THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant G.R. No.

121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001 KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed. Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads: ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x. b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore

should be exculpated HELD: 1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement. The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness. Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth. A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. 2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a

discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination. In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Voidfor-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN

substantive due process Erap assails the constitutionality of the Plunder Law (RA 7080 / RA 7659), on 3 grounds: (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under RPC, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Plunder Law provides, Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires illgotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Erap, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

SC: VALID.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and welldefined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; 2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, 3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not

necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those wordsThe intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:" Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the

parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others DISSENTS: KAPUNAN: The meanings of combination and series as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear. R.A. No. 7080 does not define pattern, plunder. an essential element of the crime of

the same crime. R.A. No. 7080 does not clearly statethe prescriptive period of the crime of plunder. David v Arroyo GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 Facts: As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency. Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review. Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue. Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without

R.A. No. 7080 makes it possible for a person conspiring with the accused in committing one of the acts constituting the charge of plunder to be convicted for

prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354 Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional. The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS 324 SCRA 689 FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressman was confined at the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to his position, he argued that he should be allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress. HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints of general law. Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man. When he was elected into office, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of action. Congress can continue to function even without all its members being present. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However,

In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege

inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of theHouse of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Quinto vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) G.R. No. 189698; 1 December 2009 Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in government and who intended to run in the 2010 elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678,* which deemed appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from office upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.** The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.*** Petitioners averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any person filing his certificate of candidacy within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.) Petitioners further averred that the assailed provision is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.

Representing the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition was premature and petitioners had no legal standing since they were not yet affected by the assailed provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also argued that petitioners could not avail the remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law. The OSG, however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned upon filing their CoCs because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Issues: Main Issue: 1. Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was based (second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) are unconstitutional. Other Issues: 2. Whether or not certiorari is petitioners proper remedy. 3. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file the case, and whether or not there is an actual controversy. Ruling: 1. On the Constitutionality of the Assailed ProvisionsThe second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment between classes: (a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It

must apply equally to all members of the class. The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. (W)hether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. An appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on the electorate as the elective official. Both may be motivated by political considerations rather than the publics welfare, use their governmental positions to promote their candidacies, or neglect their duties to attend to their campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not (It would be absurd to consider a utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.); and (b) It is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. 2. On the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be availed of because what petitioners assailed in their petition was a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Prohibition is also an improper remedy, because what petitioners actually sought was the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. What they filed was a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.However, the Supreme Court decided to resolve the petition considering that: (a) it challenged the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of the COMELEC Resolution and the law; (b) the transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised; (c) the

compelling state interest involved in the early resolution of the issues (considering that the period for filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections had started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices were to lose their employment and the governments manpower might be crippled); and (d) the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case, otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. 3. On the Legal Standing of Petitioners to File the Case and the Existence of an Actual Controversy While petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the legal standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged provisions, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. Both candidates and voters may question challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed provisions, on grounds of equal protection, because of its impact on voting rights. At any rate, the Supreme Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. There is an actual case or controversy between petitioners and the COMELEC. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would file their CoCs for the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provisions provide for automatic resignation upon filing the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners candidacy. * Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections ** An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing

Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes *** The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines Ponente: J. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura 1. CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOC. substantive vs. procedural due process The Phil. Ports Authority (PPA), was created to control, regulate, and supervise pilots and the pilotage profession. It promulgated AO 03-85 providing that : that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Later however, another AO 04-92 was issued: all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance." In the meantime, PPA issued a Memorandum laying down the criteria or factors to be considered for the re-appointment of harbor pilots. The United Harbor Pilots Association questioned this AO 04-92. They requested for the suspension of implementation of AO 04-92 before DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia. Sec. Garcia however said that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. The Association thus appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP). The OP gave due course to the appeal and directed the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of the questioned AO 04-92. Now, the OP, through then Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato Corona, dismissed the appeal and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. Secretary Corona opined that: "The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-A0 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional area." As to the claim by the Association that there was absence of prior consultation before the issuance of the AO, Secretary Corona likewise ruled that the law has been sufficiently complied with by PPA. (the law merely requires PPA to consult with relevant government agencies. Since the PPA itself is already composed of representatives from the DOTC, DENR, DPWH, DOF, NEDA, secretary Corona deemed this sufficient compliance with consultation).

SC: Procedural YES. Substantive NO. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x." In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." PROCEDURAL: Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPAAO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. SC: As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." Here, the Pilots Association, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. SUBSTANTIVE: There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards."21 A license is a right or permission granted by some

ISSUES: Was procedural due process satisfied? Was substantive due process satisfied?

competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.22 Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this preevaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US Attempt to evade or defeat tax Fraud by wire, radio, or television False statement or entries Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds: 1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that information in the documents. 3. every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Issues: 1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of

Secretary of justice vs. lantion

Due Process

Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.

notice and hearing Yes. 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels

HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, theres an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 14(1) & (2), as well as A3 7the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a. b. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport). isnt prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee) c. claimed. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been

2.

WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and

obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. 3. WON theres any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage. Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our governments international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction.