IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BELIZE, A.D.

2010

Claim No. 668 of 2010

IN THE MATTER OF the Constitution of Belize And IN THE MATTER OF the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 53 of the Criminal Code And IN THE MATTER OF an application made pursuant to Section 20(1) of the said Constitution

BETWEEN

CALEB OROZCO UNITED BELIZE ADVOCACY MOVEMENT Claimants AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BELIZE AND THE COMMONWEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION THE HUMAN DIGNITY TRUST THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS Interested Parties AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF BELIZE THE BELIZE CHURCH OF ENGLAND CORPORATE BODY THE BELIZE EVANGELICAL ASSOCIATION OF CHURCHES Interested Parties Defendant

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF BELIZE, THE BELIZE CHURCH OF ENGLAND CORPORATE BODY, and THE BELIZE EVANGELICAL ASSOCIATION OF CHURCHES (the Church Interested Parties)

A. Facts: The Claimants, Caleb Orosco and UNIBAM filed a motion, by way of a fixed date claim form dated the 24th of September 2010, seeking constitutional relief and claim, pursuant to r. 56 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, among others, the following:

1. A Declaration that section 53 of the Belize Criminal Code, Cap 101 which provides that Every person who has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any person or animal shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. Contravenes the constitutional rights of the Claimants enshrined in sections 3, 6, and 14 of the Belize Constitution and affirmed in the Preamble of the Belize Constitution and is accordingly null and void and of no effect to the extent that it applies to carnal intercourse between persons. 2. An Order striking out the words with any person or appearing in the said section 53. 3. .; 4. ..; 5. ..;

TAB 1 On or about the 24th day of May 2011 the Church Interested applied for and obtained leave of the Court to be joined as Interested Parties to the captioned claim. The Court granted the Church Interested Parties leave to join, to file affidavits and to make written and oral submissions at the hearing of this claim. TAB 2

Pursuant to this Order, the Church Interested Parties filed the following affidavits: 1. Affidavit of Bishop Philip Wright dated the 2nd day of September 2011; TAB 3 2. Affidavit of Bishop Dorick Wright dated the 7th day of September 2011; TAB 4 3. Affidavit of Pastor Eugene Crawford dated the 7th day of September 2011; TAB 5 4. Affidavit of Henry Lawrence dated the 13th day of September 2011. TAB 6
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B. Applications

There are 2 applications for the consideration of the Court:

1.

The first is by the Church Interested Parties, dated the 17TH day of October 2011 by which they seek the following reliefs:

(1) that the Second Claimant, UNIBAM, be struck as a claimant in this action, on the basis that it has no constitutional rights guaranteed by sections 3, 6 and or 14 of the Constitution of Belize; (2) that the affidavits of Jacqueline Sharpe dated th the 8 day of April 2011 and of Ryan Goodman dated the 12th of April 2011, Nicole Haylock dated the 8th of July 2011 and Joan Burke dated the 15th of September 2011 be struck out as being filed in violation of Part 32 of the Supreme Court ( Civil Procedure) Rules , 2005; (3) that Bruce Abramson of 41 rue de Zurich, Geneva, CH -1201, Switzerland; Grover Joseph Rees, of 1931 East Willow Street, Lafayette, Louisiana 70501; Dr. John R. Diggs Jr. of No. 2 Burnett Ave, South Hadley, Massachusetts, United States of America and Dr. Brendan Bain of 15 Margaret Drive, Hope Pastures, St. Andrew, Jamaica be admitted as expert witnesses in this matter;

(4) that the reports of the said experts be submitted to the Court and the Other parties within 60 days from the date of the appointment; (5) that the Applicants, the Church Interested Parties, be entitled, upon serving a copy of the experts report upon the Parties to this action, be allowed to rely on the reports as evidence at the hearing of the Claim herein; (6) (7) Such further Order as the Court deems just. Cost

This application is supported by an affidavit of the Bishop Philip Wright dated the 17th of October 2011.

2. The second application, is by the Claimants who have, in response, filed an application by which they seek the following reliefs: 1. That the affidavits of Bishop Philip Wright filed on the 8th of September 2011, Bishop Dorick Wright filed on the 7th of September 2011, Pastor Eugene Crawford filed on the 7th September 2011 and Henry Lawrence filed on the 13th September 2011 be struck out as being filed in violation of Part 32 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and/or violation of CPR part 30(3).

