J. L.

S H A W

EMPTY TERMS: THE NYAYA AND THE BUDDHISTS

The purpose of this paper is to explain the Buddhists' conception of empty term, which is linked up with their conception of ~ n y a t d , and to answer some of the questions raised by certain contemporary writers x on Ny~ya and Buddhism. Moreover, the aim is to show an important function of language which is embedded in the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. As to the background of this controversy between the Ny~ya and the Buddhists the reader will find an excellent exposition in B. K. Matilal's Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. The controversy between the Nyaya and the Buddhists occurs in the context of the proof of the proposition 'whatever exists is momentary'. In this context it is to be remembered that the Buddhists wanted to prove in some sense of the term 'proof' the following propositions. (At the end of this paper we shall see in what sense they wanted to prove these propositions.) (1) (2) (3) Whatever exists is momentary. Whatever is momentary is suffering. Whatever is suffering is g~nya.

Sometimes the proposition 'whatever is momentary is unique' is ineluded in this list. In this paper we are mainly concerned with an implication of (1) and (3). The proof of (1) requires agreeing and disagreeing examples. In this context it is to be noted that according to Indian logicians both agreeing and disagreeing examples are to be cited, unless the possibility of having both types of examples is ruled out by the very nature of the inference in question. The disagreeing examples to prove the proposition 'whatever exists is momentary' refer to empty terms. The Buddhists use examples such as 'A hare's horn which is non-momentary does not exist'. The Ny~ya points out that if the Buddhists assign existence to the locus of non-momentariness, then they are contradicting their position, and if the
Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1974) 332-343. All Rights Reserved Copyright 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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locus is unreal, then it cannot be used as an example to prove the above proposition. The Ny~ya also claimed that the Buddhists would consider the proposition 'The (A) rabbit's horn is not sharp' as true. It is also claimed by the Ny~ya that if the proposition 'The (A) rabbit's horn is not sharp' is to be considered as true on the ground that we simply refuse to attribute a property to a fictitious object, then the proposition 'The (A) rabbit's horn is sharp' should be considered as true on similar grounds. Let us consider the Ny~ya analysis of the proposition 'A rabbit's horn is sharp'. If this proposition represents a cognitive state, it can be symbolised in the following way 2: (C) a ( a (O (rabbit-rabbitness) a (horn-hornness)) Q (sharpsharpness)),

where 'Q' stands for the relation 'qualificand-qualifier'. (C) represents a complex cognitive state which involves three elementary cognitive states, viz., Q(rabbit-rabbitness), Q(horn-hornness), Q(sharpsharpness). These cognitive states are valid because they correspond to reality and the propositions corresponding to these states are true. But the cognitive state, Q (Q (rabbit-rabbitness) Q 0aorn-hornness)), is erroneous beeanse it does not correspond to reality. Hence the proposition corresponding to this cognitive state is false. Now the question is whether the proposition 'A rabbit's horn is sharp' is true or false. Since the qualificand of the qualifier sharp is erroneous, it may be said that the whole cognitive state is erroneous and the proposition which represents this cognitive state is false. A similar analysis of the proposition 'A rabbit's horn is not sharp' can be given and on similar grounds it can also be regarded as false. Now the question is whether the propositions 'Devadatta is white' and 'Devadatta is not white' can be considered as false if there is no one called 'Devadatta'. Udayana 3, a Naiy~tyika, says:
If nobody has ever seen or known a person called 'Devadatta' anywhere at any time, then the question 'Is Devadatta white, or is he black?' results simply from some outrageous perversion. A n d if, without caring to understand what this is all about, someone answers the question by saying 'he is white' another person has as much right to answer by saying "he is black'. Nothing is established by such questions and answers. In each case, the lack of our means of knowledge (to establish the subject term) and (the consequent possibility of) self-contradiction remain the same.

F r o m the above comment of Udayana it seems to us that he would con-

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sider both the propositions 'Devadatta is white' and 'Devadatta is not white' as neither true nor false. 4 There is no parallel between 'A rabbit's horn is sharp' and 'Devadatta is white' or between 'A rabbit's horn is not sharp' and 'Devadatta is not white'. In the proposition 'Devadatta is white' 'Devadatta' is not a disguised sentence or proposition, while in the case of 'A hare's horn is sharp' 'A hare's horn' is a disguised sentence or a proposition. Moreover, in the proposition 'Devadatta is white' there is no qualificand corresponding to 'Devadatta', while in the proposition 'A hare's horn is sharp' there is a qualificand corresponding to 'A hare's horn'. That is to say, there is an intentional object corresponding to the subject term in the latter case, but not in the former case. On this point one might draw some similarity between Russell and the Nygya. According to both Russell and the Ny~ya the proposition 'A hare's horn is sharp' is meaningful, but false. Russell has analysed this proposition into the following propositions: (a) (b) At least one thing is characterized by the property hate's horn. Whatever is characterized by hare's horn is sharp.

