders Intent. The JFC should personally write the Mission Statement, Commanders Intent and Conduct of Operations of the CONOPS/OPLAN.21 These elements, but especially Commanders Intent where the
19 20
See AJP-5, Chapter 4 and AJP 3-13 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces. See AJP-5, Chapter 5. 21 See AJP-5 Chapter 4.
JFC expresses the overall effect he wishes to achieve against the adversary, are critical in enabling subordinates to act purposefully when faced with unforeseen opportunities, or in the absence of orders. 0642. Public Information. The media, including the Internet, has become so important a conduit in maintaining public and political support that a JFC cannot disconnect himself from it; neither can he allow it to be the sole focus of his efforts. He should be honest about his ability to deal with the media and carefully balance the use of a media spokesperson with his own appearances; there will be moments where the importance of the message to be conveyed will require his personal lead. In every instance he should ask himself: who am I engaging and for what reason? PI at each level of command directly supports the JFC. PI is a command function; it may not, therefore, be further delegated or subordinated to other staff functions. Public understanding and support should be obtained through use of all available means, including the timely posting of relevant information on the Internet. Integration, Coordination and Synchronization of Operations 0643. Campaign Management. Clausewitz noted that War has a grammar of its own but no logic. Understanding this grammar is not the same as imposing a false sense of order on a complex and constantly evolving situation. Rather, the JFC should seek to turn this chaos to his advantage by having a clear understanding of the impact of tactical activity on the campaign plan, and ultimately the political objectives. Such an understanding will establish an advantage over an adversary who is unable or unwilling to recognize this essential linkage. As such he should be closely involved in the measurement of campaign progress in order to assess progress to know if he is winning. Campaign management is accomplished largely through a series of boards and meetings organized under the banner of Campaign Rhythm. Exactly how this is achieved will vary with the nature of the operation, especially in multinational operations, but whatever the circumstances, the JFC should be clear about what information he needs and how it should be presented to him. His role is to steer and guide the process, directly or through the COS, so that he can make timely and effective decisions. 0644. The Force. To exploit fully the complementary nature of the CC relationships and to derive the potential synergy for the successful prosecution of joint operations, integration, synchronization and coordination22 of effort is of paramount importance: a. Integration. Integration is the process by which the capabilities of the entire force, together with other organizations and agencies, are merged within the force HQ. The result is a HQ with robust linkages to the strategic and tactical levels, staffed by officers of all Services, with representation from all contributing nations, and forces merged into joint and multinational
22
See AJP-3(A) for details on synchronization and coordination processes.
components. The consequence is an integrated approach to operations driven by mutual understanding, trust and a common purpose and is a fundamental goal of the JFC. An effective method of achieving high levels of integration is to conduct a mission rehearsal prior to an operation. The aim of the rehearsal is to synchronize battlespace systems and to identify operational issues and concerns sufficiently early to inform and validate the final plan. The rehearsal allows for interaction between the JFCs staff and the various component staffs across the full span of the concept of operation. The CCs and selected JFC staff will brief their concept of operation and situational assessment. These efforts will collectively synchronize the JFC staff and the components in the execution of key military tasks during a given time period and identify issues and concerns. b. Coordination of Effort. All forces under the JFCs command should proactively consult, cooperate, and deconflict in order to achieve the JFCs intent in a coordinated manner. CCs, when assigned an Area of Operations (AOO), are tasked to plan operations in their area; the choice of AOO influences the level of coordination. When a CC conducts operations, coordination is required with the other CCs in order to support their shaping of the battle space and execution of operations. If AOOs border each other, cooperation is needed for cross or close border operations, synchronization and manoeuvre. Supporting/supported relationships can also direct coordination. Synchronization of Effort. Synchronization concerns the focusing of resources and activities together for maximum effect and can only be achieved when there is effective integration and coordination. It is usually governed by time and space dimensions and is assisted greatly by the foundation of a shared and in-depth understanding of the joint operational situation and the JFCs intent. To direct the main effort of the campaign, the JFC may designate a supported commander to synchronize subordinate operations throughout his designated JOA or within the limits of an AOO, and for a given time. The JFC will also designate those components or elements that will play a supporting role.
c.
