A Game Theoretic Approach for Analyzing the

LEACH Protocol with Multi Layer Clustering

and Energy Efficient Methods
Mehdi EffatParvar, Hamidreza Navidi and MohammadReza EffatParvar

Abstract Game theory has been used for decades in fields of science such as economics and biology, but recently it was
used to model routing and packet forwarding in wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks. Game Theory provides a mathematical
tool for the analysis of interactions between the agents with conflicting interests, hence it is w ell suitable tool to model so me
problems in co mmunication systems, especially, to wireless sensor networks (WSNs) where the prime go al is to minimize
energy consumption than high throughput and low delay. Clustering algorithm provides network scalability and energy efficient
communications by reducing transmission overhead and enhancing transmission reliability. It can localize the route set up within
the cluster and thus reduce the size of the routing table stored at the individual sensor node. In this paper we use the Multi layer
clustering and energy aware approaches base on LEACH protocol, and then we analyze the LEACH protocol behavior. The
analysis is based on a non-cooperative game approach where each cluster heads behave selfishly in or der to conserve its
energy and thus maximize its lifespan. We prove that t he Nash equilibrium of the game is the best strategy for each cluster
heads, and it causes to increase the expect ed payoffs the nodes. We show these anal ysis and its results by our simulations,
and we use this analysis to formulate a clustering mechanism that can be applied to sensor networks in practice.
Index Terms Clustering, Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Wireless Sensor Networks

1 INTRODUCTION
he behavior of a given wireless device may affect the
communication capabilities of a neighboring device,
notably because the radio communication channel is
usually shared in wireless networks. Game theory [1, 2, 3]
is a discipline aimed at modeling situations in which de-
cision makers have to make specific actions that have mu-
tual, possibly conflicting, consequences. It has been used
primarily in economics, in order to model competition
between companies: for example, should a given compa-
ny enter a new market, considering that its competitors
could make similar (or different) moves? Game theory
has also been applied to other areas, including politics
and biology.
The first textbook in this area was written by von
Neumann and Morgenstern, in 1944. A few years later,
John Nash made a number of additional contributions [4],
the cornerstone of which is the famous Nash equilibrium.
There is a significant amount of work in wired and wire-
less networking that makes use of game theory. Because
in most of the strategic situations in wireless networking
the players have to agree on sharing or providing a com-
mon resource in a distributed way, our approach focuses
on the theory of non-cooperative games. Cooperative
games require additional signalization or agreements be-
tween the decision makers and hence a solution based on
them might be more difficult to realize. In a non-
cooperative game, there exist a number of decisions mak-
ers, called players, who have potentially conflicting inter-
ests. In the wireless networking context, the players are
the users or network operators controlling their devices.
In compliance with the practice of game theory, we as-
sume that the players are rational, which means that they
try to maximize their payoffs (or utilities). We believe that
in computer networks, most of the interactions can be
captured using the concept of rationality, with the appro-
priate adjustment of the payoff function. In order to max-
imize their payoff, the players act according to their strat-
egies. The strategy of a player can be a single move or a
set of moves during the game.
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is a recent research
topic. This network is composed of hundreds or thou-
sands of autonomous and compact devices called sensor
nodes. The availability of integrated low-power sensing
devices, embedded processors, communication kits, and
power equipment is enabling the design of sensor nodes.
One of the most important constraints on sensor nodes is
the low power consumption requirement.
Sensor nodes carry limited, generally irreplaceable,
power sources. Therefore, sensor network protocols must

Mehdi Effatparvar is with the ECE Department, Ardabil Branch, Islamic
Azad University, Ardabil, Iran.
. Hamidreza Navidi is with the Department of Mathematics, Shahed Uni-
versity, Tehran, Iran.
Mehdi Dehghan is with the Computer and IT Eng Department of AmirKa-
bir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
MohammadReza EffatParvar is with the ECE Department, Ardabil Branch,
Islamic Azad University, Ardabil, Iran.