2. That Ryan Goodman of 40 Washington Square, New York, NY 10012, United States of America; Jacqueline Sharpe 33A Ridgewood Towers, Four Roads, Diego Martin; Nicole Haylock of 1114 Applestar Street, Belize City, Belize; Joan Burke of 3222 St. Jude Street, Belize City and Chris Beyer
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of John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 111 Market Place, Suite 310, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America be admitted as experts in this matter. 3. That the affidavits of Ryan Goodman, Jacqueline Sharpe, Nicole haylock and Joan Burke do stand as expert evidence to this action and be allowed to rely on the said affidavits as evidence at the hearing of the Claim herein; 4. That the service of reports of Ryan Goodman, Jacqueline Sharpe, Nicole Haylock and Joan Burke the said experts, to the Court and other parties be dispensed with; 5. That the service of the report of Chris Beyer be submitted to the Court and the Other parties within 40 days from the date of the appointment. 6. Costs; and 7. Such further orders as the Court deems just

The Claimants application is supported by an affidavit of Caleb Orozco dated the 11th day of November 2011.

These are the applications that are before the Court today.

SUBMISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE CHURCH INTERESTED PARTIES

C. Reliefs and Grounds for Reliefs being sought by the Church Interested Parties:

1. 1st RELIEF: That the Second Claimant, UNIBAM, be struck as a claimant in this action, on the basis that it has no constitutional rights guaranteed by sections 3, 6(1) and or 14(1) of the Constitution of Belize. GROUNDS: 1a. That the Second Claimant, UNIBAM, lacks locus standi to institute and maintain this Claim for constitutional relief as it has no rights under sections 3, 6 and or 14 of the Constitution of Belize that have been or are likely to be contravened in relation to it. 1b. That the United Belize Advocacy Movement (UNIBAM) is a company limited by guarantee and duly incorporated pursuant to cap. 250 of the laws of Belize and has been duly registered as a non-governmental Organization. See paragraph 5 -9 of the 1st Affidavit of Caleb Orozco. Tab 7 1c. There is no evidence before the Court that UNIBAM is alleging that it has any rights, guaranteed under sections 3, 6 or 14 of the constitution, that are being or is likely to be contravened or that UNIBAM is acting on behalf of a person or persons being detained.

1c.

Section 20 of the Belize Constitution provides that: 20(1) If any person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 3 to 19 inclusive of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of a person who is detained,
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if any other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained person), then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person (or that other person) may apply to the Supreme Court for redress.

1e. The rights that are guaranteed and enshrined under s. 3, 6 and 14 of the Constitution are rights that are accorded to individuals; so that, for a claimant to have legal standing he must show that the alleged contravention is in relation to him or to a person being detained. 1f. Justice Muria in Claim no: 292 of 2007, Belize Telecom Ltd, et al - v the Attorney General of Belize and Belize Telecommunications Ltd held that For a claimant to have legal standing to bring a claim based on any provisions of sections 3 to 19 of the Constitution, he must show that the alleged contravention is in relation to him with the exception only when the alleged contravention or likely contravention is in relation to a person detained. In the case of a detainee, the person making the allegation of contravention on behalf of the detainee, has standing to bring an action to enforce breaches of any of the provisions of sections 3 to 19 of the Constitution. I do not think that it can be seriously argued by the defendant and Interested Party, against the fact that the first, second and third claimants shares, rights and interest in those shares, as well as their directorship of BTL have been denied of them by reason of the Vesting Act 2007. The questioned that must be answered is whether that denial contravenes the rights of the first to fifth claimants as protected under sections 3 to 19 of Part II of the Constitution, in particular section 3 (Fundamental
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rights and Freedoms), section 13 (Protection of Freedom of Assembly and Association) and section 17 (Protection from Deprivation of Property). The test of standing that each of the claimants must satisfy to claim redress for breaches of any of the provisions mentioned, is that the contravention must be in relation to him. A part from the permitted exception already mentioned, no representative action can be brought to enforce the rights protected in sections 3 to 19 of the Constitution.