0645. Other Organizations. The JFC will need to make a careful assessment of other organizations operating within the JOA. This may include diplomatic and military representatives and forces from political authorities other than his own, as well as a potentially large number of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many of these organizations are under no obligation to coordinate their activities with those of the military and may be operating to a different set of objectives and values. Coordination, in order to achieve unity of effort, will be a difficult challenge, but it should not be viewed as a civil/military transition, rather as a partnership from the very outset
Preparing for Opportunities and Reverses 0646. To dominate his adversary the JFC should monitor the progress of the campaign and adapt the plan to exploit opportunities to advantage he should be ready for success. There should be a flank to exploit or an ability to make one (flank in its widest sense, not just physical). Then there should be an arm capable of exploiting this flank to the point of decision; that arm should be sustained. At the same time he should attempt to anticipate reverses and plan to overcome setbacks. To do this effectively he should retain time to think, to step back, take the longer-term view and not be distracted by short-term expediency. There is a danger that the immediacy of the JFCs actions can distract his attention from the activities and intentions of the adversary. 0647. Success can breed complacency, particularly when dealing with an outclassed adversary, and can lead to disastrous consequences. Care should be taken to prevent stagnation, to avoid becoming predictable. Although restraint should be displayed, the JFC should beware of the failure to apply advantage leading to an incomplete victory. 0648. In considering the committal of the operational level reserve, the following questions should be addressed: a. b. During the planning stage, what kind of reserve is required? Can it be afforded? Under what circumstances would the reserve be committed? What effect is required by its use? What size does it need to be and what capabilities does it require? The reserve should not be thought of necessarily in a conventional sense. Where does it need to be placed (consider each element separately)? In which environment is it most likely to be used? Under what conditions will it require moving to be ready for employment (for example a significant change in the weather)? How long does it take to launch (in total or in part)? At which level should it be kept? How to conceal its location and movement from the enemy?
c. d. e. f.
0649. Progress Review. During an operation, the plan should be continually reviewed.23 This is essential to ensure that required changes or branch plans could be incorporated into the plan in time to ensure the mission continues to be achievable.
23
See AJP-5, Chapter 4.
During an operation there will often be changes in the situation, which may necessitate the review of a plan, or higher authority may direct it. The maintenance of a running intelligence analysis will enable an accurate appreciation of the opposing forces situation. In this case, the existing plans should be reviewed in terms of the new situation to determine if additional plans are required or if revisions to current plans will suffice. This review links to the monitoring of campaign progress described in Chapter 4, which will determine whether the required effects are being achieved and the campaign is advancing towards the end state.
Section VI Termination
0650. Alliance operations inherently have both political and military goals; as such, exclusively military lines of activity will probably not achieve the strategic end state. While every campaign or major operation is directed towards a goal, at some point military action is no longer the main effort. It may be necessary for one mission to terminate and be replaced by another as part of a wider strategic plan, perhaps directed by the United Nations (UN). The term termination in this context is really more about transition than traditional notions of cease fires and victory parades. Instead the commander seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end state has been achieved, how to preserve that which has been gained, and how to make it enduring. As the military objectives will probably be achieved well before the Alliances strategic end state is realized, a follow-on force will inevitably be required. This has been particularly true of the Alliances recent experience, with an Alliance mission terminating and being replaced by another mission.24 0651. Some key considerations for the JFC are: a. A clear idea of the conditions that should exist before the end state can be said to have been achieved is required. These conditions should be identified beforehand and a system of measuring them put in place, recognising that they may alter as the campaign progresses. Often there will be a considerable time gap between the achievement of the military end state and the strategic end state. What structures, capabilities and postures are required next? Over the period of an operation a force will change, adjusting balance, configuration and posture, dictated by the evolving operating environment and conditions that exist at the time. It may look substantially different at the end of an operation to its original state. The difficulty of a large-scale change in posture and its adoption by a force configured mentally and physically for a different sort of operation should not be underestimated.
b.
24
For example in the Balkans where Alliance missions terminated and were replaced by EU missions, or in Afghanistan where a non-NATO mission was replaced by a NATO-led mission.
c.
How to change the organization and focus of the staff? Too early and there is a danger that they lose focus, too late and a period of instability may occur as readjustment takes place. How to avoid a resumption of hostilities? What state should the indigenous forces or warring factions be left in? How will responsibilities be transferred to indigenous or follow-on forces, or other organizations? Here, as much involvement by a wide range of key stakeholders as possible as part of a collective strategy is highly recommended.