T
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 21

focus primarily on power conservation. In sensor net-
works, each node has a direct influence on its neighboring
nodes while accessing the channel. So, these interactions
between nodes and aforementioned observations lead us
to use the concepts of game theory that could improve the
energy efficiency as well as the delay performance of
MAC protocol.
Recently lots of researchers have started using game
theory as a tool to analyze the wireless networks. Their
game theoretic approaches were proposed to the wide
area of wireless communication right from the security
issues to power control, and so forth, [58]. To model
WSNs problems into full information game theoretic
problems is an extremely difficult task due to distributed
nature of WSNs.
As we know energy consumption is very important
challenge in WSNs. The energy consumption can be re-
duced by allowing only a portion of the nodes, which
called cluster heads, to communicate with the base sta-
tion. The data sent by each node is then collected by clus-
ter heads and compressed. After that the aggregated data
is transmitted to the base station. Although clustering can
reduce energy consumption, it has some problems. The
main problem is that energy consumption is concentrated
on the cluster heads. In order to overcome this demerit,
the issue in cluster routing of how to distribute the energy
consumption must be solved. Now suppose that if some
Cluster Heads don't have any interest to transmit others
nod's data to the sink, so many nodes consume their
energy without any success to sending their data to the
sink. In this paper we will apply our game theory model
in wireless sensor networks to show that which strategy
is the best for the sensor nodes. We applied our model
base on Leach [9] protocol and we simulated this new
model with many scenarios. LEACH is considered as the
most popular routing protocol that use cluster based
routing in order to minimize the energy consumption; in
this paper we propose an improvement on the LEACH
Protocol that further enhance the Power consumption,
simulation results bring out that our protocol outper-
forms LEACH protocol in term of energy consumption
and overall throughput.


Also we compare the simulation results with our game
theory model, and we show which strategy is the best to
select by the nodes. We will show achieving the Nash
equilibrium is the best strategy to each pairs of nodes,
who have roles to transmit the data towards sink.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In sec-
tion 2 we review the LEACH protocol. Section 3 describes
the overview of game theory and its application. Section 4
presents the game theory modeling in the network.
In section 5 we present our problem modeling base on
the LEACH protocol. Analytical modeling and proposed
algorithm are described in Section 6. Simulation results
are explained in 7; finally we proposed the conclusion in
Section 8.
2 THE LEACH PROTOCOL
LEACH (Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy)
dynamically select sensor nodes as cluster heads and
form clusters in the network. The communications inside
the clusters are directed to the cluster head, which per-
forms aggregation. Cluster heads then directly communi-
cate with the sink to relay the collected information from
each cluster. LEACH also changes the cluster head role
dynamically such that the high-energy consumption in
communicating with the sink is spread to all sensor nodes
in the network. The operation of LEACH is divided into
rounds. Each round begins with a set-up phase when the
clusters are organized, followed by a steady-state phase
when data are transferred from the nodes to the cluster
head and on to the BS, as shown in figure 1.


Fig 1. The LEACH round.
A. Cluster Head Selection

The cluster head selection process of LEACH is as fol-
lows: every node gets a random number between 0 and 1.
If the number is less than the threshold values T(n), the
node becomes a CH for the current round.

I(n ) = _
P
1-P_r moJ_
1
P
]_
u
if n 0 (1)

Where P is the desired percentage to become a cluster
head, r is the current round, and G is the set of nodes that
have not been selected as a cluster head in the last 1/P
rounds. Using this threshold, each node will be a cluster-
head at some point within (1/p) round. During round 0
each node has a probability P of becoming a cluster-head.
The nodes that are cluster-heads in round 0 cannot be
cluster-heads for the next (1/p) rounds. Thus the proba-
bility that the remaining nodes are cluster-heads must be
increased.

TABLE 1
A WIRELESS NETWORKING GAME

Component of the
Game
Elements of a wireless net-
work
Players
Nodes in the wireless net-
work
A set of actions
A modulation scheme, transmit
power level.
A set of preferences
Performance metrics (e.g.,
Energy Efficiency, Delay,
etc.)

JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 22

B. Cluster Formation

Once the nodes have elected themselves to be cluster
heads using the probabilities in (1) then advertise to their
neighbors in the network that they are the new cluster
heads. For this operation, LEACH relies on a CSMA-
based random access scheme to avoid advertisement col-
lisions from multiple cluster heads. The non-cluster-head
nodes must keep their receivers on during this phase of
set-up to hear the advertisements of all the cluster-head
nodes. After this phase is complete, each non-cluster-head
node decides the cluster to which it will belong for this
round. This decision is based on the received signal
strength of the advertisement. Assuming symmetric
propagation channels, the cluster-head advertisement
heard with the largest signal strength is the cluster-head
to whom the minimum amount of transmitted energy is
needed for communication. After each node has decided
to which cluster it belongs, it must inform the cluster
head node that it will be a member of the cluster. Each
node transmits a join-request message (Join-REQ) back to
the chosen cluster head using a non persistent CSMA
MAC protocol. This message is again a short message,
consisting of the nodes ID and the cluster heads ID.
When the cluster head receives all join messages, it will
allocate TDMA time slot information to all the nodes in
the same cluster, notice nodes within the same cluster to
send a TDMA message to the cluster head in its own time
slot. In order to avoid signal interference near the cluster,
cluster head can determine the CDMA codes which all
nodes used. The CDMA codes which is used in the cur-
rent phase and TDMA timing information will be sent
together. When nodes within the cluster receive the mes-
sage, they will send data to the cluster head in their own
time slot.

