Republic of the Philippines

Senate
PasayCity
(Sitting as an Impeacliment Court)
INRE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF
HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
RENATO C. CORONA
Case No. 0022011
x --------------------------------------------------------- x
NOTICE
Notice is hereby given to the parties that the Honorable Presiding Officer of the
Senate Impeachment Court issued the attached Resolution of the Court, dated
8 February 2012 relative to the request of House Panel of Prosecutors dated
February 6, 2012 for the issuance of subpoenae ad testificandum et duces
tecum to the Hon. Martin S. Villarama, Hon. Maria Lourdes P. A. Serano, Hon.
Bienvenido L. Reyes and Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, members of the Supreme
Court.
Pasay City, Philippines, February 8,2012.
ATTY. EMMA
Clerk of Court of the Senate
Sitting as an Impeachment Court
cc :

The Honorable
,pu",-, Honorable
Members of the Pr ion
House of Representatives
Quezon City
Atty. MARIO LUZA BAUTISTA
Atty. JOSEPH JOE MER C. PEREZ
Private Prosecutors
c/o House of Representatives
Quezon City
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
Supreme Court
Manila
Justice
Atty. JOSE M. ROY III
Atty. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ
Atty. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.
Atty. GERMAN Q. LlCHAUCO II
Atty. DENNIS P. MANALO
Counsels for Chief Justice Corona
clo Suite 1902 Security Bank Center
6776 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
RESOLUTION
This resolves the Request for Issuance of Subpoenae requiring Hon.
Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Hon. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Hon.
Bienvenido L. Reyes and Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, all Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, to appear and testify, as well as bring before this
Court the "pertinent records in their possession relative to A.M. No. 11-10-
1-SC (Re: Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083 - Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines [F ASAP] vs.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., et.al.) and the en bane session of the Supreme
Court on October 4.2011."
The stated purpose of the Subpoenae is to require the aBove named
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to "testify on the participation of
Chief Justice Renato Corona in October 4, 2011 Supreme Court en bane
session, specifically, in the deliberations of A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC (Re: Letters
of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083 - Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines [FASAP] vs. Philippine Airlines,
Inc., et.al.), and the action that was made by the Supreme Court relative to
such case."
The Court resolves to DENY the Request.
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Internal Rules
1
of the Supreme Court
provides:
SEC. 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. - Court sessions are
executive in character, with only the Members of the Court present.
Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be disclosed to
outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by
the Court.
The Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson shall record the
action or actions taken in each case for transmittal to the Clerk of
Court or Division Clerk of Court after each session. The notes of the
Chief Justice and the Division Chairperson, which the Clerk of Court
and the Division Clerks of Court must treat with strict confidentiality,
shall be the bases of the minutes of the sessions.
It is, therefore, unequivocal from the above rule that the sessions of
the Supreme Court are executive in character with only the Members of the
Supreme Court present and that the deliberations therein are confidential.
The intention of the request for subpoenae is to require the above
named Members of the Supreme Court to bring before this Court
documents relative to their deliberation on a particular case
2
and testify on
their deliberation, specifically the participation of the respondent Chief
Justice in such deliberation.
1 A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC
2 A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC (Re: Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083 -
Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines [FASAP] vs. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., et.a!.)
This Court cannot do so without transgressing the basic
constitutional principle of separation of powers. This Court is bound to
respect the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court which is a co-equal branch
of government under the Constitution.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court was promulgated in
accordance with the rule making power of the Supreme Court under the
Constitution. Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court shall have the power to:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
The only constitutionally recognized limitation of the rule making
power of the Supreme Court is that it must not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights, which is basically the function of Congress.
Considering that the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court is a consequence
notW
of its rule making power, this Court should ~ a t t e : e r P t to undermine the
efficacy of an act of a co-equal branch of government.
Therefore, for this Court to issue subpoenae in order to require the
Members of the Supreme Court to testify on their deliberations which are
confidential according to its Rules is to make this Court omniscient over a
co-equal department which will run afoul of the tripartite system of
government and thereby dilute the well entrenched constitutional principle
of separation of powers.
