NATO Deficiencies and Improvements: Is the Alliance Ready for Afghanistan? by Brent M.

Eastwood, PhD (2006)

Brent M. Eastwood has been selected to represent the United States at the 2006 NATO Summit Young Leaders Forum in Riga, Latvia, November 27-29. The 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia in late November will be one of the most historic conferences of the alliance. For the first time, NATO forces will be deployed in Article 5 (mutual defense) operations outside of Europe. NATO must have a well-formulated mission to be successful. What does NATO want to achieve in Afghanistan? Will it bring stability and security or attempt to build a democracy? Can NATO sustain nation-building by itself? These are questions that need to be answered at the summit. In this paper I will outline the current military and political situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the military-stability issue in Afghanistan; nation-building; the need for a public health strategy; improvements to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and the implementation of a NATO Leadership Academy in Brussels, Belgium for Afghans who are the future leaders of the new democracy. I will also discuss the narcotics situation in Afghanistan and domestic political pressure in NATO countries.

The Military and Political Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan

The Taliban and al-Qaeda control northern Waziristan in northwest Pakistan. This area of operations provides a sanctuary for Islamist guerrillas.1 The difficult terrain and harsh weather favors the enemy and NATO troops will have difficulty adjusting to the type of warfare fought in the region. The challenge will also include working with

and training indigenous peoples. Afghan tribes are not known for their loyalty. They are pragmatic and will switch sides depending on the economic and political situation.2 Many Afghans are non-secular and fundamental Islamist. They do not automatically agree with President Hamid Karzais western-tinged democratic vision for Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are Afghanistans main Sunni sect and many members of this ethnic tribe have already shifted their allegiance back to the Taliban. They have safe houses throughout the border region where they train to make IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and car bombs. NATO troops may discover that they will have to pay the Pashtuns and other tribes significant amounts of cash to ensure their loyalty and cooperation. In Pakistan, half of the parliament is reportedly made up of fundamental Islamists.3 Many of Pakistans military officers and bureaucratic ministers are tacitly sympathetic to the Taliban.4 Pakistans President Pervez Musharraf is forced by domestic political pressure to resist western political reform and to refrain from clamping down on the Taliban. He also receives pressure from the U.S. in the search for Osama Bin Laden and to reduce the influence of madrasas, Muslim schools where students learn fundamental Islamic theology, the Quran, and Islamic law. The US has awarded Pakistan with some $3-billion in aid since 9/11.5 Musharraf has repeatedly denied that Pakistan is harboring safe havens for the Taliban.6 During a recent press conference before talks in the US between Karzai and Musharraf, Karzai called Musharraf my brother and said the two leaders would work together to end extremism, in madrasas preaching hatred.7

80,000 Pakistani troops are patrolling the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but this type of soldiering is comparable to patrolling the US Rocky Mountain rangethe sheer amount of distance, elevation, and terrain is staggering.

Bringing Stability to Afghanistan: The Military Question What Does Afghanistan Need?
The primary mission for the NATO and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is to provide security in Afghanistan so democracy and good governance can advance. This includes providing a safe and secure environment to assist the government of Afghanistan with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces in order to build democratic institutions, register voters, and hold elections. According to the ISAF Compact with Afghanistan, ISAF will continue to strengthen and develop the capacity of the national security forces to ensure that they become fully functional. All OEF counter-terrorism operations will be conducted in close coordination with the Afghan Government and ISAF. ISAF will continue to expand its presence throughout Afghanistan, including the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and will continue to promote stability and support security sector reforms in its areas of operation.8 The stability mission falls to 20,000 ISAF military personnel mainly comprised of German, French, Canadian, Polish, and Dutch forces from a total of 37-countries. The US has an additional 20,000 troops and as of September 28, 2006, NATO will have command over 12,000 US troops in Regional Command Capital RC(C). This is the most US troops which have been under foreign command since World War II. According to Reuters, some 8,000 U.S. troops will remain under separate U.S. command, focusing on

training Afghan security forces, counter-terrorism efforts and combat support roles.9 NATO still needs more troops from alliance countries that are available to serve outside of Europe.