C. Data Transmission

During the steady state phase, the sensor nodes can
begin sensing and transmitting data to the cluster-heads.
This transmission uses a minimal amount of energy
(chosen based on the received strength of the cluster-head
advertisement). During this phase, only the cluster heads
are active all the time. The radio of each non-cluster-head
node can be turned off until the nodes allocated trans-
mission time, thus minimizing energy dissipation in these
nodes. The cluster-head node receive all the data from the
nodes in the cluster, after receiving all the data, aggre-
gates it before sending it to the base-station.

Fig. 2. Radio Energy Dissipation Model.

3 OVERVIEW OF GAME THEORY AND ITS
APPLICATIONS

In this section, the basic concepts used in game theory are
discussed and different game models are introduced. The
issues pertinent to using game theory to analyze multiple
access schemes in wireless networks are also discussed.

A. General Concepts

A game is defined by a set of players, a set of actions
for each player, and the payoffs for the players. A player
chooses an action and the complete plan of action is re-
ferred to as the strategy. When the action is chosen de-
terministically, it is called a pure strategy. On the other
hand, when the action is chosen probabilistically accord-
ing to a certain probability distribution, it is called a
mixed strategy. Based on the strategies of the players,
their payoffs are determined. Depending on the nature of
the game, there are different solution concepts. How-
ever, almost all of them rely on the equilibrium concept
which ensures that a player will gain a fair or optimal
payoff given the strategies of the other players in the
game. Pareto optimality or Pareto efficiency is another
well-known concept in a game. A strategy is called Pareto
optimal if it is impossible to make one player better off
without necessarily making other players worse off.

B. Game Theoretic Models

Two major game-theoretic approaches which can be
used to model multiple access schemes are the noncoo-
perative and the cooperative game approaches. In a non-
cooperative game, the players make rational decisions
considering only their individual payoff. In a cooperative
game, players are grouped together and establish an en-
forceable agreement in their group.

1) Noncooperative games: Self-interested players in a
noncooperative game make decisions independently. The
players are unable to make enforceable contracts but it
does not mean that players do not cooperate. Any coop-
eration in the games must be self-enforcing. Noncoopera-
tive game theory has been used extensively to study vari-
ous issues in wireless networks (e.g., medium access con-
trol game, time slot competition, and power control in
CDMA). The goal of a noncooperative game model is to
find the equilibrium solution for networks with self-
interested nodes. A well-known solution concept for a
noncooperative game is Nash equilibrium [10]. A Nash
equilibrium is a set of strategies for the players such that
no player has any intention to change his/her strategy to
gain a higher payoff given that none of the other players
changes his/her strategy.
Let i be an index of a player, i I = {1,,M} where I is
a set of players and M is the total number of players. Let
Si denote a set of strategy of player i. si Si is any possi-
ble strategy of player i. The Nash equilibrium satisfies the
following condition [10]:
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 23


u

(s

, s
-

) u

(s

, s
-

) i I, s

S
I
(2)