TAB 8

1h. In the case of United Parties v- Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Others [1998] 1 LRC 614 at 320 Gubbay Cj held that section 24(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution provided an applicant locus standi in judicio to seek redress for a contravention of the Declaration of rights solely in relation to itself (the exception being where a person is detained) it had no right to do so either on behalf of the general public or anyone else. The fact that the persons within the political organizations were voters and are able to raise objection to the Act, which would mean they would have locus standi, is irrelevant because, only the individuals can claim infringement of fundamental rights not an organization.

TAB 9

1i. Similarly, UNIBAM, notwithstanding that it claims to be a voluntary association of men who have sex with men (MSM) and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people.. has no legal standing to claim declarations or orders to be made on the grounds that its fundamental
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rights have been breached since it does not, as an organization, have constitutional standing to bring a claim for redress under Section 20 of the Constitution in relation to alleged breaches of the rights enshrined in Sections 319 of the Constitution. 1j. It has long been established that constitutional claims for redress for breach of fundamental rights may not be brought by way of a representative action. It is a requirement of the Constitution, for a Claimant to show how his/her rights or that of a detained person have been or is likely to be violated.

See Fixed Date Claim Form

Submit: s. 53 of the Criminal Code speaks to animate individuals. It is not possible for a company to have sex against the Order of nature. Therefore it cannot be said that s. 53 violates any alleged rights of a non-human. UNIBAM must assert that it is endowed with a right and that a law or act is threatening to or has violated that right. There are instances that an inanimate applicant can have its constitutional right, which gives rise to a section 20 challenge. So for example, you will see that companies have been able to allege, successfully, that their rights to freedom of speech has been violated. However, that company could never sustain a section 7 claim that its right not to be subject to inhuman treatment is being violated. This is simply because a company has no such rights. The same applies to UNIBAM as it relates to any possible allegation that section 53 violates its rights to have sex against the order of nature. It is just not endowed with such rights, hence they can never be violated.

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2.

2ND RELIEF: That the affidavits of Jacqueline Sharpe dated the 8th of April 2011 and of Ryan Goodman dated the 12th of April 2011, Nichole Haylock dated the 8th of July 2011 and Joan Burke dated the 15th of September 2011 be struck out as being filed in violation of Part 32 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2005:

Grounds: 2a. The grounds of the application to strike out affidavits of Jacqueline Sharpe, Ryan Goodman, Nicole Haylock and Joan Burke are:
1. That the four affiants purport to be experts and none deposes to facts within their knowledge with respect to the matter in this Claim. 2. That C.P.R. 32 makes provisions for the appointment and the manner in which the experts duty is to be carried out and also sets out the overriding duty the expert has to the Court; and no application has been made by the Claimant to adduce any expert evidence before the Court. 3. That prior to submitting the testimony of an expert witness, the Claimant ought to have obtained the permission of the Supreme Court, pursuant to C.P.R. 32. 4. That on or about the 14th day of April 2011, the Claimants, in support of their claim filed an affidavit which was sworn by Jacqueline Sharpe (hereinafter referred to as Sharpe) of 33A Ridgewood Towers, Four Roads, Diego Martin, Trinidad & Tobago and in which Sharpe offers expert testimony on the subject of homosexuality and the societal discrimination and stigmatization of homosexuals. 5. Similarly, the Claimants on or about the 18th April 2011 filed, in support of their claim an affidavit of Ryan Goodman of 40 Washington Square, New York, 11

N. Y. 10012, United States of America and in which the deponent describes his educational background and purports to give expert evidence on the psychological effect Sodomy Laws have on homosexual persons. 6. That furthermore, on the 8th of July 2011 and 15th of September 2011 filed affidavits sworn by Nicole Hyde and Joan Burke, who therein proceed to give expert evidence. 7. That the evidence of Jacqueline Sharpe and Ryan Goodman is not reasonably required to resolve the proceedings justly.

2b. Section 45 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 95, Laws of Belize, R.E. 2000 provide as follows: 45. (1) any point upon that science or Where there is a question as to of science or art, the opinion point of a person skilled in the art is admissible in evidence.