The Need for More Combat Troops and Modernized Equipment

Since the Cold War, according to the 2006 NATO Handbook, NATO conventional forces have been drastically reduced. Ground forces have been cut 35%, naval vessels cut 30%, and combat aircraft cut 40%. NATO also needs more aircraft with strategic lift functions (Australia, Britain, Canada, and NATO have ordered a total of 13 C-17 Globemaster IIIs, but it will take many months before the new aircraft are operational).10 ISAF forces need more helicopters for better troop mobility since motorized convoys are frequently being ambushed on the ground. Finally, ISAF forces could make great use of armored personnel carriers such as the US Army Stryker Light Armored Vehicle (LAV III). The Stryker has received solid performance reports in its deployments to Iraq.11

Improvements to Special Operations Forces (SOF)

NATO should also undertake new personnel enhancements. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is currently without a Special Operations Component Command (SOCC). This limits the efficacy of Special Operations Forces (SOF) attached to the ISAF or NATO Reaction Force (NRF). According to Major General Thomas Csrnko, NATO needs a robust and dedicated special operations plans/policy or advisory arm.12 This feature could be accommodated by installing a separate entity at SHAPE that would feature a highly-trained and cohesive fully-manned special operations planning and liaison unit.13 This unit would manage and synchronize

NATO training and certification; develop NATO SOF capabilities such as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency; and standardize a training program for the NATO Reaction Force SOF component.14

Beyond the Military Problem to Questions of Nation-Building in Afghanistan

NATO is still primarily geared toward a military-political alliance for Cold Wartype battlefield scenarios. This is the alliances first time embarking on a mission outside Europe. NATO is not designed to conduct police investigations, drug eradication, economic development, or voter registration. It is important that the ISAF not overstretch its capabilities and succumb to the risks associated with mission creep that have plagued other international humanitarian and peace-keeping missions. NATO can not sustain nation building by itself. However, success in Afghanistan must go beyond a simple military-invoked stabilization and security effort. It requires NATO to work with other international organizations to solve the political problems necessary to promote democratization efforts. NATO needs United Nations, European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assistance in Afghanistan. The UN should undertake most of the heavy lifting of nation-building in a partnership with NATO.15 The UN is more experienced and has a broader range of countries providing troops and support. The UN has conducted more than 30-military expeditions; NATO has performed only three.16 The UN can provide personnel at a lower cost than NATO and the UN also has a more straight-forward decision making process. Once a UN humanitarian mission begins, it has a unified and integrated civil and military chain of command.17

NATO and EU cooperation is Afghanistan is vital and both bodies complement one another. NATO has great planning and policy-making capabilities while both organizations can share an increasing amount of intelligence. The EU has the proper civil and police functions that are required for nation building. The OSCE can oversee the democratization process in Afghanistan and help to build democratic institutions and monitor human rights while NATO provides security for the OSCE advisors.

A Public Health Plan Is Key

Afghanistan currently has no public health plan and a robust strategy to improve public health is one of the most important components of nation-building.18 The life expectancy in the country is 45. Doctors Without Borders operated in Afghanistan from 1980-2004, but pulled out after five staff-members were killed. The country needs a comprehensive public health strategy for sanitation, communicable diseases, potable water, nutrition, mental health, and other medical care programs.19 This type of public health program requires a long-term investment in time and money and one or more NATO countries to sponsor its implementation.20

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Improvements

There are 23 PRTs in Afghanistan with most of the reconstruction operations taking place in Regional Command Capital RC(C) around Kabul. A PRT has 60-100 personnel conducting small reconstruction projects. The teams are made up of civil affairs military troops, civilian aid workers such as those from the USAID agency, civilian construction contractors, civilian police, and agriculture advisors. PRTs have enjoyed a certain amount of success in Afghanistan, but there is room for improvement.