Where ui(.) is the payoff function of player i, s*i is a
Nash equilibrium strategy of player i, and s*-i is a Nash
equilibrium strategy vector of all players except player i.
However, Nash equilibrium may not exist in a game. Al-
so, even if Nash equilibrium exists, it may not be unique.
A noncooperative game can be classified as either a
complete or an incomplete information game. In a com-
plete information game, information such as the payoffs
and strategies of the players are observable to all the
players. On the other hand, in an incomplete information
game, the information is unknown by other players. An
incomplete information game can be modeled as a Baye-
sian game [10] in which Bayesian analysis is used to pre-
dict the outcome of the game. The equilibrium solution of
such a game is called Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Similar
to the Nash equilibrium in a complete information game,
Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be obtained in which each
player seeks for a strategy profile that maximizes its ex-
pected payoff given its beliefs about the types and strate-
gies of other players.
Moreover, a game can be classified either as a static
game or a dynamic game. A static game is a one-shot
game where all players make decisions without know-
ledge of the strategies that are being chosen by other
players. The one-shot game ends when actions of all
players are chosen and payoffs are received. In contrast,
in a dynamic game, a player chooses an action in the cur-
rent stage based on the knowledge of the actions chosen
by the other players in the current or previous stages.
This dynamic game can be called a sequential game
since players play a static game repeatedly. The common
equilibrium solution in dynamic games is a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium [11]. A subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame
of the original game. A common method to obtain sub-
game perfect equilibria is backward induction.
A dynamic game with incomplete information can be
described as a multi-stage game when information is un-
known to other players [10]. It is similar to a dynamic
game with complete information in that the players take
turns sequentially rather than simultaneously but infor-
mation is incompletely known to others. The players fol-
low their beliefs and dynamically update their beliefs by
using the Bayes rule. In a dynamic game with incomplete
information, perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the solution
concept which can be considered as a combination of the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equili-
brium concepts. Repeated game [10] is a special kind of
dynamic game in which the same set of players plays the
same stage game or one-shot game repeatedly over a long
time period. Repeated games can be divided into two key
types, namely, finite and infinite repeated games, de-
pending on whether the period of time during which the
game is played is finite or infinite. Most repeated games
are typically infinite repeated games and a player takes
into account the effect of his or her current action on the
future actions of other players.

2) Cooperative games: In a cooperative game, players
are able to make enforceable contracts. The players in a
coalition cooperate to maximize a common objective of a
coalition. In this case, players can coordinate strategies
and agree on how the total payoff is to be divided among
players in a coalition. Nash bargaining game is one type
of cooperative games where the players maximize the
product of their gains given what each player would re-
ceive without cooperation (i.e., threat point).
4 GAME THEORY MODELING IN NETWORK
In game theory (generally non-cooperative game theory)
players usually make the following assumptions:
Each player has two or more well-specified
moves/strategies.
Every player has possible combinations of
moves/strategy that leads to an optimum re-
sponse (End-state like win, loss or draw) in a
given game.
Each player has a specified payoff for each op-
timum response.
All players are rational; that is, each player, given
the two moves/strategies, will choose that one
that gives him/her the better payoff.
The use of game theory to analyze the performance of
wireless networks is not without its challenges. We point
out few challenges as follows:
Assumption of rationality
Realistic scenarios require complex model
Choice of utility functions
Mechanism design
Mapping variables in the game


Fig 3. Networks games at different levels of protocol stack.
As shown in the above figure game theory can be ap-
plied to the modeling of a wireless network at the physi-
cal layer, link layer, and network layer. But we restrict
our discussion up to network layer. At all the mentioned
levels we can formulate a game to optimize the perfor-
mance of a network. The main objective of these games is
to remove the selfish behavior of the nodes. Generally,
selfish behavior is very serious problem for overall net-
work performance. For example a node always refuse to
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 24

forward data packets from other node can create unne-
cessary partition in the network, and hence limit the con-
nectivity of the network. Here, we briefly describe a net-
work layer games which we use them in our modeling.
The main functionalities of network layer are establish-
ing and updating routes and forwarding the packets
along those routes. The presence of selfish nodes in those
routes can degrade the overall network performance as
well as the life time.
Forwards dilemma and Joint packet forward games:
In forwards dilemma game, as shown in figure 4 (a) the
p1 intends to send a packet to node r1 through p2, while
player p2 intends to send a packet to r2 through p1. The
cost of transmitting a packet equals c, where c << 1 and
reflects the energy spent by a node in forwarding a pack-
et. If a packet is successfully received by the receiver then
the sender gets a reward of 1. Each player has two possi-
ble actions: forward the packet (F) or drop the packet (D)
of the other player. Similar to this game , in the joint
packet forwarding game as shown in figure 6 (b) nodes
intend to send a packet to node r through two interme-
diate nodes p1 and p2. If the packet successfully reaches r
then each of the forwarding nodes gets a reward of one,
otherwise none of the intermediate nodes gets any re-
ward. The cost of forwarding a packet is c and has the
same meaning as that in the forwards dilemma game.
The players may take two actions: forward the packet (F)
or drop the packet (D). The aim of both these game is to
maintain the routing path as long as possible and hence a
network connectivity.