(2) That person is hereinafter called an expert. (3) The words science or art include all subjects on which a course of special study or experience is necessary to the formation of an opinion and, amongst others, the examination of handwriting. (4) Where there is a question as to foreign law, the opinion of an expert, who in his profession is acquainted with that law, is the only admissible evidence thereof, though the expert may produce to the court books which he declares to be works of authority upon the foreign law in question, and those books the court, having received all necessary explanations from the expert, may construe for itself. (5) It is the duty of the judge to decide whether the skill of any person in the

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matter on which evidence of his opinion is offered is sufficient to entitle him to be considered as an expert. (6) The opinion of an expert as to the existence of the facts on which his opinion is to be given is inadmissible unless he perceived those facts himself.

TAB 10 2b. Part 32 of the CPR provides, inter alia, as follows: (1) 32.2 Expert evidence must be restricted to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings justly (2) 32.3(1) it is the duty of an expert witness to help the Court impartially on the matters relevant to his expertise. (2) This duty overrides any obligations to the person by whom he is instructed or paid. (3) 32.4 (1) Expert evidence presented to the Court must be and should be seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or consent by the demands of the litigation. (2) An expert witness must provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. (4) 32.6(1) No party may call an expert witness or put in an experts report without the courts permission. (2) The General rule is that the courts permission is to be given at a case management conference. (3) When a party applies for permission under this Rule (a) that party must name the expert and identify the nature of the experts expertise; and (b) permission granted

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shall be only.

in

relation

to

that

expert

See affidavit of Jacqueline Sharpe dated the 8th of April 2011 and the 9th of June 2011; TAB 11 See Affidavit of Ryan Goodman dated the 12th day of April 2011; TAB 12 See Affidavit of Joan Burke dated the 15th day of September 2011; TAB 13 See Affidavit of Nichole Haylock dated the 8th day of July 2011; TAB 14 2d. The critical importance of the independence and impartiality of expert witnesses was highlighted by Barrow JA in Josephine Gabriel and Company Limited v- Dominica Brewery and Beverages Limited (Dominica) Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2004, he stated as follows: Both in the court below and before this court, the principal issue relating to the award of damages was which of two experts to rely upon in determining what was the loss sustained by the Appellant. The expert evidence that was given failed in a major way to comply with the provisions in the Civil Procedure Rules 2000 governing expert witness evidence and this made the evidence most unsatisfactory. The partisanship of the experts was the primary factor in the violation of the rules. Rule 32.3 states that the experts overriding duty is to the court. 32.3 (1) It is the duty of an expert witness to help the court impartially on the matters relevant to his or her expertise. (2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person by whom he or she is instructed or paid.

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Rule 32.4 set out in detail the way in which the experts duty to the court is to be carried out. The rule leaves no doubt about the importance attached to the impartiality of the expert and the need for that impartiality manifestly to be seen: 32.4 (1) Expert evidence presented to the court must be and should be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the demands of litigation The reports for both experts did not contain a statement that the expert understood her or his duty to the court or that she or he had complied with that duty. There was no indication that either expert had included in her or his report all matters within her or his knowledge and area of expertise relevant to the issue. The instructions given to the experts were not disclosed. The breaches of the rules that were committed in the presentation of the expert evidence were egregious. The parties were lucky to escape the consequences of such breaches. It would have been entirely appropriate because it would have been proportionate to the scale of the violations, for the judge to refuse to receive the evidence of both expert witnesses. The administration of justice cannot countenance the conduct of litigation in such a flagrant violation of rules specifically designed to protect the courts against the danger of deception by apparently credible expertise that conceals its true intent of promoting the interests of its purchasers. (my emphasis) Expert evidence of that character will often be of limited, if any true, value. In this case it remains to be seen whether and to what extent, the evidence of the experts really assisted the judge in arriving at his decision. TAB 15 In the Supreme Court of Belize in Claim No. 550 of 2010, Peninsula Citizens for Sustainable Development Limited vs. Department of the Environment and Placencia Marina Limited, the relevant facts are that the Claimant filed expert evidence in the form of an affidavit without first obtaining the Courts permission as required by Part 32.6 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2005, withdrew the expert evidence and then sought at date of trial to obtain leave of the Court to call an expert witness or to put in an expert report. Justice Legall (pgs 12 -13) held: Recognizing the error of not obtaining the prior permission of the court to call the expert witness, learned counsel for the