First, PRTs should initially train with and deploy with the troops they support for better unit integrity and calibration.21 The PRTs have succeeded in building many schools, digging wells, and repairing clinics. They have also been criticized for operating with inadequate communications and unsatisfactory vehicles. Some team members have complained that the PRTs are dysfunctional22 with vague mission parameters, unclear role delineation, and reported friction between civilian and military relations.23 They have also been without the needed civilian expertise in critical nation-building roles. My issue with PRTs is that they focus too much on reconstruction alone and do not address the deeper societal, legal, and normative values that must be built from the ground up in Afghanistan. Bricks and mortar construction projects are not enough. I call this concept society building. It is not enough to just build the school or dig the well, PRTs must also socialize the citizens into the roles and occupations that are necessary for a functioning country. The role of PRTs must be expanded by NATO and there is a way to do it that utilizes the EU, OSCE, in addition to the expertise and talent from each member country. I propose that PRTs have a separate pool of labor to call on to help conduct this society building. Since many NATO countries are reticent to send combat troops into Afghanistan, they can have the option of sending 12-month PRT Augmentees instead. PRT Augmentees are a trained team of subject matter experts which would help socialize Afghanis into the needed occupations in government, public health, public administration, economics, etc. Each NATO country could send an Education team, a Political team, an Economic team, a Legal team, or a Health team.

The Education team would be made up of primary and secondary school teachers and administrators, vocational-technical educators, and higher education professors and administrators. The Political team would have public policy experts; election, campaign, and political party specialists; public diplomats; public administrators for power, sewer, and water; experts in good governance; and specialists in Afghan culture and religion. The Economic team would have small business and entrepreneurial consultants; economic development experts; agriculture consultants; telecommunications specialists; and Information Technology and Network consultants.24 The Legal Team would have human rights monitors, rule of law monitors, attorneys, community police officers, and counter-narcotics agents. The Health team would have public health officials, AIDS-HIV experts, communicable disease specialists, sanitation monitors, drug abuse and prevention counselors, and other public health specialists. A final team would handle research and analysis. This group would analyze all the information collected from the reconstruction teams. It would be an independent and objective group that would evaluate the various policy implementations and give analytical reports with ground truth back to Brussels and host countries. The PRT Augmentee Teams would work in the following manner. NATO countries not sending combat or support military troops would be responsible for sending an 8 to 10 person civilian team of education, political, economic, legal, or health specialists to Afghanistan for 12-months. All augmentee personnel would be headquartered in Kabul. The existing PRTs in the four regional commands would then have a specialized pool of subject matter experts to call from depending on mission needs. The PRT could call on a whole team or individuals within a particular team. The

personnel selections would depend on the mission, tasks, and purpose of the PRT asking for assistance. In this scenario, a PRT serving in a village building a clinic, school, and well and would need augmentees from each of the economic, education, political, legal, and health teams. The augmentees would be on-call to work for any PRT requesting help. These personnel would assist the headquarters in administrative duties when not on assignment. Using a labor pool of subject matter experts to augment the PRTs is a great way to enhance the society-building effects that go beyond the reconstruction phase. Bricks and mortar construction is not enough. It will take talented people who work in specialty occupations to get Afghanistan on pace with the development that is needed for successful nation-building in that country.

NATO Leadership Academy

So far, my focus has emphasized NATO military and civilian personnel and not on the Afghans themselves. The NATO Leadership Academy is designed to take promising young Afghan leaders (25-35 year old) from the various regional commands and send them to a 16-week intensive leadership retreat designed to teach skills needed to govern an emerging democracy. The NATO Leadership Academy curriculum would focus on professionalism, ethics, transparency, and good governance. Students would take basic blocks of instruction in public speaking, writing, computer skills, and science and technology. Then they would receive more advanced instruction on government, agriculture, counternarcotics/counterinsurgency/ counter-terrorism, public policy analysis, economics, public administration, taxation and exchange rates, and public health. The focus would be on

applied skills rather than theory. Graduates would return to Afghanistan and then serve with PRTs in their home area and would be assimilated back into Afghan society to begin their service to the government.

Opium Problem in Afghanistan

The opium problem in Afghanistan has grown to epic proportions. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) says Afghanistans opium production is up 59 percent from last year.25 According to Reuters, a UN report last month said Afghan poppy cultivation would soar to a record level this year and yield 92 percent of the world's supply of opium.26 The profits from the opium harvest are reportedly financing Taliban activity in Kandahar and Helmand. There are no easy solutions to this problem. NATO commanders are resisting the notion of NATO personnel acting as counter-narcotics agents and conducting poppy-eradication missions. US attempts to destroy poppy fields by spraying airborne chemicals only result in farmers jumping sides to the Taliban.27 Efforts to pay Afghanis to grow other crops such as wheat or corn are met with little fanfaremore money can be made from growing poppy and other crops do not grow as well as poppy. The users of opium also risk a higher incidence of HIV/AIDS through the sharing of needles.