Fig 4. (a) Forwards Dilemma problem and its ga me form presenta-
tion.

Fig 4. (b) Joint Packet Forward problem and its game form presenta-
tion.
5 PROBLEM MODELING BASE ON LEACH
PROTOCOL
In this paper, we consider that N nodes are randomly
dispersed into a vast field. We make some assumptions
about the sensor nodes and the network model. The main
assumptions are:
All sensors are homogeneous with the same
transmission range and energy-constrained.
The sensors are in fixed but unknown locations;
The network topology does not change,
Symmetric communication channel: all links
between sensors are bidirectional.
The sensor nodes are capable of transmitting at
any one of the two pre-defined power levels- one
for a short range communication and other for a
long range communication,
The base station (BS) is located far from the sensor and
immobile. Because of Leach protocol lack to select the
distributed cluster head we believe the following re-
quirements should be met:
Clustering should be completely distributed.
Each node independently makes its decisions
based on local information and result into a well-
distributed cluster heads over the sensing field,
hence; problem associated with multi-hop
routing with unequal clustering will be alle-
viated.
Clustering should be efficient in terms of
processing complexity and message exchange.
At the end of clustering, each node is either a
cluster head, or a non cluster-head node.
The selected path should balance the load among
the nodes to prolong the network lifetime.

In our game modeling we divide the network to some
region and each region has one cluster head. Determining
these cluster heads can be different, base on their energy
or their distance to the sink. After that, each cluster head
responses to gather the data from their members and
forward them to the next cluster head which is near to the
sink. This mechanism supply one kind of multihop
routing from the nodes to the sink. The players of the
game are each pair of cluster heads that send their data to
each other, and they want to transmit the gathering data
towards the sink. The cost of transmitting a packet equals
c, where c << 1 and reflects the energy spent by a node in
forwarding a packet. If a packet is successfully received
by the receiver then the sender gets a reward of 1. Each
player has two possible actions:
Forward the packet (F)
Drop the packet (D)
Each cluster heads transmit its member's data in addi-
tion the other cluster head's data in previous levels which
are far from the sink.
As the traffic of the cluster heads in level one is more
than the other cluster heads, their energy consumption is
much more too. Now suppose that some data cross to
many levels and reach to one selfish cluster head or one
cluster head with low energy; therefore many cluster
heads consume their energy without any success to
transmit their data towards the sink.


Fig 5. Data transfer between the cluster heads as game players.
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 25

As you see in figure (5) we determined some cluster
heads in the network that they gather the data from their
members and send them to next cluster head until the
data receive to the sink. The method how we can deter-
mine the suitable cluster head is not important here, al-
though we have proposed a good approach for this work.
We tried to select the cluster heads base on their energy
and with a kind of distributed clustering method.
After selecting the cluster heads they gather the data
from their members and sent them to next level.
It is important that we know the cluster heads of each
level transmit all data from the previous cluster heads in
the networks; so as we can see in the figure (5), energy
consumption of the cluster head in level 1 is much more
than the energy consumption of the cluster head that exist
in level 4 because in level 1 cluster head gathers more
data from all other cluster heads and its own members.
6 ANALYTICAL MODELING AND PROPOSED
ALGORITHM
In our game, the cluster heads are the players and we
proposed our model for 2 players. We find the Nash equi-
librium for 2 players and then we extend our model with
N players and then we find the Nash equilibrium for N
players in the network.
By propose this model we want to analyze the LEACH
protocol efficient operation. We will show that which
strategy is the best for the Cluster heads in our method.
We use the packet forward problem in our modeling.
As you show in below figure each player has two poss-
ible actions:
Forward the packet (F)
Drop the packet (D)
Each cluster heads transmit its member's data in addi-
tion the other cluster head's data in previous levels which
are far from the sink.
The cost of transmitting a packet equals c, where c<<1
and reflects the energy spent by a node in forwarding a
packet. If a packet is successfully received by the receiver
then the sender gets a reward of 1.


Fig 6. P1 and P2 are the players that play the game.