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claimant, when the matter came up for hearing, withdrew, in open court, the expert affidavit of Dr. Mark Chernaik. On the 25th of May 2011 the Claimant filed an application for permission to call Dr. Mark Chernaik, as an expert witness, and to file an experts report. The grounds for the application stated that Dr. Mark Cherbnaik, an environmental lawyer and scientist, is able to assist the court impartially on the issues in the claim which are within his area of expertise. The Claimant also stated, as additional grounds, that the affidavit of Dr. Chernaik dated 30th July 2010 was not properly before the court, and that the expert evidence sought by the new application was reasonably required to resolve the proceedings justly. The defendant and the interested party objected to the application on several grounds; but the most important ground, in my view, was that the claimant did not comply with Part 32(6)(3) of the Rules, which states that when a party applies for permission to call an expert witness or to put in an expert report that party must name the expert and identify the nature of the experts expertise. Rule 32.692) states that the general rule is that the courts permission is to be given at a case management conference. There is no doubt that the claimant failed to comply with Rules 32.6(2) and (3). The application was made long after holding of case management, at a time when the case was set for trial, and nowhere in the application of the affidavit in support of the application, does it identify the nature of Dr. mark Chernaiks expertise. It is stated, rather vaguely, that he is an environmental lawyer and scientist. What jkind of scientist is he and in which aspect or aspects of the environment is he an expert. These questions remain unanswered.

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It seems to me that the intention of Rule 32.6(3) is that the application for permission to call an expert must show evidence to satisfy the court that the intended expert does not only possess the necessary training and experience fo the subject matter, but is also suitable to assist the court on the subject on which he intends to trestify. Neither the application nor the supporting affidavit satisfies, in my view, Rule 32.6(3). But the Claimant has submitted, among other things, and based on the overriding objective of the Rules, which is to enable the court to deal with cases justly, that the objective requires granting the application. Rule 1.12 states that dealing justly with a case includes ensuring, so far as is practicable, that the parties are on an equal footing. In this matter, the other parties the defendant and interested party have not made an application to call an expert. Moreover there is the breach of Rules 32.6(2) and (3). I think it would be unjust to grant the application which was made late and at the date of trial of the matter and contrary to the Rules. (my emphasis) 2e. The affidavit of Nicole Haylock dated the 8th of July 2011 and filed on the 11th of July 2011; the affidavit of Joan Burke dated the 15th day of September 2011 and filed on the 16th day of September 2011; Ryan Goodman sworn on the 12th of April 2011 and filed on the 18th of April 2011; the affidavits of Jacqueline Sharp dated the 8th day of April 2011 and filed on the 14th day of April 2011 fail to comply with the provisions of C.P.R. 32.12 (2) in that each of them: a. Contains no statement that the deponent understand his/her duty to the court as set out in Rules 32.3 and 32.4 (C.P.R. 32.12(2)(a)); b. Contains no statement that the deponent understand that he/she has complied with that duty (C.P.R. 32.12(2) (b); c. Does not contain a statement that the report includes all matters within the experts knowledge and area of expertise relevant to the issue on which the expert evidence is given (C.P.R. 32.12(2) (c);

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d. Does not contain a statement that the expert has given details in the report of any matters which to his knowledge might affect the validity of the report (C.P.R. 32.12(2) (d); e. All of the experts failed to attach: i. All written instructions given to him/her; ii. Any supplemental instructions given to him/her since the original Instructions were given; iii. A note of any oral instructions given to him or her nor have any of He or she has received them provided a statement certifying that no other instructions other than those disclosed from the party instructing the expert, the partys legal practitioner or any other person acting on behalf of that party. (C.P.R. 32.12(3)(a)(b)(c); In the case of Stevens v. Gullis [2000] 1 All ER 527, Lord Woolf MR in upholding the decision of a judge to exclude expert evidence for the failure to comply with the duty to act impartially and to disclose the instructions that he had been given, held: RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXPERTS Taking those two points in turn, I have come to the conclusion that there can be no doubt whatsoever in this case that the judge was perfectly entitled to make the orders which he did. First, with regard to Mr Isaac as an expert witness, he demonstrated by his conduct that he had no conception of the requirements placed upon an expert under the CPR. The CPR only came into force on 26 April 1999. But, as I have already indicated, in the order of 26 March 1999 reference had been made to the practice direction to Part 35 which was to come into force on 26 April 1999, the relevant part of which had specifically been drawn to the attention of the defendant by that order. The practice direction did no more than reflect the position as it had been well enunciated in the authorities prior to the CPR coming into force.