The proposition 'A hare's horn is sharp' is equivalent to the conjunction of (a) and (b). Since (a) is false, the conjunction of (a) and (b) is false. The Ny~ya would also analyse this proposition in a similar way. Since the cognitive state corresponding to 'A hare's horn' is erroneous, the complex cognitive state corresponding to 'A hare's horn is sharp' is erroneous. Hence the sentences or propositions corresponding to these cognitive states are false. According to the Nygya the proposition 'A hate's horn is sharp' is meaningful because it corresponds to a cognitive state or intentional object, while according to Russell a sentence or a proposition means a certain fact. He says, "... the sentence 'Socrates is mortal' means a certain fact." 5 If the Russellian facts are equated with the Ny~tya cognitive states or intentional objects, then there would be no difference between the two. It seems to us that we require many more points in common if we want to equate the Russellian facts with the Ny~ya cognitive states or intentional objects. As regards the proposition 'Devadatta is white' Russell would consider it as meaningless if 'Devadatta' is treated as a logically proper name and if there is no object denoted by 'Devadatta'. On the other hand, if 'Devadatta' is like an ordinary proper name, then the proposition 'Devadatta

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is white' would be meaningful and it would be analysed by applying his Theory of Descriptions. As to the nature of logically proper names Russell says, " A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with." 6 From the above quotation of Udayana it seems to us that he would consider 'Devadatta' as a logically proper name. But so far as the nature of a particular and our means of knowing a particular are concerned Udayana would differ from Russell. According to Russell a proposition involving a logically proper name would be meaningless if there is no object denoted by that name. It seems to us that Udayana would also consider propositions like 'Devadatta is white' as meaningless, unless he is willing to accept truth-gaps. If 'Devadatta is white' is meaningless, then according to the significance criterion for negation 'Devadatta is not white' is equally meaningless. Let us consider the proposition 'Devadatta exists'. According to Russell it is meaningless if 'Devadatta' is treated as a logically proper name. Russell's argument might be construed in the following manner. If 'Devadatta exists' is meaningful, then according to the significance criterion for negation 'Devadatta does not exist' would be equally meaningful. If the latter proposition is meaningful, then it is either true or false. If it is true, then 'Devadatta' does not denote a particular which will be the meaning of 'Devadatta'. Since a logically proper name becomes meaningless if it does not denote a particular, 'Devadatta' would be meaningless. If it were so, then the sentence or the proposition in which it occurs would be meaningless. So the proposition 'Devadatta does not exist' becomes meaningless. If it were so, then 'Devadatta exists' would be equally meaningless. Let us see whether according to the Ny~tya such propositions are meaningful or meaningless. The cognitive state or intentional object corresponding to the proposition 'Devadatta exists' would be: Q (Devadatta - existence). In this cognitive state Devadatta would be qualificand and existence would be qualifier. Since there is no person called 'Devadatta', there is no qualificand of the cognitive state. If it were so, then the proposition 'Devadatta exists' would be meaningless. If the Ny~tya accepts the significance criterion for negation, then 'Devadatta does not

