Julian S. Yap vs. Hon. Santiago O. Taada, etc., and Goulds Pumps International (phil.), Inc. G.R. No.

L-32917, July 18, 1988 Narvasa, J.

Facts: The case began in the City Court of Cebu with the filing by Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. of a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the latter's premises. The Court rendered judgment against Yap. Yap appealed to the Court of First Instance. The appeal was assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Taada. For failure to appear for pre-trial on August 28, 1968, this setting being intransferable since the pre-trial had already been once postponed at his instance, Yap was declared in default by Order of Judge Taada. The Sheriff levied on the water pump in question, and by notice dated November 4, 1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof on November 14, 1969. But in view of the pendency of Yap's motion for reconsideration of October 29, 1969, suspension of the sale was directed by Judge Taada. It appears however that a copy of this Order was not transmitted to the Sheriff "through oversight, inadvertence and pressure of work" of the Branch Clerk of Court. So the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest bidder. He later submitted the requisite report to the Court dated November 17, 1969, as well as the "Sheriffs Return of Service" dated February 13, 1970, in both of which it was stated that execution had been "partially satisfied." It should be observed that up to this time, February, 1970, Yap had not bestirred himself to take an appeal from the judgment of August 29, 1969. Judge Taada ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution on Gould's ex parte motion therefor. Yap received notice of the Order on June 11. Twelve (1 2) days later, he filed a "Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution." Yap's motion was thereafter denied. Yap argued that the water pump had become immovable property by its being installed in his residence.

Issue: Whether or not the water pump had become immovable property.

Held: No. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." 42 The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.

Pedro P. Pecson vs. Court Of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995 Davide, Jr., J.
Facts: Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the city Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it on 12 October 1983 to the private respondents, the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one hundred three thousand pesos (P103,000.00). The petitioner challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC. In its, the RTC dismissed the complaint, but as to the private respondents' claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held that the issue concerning it was "not a subject of the . . . litigation." In resolving the private respondents' motion to reconsider this issue, the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the contention that the apartment building was included in the sale. Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the assailed decision. It also agreed with the trial court that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale of the commercial lot. The private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code. The trial court then issued a writ of possession directing the deputy sheriff "to place said movant Juan Nuguid in possession of subject property located at No. 79 Kamias Road, Quezon City, with all the improvements thereon and to eject therefrom all occupants therein, their agents, assignees, heirs and representatives."

Issue: Whether or not the respondents shall have to indemnify the petitioner being a builder in good faith of the apartment building.

Held: No. By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the

provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.