This ilrgument is not without justification.
The Congress does not have the power to amend the Rules of Court.
Unlike the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions where it was specifically
provided that the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court may
be "repealed, altered, or supplemented" by Congress
3
, no similar proVision
appears in the 1987 Constitution. This will show that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared
by this Court with Congress. The Supreme Court categorically ruled in
Echegaray vs. Secretary oj Justice:
4
The rule making power of this Court was expanded.
This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal,
3 Article VIII, Section 13,1935 Constitution; Article X, Section 5(5),1973 Constitution
4 G.R. No. 132601, Tanuarv 19.1999
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive.
But while the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions provide that Congress has
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of court, said power,
however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan
5
Congress, in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the
Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953
6
which considered as a passing grade, the average of
70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 %
in the 1952 bar examinations. The Supreme Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its junction, as is the case with the law
in question."7 The venerable jurist further ruled:
5 94 Phil. 534 (1954), pp. 550, 555
6 RA. No. 372.
794 Phil. 550, p. 551.
"It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this, and
the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license."
By said ruling, the Supreme Court qualified the absolutist tone of the
power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.
Thus, if the Congress does not have the power to amend the Rules of
Court under the 1987 Constitution, by parity of reasoning, this Court does
not have the authority to disregard the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its constitutional rule making power.
Respect should be accorded to the Rules promulgated by a co-equal
branch of government, as Congress expects the same treatment from other
branches of government. For instance, the Congress under the Constitution
has the power to determine the rules of its proceedings.S What stands out
from jurisprudence on the subject is that, except for some limitations on
details found in the Constitution itself, there is a clear recognition of the
over-all autonomy of the legislative body both in the formulation and in
the application of its rules.
9
"The power to make rules is not one which
8 Article VI, Section 13 (6), 1987 Constitution
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
exercise by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other tribunal."lo The absolute control which
Congress has over its rules is well illustrated in the case Osmena, Jr. vs.
Pendantun.1
1
The Supreme Court, in no uncertain terms declared therein:
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking
the Chief Executive constitf;es disorderly conduct for which
Osmefia may be ny arguments pro and con have
been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot
be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed
the power to determine whether Osmefia conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.1
2
(emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that on matters affecting only the internal operation of
the legislature, the legislature's formulation and implementation of its rules
is beyond the reach of the courts. If this is so, then this Court has also no
10 United States vs. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5, cited in Bernas, id.
11 109 Phil. 863 (1960)
12 rd.
authority to interfere with nor undermine the control of the Supreme Court
over its internal Rules.
The House of Representative, through one of its Prosecutors, has
intimated that the principle of separation of powers only applies when the
Congress, and in this case, the Senate, is exercising its legislative functions
but not when it is sitting as an impeachment Court inasmuch as it has the
sole power to try and decide impeachment cases under the Constitution.
This Court, however, is not yet ready to accept the Prosecution's,
contention.
It must be pointed out while the House has the exclusive power to
impeach and the Senate has the sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases, it is still the Congress, one of the three branches of government"
which is exerciSing this prerogative under the Constitution. Hence,
whether it is performing a legislative function or sitting as an impeachment
Court, the Senate is not insulated from the operation of the principle of
separation of powers. As held in Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
13
, the doctrine
of separation of powers simply means that each of the three great powers
of government has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance with its own
sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
13 Santiago vs. Sandilranbavan. 356 seRA 6::16
intruding with the internal affairs of either branch. This has to be so in
order to maintain the balance of power among the three branches. This is to
prevent the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another. This
will enjoin one branch from lording it over the other and prevent too much
concentration of powers to only one branch.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Prosecution's
Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to Martin S.
Villarama, Jr., Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Bienvenido L. Reyes and
Presbitero J. Velasco, all Associate Justices of the Supreme Court is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
08 February 2012, Pasay City