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exist' becomes equally meaningless. In another way it can be shown that the proposition 'Devadatta does not exist' is meaningless if 'Devadatta' is treated as a logically proper name. The proposition 'Devadatta does not exist' asserts that the absence of Devadatta qualifies the possible qualificand of Devadatta. If Devadatta is not cognizable, the absence of Devadatta is also not cognizable. If it were so, the cognitive state in which the absence of Devadatta is a qualifier would not be possible. Hence the proposition 'Devadatta does not exist' does not represent a cognitive state. If it does not represent a cognitive state, it is meaningless. But the situation is different in cases like 'A rabbit's horn exists', 'A rabbit's horn does not exist'. In such cases we have cognitive states or intentional objects. The proposition 'A hare's horn exists' represents the following cognitive state or intentional object: Q (O (hare-hareness) O (horn-hornness)). Since such propositions correspond to some cognitive states, they are meaningful. They will be true or false depending on whether they correspond to reality or not. Against the Nyftya analysis of 'a rabbit's horn' or 'unicorn' it may be urged that the Ny~ya analysis is not tenable if such terms are treated as atomic expressions referring to indivisible unexemplified properties. The proposition 'A hare's horn exists' would not represent a cognitive state if the term 'a hare's horn' signifies an unexemplified atomic property. The Ny~tya puts forward two arguments against this criticism. (a) If there are two expressions signifying two different unexemplified atomic properties, there is no means of distinguishing the meanings of these expressions. 7 (b) Moreover, it cannot be proved that such expressions signify atomic unexemplified properties. Since there is no means of learning the meanings of such terms, it cannot be claimed that such terms are meaningful. If they are meaningful, they must refer to complex properties and each constituent of such complex properties must have exemplification. The above two arguments might be considered as criticisms of Quine's thesis that propositions like 'Pegasus exists' are meaningful even if we consider the notion of Pegasus as obscure and basic. 8 The descriptive expression 'the (a) thing that is - Pegasus' or 'the (a) thing that Pegasizes' would be meaningless according to the Nyftya. There would

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be no means of making the distinction between the meanings of 'the (a) thing that pegasizes' and 'the (a) thing that unicornizes'. Since such expressions refer to basic unexemplified properties, there is no means of learning the meanings of such expressions. From the above discussion it follows that the Ny~tya tries to establish the following points: (a) The propositions of the form 'a is F ' and 'a is not F ' are false, if 'a' is a descriptive expression signifying a complex unexemplified property and 'F' refers to a property other than existence. For example, 'The (A) hare's horn is sharp'. The propositions of the form 'a exists' and 'a does not exist' are contradictories if 'a' is a descriptive expression. The propositions (or sentences) of the form 'a is F ' and 'a is not F ' are meaningless if 'a' is a name such that nobody has ever seen or known the object or person called 'a' anywhere at any time and 'F' refers to a property including existence. There cannot be a meaningful descriptive term signifying an atomic unexemplifiable property.

(b) (c)

(d)

Let us now consider the objections raised against the Buddhists' conception of empty terms. The Ny~tya has raised the following objections against their conception of empty terms: (1) The disagreeing examples like 'The hare's horn is non-momentary and non-existent' involve contradictions if the minor terms of the arguments refer to real objects. If the minor terms refer to unreal objects or entities, then those unreal objects can never be established by any means of knowledge. Hence the Buddhists cannot use disagreeing examples to establish the thesis that whatever exists is momentary. (2) If the Buddhists claim that the proposition 'The hare's horn is not sharp' is true on the ground that its sharpness cannot be tested by any means of knowledge, then the proposition 'The hare's horn is sharp' can be claimed to be true on similar grounds. Let us also consider the interpretations of the Buddhists' conception of empty terms by some contemporary writers. Professor Potter said, "In India the positions I have called 'realism' and 'relativism' are espoused, respectively, by the Ny~tya-Vaie.sikas and

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the Buddhists of Dign~ga's school." 9 According to him, 'relativism' "allows that there is an external world but denies that the things in it have any characteristics in themselves; the relativist holds that in the world there are at best bare particulars, whose apparent clothing is entirely contributed by the mind. ''10 We shall see that Professor Potter's interpretation represents a small part of the story about Buddhism as a whole. His interpretation does not take into account the M~dhyamika Buddhists' utterance that everything is ggmya. We shall show that unless we take into account this utterance we cannot explain the nature of the utterance that everything is momentary or that every momentary object is unique. Moreover, according to Professor Potter's interpretation the Buddhists would consider the propositions 'This hare's horn is sharp' and 'This hate's horn is not sharp' as neither true nor false. Professor McDermott 11 has also discussed the Buddhists' conception of empty terms. According to her interpretation, Ratnakirti has allowed the ascription of a class of attributes to an unreal subject. Let us see how Ratnakirti would analyse the proposition 'A hare's horn is not sharp'. According to Professor McDermott's interpretation, Ratnakirti would consider this proposition as true. It simply says that sharpness and hare's hornness do not occur in any possible locus. By using Professor McDermott's technique it can be symbolized as follows: (1) ~ (31x) (O (hare's horn-hess, x). O (sharpness, x)) where '31x' means 'for some possible x'.