The game starts when there is a request from the fist
cluster heads to transmit data to second cluster head. Us-
ing LEACH protocol the node finds the route which is
highly optimized i.e. the route with low delay and high
energy to transmit the data toward the sink.
As we can see in above figure the Nash equilibrium for
two players is:

N (u) = {(1 - c, 1 - c)] (3)

We can describe this Nash equilibrium as follow: each
cluster heads to get the rewards want to transmit the data
and they want to collaborate with each other by sending
their data toward the sink. The worst strategy for one
cluster heads happens when it forwards the data but its
neighbor doesnt forward the data, so the first cluster
head which forwards the data will get the -c as it cost; it
means that it will lose its energy without any utility.
Now, in this paper we extended the implementation of
the game theory with N players, so we can suppose that
we have N cluster head that they responsible the for-
warding the data to the sink.
We can infer from Nash equilibrium for two players
that we have Nash equilibrium for N players as follow:

N (u) = {(1 - c, 1 - c, , 1 - c, 1 - c)] (4)

It means that the best strategy for each player is For-
ward strategy so they dont like Drop the data packet.
If a packet is successfully received by the receiver then
the sender gets a reward of 1. We suppose that reward is
extra power that we can give it to the cluster heads in
period of time. For the evaluation of the LEACH protocol
we proposed one new method and we call it GMLeach.
This new approach uses for the comparing with the
LEACH and we want to analyze the LEACH operation
for sending data by proposed the GMLeach. In GMLeach
we consider the multi cluster heads and we break the
network to some level. Each level has at least one cluster
head and many members. In every layer the cluster heads
can forward the data to its neighbor or it can drop the
packets. As we show in Nash equilibrium for the N play-
ers, we can conclude the forwarding is the best strategy
for each player. Therefore in GMLeach at first we con-
struct the layer and then we show that what will be hap-
pen if one layer doesnt forward the data. The pseudo
code of our algorithm is shown in below.
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 26


Also we analyze the GMLeach with the LEACH proto-
col when the players follow with the best strategy to
achieve the Nash equilibrium.
7 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of GMLeach
by comparing it with the LEACH protocol when the
players attempt to achieve the Nash equilibrium.
GMLeach is one kind of LEACH protocol that doesnt
have any attention to achieve the Nash equilibrium. In
our simulation we consider 100 nodes deployed in
2uu 2uu square monitoring areas. We placed the BS at a
far distance from all other nodes. The initial energy of a
node is set to 0.25 and 0.5 Joules and the variable =1.
The size of the message that nodes send to their cluster
heads is set to 4000 bits. Table 1 shows the system para-
meters for our simulation model, which are similar to
those used in LEACH [9].




In this simulation we use multi hop forwarding me-
thod for sending the data towards the sink. So the
LEACH and GMLeach use the multi layer clustering to
gather the data and sending them to next layer. By doing
this method energy consumption of cluster heads will be
save and they can be live for more times. In this simula-
tion we can evaluate the cluster heads behaviors on the
network when they dont like cooperate with other clus-
ter heads to forward the data toward the sink.
In each simulation we consider one layer cluster heads
as selfish nodes, so they dont forward the data to the
next cluster heads exist in next layer, and we compare it
when all cluster heads cooperate with each other and they
follow the Nash equilibrium. As we see in below figure
GMLeach packet delivery is lower than the LEACh proto-
col because in GMLeach we consider some selfish players
that dont follow the Nash equilibrium. Although the
energy consumption of GMLeach is little more in com-
pare the LEACH but if we repeat our simulation for large
time, we will find that the GMLeach nodes will be die
earlier than the LEACH because they use their energy
without any reward for sending the data toward the sink.
In figure (7) we suppose that the level one cluster heads
dont cooperate with others, so they drop the packets
which sending from level four. If we consider the selfish
layer in layer 2 or layer 3 instead of the first layer, our
total energy consumption will improve but the delivery
ratio wont be change. The reason of this happens is be-
cause of the energy consumption of the middle layer to
forward the packets, but they dont get any reward be-
cause they are unable to sending their data to the sink. It
means that layers 4, 3 and 2 cooperate with each other
and forwards their packets to the sink but layer 1 cluster
heads drop them. If this drop action accrues in level 3 or
in level 2 instead of level 1, so the energy consumption
will be increase.

