INTL 5605 Topics in Comparative Politics 02/08/12 Orion Garo

Faith, and its implications in the politics of Balkan countries during the last 2 decades
(the cases of Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Greece)

The historical developments of Balkan politics during the last two decades (since the fall of the iron curtain and its domino-effect on the Balkans) have shown that faith and religious convictions have played a crucial role. It is important to emphasize that all the countries under study are secular states, and religion is supposed to be separated from political affairs, education and other state institutions in all the countries of this European region. Yet, religion has been a decisive factor in the vast majority of conflicts that have arisen among these neighboring countries. There are many ethnically diverse communities in Southern Balkans, and most of the times diversity in ethnicity is associated with diversity in religion. In such cases religious differences magnify the ethnic tensions, making the conflicts much more difficult to prevent or manage. If we focus our attention on the post-communist federative state of (ex)Yugoslavia, we find 6 major ethnicities there: Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Albanians, Slovenes and Macedonians. There are the Montenegrins as well, but by all standards they consider themselves closely related to Serbs, even though they have had their own state since 2006. Three of these ethnicities practice the Christian Orthodox faith (Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians), two other ethnicities the Christian Catholic faith (Croats and Slovenes), and the remaining two ethnicities (Bosnians and Albanians) the Muslim faith. It is interesting to note that after the total disintegration of Yugoslavia (which was completed in 2008, after Kosovos unilateral declaration of independence), the Serbs did not embark on wars with the ethnicities of the same faith (namely, the Macedonians and the Montenegrins), but were very hasty to embark on wars with ethnicities of a different faith from theirs. In fact, the wars of

the Serbian Republic against Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo were some of the bloodiest wars ever witnessed since the end of the World War II. By 1991, the single distinguishing criterion of Serbs, Croats and (Bosnian and Albanian) Muslims became religion, as an inherited characteristic rather than active belief. Thus Serbs did not contest the identities of Croats and Muslims as separate peoples, nor did they contest the rights of the various Yugoslav peoples to "self-determination." What they did contest was the right of the Yugoslav republics to selfdetermination. From their point of view, the Croats could have their Croatia, but it could not include areas with Serb majorities. Similarly, if the Muslims wanted an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, that was fine, but it would not include regions with large numbers of Serbs. (Hayden, 1995) In other words, the Orthodox faith of Serbs living in these regions (Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo) became the Serbian Rebublics main pretext in initiating the wars against these territories. From the Kosovo Albanians point of view, Serbian eagerness to keep the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo alive lies in a deeper reason. According to an article written by Albanian political scholar Xhavit Shala, the Serbs will try to sell the hostilities they have undertaken against Kosovo Albanians under the cover of actions carried out to fulfill their historic duty of protecting the European Christianity from the Islamic invasion allegedly embodied by Albanians in Kosovo. In spite of living in the XXI century, the Serbs are trying to push the region into a new religious war. (Shala. 2007) A general perception exists among the political analysts of the ex-Yugoslavian Muslim communities that Serbs keep pushing for political tension because they persist with their claims on the already sovereign territories of Bosnia and Kosovo, and have always tried to sell these conflicts to the EU countries as a necessary duty to interrupt the Islam-isation of this South European region. This perception, on the other hand, radicalizes the position the Muslim Albanian community in ex-Yugoslavian territories, contributing to a further polarization of an already fragile political status-quo. A new generation of Serb and Albanian youth grows, and the antagonistic

attitudes towards each-others religions grow with them. In the long run, these are very false and harmful perceptions, because they contribute to the establishment of a hostile mentality which could in turn easily transform into a regional war given the adequate conditions for conflict (such as a nearby war, a worldwide war, possible economic collapse, etc.) In general terms, Albanians are a nation that has always welcomed religious diversity. Regarding legislation and community attitudes, Albania is the perfect example of the secular state. It is the only nation in Europe composed of citizens of the same ethnicity (Albanian) and three separate religions (Muslims, Christian Orthodox, and Christian Catholics). One of the most valued Albanian aphorisms is The religion of Albania is Albanian-ism coined in the 19th Century by an Albanian renascence writer, poet and scholar. This aphorism alone has had a profound effect on the religious mindset Albanian youth across several generations. Furthermore, religious practices were totally outlawed for almost 40 years during Hoxhas communist regime, and intermarriages between youngsters of different religions were encouraged by the system. This has transformed Albanians into people with the least hostile mindset towards diverse religions. After the disintegration of the communist regime in the early 90s, Albanian people started to re-frequent religious institutions. They were free to exercise their beliefs, and religious holidays became an integral part (Ramadan, Christmas, Easter, etc.) of Albanian official celebrations. Albanians are divided in four main religious communities (Catholic Christians, Orthodox Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shia Bektashi). However, Albanians never became radical in their beliefs. Youngsters of different faith continue to intermarry, and friends often celebrate with friends each-others religious feasts. The state has recognized this religious harmony among its citizens, and does its part in trying to foster it. State schools all over the country remain laic, so do the universities (state and private ones). There have never been recorded incidents between deferent religious communities in the country, and religious