d.
LEXICON
PART I ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The Lexicon contains abbreviations relevant to AJP-01(C) and is not meant to be exhaustive. The definitive and more comprehensive list of abbreviations is in AAP-15, abbreviations introduced in AJP-01(C) are annotated. ACO ACT ADL AJODWG 01(C)) AJP AMCC AOI AOO AOR ATP BDA C2 C2CS C2IS CAOC CBRN CC CCIR CDC CEP CHOD CIMIC CIS CJSOR CJTF CNO COA COG COMCJTF CONPLAN CONOPS COS Allied Command Operations Allied Command Transformation Allied Disposition List Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (new AJPAllied Joint Publication Allied Movement Coordination Centre Area of Interest Area of Operations Area of Responsibility Allied Tactical Publication Battle Damage Assessment Command and Control Command and Control Communication System Command and Control Information Systems Combined Air Operations Centre Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Component Command(er) Commanders Critical Information Requirement Campaign Design Concept(s) (new for AJP-01(C)/AJP-5 only) Civil Emergency Planning Chief of Defence Civil-Military Cooperation Communication and Information System Combined Joint Statement of Requirement Combined Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations (new AJP-01(C) from MC422/2) Course of Action Centre of Gravity Commander Combined Joint Task Force (new AJP-01(C) from MC 389/2) Contingency Plan Concept of Operations Chief of Staff Lexicon-1 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
CPG CRM CRO DCAOC DCOS DDP DDR DF DJTF DP DPC DRC DRR EAPC EEFI EEI EW EU FDC FFIR FLR FP GOP GRF HN HNS HOM HRF I&W ICI IMS Info Ops INFOSEC IO IPB IPF JFACC
Commanders Planning Guidance (new AJP-01(C)/AJP-5 from MC 133/3 corrigendum 3) Crisis Response Measure Crisis Response Operation Deployable Combined Air Operations Centre Deputy Chief of Staff Detailed Deployment Plan Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration Deployable Force (new AJP-01(C) from MC317/1) Deployable Joint Task Force Decisive Point (AJP-01(C)/AJP-5 only from MC 133/3 corrigendum 3) Defence Planning Committee Defence Review Committee Defence Requirements Review Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Essential Elements of Friendly Information Essential Elements of Information Electronic Warfare European Union Force Designation Category (AJP-01(C) from MC317/1) Friendly Forces Information Requirement Force of Lower Readiness Force Protection Guidelines for Operational Planning Graduated Readiness Force Host Nation Host Nation Support Head of Mission High-Readiness Force Indications and Warning Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (new AJP-01(C) only) International Military Staff Information Operations [Electronic] Information Security International Organisation Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (or Battlespace) In-Place Force Joint Forces Air Component Commander Lexicon-2 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
JFLCC JFMCC JOA LEGAD LTBF MC MJO 317/1) MNDDP MOE MOU MRO NAC NATO NCC NCRS NCRSM NCS NETF NFS NGO NID NIWS NMA NNCN NPG NRF NTF NTG OPCON OPG OPLAN OPP OPSEC OSCE PC PCG PfP PI PIA
Joint Forces Land Component Commander Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander Joint Operations Area Legal Adviser Long-Term Build-Up Force Military Committee Major Joint Operation (new AJP-01(C) from MG 2002 and MC Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan Measure of Effectiveness Memorandum of Understanding Military Response Option North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Contingent Commander (new AJP-01(C)) NATO Crisis Response System NATO Crisis Response System Manual NATO Command Structure NATO Expanded Task Force NATO Force Structure Non-Governmental Organization NAC Initiating Directive (new AJP-01(C) from MC133/3, NCRS) NATO Intelligence Warning System NATO/National Military Authority Non-NATO Contributing Nations Nuclear Planning Group NATO Response Force NATO Task Force NATO Task Group Operational Control Operational Planning Group (new AJP-01(C) from MC 133/3) Operation Plan Operational Planning Process Operations Security Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Political Committee Policy Coordination Group Partnership for Peace Public Information Public Information Adviser Lexicon-3 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
PIC PIO PIR PME NCRS) POLAD PPP PS PSO PsyOp(s) RFI ROE ROEREQ ROEIMPL SACEUR SACT SC SCEPC SDP SHAPE SIR SOF SOFA SOR SRSG SUPPLAN TACOM TACON TOA UN UNSC WMD
Press Information Centre Public Information Office(r) Priority Intelligence Requirement Political-Military Estimate (new AJP-01(C) from MC133/3, Political Adviser Presence Posture and Profile (new AJP-01(C) from MC422/2, AJP-3.10) Planning Situation Peace Support Operation Psychological Operation(s) Request for Information Rules of Engagement ROE Request ROE Implementation (new AJP-01(C), drawn from MC 362/1) Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Strategic Command(er) Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee Standing Defence Plan Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Specific Intelligence Requirements (new AJP-01(C) drawn from AJP- 2.1) Special Operations Force Status of Forces Agreement Statement of Requirements Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN) Support Plan Tactical Command Tactical Control Transfer of Authority United Nations United Nations Security Council Weapon of Mass Destruction
Lexicon-4 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
PART II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