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The position was made clear in numerous authorities but, in particular, in the decision of Cresswell J in the Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 LLoyd's Rep 68. In different words Cresswell J summarised the duties of an expert. There can be no excuse, based upon the fact that the CPR only came into force on 26 April 1999, for the fact that Mr Isaac did not understand the requirements of the courts with regard to experts. Those requirements are underlined by the CPR. It is now clear from the rules that, in addition to the duty which an expert owes to a party, he is also under a duty to the court. The series of orders made by the judge to which I have referred were designed to bring the present proceedings forward to a state where they could be conveniently tried at the proposed date in June 1999. If those order had been followed, it should have been possible to identify clearly and precisely what were the real issues between the parties. Because of the way which Mr Isaac responded to the experts' meeting, that was not possible. The requirements of the practice direction that an expert understands his responsibilities, and is required to give details of his qualifications and the other matters set out in paragraph 1 of the practice direction, are intended to focus the mind of the expert on his responsibilities in order that the litigation may progress in accordance with the overriding principles contained in Part 1 of the CPR. Mr Isaac had demonstrated that he had no conception of those requirements and I am quite satisfied that the judge had no alternative but to take the action which he did notwithstanding the fact that the CPR had only recently come into force and the consequences to the defendant of the course which was taken was draconian and could

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deprive him of a claim which he might otherwise have against the architect. TAB 16

These cases illustrate the point that the Courts will disallow a purported expert witness from giving evidence where the said witness demonstrates by his/her conduct that he/she has no concept of the requirements placed on him/her by the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. This is so, it is submitted by the Church Interested Parties because parties no longer have what was previously an almost unhindered right to call their own experts to give evidence in court. Expert witnesses now have an overriding duty to the court.it is the duty of the expert witness to help the court impartially on the matters relevant to his expertise (CPR 32.3(1)) and this duty overrides any obligations to the person by whom he is instructed or paid (CPR 32.3(2)) Jacqueline Sharpe, Ryan Goodman, Nichole Haylock and Joan Burke having already given evidence without regard for the Supreme Court (Civil Procdure Rules) should not now be allowed to provide evidence to the Court as expert witnesses. 3. 3rd RELIEF: That Bruce Abramson of 41 rue de Zurich, Geneva, CH-1201, Switzerland; Grover Joseph Rees of 1931 East Willow Street, Lafayette, Lousiana 70501; Dr. John R. Diggs of No. 2 Burnett Ave., South Hadley, Massachusetts, United States of America and Dr. Brendan Bain of 15 Margaret Drive, Hope Pastures, St. Andrew, Jamaica be admitted as expert witnesses in this matter; Grounds: 3a. That Bruce Abramson and Grover Joseph Rees, are experts in International and Human Rights law and are able to provide evidence in regard to the subject matter of this Claim, that would assist the Court in arriving at a just decision in this matter; Dr. John R. Diggs Jr. And Dr. Brendan Bain are experts on the matter of Public Health and particularly are able to provide the Court with

3b.

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evidence on the matter of Homosexual behaviour and how it affects the Public Health system.

It is a matter for the court to determine what expert evidence would be reasonably required for the just determination of the issues before the Court and in this regard there must be a determination as to whether the expert evidence sought to be adduced would qualify as admissible expert evidence within the provisions of section 45 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 95, Laws of Belize, R.E. 2000.

see affidavit of Bishop Philip Wright dated the 17th of October 2011, para. 8 & 9.

Dated the 30th day of January

2012

Prepared By,

__________________ MICHEL CHEBAT,S.C of M.H.CHEBAT & Co Attorneys-at-law

This Submission was filed by COURTENAY COYE LLP, RODWELL WILLIAMS, S.C., JACQUELINE MARSHALLECK and MICHEL CHEBAT, S.C. for and on behalf of the Church Interested Parties whose place of service is c/o COURTENAY COYE LLP of No. 15 A Street, Belize City, Belize, Attorneys on behalf of the Applicant.

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