Domestic Political Pressure

An important aspect of NATO and ISAFs campaign in Afghanistan is the domestic support from within each countrys populace. Domestic political constraints will hinder efforts to send additional troops and materiel. Many NATO host governments

are built on proportional representation systems with coalition governments that are often fragile. Defense and national security, even in the post-9/11-era, often takes a backseat to domestic concerns such as the economy and social services. As casualties mount and as the military campaign takes longer to provide ample security, public support for the ISAF mission may wane. NATO leaders must take into account domestic political pressures in their decision making calculus.

The Way Ahead

NATO is a political-military alliance that is inexperienced in nation-building. It is important for the alliance to focus on the security and stability of Afghanistan first. For these military tasks to be achieved, NATO operational commanders must have the personnel and materiel they need to do the job. The US has helped the unity of command issue by transferring the leadership of its troops in Afghanistan to NATO control. Recent pledges from Poland and Romania to deploy more troops to the region are welcome. In addition to additional troops and resources, NATO could stand to restructure certain aspects of its military organization. The alliance needs a Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) at SHAPE to help communicate Special Operations needs for training and doctrine development, particularly for the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). Rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan is even more difficult now considering the resurgence of Taliban insurgents. NATO countries must undertake the mission of developing and implementing a comprehensive public health plan for Afghanistan, which includes returning the Doctors Without Borders NGO in service to the country. If NATO countries do not want to send combat troops they should be given the option to send PRT Augmentee teams which specialize in economics, politics,

health, legal systems, etc. Meanwhile, A NATO Leadership Academy would provide an educational system for future Afgans leaders by teaching the intricacies of developing a democratic society. The EU and United Nations can assist in both of these policy innovations. There are no apparent solutions for the poppy and opium problem in Afghanistan and this will be the one of the main destabilization factors in the country. A counternarcotics strategy is necessary and so far, NATO command has resisted using ISAF forces for the counter-narcotics mission. NATO defense ministers must prepare their home governments for the advent of high casualties and a long campaign without conventional milestones of success. Each country must understand the domestic political pressures that will affect decision making as long as NATO is leading the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan requires progress in the use of public information to ensure that NATO heads of state keep the war in Afghanistan a high priority on their political agendas. Success in Afghanistan is definitely attainable, but it will require the PRTs to have an innovative use of personnel and policy including the new leadership academy for future Afghan leaders. NATO must decide whether it wants to attempt nation-building in the first place. If so, it must partner with the UN, EU, and OSCE. NATO must allow member countries to have flexibility in the assistance they offer, whether the assistance is in combat troops or in supplying PRT augmentees to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

Endnotes
1 2

Beehner, Lionel. August 3, 2006. Council of Foreign Relations. Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Beehner, Lionel. September 11, 2006. Council of Foreign Relations. 6 Beehner, Lionel. September 26, 2006. Council of Foreign Relations. 7 Reuters. September 26, 2006. 8 London Conference on Afghanistan Jan. 31, 2006 9 Reuters. October 4, 2006. 10 Defense Information Daily. Sept. 27, 2006. 11 Ibid. September 30, 2006. 12 Interview with Major General Thomas R. Csrnko. Special Operations Technology. October 2, 2005. Volume 3, Issue 7. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Dobbins, James. NATO's Role in Nation-Building. NATO Review. December 7, 2005. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Jones, Seth G. et al. 2006. Securing Health: Lessons from Nation-building Missions. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp. Publishing. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. McNerney, Michael J. 2006. Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle? Parameters. pp. 32-46.
21 22 23

Ibid. Ibid. 24 NATO Handbook 2006. 25 Beehner, Lionel. September 14, 2006. Council on Foreign Relations. 26 Reuters. October 4, 2006. 27 Ibid.