alliance The result of formal agreements (i.e. treaties) between two or more nations for broad, longterm objectives which further the common interests of its members. When the word alliance is written with a capital A (Alliance), it refers specifically to NATO. (This is a new term and definition which is being staffed for ratification within the context of this publication and will be proposed for inclusion in the NTDB and AAP-6) area of influence A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command or control. (AAP-6) area of intelligence responsibility An area allocated to a commander in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence, within the means at his disposal. (AAP-6) area of interest The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. (AAP-6) area of operations An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. (AAP-6) area of responsibility The geographical area assigned to the NATO strategic command Allied Command Operations. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as a modification to the existing term in AAP-6) asymmetric threat A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or negate an opponents strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result. (AAP-6) battle damage assessment The assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective. (AAP-6)
campaign A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6) centre of gravity Characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (AAP-6) civil-military cooperation The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (AAP-6) collection plan A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (AAP 6) collective strategy A framework used to comprehend the interdependencies of the security, governance, economic, social and human societal domains and to chart the long term coordinated action agreed by the key stakeholders; local governance and the international community. (This is a new term and definition which is being staffed for ratification within the context of this publication, and will be proposed for inclusion in the NTDB and AAP-6) combined Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of more than one nation participate. [The term multinational is preferred within the Allied joint community] (AAP-6) combined joint task force A combined joint task force is a combined and joint deployable task force, tailored to the mission, and formed for the full range of the Alliances military missions. (This is a new term and definition which is being staffed for ratification within the context of this publication, and will be proposed for inclusion in the NTDB and AAP-6) combined operation An operation conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. [The term multinational is preferred within the Allied joint community] (AAP-6)
command 1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit, group of units, organisation or area under the authority of a single individual. 4. To dominate an area or situation. 5. To exercise a command. (AAP-6) communication system An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to accomplish information transfer functions. Notes: 1. A communication system provides communication between its users and may embrace transmission systems, switching systems and user systems. 2. A communication system may also include storage or processing functions in support of information transfer. (AAP-6) communication and information system Collective term for communication systems and information systems. (AAP-6) component command 1. In the NATO military command structure, a third-level command organization with specific air, maritime or land capabilities. It is responsible for region-wide operational planning and conduct of subordinate operations as directed by the NATO commander. 2. A functional component command or environmental component command responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as a modification to the existing term in AAP-6) component commander 1. A single-service or functional component commander at the third level of the NATO military command structure. 2. A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (AAP-6) concept of operations A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. (AAP-6) conduct of operations The art of directing, coordinating, controlling and adjusting the actions of forces to achieve specific objectives. (AAP-6)
contingency plan A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6) control That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. (AAP-6) course of action In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6) decisive point A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or in the information environment. (AAP-6) doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (AAP-6) electronic warfare Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP6) end state The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6) fires The physical effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. (This term is a new term and definition, is being staffed for ratification within the context of this publication, and will be proposed for inclusion in the NTDB and AAP-6) force protection All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. (AAP-6)
functional command A command organisation based on military functions rather than geographic areas. (AAP6) host nation A nation which, by agreement: a. Receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. Allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. Provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6) host-nation support Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nations territory. (AAP-6) information operations Coordinated and synchronized actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of the Alliance overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting ones own. (This is a new term and definition which is being staffed for ratification within the context of this publication, and will be proposed for inclusion in the NTDB and AAP-6) intelligence The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity. (AAP-6) interoperability The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. Related term: standardisation. (AAP-6) joint Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. (AAP-6) joint force commander A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint force. (This is a new term and definition which is being staffed for ratification within the context of this publication, and will be proposed for inclusion in the NTDB and AAP-6) Lexicon-9 ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
joint operations area A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency - or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (AAP-6) line of operation In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. (AAP-6) logistics The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with: a. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of materiel. b. Transport of personnel. c. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities. d. Acquisition or furnishing of services. e. Medical and health service support. (AAP-6) military strategy That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations. (AAP-6) mission 1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. 2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task. (AAP-6) multinational Preferred term: combined. (AAP-6) national command A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander. (AAP-6) national commander A national commander, territorial or functional, who is normally not in the Allied chain of command. (AAP-6)