leaders are often seen together in TV programs, memorial days and celebrations, in a continuous effort to show and maintain the excellent religious harmony that characterizes Albania. Such harmony serves as a great example for the neighboring countries and the region as a whole, showing that conflict should (and can) be avoided even among communities that dont share the same religion. Regrettably, the mindset of Albanias neighboring countries, particularly Greece and Serbia (both countries of Christian Orthodox faith), and their governments, do not share the same characteristics. Greeks, for instance, are strongly connected to their Christian Orthodoxy. So much so, that the Church and its patriarchs have a strong say even in the states affairs. By law, Greece is a secular state, but the religious influence in politics is everpresent, and religion per-se is usually seen as a promoter and beholder of nationalism among Greeks. Lately, the Church is also seen as a keeper of tradition, as Greek governments, especially the last social democratic government (1996-2004), made extensive use of the semantics of modernity in their self-representation. (Karagiannis, 2005) In addition, Greeks strongly identify themselves with their faith, and usually are intolerant towards other religions, especially the Muslims. According to UNCHR data, there are over 1 million Albanian emigrants in Greece since 1990 and the majority of those of Muslim faith were forced to be baptized and change their name to a Greek Orthodox name in order to find employment and register with the local authorities. (UNHCR, 2011) This is the only way for an individual of Muslim faith to obtain permanent residency in Greece and follow further procedures for Greek citizenship. This fact alone demonstrates that, even though Greece is known as a secular state in the international arena, religion is deeply rooted in Greek politics, state affairs, and normative values. This certainly cannot be considered a negative thing, but a secular state is expected to respect and protect the religious views and practices of nonGreeks residing in Greece, and the Greek state does not fulfill this obligation as long as nonGreek Muslims are forced to convert to Orthodox Christianity in order to find employment. A

good illustration of this practice (undertaken by the Greek state) is the name and last name change that several Albanian athletes had to undergo, in order to play in Greek teams: Albanian Name  Risto Gjika  Agron Xhelili  Luan Shabani  Leon Koka Greek Name Christos Gkykas Georgios Dzelilis Leonidhas Sabanis Leonidhas Kokas

The above Greek names and last names are all Christian Orthodox and fulfill the primary criterion of the Greek state to be of Orthodox faith in order to reside in Greece. The intent of the state in this case is to have over 97% of the population counted as Greek Orthodox, in order to preserve a strong homogeneity of the countrys religious practice. When it comes to state tolerance of religion and religious practice, Macedonia is a very particular case. Muslim ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are 33% of the population, while 64% are Christian Orthodox ethnic Macedonians and about 1% Christian Catholic Albanians. Macedonia is regarded as a country with a high religious tolerance and Macedonian nationalism is not connected to Christian Orthodoxy as much as in the cases of Greece or Serbia. However the Albanian community in Macedonia enjoys fewer rights, especially with regard to employment and political/social representation. As a result the Albanian community lives in a weaker economic condition, and poor communities usually tend to be much more connected to religion and religious practices. Albanians identify their faith with the Albanian nationalism, and often use it as a means to detach themselves from Macedonians. Macedonians also, rarely include Albanians in their community, and often consider them as second hand citizens. So the country remains divided between the two ethnicities, there is a lack of social cooperation and fair citizenship, so the differences in religious practices can easily degenerate in regional tension. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that Macedonian politics has successfully managed these religious differences so

far, and has been working humbly to achieve its ultimate goals towards resolving the name issue with Greece and finally joining the EU. According to the statistical data, it is interesting to mention different views on this issue among Muslims and Christians. 96% of Muslims and 53% of Christians are in favor of religious teaching, or, in other words, 60% of the population is in favor of introduction of religious teaching at schools. (Dzilo, 2007) So the Parliamentary majority adopted the law on religious teaching, and classes that focus on the principles of religion were introduced. Ever since, the academic curriculum in high schools can no longer be considered laic in Macedonia. In conclusion, it can be highlighted that Southern Balkans is a region where ethnic and religious differences are present; they have been and will remain a part of everyday life. Political institutions should recognize these differences and should constantly work to prevent any conflict arising from them. Southern Balkans is a region where many territorial claims remain unsettled, and ethnic antagonism is conveyed from generation to generation. The least state actors can do is to minimize religious antagonism, and this can be achieved by strongly opposing religious fundamentalism and fostering state secularism.

References:
Hayden, Robert. Serbian and Croatian Nationalism and the Wars in Yugoslavia. 1995. Retrieved from: <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/print/4059>. Shala, Xhavit. The Serb Trap of Religious War. 2007. Retrieved from

<http://www.acnss.com/ang/st/pdf/The%20Serb%20Trap%20of%20Religious%20War.pdf>. UNCHR. Resource Book for Law Enforcement Officers on Good Practices in Combatting Child Trafficking. 2011. Dzilo, Hasan. Religious Dialogue Led to the New Law on Religious Communities in Macedonia. 2007.