The symbolic counterpart of the proposition 'A hare's horn is not sharp' shows that a possible locus of hare's horn has not been denied. That is to say, from (1) we cannot derive (2) ~ (3ax) (O (hare's horn-ness, x))

It is claimed that the disagreeing examples for the proof of the proposition 'whatever exists is momentary' are to be treated in the way the proposition 'A hare's horn is not sharp' has been treated. The fact that certain attributes or properties are denied of a non-momentary entity does not imply that there are non-momentary entities. From the above interpretation of Ratnakirti it follows that he would consider the propositions 'A hare's horn is not sharp' and 'A non-mo-

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mentary object does not exist' as true without positing an actual hare's horn or non-momentary object. Now Professor McDermott raises the following questions: "(1) If it is true that the son of a barren woman cannot speak, is it also true that the son of a barren woman is not male (and simultaneously not not male as well)? (2) And is a hare's horn identical with itself? (3) Is it the case that a non-momentary entity is non-momentary? (It would seem so.) (4) Can a non-momentary entity be characterised by various other (albeit 'unreal') attributes? (Also likely, but not explicitly affirmed by Ratnakirti.) (5) Is there one such non-momentary entity or are there finitely many or infinitely many distinguishable 'unreal' members of Ratnakirti's universe of discourse?"lz All these questions can be answered in some sense if we take into account the implication of the expression 'everything is gfmya'. It seems to us that none of the critics has linked the Buddhist conception of empty terms with the Buddhist philosophy of 'emptiness' gfmyatd. Professor Potter claims that the Buddhist logician has accepted the propositions 'This hare's horn is sharp' and 'This hate's horn is not sharp' as neither true nor false. Professor McDermott claims that Ratnakirti has accepted the proposition 'A hare's horn is not sharp' as true. Professor Matila113 has ascribed exclusion-negation rather than choicenegation to the Buddhists' conception of negation. The following are the truth-tables for choice-negation and exclusionnegation. choice-negation exclusion-negation P ~P P ,,~P T F T F F T F T I I I T If we accept Professor Matilal's interpretation, then according to the Buddhist the proposition 'A hare's horn is not sharp' is true if the proposition 'A hare's horn is sharp' is indeterminate i.e. neither true nor false. F r o m the conflicting interpretations of the Buddhist doctrine of empty terms one might come to the conclusion that the Buddhist philosophers have propounded inconsistent theories or their utterances are so vague and ambiguous that one might interpret them in different ways.

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But none of the conclusions seems to follow if these utterances are taken in the context of the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. The meaning of the empty term, in some sense of the word 'meaning', is tied up with the meaning of the term 'g~nya'. The problems and their solutions are parallel in both cases. Sometimes 'g~nyatd' is said to be the negation of all views or standpoints. From this, one might say that a term is empty if nothing can be predicated of the object referred to by that term. But this does not represent the view of the Buddhists because this interpretation presupposes that one can make statements about '~nyatd' and about empty terms. As a matter of fact, in this context the Buddhists are not trying to prove some propositions which are either descriptive or prescriptive in terms of some other propositions which are either descriptive or prescriptive. The expressions like 'everything is ggnya' or 'everything is momentary' are used as pointers to something which cannot be stated in language. It is true that the Buddhists have started with the proof of the proposition 'everything is momentary' and this p r o o f involves reference to empty terms. Now it may be asked, if the expression 'everything is momentary' is neither descriptive nor prescriptive, then what is the function of this expression? In reply it may be said that the Buddhists are refuting the thesis that there are permanent or relatively permanent things. Now it may be said that the negation of a thesis presupposes the acceptance of some other thesis. This type of objection has been raised against the dialectic of Nag~rjuna, which rejects the different philosophical views about reality by deducing contradictions from those views. The critics of Nagarjuna might point out that if the presence of a contradiction is used as the criterion for the unreality (falsity) of a particular view, then the absence of a contradiction must be the criterion of the reality (truth) of a view. In reply it may be said that this would follow if the expressions of the Buddhists are taken as statements or propositions. The Buddhists are not refuting in the usual sense of 'refutation'. This language of refutation is used as a pointer to something which cannot be expressed in language. The Buddhists wanted to show certain things by using language as a pointer. First of all, they have criticised the views of other philosophers either by showing a contradiction in those views or by proposing a counter thesis such as 'everything is momentary'. Secondly, they have shown that even the concept of identity is not applicable to these momentaries, because they are unique. Thirdly, this concept o f

