SECTION 18 United States V. Kozminski, 487 U. S.

931 (1988) Facts: After two mentally retarded men were found laboring on respondents' farm in poor health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation from the rest of society, respondents were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 241 by conspiring to prevent the men from exercising their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude, and with violating 18 U.S.C. 1584 by knowingly holding the men in involuntary servitude. At respondents' trial in Federal District Court, the Government's evidence indicated, inter alia, that the two men worked on the farm seven days a week, often 17 hours a day, at first for $15 per week and eventually for no pay, and that, in addition to actual or threatened physical abuse and a threat to reinstitutionalize one of the men if he did not do as he was told, respondents had used various forms of psychological coercion to keep the men on the farm. Issue: What is involuntary servitude? Ruling: For purposes of criminal prosecution under 241 or 1584, the term "involuntary servitude" necessarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process. This definition encompasses cases in which the defendant holds the victim in servitude by placing him or her in fear of such physical restraint or injury or legal coercion. PEOPLE VS. BON FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother. 5 All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them. The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.26 The RTC pronounced appellant's defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. However, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape. Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief31 before the Supreme Court, assails the findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000.32

ISSUE: Has the constitution and congress abolished death penalty?

RULING: No. Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its re imposition through law as being "in a state of hibernation."85 No longer. It reawakened then it died; because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of depriving liberty. Wilkins versus Gaddy Facts of the Case In 2008, Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court. Without the aid of an attorney, he alleged that he was "maliciously and sadistically" assaulted "without any provocation" by a corrections officer. Mr. Wilkins claimed that as a result of the assault he sustained heel and lower back pain, increased blood pressure, migraine headaches and dizziness, depression, panic attacks, and nightmares of the assault. The district court, on its own motion, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In a motion for reconsideration, Mr. Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prove fatal to his claim. The district court denied Mr. Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Issue: May the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner constitute cruel and unusual punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious injury ? Ruling: Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit. The Court reaffirmed its prior decision in Hudson v. McMillian holding that a "significant injury" is not a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. Instead, the Court stated the core inquiry is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically cause harm." The Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The Court reiterated, rejected the proposition that "significant injury" is a threshold requirement of a claim of excessive force in violation of the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment. Rather, the relevant question is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously or sadistically to cause harm." The extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner may be relevant in determining whether the use of force could reasonably have been thought to be necessary under the circumstances, and it may be evidence of the amount of force that was applied. But "an inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an

excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury." Contrary to the approach taken by the lower courts in this case, a claim of excessive force cannot be rejected solely because of the court's perception of the severity of the claimant's injuries. Graham vs. Florida, No. 08 7412. May 17, 2010, 560 U. S. ____ (2010) FACTS: Petitioner Graham was 16 when he committed armed burglary and another crime. Under a plea agreement, the Florida trial court sentenced Graham to probation and withheld adjudication of guilt. Subsequently, the trial court found that Graham had violated the terms of his probation by committing additional crimes. The trial court adjudicated Graham guilty of the earlier charges, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to life in prison for the burglary. Because Florida has abolished its parole system, the life sentence left Graham no possibility of release except executive clemency. He challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, but the State First District Court of Appeal affirmed. ISSUE: Does the the cruel and unusual punishments ban cover a punishment for crime that is no graduated and proportionate to the offense. RULING: Embodied in the cruel and unusual punishments ban is the precept . . . that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense. Weems v. United States. The Court s cases implementing the proportionality standard fall within two general classifications. In cases of the first type, the Court has considered all the circumstances to determine whether the length of a term-of-years sentence is unconstitutionally excessive for a particular defendant s crime. The second classification comprises cases in which the Court has applied certain categorical rules against the death penalty. In a subset of such cases considering the nature of the offense, the Court has concluded that capital punishment is impermissible for nonhomicide crimes against individuals. Lumanog vs People Facts:The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of Colonel Abadilla who was ambushed in broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. The trial court found the accused guilty and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that the accused-appellants are sentenced each to suffer reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole. The appellants argue that the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole meted by the CA pursuant to Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9346 is unconstitutional. They claimed that Section 19, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides that any death penalty imposed

shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. There is no mention of without the benefit of parole or shall not be eligible for parole therein. Appellants contend that the questioned provisions of R.A. No. 9346 constitute encroachments of the President s constitutional power of executive clemency. Issue: Is Sec. 3, Republic Act No. 9346, which disqualifies persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua from parole, unconstitutional? Ruling: Appellants attack on the constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. 9346 on grounds of curtailment of the President s absolute power to grant executive clemency, imposition of an inhuman punishment and violation of equal protection clause, is utterly misplaced. As the Court ruled in People vs. Gardon, Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the law shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment. Although the law makes no reference to persons convicted to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the Court has consistently held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not apply to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Lim vs. PeopleGR 130038, 18 September 2000 Facts: Rosa Lim bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300,000 from the store of Maria Antonia Seguan, by issuing a check payable to cash drawn against Metro Bank. The next day, Lim again purchased jewelry valued at P241,668 by issuing another check payable to cash likewise drawn against MetroBank. Seguan deposited the checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor as Lim s accounts in said bank were already closed. Upon demand, Lim promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did. Rosa Lim was charge for two counts of violation of BP 22, where she was found guilty, and sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with fine (P200,000). Issue: Has BP 22 been decriminalized? Ruling: No. BP 22 was not decriminalized; only the sentence of imprisonment was set aside and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term. We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.