TABLE 2
SIMULATION PARAMETERS

Parameters Values
E
cIcct
50nJ/bit
E
A
5nJ/bit

]s

(If J
to BS
J
o
)
10 pJ/bit/m
2

mp

(If J
to BS
> J
o
)
0.0013 pJ/bit/m
4

Area 2uu 2uu
Simulation rand 500 time

ALGORITHM
THE LAYERS CONSTRUCTED
Foi i= 1 to numbei of layeis
X=i
IF Clustei(i).nextBop=u then
Senu uata to Base Station
Else
Foi j=clustei(i).layei ueciease till 1
IF Clustei(i).layei=4 anu
Clustei(x).layei=Numbei of
uisiuptive layei then
BREAK;
Enu IF
Else
senu uata to Neighboi clusteiBeau
IF (Clustei(x).nextBop <> u)
x=Clustei(x).nextBop;
ELSE IF (Clustei(x).nextBop=u)
then
senu uata to Base Station "nex
tBop=u means nextBop=Base Station"
ENB IF
ENB F0R i
ENB IF
ENB F0R }


JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 27


Fig 7. Packet delivery when the Layer 1 cluster heads are selfish and
dont cooperate the others.
In figure (7) layer 1 cluster heads drop the forwarded
packets which sent from layer one, thus the delivery ratio
of the GMLeach is lower than the Leach.


Fig 8. Energy Consumption when the Layer 1 cluster heads are sel-
fish and dont cooperate the others.
In figure (8) layer one cluster heads save their energy
by dropping the packets have been sent by layer one, so
the energy consumption of the GMLeach is little better
than the LEACH. Although this energy consumption is
good for some players who are in layer one, but the per-
formance of the network will be decrease because of this
drop action.


Fig 9. Packet delivery versus the energy consumption.
Figure (9) shows the packet delivery versus the energy
consumption. As we show in above figure the energy
consumption of the GMLeach is higher that the LEACH
protocol, which the nodes like, achieves the Nash equili-
brium.
8 CONCLOSION
Wireless sensor networks are typically ad-hoc networks
of resource-constrained nodes; in particular, the nodes are
limited in power resources. It can be difficult and costly
to replace sensor nodes, for instance when implanted in
the human body. Data transmission is the major consum-
er of power, so it is important to have power-efficient
protocols. In order to reduce the total power consumption
in the network, we consider nodes which cooperate to
transmit data. Power restriction is the most remarkable of
these constraints: The range of data transmission depends
on the power used by the node. Reduced power con-
sumption is an important goal in the design of WSN pro-
tocols. Because data transmission is expensive, the man-
agement of communication between nodes plays a vital
role for the power efficiency of these networks. Coopera-
tion between sensor nodes can potentially reduce the total
power consumed for data transmission in the whole net-
work. For save the power in wireless sensor network we
used the clustering mechanism and we consider multi
layer cluster heads method to reduce the energy con-
sumption. We applied our method base on LEACH pro-
tocol and we obtain the Nash equilibrium in our method.
Then we showed that if the cluster heads select the strate-
gy which they achieve to the Nash equilibrium the ener-
gy consumption of the networks will be improve and the
packet delivery ratio will be increase.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.
[2] R. Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory. Prentice Hall, 1992.
[3] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994.
[4] J. Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. National
Academy of Sciences, vol. 36, pp. 4849, 1950.
[5] A. Agah, S. K. Das, and K. Basu, A game theory based ap-
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 28

proach for security in wireless sensor networks, Proc. 23rd
IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications
Conference (IPCCC 04), pp. 259263, Phoenix, Ariz, USA, April
2004.
[6] R. Kannan, S. Sarangi, and S. S. Iyengar, Sensor-centric energy-
constrained reliable query routing for wireless sensor net-
works, Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, vol. 64, no.
7, pp. 839852, 2004.
[7] S. Sengupta and M. Chatterjee, Distributed power control in
sensor networks: a game theoretic approach, Proc. 6th Interna-
tional Workshop Distributed Computing (IWDC 04), vol. 3326 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 508 519, Kolkata, In-
dia, December 2004.
[8] X. Zhang, Y. Cai, and H. Zhang, A game-theoretic dynamic
power management policy on wireless sensor network, Proc.
International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT 06),
Guilin, China, November 2006.
[9] W. Heinzelman, A. Chandrakasan and H. Balakrishnan, "Ener-
gy-Efficient Communication Protocol for Wireless Microsensor
Networks," Proc. 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences (HICSS '00). Januray 4-7, 2000.
[10] D. Fudenburg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, Lon-
don, 1991.
[11] K. Ritzberger, Foundations of Noncooperative Game Theory,
Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.



JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2012, ISSN 2151-9617
https://sites.google.com/site/journalofcomputing
WWW.JOURNALOFCOMPUTING.ORG 29