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uniqueness is used to show the g~nyatd of our talk about reality. N o w let us see how the Buddhists would interpret the empty terms in the light of the above discussion. They would not mind accepting b o t h ' A hare's horn is sharp' and 'A hare's horn is not sharp' as true. This simply shows that the term 'a hare's horn' is empty. As by deducing contradiction a view about reality is rejected, so by ascribing contradictory properties the unreality of a thing m a y be claimed. I f both the propositions 'The son of a barren w o m a n is male' and 'The son of a barren w o m a n is not male' are true, then it follows that the term 'the son of a barren w o m a n ' does not signify anything real. N o w it m a y be argued that if the presence of contradiction is the sign or criterion of emptiness, then the absence of contradiction is the criterion of non-emptiness. A term is non-empty if contradictory properties are not ascribable to the referent of that term. A parallel argument has been put forward in the context of metaphysics. It is said that if contradiction is the criterion of unreality, then the absence of contradiction or identity must be the criterion of reality. But the Buddhists rule out identity also as the criterion of reality. They will not accept the thesis 'x is real or exists/ff x is identical with itself', for their thesis 'everything is unique' rules out even self-identity. Hence self-identity would be a criterion not of reality but rather of unreality. In the context of empty terms the Buddhist would argue in the same way. I f it is claimed that the proposition ' A hare's horn is a hare's horn' is true, then it follows that identity has been ascribed to a hare's horn and hence the term is empty. If it is claimed that the proposition 'A hare's horn is not a hare's horn' is true, then also it follows that the term is empty because contradictory properties have been ascribed to the same thing. N o w it may be asked whether there is any criterion which will m a r k the distinction between real and unreal, between empty and non-empty terms. On this point a consistent Buddhist would not claim that the presence or absence of contradiction is a criterion of reality or unreality, although the presence of contradiction is used as a pointer to the unreality of a thing. Most of the questions and objections raised by the critics of the Buddhists are based on the assumption that the utterances of the Buddhists express propositions which are either true or false, or neither true nor false in the sense of indeterminate. In some sense none of them is ap-

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plicable to the utterances of the Buddhist. As a m a t t e r of fact we c a n n o t say even this if it is t a k e n as a statement or proposition. Their entire talk a b o u t reality should be t a k e n as a pointer. W e should n o t try to i n t r o d u c e the statement a n d m e t a - s t a t e m e n t d i s t i n c t i o n or the thesis a n d rectathesis distinction i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the utterances o f the Buddhist. N o w it m a y be asked, if we c a n n o t say a n y t h i n g a b o u t reality, then what is the p u r p o s e a n d the f u n c t i o n of this l a n g u a g e used in this context? A Buddhist m i g h t answer i n the following way: L a n g u a g e might be used 'to show' s o m e t h i n g which c a n n o t be said i n language.

Victoria University o f Wellington, New Zealand

NOTES 1 K. H. Potter, 'Realism, Speech-Acts, and Truth-Gaps in Indian and Western Philosophy'; A. C. S. McDermott, 'Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1970). 2 B. K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyfiya Doctrine of Negation, Part 1, Ch. 2. 3 Quoted from B. K. Matilal, 'Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic', Journal o f lndian Philosophy 1 (1970). 4 I would like to interpret Udayana's remark "Nothing is established by such questions and answers" as referring to spurious questions and spurious answers which are neither true nor false. B. Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', reprinted in W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (eds.), Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, p. 305. 8 B. Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', reprinted in W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (eds.), Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, p. 316. 7 B. K. Matilal, 'Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic', Journal oflndian Philosophy 1 (1970), 97. s W. V. Quine, 'On What There Is', reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 188. 9 K. H. Potter, 'Realism, Speech-Acts, and Truth-Gaps in Indian and Western Philosophy', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1970), 16. lo Ibid., p. 15. 11 A. C. S. McDermott, 'Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1970). 12 Ibid., p. 28. lz B. K. Matilal, 'Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1970). BIBLIOGRAPHY Matilal, B. K., The Navya-nyaya Doctrine of Negation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1968.

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Matilal, B. K., 'Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic', Journaloflndian Philosophy 1 (1970). Matilal, B. K., Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1971. McDermott, A. C. S., 'Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic', Journal oflndian Philosophy 1 (1970). McDermott, A. C. S., An Eleventh-century Buddhist Logic of 'Exist', D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht, 1970. Potter, K. I-I., 'Realism, Speech-Acts, and Truth-Gaps in Indian and Western Philosophy', Journal of lndian Philosophy 1 (1970). Quine, W. V., 'On What There Is', reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964. Ratnakirti, K.sa~abhahgasiddhib Vyatirekatmika, translated in McDermott (1970). Russell, B., 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', reprinted in W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (eds.), Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, The Free Press, New York, 1963. Udayana, ~tmatattvavivekab. Portions translated in Matilal (1970).