national component Any national forces of one or more services under the command of a single national commander, assigned to any NATO commander. (AAP-6) NATO assigned forces Forces/HQs which nations agree to place under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander in accordance with the NATO Crisis Response System, or as specified in special agreements such as MOU or when requested by a Strategic Commander through an Activation Order on the basis of a North Atlantic Council-agreed OPLAN and Execution Directive. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as modification to the existing term in AAP-6) NATO command forces Forces/HQs in being which nations have placed under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as modification to the existing term in AAP-6) NATO earmarked forces Forces/HQs which nations agree to place under the operational command or the operational control of a NATO commander at some future time. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as modification to the existing term in AAP-6) NATO military authority Any international military headquarters or organization covered by the Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, (called the Paris Protocol) and any other military authority to which the NATO Council has applied the provisions of the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and International Staff (called the Ottawa Agreement) by virtue of the said Agreement. (AAP-6) operation A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6) operation order A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of affecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)
operation plan A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation plan is usually used instead of order in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6) operational art The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (This term is a new term and definition, is being staffed for ratification within the context of this publication, and will be proposed for inclusion in the NTDB and AAP-6) operational command The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note it does not include responsibility for administration. (AAP-6) operational control The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6) operational level The level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as a modification to the existing term in AAP-6) operations security The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6) peace support force A military force assigned to a peace support operation. (AAP-6)
peace support operation An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. (AAP-6) public information Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support. (MC457) readiness state The measure of the capability of forces at a given point in time to execute their assigned missions. (AAP-6) rules of engagement Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (AAP-6) standardization The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs in order to achieve and maintain the compatibility, interchangeability or commonality which are necessary to attain the required level of interoperability, or to optimise the use of resources, in the fields of operations, materiel and administration. (AAP-6) strategic level The level of operations at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as modification to the existing term in AAP-6) supported commander A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6) supporting commander A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6) sustainability The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6)
tactical command The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6) tactical control The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6) tactical level The level of operations at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as modification to the existing term in AAP-6)
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS
C-M(99)21 C-M(2001)63 PO(2005)0089 SG(2002)0572 SG(2003)0355 MCM-077-00 MC 327/2 MC 53/3 MC 58/3 MC 133/3 Corr 3 MC 317/1 MC 324/1 MC 327/2 MC 362/1 MC 389/2 MC 400/2 MC 402/1 MC 411/1 MC 422/2 MC 457 MC 472 MC 477 AJP-2 AJP-2.1 AJP-3 AJP-3.4.1 AJP-3.9 AJP-3.10 AJP-3.10.1 AJP-3.12 AJP-3.13 AJP-4 AJP-5 AJP-9 AAP-6 (2006) AAP-15(2006) The Alliances Strategic Concept NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS): Policy Guidelines NATO Crisis Response System Manual Guidance for The Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism Exchange of Letters between NATO and the EU on the Compilation of the Results of the Work on NATO-EU Relations Military Committee Guidance on the Relationship between NATO Policy and Military Doctrine NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATOs Operational Planning System The NATO Force Structure The NATO Military Command Structure NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations NATO Rules of Engagement MC Policy on NATOs Combined Joint Task Force MC Directive for Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy NATO Military Policy on Psychological Operations NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) NATO Policy on Information Operations NATO Military Policy on Public Information NATO Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism Military Concept for the NATO Response Force Joint Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security Doctrine Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations Allied Doctrine for Joint Targeting Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological operations Allied Joint Doctrine for Engineering Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications
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Ajp - 01 (C) Allied Joint Operation

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AJP-01(C)

ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

ORIGINAL NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

6-1 6-4 6-8 6-14 6-15 6-19

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

CHAPTER 1 THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Section I Strategic Trends

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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For example, civilian aircraft, ships, or sleeper devices.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

Securing Afghanistans Future, page79.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

Rule of law lost

National military support ineffective or part of the problem

Insufficient, national military not enough to provide support

Effective, with national military support

Rule of law upheld

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

MC 327/2, para 41.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED AJP-01(C)

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